A.

CONCEPTS

1. Picart v Smith

Facts: Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union When Smith
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile with rate of speed of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts,
as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning signals. Being perturbed by the rapid approach of the
vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to
the left. The bridge is about 75 meters and a width of only 4.80 meters. The vehicle approached without
slowing down. Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of
the railing where it as then standing; but due to the automobile’s close proximity to the animal, the animal
became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as
struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.

The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence and liable for civil obligations

Ruling: Yes. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and
rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it
was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this
change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it
was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater
safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or
guarding against its consequences.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant
was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
Note: “last clear chance” rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a point where he
cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that
position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery

2. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC vs GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna,
in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine.
While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any
kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying
said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard
assigned on the gate.
The plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of other
boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and
while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver,
having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner
maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid
accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American
origin, recognized in this Jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric 16 Phil., 8.
Issue: Whether the tank is an attractive nuisance
Ruling: No
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural,
in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance
was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always
the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial
pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, . .
. (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance."
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the
petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by
petitioner — that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery,
because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible
individual — needs no further discussion.

Separate Opinions
PABLO, J., disidente:
La recurrente tiene dos estanques de agua, de nueve pies de profundidad, como anexos indispensables a
su fabrica de hielo; estan constuidos dentro de un solar que esta cercado pero con una puerta de entrada
siempre abierta en donde pasan libremente los coches que distribuyen hielo y las personas que lo compran
de la fabrica; cualquiera puede entrar sin distincion alguna, no hay ningun guardia en la puerta que impida
la entrada de cualquiera persona. A dichos dos entanques tiene libre acceso el publico.
Es evidente que la recurrente debio haber cercado dichos estanques como medida ordinaria de precaucion
para que los ninos de corta edad no pueden entrar, tanto mas cuanto que los bordes de esos estanques
solo tienen un pie de altura la superficie del terreno. El cerco puesto en el perimento del solar, con puerta
continuamente abierta, no es suficiente medida para impedir que los ninos puedan meterse en los
entanques. Ese cerco con su puerta abierta es como un velo transparente con que se cubre una mujer
semidesnuda en un teatro, pica la curiosidad y atrae la atencion del publico.
Los niños son curiosos por naturaleza y los de ocho años no tienen perfecto conocimiento de las cosas.
Alucinados por la natural atraccion de las aguas, se meteran en ellas con peligro de sus vidas, a menos que
exista algo que les impida.
Voto con la confirmacion de la decision apelada.
(Sorry guys, di ko alam pano to itranslate, eto yung nasa full case)

3. Francisco vs. Chemical Bulk Carriers Incorporated (CBCI)

FACTS: Francisco was the owner and manager of a Caltex station. A certain Bacsa came to Francisco’s
Caltex station and introduced himself as an employee of CBCI. Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a certain
quantity of CBCI’s diesel fuel. Francisco agreed, subject to the following conditions: (1) that Petron
Corporation (Petron) should deliver the diesel fuel to Francisco at his business address which should be
properly indicated in Petron’s invoice; (2) that the delivery tank is sealed; and (3) that Bacsa should issue a
separate receipt to Francisco. For ten months, 17 deliveries to Francisco were made and all his conditions
were complied with. Thereafter, CBCI demanded payment from Francisco, but the latter rejected CBCI’s
demand.
CBCI filed a case in court, and according to it, Petron, on various dates, sold diesel fuel to CBCI but these
were delivered to and received by Francisco. Francisco then sold the diesel fuel to third persons from
whom he received payment. CBCI alleged that Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel without
authority from CBCI and deprived CBCI of the use of the diesel fuel it had paid for. (In essence, CBCI is
alleging that the diesel was stolen by Bacsa and then delivered to Francisco). CBCI asserted that Francisco
violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Civil Code and that he should be held liable. Francisco explained
that he operates the Caltex station with the help of his family because he completely lost his eyesight due
to sickness. Francisco claimed that he asked Jovito, his son, to look into and verify the identity of Bacsa.
Francisco said he was satisfied with the proof presented by Bacsa. Francisco maintained that he acquired
the diesel fuel in good faith and for value. Trial Court ruled in favor of Francisco. However upon appeal, CA
set aside the trial court’s decisionruled that Bacsa’s act of selling the diesel fuel to Francisco was his
personal act and the sale does not bind CBCI.
ISSUE: Did Francisco exercise the required diligence of a blind person in the conduct of his business?
HELD: No. Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place. The most common
standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent person. To
determine the diligence which must be required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract average
standard corresponding to a normal orderly person.
However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably
careful person who has the same physical disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such
as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must
act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.
We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and operating the Caltex station for 15
years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact business until this time. In this instance, however,
we rule that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is
blind. First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was authorized
by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and authority of Bacsa. Second,
Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen
property, yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco
relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper.  If
Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI.
Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petron’s invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized
Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct
expected of a reasonable person who is blind.

***In case this will be asked***

Express or Tacit Approval of the Transaction
The heirs of Francisco argue that CBCI approved expressly or tacitly the transactions. According to them,
there was apparent authority for Bacsa to enter into the transactions. They argue that even if the agent
has exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the later to
act as though he had full powers. Also, they argue that CBCI should be considered in estoppel for failure to
act during the ten month period that deliveries were being made to Francisco.
The general principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better title than he has. Only the
owner of the goods or one authorized by the owner to sell can transfer title to the buyer.  Therefore, a
person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no
more than what the seller can legally transfer. The owner of the goods who has been unlawfully deprived
of it may recover it even from a purchaser in good faith. Thus, the purchaser of property which has been
stolen from the owner has been held to acquire no title to it even though he purchased for value and in
good faith.
The exception from the general principle is the doctrine of estoppel where the owner of the goods is
precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell. (Requisites: the owner must, by word or conduct,
have caused or allowed it to appear that title or authority to sell is with the seller and the buyer must have
been misled to his damage.)
In this case, it is clear that Bacsa was not the owner of the diesel fuel.  Francisco was aware of this but he
claimed that Bacsa was authorized by CBCI to sell the diesel fuel. However, it is not supported by any
evidence except his self-serving testimony. First, Francisco did not even confirm with CBCI if it was indeed
selling its diesel fuel since it is not one of the oil companies known in the market to be selling petroleum
products. This fact alone should have put Francisco on guard. Second, it does not appear that CBCI, by
some direct and equivocal act, has clothed Bacsa with the indicia of ownership or apparent authority to sell
CBCI’s diesel fuel. Third, the receipt issued by Bacsa was typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper.
There was no letterhead or any indication that it came from CBCI. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
this was a personal receipt issued by Bacsa and not an official receipt issued by CBCI.
Clearly, Bacsa cannot transfer title to Francisco as Bacsa was not the owner of the diesel fuel nor was he
authorized by CBCI to sell its diesel fuel. Since CBCI was unlawfully deprived of its property, it may recover
from Francisco, even if Francisco pleads good faith.
4. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. NORDEC PHILIPPINEs

Facts:

Meralco was contracted to supply electricity to Marvex Industrial Corporation (Marvex) under an
Agreement for Sale of Electric Energy. It installed metering devices at Marvex’s premises and Marvex was
billed according to the monthly electric consumption recorded in its meter. Later on, Meralco service
inspectors inspected Marvex’s electric metering facilities and found that the main meter terminal and
cover seals had been tampered with. During a second inspection, Meralco found that the metering devices
were tampered with again. Subsequently, Meralco assessed Marvex a differential billing. Meralco sent
demand letters, and disconnected Marvex’s electric service when it did not pay. Nordec, the new owner of
Marvex,sued Meralco for damages with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction with Regional Trial
Court. It alleged that Meralco’s service inspectors conducted the inspections without its consent or
approval. Following the inspections, Meralco’s inspectors gave an unnamed Nordec employee a Power
Field Order that did not mention the alleged defects in the metering devices. Nordec further claimed that
the parties exchanged letters on the alleged unregistered electric bill, and that it requested a
recomputation. Nordec claimed that Meralco then disconnected its service without prior notice, resulting
to loss of income and cancellation of other business opportunities.

Issue:

Whether or not Manila Electric Company was inexcusably negligent when it disconnected Nordec
Philippines’ electric supply.

Ruling:

YES. It is well-settled that electricity distribution utilities, which rely on mechanical devices and equipment
for the orderly undertaking of their business, are duty-bound to make reasonable and proper periodic
inspections of their equipment. If they are remiss in carrying out this duty due to their own negligence,
they risk forfeiting the amounts owed by the customers affected.
Moreover, the duty of inspecting for defects is not limited to inherent mechanical defects of the
distribution utilities' devices, but extends to intentional and unintentional ones, such as those, which are
due to tampering and mistakes in computation.
Meralco argues that the degree of diligence imposed upon it was beyond the prevailing law at the time,
namely, Commonwealth Act No. 349. It claims that under this law, it is only required to test metering
devices once every two (2) years. Thus, for it to be penalized for taking four (4) months to rectify and repair
the defective meter, was tantamount to judicial legislation. However, as pointed out by Nordec, the two
(2)-year period prescribed under Commonwealth Act No. 349 is for the testing required of meters and
appliances for measurements used by all public services by a standardized meter laboratory under the
control of the then Public Service Commission. It does not pertain to distribution utilities inspections of the
metering devices installed in their consumers' premises.
Further, contrary to Meralco's claim, the duty imposed upon it pursuant to Ridjo is not beyond the
standard of care imposed by law. Distribution utilities are public utilities vested with public interest, and
thus, are held to a higher degree of diligence. Should a distribution utility not exercise the standard of care
required of it due to its negligence in the inspection and repair of its apparatus, then it can no longer
recover the amounts of allegedly used but uncharged electricity.
The distribution utility's negligence is all the more apparent when it had made prior findings of tampering,
and yet still failed to correct these defects. In Manila Electric Company v. T.E.A.M. Electronics
Corp.,Meralco conducted an inspection on September 28, 1987 and found that the meters therein were
tampered, and then conducted a second inspection on June 7, 1988, which yielded similar evidence of
tampering. Likewise, the respondent in that case was in the midst of a differential billing dispute with
Meralco, and had previously been assessed P7,000,000.00 due to alleged tampering. There, this Court
found that Meralco was negligent for failing to repair the defects in respondent's meters after the first
inspection
Here, as observed by the Court of Appeals, Meralco itself claimed that the irregularities in the electricity
consumption recorded in Nordec's metering devices started on January 18, 1985, as evidenced by their
August 7, 1985 demand letter, covering January 18, 1985 to May 29, 1985. However, the alleged tampering
was only discovered during the May 29, 1985 inspection. Considering that Nordec's meters were read
monthly, Meralco's belated discovery of the cause of the alleged irregularities, or four (4) months after
they purportedly started, can only lead to a conclusion of negligence. Notice of a defect may be
constructive when it has conspicuously existed for a considerable length of time. It is also worth noting
that during a third inspection on November 23, 1987, further irregularities in Nordec's metering devices
were observed, showing electricity consumption even when Nordec's entire power supply equipment was
switched off. Clearly, Meralco had been remiss in its duty as required by law and jurisprudence of a public
utility.
Meralco is also duty-bound to explain the basis for its billings, especially when these are for unregistered
consumption, to prevent consumers from being solely at its mercy. Here, the Power Field Orders given to
Nordec following the inspections did not mention the alleged defects that were discovered. Nordec's
request for recomputation of the alleged unregistered electric bill was still pending when its electric supply
was disconnected on December 18, 1986.
Finally, as found by the Court of Appeals, Meralco failed to comply with the 48-hour disconnection notice
rule. Meralco claims that the statements in its demand letters, that failure to pay would result in
disconnection, were sufficient notice. However, pursuant to Section 97 of Revised General Order No. 1, the
governing rule when the disconnection occurred, disconnection due to non-payment of bills requires that a
48-hour written notice be given to the customer.It must be emphasized that electricity is "a basic necessity
whose generation and distribution is imbued with public interest, and its provider is a public utility subject
to strict regulation by the State in the exercise of police power." The serious consequences on a consumer,
whose electric supply has been cut off, behoove a distribution utility to strictly comply with the legal
requisites before disconnection may be done. This is all the more true considering Meralco's dominant
position in the market compared to its customers' weak bargaining position.
5. CASUMPANG v. CORTEJO G.R. No. 171127 March 11, 2015

FACTS: Around 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer, to the Emergency
Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach pain,
and fever. Thereafter, she was assigned to Dr. Casumpang, a pediatrician. At 5:30 in the afternoon of the
same day, Dr. Casumpang, upon examination using only a stethoscope, confirmed the diagnosis of
Bronchopneumonia. Mrs. Cortejo immediately advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and
had no colds or cough but Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her son's bloodpressure is just being active
and remarked that that’s the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm.

The following day Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang's attention and stated that Edmer had a fever,
throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the
traces of blood in Edmer's sputum. Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang simply
nodded and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is bronchopneumonia.

Edmer vomited phlegm with blood streak. Dr. Miranda then examined Edrrer’s sputum with blood and
noted that he was bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue, Dr. Miranda conducted a
tourniquet test, which turned out to be negative. Dr. Miranda then called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic
and told him about Edmer's condition. Upon being informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several procedures
done. Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering
from Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever. Dr. Casumpang recommended Edmer’s transfer to the ICU, but since the
ICU was then full, the respondent, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.

At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was transferred to Makati
Medical Center. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed Dengue Fever Stage IV that was
already in its irreversible stage. Edmer died at 4:00 the next morning.

Believing that Edmer’s death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the
respondent filed an action for damages against SJDH, Dr. Casumpang, and Dr. Miranda.

ISSUES:

1. W/N Casumpang had committed inexcusable lack of precaution in diagnosing and in treating the patient

2. W/N Miranda had committed inexcusable lack of precaution in diagnosing and in treating the patient

3. W/N or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners’ negligent act/omission and the
patient's resulting death

RULING:

1. YES, Casumpang was negligent.

Even assuming that Edmer's symptoms completely coincided with the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, we
still find Dr. Casumpang guilty of negligence. Wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice.
Physicians are generally not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide error of judgment and from
acting according to acceptable medical practice standards. Nonetheless, when the physician's erroneous
diagnosis was the result of negligent conduct, it becomes an evidence of medical malpractice.

In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis of bronchopneuronia,
Dr. Casumpang selectivdy appreciated some and not all of the symptoms presented, and failed to promptly
conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect
dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable prudence would have shown that indications of
dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes negligence. Apart from failing to promptly detect
dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly undertake the proper medical management needed
for this disease. Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to the acceptable medical standards in diagnosing
and treating dengue fever.

Dr. Casumpang's claim that he exercised prudence and due diligence in handling Edmer's case, sside from
being self-serving, is not supported by competent evidence. He failed, as a medical professional, to observe
the most prudent medical procedure under the circumstances in diagnosing and treating Edmer.

2. No, Dr. Miranda is not liable for negligence.

We find that Dr. Miranda was not independently negligent. Although she was subject to the same standard
of care applicable to attending physicians, as a resident physician, she merely operates as a subordinate
who usually refer to the attending physician on the decision to be made and on the action to be taken. We
also believe that a finding of negligence should also depend on several competing factors. In this case,
before Dr. Miranda attended to Edmer, Dr. Casumpang had diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia.
There is also evidence supporting Dr. Miranda's claim that she extended diligent care to Edmer. In fact,
when she suspected, during Edmer's second episode of bleeding, that Edmer could be suffering from
dengue, she wasted no time in conducting the necessary tests, and promptly notified Dr. Casumpang about
the incident. Indubitably, her medical assistance led to the finding of dengue fever. Dr. Miranda's error was
merely an honest mistake of judgment; hence, she should not be held liable for medical negligence.

3. Yes, causal connection between the petitioners’ negligence and the patient's resulting death was
established.

Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue fever despite the presence of its characteristic
symptoms; and as a consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he also failed to promptly manage Edmer's
illness. Had he immediately conducted confirmatory tests, and promptly administered the proper care and
management needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications or even death, could have been
substantially
reduced. That Edmer later died of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV, a severe and fatal form of dengue
fever, established the causal link between Dr. Casumpang's negligence and the injury. The element of
causation is successfully proven.
6. Li vs Soliman

Facts: On July 7, 1993, respondents' 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the
mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Luke's Medical Center (SLMC).  Results showed that Angelica
was suffering from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, a high-grade cancer of the bone which usually afflicts
teenage children.  Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelica's right leg was amputated
by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor.  As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining
cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to
other parts of the patient's body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo
referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.

On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC.  However, she died on September 1, 1993,
just eleven (11) days after the administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. 
On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr.
Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of
Angelica's safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their
failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet
decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused
Angelica's untimely demise. Further, it was specifically averred that petitioner assured the respondents
that Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with and when asked regarding the side
effects, petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness.  Respondents thus claimed that
they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its
side effects. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as
she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died.

Issue: Whether or not Dr. Rubi Li is negligent and is liable for damages.

Held: No. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to
disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose,
the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was
injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to
"point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her
decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence on record, the Court held that there was adequate disclosure of material
risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica's parents.
Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelica's
lower extremity, that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her
knee.On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents' claim that petitioner told them of
95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing
with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapy's success rate.
Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require only a reasonable explanation of
potential harms, so specific disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary.
(In relation to proximate cause) In this case, both the trial and appellate courts concurred in finding that
the alleged negligence of petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy drugs to respondents’ child was
not proven considering that Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda, not being oncologists or cancer specialists, were
not qualified to give expert opinion as to whether petitioner’s lack of skill, knowledge and professional
competence in failing to observe the standard of care in her line of practice was the proximate cause of the
patient’s death. Furthermore, respondents’ case was not at all helped by the non-production of medical
records by the hospital (only the biopsy result and medical bills were submitted to the court).
Nevertheless, the CA found petitioner liable for her failure to inform the respondents on all possible side
effects of chemotherapy before securing their consent to the said treatment.

B. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

7. DM Consunji v. Court of Appeals, 2001
Facts: Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig
City to his death. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District filed a report stating that: The victim
was rushed to the hospital but pronounced dead on arrival. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A.
Juego together with two others were performing their work as carpenters at the elevator core of the 14th
floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a platform made of channel beam (steel)
measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to
connect the chain block with the platform, got loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim
to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety. And the falling
of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to prove negligence on the part of
petitioner
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner contends that PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block is mere opinion. This contention, however, loses
relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to
warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having
charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence
on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work
in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule
of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and
human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the
appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellant’s negligence arises.
It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference
from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for
the application of the doctrine has been established. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other
evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

8. Reyes vs Sisters of Mercy Hospital

Facts: Leah Alesna Reyes was the wife of the deceased Jorge Reyes who was diagnosed with Typhoid by Dr.
Maryln Rico at the Mercy Community Clinic. Before seeking professional help, Jorge had been doing home
medication since he was suffering from a recurringfever. When his condition did not do any better, he was
taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife, herein petitioner. (Leah Reyes). Dr. Marlyn Rico
conducted a Widal Test since she surmised that the area had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid
fever. Jorge was found positive for typhoid. Dr. Rico then indorsed him to Dr. Marvie Blanes when her shift
ended. Dr. Blanes also had the same diagnosis as Dr. Rico, that Jorge is suffering from typhoid fever. Dr.
Blanes ordered the administration of chloromycetin (drug used for typhoid cases); this was administered by
nurse Josephine Pagente. Jorge’s condition did not improve and continued to worsen. Eventually, he died.
Cause of death was “Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.” Petitioner
Reyes was prompted to file a case against Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico
and Nurse Pagente. The complaint was amended to implead Mercy Community Clinic and to remove Nurse
Pagente.
Petitioner’s Argument: Jorge did not simply die of typhoid fever but his death was due to wrongful
administration of chloromycetin. Had respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not
have recommended and rushed the performance of the Widal Test; hastily concluded that Jorge had been
suffering from typhoid without checking the compatibility of the drug to the patient. The Clinic and its
directress, Sister Rose Palacio, was negligent in failing to provide adequate facilities and in hiring negligent
doctors and nurses. These were all denied by the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur is applicable in the instant cases.

Ruling: No. There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Petitioners asserted in the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies to the present case because Jorge Reyes was merely experiencing fever and chills for five
days and was fully conscious, coherent, and ambulant when he went to the hospital. Yet, he died after only
ten hours from the time of his admission. Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application
of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

The contention is without merit. We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the Ramos case, the
question was whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a hospital should be made liable for the
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. In that case, the patient was given
anesthesia prior to her operation. Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time of her
operation, the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental brain damage does not normally
occur in a gallblader operation in the absence of negligence of the anesthesiologist. Taking judicial notice
that anesthesia procedures had become so common that even an ordinary person could tell if it was
administered properly, we allowed the testimony of a witness who was not an expert. In this case, while it
is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance was rendered, there is
really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had
recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by
his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and professional medical help came
too late for him.

Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify
application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents
of the standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the issue of the correctness of her
diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.

Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously
applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in
malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that
the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual
procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur  can have no application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why
any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the
desired result.
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

9. Caedo vs Yu Khe Thai 26 SCRA 410

Facts: Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 along E.
de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage bound for the airport. Several members of his
family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai
driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights
on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8)
meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the
intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of thecaretela’s left
wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming
vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no
question that defendant’s driver was negligent and liable.

Issue: Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily liable
with the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.

Ruling: Yes. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, if the causative
factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he
could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the master’s liability in civil
law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately
the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects
his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be
imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and
open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special
state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the
presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it
earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at
that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left
side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn
the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden
warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that,
wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. Under
the facts the owner of the car was not liable.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for
them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of
traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car
owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the
part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of
his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his
own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned,
absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform
standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribe

10. Añonuevo vs. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 24, G.R. No. 130003 October 20, 2004

Villagracia was travelling along Bonifacio Avenue on his bicycle, while Anonuevo, traversing the opposite
lane was driving a lancer car owned by P&G (the employer of his brother). Anonuevo was in the course of
making a left turn towarss Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villarica sustained serious injuries
and had to undergo 4 operations.

Villagracia filed an action for damages against P&G and Anonuevo before the RTC. He also filed criminal
complaint against Anonuevo before the MTC, but Anonuevo was acquitted of criminal charge. RTC
rendered judgment against P&G and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of ₱150, 000
for actual damages, ₱10,000 for moral damages, and ₱20,000 for attorney’s fees, as well as legal costs.
Both defendants appealed to the CA, and CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

P&G and Anonuevo filed their respective petitions for review with the SC. P&G’s petition was denied.

Anonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install
safety gadgets. He posists that Article 2185 of the NCC applies by analogy.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.

Issue #1: W/N Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations?

NO. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgement of the actor
in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.
Anonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However,
Anonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the
accident. Even assuming that Anonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped
with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow
down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

Issue #2: W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence?

NO. As between Anonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Anonuevo as solely responsible for
the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine
that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety
equipment.

---

As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as solely responsible for the
accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that
the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety
equipment. Añonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could
no longer claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that
Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracia’s
bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in
time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it was incumbent on Añonuevo to have established that
Villagracia’s failure to have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact that
Añonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider such causal connection as not proven.

---

Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Extraordinary Diligence; Motor Vehicles; An automobile driver must at all
times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would have exercised under the
circumstances.—There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor
vehicle. As far back as 1912, in U.S. v. Juanillo, the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable of
great speed, greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by animals, “and beyond doubt it is highly
dangerous when used on country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the mass of the
people who travel on such roads.” In the same case, the Court emphasized: A driver of an automobile,
under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the
reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the
power and control of the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in
averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons
riding, driving, or walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along and let the horse or
person get out of the way in the best manner possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted
and an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon to account for his acts. An
automobile driver must at all times use all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would
have exercised under the circumstances.
STATUTES & ORDINANCES/ ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS

11. Marinduque V. Workmen’s

FACTS: August 23, 1951 6:00 am: In Marinduque, the deceased Mamador together with other laborers of
the Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. rode a truck driven by its employee Procopio Macunat and on its
way to the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it
turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of Mamador and injury to the others. In a
criminal case, Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased but has paid nothing. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of compensation to the heirs of
Pedro Mamador for his accidental death. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. maintains that this claim is
barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law because (a) Macunat was prosecuted and
required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
for the sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and
not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between
said heirs and Macunat Nava vs. Inchausti Co.: indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the
“other person” does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation

ISSUE: W/N Mamador having violated the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks
was notorious negligence thereby precluding recovery

HELD: NO. award of compensation is hereby affirmed under the circumstance, There is no doubt that mere
riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because
transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious negligence in this
particular instance because there was the employer’s prohibition. Does violation of this order constitute
negligence? Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Others
consider the circumstances. However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule
promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence.
(C.J.S., Vol. 65, p. 427.) This order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater obligation
than the rule of a Commission or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible
evidence of negligence; but it declared that under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to
have acted with negligence. Correctly, it is believed, since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal
safety of the riders.
Seperate Opinion by Montemayor:
Injury was not in the course of the employment but was not raised on the lower courts or in the appeal

12. Sanitary Steam Laundry v. CA

Facts: This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Bent panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam
Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others. The
accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980. All the victims were
riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found
petitioner's driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and accordingly held petitioner liable to
private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorney's fees. Its decision was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. It is here for a review of the appellate court's decision.
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.
(PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of a company project at Lian, Batangas. The other
passengers were family members and friends whom they invited to an excursion to the beach after the
visit to the construction site. The group stayed at Lian beach until 5:30 p.m., when they decided to go back
to Manila.
The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-45, was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the employees of
PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling
along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front
portion by petitioner's panel truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the opposite
direction. The panel truck was on its way to petitioner's plant in Dasmariñas, Cavite after delivering some
linen to the Makati Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in front of
him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this
caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his
panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane.
The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and
Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to various
hospitals.
Private respondents filed this civil case for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch, against petitioner.
Issue: Whether the petitioner's swerving to the lane of respondents is a presumption of negligence for his
violations of traffic rules and regulations.
Ruling: Yes. First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any
other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. 3 Petitioner
says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly
increases the risk of accident,"4 that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased
visibility," and that the tact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased [its]
maneuverability,"5 However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of
proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case, there was no way either driver could have avoided the
collision.

The panel truck driver's testimony is consistent with the testimonies of private respondents that the panel
truck went out of control and simply smashed into the Cimarron in which they were riding.

Charito Estolano, another passenger who was seated in front of the Cimarron, similarly testified that they
just saw the panel truck hurtling toward them.

The foregoing testimonies show that the driver of the panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped
the Cimarron. Hence, even if both headlights of the Cimarron were lighted, it would have been bumped
just the same because the driver of the panel truck could not stop despite the fact that he applied the
brakes. Petitioner's contention that because of "decreased visibility," caused by the fact that the Cimarron
allegedly had only one headlight on, its driver failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis in fact. Only
its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only one headlight on. The police investigator did not state in his
report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had only one headlight on.

Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioner's contention that because of overcrowding in the front seat of
the Cimarron there was "decreased maneuverability" which prevented the Cimarron driver from avoiding
the panel truck. There is absolutely no basis for this claim. There is nothing in the testimonies of the
passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito Estolano, who was seated in front, which suggest that the
driver had no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle. To the contrary, from the testimony of some of the
witnesses,9 it appears that the driver of the Cimarron tried to avoid the collision but because of the
emergency created by the speeding panel truck coming from the opposite direction he was not able to
fully move his Cimarron away from the path of the oncoming vehicle. We are convinced that no
"manuevering" which the Cimarron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the
panel truck, given the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was
immaterial.

All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner's
driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioner's panel truck to the opposite lane could mean
not only that petitioner's driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating
the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.

Petitioner's driver claimed that the distance between the panel truck and the passenger jeepney in front
was about 12 meters. 10 If this was so, he would have had no difficulty bringing his panel truck to a stop. It
is very probable that the driver did not really apply his brakes (which is why there were no skid marks) but
that finding the jeepney in front of him to be in close proximity, he tried to avoid hitting it by swerving his
vehicle to the left. In the process, however, he invaded a portion of the opposite lane and consequently hit
the Cimarron. Indeed, the panel truck driver testified that his vehicle was running at the speed of 60 miles
per hour. 11 He tried to correct himself when asked by petitioner's counsel whether the panel truck
speedometer indicated miles or kilometers by saying that the speedometer measured kilometers and not
miles, but on cross examination his testimony got muddled. 12

Be that as it may, whether the driver meant 60 miles per hour (which could be 96.77 kilometers per
hour) or 60 kilometers per hour, the fact remains that the panel truck was overspeeding because the
maximum allowable speed for truck and buses on open country roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in
Imus, Cavite, is only 50 kilometers per hour. 13

The case of Bayasen, which petitioner invokes, cannot apply to this case. There was no swerving of the
vehicle in that case but skidding, and it was caused by the fact that the road was wet and slippery. In this
case, the road was dry and safe. There was no reason for the vehicle to swerve because of road
condition. The only explanation for this occurrence was human error.

Petitioner's reliance on the McKee case is also misplaced. In that case, the driver of the vehicle at fault, a
truck, had an opportunity to avoid the collision but he ignored the signals from the other vehicle, a car, to
slow down and allow it to safely pass the bridge. In this case, there was no such opportunity given the
Cimarron on the night of the mishap. Everything happened so quickly that before the passengers of the
Cimarron knew it, the vehicle had been bumped by the truck.
Second. On its liability as employer of the negligent driver, petitioner contends that the non-submission of
the NBI clearance and police clearance of its driver does not mean that it failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. It argues that there is no law
requiring employees to submit NBI and police clearance prior to their employment. Hence, petitioner's
failure to require submission of these documents does not mean that it did not exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees. On the other hand, it asserts that its employment of
Herman Hernandez as a driver means that he had passed the screening tests of the company, including
submission of the aforementioned documents. Petitioner maintains that the presumption is that the said
driver submitted NBI and police clearance.

Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of Appeal's position that it failed to exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees by not requiring its prospective employees to undergo
psychological and physical tests before employment has no basis in law because there is no law requiring
such tests prior to hiring employees.

The petitioner's contention has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not say that petitioner's failure to
submit NBI and police clearances of its driver was proof that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in
the selection of its employees. What the Court of Appeals said was that petitioner's policy of requiring
prospective employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to have at least two (2) years experience as
driver prior to employment was not enough to prove the exercise of due diligence and that even this policy
petitioner failed to prove by its failure to present the driver's NBI and police records during the trial.

With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment,
although no law requires it, such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due
diligence. As the trial court said: 14

. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, were conducted on their
would-be employees. No on-the-job training and seminars reminding employees, especially
drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done. There were no
instructions given to defendant's drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor what
to do after an emergency occurs. There was even failure on the part of defendant to present
its concerned employee's 204 file. All these could only mean failure on the part of
defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.

Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. 15 Accordingly, it behooves employers to
exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the
minimum requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista, the office manager of petitioner in
its Dasmariñas plant, said that petitioner has a policy of requiring job applicants to submit
clearances from the police and the NBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driver they are
required to have at least two (2) years driving experience and to be holders of a professional
driver's license for at least two years. But the supposed company policies on employment were not
in writing. Nor did Bautista show in what manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they
drove their vehicles in a safe way.
Third. With respect to the question of damages, we find no reversible error committed in the award of
actual damages to private respondents. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts. 16 Here, the actual damages claimed by private respondents were duly supported by receipts and
appear to have been really incurred.

C. NEGLIGENCE AS THE PROXIMATE CAUCE

13. Bataclan vs. Medina

Facts: Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated
by its owner defendant Mariano Medina left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven
by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and
conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe
Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a
woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that
same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the
Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.
Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the
bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There
is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including
the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers
trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After
half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on
one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and
almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and
escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the
bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who
answered the call for help set it on fire.

Issue: Whether or not the negligence of the bus driver Medina is the proximate cause of the injury

Ruling: Yes. The Court defined proximate cause as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only
on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not
only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because
it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through is driver and its conductor.

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the
Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also
agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the
driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as
testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the
witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the
canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The
chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.

14. ABROGAR vs. COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES INC.

G.R. No. 064749

March 15, 2017

Facts: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a participant
in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race. The issues revolve on
whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty of negligence, and, if so, was their
negligence the proximate cause of the death of the participant; on whether the negligence of the driver of
the passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; on whether the doctrine of assumption of risk
was applicable to the fatality; and on whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of
earning capacity of the latter who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.

In the RTC decision dated May 10, 1991, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Romulo
Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc.,
ordering both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs the amounts of Twenty
Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (P28,061.63) as actual damages; One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the total amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One
Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (P178,061,63) or Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and Sixteen
Centavos (P17,806.16) as attorney's fees. On the cross-claim of defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc.,
defendant Intergames, Inc, is hereby ordered to reimburse to the former any and all amounts which may
be recovered by the plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision.

The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the marathon had
fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called for by and appropriate
under the circumstances; that the accident had happened because of inadequate preparation and
Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence; that the respondents could not be excused from liability by
hiding behind the waiver executed by Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the
waiver could only be effective for risks inherent in the marathon, such as stumbling, heat stroke, heart
attack during the race, severe exhaustion and similar occurrences; that the liability of the respondents
towards the participants and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had
been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived benefits from the marathon that in turn
had carried responsibilities towards the participants and the public; that the respondents' agreement to
free Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind third
persons; and that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered by the
petitioners from Cosmos.

All parties appealed to the CA. The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not awarding damages for
loss of earning capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason that such damages were not recoverable due
to Rommel not yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be premature to award such damages
upon the assumption that he would finish college and be gainfully employed. The CA reduced the issues to
two, namely:

1. Whether or not appellant Intergames were negligent in its conduct of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon"
held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel
Abrogar.

2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarity liable with appellant Intergames for
the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found to have been negligent in the
conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel
Abrogar.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that
respondent Intergames was not negligent considering that:

A. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the conduct of
the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route; and

B. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshal during the
marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to its participants.

2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that the doctrine of
assumption of risk finds application to the case at bar even though getting hit or run over by a vehicle is not
an inherent risk in a marathon race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased Abrogar made such waiver as
claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of one's right to life and limb for being against public policy.

Held: 1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of
the time and of the place. The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article
20.

2. Yes. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious,
known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact
that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and
to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper caution or not
is immaterial. In other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a
known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's
negligence, but one does not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and
appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three
elements, namely; the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;he must further understand its nature;
and his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an
effective form of express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is
ample authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a
known situation because of his youth, or lack of information or experience, and thus will not be taken to
consent to assume the risk. Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar recovery by
the petitioners.