Case no.

14

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

A case of testate estate of a foreigner executed in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with his
first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three
illegitimate children.
(By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who
pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and
finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.)

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner:

(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;

(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, the satisfaction of the legacies of
deceased Amos G. Bellis.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights.

HELD:

No. Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored
in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern. Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate
children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Principle: Lex Rei Sitae "the law where the property is situated"

Article 16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Case no. 34

Dionisio Dumlao (plaintiff-appellant ) Vs

. Quality Plastic Products. Inc (defendant-appelee)

GR. NO. l-27956

Facts:

On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-662 rendered a judgment
ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay
solidarily Quality Plastic Products,... Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The
lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond,... Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the
satisfaction of the judgment."
Defendants failed to pay the amount before the decision became final. Oria's land, which was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at
public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land for the lack of jurisdiction. That Pedro Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long
before june 13, 1960 when the action was filed and impossible to have served with summons. Oria's death was not known
to Quality Plastic Products. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy
sheriff on Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court’s judgment against deceased Oria and execution against his land be annulled on
the ground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD:
Yes. no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity.

After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil Case
No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not
apprise the court that Oria was dead. It.. specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and
that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more
civil personality. His juridical capacity, which... is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was
lost through death.
WHEREFORE, the lower court' decision is reversed and set aside.

Principles:
Article 37
Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is
lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which... is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death.

Article 42
Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by the will.
Case no. 54
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

FACTS:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. On January 10, 2012 Manalo
filed in the RTC of Dagupan City a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil registry of San Juan, Manila, in
order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage. And she alsoprayed that she will be allowed to reuse her maiden
surname, Manalo.
The trial court denied the petition for cancellation of entry of marriage for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if
they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country"
and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues
related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter
into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.
Manalo appealed to CA. The CA overturned the RTC decision (reversed and set aside). It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry.Case elevated to higher court for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Filipino Citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
decree proceedings abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his/her spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
HELD:
1. Yes. Review for certiorari is denied. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of
the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse
even though the latter is no longer married to the former.
However, this case was remanded to the RTC as the Court cannot determine due to insufficient
evidence. It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven.
There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.
The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be
proved.
Principle:
According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the
divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the
provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court
will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if
Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the
law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that
the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the
equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings.
Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree
obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence
as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
Case no. 74

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs.

ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
A.M. No. 2349, 3 July 1992
211 SCRA 06
FACTS:
December 24,1981, Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
"grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. Respondent successfully evaded five (5)
attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he
could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence.
On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted
respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend
respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint
against him" in the instant
September 8, 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order.
In his Answer, Believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio.Atty. Terre averred that
he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single;
that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968 and that the
child she was then carrying was the son of Bercenilla where Dorothy denied the allegation.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met
for the first time in 1979 ; she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single ; respondent was aware
of her marital status ; but Atty. Terre explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first
husband were first cousins and she was then convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her
mother andex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him . In their marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote "single" as her
status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such they were
married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 .
Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 all through their married state up to the time he
disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his
parents. She was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain
name Helina Malicdem. She then filed a case for abandonment of minor and a criminal case bigamy against respondent
and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to exist
Additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered
automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave .

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage.

HELD:
Yes. A judicial declaration that the first marriage is null and void ab initio is essential for the Supreme Court to
determine whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his
name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
Principles:
Article 40 Of the Family Code
“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void”

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent
Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing
that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly
first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. For if we are to hold Jordan
Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his
second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
Case no. 94

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO FACTS:
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For
many years, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda
Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant),
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time
he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the
petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The
children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to
deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium
in Makati.

This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda Bildner and
Sylvia Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit, and granted the petition to nullify the Court of
Appeals’ ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda Ilusorio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together and observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity

HELD:

No. Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium but clearly she wanted
the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition. What the law provides is that “husband and wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity”. The sanction thereof is the “spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.
Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated from bed and board
since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a “shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion”. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two
loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs
Principle:
Art. 68.
The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.

The 3 duties of the spouses to each other are:

1. Live together
2. Observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity
3. Render mutual help and support

Article 68 is Article 36’s reference when it refers to the spouse’s inability to comply
with the essential marital obligations.

Although the courts cannot compel the spouses to comply with their marital
obligations, under Articles 100 and 127, the spouse who leaves the conjugal home or
refuses to live there without just cause shall not have the right to be supported.
Case no. 114
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA, petitioners,vs.
HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch III, Guian, Eastern Samar;
RUFINO M. GARADO, Sheriff IV; and CASIANO HOMBRIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001
FACTS:

On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint .for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena.3 The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based
on occupation since time immemorial.4 A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. In a Decision dated November
24, 1989, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda.5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners "to vacate the land they have leased from the plaintiff-
appellant [private respondent Casiano Hombria], excluding the portion which the petitioners reclaimed from the sea and
forms part of the shore, as shown in the Commissioner's Report, and to pay the plaintiff-appellant the agreed rental of
P1.00 per year from the date of the filing of the Complaint until they shall have actually vacated the premises."6 The
Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed.

On May 22, 1995, private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above decision which has
already become final and executory. The motion was granted by the public respondent judge, and a Writ of Execution was
issued therefor. However, the public respondent sheriff subsequently filed a Manifestation requesting that he "be clarified
in the determination of that particular portion which is sought to be excluded prior to the delivery of the land adjudged in
favor of plaintiff Casiano Hombria.

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of
Demolition.

CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one
of the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the
petitioners.

HELD:

Yes, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with
the rules.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
Principle:

Under the Family Code Article 124, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under of the
Family Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the
Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by
the husband is not a fatal defect.

The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a
conjugal property. In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of
demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of Samar whereas the petition was
prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s signing
the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh. Hence, petition was granted and the case was remanded to
the CA for further proceedings.
Case no. 134

MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, petitioners, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur;
VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.

G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992

FACTS:

December 10, 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto
Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption
was grunted on, 18 November 1982.
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural
parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo
contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by
mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's
Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.
2. Whether or not the effects of adoption may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties.
HELD:
1. No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences
provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural
parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.

2. No. SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when
adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit
the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint
filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.

Principle:
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as
follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting
parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and
emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of
the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
 Case no. 148
ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

FACTS:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio .That petitioner has been a bona fide
resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition. That petitioner's maiden
name is ELISEA LAPERAL.
March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable
Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria'
Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her. That the said partial decision is now final;That
during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for
many years now; That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has
likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted
to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to
resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.

The City Attorney of Baguio opposed the petition on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article
370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

The court denied the petition. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for
change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to
confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner be allowed to change her name or be permitted to resume using her maiden name.

HELD:

No. Article 372 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.

WHEREFORE, petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.

Principle:

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife
should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

Even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the petition — is, not a
sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances
was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no
more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.