G.R. No.

142396 February 11, 2003

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher
and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal
charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the
house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to
have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who
would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988,
Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges
of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case.

"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to
study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he
was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines.
When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United
Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance
Movement in the Philippines.

"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and
introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose
Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for
several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.

"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Iñigo, the
defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar
from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio
nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of
over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff
his calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and
gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in
defendant’s own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.

"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife
and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help
plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more concentrated on
politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at Mario's
Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but
for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant people to x x x
place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for
which he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business.

"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo,
Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After
some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did not yet have the
money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m.,
he came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the
pair of carpets.1aw phi 1.nét

"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to plaintiff's house
and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas
Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from
it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told
him that he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house
for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and
without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he
saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab
with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6
Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought
inside the house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant
was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attaché
case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's
wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who was
playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why
he was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by
defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He
asked for any warrant, but the defendant told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he
would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.

"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet his
cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and
another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a
pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-
made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his
TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from
his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house.

"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world, in various
newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified
in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x

In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines,
but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on
TV with said news.

"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed
together, where they were detained for three days without food and water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for Scalzo and
moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice from the United States
Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted
the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on
the ground that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam,
was beyond the processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13
December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer
to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which could likewise
be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration
of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a
voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief.
Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States government, as well as its agencies and
officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the
Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to
refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo
denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.

Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023,
assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition
and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the incident in a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to
comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the
appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment.

Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in
default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception
of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to admit
his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his
answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses
(a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in
the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration
of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to
answer for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation.

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion
Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice
Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order
of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court, docketed G.R.
No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of
Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On
31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity
of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review
with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of
Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a
decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this
Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial.
The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to
dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the
authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to
the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of
his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic
immunity could not be taken up.

The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the trial court
reached a decision; it adjudged:

"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the
plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the
manner following:

"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral
damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees
in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.

`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the Court on this
judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this
action as a pauper litigant.’"2

While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he
was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held
accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was
sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the
criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna
Convention.

Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether
or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in
G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an
entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic
immunity.

The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the
finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part
of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject
matter and causes of action.3 Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or
not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat
immune from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a
pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not
resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation -

"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13
June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA
records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA
special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position,
which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated
motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue
of diplomatic immunity."4
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United
States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug
dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S.,
(and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make
the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents -

1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;

2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;

3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;

4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and

5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.

6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of
Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court
of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);

7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and

8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of
Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of
this Court.5

The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly
advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the
diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14
October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm
from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case
pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United
States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to
inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were
presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department,
recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial
Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities
under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated
Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports
of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special
agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of
attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel6 to show (a) that the United States
Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff
of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until
his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law
enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated
Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October
1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic
mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit
12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs Enforcement
Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement
agencies on narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish
and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3)
to conduct complex criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect
the interests of the United States.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary law
and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among
the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment
of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the
person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the
16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of
ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary international law.8 Traditionally, the
exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as
being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official
usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more
prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic
mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by
and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations
with the receiving state.9

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or
nuncios accredited to the heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the
heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs12 accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising
the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the
technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff,
excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded
diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to
the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same
be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with
blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents"
as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same
privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective
states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial
duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and
administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges
accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing
their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature.

Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attaché of the
United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An
attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its
cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging
to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department,
who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the
military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like.
Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main
function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the
host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home
government.14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor
are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.

In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and
791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November
1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No.
97765, viz:

"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that
simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity,
thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.

"x x x x x x x x x

"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent. Setting
aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround
such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and
seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance
and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State
and Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the purpose of determining
his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even
granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by
petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed.

"x x x x x x x x x

"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his
official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x
x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to
dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have
been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and
whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded
to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary."

A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the
Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez,
Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W.
Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988)
was listed as an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore,
accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such
"records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of
the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,15 the Court has recognized that, in such
matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and
incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should
behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most
circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It
might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial
jurisdiction.16 The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has
formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only
concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and
"performs duties of diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession
of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note
formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-
immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an
essentially full-time basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and
descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol
would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category.19

But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently
established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked
to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this
case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions
when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be
resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule
of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign
capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -
par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an
official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.23

In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air Force and special
officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled -

"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a moment be imagined that
they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified
against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States,
they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for
their acts."25

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals26 elaborates:

"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar
in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368):
`Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been
said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department
on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

"x x x x x x x x x

"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official
is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long
as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of
the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto
and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine
territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar
agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to
send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the
Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere
mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the
two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of
Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job
description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the
arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country
to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 496. December 31, 1902. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellant, v. WILLIAM FOWLER ET

AL., Defendants-Appellees.

Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for Appellant.

William Lane O’Neill, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CRIMES ON HIGH SEAS. — Courts of First Instance

of the Philippines have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of crimes committed on the
high seas on board of a transport or other vessel not registered or licensed in the
Philippines.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of
the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the transport Lawton, then
navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of
the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri
causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation,
and without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and
provided.

The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being
present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants presented a demurrer,
alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime
charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime was committed
on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the
Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the
court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.

This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court
has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month’s
imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military
Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on
board vessels flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Courts of First
Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the order of
August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. He
argued that the President of the United States had unquestionable authority to
authorize the commanding general and the Civil Commission to establish a judicial
system with authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in support of this doctrine, which
was applicable to this Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of some of the
States of the Union during the Mexican was and the war of secession.

The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the court
was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to have been committed
on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the discharge of the defendants,
with the costs to the Government. Against this order the prosecuting attorney
appealed, and the case was brought before this court.

This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high
seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil
Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer
jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes committed on
board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are clear and precise
with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to criminal
cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the
case, Act. No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.

This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the
Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven
paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and
offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or
within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on bard a ship or water
craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the
laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the Courts of
First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class,
our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board
the same.

Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with the
costs de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa and Ladd, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 177218 October 3, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NOEL T. SALES, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ
sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and
RTC’03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight
physical injuries, respectively. The Information3 for parricide contained the following allegations:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening at
Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of
his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more
or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC’03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted
slight physical injuries in the following manner:

That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 o’clock in the evening, at
Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel
Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and
prejudice of the victim’s heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6

When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of
parricide7 and slight physical injuries8 respectively. The cases were then consolidated upon
manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.9 During the pre-trial
conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales
(Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellant’s family was living in
the conjugal home located in Barangay San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant
voluntarily surrendered to the police.10
Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively,
left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of
their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria),
looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their
father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon
them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a
furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken
so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a
coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria
stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting
Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in
Noemar’s head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left
cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried
to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their
son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a
quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a
hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a
vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they
met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their
house.

Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His body
was never examined by a doctor.

The Version of the Defense

Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions
without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not
to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them. During those times, Noemar
and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.

However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents’ permission on September
16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons
stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could search for
Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8 o’clock in the evening of September 20,
2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger. He hit
Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side. After whipping his sons in their
buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost
consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at
the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing.
The pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he
wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a
vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back
to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He
claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the
whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than
a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from
epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15
minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.11 Thereafter, appellant
surrendered voluntarily.12

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not
consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no
proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive
portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales,
beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-782 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of
Noemar Sales, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC’03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20)
days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal
Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in
accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.14

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in an Order16 dated September 21,
2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision17 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3,
2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries,
respectively, is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may
appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.18

Issues

Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.19

Our Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The Charge of Parricide

Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies
battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According to him,
Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his
mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take
a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest
pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To
substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed
suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on children of
tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or
guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must not
exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon
them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended
punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.

Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family
dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents. This was
further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace.
Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for
the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not
by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his
anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It
was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost
consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant
would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical
attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It
bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic
punishment in the guise of discipline.

Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline
Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

xxxx

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.20 Here, there
is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed
a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit. This
declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr.
Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate
indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that
his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was
never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his
contention, the latter’s testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony.
Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria
declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also
unsubstantiated by evidence.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this
case.

All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.

We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant
committed the crime of parricide.

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused."21
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person
was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating
he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead.
Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him
the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate22 was also presented in evidence.

There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the
deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria
testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by
appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this
time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes
indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their
father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body to
endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.

As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While Noemar’s
birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.23 As earlier
stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference
and likewise made the same declaration while under oath.24 Maria also testified that Noemar and
Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the
relationship between appellant and Noemar.

Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.

There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so
Grave a Wrong

The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the barangay
captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer
on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture"25 which is the essence of voluntary
surrender.

However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit
so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his
sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a
stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that
immediately caused his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused
were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim."26

The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial court’s award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00 should be increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.27 "In
addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid."28

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. However, even
if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed. This is because the exclusion of said
mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only one
mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is
sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code provides in part as follows:

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

xxxx

The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With
one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the
imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on appellant was
thus proper.29

The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries

The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their
father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his
right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.30 Maria corroborated
her son’s testimony.31

Junior’s testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of
Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical
Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular contusions with
hematoma on the right side of Junior’s face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have
been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of
brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the
patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked how long does he think the injuries
would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.32 But if applied with medication, the injuries
would heal in a week.33

We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was
beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves
credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and
supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries.1awphil

Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries

We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries
sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly meted
upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. – The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same
period.

xxxx

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the
penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC’03-782 and RTC’03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the
crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of
exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all
monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-
appellee.

Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and
ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3)
Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F.
Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-
966). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about
eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers
tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose.
Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn
Jan. 14, 1966).

Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September, 1964.
Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.

Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give
him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife
for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise
eighty-five pesos for his expenses.

On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and
took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to
Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to
the big city.

At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter
which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an employment
agency where they learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was
working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they proceeded to her
employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson,
gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. It was then
noontime.

Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where they
ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad
station that same day, January 8th, for their homeward trip.

After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the
afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.

The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had
one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an
opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on
the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between
Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-
feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than
one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.

Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping
with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in
line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the
window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a
woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of
Reganet.

Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers
bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It
was around eight o'clock in the evening.

Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors
(Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on
his seat.

For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite
him. She was not able to get up anymore.1

Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but
before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was
supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm.
Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins,
who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach.2

Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train
escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag,
Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was
a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach
No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a
distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9,
holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward.
He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel
ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little
finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast.
He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel
saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform
when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.

Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.

Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he
received the information that there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and,
while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with
his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B.
Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the
coach and on the aisle.

Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors. When
Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on
the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's
buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows
administered to him.

When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from
the train and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their
names. The bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS).

Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad
tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals
for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the
official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were
autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G
to I-2, J-1 and J-2).

Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab
wounds, namely:

(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.

(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.

(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.

(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.

(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.

(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9,
C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)

Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving
train to avoid being killed. They were:

(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .

(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.

(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and

(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5,
C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).

Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida
Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio
supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).

Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she
was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of
the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of
charge. As a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one
month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with
her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos
cash in a paper bag which was lost.

The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone
headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary
investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal,
Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers were
taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.

Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the
station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he
stabbed somebody "who might have died and others that might not". He clarified that in the train four
persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".

He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons
because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49
tsn Sept. 3, 1965).

Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from
Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He
said that he stabbed two persons who were demanding money from him and who were armed with
knives and iron bars.

When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented that
everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the
back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back,
gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors.

On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court
of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Through counsel, the accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case
was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965
filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated
murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after jumping from the running
train to avoid being stabbed).

At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial,
Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers
appealed.

In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal
liability was only for two homicides and for physical injuries.

According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1
and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8,
1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he
took out his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder in the same
pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were allegedly
observing them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected that the four
men harbored evil intentions towards them.

When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They
were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach,
the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they
were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other
two seated themselves behind them. Some old women were near them. When the train was already
running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed
a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was
holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if
he would not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money
provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.

When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight
inches long including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it,
causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his
pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of
Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the
second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to
lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his
chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers
raised him. His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded
his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose
stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.

However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was
already weak. He fell down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by
Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used. He recovered consciousness
when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.

The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital who
treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following
injuries on Antonio Toling:

Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal
(wound on the forehead) and

Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right,
penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).

and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left,
penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit
or "about one inch from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital
on January 17th.

The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which
resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the following observations:

What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It
appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard
earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager sum of
P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to
receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate in
Manila.

It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could
easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close
resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at, however, the
accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them, immediately suspected
them as having evil intention towards them (accused).

To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused
coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who
happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control and actuated them
to run amuck.

We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins,
whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze
at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed
that their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or
jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained the notion or
suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might
victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-passengers.
Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.

A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the
prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable
because the twins, according to a Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the
witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins,
refused to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that they
might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn
November 5, 1965).

In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn
statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical
certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with
the knife was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution
witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose
was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.

In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose
declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station,
before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair
of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having
attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be
Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is
attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after
the former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not
Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).

The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract
from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins
that they stabbed several passengers.

Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's
decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he
does not particularize on the supposed contradictions.

The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony
is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide.
Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from
committing other killings.

It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not
corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the
train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea
and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.

Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was
nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234,
December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the
acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception and
recollection are not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her
testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the
seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy
reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons.

On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted
the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the
twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies
of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.

Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante
delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach
No. 9. It is probable that no one actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because
everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and
confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the twins
consummated all the killings.

On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9,
which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the twins without
being readily perceived by the other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there
really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the
blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.

Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they admittedly
killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny
that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the
grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland
who reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban
areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are convinced that the
record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.

To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court, because
they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and
P-2). The omission of her name in judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the
necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C.
Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions,
contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to
M-2 and S to S-2).

The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they
met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs
should be indemnified. As to three of them, the information charges that the accused committed
homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.

No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been
reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended".
The presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c],
Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a
state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701,
cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).

Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape
jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for
homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs.
Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).

The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already
named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of
the said victims.

The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of multiple
frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal
and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence.
Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.

The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and
attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not
anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves
(even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that
insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The
conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.

The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence,
they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other".

As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a)
cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal,
12th Ed. 650).

On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de
las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la
logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652,
People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).

The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105
Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others,
was convicted of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted murders;
People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants were
convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who
fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil.
272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S.
vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82,
102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97
Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi,
61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes
committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were the
product of a single criminal impulse or intent).

As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for
murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised
Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted.

A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying
circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence.
Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8)
separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion
perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the
attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven
victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C.
Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the
service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muñoz
Palma, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., took no part.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant.

Angel Roco for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.

STREET, J.:

The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is
under discussion in the present appeal are these:

At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the
Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into the
Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the
accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio
Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as
helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.

The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he
accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult them.
The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved
towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused
had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and
immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no
more.

The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and
was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows were moored to the shore, but between these
and the boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full midday,
and there was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the failure of Venancio
Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim or the
strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and was drowned.

Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped into the water,
the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this
reason they made no movement looking to rescue; but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that
Venancio did not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. The fact
that the accused at his juncture threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment except
tho show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring.

On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to
watch for the body, in the hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered.
Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.
It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a
bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his personal belongings have been delivered to a
representative of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is
needless to say, take it for granted that he is dead.

The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility
that Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think that the trial judge did not err in holding
that he is dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances stated. The
proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river, so far as the observers
could see; and this circumstance, coupled with the known fact that human life must inevitably be
extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death. The possibility that he might
have swum ashore, after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions, we consider too
remote to be entertained for a moment.

As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the likewise can be no
doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in obedience
to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to
him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the
same circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, "If a man
creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try to
escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.

In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is cited in
the brief of The Attorney-General, as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual,
after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the
injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by
drowning. The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the
wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person, supposing that he
had received no succour, and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from
submersion. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal
that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated
homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: "That even
though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary
effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a
hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed,
nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order
to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured
person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by
said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him
of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed
from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any
error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused." (II Hidalgo,
Codigo Penal, p. 183.)

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio
Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as
an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong
as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced
the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the
corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay
the costs. Said sentenced is in accordance with law; and it being understood that the accessories
appropriate to the case are those specified in article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority opinion in this case.

The only fact that the evidence shows in that Venancio Gargantel, one of those who were in a boat
of the steamer Vigan subject to the orders of the accused Calixto Valdez and who at the time was
engaged in the work of raising the anchor of that vessel, which was then lying at the Pasig River, a
short distance from the lighthouse and not far from its mouth at the Manila Bay, upon seeing that the
accused was approaching him, armed with a big knife, and in the attitude of attacking him, threw
himself into the water and disappeared from the surface and had not been seen again. This event
took place at noon on November 29, 1919, the boat being then about 30 or 40 yards from land and
about 10 steps from the Vigan, there being two lighters moored to the shore and at a distance of
about 18 or 20 yards from the boat. All of these facts are stated in the decision itself.

The original information in the present case, charging Calixto Valdez y Quiri with the crime of
homicide and alleging that as a result of his having thrown himself into the river under the
circumstances mentioned, Venancio Gargantel was drowned, was presented on December 8, 1919,
that is, nine days afterwards.

There is no evidence whatever that the corpse of Venancio Gargantel had been found or, what is the
same thing, that he had died. From November 28, the day when the event occurred, until December
8, when the information was filed, it cannot in any manner be maintained that the necessary time
had passed for us to properly conclude, as is alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died
by drowning, as a consequence of his having thrown himself into the water upon seeing himself
threatened and attacked by the accused. Neither does it appear in the evidence that all the
precaution necessary for us to assure ourselves, as a sure and proven fact, that Venancio Gargantel
then died by drowning, were taken; nor is there any evidence that it would have been impossible for
him, by swimming or by any other means to rise to the surface at a place other than the Pasig River
or that where the boat was, from which he threw himself into the river, and in that manner save
himself from death.

From the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution which is the only evidence in the record, for
the accused di not take the stand, it only appears that Venancio Gargantel, after having jumped from
the boat, did not rise again to the surface. Such was the statement of two of those witnesses who
were members of the boat's crew at the time. Another witness also declared that Gargantel was
afterwards not again seen at the house where he lived in this city, No. 711 San Nicolas Street,
where he kept his trunks and some effects, a fact which caused his mother, who lived in the
municipality of Guimbal, in the Province of Iloilo, upon being informed of it and upon the failure of
Venancio to appear in said place, to give special power on the 28th of that month of December, that
is, one month afterwards, to a student, Ignacio Garzon, to get the trunks and effects of Venancio
from said house. Sid Garzon himself testified, upon being asked whether Venancio Gargantel had
returned to the house of his parents since November 29, 1919, that he had no information about it,
and another witness, Pedro Garcia, of the prosecution, stated that he had probably died, because he
had not seen Venancio Gargantel.

Therefore, in short, the only fact proved is that since Venancio Gargantel threw himself into the river,
upon being threatened with a knife by the accused, his whereabouts has remained unknown even at
the moment of rendering judgment in this case, or, February 9, 1920, that is, two and one-half
months after the occurrence of the event.

It is stated in the decision that the friend and parents of Gargantel give him up for dead. There is
nevertheless in the record no statement of any parent of Gargantel to that effect; for his mother
Maria Gatpolitan, a resident of the municipality of Guimbal, merely stated in the power of attorney
executed in favor of Ignacio Garzon that the latter should take steps in order that the city fiscal might
investigate the death of her son which, according to information, was caused by another members,
of the crew of the steamer Vigan; and none of his friends, that is, none of the two members of the
party in the boat at that time and of the crew of the steamer Vigan, nor Maximo Gumbog, the owner
of the house in which Gargantel lived in this city, nor Pedro Garcia, another member of the crew of
that steamer, and finally, nor Ignacio Garzon himself has stated that he gave up Gargantel for dead,
for the simple reason that this was not possible, for they only knew that he did not again rise to the
surface and was not seen again after having thrown himself into the river from the boat.

For this reason it is stated in the decision that the circumstances therein stated are such that they
exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel could have survived and that the
circumstance that never rose to the surface after having jumped into the river, as witnessed by the
persons present, together with the admitted fact that human life is necessarily asphyxiated under the
water, is conclusive that he died. Then, there is nothing more than a deduction that Gargantel had
died based upon those facts and circumstances.

In my opinion this is not sufficient to convict the accused as guilty of homicide, because there is the
possibility that Gargantel had risen to the surface at some place away from the where he threw
himself into the river and had embarked on some other vessel in the same river or out of it in the bay
and had gone abroad, or to some province of these Islands and is found in some municipality
thereof, cannot be denied. And this is very probable inasmuch as it does not appear in the record
that the necessary investigation has been made in order to determined even with only some
measure of certainty, not to say beyond all reasonable doubt, that it was and is impossible to find
said person or determined his whereabouts.

Furthermore, there is not even a presumption juris tantum that he had died, for in order that this
presumption may exist, according to section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary that
no information about him should have been received for seven years from his disappearance upon
his throwing himself into the river, which occurred on November 29, 1919, that is, only about one
year and four months ago. And if, in order that a finding of a civil character in favor of or against
some person, may be made, by virtue of that presumption, it is necessary that seven years should
have elapsed without any notice being received of the person whose whereabouts is unknown, it is
not just, reasonable, or legal that the period of one year and four months from his disappearance or
since Venancio Gargantel threw himself into the water should suffice for us to impose upon the
accused Calixto Valdez such a grave penalty as that of twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, merely assuming without declaring it, as a proven fact, that Gargantel has died and at the
same time finding said accused to be the author of that death.

Lastly, the decision of the English Supreme Court or that of the Spanish Supreme Court dated July
13, 1882, cited by the majority opinion is not applicable. The first, is not applicable because in the
present case it is not proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that some damage resulted to Gargantel,
just as it cannot be considered as proved that he had died, or that he had been injured or that he
had suffered some injury after having thrown himself into the river as a result of the threat of the
accused. The second is not applicable because the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain refers to
a case, in which the injured party had already been wounded with a cutting instrument by the
accused before throwing himself into the river upon the latter aiming at him with his gun, it having
afterwards been proved upon his being taken out of the river that the wound inflicted upon him by
the accused was mortal; and, consequently, it was declared by said court that, even if the death of
the deceased be considered as not having resulted exclusively and necessarily from that most grave
wound, the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary to escape it and
threw himself into the river, by depriving him of all possible help and placing him in the serious
situation related in the judgment appealed from -a case which, as is seen, is very different from that
which took place in the present case.

For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion, with due respect to the opinion of the majority,
that the accused Calixto Valdez y Quiri cannot be found guilty of homicide and should be acquitted.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26789 April 25, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DICTO ARPA and MAALUM ARPA defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete
and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Antonio L. Africa for defendants-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Automatic review by this Court of the death penalty imposed by the trial court on the accused for the
crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide.

In the information filed before the Court of First Instance of Davao, the accused, Dicto Arpa and
Maalum Arpa, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide (Criminal Case No.
9694); alleged to have been committed as follows:

That on or about February 20, 1966, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, having boarded a motor
banca named "MAMI I", owned by Epimaco Mola together with other passengers bound for
Talicud Island, Davao, and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it
developed engine trouble, the accused, conspiring together and helping one another, with
intent to steal the motor banca and by means of intimidation, the accused Dicto Arpa firing
his .22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the banca, and fired at one of the
passengers, hitting the said passenger at the right shoulder, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously took and carried away the said motor banca "MAMI I" belonging to the said
Epimaco Mola valued at P2,100.00, to the damage and prejudice of the above-named owner
in the aforementioned amount of P2,100.00, and as a result of the jumping into the sea of all
the passengers of the motor banca, Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes
Villegas, all passengers of the motor banca were drowned and died.

On the scheduled date of arraignment on March 7, 1966, the accused, through their counsel de
oficio, Atty. Bernardino Bolcan Jr., manifested their desire to plead guilty only as to the fact of "the
killing of one of the persons mentioned in the information," 1 denying the killing of the two other
persons. The fiscal, however, manifested that the State could not agree to the accused's offer to
plead guilty to only one homicide, since "the two other persons were lost on the same occasion, ...
because of the incident. They jumped overboard after the firing at one of the victims, ..." 2 The trial
judge, Hon. Manases G. Reyes, accordingly did not accept the plea and reset the arraignment for
the next day, informing the accused that as the prosecution was not agreeable to their qualified plea,
they would have to enter into trial.

When the case was called on the following day, the information was read to the accused in the
dialect they understood, and both accused pleaded guilty, their counsel de oficio invoking, in their
favor two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
The fiscal objected to the appreciation of the latter circumstance, demonstrating that "there could be
no lack of intent when they immediately fired at one of the victims point blank with a pistol, that is
fatal." 3
The case was submitted and the trial court rendered thereafter on March 11, 19661, its decision,
crediting the accused with the mitigating circumstance of their voluntary plea of guilty, but rejecting
the claimed mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, in view of "the
nature and gravity of the offense committed." The trial court further found two aggravating
circumstances against the accused, as follows;

A perusal of the information reveals the following, allegation in the information:

...and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it developed engine
trouble....

These allegations to the mind of the Court constitute two aggravating circumstances. The
first underlined portion constitutes the aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed in an uninhabited place. (People vs. Rubia 52 Phil. 172). And the second
constitutes the aggravating circumstance that the crime is committed on the occasion of
conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.

The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea is a
misfortune which tends to create confusion and apprehensions of the passengers and,
thereby, to commit a crime such a time the accused manifested greater perversity and
instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking advantage of the said misfortune.

As it is, therefore, the accused in the commission of this crime has one mitigating
circumstance in their favor and two aggravating circumstances against them, and offsetting
one another there is still remaining one aggravating circumstance to the accused.4

Consequently, the trial court sentenced each of the accused to the penalty of death and order both
of them, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo
Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of P6,000.00 for each of them, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed, and to indemnify Epimaco
Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and to pay the costs proportionately.

For purposes of this review, Atty. Antonio L. Africa was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused,
upon the latter's request for such counsel. Said Counsel urges the reversal of the death sentence,
and the Solicitor-General recommends the affirmance thereof. Counsel for the accused in a well-
prepared brief, assigns the following errors: —

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS

ROBBERY WITH TRIPLE HOMICIDE.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNINHABITED PLACE AND
ON THE OCCASION OF A MISFORTUNE.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT
COMMITTED.

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH.
The accused, leaving voluntarily pleaded guilty to the information, come under the firmly settled
doctrine of being deemed to have admitted all the material facts alleged in the information, including
the aggravating circumstances therein alleged. 5

The first error assigned that "if the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend homicide, (in
view of the allegations in the information that the accused's intent was to steal the motor banca and
that accused Dicto Arpa fired his 22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the banca), but
homicide follows the robbery as an incident of the latter, the criminal acts should be viewed as
constitutive of two offenses, and not as a single special offense (of robbery with homicide)" 6 is
without merit. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which defines the special, single
and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide with the use of violence against, or intimidation of any
person, imposes one distinct penalty of reclusion perpetua to death "when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed." In the case of People vs.
Mangulabnan, et al., 7 this Court pointed out that the "English version of the Code is a poor
translation of the prevailing Spanish text of sale paragraph, which reads as follows: lawphi 1.nêt

I. o Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte cuando con motivo o' con occasion del robo
resultare homicidio.

We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7,
1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High
Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide,
has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision
of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the
homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the
result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or
persons intervening in commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration
(Decision of January 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal p. 501-502).

In that case, one of the two unidentified co-participants of the appellant Mangulabnan climbed up a
table and fired at the ceiling, which was conceded to be "an unpremeditated act that surged on the
spur of the moment and possibly without any idea that Vicente Pacson was hiding therein" that
resulted in the killing of said Vicente Pacson, but said appellant having been shown to have
participated in the criminal design to commit the robbery with his co-defendants was held guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide. Here, upon the accused carrying out their criminal design to
steal the motor banca, one of them, Dicto Arpa, started firing his revolver to scare the passengers
and fired directly at one of the passengers, hitting him at the right shoulder, and as a result, the three
passengers jumped into the sea and met their death by drowning. Even if we were to concede
appellants' contention that their original criminal design did not clearly comprehend homicide, and
that homicide followed the robbery "as an incident of the latter", still the deaths clearly resulted by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery and the trial court therefore correctly found them guilty of
the crime of robbery with triple homicide.

The remaining errors assigned concern the trial court's appreciation and finding of two aggravating
circumstances as against one mitigating circumstance of a voluntary plea of guilty in the commission
of the crime and the mandatory imposition, as a consequence, of the penalty of death.

We hold that the trial court correctly held that the crime committed was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place. The accused, in having boarded at Davao City the motor banca,
together with other passengers bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and carrying out their criminal
design of stealing the said motor banca, once it was in the middle of the sea and when it developed
engine trouble, with one of them firing revolver shots in order to forestall any resistance, certainly
cannot disclaim that they sought the isolation of the sea to attain their criminal objective without
interference. As held by this Court in People vs. Rubia, 8 the aggravating circumstance of the crime of
homicide having been committed in an uninhabited place must be considered, where the deed was
committed at sea, where it was difficult for the offended party to receive any help, while the
assailants could easily have escaped punishment, and the purely accidental circumstance that
another banca carrying the eyewitnesses to the crime was also at sea in the vicinity at the time
without the assailants' knowledge is no argument against the appreciation of said circumstance.

We hold, however, against the trial court's finding of a second aggravating circumstance in that the
crime was committed "on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other
calamity or misfortune." 9 In so holding, the trial Court reasoned:

The Court believes that the development of engine trouble in the middle of the sea is a
misfortune which tends to create confusions and apprehensions of the passengers and,
thereby, to commit a crime at such a time the accused manifested greater perversity and
instead of rendering help increased their affliction by taking advantage of the said misfortune.
(Decision, p. 3).

The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the context of
the phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal
Code, which refer to other conditions of distress similar to those precedingly enumerated therein,
namely, "configuration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic", such as the chaotic conditions resulting
from war or the liberation of the Philippines during the last World War. The reason for the provision
of this aggravating circumstance "is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the
midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted adds to their suffering by taking
advantage of their misfortune to despoil them." 10 Clearly, no such condition of great calamity or
misfortune existed when the motor banca developed engine trouble.

It should be added that there is nothing in the record whatever to indicate that the engine trouble
developed was a serious one such as to create confusion and apprehension on the part of the
passengers as perceived by the trial court, and that the same was not easily repaired; if at all, the
indications are to the contrary, for as alleged in the information, the accused succeeded in stealing
the motor banca at sea.

We hold also against the accused's claim of a second mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong. The trial court correctly held that this circumstance could not properly be
appreciated in favor of the accused "viewed from the nature and gravity of the offense committed."
As previously pointed out by this Court in the case of People vs. Boyles, 11 the true nature of this
circumstance "addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when he
executes or commits the criminal act; not to his intention during the planning stage. Therefore, when,
as in the case under review the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the
resistance offered by the victim, was compounded into the more serious crime of robbery with
homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be rightly granted." In the
present case, the accused embarked on their most reprehensible criminal design of pirating a motor
banca at sea, firing a volley of shots at the passengers notwithstanding the lack of indications of any
resistance, thus forcing them to jump overboard in a desperate act of self-preservation only to be
swallowed by the sea. The accused cannot now disclaim their lack of criminal intent and
responsibility for the direct, logical and fearsome consequences of their unlawful acts.
As thus established, therefore, the crime committed was Robbery with Triple Homicide, attended by
the aggravating circumstance of the same having been committed in an uninhabited place which is
offset by the accused's voluntary plea of guilty, and the proper imposable penalty is the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua. (Article 294, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 3, Revised Penal Code.)
The compensatory damages awarded to the heirs of the victims should properly be increased to
P12,000.00. (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968.)

It may be noted that even if the accused were to be granted the additional claimed mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent, the said imposable penalty would still be the same. 12 The question of
the fact of death of the two other passengers, since the accused deny knowledge of the fact of their
death, as their counsel in the lower court claimed that there was no showing of such fact, 13 although
both counsels in this Court as well as in the lower court do not dispute the "judicial admission by the
accused appellants of the fact of killing (death) of one of the persons named in the
information" 14 would not affect the nature of the single and indivisible crime of Robbery with
Homicide committed by the accused nor the proper imposable penalty as herein established, since
all the homicides perpetrated by reason or occasion of the robbery are merged in the composite,
integrated whole that constitutes the crime of robbery with homicide. 15

Nevertheless, we feel constrained to add that in reviewing the records of the case, we were struck
with the paucity of facts and evidence attending the commission of the crime other than those stated
in the information and other circumstances that would aid the Court in its ordained task of passing en
consulta upon the legality and propriety of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, e.g. the age
and education or lack thereof of the accused, and whether there were other passengers who
survived, aside from the three persons named in the information as having drowned, as well as what
the crew did, if anything, during the commission of the crime. Were it not for the conclusion here
reached of imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, by virtue of our disallowance of the
additional aggravating circumstance of calamity or misfortune found by the trial court, we might have
been constrained to remand the case for new trial to the court a quo in order to satisfy ourselves as
to the degree of culpability of the accused in relation to the death penalty imposed, especially since
the information did not expressly designate as such the aggravating circumstances found by the trial
court and there was no discussion nor spelling out thereof whatever in the eight-page transcript of
the entire proceedings. We therefore reiterate the rule of practice recommended since the early
cases of U.S. vs. Talbanos 16 and U.S. vs. Rota. 17 set out in Rule 118 section 5 of the Rules of
Court, 18 and thereafter suggested a number of cases, lastly, in the case of People vs.
Bulalake, 19 where this Court said:

It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
court. Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the extreme penalty of
death are subject to review by the Supreme Court as law and justice shall dictate, whether
the defendant appeals or not, which automatic review neither the Court nor the accused
could waive or evade it would seem that the proper and prudent course to follow where the
accused enters a plea of 'guilty' to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant person
with little or no education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but to
aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and
comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified: the accused are imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Alfonso Villegas, Bernardo Villegas and Lourdes Villegas in the amount of P12,000.00 for each of
them, and Epimaco Mola in the sum of P2,100.00, and proportionately to pay the costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.