G.R. No.

L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, a judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

Joseph Brimo, a Turkish nationality who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will that his
property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation.

ISSUE:

Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s
estates.

Held:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed
of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as
impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

ISSUE:

Will there be forfeiture?

Even if the testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes of
the testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a will
should not be given effect. A person’s will is merely an instrument which is PERMITTED,
so his right is not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws.
 The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his
national law. He cannot provide otherwise.

The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that
provision is not legal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws.

No, the Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16.

According to Article 16 of the Civil Code, suchnational law of the testator is the one to governhis
testamentary dispositions.

The provision in the will is not valid. Said condition then is considered unwritten, hence the institution
of legatees is unconditional and consequently valid and effective.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. His first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In his first wife
whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children.

On August 5, 1952, Amos made two wills that his distribute estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner:

(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;

(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and

(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äw phï1.ñët

Before he died, he made two wills in the Philippines. One disposing of his Texas
properties and the other disposing his Philippine Properties. In both wills, his
illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will
on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be
entitled if Philippine law were to apply.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate
in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether Texan Law or Philippine Law must apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under
the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. Further,
even if the deceased had given them share, such would be invalid because the law
governing the deceased does not allow such.

Or
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

Or

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should
be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived
his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas
law, which is the national law of the deceased.

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California

where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of
nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the
time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he
had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural

daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in
favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court
had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen
claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the
matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately
applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter
Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national
of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator
should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:

Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

What law should be applicable – Philippine or California Law?

Ruling:

The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with respect to
order of succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE
PERSON.

California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and manner
he desires.

Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where the
personal property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the LAW
OF HIS DOMICILE.
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of
validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedent’s domicile –
the Philippines.

S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as
provided by the CA Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other countries as provided by
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California.

The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testator’s
domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the conflicts of law rule in
CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2
states.

The SC reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case back to it for
decision with an instruction that partition be made applying the Philippine law.

Hermosisima v. CA; 109 Phil 629

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, filed with her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of
Francisco Hermosisima and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Francisco Hermosisima,
petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner
who was almost ten years younger than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he made no promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life
insurance underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953
when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV Escano to
which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she
was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez.

Issue:

whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?

Held:
NO
Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise".

The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself
more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.

That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus
vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England
has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-
called Balm suit in many of the American States.

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and
manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the
award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals
said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-

appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her
age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is
liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the
provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in
Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio
introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of
Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita
sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

The defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita’s
father.
Given that the defendant had the same last name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who
regarded him as a member of their family.

defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only
in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged
love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but
also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs
reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden
from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita
continued nonetheless.
Given that the defendant had the same last name with Lolita made them close and frequented her
house to teach her how to pray the rosary. Eventually both of them fell in love and conducted the
clandestine trysts which eventually reached the ears of the Lolita’s parents. Defendant, a Chinese
national was filed with deportation by plaintiffs (Lolita’s parents and siblings) but the affair continued
nonetheless. Lolita disappeared but found a note with the defendant’s handwriting.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good
custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

HELD:

Yes, the defendant is liable. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 21 of the Civil Code. The defendant
took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close
with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man.
Art. 21. “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

In the case at bar, Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an
act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages. The decision
appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00
as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay
the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses
of litigations. Costs against appellee.

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

Facts:
 Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on

September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone
their wedding because his mother opposes it. But the next day, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has

changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz
actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting
that the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for
breach of promise to marry.

Issue:

Whether or not Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to marry?

Held:
Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

Surely, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and go through all

the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite

different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the

New Civil Code.

When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages may not

be awarded when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

DECISION: Affirmed.
 [G.R. NO. 147076. June 17, 2004]

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE

SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. ACT THEATER, INC., Respondent

On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act

Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel
Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of the
Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in
violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876.The
respondents employees were subsequently criminally charged
(Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo.On account
of the incident, the respondents water service connection was cut
off.Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for injunction
with damages (Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the petitioner
MWSS.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated January 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581 is
AFFIRMED in toto.

Facts:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc., namely, Rodolfo
Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto Ruales, were apprehended by members of
the Quezon City police force for allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401,
as... amended by B.P. Blg. 876. The respondent's employees were subsequently criminally charged
(Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo. On account of the incident, the respondent's
water service connection was cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for...
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the court a quo that the
petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, in cutting off the respondent's water
service connection without prior notice. Due to lack of water, the health and... sanitation, not only
of the respondent's patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected. The
respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages.
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the aforesaid decision to the CA.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME CODE
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional
law, or recognized as a result of long usage,[6] constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one
person against the other.
the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right... should not be confused with the
manner by which such right is to be exercised.
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of one's rights:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable.[9] In this case, the petitioner
failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is... due to it when the petitioner
unceremoniously cut off the respondent's water service connection.
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo
and the appellate court that the petitioner's act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the
respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil
Code.
the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around
6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal
day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for
which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket
of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture
taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of
hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great
shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to
speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave
the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still
recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step
out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million
Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17

FACTS:

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko
Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr.
Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager,
Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the
latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough
to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman
accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr.Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by
the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. ZenaidaFruto, if Dr.
Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She
wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t
want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that
the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with
the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms. Lim was when she approached
him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”.
Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him.
It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she
was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ruled that Mr. Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of
Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
guests. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “AmangBisaya”, an
entertainment artist.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
RULING:

No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.

Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Art. 21. of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage”.Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is
an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against
him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being
polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him
only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited,
cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employees.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”
2005 Feb 28
G.R. No. 154259

FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent
was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager.
During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the
Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman
approached him and escorted him out of her party.

Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances
painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to
keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet
table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished
eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party.

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower
court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court,
consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion
for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review.

ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as
the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING: The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof of motive
on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version
of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held
liable as its liability springs from that of its employees.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct.

The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one
who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and

RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO
REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”,
respondent (G.R. No. 154259 February
28, 2005)
Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in
the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of
petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as
attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13,
1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a
party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried
the latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners,
approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a
Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She
said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate,
and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages
caused to plaintiff.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when
Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of
defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to
be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s
reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff
simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners
not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104,
dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.