PARENTS AND GUARDIANS

1. Libi v IAC (1992)

Facts: Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable
incident which took place and from which she died, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18
and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts, when
Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her
refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the
house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City.

Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the
crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets
of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors,
their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their
interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by
shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the
other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation
and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of
his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s
death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Issue: W/N the parents of Wendell Libi is liable

Ruling: Yes. The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of
age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall
be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such
liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was
amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification,
the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For
civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with
Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’

‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with
discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).

". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key
to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had
been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly
displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell
Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ." 

2. CICL XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GLENN REDOQUERIO

FACTS: An Information was filed against CICL XXX, a minor, 17 years old, but acting with discernment
conspiring together, confederating with CHRISTOPHER PUYO AND JAYJAY NARAG and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously[,] with intent to kill, attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one GLENN REDOQUERIO by then and there mauling him and
hitting him in the head with a piece of stone, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds, the
offender thus performing all the acts of execution that would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence
but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of the perpetrator, that
is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said GLENN REDOQUERIO, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.

RTC convicted CICL XXX of the crime of Frustrated Murder. Aggrieved, CICL XXX appealed to the CA. CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction. CICL XXX then filed a motion for reconsideration which was later on denied by
the CA in a Resolution. Hence, the instant appeal. The Supreme Court acquits CICL XXX for the crime of
Frustrated Homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not CICL XXX is civilly liable despite the fact that he was acquitted of the crime charged?

RULING: YES.
While CICL XXX is not criminally liable for his acts because the presumption that he acted without discernment
was not overcome, he is still civilly liable for the injuries sustained by Redoquerio. It is well-settled that
"[e]very person criminally liable is also civilly liable x x x. However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. Exemption from criminal liability does not always include
exemption from civilliability."30

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, awarded to Redoquerio the following:

a. Actual damages (as proved by receipts): P18,922.90
b. Civil indemnity: P30,000.00
c. Moral damages: P30,000.00

However, in light of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,31 the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
should be reduced to P25,000.00 each, and an award of exemplary damages amounting to P25,000.00 should
likewise be imposed.

The foregoing liability is imposed upon CICL XXX's parents because Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that:

ARTICLE 101. Rules Regarding Civil Liability in Certain Cases. The exemption from criminal liability established
in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or
insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court,32 the Court en banc interpreted the above provision to mean that the
civil liability of parents for criminal offenses committed by their minor children is direct and primary. The
Court said: Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the
civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and
also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family.

xxxx

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children
9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard
to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under
21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 33 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Article 101 of the RPC, however, provides that the foregoing liability of CICL XXX's parents is subject to the
defense that they acted without fault or negligence. Thus, the civil aspect of this case is remanded to the trial
court, and it is ordered to implead CICL XXX's parents for reception of evidence on their fault or negligence.

OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ENTERPRISES OR EMPLOYERS

3. DRA, LEILA DELA LLANO vs. REBECCA BIONG

G.R. No. 182356     (December 4, 2013)

FACTS: Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City at around
11p.m. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
backseat.
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds
after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently
pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not
appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
Joel, the truck driver, revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the
name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck
and shoulder. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s
condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.
She was suggested to undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. Dr. Flores
operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of
her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Dra. dela
Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC of Quezon City.
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable
relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela
Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a
counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury
to be Joel’s reckless driving. The CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a
reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
Ruling: NO. Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant
must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual
duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual relations of
certain members of society to others.
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with
the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated
on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent
act or omission committed by his employee."
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum
probandum or the ultimate fact can be established.
4. CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR (Topic: Owners and
Managers of Enterprises/ Employers) *Note, Issue 1 is the most connected to the topic. God bless sa atin.
Fightingggg! (͡° ͜ʖ ͡°)
G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
FACTS: Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street, Parañaque
City. A van was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van
swerved to its left and hit Reyes. A witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the
van. The witness told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead
of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the
van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Bautista was Caravan's
employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver. Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of
Reyes. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her since she was
nine (9) years old, filed a complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar
alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit
Reyes.
Summons could not be served on Bautista. Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in
favor of Abejar. Petitioner appealed, then Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision.
Caravan contends that Abejar offered no documentary or testimonial evidence to prove that Bautista, the
driver, acted "within the scope of his assigned tasks" when the accident occurred. According to Caravan,
Bautista's tasks only pertained to the transport of company personnel or products, and when the accident
occurred, he had not been transporting personnel or delivering products of and for the company.
ISSUE 1: Should Caravan be held liable as an employer, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code? (Core
issue: Registered owner Rule vis-à-vis Article 2180)
HELD: Yes. Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-delict provided in Article
2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The pertinent paragraph under the provision states that
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.” Vis-à-vis
the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by
the operation of their vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered owner
of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: (1) an employment relationship between the driver and
the owner; and (2) that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand,
applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle.
Contrary to petitioner's position, it was not fatal to respondent's cause that she herself did not adduce proof
that Bautista acted within the scope of his authority. It was sufficient that Abejar proved that petitioner was
the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes. It is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner
that harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. The Court stated that Article 2180 "should
defer to" the registered-owner rule. It never stated that Article 2180 should be totally abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180
apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question.
Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. This case, thus, harmonizes the
requirements of Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the so-called registered-owner
rule.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is
concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of
moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly
any means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner
may have done in relation to that employment. The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible
to the public.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van that hit Reyes. The Certificate
attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.
Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
satisfied arises. It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it
can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista;
second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of the accident.
On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting within the scope of his assigned
tasks at the time of the accident. When asked by the court why Bautista was at the place of the accident when
it occurred, petitioner's accountant and supervisor, testified that she did not "have the personal capacity to
answer [the question]" and that she had no knowledge to answer it. Such testimony does not affect the
presumption that Article 2180's requirements have been satisfied. Mere disavowals are not proof that suffice
to overturn a presumption.
On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and
supervision of Bautista. In its selection of Bautista as a service driver, petitioner contented itself with Bautista's
submission of a non-professional driver's license. Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's
license to operate another's motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it selected Bautista as service driver; it
also committed an actual violation of law. For failing to overturn the presumption that the requirements of
Article 2180 have been satisfied, petitioner must be held liable.
ISSUE 2: Since Bautista was already dropped as a party, is the petitioner excused from liability?
HELD: No. The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary. It does not depend on the
inclusion of the negligent driver in the action. Agreeing to petitioner's assertion would render impotent the
rationale of the motor registration law in fixing liability on a definite person. Petitioner's interest and liability is
distinct from that of its driver. Regardless of petitioner's employer-employee relationship with Bautista,
liability attaches to petitioner on account of its being the registered owner of a vehicle that figures in a
mishap. This alone suffices. A determination of its liability as owner can proceed independently of a
consideration of how Bautista conducted himself as a driver. While certainly it is desirable that a
determination of Bautista's liability be made alongside that of the owner of the van he was driving, his non-
inclusion in these proceedings does not absolutely hamper a judicious resolution of respondent's plea for
relief.
ISSUE 3: According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not
the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She is also not "the executor or
administrator of the estate of the deceased." Caravan contends that only the victim herself or her heirs can
enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for damages. Is Abejar a real party in
interest?
HELD: Yes. Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real
party in interest in this case. In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for
damages: that she exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes' death was caused by the
negligence of petitioner and its driver; and that Reyes' death caused her damage. Respondent properly filed
an action based on quasi-delict. Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against petitioner stems from her
having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes.
Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who exercise substitute parental authority:
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same
order of preference shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising substitute parental
authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents:
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of
the child as the parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents are also both deceased. The
whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers
or sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child,
assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes'
custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent.
Consistent with Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes' education and provided for her
personal needs. To echo respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own
daughter.
5. RAMOS v. CA

FACTS: 
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was experiencing occasional pains allegedly caused by stones in her gall bladder. She
was told to undergo an operation and after some tests and exams, she was indicated fit for surgery. Dr. Orlino
Hozaka, defendant, decided that Erlinda should undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation. Rogelio, husband of
Erlinda, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist.

Around 7:30 AM of June 17, 1985, Herminda (sister-in-law of Erlinda) accompanied Erlinda to the operating
room and saw Dr. Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Dr. Hosaka only arrived
around 12:15 PM, three hours late. Nonetheless, the operation continued and Herminda then saw Dr.
Gutierrez intubating the patient and heard her saying “and hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok”. Thereafter, bluish discoloration of the nailbeds appeared on the patient. Hence, Dr. Hosaka
issued an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. The patient was placed in a
trendelenburg position for decrease of blood supply in her brain. At 3:00 PM, the patient was taken to the ICU.

Four months after, the patient was released from the hospital. However, the patient has been in a comatose
condition. Hence, the petition filed a civil case for damages against herein private respondents alleging
negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. Petitioners contended that the faulty management
of her airway casused the lack of oxygen in the patient’s brain. On the respondent’s part, they contended that
the brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.

Issue:
Whether or not the hospital is liable.

Ruling:
YES.

The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting
"consultants,” who are allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for
negligence in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than real.

In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the
conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or
attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications; generally,
evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and
references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a
review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application.  This is particularly true
with respondent hospital.

After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required to attend
clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand
rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to
maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to
these, the physician's performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the
basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A
consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable
to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely terminated.

In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital
asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the
right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with
the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test
is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner's condition.

The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article
2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.  Such responsibility
ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of
the family to prevent damage.  In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs,
once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who
should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision
which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature,
respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having
failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's
condition.
6. Professional Services Inc., vs Agana

Facts:

Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody
anal discharge. Dr. Miguel Ampil, diagnosed her to be suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid.” Dr. Ampil,
assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on
Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the
removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana,
to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, to perform hysterectomy on her.

After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed
the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that
the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery.

Two weeks after Natividad returned from the United States to seek further treatment, her daughter found a
piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house
where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her
that the pains would soon vanish.

Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment
at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina — a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly
infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to
excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage.

Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc.
(PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for
negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence.

Pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was duly substituted by her children (the
Aganas). The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for
negligence and malpractice.

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes with Dr. Ampil liable to
reimburse Professional Services, Inc., whatever amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs.

Issues: Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.

Held:

Yes, PSI is solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the court held
that private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff.
While ‘consultants’ are not, technically employees, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. The court held that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases,
an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.

Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under Article 2176  in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. Even when no employment
relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the
hospital may still be vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 1431 and Article 1869 of the Civil
Code or the principle of apparent authority. Moreover, regardless of its relationship with the doctor, the
hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or failure to follow established
standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation.

In addition to the pronouncement in Ramos vs CA, Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of
apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence.

Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out” theory, or doctrine of ostensible
agency or agency by estoppel, imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship,
but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority exists.

In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians
associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. It is now estopped from passing all
the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to
believe that it vouched for their skill and competence. PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public that
Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that
they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected, these
patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were being
rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants.

Under the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility, PSI as owner, operator and manager of
Medical City Hospital, did not perform the necessary supervision nor exercise diligent efforts in the supervision
of Drs. Ampil and Fuentes and its nursing staff, resident doctors, and medical interns who assisted Drs. Ampil
and Fuentes in the performance of their duties as surgeons. Premised on the doctrine of corporate negligence,
the trial court held that PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty.

In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and
under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment.
Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty.

It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical
City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude
that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out,
particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. In Fridena v. Evans,
it was held that a corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice given to its agents or officers
within the scope of their authority and in reference to a matter to which their authority extends. This means
that the knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure
of PSI, despite the attending nurses’ report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes
amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed. This
renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but
also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.

PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil. In neglecting to offer
such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180 and, therefore, must be
adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil.

7. Cerezo v. Tuazon G.R. No. 141538 March 23, 2004

FACTS: Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga.
The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines,
her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There was a "Slow
Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons was served upon the person
of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no
service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action
for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE: W/N Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, but also
primary and direct

RULING: Yes. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An
indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom
no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final
resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only
mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability
based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words “primary and direct,” as contrasted with “subsidiary,” refer
to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the
obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the
fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s
criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in
failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s
liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable
in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a
delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for
the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for review. The Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount due shall earn legal interest
at 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial court’s decision. Upon finality of this
decision, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per annum, until full payment. SO
ORDERED.

THE STATE

8. Meritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands

Facts:
Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of
the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature
later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the
collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages
and ordered the government to pay the same.
Issues:
Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
Ruling:
No. All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its
consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the
Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into
the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State
Governments in the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in
determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents
whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. No claim arises
against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized
exercise of powers by its officers or agents. As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to
sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is: By consenting to be
sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create
any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any
cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability
for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or
negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida , on that the person obligated, by his
own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by
private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state
in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we
must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the
general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state,
therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state
acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations.
That the Civil Code refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in
consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal
presumption gives way to proof, that responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons
mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found,
in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special
agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of
objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902
respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or
negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the
state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said
article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive
official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes
owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
 That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the
trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18,
1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is
based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office
who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions
of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that
the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this
instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set
forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter
rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
 TEACHERS AND ESTABLISHMENTS

9. Amadora vs CA

Facts: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the former’s death.  Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.  The victim’s
parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors,
high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. 
Complaints against the students were dropped.  Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and
reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of
learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the
semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event,
defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining
discipline.  Petitioners on other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school
to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

Issue: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

Ruling: No. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics
report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the
mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would
have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.

The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student
body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or
sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the
teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that
day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino
Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.

At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in
enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against
him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the
offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent
when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing
discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised
due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.

In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in
view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students
and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher
authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it
does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.

Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any
of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

10. Philippine School of Business Management vs CA

Facts: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-
floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge Regina Ordoñez-
Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was
enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and several school authorities, including the chief of security and his
assistant chief. The private respondents sought to adjudge them liable for their son’s death due to their
negligence, reckless and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack
on the victim. The petitioners alleged that the complaint against them has no cause of action given that PSBA
is an academic institution. An academic institution is beyond the ambit of rule as provided by Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents and on appeal, the appellate court ruled the
same.

Issue: Whether or not the liability of the school and the authorities is based on quasi-delict.

Ruling: NO.
The liability is based on the students and the school’s contractual relations.
Contractual Relations of students and the school

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions
of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere
that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences
when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a
constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this
Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.

Non-applicability of Article 2180 and 2176

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. Article
2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

In comparison with Air France vs Carrascoso

In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to
the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect,
Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort.

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: The field of non-contractual
obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a
person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21,
which provides: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Air France penalized the
racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent
to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat."

Breach of Contract not yet proven in the present case

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the
same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material
only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned,
for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is
specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the
school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.

11. St. Joseph College (SJC) vs. Jayson Miranda, represented by his father Rodolfo Miranda
(Vicarious Liabilities: Teachers and Head of establishments)

Facts: On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s [SJC’s] premises, the
class to which [respondent Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion
of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject
teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.
The science teacher, Tabugo, left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately
secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson checked the
result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by
one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in
the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of the bodies
of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left
eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.

According to the science teacher, before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates
were given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test
tube until the heated compound had cooled off. But Jayson, a grade 6 pupil, and a person of sufficient age and
discretion and completely capable of understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher,
without waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment
and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked
at the compound.
Jayson was brought to the school clinic and thereafter to St. Luke’s Medical. When the teacher visited Jayson,
Jayson cried and apologized to the teacher for violating her instructions. After the treatment, Jayson was
discharged and an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired.

Jayson’s father requested that the school advance for the hospital bill until his wife would return from abroad
and pay back the money. But the parents of Jayson, through their counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that
it should pay for the medical expenses. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Jayson, and CA affirmed in toto
RTC’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not SJC should be held liable for the actions committed by the science teacher.

Ruling: YES. Petitioners were "negligent since they all failed to exercise the required reasonable care,
prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students."

In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate cause of the latter’s
injury. We find that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously
looked into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and
unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have
prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight.
The court a quo correctly ruled that:

"All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all of them are responsible for
exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students
as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court,
these [petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of
them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the
science experiment although [Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence, however,
was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the
experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the school clinic for
immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is
inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the
accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to
the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, understands
that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school and
testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the
subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and supervision over [petitioner] Tabugo
and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that the science
experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr.
Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other
individual [petitioners] were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other
individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.

"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should
have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is still
liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of
dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. The
fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct of science experiments is not a
justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to install
safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute
safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield
students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.

"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although an educational
institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct
and immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee."