SUCCESSION (INTRO AND PART 1 CASES)

SEC B

1). Edward Christensen, et. al, v. Garcia; G.R. L-16749; January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently
was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until
his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself
a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant
claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law
of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be
increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand,
counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil
Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of
California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator
could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children
not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the
conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule
says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow
the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside
California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California,
it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

2) Maria Cristina Bellis, et. al, v. Edward Bellis; G.R. No. L-23678; June 6, 1967

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." He had eight
(8) legitimate children from two wives and three (3) illegitimate children.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he bequeathed, among others,
an amount of P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each.

On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The executor of the will paid all the bequests therein including to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Their oppositions were overruled by the lower court. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illegitimate children of a person, who is citizen and a domiciliary of a foreign country, and
whose estate in the Philippines had been settled in accordance with a will validly probated here, are entitled
to their respective legitimes.

RULING:

No.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount
of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and
the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not
alter the law, for a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

3) Nacar vs. Nistal; G.R. No. L-3306; December 8, 1982

FACTS:

Sometime in the year 1968 petitioners stepfather, Isabelo Nacar, incurred an indebtedness with the
respondent in the amount P2,791.00. Despite repeated demands by the respondent, Isabelo was not able to
pay. Thus, prompting the respondent to file a civil action for the collection of money against Isabelo. In the
year 1970, Isabelo died. Respondent then filed a complaint in Civil Case and entitled it "Claim Against the
Estate Nicanor Nacar the Late Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment".
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment, and to order the return of the
carabaos. In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a
cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have
been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of action
against him.
Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a
complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the attached carabaos and that the certificates
of ownership of large cattle were in his name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a complaint against an heir of a decedent, who incurred indebtedness, is the correct action
for the collection of money?

HELD:
The Court held in the negative. Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of
action against petitioner Nacar. The Court said that, a cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in
the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in
violation of plaintiff's right with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an
action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner
Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the
complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as
the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr.
Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of action against
the former.

4) Payduan vs. Builders Savings; G.R. No. 202324; June 4, 2018

Conchita Gloria and Maria Lourdes Gloria-Payduan vs. Builders Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
G.R. No. 202324; June 4, 2018

Ponente: Del Castillo, J. (1st Division)

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorai

Facts:
• Spouses Juan and Conchita Gloria are registered owners of a parcel of land located in Kamuning,
Quezon City.
• Maria Lourdes Gloria – Payduan was their adopted daughter.
• Juan passed away in 1987, and so Conchita and Lourdes filed before the RTC against respondent,
Builders Savings and Loan Association, and Benildo Biag for declaration of null and void real estate
mortgage, promissory note, cancellation of notation in the transfer certificate of title an damages with
prayer for injunctive relief.
• Petitioners claimed:
o Biag duped them into surrendering the TCT to him because he will verify the title, however,
he used it to mortgage the property to Builders Savings.
o Biag deceived Conchita that her daughter requested her to sign the subject loan and mortgage
documents, as well as, a promissory note which also contained the signature of Juan who was
already long deceased as mortgagor and co-maker.
o Biag and Builders Savings colluded to foreclose the property and sold it at an auction.
• Builders Savings contested:
o Lourdes had no capacity to sue nor authority and interest for she was not legally adopted by
the spouses.
o Conchita neither signed the verification attached to the complaint nor executed a special
power of attorney to authorize her daughter Lourdes.
o Builders Savings presented its Credit Investigator Danilo Reyes who testified that he
personally met Spouses Juan and Conchita Gloria, Maria Lourdes and her husband, and
Benildo Biag when they went to their office to apply for a loan.
• RTC granted in favor of the petitioners:
o Declared the mortgage and promissory note null and void.
 o Directing the Builders Savings to return the title free from all liens an encumbrances
• CA however ruled in favor of Builders Savings:
o When an alleged heir sues to nullify a document which would impair her interest as such heir,
her successional rights must first be determined in a special proceeding.
o Moreover, Conchita failed to sign the certification against non-forum shopping thrice, which
resulted to dropping her from the case as plaintiff.

Issue:
Whether or not Lourdes as a co-owner of the subject real property is a real party in the case.

Ruling:

Yes. Article 777 of the Civil Code specifically provides that successional rights are transmitted from the
decedent to his/her heirs from the moment of death of the former; that even if there were no pending
settlement proceedings for the distribution of a decedent's estate, there was no need for a prior declaration
of heirship before the heirs may commence an action arising from any right of the deceased, such as the
right to bring an action to annul a sale.

In this case, Lourdes was not legally adopted by the spouses but a natural child. Being the daughter of the
deceased Juan and Conchita, Lourdes has an interest in the subject property as heir to Juan and co-owner
with Conchita. The fact that she was not judicially declared as heir is of no moment, there was no need for a
prior declaration of heirship before heirs may commence an action arising from any right of their predecessor,
such as one for annulment of mortgage. No judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir
may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.

Thus, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such
transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken
from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage
of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. As such co-owners, each of the heirs
may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery
of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all
the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

5) Salitico vs. Heirs of Resurreccion Felix; G.R. No. 240199; April 10, 2019

G.R. No. 240199 – Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons –
General Principles – When does successional rights commence?
Civil Law – Succession – Start of Successional Rights

FACTS:

In 1986, Amanda Burgos executed a will whereby she devised a property in favor of Resurreccion Felix.
Amanda died in 1986. In 1998, Felix sold the land bequeathed to her by Amanda to Spouses Isidro and
Conrada Salitico.

In 2008, Amanda’s will was subjected to probate. The will was allowed by the probate court in 2009.

In 2010, the administrator of the estate of Amanda demanded Spouses Salitico to vacate the subject property.
The administrator contended that the sale made by Felix was not valid because under the Rules, no will shall
pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Here, the devised
property bequeathed to Felix has not yet passed to her because the will was not yet probated when she made
the sale.
In 2011, Spouses Salitico filed a specific performance case against the heirs of Felix and the estate of
Amanda.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale is valid.

HELD: Yes. Felix was already the owner of the bequeathed property when Amanda died. Article 777 of the
Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very moment of the decedent’s death meaning that
the transmission by succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time,
the heir is already legally deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, “and not at
the time of declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution.” Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of
his/her hereditary share immediately after such death.

Upon the death of Amanda, Felix became the absolute owner of the devised subject property, subject to a
resolutory condition that upon settlement of Amanda’s Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or
excessive. Hence, there was no legal bar preventing Felix from entering into a contract of sale with the
petitioners Sps. Salitico with respect to the former’s share or interest over the subject property.

SIDE ISSUE: But may the Spouses Salitico already register the property in their name?

HELD: No. Rule 90, Section 1of the Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with Section 91 of P.D. 1529
or the Property Registration Act. It is only upon the issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order
of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering
the subject property may be issued in the name of the distributees.

6) Treyes vs. Larlar; G.R. No. 232579; September 8, 2020

FACTS:

Rosie Larlar Treyes died without a will and without any children. At the time of her death, she owned fourteen
real estate properties with her husband, Dr. Nixon Treyes, as conjugal properties. Subsequently, Dr. Nixon
executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, transferring the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming that he
was the sole heir. Rosie left behind seven siblings, Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne
(Larlar, et al.).

Larlar, et al. filed a Complaint for annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of
ownership and possession, partition, and damages. Dr. Nixon filed a Motion to Dismiss, but the RTC denied
it. Treyes then filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which was also denied.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Is it necessary for the court to determine the status of an heir in a separate special proceeding before an
ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession of property can be filed?

RULING:
No. Larlar, et al. do not need to establish their rights as intestate heirs through a separate special proceeding
before filing an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession of property. The rights of
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent, as stated in Article 777 of the Civil
Code. The Court has held that the title or rights to a deceased person’s property are immediately passed to
his or her heirs upon death, without need for them to be declared heirs. The Civil Code identifies certain
relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs and intestate heirs, and subject to required proof, they are
entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the decedent. In this case, Larlar, et al., as siblings of Rosie, are
entitled to their share of the inheritance without a prior separate judicial determination of their heirship.

Delaying the enforcement of the rights of the heirs until their heirship is determined with finality in a separate
special proceeding would contradict Article 777 of the Civil Code. The Court supports the institution of an
ordinary civil action by legal heirs based on their right of succession without a previous and separate judicial
declaration of their status as such.

Therefore, unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the
determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare
the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of
their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial
declaration of their status as such.

7). Estate of K.H. Hemady vs. Luzon Surety; G.R. No. L-3487; November 28, 1956

FACTS:

Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on 20 different indemnity agreements or
counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K.H. Hemady, a surety solidary
(guarantor) in all of them.

Luzon Surety prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed
in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and
documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12% interest thereon.

Upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady’s estate, the Court of First Instance dismissed the claims of
Luzon Surety on two grounds. First, the CFI held that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps
were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor
(Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds.

And second, the CFI held that whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death are not chargeable to his
estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Hemady’s liability as a solidary guarantor is extinguished by his death. – NO.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Hemady’s liability as a solidary guarantor is not extinguished by his death.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed
the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not
only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.

Under the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession, are subrogated to all the rights and
obligations of the deceased (Art. 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to
which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased. The heirs take such property subject
to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.
8). Uson vs. Del Rosario; G.R. No. L-4963; January 29, 1953

FACTS:

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five parcels of land situated in Labrador,
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children.

Uson alleged that she was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Uson. However, she claimed that when
Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife del Rosario illegally took possession of said lands.

In their answer, defendants set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her
husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of
alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband
upon his death.

The court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession
of the lands in dispute. Defendants interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether Uson is the rightful heir despite the agreement she had with her deceased husband to separate. –
YES.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she
expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death
in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple
reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

9) Borja vs. Borja; G.R. No. L-28040; August 18, 1972

Decedent/Testator: Josefa Tangco, died on October 6, 1940; Francisco de Borja, died on April 14, 1954
Type of Succession: Testate

I. Facts:

Francisco de Borja filed a petition for the probate of the will of his wife Josefa Tangco who died on
October 6, 1940 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on April 2, 1941. In
1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator and in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja,
was appointed co-administrator.

When Francisco died on April 14, 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of
his mother, Josefa Tangco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana his second wife instituted testate proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued
with several court suits and counter-suits, including the three cases at bar. In order to put an end to all these
litigations, they entered a compromise agreement on October 12, 1963 which includes the condition of selling
the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal and that Jose de Borja obligates
himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of P800,000. They also agree that they
mutually withdraw, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action,
suits, debts, claims and demands, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against
each other. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment, shall deliver to the heir Jose
de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession.

On May 16, 1966, Jose de Borja submitted their compromise agreement to the Court of First Instance
of Rizal and on August 8, 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija
court declared it void and unenforceable. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's
order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed
the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Tasiana
Ongsingco argued that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco de Borja.

Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet
been probated. (Yes)

II. Ruling:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and
set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.

III. Ratio Decidendi:

Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs.
Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement
and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and
public policy. She also argued that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity
of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "if the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court
and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made which bars the validity of the agreement.

Upon the other hand, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on October 12, 1963,
the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not.

The ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to
settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share
and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation
as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted
or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code
of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 of the present Civil Code. Her successional
interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will
were not probated. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and
analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.

Since the compromise agreement was entered into between Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, the heir and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, it is
clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract,
even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an
extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be
enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
 Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

The Court conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its
order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be,
and is, reversed.

IV. Doctrine/Principle:

Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Successional interest existed independent of the last will and testament and would exist even if such
will were not probated at all.

Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

10) Bonilla vs. Barcena; G.R. No. L-41715; June 18, 1976

FACTS: On March 31, 1975, Fortunato Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion Bonilla and wife
of Ponciano Bonilla instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. Fortunata
died on July 9, 1975. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Fortunata
was dead and therefore has no legal capacity to sue. When the motion was heard, counsel for plaintiff asked
for the substitution by her minor child and her husband, but the court dismissed the case on the ground that
a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE: Whether the deceased Fortunata can be substituted by her heirs in the instant case?

HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case until completion. The records show that Fortunata died on July 9, 1975 while the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata
was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Sec. 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court promptly of such death and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
legal representatives. This duty was complied with by the plaintiff’s counsel.

Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.” Hence, from the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of
their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor
when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right is pure or contingent. The right
of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before any judicial declaration of heirship in
the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in
litigation was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs
have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. Under
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased." The
question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. The causes of action which survive affect primarily and principally property and property
rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while causes of action which do not survive are
those where the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental. This case being an action to quiet title affects property and property rights primarily and therefore
is one that survives death. Hence, substitution is proper.

11) Vitug vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 82027; March 29, 1990

Doctrine: A survivorship agreement between spouses does not constitute a conveyance mortis causa or a
will because it is merely an aleatory contract which imposes an obligation with a term – the term being death.
*Nota bene: an aleatory contract is when one of or both of the parties reciprocally bind themselves to give or
do something in consideration of what the other shall give/do upon the happening of 1) an uncertain event;
or, 2) an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time.

Recit-Ready Summary:

Dolores Luchangco and Romarico Vitug were spouses who, in 1970, executed an Survivorship
Agreement with the Bank of America. Basically, this agreement stated that all the money deposited in Account
No. 35342-038 will be considered conjugal funds of the spouses (therefore conjugal property) during the
lifetime of both spouses – however when one of them dies, the money in the account will become the sole
property of the surviving spouse. In 1980, Dolores died and thus Romarico became the co-administrator of
his deceased wife’s estate together with Nenita Alonte; on the other hand Rowena Faustino-Corona was
appointed as executrix of the two wills left behind by Dolores.

In 1985 Romarico filed with the probate court asking for permission to sell certain shares of stock and
real properties belonging to the decedent’s estate in order to fund a reimbursement of advances he allegedly
made in favor of the estate such as estate tax and deficiency estate taxes. Romarico alleged that the money
he used to pay off the taxes were his personal funds. Rowena opposed the motion to sell the said properties
alleging that Romarico withdrew the alleged advances from Bank of America Account No. 35342-038 (the
account under the Survivorship Agreement) which was the conjugal property of the spouses and thus
constitute part of the estate – therefore no reimbursement was due to Romarico. Vitug on the other hand
averred that by virtue of the Survivorship agreement, the money in the said account had become his sole
property upon the death of the decedent.

The RTC upheld the validity of the agreement and granted Romarico’s motion to sell properties, the
proceeds of which will be used as reimbursement to him. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled
that the Survivorship Agreement was a conveyance mortis causa thus technically a will, and it did not comply
with the formalities laid down by law. The main issue is whether or not the Survivorship Agreement constituted
a will. The Court ruled in the negative stating that the contract merely imposed an obligation with a term, the
term being the death of either one of the spouses. Neither is there any indication that the Survivorship
Agreement had been executed to frustrate laws on will, donations, and conjugal partnership. The death of
Dolores vested in Romarico sole ownership of the funds in the account and thus cannot be included in the
inventory of the former’s estate.

Facts

- Spouses Romarico Vitug and Dolores Luchangco Vitug executed a Survivorship Agreement
(“Agreement”) with the Bank of America, and the pertinent section of such Agreement provides:

We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter
deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the
property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of
us during our lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole
property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by
such survivor or survivors.
- In 1980 Dolores died in New York and left two wills – Romarico was appointed as administrator together
with Nenita Alonte, and Rowena Faustino-Corona was designated as executrix. In 1985 Romarico filed a
motion before the probate court to be allowed to sell some shares of stock and certain properties from
the estate in order to raise money to reimburse him for his payment of inheritance taxes which he allegedly
advanced and took out of his own pocket/own personal funds (total amount is approx. P680,000). Rowena
opposed the motion to sell claiming that the money Romarico used to pay such taxes came from the bank
account under the Agreement, which was conjugal property of the spouses, therefore it was necessarily
part and parcel of the estate of the deceased.
- The RTC upheld the validity of the Agreement and granted the motion to sell some properties from the
estate of Dolores. However on appeal with the CA, the court held that the agreement constituted a
 conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of the a valid will as prescribed in Art.
805 therefore it was null and void.

Issue:

1. WON the Agreement partook the nature of a conveyance mortis causa/a testamentary will.
Held:

- NO, the Agreement did not purport to deliver one party’s separate and personal properties in favor of the
other, but simply their joint holdings. In the absence of any proof that the funds exclusively belonged to
either one of the parties, the presumption is that it is conjugal property. In reality, the Agreement is merely
an aleatory contract which imposes an obligation with a term – and that term being the death of either
spouses.
- Romarico cited two cases where he based his arguments, the first being on Rivera v. PBTC where the
Court ruled that a survivorship agreement does not purport to deliver one spouse’s separate properties
in favor of the surviving spouse, but rather merely their joint holdings. The second case, Macam v.
Gatmaitan states that: “an aleatory contract is one whereby one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case
of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time”. The Court ruled
that a survivorship agreement falls under the second type of aleatory contracts which depends on an
uncertain event.
- The Court further ruled that since there was no proof that the funds were personally belonging to either
of the spouses, it is presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of their marital
relations. Furthermore, a survivorship agreement is not a donation inter vivos because it only takes effect
after the death of either spouses and neither is it a donation between spouses because it involves no
transfer of any of either spouse’s personal property.
- Finally the Court disagreed with the CA when the latter ruled that the Agreement was a modification of
the conjugal partnership because it was a mere cloak to circumvent the rules on CPG. The spouses were
not prohibited by law to invest their conjugal property by way of the Agreement – they merely put what
rightfully belonged to the both of them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose any of their
personal properties to one another, therefore it cannot be considered under prohibited donations.

12) Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon; G.R. No. L-60174; February 16, 1983

G.R. No. L-60174 | 1983-02-16

Topic: Disposition and encumbrance; NCC

Facts:
• Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several pieces of land in
1948-1950. In 1960-1962, said lands were partitioned into 3 lots
• 1951 – the wife sold the lots to the petitioners without the consent of her husband
• April 26, 1976 – the heirs of Aldon (wife and children) filed a complaint against the petitioners
alleging that they had orally mortgaged the said properties to the Felipes and that an offer to redeem
the properties was made but they refused
• RTC ruled in favor of Felipe, declaring that they were the rightful owners of the lots in question
• CA reversed the decision on the ground that the sale instituted by the wife was invalid since the
properties were conjugal in nature and that the sale was done without the husband’s consent

Issue: Whether or not the sale of properties in question was valid without the consent of the husband?

Held: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165 NCC). Subject to certain
exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife’s consent (Art. 166 NCC). And the wife cannot bind the conjugal property without the husband’s
consent, except in cases provided by law (Art. 172 NCC)
In the instant case, the wife’s sale is not covered by the phrase “except in cases provided by law.” THE SALE
IS INVALID
Void or voidable? VOIDABLE
According to Art. 1390 NCC, among the voidable contracts are “those where one of the parties is incapable
of giving consent to the contract (Par. 1). The wife had no capacity to give consent to the contract of the
sale. The capacity belonged not to the husband alone but to both spouses. This is further supported by
the provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is
required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction
questioned (Art. 173 NCC).

The voidable contract of the wife was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because
he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. The wife, who was the party responsible for the defect,
could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the
marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.

The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of
Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation the wife. After the death of their father, they acquired the right
to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father’s share
in the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-
third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.

The Felipes were purchasers of bad faith as revealed in a testimony that sometime in
December 1970, Vicente Felipe (son of the petitioners) attempted to have the wife (Gimena) sign a ready-
made document claiming the sale of the land to them. If sale was valid, why did they need a document of
sale in their favor. Because they knew the lots still did not belong to them.

13) Union Bank vs. Santibanez; G.R. No. 149926; February 23, 2005

FACTS:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a
loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit
Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and
Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a
Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement
for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before
the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency
of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors
for Edmund and (1) for Florence.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5,
1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez. Florence filed
her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement. Union Bank
asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped
Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.

In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from
the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court.

ISSUE:

W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate
of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending.
HELD:

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as
follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
Florence, my children.

The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which
might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire
thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement
is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the
claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.

14) Roman Catholic Church vs. Rigor; G.R. No. L-22036; April 30, 1979

FACTS:

Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October
29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. In
addition to the devices contained therein, the will had a provision to the effect that the testator intended to
devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest. It was stated therein that the
parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time
that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a device in favour of a person whose identity at the time of the testator’s death cannot be
ascertained, may be efficacious.

RULING:

No.

The Supreme Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time
of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee
or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring
to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply
and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.

The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death,
who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary.
In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the
seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy
and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he
had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the
ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of
February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late
(Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood."

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion
is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands
by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's
nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or,
having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could
not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary
or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article
956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the
estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists."

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal
succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no
substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal
heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.