Professional Documents
Culture Documents
22(2) 12–18
ISSN 1211-0442 (DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.419),Peer-reviewed article
Journal homepage: e-logos.vse.cz
Abstrakt: This paper evaluates an argument according to which many anthropologists commit
themselves to Cartesian dualism, when they talk about meanings. This kind of dualism, it is
argued, makes it impossible for anthropologists to adequately attend to material artefacts. The
argument is very original, but it is also vulnerable to a range of objections.
1The University of Manchester, School of Social Sciences, Arthur Lewis Building, The University of
Manchester, Manchester. M13 9PL, United Kingdom, t.r.edward@manchester.ac.uk
Premise (1)
Premise (1) of the argument is that many anthropologists understand what meanings are in a
way that commits them to the doctrine of Cartesian dualism. One of the sections of the
Introduction to Thinking Through Things opens with the following claim:
It remains a commonplace within anthropology and related disciplines that meanings can only
be thought of as abstractions – ideas that somehow circulate in the ether, over a material
substrate primordially devoid of significance. (2007: 3)
The authors of the Introduction go on to associate the commonplace way of thinking about
meaning within anthropology with Cartesian dualism. They quote an anthropologist who tells
us that our thinking is still shaped by the Cartesian division of substances into unextended minds
and unthinking extended matter (2007: 9). Soon afterwards they write:
…in our Cartesian-Kantian bind, we assume that the manifold of the universe cannot but consist
at most of mind and matter (representation or reality, culture or nature, meaning or thing)...
(2007:9)
The assumption identified in this claim is supposed to be common to much anthropological
work.
From the textual evidence above, we can extract a more precise characterization of
Cartesian dualism. As the term ‘Cartesian dualism’ will be used in this paper, it refers to a
doctrine according to which: (i) there are material substances and their properties; (ii) there are
minds and their properties; (iii) this is all that there is; (iv) minds are substances that are entirely
separate from matter – they are not matter nor are they composed even partly of matter – and
material substances are in turn entirely separate from minds. The word ‘substance’ is being used
here in a specialist sense, derived from the writings of Descartes, to mean an entity that can
exist independently of other entities. Here, we do not need to investigate further the definition
of substance.
The authors of the Introduction do not provide any evidence of anthropologists committing
themselves to this doctrine. They quote an author who sounds as if he might agree but this
author also does not provide the missing evidence (see Ingold 2000: 340). Few anthropologists
would want to commit themselves to such a controversial metaphysical doctrine as Cartesian
dualism, at least in their anthropological works, so it is necessary to provide evidence that
anthropologists are nevertheless committing themselves to it. At present, premise (1) is
inadequately supported.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that it can be supported. To justify this doubt, I will focus on what
anthropologists say about word meaning, that is to say, the meanings of individual words.
Though there are other kinds of meaning, word meaning is a central case of the kind of meaning
which the authors of the Introduction are interested in.
If one examines anthropological works, it is doubtful that one can find many explicit statements
along the following lines: “The meaning of a word is a concept. Concepts are the constituents
of mental representations, the building blocks from which they are formed. A mental
representation is a representation within a mind of how the world is. There are material entities
Premise (2)
Premise (2) of the argument is that from Cartesian dualism, it follows that the sciences should
be divided into the sciences of matter and the sciences of non-material minds. In other words,
for a Cartesian dualist, a science should either be a science of matter or else a science of mind.
There should be no science which is both and no science which is neither. I regard the authors
of the Introduction as committing themselves to this premise when they write:
If we are all living in the same world – one best described and apprehended by [natural] science
– then the task left to social scientists is to elucidate the… different accounts of that one world.
This just follows from the way the dualism of mind and matter apportions questions of difference
and similarity… After all, while matter (nature) just is what it is indifferently, mind (culture)
can represent it in different ways. So, to the extent that anthropology takes difference as its
object, leaving the study of the indifferences of nature to natural scientists, it cannot but be a
study of the different ways the world (the one world of Nature) is represented by different people
– and particularly by different groups of people. (2007: 9)
According to this passage, if Cartesian dualism is true, then the natural sciences study the world
of matter, so the only task left for the social sciences is to study the world of minds, specifically
the way that groups of minds represent the world of matter. There are a number of questions
that this passage gives rise to, and it seems to me that there are a few confusions as well. But
what comes through is that there is no consistent way to be a Cartesian dualist without saying
that the sciences should be divided into the sciences of matter and the sciences of non-material
minds. The natural sciences would cover the former category, while the latter category is
covered by the social sciences (or the social and psychological sciences).
To dispute premise (2), I will consider two possible inquiries which do not fall exclusively into
a science of matter or exclusively into a science of mind but can be legitimately pursued even
if Cartesian dualism is true. The first inquiry is an inquiry into what there is. Let us imagine
that a person pursuing this inquiry concludes that there are material entities and their properties,
there are minds and their properties and there is nothing more. Such an inquiry cannot be
categorized as belonging exclusively to a science of matter, since it concludes that there are
minds and their properties, but nor can it be categorized as belonging exclusively to some
science of mind, since it concludes that there is matter and its properties.
The second inquiry is an inquiry into the following questions. Does the body appear to affect
the mind? If so, in what ways? Does the body actually affect the mind? If so, in what ways?
Such an inquiry also cannot be categorized as belonging exclusively to some science of matter
or else exclusively to some science of mind, because the third and fourth questions concern
both mind and matter.
The authors of the Introduction define science as the search for representations that
transparently and faithfully reflect reality (2007: 11). Now some people would probably dispute
whether the first inquiry counts as science, given its conclusions, but a Cartesian dualist who
works with this definition of science would have to count both inquiries as science. Yet these
inquiries do not fit into a scheme which divides the sciences into the sciences of matter and
mind, such that all legitimate scientific inquiry belongs to either to one kind of science or else
to the other. In which case, it does not seem that Cartesian dualism requires this division. Since
Premise (5)
Premise (5) is the premise that if anthropology only says about material artefacts that they are
bits of matter which are represented by some minds in certain ways, specifying those ways,
anthropology is not adequately attending to material artefacts. An example of this way of
attending to material artefacts was provided earlier on. An anthropological work might tell us
that a certain flute is represented by those who use it as a means to win the favour of the Gods.
The authors of the Introduction are dissatisfied with this representational approach to material
artefacts because it gives rise to the question of which representations are correct and they think
that we have no choice but to say that ones from our scientific culture are correct, which means
not taking concepts from other cultures seriously (2007: 11-12). They are committed to premise
(5) because the whole point of their project is to pursue a more satisfactory way of responding
to material artefacts within anthropological research. My objection here is not to this premise,
taken in isolation, rather to this premise as part of the argument we have been considering.
The authors of the Introduction do not address the philosophical question of whether Cartesian
dualism is true. They do not try to contribute to philosophy by determining the answer to this
question, rather they are anthropologists seeking a better way of engaging with cultural
artefacts. However, given that they portray Cartesian dualism as determining what
anthropology should and should not be doing, there is no way for them to defend their project
without taking up this philosophical question and arguing against Cartesian dualism. For
Cartesian dualism, as they portray it, entails that the proper focus of anthropologists in relation
to material artefacts is on how these artefacts are represented.
The previous section disputed whether there really is this entailment, but supposing that there
is this entailment is part of the argument as a whole. Consequently, one cannot endorse (5)
along with the other premises of the argument without being prepared to do something which
the authors of the Introduction are not prepared to do: without inquiring into whether or not
Cartesian dualism is true. The strategy of saying, “We are just arguing that another approach is
better for the purposes of doing anthropology, and leaving aside whether or not Cartesian
dualism is true,” cannot work, because Cartesian dualism as they portray it rules out this other
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