I.
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Effectivity of Laws
1. Tañada v. Tuvera
FACTS: Tañada with a group of lawyers came to court and claimed that
they have plenty of presidential decrees issued by former president
Marcos. and that these decrees were not published. Invoking the
people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated. Tañada’s group filed a case to
compel the public officials concerned to publish, and or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders issued by then President
Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that all unpublished issuances should
be published in the Official Gazette and newspapers for general
circulation. The Supreme Court explained that the publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by Art. 2 of the Civil Code and shall take effect after fifteen
days upon completion of their publication. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other issuances however, which apply
only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned.
2. People v. Simon
3. GSIS v. COA
4. People v. Que Po Lay
FACTS :In 1949, the Central Bank issued Circulat No. 20 requiring
persons in possession of foreign exchange to sell the same to the Central
Bank. The appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange
consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to
about $7000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its
agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said
circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or
omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular
had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638
and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official
Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Que Po Lay can be penalized under the CN 20
despite lack of publication?
HELD: NO. Que Po Lay cannot be penalized. While CN 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law, it was however issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance. It has the force and
effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. In the present case,
although CN 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after
appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular,
particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no
one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951. In
other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for CN 20
was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession within one day of his taking possession
thereof.
5. Victorias Milling Corp. v. Social Security Commission,
Ignorance of Law
6. Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner, -versus- ISAGANI D. BOBIS,
Respondent G.R. No. 138509, FIRST DIVISION, July 31, 2000,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party
may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license
is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its
nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be
remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence
at the material time of the first marriage.
FACTS On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with
one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled,
nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second
marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on
petitioners complaint-affidavit. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated
a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the
first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
ISSUE Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy. (NO)
RULING A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It
is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the
criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.
Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence
of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal
case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have
been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or
may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on
the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. Article 40 of
the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of
this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine
the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage
was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still
no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it
not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. In the
case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake
and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage
and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage
license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining
a declaration of nullity of the first on the assu
7. Bank of America, NT & SA vs American Realty Corp.
Prospective Application of Laws
8. People vs Valdez
9. Erectors, Inc vs NLRC
Repeal of Laws
10. Aguetas vs CA
11. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA,
12. De Agbayani vs PNB
Judicial Decisions
13. Co vs CA
14. Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
Nationality Principle (Lex Nationalii)
15. Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS: Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age, exchanged marriage vows
with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, without the knowledge of
her parents. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because
Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted because
of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke. The
following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father
Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be
an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church. The
recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, a letter disclosing an
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;
Vicenta thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta had gone to
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her
marriage stirred in Cebu society. A lawyer filed for her a petition,
drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage.
She did not sign the petition and the case was dismissed without
prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing. On 24 June
1950, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she
was single, that her purpose was to study, and that she was domiciled in
Cebu City. The application was approved, and she left for the United
States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the Tenchavez in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character". On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by
the said tribunal. In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition
with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor.
On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her
marriage On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on
8th of August 1958
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to be declared legally separated from
the defendant Vicenta F. Escaño, and the latter liable for damages
amounting to 1 million pesos.
HELD: YES, plaintiff is entitled to a decree of legal separation from
the defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño. But on the liability for
damages amounting to 1 million pesos, the latter is required only to
pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages
and attorneys' fees. Neither party to recover costs.
16. Van Dorn vs Romillo, Jr.,
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United
States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972. In 1982 they were
divorced in Nevada, USA. Petitioner re-married in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, private respondent filed suit against the
petitioner in the RTC of Pasay City stating that petitioner Alice’s
business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is their conjugal
property and that the private respondent be declared with the right to
manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that
he and petitioner had “no community property”. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved
is located in the Philippines so the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case.
Petitioner contends that the respondent is estopped from laying
claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation
he made in the divorce proceedings. Respondent on the other hand
maintain that,the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public policy.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: The divorce decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner,
as her husband, in any State of the Union.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
17. Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on
Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in
Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceedings
against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.On the
other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a
trial court in Manila on January 23, 1983
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to the petitioner. More than five months after the issuance
of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to
Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her
and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued
a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute
petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery even though they are no
longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
Held:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage,
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that private
respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far
as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and
has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Principle of Lex Rei Sitae:
Real property as well as personal property is subject to law where it
is situated
18. Testate Estate of Bohanan vs Bohanan
Facts: Bohanan was born in Nebraska therefore he is a citizen of
Nebraska even though he lived in the Philippines for a long period of
time. He still remained a citizen of the United States. Bohanan
eventually chose Nevada to spend the rest of his days when he
died. He remained a citizen of the United States.
Issues1. Whether or not the disposition of Bohanan’s Estate is valid
because of the petitioner. His Former wife, Magdalena Bohanan, and two
of her children Mary Lydia and Edward Bohanan claim that they have
been deprived of their share of the Estate under the laws of the
Philippines
2. The claim of the testator’s children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan,
who had received legacies in the amount of PHP 6, 000 each only, and,
therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which in
accordance with the laws, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the
testator.
Ruling: The wife of the Testator, Magdalena Bohanan claims that she
should be entitled to receive but the last will has not given her any
share of the Estate left by the testator. Therefore the court refused to
recognize her claim on the ground that the laws of Nevada of which
the deceased is a citizen allow him to dispose of all of his estate or
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to
his wife. Therefore Magdalena Bohanan has no right to share in the
inheritance left by the testator. For the second issue, the old Civil
Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in
1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal
property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, thus the two-third rule is not
enforceable
19. Bellis vs Bellis
Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave,
inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. Amos G. Bellis executed a will
in the Philippines, in which he directed that his distributable estate
should be divided in the following manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000.00 each
and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives.
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he
divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived
him), and, finally, three illegitimate children. 6 years prior Amos Bellis’
death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate
and properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their
oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been
deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his
Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation
of two separate wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the
determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights
RULING: Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the
Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the
intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since
Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to
the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the
deceased.
20. In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward E. Christensen
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to
California, where he resided and consequently was considered a
California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his
residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen
of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only
heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural
daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of
the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable;
that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the
successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On
the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that in as
much as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national
law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply
the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law
there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose
of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering
the estate of Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said
in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter:
It is ultimately the Philippine Law. The California law has two rules on the
matter. The internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in
California and the conflicts rule which should apply to Californians
domiciled outside of California. Edward being domiciled outside California
(in the Philippines) follows that the law of his domicile. The validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, Helen,
should be governed by the Philippine law in determining the successional
rights of Helen.
II. HUMAN RELATIONS Art. 19-21
21. Amonoy vs Gutierrez,
In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Fornilda in a
partition case. Since Fornilda had no money to pay, he agreed to
make use of whatever property he acquires as a security for the
payment of Amonoy’s attorney’s fees which amounts to P27k. In July
1969, Fornilda died. A month later, the property was finally adjudicated
and Fornilda, through his heirs, got his just share from the property in
dispute. Fornilda was however unable to pay Amonoy. Hence, Amonoy
sought to foreclose the property in 1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the
spouses Jose Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda then sued Amonoy
questioning the validity of his mortgage agreement with Fornilda. It
was their claim that the attorney’s fees he was collecting was
unconscionable and that the same was based on an invalid mortgage
due to the existing attorney-client relationship between him and Fornilda
at the time the mortgage was executed.
The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals
but they appealed to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.No. L-72306.
Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to foreclose the property.
Amonoy was also the highest bidder in the public sale conducted in view
of the foreclosure. He was able to buy the property of Fornilda for
P23k. But constructed on said property was the house of the spouses
Gutierrez.
Pending the spouses’s appeal with the Supreme Court, Amonoy was
able to secure a demolition order and so on May 30, 1986, Amonoy
started demolishing the house of the spouses. But on June 2, 1986, the
Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
the demolition order. On June 4, 1986, Amonoy received a copy of the
TRO. Finally, on June 24, 1989, the Supreme Court promulgated a
decision in G.R.No. L-72306 where it ruled that the mortgage between
Amonoy and Fornilda is void, hence, Amonoy has no right over the
property. But by this time, the house of the spouses was already
demolished because it appears that despite the TRO, Amonoy
continued demolishing the house until it was fully demolished in the
middle of 1987.The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It is now
the contention of Amonoy that he incurred no liability because he was
merely exercising his right to demolish (pursuant to the demolition order)
hence what happened was a case of damnum absque injuria (injury
without damage).
ISSUE: Whether or not Amonoy is correct.
HELD: No. Amonoy initially had the right to demolish but when he
received the TRO that right had already ceased. Hence, his continued
exercise of said right after the TRO was already unjustified. As quoted by
the Supreme Court: “The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others.”
What Amonoy did is an abuse of right. Article 19, known to contain
what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible.
22. Pro Line Sports Center VS. CA
This case stemmed from a criminal case for unfair competition filed
by Pro Line Sports Center, Inc. and Questor Corporation against
Monico Sehwani, president of UNIVERSAL. In that case, Sehwani was
exonerated. As a retaliatory move, Sehwani and UNIVERSAL filed a
civil case for damages against PROLINE and QUESTOR for what
they perceived as the wrongful and malicious filing of the criminal
action for unfair competition against them. Edwin Dy Buncio, General
Manager of PROLINE, sent a letter-complaint to the NBI regarding the
alleged manufacture of fake "Spalding" balls by UNIVERSAL.
On February 23, 1981, the NBI applied for a search warrant with Judge
Vera and issued Search Warrant No. 2-81 authorizing the search of the
premises of UNIVERSAL in Pasig. In the course of the search,
some 1,200 basketballs and volleyballs marked"Spalding" were seized
and confiscated by the NBI Meanwhile, on February 26 1981,
PROLINE and QUESTOR filed a criminal complaint for unfair
competition against respondents Monico Sehwani and Robert,
Kisnu, Arjan, and Sawtri, all surnamed Sehwani and Arcadio del los
Reyes, before the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The complaint was
dropped on June 24, 1981, for the reason that it was doubtful
whether QUESTOR had indeed acquired theregistration rights
over the mark "Spalding" from A.G. Spalding Bros., Inc.,
After the prosecution rested its case, Sehwani filed a demurrer to
evidence arguing that the act of selling the manufactured goods was an
essential and constitutive element of the crime of unfair competition
under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and the
prosecution could not prove that he sold the products. In its
Order of January 12 1981, the trial court granted the demurrer and
dismissed the charge against SehwaniAfter that, UNIVERSAL and
Sehwani filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig,charging that PROLINE and QUESTOR maliciously and
without legal basis committed the following acts to their damage and
prejudice
Issues:
1. Whether private respondents Sehwani and UNIVERSAL are entitled
to recover damages for thealleged wrongful recourse to court
proceedings by petitioners PROLINE and QUESTOR; and,
2. Whether petitioners' counterclaim should be sustained.
Ruling: PROLINE and QUESTOR cannot be adjudged liable for
damages for the alleged unfounded suit. Thecomplainants could
not prove two essential elements of the crime of malicious
prosecution: absence ofprobable cause and legal malice on the part
of petitioners.UNIVERSAL failed to show that the filing of Crim.
Case No. 45284 was bereft of probable cause. Probablecause is the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind
23. Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs CA
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. The elements of an abuse of right under
Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another. In this case, petitioners could not be said to have
violated the a forestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a
bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by a
private respondent. Moreover, private respondent did nothing to clarify
the case of mistaken identity at first propitious hand. Instead, private
respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless
petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for
damages
FACTS: Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered.
As part payment thereof, Albenson was given by Pacific Banking
Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks. When presented for payment,
the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter,
petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored
check. From the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the
recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." In
addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking
Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the
subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao". After obtaining the
foregoing information, Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to
replace and/or make good the dishonored check. Respondent Baltao,
through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature
appearing thereon is his. On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S.
Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son
Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E. L.
Woodworks, on the ground floor of Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed.
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for
allegedly issuing a check that bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against
herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and
Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages. (NO)
RULING: Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards that may be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. The elements of an abuse of right under
Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Petitioners could not be said to have violated the forested
principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for
violation of BP 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect
the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly
believed was issued to them by a private respondent. Petitioners had
conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the
following results: from the records of the SEC, it was discovered that the
President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates),
was one "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and
Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the check
was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao";
verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation,
revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged to one
"Eugenio Baltao"
24. Garciano vs CA
Facts: The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year
in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. she
applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was
taking her to Austria The application was recommended for approval by
the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of
the school's Board of Directors Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the
petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still
abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's
founder, concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers
Association and... the school faculty, to terminate her services as a
member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written
contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to
sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a
temporary... basis as no one would accept the position without a written
contract Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz,
signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your
usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . .
effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination
received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the
Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared null and void.
On September 3, 1982, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito
Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination
and unjust and illegal dismissal. the lower court rendered a decision on
August 30, 1985, ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay her
P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, P32,400
as lost earnings for nine years, and P10,000 as litigation expenses and
attorney's... fees.The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to
the Court of Appeals... which on August 30, 1990
Issue: they should not have been held liable to plaintiff-appellee for
damages
Ruling: The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court
of Appeals Defendants- Appellants had no authority to dismiss the
plaintiff. appellee and the latter was aware of this. Hence, the letter of
termination sent to her... through her husband by the defendants-
appellants had no legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent
her from reporting for work.
Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code
arises only from unlawful, willful, or negligent acts that are contrary
to law, morals, good customs, or public policy the Court of Appeals
was correct in finding that the petitioner's discontinuance from
teaching was her own choice.
Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover damages
to injured... persons who are not themselves at fault
The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified for
she is not entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages (Art.
2234, Civil Code)... the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
25. Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp, vs CA
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the NCC are known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, which sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards
are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. In this case, the petitioners clearly failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article
21 of the Civil Code.The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
FACTS: Restituto M. Tobias (Tobias) herein private respondent was an
employee of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp (GMCRC) herein
petitioner. Herbert Hendry (Hendry) herein petitioner, was the Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of GMCRC. Sometime in 1972,
GMCRC discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Thereafter,
Hendry ordered Tobias to take a force leave so as to have Tobias
investigated. Hendry declared that Tobias was their number one suspect
in the anomaly. Thus, criminal complaints for estafa were filed against
Tobias. These charges were, however, dismissed for lack of probable
cause. Subsequently, Hendry dismissed Tobias from employment.
Claiming that he was illegally dismissed, Tobias filed a complaint for
damages against GMCRC and Hendry with the RTC. The RTC decided
in favor of Tobias. On appeal, the CA affirmed. Now, GMCRC and Hendry
assail the decision of the CA. It asseverates that the dismissal of Tobias
was in lawful exercise of its right. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not GMCRC and Hendry exercised lawfully their right
to dismiss Tobias. (NO)
RULING: An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action
such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a
leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded
Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. The imputation of guilt
without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19
of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages
to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to
dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
26. RCPI vs CA
Facts:
the freight company claimed that due to "utter, patent, and wanton...
carelessness, gross negligence and unpardonable fault" of the personnel
of RCPI, the latter transmitted erroneously a telegram which should have
read "No truck available" but instead read "Truck available", As a
consequence, the freight company suffered damages, and prayed for...
an award of P100,00.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral
damages, exemplary or corrective damages in the discretion of the Court,
and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees
Issues:
The respondent court erred in condemning the petitioner to pay
corrective damages and attorney's fees plus costs and litigation
expenses
Ruling: We gave due course to the Petition on January 28, 1981, only in
so far as the aspect of damages is concerned, having found that
respondent Court correctly concluded that the error in the transmission of
the telegram was due to the gross negligence of RCPI employees and...
not to atmospheric disturbances as it claimed, and that there was no
contributory negligence on the part of the freight company.
In respect of compensatory and actual damages, it is not entirely
erroneous to grant both items of damages. They were so awarded in MD
Transit vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 22 SCRA 559 (1968). True,
compensatory and actual... damages are dealt with in the Civil Code
under the same Chapter 2 thereof and that the two terms are used
therein as equivalent to one another. However, as provided for in Article
2200 of the Civil Code, which is part of the aforementioned Chapter 2,...
indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the
loss suffered, or actual damages ("damnum emergens"), but also that of
the profits which the obligee failed to obtain, or compensatory damages
("lucrum cessans").[1] In other words, there are two components to actual
or compensatory damages.
In this particular case, the value of the actual loss suffered by Yabut has
been proven to be P132.12 (not P500.00 as held by respondent Court).
[2] This is compensable. Compensatory... damages were also awarded
for injury to Yabut's "business reputation or business standing", "loss of
goodwill and loss of customers or shippers who shifted their patronage to
competitors". The grant thereof is proper under the provisions of Article
2205 of the
Civil Code, which provides that damages may be recovered "for injury to
the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit." And even if not
recoverable as compensatory damages, they may still be awarded in the
concept of temperate or moderate damages.
"There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that
there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit
or to the goodwill of a business... firm is often hard to show with certainty
in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The
judge should be empowered to calculate moderate damages in such
cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from
the... defendant's wrongful act.
Exemplary damages were likewise properly imposed. In contracts and
quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.[4] There was gross negligence on the part of RCPI personnel in
transmitting the wrong telegram, for which RCPI must be held liable.
Gross carelessness or negligence constitutes wanton misconduct
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court is hereby modified and
the damages awarded hereby reduced to P3,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages;
and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and... litigation expenses.
27. Tanjanco vs CA,
Facts: From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted
the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of legal age. Tanjanco
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who
eventually reciprocated such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of
marriage in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge
sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to
Santos which eventually led to Santos getting pregnant. As a result of her
pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretary in IBM
Philippines, Inc. In her state of unemployment Santos became unable to
support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not fulfill his
promise of marriage she suffered mental anguish, a besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos
prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn
child she was bearing, and pay her for support and damages.
Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to
state cause of action. Santos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
and the latter decided the case, stating that no cause of action was
shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a
cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil
Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision pleading that actions for breach
of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of
his promise to marry her.
Held:
No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult
age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated
acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction.
Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant
been deceived she would not have again yielded to his embraces much
less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that the
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable
for a breach of promise to marry.
In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted
by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the
original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the
memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort
upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction
is not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and
granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for
one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual
passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind the
idea of seduction.
28. Constantino vs Mendez,
Facts: It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita
Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support, and damages
against private respondent Ivan Mendez. In her complaint, Amelita
Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of
August 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta.
Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following...
their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico
where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and
courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's
proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked
Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of
getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and
through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to
Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact
in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in
Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help
and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no... sexual relations with
any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at
the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy,
Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a
prosperous businessman of
Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita
prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual,
moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied
having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.
the trial court rendered a decision... rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to
pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and
moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's
fees.On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision
was set aside and the complaint was dismissed.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
factual findings of the trial court and in not affirming the decision of the
trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate court committed a
misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan did... not have
sexual access with Amelita during the first or second week of November,
1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.
Issues:
whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the
complaint
Ruling:
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of
Appeals to review the factual findings of the... trial court and rectify the
errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as could be
established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It is the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that
as a rule are considered final and... conclusive even on this Court
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on
record, that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing
evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael
Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the... evidence
on record is controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the
evidence on record. Even the trial court initially entertained such posture.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit
6) so that as correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing
medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that
"the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting... from the day of
conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the child
(Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1975
or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita
testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November,... 1974,
nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh.
F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez
requesting for a conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto
Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances...
of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that
Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the
duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about
October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN,
December 8, 1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed
to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment to
Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by... her boyfriend. She
also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of
gossips so she left her work.
The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations
that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence... establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint
must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles19* &
21** of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of
marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with... the
Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for
recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a
product of voluntariness and mutual desire.
29. Pe vs Pe
FACTS: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers, and sisters of one Lolita Pe,
who is 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant, Alfonso Pe, on the other
hand, is a married man. Because of the similarity in their family name, the
defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member
of their family. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love
affairs. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge
of her parents, the defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and even from seeing Lolita. Nevertheless, the defendant continued his
love affair with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home.
Plaintiffs then brought an action to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages. They based their action on Article 21
of the New Civil Code, which provides that “Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.” Defendant set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein,
even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
ISSUE:
Did the defendant commit injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of
the New Civil Code?
HELD:YES. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in
Article 20 of the Civil Code. The wrong caused by Alfonso is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
The defendant took advantage of the trust of the plaintiffs and even used
the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The defendant
tried to win Lolita’s affection thru an ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced Lolita to the extent of making her fall in love with him. No other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant
not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning
the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with
her.
30. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or
quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Prior decisions
of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction
FACTS: On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance
of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that petitioner courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan
to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987,
the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she
was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment,
she sustained injuries, during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's
fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may
be just and equitable. The lower court applying Article 21 of the Civil
Code ruled in favor of respondent. The CA affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE: W/N Article 21 is applies to the case at bar
RULING: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate
and punish in the statute books. In the light of the above laudable
purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance
of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him
in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted
to. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be
applied-in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of
moral seduction
31. Buñag vs CA
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, he invited her
to take their merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, to which
plaintiff obliged. But instead to Aristocrat he brought plaintiff to a motel or
hotel where he raped her. Later that evening, defendant brought plaintiff
to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days.
Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their
respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. October 1, 1973, Defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage
license.
Defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating the plaintiff and
compelled her to go back to her parents. The plaintiff was ashamed when
she went home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception
done against her by appellants. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages
for an alleged breach of promise to marry.The trial court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff and against the petitioner, but absolved his father.
Issue: Whether or not the failure to comply with the promise of the
marriage of the defendant is considered contrary to morals, good custom
or public policy.
Held: It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule
that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of
promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has
actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
thereof.
32. Ponce vs Legaspi
FACTS: Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of the
stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was
owned by the spouses Porter.The allegations of petitioner states that
during the time while respondent Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR,
there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other
officers; that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport
Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still used the
office space, equipments and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant
frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa was filed where Legaspi
appeared as counsel for Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take
steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for
disbarment against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was granted by the
lower court and affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint for damages by Legaspi is justified.
RULING: Decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO: While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded
criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits,
the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original
proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without
doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be the basis for a
subsequent action for malicious prosecution. However, malice and want
of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the
case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in
appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the
interest of which he was duty bound to protect, constituted grave
misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the petitioner, however, was of
the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to
appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she
had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the
disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per
se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of
damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage
results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria
Unjust Enrichment / Accion In Rem Verso
33. Obaña vs CA
DOCTRINE: No person should be benefited without a valid basis or
justification and shall enrich himself at the expense of another.
FACTS: Sandoval sold 170 cavans of rice to Chan Lin at P37.25 per
cavan, to be delivered at Obana's store in San Fernando, La
Union. Chan Lin accompanied the delivery and sold the same rice to
Obana at P33.00 per cavan. When Sandoval's driver tried to collect the
payment from Chan Lin, he was nowhere to be found. Obana
refused to pay Sandoval, claiming that he had already paid Chan Lin.
Sandoval filed a suit for replevin against Obana. The Municipal Court
ordered Obana to pay Sandoval half of the cost of the rice. The
Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint. The Court of
Appeals reversed and ordered Obana to return the rice or pay its value
to Sandoval.
ISSUE: Did Obana unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Sandoval?
RULING: YES. Obana unjustly enriched1 himself by holding on to the
rice that did not belong to him. He did not acquire ownership of the rice
because Chan Lin was not authorized by Sandoval to sell it to him. 2
Chan Lin was merely an agent who had no power to dispose of the
goods entrusted to him. Obana should have verified Chan Lin's
authority before paying him. Sandoval did not receive any payment
for the rice and was deprived of his property by Chan Lin's fraud.
Therefore, Sandoval is entitled to recover the rice or its value from
Obana, who benefited from Chan Lin's swindling. Notably, Obana
himself testified before the Court of First Instance, he admits that three
days after the delivery, he was repaid the sum of P5,600.00 by Chan
Lin, who was then accompanied by SANDOVAL's driver, and that he
had delivered the rice back to them. On rebuttal, however, the driver
denied that the rice had ever been returned. Having been repaid the
purchases price by Chan Lin , the sale, as between them, had
been voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby
divested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should
return the rice to Chan Lin, but since even the latter, again from
petitioner-defendant's own testimony above-quoted, was ready to
return the rice to SANDOVAL, and the latter's driver denies that the
rice had been returned by petitioner-defendant cannot be allowed to
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another by holding on to
property no longer belonging to him.7 In law and in equity, therefore,
SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, or the value there of
since he was not paid the price therefor. WHEREFORE, albeit on a
different premise, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
Article 24
34. Valenzuela vs CA
Facts: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No.
FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza
Street, Araneta Avenue. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where
there were people, to verify whether she had a flat... tire and to solicit
help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat
and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights,
alighted from the car, and... went to the rear to open the trunk. She was
standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a
man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a
1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in
the name of... defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.he was brought to
the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)." She was
confined in the hospital for twenty (20)... days and was eventually fitted
with an artificial leg Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent.he
was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with
a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full
bright lights.
when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San
Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph,
with "full bright lights. Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the
right... to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's
car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no
parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.
Issues: Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving his
company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for us to determine
is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory
negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire
area Li points out, is a no parking zone.
Ruling: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. Based on the foregoing definition,... the standard or act to
which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for
her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree. While the emergency
rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity
to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which
is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the
suddenness of the event which... absolutely negates thoughtful care, but
by the over-all nature of the circumstances.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her
to do so and which is not a hazard to... other motorists. It would be
hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because
the entire length of
Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) In the instant case, Valenzuela,
upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St.,
noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid... putting herself and other
motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation.
Principles: Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise
the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The
emergency... which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions
35. Rongavilla vs CA
36. Cayabyab vs CA
FACTS: Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994, and the eldest
among the six children of Conrado and Metchie Bertiz. She was six years
and nine months old when the rape was committed on August 7, 2001.
On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home in Manlunas
St., Lagoon Area, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, taking care of her
younger siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene, while her father was
out. On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant went to the victim’s
house and asked her to lie down on her father’s bed. When she refused,
appellant removed her clothes and his own clothes, then forced her to lie
down on the bed and laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Alpha Jane shouted in pain which startled the appellant who
sprayed her with tear gas and left. Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly
thereafter and Alpha Jane told her what had happened. She immediately
reported the incident to the barangay officials and brought Alpha Jane to
the Philippine Air Force General Hospital for medical examination. She
also sought assistance from the police at the 521st Air Police Squadron
who, after gathering information from the victim, arrested the appellant at
his house. Alpha Jane was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
Camp Crame the following day, and on August 10, 2001, to the Child
Protection Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH for further medical examinations, which
both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on the
victim’s genitalia.
ISSUE: won the photocopy of birth certificate may be admitted.
HELD: Yes. We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a
mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the absence of any showing
that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without
the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the victim’s minority, for said
photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the “best evidence rule” as
expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which reads: . . . (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Without doubt, a
certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil
registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the
photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may
be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case at
hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production. In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of
the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having
failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this
secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed
admitted and the other party is bound thereby. In fine, we find that the
prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old,
being born on November 26, 1994, when the rape incident happened on
August 7, 2001.
Protection of Human Dignity
37. Concepcion vs CA
Facts: 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at No.
51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased
to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also
resided in the same compound... where the apartment was located.
Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying
government agencies and private entities with office equipment,
appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis.
Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing... capital on
condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit
earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor. Sometime in
the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the
deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latter's
apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with
Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing!
Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat
ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para
magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing." To clarify matters, Nestor went with
Rodrigo, upon the latter's dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion
family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom
they were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. The same
accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2)
confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the
imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor
from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the
telephone reiterating... his accusation and threatening her that should
something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the
affair, he would kill Florence.
Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that
he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased
to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much so
that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could
no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. To
make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestor's fidelity
resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even
expressed her desire to... leave her husband. Consequently, Nestor was
forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the
Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of
being Florence's lover. Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects
of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then only
casually asked the latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.
Issues: whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to
private respondents, the Nicolas spouses;
Ruling: All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the
award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We
reject petitioner's posture that no legal provision supports such award,
the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor
Art.26 of the Civil Code.There is no question that private respondent
Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner's
abusive, scandalous and insulting language. Petitioner attempted to
exculpate himself by... claiming that he made an appointment to see
Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could talk
with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship with
Florence. He said that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and
the name of... his late brother (Florence's husband).[13] How he could be
convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he would
protect his nephews and nieces and his family's name if the rumor were
true, he did not say. Petitioner admitted that he had... already talked with
Florence herself over the telephone about the issue, with the latter
vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not
let the matter rest on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He had
to go and confront Nestor, even in... public, to the latter's humiliation.
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the
truth about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate
denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to
face, invade the latter's privacy and hurl defamatory words at him... in the
presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him -
a married man - of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This
definitely caused private respondent much shame and embarrassment
that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood... without
feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in
his family where before there was none. This is why a few days after the
incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public apology and
payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.
If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not
actually happen, then there would have been no cause or motive at all for
them to consult with their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and
not obtaining a response from petitioner, file an action for... damages
against the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek redress
bespeaks of the validity of their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting
to note that while explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion
testified against him, petitioner never advanced any... reason why the
Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no
dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped
our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private respondents, petitioner
sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk... not to the Nicolas
spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case,
otherwise her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly,
Florence told the lawyer that it was not for her to decide and that she
could not do anything about it as she was not a... party to the court case.
38. St. Louis Realty Corp vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner, St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the
permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio but without permission of private
respondent Dr. Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and faculty member of UERM
Medical Center, in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968,
an advertisement with the heading “WHERE THE HEART IS”. The same
advertisement was republished in the Sunday Times dated January 5,
1969.
The private respondent noticed the mistake and wrote a letter of protest.
The letter was received by St. Louis Realty’s officer in charge of
advertising. He stopped the publication of the advertisement. However,
no rectification or apology was made. Private respondent’s counsel
demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral, and exemplary damages
of P110,000. It published in the issue of the Manila Times on March 18,
1969, a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house
but it did not publish any apology to Dr. Aramil and an explanation of the
error. Dr. Aramil filed a complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty
published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15, 1969, a notice of
rectification.
St. Louis Realty argued that the case was not covered by Article 26 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the case at bar is covered by Article 26 of the Civil
Code.

HELD: YES. St. Louis Realty’s employee was grossly negligent in mixing
up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication
like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written
apology or explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier “rectification “.
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from
Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life
was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered a diminution of
income and mental anguish.
Liability of Public Servants or Employees
39. Ledesma vs CA
FACTS:On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation filed Case No. 38287 in the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal against petitioner to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt
Agreement No. 7389 executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which
petitioner had failed to comply with. As summons could not be served on
the latter, said case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981.
On December 2, 1988, private respondent bank instituted Civil Case No.
88-2572 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 133,
against petitioner on the same cause of action and subject matter.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription which was
denied and judgment was rendered in favor of private respondent. Said
judgment was affirmed by respondent Court and petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied.
Petitioner's petition for review on certiorari of the said judgment was
denied its present motion for reconsideration contending that the second
action filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed.
ISSUE:Whether the second action filed by private respondent bank had
already prescribed
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the filing of the first action interrupted the
running of the period, and then declared that at any rate, the second
action was filed within the balance of the period remaining.
Article 1155 of the Civil. Code provides that the prescription of an action,
involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an
action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is
interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand
by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.
The correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected
in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in the case of
Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways Company.
Article 1155 has been interpreted in both case to mean that upon the
cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of
prescription commences to run anew. Petitioner is wrong in insisting that
in case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled
and continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period
available for the filing of another action. This postulation of petitioner, if
we are to adopt it, would result in an absurdity wherein Article 1155
would be interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the prescriptive period is
interrupted in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written
acknowledgment of a debt, but it is merely tolled where an action is filed
in court.
Hence, the present motion is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
Civil Liability Arising from Criminal Offenses and from Quasi Delict
40. Caiña vs People
Merlin P. Caiña, whom we denominate petitioner, questions the award of
damages made by the Municipal Trial Court while acquitting him of the
charge of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. The
award of damages was initially deleted on appeal but was later on
reinstated by the Regional Trial Court upon a motion for reconsideration.
The records of this case were sent to the Court of Appeals inspite of the
appellant's error in filing a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court on a
pure question of law. The appellate court forwarded the case to us.
Instead of rejecting the case at that time, this Court considered the issue
sufficiently important to warrant this review. The completed records were
re-assigned to the undersigned ponente for study and report preparatory
to full court deliberations only on August 5, 1992.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The petitioner, Merlin P. Caiña, accused of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries, was acquitted of the criminal charge against
him in a decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 4. However, the petitioner was ordered to pay the
private complainant, Dolores Perez, the sum of P2,893.40 representing
actual damages. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and for failure of the prosecution
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is hereby acquitted.
"However, the accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the
amount of P2,893.40 representing the actual damages incurred by the
private complainant in connection with this case." (Records, pp. 479-480)
The petitioner, questioning the award of damages, appealed to the
Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 24 rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing observations, the decision
pertaining to the civil aspect only, appealed from, is hereby REVERSED
and a new one entered, absolving accused of civil liability. It is
understood that this decision does not touch the trial court's decision on
the acquittal of the accused." (Rollo, p. 33)
The private complainant subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration
upon which the Regional Trial Court reversed its former decision, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing observations, this court hereby
RESOLVES to reconsider its decision dated February 17, 1986 and
consequently to AFFIRM as it hereby affirms in toto the decision
appealed from as far as the civil aspect of the same is concerned."
(Rollo, p. 43)
As a result of such reversal, the petitioner filed this appeal raising one
legal Issue to be resolved:
"THAT THE TRIAL COURT AND THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST THE
HEREIN PETITIONER AND THE SAID AWARD IS VOID AND
ILLEGAL." (Rollo p. 26)
The petitioner alleges that the award for damages is void and illegal as
there was no finding of any preponderance of evidence as to the causal
connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by
the private complainant. In fact, there is a clear showing from the face of
the decision of the trial court that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise does not exist.
Before discussing the merits of this case, we first discuss the procedural
aspect.
The procedure adopted by the petitioner in this case is improper. This is
evident from the fact that the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the
Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court claiming that the issue raised
is a pure question of law (Records, p. 805). The proper procedure that
should have been followed was to file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Regional Trial Court in its order issued March 31, 1987 (Records, p.
807) correctly reminded the petitioner that the appeal to the Supreme
Court shall be through a petition for certiorari governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, the Regional Trial Court forwarded the records
of the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in turn, noting
in the Notice of Appeal that only questions of law were involved,
thereupon transmitted the records of said case to this Court (Rollo, p. 1).
This Court en banc, through a resolution entitled Murillo v. Consul, UDK-
9748, March 1, 1990 laid down the following guidelines for appeals in civil
cases and criminal cases except where the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed: (1) If an appeal is attempted
from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that appeal
can and should never go to this Court, regardless of any statement in the
notice that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; (2) If an appeal by
notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals and in the latter Court, the appellant raises naught but issues of
law the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; (3) If an
appeal is essayed from the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction by notice of appeal, instead of
by petition for review, the appeal is inefficacious and should be
dismissed; and (4) it is only through petitions for review on certiorari that
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court may properly be invoked.
Applying the rules abovementioned, the Court of Appeals should hot
have transmitted the records to this Court.
But even assuming arguendo that a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 was correctly filed, from a reading of the petitioner's brief, it can
be seen that what the petitioner is raising is a question of fact.
The case
of Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93, 100-101
[1991], distinguishes between questions of fact and questions of law. We
quote:
xxx xxx xxx
"x x x a question of law - which exists 'when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts' 'there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts,' (Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al.,
19 SCRA 289, 292, citing II Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 2784, and II Martin,
Rules of Court, 255; SEE also, Francisco, The Rules of Court, Annotated
and Commented, 1968, ed., Vol. III, pp. 485-488) or when the 'query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole
and the probabilities of the situation.' (See Lim v. Calaguas, 83 Phil. 796,
799, and Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Rich, 28 SCRA 699, 705, cited in
Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., p. 474)
xxx xxx xxx
Questions on whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence to
justify the award of damages or whether or not there was a causal
connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by
the private complainant or whether or not the act from which civil liability
might arise exists are questions of fact.
In this regard, the petitioner's case should not have been elevated to this
Court since a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 allows only
questions of law to be raised (Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
The proper procedure that he should have adopted was to file a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of
judgment pointing out errors of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed (See
Resolution of Court of Appeals dated August 12, 1971, par. 22 [b] of
Interim Rules of Court and Sec. 22, BP 129).
However, this Court noting that this case was last acted upon by the
Regional Trial Court six (6) years ago and the records of the case have
already been brought to this Court, has decided to delve on the merits of
the case.
The petitioner's contention is meritorious. We grant the petition.
It is clear from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court that there was no
finding of recklessness, negligence and imprudence on the part of the
accused. We quote:
"With respect to the evidence presented by the prosecution, it is the
thinking of the court that the most important or paramount factor in cases
of this nature, is to evidently prove the recklessness, negligence and
imprudence of the
accused. The prosecution failed to show a clear and convincing evidence
of such recklessness, negligence and imprudence. Prosecution witness R
ene Abas stated that the speed of the jeep of the accused was on a regul
ar speed or not so fast or just the very speed the jeep can run. (Decision,
p. 5, Records, p. 477, Underlining Supplied).
It can be gleaned therefore from the decision that the act from which civil
liability might arise does not exist.
It is noted by the Court that in the dispositive portion of the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court, the accused (petitioner in this case) acquittal was
based on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt making it possible for Dolores Perez to prove and recover
damages. (See Article 29, Civil Code) However, from a reading of the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court, there is a clear showing that the act
from which civil liability might arise does not exist. Civil liability is then
extinguished. (See Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 570
[1984])
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the
Regional Trial Court issued on July 14, 1986 is SET ASIDE while the
Regional Trial Court's decision issued on February 17, 1986 reversing
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court pertaining to the civil aspect,
absolving accused of civil liability, is hereby REINSTATED.
41. Tayag vs Alcantara
Acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to prosecution in a civil
action for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver and the
operator.
Facts: On Sept. 2, 1974, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB
’74 and as a result of he was physically injured causing his instantaneous
death as well as destroying the bike he was riding. The bus was being
driven by the defendant, Romeo Villa y Cunanan, at the time of the
accident at a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and
proper and in a grossly negligent, careless, reckless, and imprudent
manner. The heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., petitioners, filed with the Court of
First Instance a complaint for damages against Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan, private respondents, on Sept.
25, 1974. The private respondents admitted some and denied the other
allegations in the complaints; thereafter, filed a motion to suspend trial on
the grounds of a pending criminal case against the driver of the bus,
Romeo Villa y Cunanan. The respondent Judge granted the motion and
subsequently suspended the hearing of the Civil Case. The respondent
judge acquitted the accused, Romeo Villa, of the crime of homicide on
the ground of reasonable doubt in the criminal case filed against him. The
private respondents then filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action on the basis of the
driver’s acquittal in the related criminal case. The petitioners then
opposed the motion alleging that their cause of action is based on a
quasi-delict, not on a crime, but the respondent Judge dismissed the
complaint and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners. Hence, this petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the
order of the respondent Judge was filed.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the civil case.
Held: Yes, The respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the civil case. In this case, the allegations in the complaint
show that the petitioner's cause of action was based upon a quasi -delict.
The essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present,
namely:1) An act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part
of private respondent:2) Damage caused by the said act or omission;3)
Direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission;4) No
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. As stated in the
case of Elcano vs. Hill, the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished by the acquittal of
the accused in the criminal action arising from the same act.
The petitioner’s cause of action is based on a quasi-delict, therefore, the
acquittal of the driver, Romeo Villa, in the criminal case is not a bar to the
prosecution in the civil case for damages based on a quasi-delict. The
petition is granted and the order of dismissal rendered by the respondent
Judge is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
Independent Civil Actions
42. Carandang vs Santiago
FACTS: • This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente
Santiago to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173 suspending the trial
of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534 Tomas
Valenton, Jr. who was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide
committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein.
Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where
the case is now pending. • Petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton,
Jr. and his parents, damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily
injuries received by him on occasion of the commission of the crime of
frustrated homicide by said accused Tomas Valenton Jr. The judge ruled
that the trial of the civil action must await the result of the criminal case
on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was submitted, but the court
denied the same; hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Santiago erred in suspending the civil
case?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes, Article 33 of the new Civil Code
provides: • In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence. • The Code Commission itself states that
the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for
libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But
respondent argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a
specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and therefore said
term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in
accordance with the rules statutory construction • In the case at bar, the
accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated
homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was
inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar
Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not
physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction
of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question arises
whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical
injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily
injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not. • The Article in question
uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation
and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of
offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud
must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the
laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could
not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the
Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article, some in their
general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
"physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are
general terms. • For the foregoing considerations, we find that the
respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil
case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby
ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the
result of the pending criminal case, with costs against the defendant
Article 33 (Carandang v. Santiago)
Facts:The petitioner seeks the help of the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to annul the order of Judge Vicente Santiago suspending the
civil case filed by the petitioner against Tomas Valenton, Sr. and Tomas
Valenton, Jr. to await the result of a criminal case filed by said petitioner
against the defendants.In his contention, Judge Santiago stated that trial
of the civil action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal.
The court anchored its decision on the contention of the defendants that
the plaintiff cannot invoke article 33 since the defendants were charged
with frustrated homicide and not for physical injuries.
Issue: Whether or not the order of the court of first instance is correct.
Ruling:No. The supreme court in its ruling decided in favor of the
appellant, the term physical injuries just like the words defamation and
fraud mentioned in the aforementioned article were used in its generic
sense. It does not pertain to the “physical injury” stated in the Revised
Penal Code, since the defendant in his attempt to kill the plaintiff caused
him bodily injury the court deemed it proper for the plaintiff to invoke
article 33 of the Civil Code.
43. Madeja vs Caro
FACTS: A criminal case for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
instituted before the CFI of Eastern Samar against Dr. Eva Japzon in
relation to the death of her patient Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
The offended party, Carmen Madeja (Cleto’s widow) reserved her right to
file a separate civil action for damages.While the criminal case was still
pending, Carmen filed for damages with the same court. Carmen alleged
that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr.Japzon.
Granted Japzon’s Motion to Dismiss, the instant civil action may be
instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action.
ISSUE: W/N the order of respondent judge to grant the MTD should
be set aside.
HELD: YES. In INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; RECOGNIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 33 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. — The term "physical
injuries"in Article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to
an independent civil action, that reckless imprudence is not included in
Article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was
concurred in by only five Justices.
Prejudicial Question
44. Ras vs Rasul
Facts: On or about April 27, 1978, Luis Pichel filed a complaint against
petitioner Alejandro Ras and a certain Bienvenido Martin before the Court
of First Instance of Basilan, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 73
praying for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by Alejandro
Ras in favor of his co-defendant Bienvenido Martin and for the
declaration of the prior deed of sale allegedly executed in his favor by the
defendant Alejandro Ras as valid. Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed on or
about September 5, 1978 an Information for Estafa in the same court
against Alejandro Ras arising from the same alleged double sale
Issues: prejudicial question
On November 6, 1978, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion for
Suspension of Action" in said Criminal Case No. 240 claiming that the
same facts and issues were involved in both the civil and criminal case
and that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would... necessarily
be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
Ruling: Wherefore, the Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case No.
240 dated December 12, 1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on May 16, 1979 is hereby made
permanent and respondent judge is enjoined from proceeding with the...
arraignment and trial of Criminal Case No. 240 until and unless Civil
Case No. 73 shall have been finally decided and terminated adversely
against petitioner. No costs
Principles:
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of
the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also... that the
resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil
Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the
plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his... signatures in the alleged deed of sale
and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary
that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his
claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was...
committed. The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate
from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the
criminal action.
45. Yap vs Paras
This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of
property they inherited from their parents. The case is complicated by the
circumstance that the private respondent's counsel in this petition is the
son of the judge, the other respondent, whose action is being questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin
Paras.[*]
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in
the intestate estate of their parents for P300.00. The sale was evidenced
by a private document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold
the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa
against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of General Santos City[1] . On the same date, she filed a complaint for the
nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City.[2]
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal
complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D.
Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge
motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground
that:
x x x after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P.
Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court
holds and maintained (sic) that there is a prejudicial question to a civil
action, which must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the case of
Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a
pronouncement that "a criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale
of property is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the
alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of
their signatures to the Deed." [3]
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30,
1991. She then came to this Court for relief in this special civil action for
certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which
has concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case
directly in view of the peculiar circumstances involved.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in
a civil case, the criminal action may not be dismissed but only
suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be done motu proprio by
the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the defendant
in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also stressed that a reversal
of the order of dismissal would not bar the prosecution of the accused
under the double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed
the comment in his behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona.
Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office.
He has made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at the time
the questioned order of dismissal was issued by his father. He thus
impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have
been a basis for the order in view of the alleged double sale of the
property which was being litigated in the regional trial court. He
concedes, however, that the order may have been premature and that it
could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double jeopardy
would not attach because of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his
Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal
action on the ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent
judge did indeed commit grave abuse of discretion in motu
proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended by this Court on July 7,1988, provides as follows:
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal
or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed
in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light
of the clear provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new,
being only a rewording of the original provision in the Rules of Court
before they were amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be
made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it
also says suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if the person
who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C.
Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's
misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended provides:
Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal.[4] It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused.[5]
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending
the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil
case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action
would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused." [6]
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the
criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not
appear anywhere in the decision of Ras v. Rasul.[7] Worse, he has not
only misquoted the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts of that
case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later
also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the
second sale and asked that the sale made by Ras in his favor be
declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold the property to
Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale
were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed against Ras
based on the same double sale that was the subject of the civil action.
Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case),
claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would
necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that
a suspension of the criminal action was in order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases
against petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in
the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as
defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged
prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and
complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the very same
facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or
innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in
favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale
and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in
the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross
injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the
civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and
spurious.
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil
Case No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the
plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale
and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary
that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his
claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and no estafa was
committed. The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate
from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the
criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the
ground that the defense in the civil case - forgery of his signature in the
first deed of sale - had to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question
would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the
case at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge had not been
informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge
Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil
action would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will
raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action.
The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution should
determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension
in accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended, and even without the accused indicating his
defense in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests
not only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the respondent
judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code
of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence" and "should administer justice impartially." He
is hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the case at bar,
with the warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge
Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case
No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No.
1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be
assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.
46. Balgos, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan
Does the denial by the Sandiganbayan of the motion to withdraw the
information and of another motion to suspend proceedings on the ground
of a prejudicial question in a pending civil action constitute a grave abuse
of discretion correctible by the writs of certiorari and prohibition?
The facts are undisputed. Petitioners were charged with violation of
Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practice Act, as amended, in an information that was filed
with the Sandiganbayan on April 18, 1986 by the Special Prosecutor
which was approved by the Deputy Tanodbayan, after a preliminary
investigation. The information reads as follows:
"That on December 27, 1984, in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Flaviano D. Balgos, Jr.,
a public officer, being the acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and also the Ex-Officio provincial sheriff of
the said province; and the other accused Virgilio F. Dacayo, Jesus
C. Sison and Leon C. Cuaresma, all public officers, being Deputy
Provincial Sheriffs of said province, acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully enforce a
Writ of Execution against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia
Acosta-Ang, despite their knowledge that the registered owner is not the
judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 4047 of the Regional Trial Court
of Nueva Vizcaya which is the subject of the said writ of execution,
thereby causing undue injury to the said Leticia Acosta-
Ang (complainant) and giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment
creditor in said civil case."[1]
On March 18, 1987, Antonio Uy Lim, the plaintiff and prevailing party in
Civil Case No. 4047 filed a complaint for rescission of the sale of the car
by Juanito Ang to private respondent Leticia Acosta-Ang for being
allegedly in fraud of creditors. The said complaint was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 5307. On the same day, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation
in the Tanodbayan. The same was granted on May 18, 1987.
After conducting the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan issued an order
resolving to:
"(a) set aside and render without force and effect its Resolution in this
case dated March 25, 1986;
b) to dismiss the case for lack of merit.
"(c) to withdraw the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 11414 as soon
as possible in the interest of justice."[2]
On April 22, 1988 the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
to withdraw the information against petitioners. This was denied on June
29, 1988. On September 1, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to suspend
proceedings in the criminal case against them on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307. This was
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan on October 24, 1988.
Hence, the instant petition where it is alleged that
the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the aforestated motions.
On June 6, 1989, the Court, acting on the ex-parte urgent motion of
petitioners for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
the Sandiganbayan from setting the arraignment of petitioners, and after
requiring the Solicitor General to comment thereon, granted the
motion. Thereafter, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in support
of the stand taken by the petitioners.
The petition is devoid of merit.
In the case of Crespo vs. Mogul,[3] this Court laid down the ground rules
and the parameters pertaining to the direction and control of the
prosecution of a criminal action by the fiscal or government prosecutor as
provided for in the rules[4] in relation to the jurisdiction of the competent
courts over such cases. We ruled that while the public prosecutor has
the sole direction and control in the prosecution of offenses, once the
complaint or information is filed in court, the court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case and all subsequent actions that may be taken
by the public prosecutor in relation to the disposition of the case must be
subject to the approval of the said court.[5]
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be
conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the
court must be secured. And if after such reinvestigation the prosecution
finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the
dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action must be addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.
In the past, a government prosecutor could practically impose his
judgment or opinion on the court as it was recognized that the
prosecution of offenses is his exclusive domain which resulted then and
again in a clash or conflict of opinion between the prosecutors and the
courts to the detriment of the administration of justice. Such a situation
may no longer be possible since Crespo. It is the court that has now the
final say on any subsequent disposition or action once the case is
brought before it.
The only instance when the appellate court should stay the hand of the
trial court in such cases is when it is shown that the trial court acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to such lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In this case, the petitioners are public officers charged with having
violated Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 4047 against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia
Acosta-Ang (complainant) who is not the judgment debtor thereby
causing undue injury to said complainant and giving unwarranted benefits
to the judgment creditor in said case.
Upon reinvestigation of the criminal case by the Tanodbayan, he found
evidence tending to show that the sale of said car to the complainant
by Juanito Ang, the judgment debtor, was a sham intended to defraud his
creditors; that the deed of absolute sale which ostensibly was executed
before a notary public on June 18, 1983 appeared to be fictitious
inasmuch as the entry of the document in the notarial register of said
notary public on said date referred to a catering contract of other parties;
that the certificate of registration of the car was issued to complainant
only on June 13, 1984 which showed that the document of sale was
actually executed only on or about the same date, that is, seven (7) days
after Juanito Ang received copy of the adverse decision in Civil Case No.
4047 on June 8, 1984; and that upon the execution of the judgment, the
car was found in the possession of Alvin, the son of Juanito Ang, who
admitted that the car belonged to his father by showing the receipt of its
repair in the name of Juanito Ang. This is the basis of the motion for
withdrawal of the information of the Tanodbayan.
In denying said motion the public respondent Sandiganbayan stated in its
resolution dated June 29, 1988 that the issue in the criminal case was not
so much whether the car was owned by Juanito Ang or Leticia Ang but
whether it was rightly seized, that is, whether or not it was attended with
partiality as to extend unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor,
quoting the resolution of the Tanodbayan after a preliminary investigation
for the filing of the information:
"In the implementation of the writ of execution it is the bounden duty of
the sheriffs to ascertain the true owner of the property sought to be
levied. Assuming that they have not seen the Certificate of Registration
showing that the real owner is Leticia Acosta-Ang, they could have easily
verified the same at the Land Transportation Commission. Their
contention that they were informed by Alvin Ang and the neighbors
of Juanito Ang (the judgment debtor) that the latter is the owner of the car
is clearly hearsay evidence. The best evidence is the document itself --
the Certificate of Registration shown to the respondents. Their
conclusion that the transfer of ownership to Leticia Ang, even if true, may
be simulated to defraud the judgment creditor is plainly untenable, for the
same should be addressed to the sound discretion of a competent court
in an action for annulment of the Deed of Sale.
The respondents are aware that the complainant is not a party to the civil
case filed by the creditor against spouses Juanito and Lydia Ang and that
a writ of execution cannot be implemented validly against one who is not
a party to the action. All these, coupled with the undue haste in which
the levy on the Mustang car was made without first ascertaining the true
owner thereof demonstrate quite convincingly the evident bad faith and
manifest partiality of the respondents, thereby giving unwarranted
benefits to the judgment creditor to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant. x x x "[6]
We agree. Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan was
persuaded that in fact the sale of the car to Leticia Ang was fraudulent,
this did not necessarily clear petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft charge
against them. Still the burden is on the petitioners to establish that they
acted in good faith in proceeding with the execution on the car even as
they were presented evidence tending to show it did not belong
to Juanito Ang anymore.
In its resolution dated August 11, 1988 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan held that the
arguments adduced relate to matters of defense. The Court finds that
the public respondent did not err in denying the motion for withdrawal of
the information.
By the same token, the denial of the motion to suspend the criminal
proceedings on the ground of the pendency of a prejudicial question in
Civil Case No. 5307 is well taken. The doctrine of prejudicial question
comes into play usually in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because whatsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.[7]
In this case, as correctly held by public respondent, the pending civil case
for the annulment of the sale of the car to Leticia Ang (Civil Case No.
5307) is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for
the acts allegedly committed by them in seizing the car. Even if in the
civil action it is ultimately resolved that the sale was null and void, it does
not necessarily follow that the seizure of the car was rightfully
undertaken. The car was registered in the name of Leticia Ang six (6)
months before the seizure. Until the nullity of the sale is declared by the
courts, the same is presumptively valid. Thus, petitioners must
demonstrate that the seizure was not attended by manifest bad faith in
order to clear themselves of the charge in the criminal action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the
restraining order dated June 6, 1989 is hereby lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
47. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs Fernandez
The petitioner is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the
laws of France and not doing business in the Philippines.it is the actual
owner of the abovementioned trademarks used on... clothings and other
goods specifically sporting apparels
In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and
was issued Reg. No. SR-2225 (SR stands for Supplemental Register) for
the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE" by the
Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts, sportswear and other...
garment products of the company. Two years later, it applied for the
registration of the same trademark under the Principal Register.
Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to respondent Gobindram
Hemandas all rights, title, and interest in the trademark "CHEMISE
LACOSTE & DEVICE".
On November 21, 1980, the petitioner filed its application for registration
of the trademark "Crocodile Device""Lacoste"... the latter was opposed by
Games and Garments In 1982, the petitioner filed a Petition for the
Cancellation of Reg. No. SR-2225
On March 21, 1983, the petitioner filed with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) a letter-complaint alleging therein the acts of unfair
competition being committed by Hemandas
The NBI conducted an... investigation and subsequently filed with the
respondent court two applications for the issuance of search warrants
which would authorize the search of the premises used and occupied by
the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and Garments both owned and
operated by Hemandas.
The respondent court issued Search Warrant Nos. 83-128 and 83-129 for
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal CodeHemandas filed a
motion to quash the search warrants alleging that the trademark used by
him was different from petitioner's trademark
The respondent court was, however, convinced that there was no
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its
order dated March 22, 1983, the search warrants were recalled and set
aside and the NBI agents or officers in custody of the seized items...
were ordered to return the same to Hemandas.
Hemandas argues in his comment on the petition for certiorari that the
petitioner being a foreign corporation failed to allege essential facts
bearing upon its capacity to sue before Philippine courts. He states that
not only is the petitioner not doing business in... the Philippines but it also
is not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Issues:
THE PETITIONER HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE BEFORE PHILIPPINE
COURTS.
Ruling:
even assuming the truth of the private respondent's allegation that the
petitioner failed to allege material facts in its petition relative to capacity
to sue, the petitioner may still maintain the present suit against
respondent Hemandas.
As early as 1927, this Court... was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines needs no license to sue
before Philippine courts for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before
our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a
foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the
rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are
parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international
commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which
we are a party and which we entered into because it is in... our national
interest to do so.
The Paris Convention provides in part that:
ARTICLE 1
"(1) The countries to which the present Convention applies constitute
themselves into a Union for the protection of industrial property.
ARTICLE 2
"(1) Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may
hereafter grant, to nationals, without prejudice to the... rights specially
provided by the present Convention. Consequently, they shall have the
same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any
infringement of their rights, provided they observe the conditions and
formalities imposed upon nationals.
ARTICLE 8
"A trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the Union without
the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it farms part of a
trademark.
We have carefully gone over the records of all the cases filed in this
Court and find more than enough evidence to sustain a finding that the
petitioner is the owner of the trademarks "LACOSTE", "CHEMISE
LACOSTE", the crocodile or alligator device, and the composite mark of
LACOSTE and the representation of the crocodile or alligator. Any
pretensions of the private respondent that he is the owner are absolutely
without basis. Any further ventilation of the issue of ownership before the
Patent Office will be a superfluity and a dilatory tactic.
The records show that the goodwill and reputation of the petitioner's
products bearing the trademark LACOSTE date back even before 1964
when LACOSTE clothing apparels were first marketed in the Philippines.
To allow Hemandas to continue using the trademark Lacoste for the...
simple reason that he was the first registrant in the Supplemental
Register of a trademark used in international commerce and not
belonging to him is to render nugatory the very essence of the law on
trademarks and tradenames.
Principles:
a foreign corporation which has never done any business in the
Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business
here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use
therein of its products bearing its corporate and... tradename, has a legal
right to maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and
inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the
same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears that they have
personal knowledge of the existence of... such a foreign corporation, and
it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to
deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.
The purpose of the law protecting a trademark cannot be
overemphasized. They are to point out distinctly the origin or ownership
of the article to which it is affixed, to secure to him, who has been
instrumental in bringing into market a superior article of merchandise,
the... fruit of his industry and skill, and to prevent fraud and imposition
The law on trademarks and tradenames is based on the principle of
business integrity and common justice. This law, both in letter and spirit,
is laid upon the premise that, while it encourages fair trade in every way
and aims to foster, and not to hamper, competition, no one,... especially a
trader, is justified in damaging or jeopardizing another's business by
fraud, deceipt, trickery or unfair methods of any sort. This necessarily
precludes the trading by one dealer upon the good name and reputation
built up by another
48. Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. vs Naldoza,
Facts: The case at bar is a petition for disbarment against Atty. Primo L.
Naldoza for appealing a decision which is final and executory, deceitfully
obtaining $2,555 from the client allegedly for “cash bond” in the appealed
case, and issuing a spurious receipt to conceal the illegal act.
Respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal and
asserted that it was the latter who initiated the action to delay the
execution of POEA decision. He also denied the two other charges. Trial
procedures were instituted before the IBP.
Meanwhile, a criminal case based on the same facts was filed before
RTC Makati, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he
was declared civilly liable in the amount of $2,555. Having been acquitted
in the criminal case, he manifested a Motion for Dismissal of the IBP
case.
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention on the
ground that the criminal case for estafa is completely different from the
proceedings before him. Acquittal in the former did not exonerate
respondent in the latter. He further noted that the RTC Decision itself
hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him
civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555. He was suspended by the
IBP for one (1) year. Thus, he appealed before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not respondent should be freed of the administrative
proceeding since he was acquitted of the criminal charge.
(2) Whether or not respondent is negligent when he appealed the
decision of the POEA knowing it to be final and executory.
Held:
(1) Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even
if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court.
(2) Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the
appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was
dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and
executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that
the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that
the Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioner's failure to submit an
Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly,
this charge has no leg to stand on.

PART 2
iii. CIVIL PERSONALITY MINORITY
Good noon. Here is another set of cases for you to read:
III. CIVIL PERSONALITY
Minority
49. Sia Suan vs Alcantara
50. Braganza vs Villa Abrille
51. Bambalan vs Maramba
Natural Persons
52. Geluz vs CA
FACTS: In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married,
Villanueva became pregnant. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents
and upon her aunt’s advice, she had an abortion by Antonio Geluz, a
physician. After Villanueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant
for the second time. As she was an employee of the Commission on
Elections and found it inconvenient, she had her second abortion by
Geluz in October 1953. In less than two years, she again became
pregnant. On 21 February 1955, Villanueva went to the clinic of Geluz in
Manila accompanied by her sister and her niece. Unknown to Lazo and
without his consent, his wife had an abortion for the third time, an
abortion of a two-month old fetus. Villanueva paid Geluz fifty pesos. At
that time, Lazo was in Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Geluz. The trial
court ordered Geluz to pay Lazo damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the
trial court. Hence, Geluz filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?
HELD: No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality.
Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
“provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following
article.” In this case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother’s womb. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury of death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages
at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased
child, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot
expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them.
In this case, however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have
not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because
the appellee’s indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also
caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to
have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the
appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment. Hence, the decision appealed
from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed
53. Quimiguing vs Icao
FACTS: Quimiging sued Icao before the court of first instance of
Zamboanga del norte. Quimiguing averred that she and Icao, succeeded
in having sexual relations with her through force and intimidation. As a
result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao
and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support,
damages and attorney’s fees.The lower court dismissed the case and
subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a
cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and
damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint.
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of
the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for
damages. This is pursuant to the provision of the Civil Code (Art. 40)
which recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which
includes its right to support from its progenitors; even it is only just a
conceived child “en ventre de sa mere.” Additionally, “for a married man
to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation
for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision
supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of
seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
54. De Jesus vs Syquia,
FAMILY CODE
ARTICLE 2 No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites
are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female; and
(2) Consent freely give in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
ARTICLE 3 The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2
of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
ARTICLE 26 All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
GENERAL RULE: If valid in the country where it is celebrated, it is also
valid in the Philippines by the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis.
EXCEPTIONS: Article 35 – (1) minors; (4) bigamy/polygamy; (5) mistake
of identity; and (6) without judicial declaration of previous marriage is
terminated Article 36 – Psychological incapacity Article 37 – Incestuous
marriage Article 38 – Against Public policy.
1. Acebedo vs Arquero:
Facts:
By letter-complaint[1] dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged
Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Brooke's Point, Palawan for immorality
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former
stenographer of the MTC Brooke's Point, and respondent unlawfully and
scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke's
Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero,...
was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint
was the girl's Baptismal Certificate[2] reflecting the names of respondent
and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the letter-complainant
was a copy of a marriage... contract[3] showing that complainant and
Dedje Irader contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.
respondent vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it
is "just a (sic) mere harassment and a product of complainant's hatred
and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife."[6] Attached to... the answer were
the September 27, 1987 affidavit of desistance[7] executed by
complainant in favor of his wife with respect to an administrative
complaint he had much earlier filed against her, and complainant's sworn
statement. dated September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child
born out of wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support his
contention that the complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme
concocted by complainant to harass him.
respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise
instituted a criminal complaint against him for "adultery" which was,
however, dismissed after preliminary investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting
with another woman.
Issues:
GUILTY of immorality
Ruling:
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then
Executive Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan for investigation, report and recommendation.
[9] Judge Vergara having retired during the... pendency of the
investigation, the case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y.
Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this
Court to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and
baptismal certificate submitted by complainant; (2) conduct... an
investigation as to the information contained in the said baptismal
certificate and the circumstances under which it was issued, and such
other verifiable matters relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her report
and recommendation thereon
In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez
recommends that the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce
adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the charge.[11]
The report focuses on the non-appearance of complainant... and Dedje
Irader Acebedo
By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be
dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and
that he be suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without...
pay
While complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the
present case, the same does not ipso facto warrant its dismissal. Once
administrative charges have been filed, this Court may not be divested of
its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth... thereof.
Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant's wife
with the spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to
their marriage which was embodied in a "Kasunduan", the pertinent
portions of which are reproduced hereunder
By respondent's own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship
with complainant's wife
Respondent's justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary,
respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no
force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and
his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that... marriage is "an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." It is an institution of
public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot
be made inoperative by the... stipulation of the parties
Respondent's act of having illicit relations with complainant's wife is,
within the purview of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is
classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and...
dismissal is imposed for the second offenseSince the present charge of
immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense, his
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process
Server of the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point, Palawan, GUILTY
of immorality, for which he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and
one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that commission of the
same... or similar acts shall be dealt with severely
2. Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee
Facts:
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine
Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The
estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng
Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage...
contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was
claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had
been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine
Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and
Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the
Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that
under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage;
Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine ;lands and sometime
thereafter took to himself a... concubine Mora by whom he had two
children
Issues:
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
Ruling:
Principles:
"The inhabitants of the territories... over which Spain relinquishes or
cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their
religion."
"that no law shall... be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination ox
preference, shall forever be allowed.
no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his
calling, and that the separation between state and church shall be real,
entire, and... absolute.
"with all... solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free
exercise of their religions with which it will not interfere in the slightest
way, and it will also respect their customs."
"Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding
civil cases in which the parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such
action is deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of the
Philippine Islands, except laws of the United States applicable to the
Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of... the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties... were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful... contract of
marriage.
Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should
retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
3. Pugeda vs Trias
FACTS :Maria Ferrer and Mariano Trias were husband and wife and
acquired lands. However, when the latter died, Maria contracted marriage
with Fabian Pugeda. Now, there has been conflicting claim of the said
lands between Pugeda and Maria’s children with his first husband when
she also passed away. Pugeda prayed that the properties, acquired as
conjugal properties, be partitioned and one-half thereof begiven as share
of his since he contracted a lawful marriage with Maria. But Maria’s
children, the defendants, denied the existence of the marriage and
introduced a photo static copy of the record of marriages in the
municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January 1916,which
showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein; but this
absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the
person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in
the registry. Because of this, the lower court affirmed the existence of the
marriage. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of marriage record in the registry
renders the marriage void or nonexistent
Ruling: NO. As ruled in Madridejo vs. De Leon, “The mere fact that the
parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while
the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage,
since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate not being one of said requisites.”
Thus, similarly, the absence of a marriage record in the registry does not
render the marriage void since it is not one of the requisites of marriage
to comply with. The person who officiated at the solemnization is
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage and can
prove the existence of such marriage; as in this case, it was Ricardo
Ricafrente who was the solemnizing officer. Testimony is an admissible
evidence of the existence of marriage. This is pursuant to Article 53 of the
Civil Code which states that “As to marriages contracted subsequently,
no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be
admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared,
or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be
proved by evidence of any kind." FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed, and the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio G. Lucero,
presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria
C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the
sense that all of her properties be divided among her eight children at the
rate of one- eighth per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge
Lucero is hereby affirmed.
4.Hernandez vs CA
FACTS: Lucita Estrella Hernandez, petitioner, filed a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent, Mario C. Hernandez on
the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from
the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, the
respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and
contribute to the management of the household. He devoted most of his
time to engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. During their
marriage, he cohabitated with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child. He also had affairs with different women which
endangered the health of the petitioner for infecting her with a sexually
transmitted disease (STD). She averred that the respondent was
irresponsible, immature, and unprepared for the duties of a married life. A
petitioner’s friend, Ester Alfaro testified and confirmed that the petitioner
was once hospitalized
because she was beaten up by the respondent. Alfaro tried to talk to the
petitioner but was accused by the latter of meddling with their marital life.
Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, the respondent
be ordered to give support to their three children in the total of P9000
every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that
she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don
Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased
during the marriage, as well as the jeep which respondent took with him
when he left the conjugal home.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court will grant the petition for annulment of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent.
HELD: No. Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities; It was not sufficiently
proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties
due to some incapacity of a psychological nature and not merely
physical.
The respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
Expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise
cause of the private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
5. Arañez vs Occiano
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Arañes charges Judge Salvador Occiano for
Gross Ignorance of the Law. It was known that the respondent judge
solemnized the petitioner and her late groom Dominador Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction which
should be in Balatan, Camarines Sur. They also had no marriage license
making their marriage void. Due to ththe is, petitioner’s rights to inherit
the vast property of Orobia and his pension was not recognized. Judge
avers that he was asked to go to Nabua due to Orobia’s difficulty of
walking and Balatan is far from them. Then when the judge was about to
solemnize, he found out that there was no marriage license, and he
initially refused. Due to the pleas of the couple together with all the
preparation and possibility of endangering the health of Orobia, he
continued to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. On the
condition that they will provide the judge the Marriage License afternoon
of the same day. However, the license was not complied with. It was later
found out that the marriage license cannot be given due to the late
Orobia’s failure to provide the death certificate of his previous spouse.
Later, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance owing her negligence. Is
the respondent judge liable for the irregularity of the formal requisite of
the marriage of the petitioner?
BP 129: Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 Authority of the RTC
and lower judges to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction. Where a judge solemnizes outside jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. (Navarro vs. Domagtoy).
Marriage License Authorizes Solemnizing Officer Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the
petitioner. Subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Withdrawal of Complaint Does Not Necessarily Exonerate
Disciplinary Actions – The Affidavit of Desistance is not enough,
because the prompt and fair administration of the law, as well as the
discipline of personnel of justice will be undermined.
DECISION: His act of solemnizing the marriage of the petitioner and
Orobia is contrary to law. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M.
Occiano, Presiding Judge of MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined is
P5,000 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future will be death with more severely. SO ORDERED
6. Morigo vs People
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for
four years. The lost contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio
received a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant
communication took place between them. They later became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On
August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to take
effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993,
accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from
the bigamy case? HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the
nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case
filed.
7. Republic vs Orbecido
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on
May 24, 1981. Related imageThey were blessed with a with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido. Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California. He then filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the
Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article
26 of the Family Code?
HELD: No. The records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. Accordingly, for
his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact,
such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must
also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Marriages Exempt from the License Requirement
1.Marriage in Articulo Mortis (Art. 27)
2. Marriage in a remote place (Art. 28) :
f the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local
civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without the necessity of a
marriage license.
3.Marriage among Muslims and among members of the ethnic and
cultural communtiies, provided that they are solemnized in accordance
with their customs, rites and practices. (Article 33)
4.Ratification of marital cohabitation (Article 34) : No license shall be
necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to marriage.
Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation
(a) The parties must have lives as husband and wife for at least five
years;
(b) There is no legal impediment to marry each other during this period;
(c) An affidavit be executed by the parties stating the foregoing facts
(d) The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the parties and found no legal impediment to
marriage.
5. In case either or both of the contracting parties are the point of death,
marriage may be solemnized without the necessity of a marriage license
and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
Marriage in Articulo Mortis
• Point of death but must be still conscious of what they are doing. Mere
sickness will not justify a marriage in point of death. There must be a
dying party.
• It remains valid even if the ailing or dying party survives or does not
die.
• May be solemnized by a religious sect, a judge, or any persons cited in
Arts. 31 and 32.
• At the point of death – when one is in a situation of life and death and
already dying, it is different from ‘danger of death’ refers to a situation
wherein one is only in danger of dying but not at the point of dying.
8. Niñal vs Bayadog
FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. They executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, thus,
they are exempted from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners,
children of Pepito in the first marriage, filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage was valid
HELD: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage should be a period of legal
union. Pepito and Teodulfa’s marriage was still subsisting 5 years prior to
Pepito and Norma’s marriage. 2nd marriage is void ab initio. Note:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
9. Sy vs CA
FACTS: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy were married on November 15,
1973 that during their marriage Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Filipina filed for a petition legal separation but later amended to filing of
dissolution of conjugal partnership on 1987. On 1988 she filed for a
criminal case of attempted parricide after the incident in the dental clinic
when Fernando punched Filipina, choked her and released her only
when he though she was dead. On 1991, a decree of legal separation
was granted to her. On 1992, she filed for a petition of declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity citing habitual
alcoholism among others. RTC denied her petition due to lack of
quantum evidence and the CA affirmed decision. Appeal for petition thus
the case at bar, for the first time on appeal she raised the issue on the
lack of marriage license. Is the marriage void ab initio due to the absence
of marriage license at the of celebration? Is Fernando Sevilla
psychologically incapable to consummating the marital obligations?
New Issue Upon Appeal Not Allowed; Relaxed Rule Litigants could not
raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the
basic rules of fair play and justice, nut this observance of procedural rules
are relaxed when its enforcement defeats its very reason to exist. Thus,
the issue at hand.
Incongruity of Dates on License and Celebration It was found out on
the birth certificates of the children that they were married November 15,
1973. However, the marriage contract and license shows that it was
issued on September 17, 1974 which was issued almost one year after
marriage celebration. DECISION: These documents (testimony of
admittance of 1973 marriage and birth certificates) are deemed sufficient
proof of that the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage
license. MARRIAGE STATUS: VOID AB INITIO due to the absence of
marriage license at the time of celebration.
10. Republic vs CA and Castro
FACTS: Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married on
June 24, 1970 without the knowledge of their parents. They cohabitated
for only four months and had a baby. Angelina M. Castro wants to leave
Philippines with a desire to go to United States, and she wants to settle
her issues on their marriage. Upon the work of her lawyer, it was
discovered that there was no marriage license at the time of the marriage
celebration. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: Civil Registrar issued a
Certificate stating that “said license cannot does not appear from our
records”
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE: Castro did not go to the Civil Registrar in
Pasig to apply for a marriage license. RTC denied her petition because
there was no sufficient evidence. CA reversed this ruling. Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines raised the issue of the disregard of the legal
presumption of marriage. Are the evidences sufficient to establish the
absence of marriage license between Castro and Cardenas? Rules of
Court, Rule 132, Section 28 Proof of lack of record. – A written statement
signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy,
that after diligent search, no record or entry of specified tenor is found to
exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.
Certification of Due Search and Inability to Find Having done diligent
search, the certificate issued by the Civil Registrar enjoys probative value
which sufficiently proves that there was no issuance of the marriage
license being questioned. Secret Marriage A legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage without the knowledge of
the relatives of the contracting parties.
DECISION: Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by the private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
MARRIAGE STATUS: VOID AB INITIO due to the absence of marriage
license at the time of celebration.
11. Cariño vs Cariño
Facts: The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of
the two marriages contracted by the deceasedSPO4 Santiago S. Cariño,
whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the
two Susans whom he married. His first marriage was with Susan Nicdao
Carino with whom he had two offspring’s (Sahlee and Sandee) and the
second marriage was with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S.
Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under
the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee
received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sums
of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with
Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without
the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee,
ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue
1.Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is
void for lack of marriage license.
Ruling: NO. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the
marriage of Nicdao and Carino was solemnized in1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar,
the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage
license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such
being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of
Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity
of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The
marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court
of Appeals is affirmed
Psychological Incapacity
A marriage contracted by any party, who at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential martial
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
become manifest only after its solemnization (as amended by EO 227).
Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity
1. Gravity Grave or serious enough such that the party cannot carry out
the ordinary duties required in the marriage life.
2. Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the past history of the party
antedating the marriage. Although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage.
3. Incurability It must be incurable and it is beyond the means of the party
involved Applicable to sadists, unbearable jealousies, paranoids, anti-sex
and homosexuality.
12. Santos vs CA
FACTS: Leouel Santos invokes Art. 36 in attempt for declaration of nullity
of marriage to Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos. Leouel is 1st Lieutenant of
Army. He and Julia met in 1986 and married in July 1987. After marriage
they lived with Julia’s parents but were having marital issue. Julia then
leaves for the US to work as a nurse, promising to return when her
contract was done but never did. He tried looking for her when he was
assigned in the US but to no avail.Leouel argues that failure to establish
contact for 5 years is indicative of psychological incapacity to marry.
ISSUE: W/N Julia was psychologically incapacitated
HELD: Contention has no merit, petition denied. Unable to qualify for the
three characteristics of Psych Incap: 1) gravity 2) juridical antecedent 3)
incurability Under Art 68 of FC obligations of marriage: 1) mutual
obligation to live together; 2) observe love, respect and fidelity; 3) render
help and support. Constitution Section 1 & 2 Art. 15 protects sanctity of
marriage - marriage is foundation of family and an inviolable social
institution.
13. Republic vs CA and Molina
FACTS: The couple, Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina got married in
1985. A year later, they had a son but the wife, Roridel asserts that
Reynaldo showed “immaturity and irresponsibility” b/c he would squander
their money, spend more time with his friends, depend on his parents for
financial support, etc. In 1996, Reynaldo was jobless and Roridel became
sole breadwinner. The couple was already estranged by this time, further
in 1997, wife resigns from job and lives with parents and husband
abandons wife and child. So, in 1990 the wife petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage to Reynaldo on the grounds of Art. 36. During trial, it
was established that: 1) marriage was valid 2) child exists and is in
custody of the wife 3) couple separated for almost 3 years 4) no support
and no damages are sought. Wifey entered into evidence testimony of
friends, a social worker and a psychiatrist. (RTC declares marriage void,
CA affirm in toto)
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in its interpretation of psych incapacitated The
OSG assails that this will have been the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world, if such cases are allowed. So the court needs to lay down a
guideline on what is applicable under Art. 36. Argument of the wife is that
this is a case of “opposing and conflicting personalities” - OSG says that
is not equivalent to psych incapacitated, that is only neglect of duty, not
defect in psych nature which would render one incapable of performing
marital responsibility.
HELD: Petition granted, CA decision set aside, marriage still valid This is
now the controlling doctrine for application of Art. 36.
Molina Doctrine
1.The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
2.The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified, b)alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision
3.The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
4.Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
5.Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6.The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 (68 live together, love & fidelity, mutual support; 69 fixed
domicile; 70 joint responsibility of support to family; 71 management of
household is duty of both) of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220 (in:re duties of parents to unemancipated
child), 221 (civil liability for acts injurious to unemancipated) and 225
(joint legal guardianship of unemancipated child’s property) of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
7.Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. (in this case 2 justices from
the tribunal became amicus curiae)
8) Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the SolGen issues a certification (15 days from date case is
deedmed submitted for resolution of the court).
14. Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
FACTS: On January 14, 1988 Loila Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano was married and had a daughter. Unknown to Loila, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital obligations. Respondent
alleged that Toshio had a commonlaw wife in Japan in 1986, who he had
brought to the Philippines as well in 1987. After they were married for 1
month, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to come back. The first 2
months Loila received support for her and daughter but then later and no
contact. She learned later that in 1991 Toshio visited the Philippines but
never bothered to see her. So on June 17, 1996 she filed for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which the
RTC ruled in affirmative on August 28, 1997 marriage declared null &
void. OSG questioned this in the CA but was denied. Rationale of CA is
that the cases of Molina and Santos were marriages involving Filipino
spouses. This was different because it is a mixed marriage.
ISSUE: W/N the abandonment of Toshio and insensitivity to them, as well
as the existence of his common-law wife and the fact that this was a
mixed marriage be ground for declaring that he was psychologically
incapacitated to contract marriage.
HELD: Petition has merit, ergo reversed the decision of the RTC and the
CA marriage still valid. Molina and Santos cases apply - mixed marriage
is an irrelevant fact, no distinction in nationality when proving
psychological incapacity. The abandonment was not presented as a
showing of psychological disorder on the part of Toshio. There was no
evidence submitted to show this either. This is only grounds for separatio
15. Antonio vs Reyes
FACTS: Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes got married on 6 Dec
1990. The union bore a child who sadly died at 5- months old. On 1993
Leonilo (petitioner) filed for petition to have his marriage declared null
and void alleging that Marie was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with essential marital obligations. Manifestations of this include:
1) she concealed that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,
instead introduces him as the adopted son;
2) she fabricated a rape story re her bro-in-law;
3) she misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist with a graduate degree in
psychology;
4) claimed to be a recording artist, that there was a show in her honour,
5) She invented friends and sent petitioner letters through them saying
that she was #1 money maker of her record label - she’s like P2 Million
worth;
6) she represented herself to be earning a higher income than what she
actually earns, spends lavishly and borrowing money on false pretexts;
7) she was extremely jealous of everyone and would monitor his actions
even in his work.
The psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist testifying on behalf of
petitioner stated that the respondent exhibited signs of being a
pathological liar. That this undermined the basic relationship which should
be based on mutual love, trust and respect. Hence this should be ground
for psychological incapacity. Respondent denies this and gives reasons
with regard to why she acted in the way that the petitioner described. She
also presented a psychiatrist to refute the testimonies of the other two
expert witnesses wherein he stated that respondent was subjected to the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale which he himself
conducted. He postulated that respondent did not exhibit signs of
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism and psychotic tendencies, etc.
Before the RTC decision to annul, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage already. Then the
CA reversed the decision of the RTC later. Appellate court concluded on
the basis that such evidence was not sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity.
ISSUE: W/N the state of facts as presented by petitioner can be sufficient
to meet the standards as laid down in the Molina case to rule the
declaration of Nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity.
HELD: Petition granted, RTC decision reinstated, marriage null and void.
1.Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden of proving the psych
incapacitated 2) Root cause is indeed psych in capitated as evidenced by
the 2 expert witness
3) Juridical antecedence - the letters sent by the fictitious friends was
from before the marriage
4) Gravity - intolerable behavior made petitioner leave his wife
5) Inability to comply with essential marital obligations - live together,
mutual love, respect and fidelity not present
6) Catholic church annulled the marriage already On incurability - the
Santos case did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the
psychological incapacity established in action for declaration of nullity. In
this case there was no testimony from expert witness if this condition was
curable or incurable because there was no legal necessity. From totality
of evidence the Court is convinced that psychological incapacity of the
wife is established.
16. Dedel vs CA
FACTS: David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz-Dedel got married first civil in
1966 and church in 1967. Union had 4 children with the last kid born in
1976. Four children resulted from union. Wife had a lot of extramarital
affairs - “irresponsible and immature wife.” She also had children outside
of the marriage. (Nymphomania for women or satyriasis for men). Wife
received treatment from a clinical psychiatrist but wife still continued with
her behavior. So on 1997, David sought declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psych incap. Testimony for the petitioner asserted that
Sharon had AntiSocial Personality Disorder as she exhibited blatant
display of infidelity. RTC declared marriage null. The Republic through
the OSG appealed and stated RTC erred and that based on the Molina
case there should have been a certification issued by the OSG. So CA
set aside the RTC decision
ISSUE: W/N the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to sustain
finding that respondent if psych incap.
HELD: Petition denied. CA decision stands. Just like in the Marcos case,
the evidence presented is only grounds for legal separation. The wife’s
sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity.
17. Tan-Andal v. Andal
Mario Andal and Rosanna Tan-Andal were childhood friends. They lost
contact with each other for 17 years. Mario had worked in Switzerland,
Germany, and Italy before returning to the Philippines in April 1995. The
parties reconnected and eventually became a couple. Mario left for Italy
in July 1995. Barely two (2) months after he had left, he had quit his job
and stayed in the country.
Mario and Rosanna married on 16 December 1995 at the Saints Peter
and Paul Parish in Poblacion, Makati City. On 27 July 1996, Rosanna
gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only child of the parties. The family lived
in a duplex in Parañaque City, with Rosanna's parents living in the other
half of the duplex.
According to Rosanna, Mario exhibited odd behaviors prior their wedding
and during their marriage. Mario had difficulty in managing his finances.
Rosanna taught him to run Design and Construction Matrix, the
construction firm she had set up before she married. However, Mario
continued with his "emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and
psychological imbalance." He made numerous cash advances and
purchases using supplementary credit card, which resulted to the family’s
financial losses and the closure of Design and Construction Matrix. He
would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of
his whereabouts. Once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and
would sleep for days. Mario was also "hyper-active" late at night.
Mario allegedly did not assist Rosanna when she gave birth to their child,
Ma. Samantha. He left her in the hospital, knowing that she could not
move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had worn off. He only
returned to the hospital later that evening to sleep. When Rosanna and
Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed
symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and,
at times, would hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought were out to
hurt them. Further, during the times when Ma. Samantha was sick, Mario
would instead ignore the ill child.
Rosanna petitioned the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) to voluntarily commit
Mario for drug rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation
Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and, eventually, at the Seagulls
Flight Foundation. Mario remained confined there until 24 December
2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without completing
his rehabilitation program. Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario's
premature release from the rehabilitation center. Since Mario's release,
Rosanna and Mario had been separated and had not lived together.
Mario also failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.These
events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological incapacity
to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna
contended that Mario's drug use was the manifestation of a grave
personality disorder "deeply rooted within Mario's adaptive system." She
prayed that the trial court nullify their marriage and that she be declared
the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her
aunt as well as the duplex built on it.
To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr.
Garcia, a physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness. Dr. Garcia found
Rosanna "psychologically capacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations." As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with
narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder
with psychotic features. Mario's narcissistic antisocial personality
disorder, which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical antecedence,
and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia
testified that Mario's personality disorder was grave and "deeply rooted"
in his character. Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering from personality
disorders are "impermeable to any form of psychiatric therapeutic
modality" because of "the presence of denial and cognizance on the
basic pathology of the person suffering from the disorder."
Mario contended that it was Rosanna who was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. He prayed
that the trial court nullify his marriage to Rosanna due to her
psychological incapacity, and that the properties they had acquired
during their cohabitation be divided equally between them. He also
prayed that the custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded to him.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage on the ground of Mario's
psychological incapacity. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to
Rosanna, with Mario having visitation rights. As to the Parañaque duplex,
the trial court declared Rosanna as its sole and absolute owner, including
the parcel of land on which it was built.
The Court of Appeals (“CA”) reversed the ruling of the lower court and
declared the parties’ marriage to be valid and subsisting. It found Dr.
Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be "unscientific and unreliable"
since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. It ruled that Dr.
Garcia "was working on pure suppositions and second-hand information
fed to her by one side."
Before the Supreme Court, Rosanna argued that psychological
incapacity need not be grounded on psychological illness, as this is
allegedly more consistent with psychological incapacity being a “liberal
ground” for nullifying marriages. She cited cases where the Supreme
Court held that competent evidence, not necessarily expert opinion, may
establish psychological incapacity, and that what matters is the totality of
the evidence presented. Rosanna added that psychological incapacity is
incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or clinical sense. For her,
incurability is manifested by ingrained behavior manifested during the
marriage by the psychologically incapacitated spouse.
ISSUE:
Does psychological incapacity need to be medically or clinically
identified?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that psychological incapacity need not be
medically or clinically proven. In effect, the Court modified the doctrine
enunciated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina (“Molina”).
Considering the inconsistencies with which the doctrine laid down in
Molina has been applied, the Court took a more comprehensive but
nuanced approach regarding the proper interpretation and application of
said doctrine.
Under the second guideline in Molina, the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts, and d) clearly explained in
the decision. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals (“Santos”), the Court defined
psychological incapacity as a mental (not physical) incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations. It involves the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In the past,
however, the Court has been inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in
psychological incapacity cases. In light of said inconsistencies, the Court
now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Now,
psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality
disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must,
however, be proof of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s
personality which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality
that undermines the family. Such personality structure must make it
impossible for him or her to understand and comply with their marital
obligations. The proof required for this need not be given by an expert.
Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses
before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they
have consistently observed from the incapacitated spouse.
With regard to the juridical antecedence requirement of the psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, the incapacity must be
characterised as incurable. However, the Court acknowledges that
psychological incapacity, not being an illness in a medical sense, is not
something to be cured. As such, the third Molina guideline is amended to
mean incurability in a legal sense, not a medical sense, Particularly, this
means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a
specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s
respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic
that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable
breakdown of the marriage.
Considering the foregoing, the Court found Mario psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Rosanna
was able to discharge the burden of proof required to nullify her marriage
to Mario. Clear and convincing evidence of his incapacity was shown
through testimonies on Mario’s personality and how it formed primarily
through his childhood and adult experiences well before he married
Rosanna. Dr. Garcia was also able to recount how Mario developed traits
exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsiveness, lack of remorse, lack of
empath, and a sense of entitlement, behaviours which manifest his
inherent psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations.
While drug addiction is a ground for legal separation, it will not prevent
the court from voiding a marriage so long as it can be proven that the
drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the
time of marriage. Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna
clearly and convincingly proved that Mario’s drug abuse was of sufficient
durability that antedates the marriage. His persistent failure to
Doctrine:
rehabilitate, even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs,
The court emphasized that the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his
marriage belongs to the petitioner, and any doubt should be resolved in
obligations not only to his wife, but also to his child.
His failure to render mutual help and support was also clearly proven by favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage. The court also
his consistent failure to find gainful employment and even driving to clarified that psychological incapacity is not limited to personality
bankruptcy the construction firm founded by Rosanna by siphoning its disorders and can be proven through the totality of evidence, including
funds for his drug abuse. the testimony of ordinary witnesses who have observed the behavior of
the allegedly incapacitated spouse.
18. Datu vs Datu
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Irene
Constantino Datu against Alfredo Fabian Datu. The case revolves
around the issue of whether Alfredo's psychological incapacity is
20. Pugoy-Solidum vs Republic
sufficient grounds to void their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Facts: This case involves a petition for nullity of marriage filed by
Code. The trial court ruled in favor of Alfredo, finding that his
Hannamer C. Pugoy-Solidum against her husband, Grant C. Solidum.
schizophrenia rendered him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
Hannamer alleged that Grant was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
his essential marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted
court's decision. Irene argues that Alfredo's schizophrenia does not
the petition, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision and
automatically make him psychologically incapacitated and questions the
declared the marriage valid. Hannamer filed a petition for review on
authenticity and admissibility of the evidence presented. The Supreme
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Court denied Irene's petition, upholding the lower courts' findings and
ruling that Alfredo's psychological incapacity was proven.
Doctrine:
To declare a marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
Doctrine: psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to void a marriage under Article
antecedence, and incurability. Expert testimony is important, but a
36 of the Family Code, is a legal concept and not a medical one. It is
personal examination of the alleged incapacitated spouse is not always
enough for the parties to prove that an enduring part of their personality
mandatory. The petitioner bears the burden of proving the gravity,
renders them incapable of performing their essential marital obligations.
juridical antecedence, and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
The requirement that the psychological incapacity be rooted in a
particular psychological illness is no longer necessary.

21. Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA

19. De Silva v. De Silva: This case involves a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
due to psychological incapacity. The petitioner, Raphy Valdez de Silva,
alleged that her husband, Donald de Silva, was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab initio, but the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision. The petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married on 22 May 1988.
On the night of their wedding day, they slept together on the same bed in
the same room. According to Gina, they were supposed to have sexual
intercourse, but Chi Ming Tsoi turned his back on her and went to sleep. It
continually happened on the second, third and fourth nights. When they
had their honeymoon in Baguio City for four days, Chi Ming Tsoi
distanced himself and there was still no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Because of this, they both submitted themselves for
medical examinations. The result of Gina’s physical examination was she
was healthy, normal, and still a virgin. As for Chi Ming Tsoi, his penis was
examined for the purpose of finding out whether he was impotent. The
result showed that there was no evidence of impotency and he was
capable of erection and of having sexual intercourse with a woman
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged refusal to have sexual intercourse
constitutes psychological incapacity.
(YES) RULING: Chi Ming Tso also claims that he wanted to have sex with
Gina; that the reason for Gina's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above. Assuming it to be so, he would have
discussed with Gina or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him every time he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had
tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. One
of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
22. Marcos vs Marcos
The guidelines set in Santos vs. CA do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,
the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
FACTS: Brenda filed before the RTC a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that due
to Wilson’s failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Brenda also submitted herself to a
psychologist for psychological evaluation while the appellant on the other
hand did not. The RTC found the Wilson to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his
failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards
Brenda and their children. Reversing the RTC, the CA held that
psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. It ruled that it is essential in a petition for annulment
is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
Wilson was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
The psychological findings about Wilson by the psychiatrist were based
only on the interviews conducted with Brenda.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA could set aside the findings by the RTC of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation.
(NO) RULING: The guidelines set in Santos vs. CA do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
23. Buenaventura vs CA
Marriages void under Article 36; no moral damages, Article 147 FACTS:
This was petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity between both Noel Buenaventura and Isabel.
FACTS: This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where
he stated that he and his wife, Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura,
were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. The lower court found that petitioner
was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry, and deceived
Private Respondent Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to
relate tohis wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a father. Moreso,
he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of
trouble, he’d rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his
wife.

ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the
marriage between Buenaventura and Singh may be declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, due to the psychological
incapacity of the petitioner.

2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to the aggrieved spouse

is proper in such cases.

RULING:1. Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the
acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological
incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity has
been defined, as no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage

2. Based on the above definition of psychological incapacity, by

declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated,
not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific
evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who
had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the
same.