QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER SOURCES OF OBLIGS; ELEMENTS OF A QUASI-DELICT

1. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Company

Facts:
Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo which is located
upon the line of the defendant railroad company. He used to travel by trade to the office located in Manila for
free. On January 21, 1915, on his way home by rail and when the train drew up to the station in San Mateo, he
rose from his seat, making his exit through the door. When he stepped off from the train, one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him to slip off from under him and he fell violently on
the platform. He rolled and was drawn under the moving car. He was badly crushed and lacerated. The
accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. He was hospitalized which resulted to amputation
of his hand. He filed the civil suit for damages against defendant in CFI of Manila founding his action upon the
negligence of the employees of defendant in placing the watermelons upon the platform and in leaving them
so placed as to be a menace to the security of passengers alighting from the train. The trial court after having
found negligence on the part of defendant, adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use due caution in alighting
from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering, hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the defendant company should be held primarily liable despite the negligent conduct of its
employees in in placing an obstruction upon the platform and alleged contributory negligence of the
passenger employee.

Ruling:
Yes. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the
fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has
its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members,
or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all
other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere
inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental
distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact
that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere
incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain. In
the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant
sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme
Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:

These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those
to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out
the undertakings imposed by the contracts.

2. Spouses Guanio vs. Manila Shang Ri La Hotel

Facts:
For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M. Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio
(petitioners) booked at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).
Prior to the event, Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent) scheduled an initial food tasting.
Petitioners claim that they requested the hotel to prepare for seven persons ─ the two of them, their
respective parents, and the wedding coordinator. At the scheduled food tasting, however, respondent
prepared for only six. Petitioners initially chose a set menu which included black cod, king prawns and angel
hair pasta with wild mushroom sauce for the main course which cost ₱1,000.00 per person. They were,
however, given an option in which salmon, instead of king prawns, would be in the menu at ₱950.00 per
person. They in fact partook of the salmon.

Three days before the event, a final food tasting took place. Petitioners aver that the salmon served was half
the size of what they were served during the initial food tasting; and when queried about it, the hotel quoted
a much higher price (₱1,200.00) for the size that was initially served to them. The parties eventually agreed on
a final price ─ ₱1,150 per person. A day before the event or on July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and forged
their contract. Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondent’s representatives, Catering Director Bea
Marquez and Sales Manager Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they would; their
guests complained of the delay in the service of the dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were
unavailable; the hotel’s waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and despite
Alvarez’s promise that there would be no charge for the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight,
they were billed and paid ₱8,000 per hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next
day.

Petitioners further claim that they brought wine and liquor in accordance with their open bar arrangement,
but these were not served to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks. Petitioners filed a complaint
for breach of contract and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City which granted
theirnpetition. On appeal to CA, the latter reversed the lower court and held that that the proximate cause of
petitioners’ injury was an unexpected increase in their guests.

Issue: Whether or not the hotel management is guilty for breach of contract.
Ruling: No. Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal reason to comply with the terms of a
contract. It is also defined as the [f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the
whole or part of the contract.

The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to
inform respondent of the change in the expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records
of the case. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5
of the parties’ contract provide, respondent from liability for "any damage or inconvenience" occasioned
thereby.
As for petitioners’ claim that respondent departed from its verbal agreement with petitioners, the same fails,
given that the written contract which the parties entered into the day before the event, being the law
between them.

However CA is not correct when it used proximate cause as a basis as, the doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a
case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate
the relation thus created. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. However, in the present
petition, under considerations of equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way
of nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were subjected to during to the event.
( Civil Code, Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source
enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded)

3. Air France vs Carrascoso

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March
30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class"
seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken
over his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class
and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of
suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted
to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was
no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first
class seats.

ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?

RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to
go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from
what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of
the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper. 
4. ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER, V. KEIHIN-EVERETT
MAINPOINT: Article 2176 of the Civil Code does not apply when the party's negligence occurs in the
performance of an obligation. The negligent act would give rise to a quasi-delict only when it may be the basis
for an independent action were the parties not otherwise bound by a contract.

FACTS: Respondent, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking Service Agreement with Matsushita. Under the
Trucking Service Agreement, Respondent would provide services for Matsushita's trucking requirements.
These services were subcontracted by respondent to Orient Freight, through their own Trucking Service
Agreement executed on the same day.

In April 2002, Matsushita called Respondent  about a tabloid news regarding an interception by
Caloocan City police of a stolen truck filled with shipment owned by Matsushita. Respondent directed Orient
freight to conduct an investigation. During its meeting with Keihin-Everett and Matsushita Orient Freight
reiterated that the truck merely broke down and had to be towed. But when the shipment arrived in Japan, it
was discovered that 10 pallets of the shipment's 218 cartons, were missing.

Respondent independently investigated the incident and found out that pilferage was consummated.
Matsushita, however, terminated its agreement with the respondent for loss of confidence of how the
respondent handled the incident and for nondisclosure of relevant facts.

Respondent demanded for P2,500,000.00 from Orient Freight as indemnity for lost income. It argued that
Orient Freight's mishandling of the situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with
Matsushita. When the latter refused to pay, respondent filed a complaint with the court.

RTC rendered in favor of the respondent and ordered the Orient Freight to pay respondent damages
representing net profit loss incurred" and attorney's fees. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition was
filed. Orient Freight argued that RTC and CA incorrectly found it negligent under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
as there was a pre-existing contractual relation between Orient and respondent, which would preclude the
application of the laws on quasi-delicts.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC and CA erred in finding Orient Freight negligent under Article 2176.

RULING: YES. This Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-delict
(culpa aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive
and independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the
contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation, In quasi-delict, the defense of "good
father of a family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are
concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selection and
supervision of employees. In  quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence  and it is incumbent upon the
injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former's complaint will be
dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was
breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the
carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed.

The doctrine "the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort," on which the lower courts relied, is
inapplicable here. Petitioner's negligence, arising as it does from its performance of its obligation to
respondent, is dependent on this obligation. Consequently, Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on
negligence in the performance of an obligation should apply.

Under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, liability for damages arises when those in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of negligence, among others. Negligence here has been defined as "the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances just demand, whereby that other
person suffers injury." If the law or contract does not provide for the degree of diligence to be exercised, then
the required diligence is that of a good father of a family. The test to determine a party's negligence is if the
party used "the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation" when it performed the negligent act. If the party did not exercise reasonable care and caution, then
it is guilty of negligence.

Articles 2200 and 2201 of the Civil Code provide for the liability for damages in contractual obligations:
Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also
that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain.

Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

With the foregoing, Orient freight is still liable for the loss of profit sustained and damages. Since it did
not sufficiently shown why the computation made by the trial court should be disturbed. The petition is
denied and CA’s resolution was affirmed.
5. INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS VS. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO
FACTS: Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing. Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing thread for weaving. Petitioner hired respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as Civil Engineer to
maintain its thread for weaving. Petitioner hired respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as Civil Engineer to
maintain its facilities. The respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness. Days
after, he was diagnosed with chronic Poly Sinusitis and thereafter with moderate, severe and persistent
Allergic Rhinitis. Accordingly, respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and textile
dust as it will transmute into health problems.

Distressed, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with NLRC. Subsequently, respondent filed another
complaint with the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of
the gross negligence of petitioner to provide him a safe, healthy and workable environment. In his complaint,
respondent alleged that as part of his job description, he conducts regular maintenance check on petitioner’s
facilities including its dye house area, which is very hot and emits foul chemical odor with no adequate safety
measures introduced by petitioner. According to respondent, the air washer dampers and all roof exhaust
vests are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint praying for moral
damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in
failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent.

RULING:
Yes. True the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases. More, the acts
complained of appear to constitute matters involving employee- employer since respondent’s claim for
damages is specifically grounded on petitioner’s gross negligence to provide a safe, healthy and workable
environment for its employees – a case of quasi delict.
It is basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein,
which is a matter resolved only after and as result of a trial. In this case, a perusal of the complaint would
reveal that the subject matter is one of claim of damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of
the regular court’s jurisdiction.
6. Fabre vs CA
Facts: Petitioners Sps. Fabre owned a 1982 model Mazda minibus, as a school-bus, which is driven by Porfirio
J. Cabil,. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. (WWCF)
contracted with petitioners to transport its Young Adults Ministry members from Manila to La Union and back
for P3,000.00. The group left their meeting place at around 8AM instead of their initial plan of 5am. The usual
route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair,
so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to
take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, the bus came upon a
sharp curve on the highway, and due to a slippery road because of the rain, the bus rolled off the road. Several
passengers were injured which includes respondent Amyline Antonio. The driver, claimed he did not see the
curve until it was too late, that he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite
the care he took in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw
the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it for which he allegedly slowed down to 30
kilometers per hour, from his initial speed of 50km/h. Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought
this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia
and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. She was taken to multiple hospitals before she was
operated for spine correction in Makati Medical Center.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioners are liable under quasi delict

Held: Yes. First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the theory that
petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held, for although the
relation of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature,” nevertheless “the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort.”  The fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was
dark, that he drove his bus at 50 km/h when even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 km/h, and that
he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries
suffered by private respondent. Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to
the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of
their employee. Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed
a professional driver’s license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications,
experience and record of service. Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. In the case at bar, the Fabres, in
allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for
school children only, from their homes to the St. Scholastica’s College in Metro Manila. They had hired him
only after a two-week apprenticeship. He was not tested for his ability for long travels. The existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on
the part of an employer. As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence” for
the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of
the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.

As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be
engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to
apply to them. With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals do not sufficiently indicate the factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are nevertheless
supported by evidence in the records of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls squarely
within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict. On the
theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized
by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabil’s gross negligence amounted to bad faith. Amyline Antonio’s
testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and co-passengers, fully establish the physical suffering and
mental anguish she endured as a result of the injuries caused by petitioners’ negligence.

7. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT v NAVIDAD

397 SCRA 75 (2003)

FACTS: On October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. A drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare).  While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the
LRT tracks, the guard Junelito Escartin of Prudent Security Agency, approached him. Due to misunderstanding,
they had a fist fight. There is no evidence as who started the fight. Nicanor fell on the tracks and was killed
instantaneously upon being hit by a moving LRT train operated by Rodolfo Roman, an employee of Metro
Transit Org. Inc.

On December 8, 1994, Marjorie, the widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages
against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and
Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. The Security
Agency denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented evidence while Prudent and Escartin filed for demurrer
contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.

The Trial Court favored the widow against Prudent and Escartin, complaint against LRT and Roman were
dismissed for lack of merit. It rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security
and Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs actual, compensatory, moral damages
and to indemnify the death of Nicanor, as well as attorney’s fee and the cost of suit.

Prudent and Escartin appealed the decision and the Court of Appeals reversed by exonerating Prudent and
held LRTA and Roman liable. The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as
yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the
place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token
therefor. Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not LRTA is liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr.

RULING: YES. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and
for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers. Article 1756 states that “in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be
made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be
negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has
not been shown. If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is
concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that “there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of
Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x
x.” This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records
of the case. There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable
act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT
and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable
only for his own fault or negligence. The Court absolved Roman from liability and affirmed the assailed
decision.

As to damages, the award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may
be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
 QUASI-DELICT VS. DELICTS

1. Barredo v Garcia
Facts: A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela was
overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the
injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime
and was convicted. When the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute
a separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages
against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.

Issue: Whether the parents may bring a separate civil action against Barredo, thus making him primarily and
directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer.

Ruling: Yes. It is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. The defendant
(Barredo) maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has
not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut
thru the tangle that has, in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or
crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain:
“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate  legal institution under
the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely  apart and independent from a
delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover
the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1903 limits cuasi-delitos TO ACTS OR
OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’ But inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not
only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil
Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the “confusion worse confounded.’
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy
the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa
extra-contractual.

The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which ‘any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the
rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.

“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana
under the Civil Code. Specifically, they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from
criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code.

Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the  employer – in this
case the defendant-petitioner – is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”

Extra Info: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present Civil Code. However, the
principle enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault or negligence as quasi-delict is distinct and
separate from negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of
the Civil Code.

2.ELCANO V. HILL, G.R. NO. L-24803, MAY 26, 1977

FACTS:
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."

Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor.
Reginald, although married, was living with his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, and getting subsistence from
him at the time of the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano.

ISSUE 1: W/N the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

RULING: NO.
The separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.

To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code..
The concurrence of the RPC and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts. Article 2177 of the new code provides: Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. Thus an acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, shall not bar a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict. But such forestalls
a double recovery.

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused.

3. Andamo v Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette,
Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives
of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.

Petitioners instituted a criminal action, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay
City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.

Respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the
civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the related
Criminal Case. Eventually the RTC dismissed Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3
(a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense
may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Petitioners appealed from that order
to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC affirmed RTC.

Issue: whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths and etc, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.

Ruling: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195,
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if
proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case
of Samson vs. Dionisio while the property involved here belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact ramains that petitioners’ complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances
built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the
causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the
parties make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.” Article 2176,
whenever it refers to “fault or negligence”, covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states: “Article 2177.
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.” We consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a
"culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence.
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime—a distinction exists between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the
criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Hence, the decision of the IAC was set
aside.
Additional doctrine about Civil law; Action

 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.  The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed
so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims
 PARTIES; NATURE OF LIABILITY OF JOINT TORTFEASORS

1. ANTONIO GELUZ v. CA (1961)

FACTS: The litigation was commenced in the CFI of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz through her
aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant. In 1955, Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus,
in consideration of the sum 50php. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for
his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third
and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Convinced of the
merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of Lazo and
against Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the
suit. On appeal, CA sustained the award.

ISSUE: W/N husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same

RULING: NO. The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial
paragraph of Article 2206 of the NCC. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum
award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality
of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased,
his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from
an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its
loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).

But in the case before us, both the trial court and the CA have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by
the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes
and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the CA did not contradict it, that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of
the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant.

The immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.

2. Philippine National Construction Corporation vs CA

PASUDECO is a company that transports sugarcane. Due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, they had to take a
different route, which is via NLEX. PNCC is tasked to maintain the safety of motorists in the NLEX. During
patrol, PNCC saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle of the road. PNCC asked PASUDECO to remove such, yet
there were scattered flattened sugarcanes that remained. A certain Arnaiz, who was driving in NLEX, ran over
the flattened sugarcanes and thus the vehicle turned turtle.

Issue: What is the liability of PASUDECO and PNCC as join tortfeasors?

Ruling: Solidarily liability.

PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in
removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and
proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the
Court held in the vintage case of Sabido v. Custodio: According to the great weight of authority, where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of
each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole
injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.

It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause
of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than
plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries,
a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to
one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without
the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury
are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible
persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable,
and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for
the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194
of the Civil Code.

3. John Kam Biak Y. Chan v. Iglesia ni Cristo [GR. 160283, Oct. 14, 2005]
FACTS: Petitioner owns the Aringay Shell Gasoline Station, which was bounded on the south by a chapel of the
respondent. The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms.
In view of this, the services of Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the AFP, was procured by
petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. The petitioner and Yoro
executed a Memorandum of Agreement, which provided that any damage incurred within or outside the
petitioner’s property during the digging shall be borne by Yoro. Diggings commenced. Later, petitioner was
informed by the members of respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land
belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the
damage and prejudice of the respondent. A complaint was filed against petitioner and his engineer, Teofilo
Oller. Yoro was impleaded as 3rd party defendant. Four years later, the court held that the diggings were
made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure, and not for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks.
Trial court held petitioner to be 35% liable, Yoro – 65% liable, and Oller was absolved from liability. Petitioner
appealed the trial court’s decision, alleging that the trial court should have taken into consideration the MOA
he had executed with Yoro with respect to liability for damages.

ISSUE: WON the memorandum of agreement entered into by the petitioner and Yoro has the effect of making
the latter solely responsible for damages to the respondent.

HELD: No. The basis of their solidarity is not the MOA, but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. The
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary [Art. 2194] . As a general
rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their
MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioner’s property line.
Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that ensures that he be so
declared as liable. Petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation traversed the
respondent’s property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the diggings, his security
guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller. Petitioner and Yoro are solidarily liable, regardless of the terms of their
MOA.

4. SPOUSES TEODORO PERENA vs SPOUSES NICOLAS ZARATE, NAT’L RAILWAYS G.R. No. 157917   08/29/12
FACTS:
The Pereñas were engaged in the business of transporting students using a KIA Ceres Van, which was
driven by their employee Clemente Alfaro, having the capacity to transport 14 students at a time from their
respective residences in Parañaque City to Don Bosco, Makati City. In June 1996, Spouses Zarate contracted
the Perenas for the transport of their son Aaron who was a student of Don Bosco Technical Institute. The van
picked Aaron up around 6:00 a.m. from the Zarates’ residence. Considering that the students were due at Don
Bosco by 7:15 a.m., and that they were already running late because of the heavy vehicular traffic on the
South Superhighway, Alfaro took the van to an alternate route at about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the narrow
path underneath the Magallanes Interchange, which at that time was marked by piles of construction
materials and parked passenger jeepneys, and the railroad crossing in the narrow path had no railroad
warning signs, or watchmen, or other responsible persons manning the crossing, that was then commonly
used by Makati-bound vehicles as a short cut into Makati.

At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing, PNR train operated by Jhonny Alano
neared the railroad crossing to which lfaro drove the van eastward across the railroad tracks, closely tailing a
large passenger bus. His view of the oncoming train was blocked because he overtook the passenger bus on its
left side. The train blew its horn to warn motorists of its approach. When the train was about 50 meters away
from the passenger bus and the van, Alano applied the ordinary brakes of the train. He applied the emergency
brakes only when he saw that a collision was imminent. The passenger bus successfully crossed the railroad
tracks, but the van driven by Alfaro did not. The train hit the rear end of the van, and the impact threw nine of
the 12 students in the rear, including Aaron, out of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which
dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing him. Alano fled the scene on board the train,
and did not wait for the police investigator to arrive. Devastated by the early and unexpected death of Aaron,
the Zarates commenced this action for damages against Alfaro, the Pereñas, PNR and Alano. RTC ruled in favor
of plaintiffs; CA affirmed the RTC but limited the award for moral damages and also upheld the award for the
loss of Aaron’s earning capacity (2/3 x (80 - age at the time of death) = life expectancy)

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision that petitioners are jointly and severally
liable to pay damages with Philippine National Railways?

HELD:
NO. The RTC found the Pereñas and the PNR negligent. The CA affirmed the findings. This court
concurs. Pereñas’ defense was that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of Alfaro. Court finds no adequate cause to differ from the conclusions of the lower courts
that the Pereñas operated as a common carrier; and that their standard of care was extraordinary diligence,
not the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family. Although in this jurisdiction the operator of a school
bus service has been usually regarded as a private carrier, the exact nature of the operation of a school bus
service has not been finally settled. The court settles this matter in this case.

A private carrier is one who, without making the activity a vocation, or without holding himself or itself
out to the public as ready to act for all who may desire his or its services, undertakes, by special agreement in
a particular instance only, to transport goods or persons from one place to another either gratuitously or for
hire.11 The provisions on ordinary contracts of the Civil Code govern the contract of private carriage.The
diligence required of a private carrier is only ordinary, that is, the diligence of a good father of the family. In
contrast, a common carrier is a person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering such services to
the public.12 Contracts of common carriage are governed by the provisions on common carriers of the Civil
Code, the Public Service Act, 13 and other special laws relating to transportation. A common carrier is required
to observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the
loss of the effects of passengers, or the death or injuries to passengers. The true test for a common carrier is
not the quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the number and character of the
conveyances used in the activity, but whether the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier
that he has held out to the general public as his business or occupation. If the undertaking is a single
transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation engaged in, as advertised and held out to the
general public, the individual or the entity rendering such service is a private, not a common, carrier. The
question must be determined by the character of the business actually carried on by the carrier, not by any
secret intention or mental reservation it may entertain or assert when charged with the duties and obligations
that the law imposes.

Applying these considerations to the case before us, there is no question that the Pereñas as the
operators of a school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business, not just
as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over established roads by the method by which
the business was conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the
Pereñas operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation
indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service
and for a fee. Pereñas, acting as a common carrier, were already presumed to be negligent at the time of the
accident because death had occurred to their passenger. There is no question that the Pereñas did not
overturn the presumption of their negligence by credible evidence.

The Pereñas were liable for the death of Aaron despite the fact that their driver might have acted
beyond the scope of his authority or even in violation of the orders of the common carrier. There was a
showing, to begin with, that their driver traversed the railroad tracks at a point at which the PNR did not
permit motorists going into the Makati area to cross the railroad tracks. Although that point had been used by
motorists as a shortcut into the Makati area, that fact alone did not excuse their driver into taking that route.
On the other hand, with his familiarity with that shortcut, their driver was fully aware of the risks to his
passengers but he still disregarded the risks.
5. TORRES-MADRID BROKERAGE v. FEB MITSUI MARINE INSURANCE CO., GR No. 194121, 2016-07-11
Facts:
 A shipment of electronic goods from Thailand and Malaysia arrived at the Port of Manila for Sony
Philippines, Inc. (Sony). Sony had engaged the services of TMBI to deliver the shipment from the port
to its warehouse in Binan, Laguna.

 TMBI - who did not own any delivery trucks - subcontracted the services of Benjamin Manalastas'
company, BMT Trucking Services (BMT), to transport the shipment from the port to the Binan
warehouse.[3] Incidentally, TMBI notified Sony who had no objections to the arrangement. [4]

 The four trucks left BMT's garage for Laguna. [5] However, only three trucks arrived at Sony's Binan
warehouse. The truck driven by Rufo Reynaldo Lapesura was found abandoned along Muntinlupa
City.[6] Both the driver and the shipment were missing.

 Victor Torres filed a complaint with NBI against Lapesura for "hijacking." [9] The complaint resulted in a
recommendation by the NBI to prosecute Lapesura for qualified theft. [10] TMBI notified Sony of the loss
through a letter & It also sent BMT a letter demanding payment for the lost shipment. BMT refused
to pay, insisting that the goods were "hijacked."

 Sony filed an insurance claim with the Mitsui, the insurer of the goods. Mitsui paid
Sony PHP7,293,386.23 corresponding to the value of the lost goods.[12]

 After being subrogated to Sony's rights, Mitsui sent TMBI a demand letter for payment of the lost
goods. TMBI refused to pay Mitsui's claim. As a result, Mitsui filed a complaint against TMBI.

 TMBI, in turn, impleaded Benjamin Manalastas (the proprietor of BMT) as a third-party defendant.
TMBI alleged that BMT's driver, Lapesura, was responsible for the theft/hijacking of the lost cargo
and claimed BMT's negligence as the proximate cause of the loss. TMBI prayed that in the event it is
held liable to Mitsui for the loss, it should be reimbursed by BMT,

 RTC found TMBI and Benjamin Manalastas jointly and solidarity liable to pay Mitsui PHP
7,293,386.23 as actual damages, attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed, and the
costs of the suit.[14] The RTC held that TMBI and Manalastas were common carriers and had acted
negligently. Both TMBI and BMT appealed the RTC's verdict.

Issues: WON TMBI and BMT are solidarity liable to Mitsui?

Ruling: NO. TMBI and BMT are not solidarity liable to Mitsui . We disagree with the lower courts’ ruling that
TMBI and BMT are solidarity liable to Mitsui for the loss as joint tortfeasors. The ruling was based on Article
2194 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.

TMBI's liability to Mitsui does not stem from a quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) but from its breach of
contract (culpa contractual). The tie that binds TMBI with Mitsui is contractual, albeit one that passed on to
Mitsui as a result of TMBI's contract of carriage with Sony to which Mitsui had been subrogated as an
insurer who had paid Sony's insurance claim. The legal reality that results from this contractual tie precludes
the application of quasi-delict based Article 2194.

A third party may recover from a common carrier for quasi-delict but must prove actual n   egligence

We likewise disagree with the finding that BMT is directly liable to Sony/Mitsui for the loss of the cargo. While
it is undisputed that the cargo was lost under the actual custody of BMT (whose employee is the primary
suspect in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment), no direct contractual relationship existed between
Sony/Mitsui and BMT. If at all, Sony/Mitsui's cause of action against BMT could only arise from quasi-delict, as
a third party suffering damage from the action of another due to the latter's fault or negligence, pursuant to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. [51]
We have repeatedly distinguished between an action for breach of contract {culpa contractual) and an action
for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana).
In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs to establish the existence of the contract and the
obligor's failure to perform his obligation. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove or even allege that the
obligor's non- compliance was due to fault or negligence because Article 1735 already presumes that the
common carrier is negligent. The common carrier can only free itself from liability by proving that it
observed extraordinary diligence. It cannot discharge this liability by shifting the blame on its agents or
servants.[52]

On the other hand, the plaintiff in culpa aquiliana must clearly establish the defendant's fault or
negligence because this is the very basis of the action.[53] Moreover, if the injury to the plaintiff resulted from
the act or omission of the defendant's employee or servant, the defendant may absolve himself by proving
that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, [54]

In the present case, Mitsui's action is solely premised on TMBl's breach of contract. Mitsui did not even sue
BMT, much less prove any negligence on its part. If BMT has entered the picture at all, it 'is because TMBI
sued it for reimbursement for the liability that TMBI might incur from its contract of carriage with Sony/Mitsui.
Accordingly, there is no basis to directly hold BMT liable to Mitsui for quasi-delict.

BMT is liable to TMBI for breach of their  contract of carriage

We do not hereby say that TMBI must absorb the loss. By subcontracting the cargo delivery to BMT, TMBI
entered into its own contract of carriage with a fellow common carrier. The cargo was lost after its transfer to
BMT's custody based on its contract of carriage with TMBI. Following Article 1735, BMT is presumed to be at
fault. Since BMT failed to prove that it observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation to
TMBI, it is liable to TMBI for breach of their contract of carriage.

In these lights, TMBI is liable to Sony (subrogated by Mitsui) for breaching the contract of carriage. In turn,
TMBI is entitled to reimbursement from BMT due to the latter's own breach of its contract of carriage with
TMBI. The proverbial buck stops with BMT who may either: (a) absorb the loss, or (b) proceed after its missing
driver, the suspected culprit, pursuant to Article 2181, [55]

WHEREFORE, the Court ORDERS petitioner Torres- Madrid Brokerage, Inc. to pay the respondent. Respondent
Benjamin P. Manalastas is in turn ORDERED to REIMBURSE Torres-Madrid Brokerage, Inc. of the above-
mentioned amounts.