Case No.

01

Tañada V. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts: This is a case wherein the petitioner seeks the disclosure of a number of P.D.s,
which they claimed had not been published as required by law, invoking the people’s
right to be informed on matters of public concern. However, respondents contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. In the decision of
this case, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of the decrees
ordering respondent to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the “unless it is otherwise provided” effectivity clause does not
require its publication in the Official Gazette.

Held: All statutes including those of local application and private laws shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature, and part of those statutes that should
be published are presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative rules and
regulations, charter of a city and Central Bank circulars. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis
non excusat”. Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what P.D.
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of
the specific contents and texts of such decree.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. More so,
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the P.D. nos., title of the case,
its whereabouts, and its date of effectivity cannot satisfy the publication requirement.
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Case No. 21

Globe Mackay V. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

Facts: Private respondent Restituto Tobias was an employee of Globe Mackay. He

then discovered fictitious purchases and fraudulent transactions for which the company
lost several thousands of pesos. He reported the anomalies to his immediate superior
Eduardo Ferraren and Herbert Hendry, but Hendry confronted him the next day stating
that he was the number one suspect and ordered him to take one week forced leave,
not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open and to leave the
office keys. When Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went
up to him and called him a “crook” and a “swindler”. He was then instructed to go
through a series of examinations by the police investigators to determine his complicity
in the anomalies, but Tobias was cleared. Notwithstanding the two police reports
exculpating Tobias, petitioners filed a complaint of estafa. Then, Tobias received a
notice that his employment has been terminated. Unemployed, Tobias sought
employment with RETELCO, however, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe
Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive and abusive acts of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Art. 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the ff: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in the said article and
results to damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held liable.

In the case at bar, the imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgresses the standards of human conduct set
forth in Art 19 of the Civil Code. The Court had already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom, If the dismissal is done abusively,
then the employer is liable for damages to the employee.
Case No. 41

Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog V. Court of Appeals, Ramonito and Generoso

Balogbog
G.R. No. 83598 March 07, 1997

Facts: Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died
intestate. They had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their
parents. Private respondents on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with
Catalina Ubas and as such are entitled to inherit 1/3 from the estate of their
grandparents. Petitioners deny knowing the private respondents and claim that Gavino
did not marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.

Issue: Whether or not the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalina was
successfully overcome.

Held: Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only
by cogent proof of which the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no
marriage took place. Private respondents proved through testimonial evidence that
Gavino and Catalina were married and that their children were recognized as legitimate
children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of marriage because the State is
interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a matter of
constitutional concern.

Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be
presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and
Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as
husband and wife.
Case No. 61

Chi Ming Tsoi V. Court of Appeals, Gina Lao-Tsoi

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Facts: On May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi had their marriage at the Manila
Cathedral, Intramuros Manila. The first night of their married life was spent in the house
of Gina’s mother. Both of them slept in the same room and in one bed, but there was no
sexual intercourse that occurred between them. The defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. Went they went to Baguio,
the defendant invited her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They stayed
there for 4 days but there was no sexual intercourse between them since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking
chair. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. From the day of their marriage until the day of their separation, no
intercourse has taken place between them. She claims that she did not even see her
husband’s private parts nor did he see hers. For this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, who is a urologist in the Chinese
General Hospital. The results were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin. She
further claims that the defendant is impotent, a closet “homo” as he did not show his
penis, and that he uses an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that he married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to publicly maintain his appearance of a normal man. The
defendant submitted himself in a physical examination. As a result, there is no evidence
of impotency and he is capable of erection. Subsequently, Gina filed a motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to nullify their marriage and the Trial Court granted
the motion and stated their marriage void. On appeal, CA affirmed it. Chi Ming Tsoi, the
petitioner, then filed a motion to the Supreme Court appealing that it is Gina,
respondent, who had a problem on sexual intimacy." Hence, this instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a

basic marital obligation

Held: Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the FC is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of a marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The assailed decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.

Case No. 81

Republic of the Philippines V. Court of Appeals, Alan Alegro

G.R. No. 159614 December 09, 2005

Facts: Alan Alegro and Lea Julaton were married in Jan. 1995. On Feb. 1995, Lea
arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house.
He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go
back to her parents. Alan narrated that when he reported for work the following day, Lea
was still in the house, but when he arrived home later, Lea was nowhere to be found,
and did not return home since then. Alan further testified that after his work, he went to
the house of Lea’s parents to look for Lea; he went to the house of one of Lea’s friends,
Janeth Bautista, and to his friends’ houses as well; he sought the help of Brgy. Captain
Magat; when informed by Nelson Abaenza that Janet had left for Manila, he went to
Manila and went to the house of Janeth in Navotas; on his free-time as a taxi driver, he
would look for Lea in the malls; when he returned to Samar, he again looked for his
wife; he reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and NBI. The Trial
Court declared Lea as presumptively dead after his filing of the aforementioned petition
on March 2001. The Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Trial Court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent acted on a well-founded belief of the death of his
wife.

Held: The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Brgy. Captain Magat.
The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other
person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony.
On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his
parents-in-law, his father in- law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left
without notice.

More so, respondent, failed to make inquiries from his parents in- law regarding Lea’s
whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility
of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s
whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.

The respondent did not report and seek the help of the local authorities and the NBI to
locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice
to dismiss his petition in the RTC. In summary, the Court finds and so holds that the
respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
in the RTC, that his spouse Lea was already dead.
Case No. 101

Uy V. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000

Facts: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of
the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their
conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically
incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the
husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291
and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending
that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of Family Code and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person
and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the
provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing
special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process
particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that
Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact between
Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing
mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in
law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties,
may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a
parcel of land with improvements.

Held: No. SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not
apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in
a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.

The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same
powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the
sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial
proceedings under Family Code. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to
provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised
Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve
notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show the
cause why the petition should not be granted.

Case No. 121

Andal V. Macaraig
G.R. No. 2474 May 30, 1951

Facts: Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint
for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano
Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated the land by
virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from
tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house
and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed.
Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of
Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend
the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

Held: Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on
January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he
was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the
husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes
absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and
incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place
through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other
than the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between
husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the
owner of the parcel land.
Case No. 141

Amadora V. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

Facts: Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his
relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate
would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito
Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as
well.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants
liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.

Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically
not schools of arts and trades

Held: The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180)
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of
reddendo singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the
general rule.

Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones
directly involved with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head
and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old
schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and
directly instructed the apprentices.

Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because
there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or
that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their
non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him
because he wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted
by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply
sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances
here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek,
as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.