Animal Rights and Feminist Theory

Animal Rights and Feminist Theory
Author(s): Josephine Donovan

Source: Signs, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Winter, 1990), pp. 350-375
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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VIEWPOINT
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND FEMINIST

THEORY
JOSEPHINE DONOVAN
PeterSingerprefaceshis groundbreaking treatiseAnimalLibera-

tion(1975) withan anecdoteabouta visithe and his wifemade to
the home ofa womanwho claimedto love animals,had heardhe
was writinga book on the subject,and so invited him to tea.
Singer's attitudetoward the woman is contemptuous:she had
inviteda friendwho also loved animalsand was "keen to meetus.
When we arrivedour hostess'sfriendwas alreadythere,and ...
certainlywas keen to talk about animals.'I do love animals,'she
began... and she was off.She paused while refreshments were
served,tooka hamsandwich,and thenaskedus whatpetswe had."'
Singer'spoint is not only to condemnthe woman's hypocrisyin
claimingto love animalswhile she was eatingmeatbutalso to dis-
sociate himselffroma sentimentalist approachto animalwelfare.
This article is dedicated to my great dog Rooney (1974-87), who died as it was
being completed but whose life led me to appreciate the nobility and dignity of
animals.
1 Peter Singer,Animal Liberation (New York:Avon, 1975), ix-x. ThroughoutI use
the shorthandterm "animal rightstheory" to referto any theorizingabout humane
treatmentof animals, regardless of its philosophical roots. I would like to acknowl-
edge the contributionof Gloria Stevenson, who introduced me to the concept of
animal rightsyears ago, and my dog Jessie.
[Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1990, vol. 15, no. 2]
? 1990 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved. 0097-9740/90/1502-0383$01.00
350

Winter1990/SIGNS
Speakingforhis wifeas well,he explains:"We were notespecially

'interestedin' animals.Neitherof us had ever been inordinately
fondofdogs,cats,or horses.... We didn't'love' animals.... The
portrayalof those who protestagainstcrueltyto animalsas senti-
mental,emotional'animallovers'[has meant]excludingtheentire
issue... fromserious political and moral discussion." In other
words, he fears that to associate the animal rightscause with
"womanish"sentimentis to trivializeit.2
Singer's concernsabout the image and strategiesof animal
rightsactivistsare sharedbyanothermajorcontemporary theoristof
animalrights,Tom Regan. In his prefaceto The Case for Animal
Rights(1983) Regan stressesthat"since all who workon behalfof
the interests of animals are ... familiar with the tired charge of
being 'irrational,'
'sentimental,''emotional,'or worse,we can give
thelie to theseaccusationsonlyby makinga concertedeffort notto
indulge our emotions or parade our sentiments. And that requires
makinga sustainedcommitment to rationalinquiry."3In a later
articleRegan defendshimselfagainstchargesof being hyperra-
tionalby maintaining that"reason-not sentiment, not emotion-
reasoncompelsus to recognizetheequal inherentvalue of... an-
imalsand ... theirequal righttobe treatedwithrespect."4 Regan's
and Singer'srejectionof emotionand theirconcernabout being
brandedsentimentalist are notaccidental;rather, theyexpose the
inherentbias in contemporary animalrightstheorytowardrational-
ism, which,paradoxically,in the formof Cartesianobjectivism,
establisheda majortheoretical justificationforanimalabuse.
Womenanimalrightstheoristsseem,indeed,to havedeveloped
moreofa sense ofemotionalbondingwithanimalsas thebasis for
theirtheorythanis evidentin the male literature.MaryMidgley,
forexample,anothercontemporary animal rightstheorist,urges,
"Whatmakesour fellowbeings entitledto basic considerationis
surelynotintellectualcapacitybutemotionalfellowship." Animals,
she notes,exhibit"social and emotionalcomplexityof the kind
which is expressedby the formation of deep, subtle and lasting
relationships."5ConstantiaSalamone, a leading feministanimal
2 In the Ethics
Spinoza remarkedthat opposition to animal slaughter was based
on "superstition and womanish pity" rather than on reason (as cited in Mary
Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter [Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1983], 10). This is the kind of charge that disconcerts Singer.
3 Tom Regan, The CaseforAnimal Rights (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1983), xii.
4 Tom
Regan, "The Case forAnimal Rights,"in In Defense of Animals, ed. Peter
Singer (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 24.
5 Mary
Midgley, "Persons and Non-Persons," in Singer, ed., 60.
351

Donovan /ANIMALRIGHTS
rightsactivist,roundlycondemnstherationalist, masculinistbias of
currentanimal rightstheory.6 In the nineteenthcentury,women
activistsin the antivivisection movement,such as Frances Power
Cobbe, viewed as theirenemythe "coldlyrationalmaterialism"of
science,whichtheysaw as threatening "to freezehumanemotion
and sensibility.... Antivivisection ... shielded the heart,the hu-
man spirit,fromdegradationat the hands ofheartlessscience."7
Yet Singer's anecdote points up thatone cannot simplyturn
uncriticallyto womenas a groupor to a femalevalue systemas a
sourcefora humanerelationshipethicwithanimals.Whilewomen
have undoubtedlybeen less guiltyofactiveabuse and destruction
of animalsthanmen (VirginiaWoolfobservesin Three Guineas:
"The vastmajority ofbirdsand beastshavebeen killedby you; not
by us"),8 they nevertheless have been complicitin that abuse,
largely in their use of luxuryitems thatentail animal pain and
destruction(such as furs) and in their consumptionof meat.
CharlottePerkinsGilman,an animalwelfarecrusaderas well as a
feminist, criticizedsuch hypocrisy decades beforeSingerin her"A
Study in Ethics" (1933).Condemningwomen'shabitofwearing"as
decorationthecarcassoftheanimal,"Gilmanremarkstheshocking
inconsistency that"civilizedChristianwomen,sensitiveto cruelty,
of
fond pets, should willinglymaintainthegreatestpossiblecruelty
to millions of harmless little animals.... Furs are obtained by
trapping.Trapping means everyagonyknownto an animal,impris-
onment,starvation, freezing,franticfearand pain. If one woman
hungup or fasteneddown hundredsofkittenseach by one paw in
herbackyardin winterweather,to struggleand dangle and freeze,
to cryin anguishand terrorthatshe might'trim'somethingwith
6Constantia Salamone, xeroxed formletter,July 1986.

7 James Turner,Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain and Humanity in the
Victorian Mind (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 101, 103.
Roswell C. McCrea, The Humane Movement: A Descriptive Survey (1910; reprint,
College Park, Md.: McGrath, 1969), 117, notes that sentimentalismversus rational-
ism as a basis foranimal rightstheorywas an issue in the nineteenth-centuryanimal
rightscampaign: "As a rule humane writings[and] work,are based on a 'faith'rather
than any rationalistic scheme of fundamentals. The emotional basis is a common
one, and the kind treatmentof animals is assumed to be a thing desirable in itself."
The exception was the Humanitarian League under Henry Salt, which tried to place
"humane principles on a consistentand rationalbasis." It was based "not merely on
a kindlysentiment,a product ofthe heartratherthan ofthe head." However, Frances
Power Cobbe and otherwomen theoristsof the time were not afraidto privilege the
heart. For an introductionto their ideas see Coral Lansbury, The Old Brown Dog:
Women, Workers,and Vivisection in Edwardian England (Madison: Universityof
Wisconsin Press, 1985).
8 VirginiaWoolf,Three Guineas (1938; reprint,New York:Harcourt,Brace, 1963),
6. Woolf's note to this passage indicates she had done some research on the issue.
352

Winter1990/SIGNS
their collected skins... she would be considered a monster."9

Recognizingthatsuchproblemsare involvedin women'shistorical
relationshipwith animals, I believe that culturalfeminism,in-
formedbyan awarenessofanimalrightstheory, can providea more
viable theoreticalbasis foran ethic of animal treatmentthan is
currently available.
Contemporary animalrightstheoryincludestwomajortheoret-
ical approaches,one based on naturalrightstheoryand theotheron
utilitarianism.The majortheoretician forthenaturalrightsposition
is Tom Regan,whose primarystatementappears in The Case for
AnimalRights.In thislengthy, impressive,but sometimescasuis-
tical documentRegan argues that animals-in particular,adult
mammals-are moralentitieswho have certaininalienablerights,
just as humansdo, accordingto the naturalrightsdoctrineenunci-
ated in the eighteenthcentury(particularly by Locke).'?
Reganbuilds his case primarily by refuting Kant,who had stip-
ulatedin his second formulation oftheCategoricalImperativethat
"manand generallyanyrationalbeing existsas an end in himself,
not merelyas a means," thatrationalbeings possess "absolute
worth,"and thattherefore theyare entitledto treatment as ends."
Itis onthebasisoftheirrationality
thathumansareidentified byKant
and otherEnlightenment thinkers as moralagentswhoaretherefore
entitledto such naturalrightsas to be treatedas ends.
In the articulation
of Locke and the framers ofthe U.S. Decla-
rationof Independence and Constitution not all humanswere in
factconsideredsufficiently rationalas to be considered"persons"
9 Charlotte Perkins
Gilman, "A Study in Ethics" (Schlesinger Library,Radcliffe
College, Cambridge, Mass., 1933, typescript). Published by permission of the
Schlesinger Library. It must be noted that the women criticized by Singer and
Gilman are guiltyof sins of omission ratherthan commission; they are not actively
conducting atrocities against animals. Their failure is due to ignorance and habit,
traitsthatare presumably correctablethroughmoral education. In this article I focus
mainly on the rationalist ideology of modern science because it is the principal
contemporarylegitimizationof animal sacrificeand because its objectifyingepiste-
mology,which turns animals into "its," has become the pervasive popular view of
animals, thus legitimizing other formsof animal abuse such as factoryfarming.
'1 Despite his accent on rigorouslyrationalinquiry,Regan throughoutuses the term
counterintuitiveas a kind ofescape clause whenever deductive reason per se proves
inadequate. An example ofwhere Regan's argumentbecomes (to me at least) illogical
is his lifeboat hypotheticalwhere he maintains thatwith fournormal adult humans
and one dog, it is the dog who mustbe sacrificed.His reasoning here suggests an un-
acknowledged hierarchywithhumans stillat the top. See Regan, The CaseforAnimal
Rights,324-25. See also Peter Singer's critique in "Ten Years of Animal Rights Lib-
eration,"New YorkReview of Books (January17,1985), 46-52, esp. 49-50, and "The
Dog in the Lifeboat," New York Review of Books (April 25, 1985), 57.
" Kant, "Theory of
Ethics," in Kant Selections, ed. Theodore M. Greene (New
York: Scribner's, 1927), 308-9.
353

entitled to rights:only white, male propertyholders were deemed

adequately endowed to be included in the categoryof personhood.
Indeed, much of the nineteenth-centurywomen's rights move-
ment was devoted to urging that women be considered persons
under the Constitution.l2Here as elsewhere in Western political
theory women and animals are cast together. Aristotle, for
example, linked women and animals in the Nicomachean Ethics
by excluding them fromparticipation in the moral life. As Keith
Thomas points out, the centuries-long debate over whether
women have souls paralleled similar discussions about the moral
status of animals.'3
In building his case for animal rights, Regan extends the
category of those having absolute worth or inherent value to
include nonrational but still intelligent nonhuman creatures. He
does this by elaborating the distinction between moral agents
(those who are capable of making rational, moral judgments) and
moral patients (those who cannot make such formulationsbut who
are nevertheless entitled to be treated as ends). This is contraryto
Kant, who maintains that"animals .. are there merely as a means
to an end. That end is man."'4
Regan makes his case by countering Kant's theorythat human
moral patients (i.e., those who are severely retarded, infants,or
othersunable to reason) need not be treated as ends. This to Regan
is unacceptable. Therefore, if one accepts both moral agents and
moral patients as entitled to the basic respect implied in the notion
of rights,Regan argues, it follows that nonhuman moral patients
(animals) must be included in the category of those entitled to be
treated as ends. To argue otherwise is speciesist; that is, it arbi-
trarilyassumes that humans are worth more than other life-forms.
Speciesism is a concept borrowed fromfeministand minoritygroup
theory.It is analogous to sexism and racism in thatit privileges one
group (humans, males, whites, or Aryans) over another.15Regan,
therefore,maintains an absolutist deontological nonconsequential-
12
See furtherdiscussion in Josephine Donovan, Feminist Theory: The Intellec-
tual Traditions of American Feminism (New York: Ungar, 1985), 4-5.
13 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibil-
ity (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 43. For furtherthoughtson the "cultural symbol-
ism" thatlinks women and animals, see Midgley,Animals and Why They Matter (n.
2 above), 78-79.
Kant, "Duties to Animals and Spirits,"as cited in Regan, The Case for Animal
14
Rights, 177.
15
Ibid., 155; the termspeciesist was coined, according to Regan, by Richard D.
Ryder in Victims of Science (London: Davis-Poynter,1975). See also Singer,Animal
Liberation (n. 1 above), 7, 9.
354

Winter1990/SIGNS
istposition;treatinganimalsas ends is, he insists,a moralduty.It

is a matterofjustice,notkindness.'6
AlthoughReganrejectsKant'sdetermination ofrationality as the
basis forentryintothe "kingdomof ends,"he specifiesthatthose
who have "inherentvalue" musthave a subjectiveconsciousness
(be "subjectofa life") and/orhave the kindofcomplexawareness
foundin adultmammals.'7 This criterionleaves open the question
of severelyretardedhumans,humans in irreversiblecomas, fe-
tuses,even humaninfants. Regan'scriterion in factprivilegesthose
withcomplexawarenessoverthosewithout.'8 Therefore, thoughit
rejectsKantian rationalism,Regan'stheorydepends on a notionof
complex consciousness that is not far removed from rational
thought, in
thus, effect, the
reinvoking rationality criterion.I do not
quarrel with the idea thatadultmammals have a highlydeveloped
intelligencethatmay be appropriatedto humanreason; ratherI
questionthe validityofthe rationality criterion.Regan's difficulty
here stems in part,it seems, fromnaturalrightstheory,which
privilegesrationalism and individualism, butitmayalso reflecthis
owndeterminedexclusionofsentiment from"serious"intellectual
inquiry.
Froma culturalfeminist pointofview thepositiondevelopedby
utilitariananimal rightstheoristsis more tenable in this regard
because it dispenseswiththe higher-intelligence criterion,insist-
inginsteadon thecapacityto feel-or thecapacityto suffer-asthe
criterionbywhichtodeterminethosewhoare entitledtobe treated
as ends.
The utilitarian
positionin animalrightstheoryhas been devel-
oped principallyby PeterSinger.Indeed, it is his admirableand
courageousbook Animal Liberationthat largelygalvanized the
currentanimalrightsmovement.Singer'scentralpremisederives
froma key passage in JeremyBentham's Introductionto the
Principlesof Morals and Legislation(1789). Duringa hightide of
thenaturalrightsdoctrine,theFrenchRevolution,Benthamwrote:
The day maycome whentherestoftheanimalcreationmay

acquire those rightswhich never could have been with-
holdenfromthembutbythehandoftyranny.... It mayone
day come to be recognizedthatthe numberofthe legs, the
villosityofthe skin,or thetermination
ofthe os sacrum,are
reasons... insufficient forabandoninga sensitivebeing to
16
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 280.
17
Ibid., 243.
18
Ibid., 77, 247, 319.
355

the same fate.Whatelse is it thatshouldtracethe insupera-

ble line? Is it the facultyofreason,or perhapsthe facultyof
discourse?But a full-grown horseor dog is beyondcompar-
ison a morerational,as well as a moreconversableanimal
thanan infantofa day,or a week, or even a month,old. But
suppose the case were otherwise,whatwould it avail? The
questionis not,Can theyreason? nor,Can theytalk? but,
Can theysuffer?19
A similarpassage occursin Rousseau's Discourse on theOriginof

Inequality(1755). It seems in parttobe a rejoindertotheCartesian
view ofanimalsas machines,discussedbelow.
We mayput an end to the ancientdisputesconcerningthe

participationof otheranimalsin the law of nature;forit is
plain as
that, they wantbothreasonand freewill,theycannot
be acquainted with thatlaw; however,as theypartakein
some measureofour naturein virtueofthatsensibilitywith
whichtheyare endowed,we maywell imaginetheyought
likewiseto partakeofthebenefitofnaturallaw,and thatman
owes thema certainkindofduty.In fact,itseemsthat,ifI am
obligednotto injureanybeing like myself,it is notso much
because he is a reasonablebeing,as because he is a sensible
being.20
Thus,bothBenthamand Rousseau advocatethatnaturalrights,

or entranceintoKant'skingdomof ends, be accordedto creatures
who can feel. Theirassumptionis thatthe commonconditionthat
uniteshumanswithanimalsis sensibility, the capacityto feel pain
and experiencepleasure.
The utilitarianpositionproceedsfromthispremiseto establish
thatif a creatureis sentient,it has intereststhatare as equally
worthyof considerationas any othersentientcreature'sinterests
when humansmake decisions about theirwell-being.In Singer's
words,"The capacityforsuffering and enjoymentis a prerequisite
forhavinginterests.21A stone, example,does nothave interests
for
in the questionofbeingkickedbecause it cannotsuffer, whereasa
mousedoes have such because
interests it can experiencepain as a
19
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1789), in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, ed. Edwin A. Burtt(New
York: Modem, 1939), 847, n. 21.
20
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin and
Foundation of Inequality among Mankind, ed. Lester G. Crocker (New York:
WashingtonSquare, 1967), 172. See also Midgley,Animals and Why They Matter,62.
21
Singer,Animal Liberation, 8.
356

Winter1990/SIGNS
result."Ifa beingsuffers," Singermaintains, "therecan be no moral

justification forrefusingto take thatsuffering into consideration.
... The principleofequalityrequiresthatitssuffering be counted
equally with the like of
suffering... any other being." In short,
"pain and suffering are bad and shouldbe preventedorminimized,
irrespectiveofthe race,sex,or species ofthe being thatsuffers."2
This is the essence ofthe utilitarian animalrightsposition.
Utilitarian
animalrightstheoryhas thevirtueofallowingsome
flexibilityindecisionmaking, as opposedtoRegan'sabsolutiststance
thatno animal'ssuffering is justifiableunderanycircumstances. As
a utilitarian, for
Singerinsists, example, thatan awareness of conse-
quences can and shouldinfluencetheevaluationofan individual's
fatein anygivensituation.This leads himtoadmitthat"therecould
conceivablybe circumstances in whichan experiment on an animal
standsto reduce suffering so muchthatit would be permissibleto
carryit outeven ifit involvedharmto theanimal. . . [even if] the
animalwerea humanbeing."23 Elsewherehe saysthatifthesuffering
ofone animalwouldhavetheresultofcuringall formsofcancer,that
suffering wouldbejustifiable.24 Singer'sbasicpositionis that"similar
interestsmustcountequally,regardlessofthe species ofthebeing
involved.Thus,ifsomeexperimental procedurewouldhurta human
being and a pig to the same and
extent, therewereno otherrelevant
consequences ... it would be wrongto saythatwe shoulduse the
pig because the of
suffering thepig countsless thanthesuffering of
a humanbeing."2
Therefore,althoughSingeralso uses the term"animalrights,"
his modifications takeit even farther fromtraditional naturalrights
doctrinethan do Regan's reconceptions.It is not a matterof
politicalrightsofa rationalcitizen,suchas therightto freespeech
or to vote,noris it the rightofan intelligentcreatureto be treated
as an end (in Kantianterms).Ratherit is the rightof a sentient
creatureto have its interestsin remainingunharmedconsidered
equally when weighed againstthe interestsof anothersentient
creature.26
Ibid., 8, 18.
22
23Peter Singer and Tom Regan, "The Dog in the Lifeboat: An Exchange," New
York Review of Books (April 25, 1985), 57. It should be noted that however much
Regan and Singer disagree in theory,in practice their positions are similar: each
opposes animal experimentation,exploitation of animals for food and clothing,
factoryfarming,trapping,hunting,rodeos, and circuses.
4 Singer, "Ten Years of Animal
Rights Liberation" (n. 10 above), 48.
25 Ibid.
6 Peter Singer,"Ethics and Animal
Liberation," in Singer,ed. (n. 4 above), 1-10.
Historically,utilitarianismdeveloped as part of the wave of sentimentalism that
emerged in late eighteenth-centuryEurope, which paved the way intellectuallyfor
the animal protectionmovement of the nineteenthcentury.See Turner(n. 7
above),
357

Singer's insistence thatanimals have interestsequal to humans

makes his argument as morally compelling as Regan's contention
thatanimals have rights.Nevertheless, there are some weaknesses
in the utilitarianposition. One is that a precise value standard for
decision making or weighing of interests is not provided, which
allows unacknowledged prejudices to intrude.Second, it requires a
quantificationof suffering,a "mathematization" of moral beings,
that falls back into the scientificmodality that legitimates animal
sacrifice.Thus, while it recognizes sensibilityor feeling as the basis
for treatmentas a moral entity,the utilitarian position remains
locked in a rationalist,calculative mode of moral reasoning that
distances the moral entities from the decision-making subject,
reifyingthem in terms of quantified suffering.Justas the natural
rightstheoryproposed by Regan inherentlyprivileges rationality,
Singer's utilitarianismrelapses into a mode of manipulative mas-
terythat is not unlike that used by scientificand medical experi-
mentersto legitimatesuch animal abuses as vivisection. It is forthis
reason thatwe must turnto culturalfeminismforalternativetheory.
Cultural feminismhas a long history.Even during feminism's
"firstwave," thinkersotherwiseas diverse as MargaretFuller, Emma
Goldman, and CharlottePerkinsGilman articulateda critique ofthe
atomistic individualism and rationalism of the liberal tradition.27
They did so by proposing a vision thatemphasized collectivity,emo-
tional bonding, and an organic(or holistic) concept oflife. In Woman
in theNineteenthCentury(1845), forexample, Fuller argued thatthe
31-33; and Thomas (n. 13 above), 173-80. Of course, women's increasing partici-
pation in cultural life in the eighteenth century undoubtedly contributed to the
emergence of sentimentalism and to the growing empathy for animals seen in
Bentham's and Rousseau's statements.
27 For a full discussion, see Donovan, Feminist Theory (n. 12 above), 31-63. The
other major theoretical traditionthatone mightwish to turnto foralternativeideas

about human relationship with the natural world is Marxism; however, as Isaac D.
Balbus perceptively points out in Marxism and Domination: A Neo-Hegelian,
Feminist, Psychoanalytic Theory of Sexual, Political and Technological Liberation
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1982), Marxism is rooted in a philoso-
phy of domination. Marx indeed saw human identityas formedthroughlabor that
manipulates an objectifiedphysical world. Balbus turnsinstead to Hegel, who urged
that "all substance is subject," that is, motivated by a specific teleology, but all
subjects are not identical (285). "Neither instrumentalreason nor mere intuitionor
feeling but rather a new form of instrumental,empathic reason will guide the
interactionsbetween humans and the world on which they depend" (286). Such a
"postobjectifyingconsciousness" (285) will emerge, Balbus believes, when new
child-rearingpractices are developed thatintervene in the present male maturation
process, which requires the development of enmity forthe mother.Thus, Balbus
turns in the latter part of his book to neo-Freudian cultural feminist theory-
specifically that developed by Dorothy Dinnerstein-to substantiate his position.
358

Winter1990/SIGNS
"liberation"ofwomenand theirintegration intopublic lifewould

effecta feminization
ofculture,whichwouldmeana reignof"plant-
likegentleness,"a harmonic,peacefulrule,an end toviolenceofall
kinds(including,she specifies,theslaughterofanimalsforfood)and
the institutionof vegetarianism(substituting, she urges, "pulse
[beans] foranimalfood").28Gilmanputforth a similarvisionin her
utopiannovelHerland(1911).Indeed,in additiontoFullerand Gil-
manthereis a longlistoffirst-wave feminists who advocatedeither
vegetarianism oranimal welfare reform,includingMaryWollstone-
craft,HarrietBeecher Stowe,Lydia MariaChild, Elizabeth Black-
well, Elizabeth StuartPhelps Ward,Susan B. Anthony, Victoria
Woodhull,ElizabethCady Stanton,theGrimkesisters,Lucy Stone,
FrancesWillard,Frances Power Cobbe, Anna Kingford, Caroline
Earle White,and AgnesRyan.29
28MargaretFuller,Womanin theNineteenth Century(1845; reprint,New York:
Norton,1971),113.
29MaryWollstonecraft, A Vindicationof the Rightsof Woman(1792; reprint,
Baltimore:Penguin,1975),291-92,and OriginalStoriesfromReal Life( London:J.
Johnson,1788); HarrietBeecher Stowe,"Rightsof Dumb Animals,"Hearthand
Home 1, no. 2 (January2, 1869): 24; Elizabeth Blackwell,Essays in Medical
Sociology(London:LongmansGreen,1909);ElizabethStuartPhelpsWard,"Love-
liness: A Story,"AtlanticMonthly84 (August1899): 216-29, "'Tammyshanty, "
Woman'sHome Companion35 (October 1908): 7-9, Trixy(Boston: Houghton
Mifflin,1904), ThoughLife Do Us Part (Boston: HoughtonMifflin,1908), and
variousarticleson vivisection;FrancesPowerCobbe, The ModernRack (London:
Swann,Sonnenshein, 1899),TheMoralAspectsofVivisection(London:Williams&
Margater, 1875); AnnaBonus Kingford, The PerfectWayin Diet, 2d ed. (London:
Kegan, Paul, Trench,1885), Addressesand Essays on Vegetarianism (London:
Watkins,1912). Anthony, Woodhull,the Grimk6sisters,Stone,and Willardare
mentionedby varioussourcesas being vegetarian, and Child as being concerned
withanimalprotectionism. See Singer,AnimalLiberation,234. ElizabethGriffith,
in herbiography In Her Own Right(New York:Oxford,1984),notesthatElizabeth
Cady Stantonfollowedthe Grahamite(largelyvegetarian)regimein her youth,
following thepracticesoftheGrimkes(34-35). RuthBordin,in FrancesWillard:A
Biography(Chapel Hill: Universityof NorthCarolina Press, 1986), 122, says
FrancesWillardbelieved flesh-eating was "savagery"and thatthe "enlightened
mortalsofthetwentieth century[would]surelybe vegetarians."Indeed,thereis an
interesting connectionbetweenthe nineteenth-century temperanceand humane
movements. In 1891theWCTU in Philadelphia(probablyundertheaegis ofMary
F. Lovell) developed a "Departmentof Mercy"dedicatedto antivivisectionism.
Accordingto Turner,94, it was virulently antiscience.In Lettersof Lydia Maria
Child(1883; reprint, New York:NegroUniversities Press,1969),Child saysshe is a
memberofthe SPCA and supportsthe humanemovement.She stressesthe close
kinshipbetween animalsand humansas her rationale(letterof 1872, 213-14).
Caroline Earle Whitewas a leading animal protectionist in nineteenth-century
Philadelphia;she wrotenumerousarticleson the subject.Much of AgnesRyan's
materialis unpublishedin the SchlesingerLibraryin Cambridge.It includesan
"animalrights"novel,Who Can Fear Too ManyStars? CharlottePerkinsGilman
wrotenumerousarticleson animalissues,including"The BeastPrison,"Forerunner
359

In the second wave of feministtheorytherehave been a few

articlesspecificallylinkingfeminismwith animal rights:in the
1970s Carol Adams'sarticleson vegetarianism and morerecently
ConstantiaSalamone'spiece in ReweavingtheWebofLife(1982).30
There have been a numberofotherworksthatlinkfeminismmore
generallywith ecology,such as those by Susan Griffin, Carolyn
Merchant,RosemaryRadfordRuether,Marilyn French, Paula
GunnAllen,Chrystos,and YnestraKing.31
Fromtheculturalfeminist viewpoint,the dominationofnature,
rootedin postmedieval,Western,male psychology, is the underly-
ing cause ofthe mistreatmentof animals as well as of the exploita-
tionofwomenand theenvironment. In herpathbreaking study,The
Death of Nature:Women,Ecology,and the ScientificRevolution,
31 (November1912): 128-30, and "Birds,Bugs and Women,"Forerunner 4 (May

1913): 131-32. A further usefulreferenceon womenin theU.S. nineteenth-century
animal welfaremovementis SydneyH. Coleman,Humane SocietyLeaders in
America(Albany,N.Y.:HumaneAssociation,1924).
30 CarolAdams, "The OedibleComplex:Feminism andVegetarianism,"inTheLes-
bianReader,ed.GinaCovinaandLaurelGalana(Oakland,Calif.:Amazon,1975),145-
52,and"Vegetarianism: The InedibleComplex,"SecondWave4, no.4 (1976):36-42;
ConstantiaSalamone,"The Prevalenceof the NaturalLaw: Womenand Animal
Rights," inReweavingtheWebofLife:Feminism andNonviolence,ed. PamMcAllister
(Philadelphia:New Society,1982),364-75. See also thearticlesbyJanetCulbertson,
CynthiaBranigan, andShirleyFuerstin"Special Issue: FeminismandEcology,"Her-
esies,no. 13 (1981);JoanBethClair(Newman),"InterviewwithConnieSalamone,"
WomanofPower,no. 3 (Winter/Spring 1986),18-21; AndreeCollard,"Freeingthe
Animals,"Trivia,no. 10 (Spring1987),6-23; KarenDavis, "FarmAnimalsand the
FeminineConnection," Animals'Agenda8, no. 1 (anuary/February 1988): 38-39,
whichprovidesan important feministcritiqueofthemachoveinintheecologymove-
ment;and Andr6eCollardwithJoyceContrucci,Rape oftheWild:Man's Violence
againstAnimalsand theEarth(Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,1989).Forth-
comingis CarolJ.Adams,TheSexualPoliticsofMeat:A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical
Theory(New York:Continuum). AliceWalkerhas also recentlyembracedtheanimal
rights cause. See her"AmI Blue?" Ms. (July1986),reprintedin ThroughOtherEyes:
AnimalStoriesbyWomen,ed. IreneZahava(Freedom,Calif.:Crossing,1988),1-6;
andEllen Bring,"MovingtowardCoexistence:AnInterviewwithAliceWalker," An-
imals' Agenda 8, no. 3 (April 1988): 6-9.
Womanand Nature:TheRoaringInsideHer (New York: Harper
31 Susan Griffin,
& Row,1978); CarolynMerchant,The Death of Nature:Women,Ecology,and the

Revolution(New York:Harper& Row,1980);RosemaryRadfordRuether,
Scientific
New Woman/New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation(New York:
Seabury,1975),and Sexismand God-Talk:Towarda FeministTheology(Boston:
Beacon,1983); MarilynFrench,BeyondPower:On Women,Men,and Morals(New
York:Summit,1985);Paula GunnAllen,TheSacredHoop: Recovering theFeminine
in American Indian Traditions (Boston: Beacon, 1986); Chrystos,"No Rock Scorns
byRadicalWomenofColor,
Me as Whore,"in ThisBridgeCalled MyBack:Writings
ed. CherrieMoragaand Gloria Anzaldia (Watertown,Mass.: Persephone,1981);
YnestraKing,"FeminismandtheRevoltofNature,"Heresies,no. 13 (1981):812-16.
360

Winter1990/SIGNS
CarolynMerchantrecognizesthat"we mustreexaminethe forma-

tionofa worldview and a sciencethat,byreconceptualizing reality
as a machineratherthana livingorganism,sanctionedthe domi-
nationofbothnatureand women."32
Critiques of the logical fallacies inherentin the scientific
epistemology are notnew.Wittgenstein demonstrated thetautolog-
ical nature of the analyticjudgmentin his Tractatus in 1911,
indeed, a point Hume made in the Enquiry ConcerningHuman
Understandingin 1748; but it was the critiqueofferedby Max
Horkheimerand TheodorAdornoin theirDialectic of Enlighten-
ment(1944) thatfirstmade the connectionbetweenwhatHusserl
called the "mathematisation ofthe world,"33 and the derogationof
womenand animals.34
The scientificor experimentalmethod convertsrealityinto
mathematical entitiesmodeledon thephysicaluniverse,which,as
seen in Newton'slaws, is cast in the image of a mechanismthat
operates accordingto fixedrepetitions.No distinctionis made
between life-forms such as humanand animal bodies, which are
seen as machinesin the Cartesianview,and nonlifeformssuch as
rocks.
Horkheimerand Adornoarguethatthe impositionofthe math-
ematicalmodel upon realityreflectsa psychologyof domination.
"In [scientific]thought,men distancethemselvesfromnaturein
orderthusimaginatively to presentit to themselves-butonlyin
orderto determinehow it is to be dominated."Using the term
"enlightenment" to referto the scientificviewpoint,theynotethat
is
"enlightenment as totalitarian as any system";it operates"as a
dictatortowardmen.He knowsthemin so faras he can manipulate
them."35
The pretensionsofuniversality ofscientific
knowledgeand the
generalizingcharacterof the machinemetaphormean thatdiffer-
ences and particularities are erased,subdued,dominated."In the
impartiality of scientific language, that which is powerless has
wholly lost any means of expression."3As Max Scheler noted,
"Those aspects whichcannotbe representedin the chosen sym-
bolic language of mathematics ... are assigned a fundamentally
differentstatus:theybelong to the realm of the 'subjective'and
32
Merchant, xviii.
33As cited in Colin Gordon's afterwordto Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews
and Other Writings,1972-1977, by Michel Foucault (New York: Pantheon, 1980),
238.
34Max Horkheimer and Theodor F. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944;
reprint,New York: Herder & Herder, 1972).
35Ibid., 39, 24, 9.
36 Ibid., 23.
361

'unscientific.'"37 Thus, all that is anomalous-that is, alive and

nonpredictable-is erased or subdued in the Newtonian/Cartesian
epistemological paradigm. The anomalous and the powerless in-
clude women and animals, both of whose subjectivities and reali-
ties are erased or converted into manipulable objects-"the mate-
rial of subjugation"3--at the mercy of the rationalistmanipulator,
whose self-worthis established by the factthathe thus subdues his
environment. "Everything-even the human individual, not to
speak of the animal-is converted into the repeatable, replaceable
process, into a mere example for the conceptual models of the
system."39
Horkheimer and Adorno conclude thatthis scientificepistemol-
ogy is an ideological formthat is rooted in the material conditions
ofsocial domination-particularly thatofmen over women. In "their
nauseating physiological laboratories" scientists "force [informa-
tion] fromdefenseless [animals] .... The conclusion theydrawfrom
mutilatedbodies [is that] . . . because he does injuryto animals, he
and he alone in all creationvoluntarilyfunctions.. . . Reason ... be-
longs to man. The animal ... knows only irrationalterror."40 But the
scientistfeels no compassion fororempathywithhis victimsbecause
"for rationalbeings ... to feel concern about an irrationalcreature
is a futile occupation. Western civilization has left this to women
... [through]the division of labor imposed on her by man."41
The association of the postmedieval split between reason and
the emotions with the division of labor and in particularwith the
rise of industrial capitalism is a well-developed thesis, particularly
among Marxist theorists. Eli Zaretsky,in Capitalism, the Family
and Personal Life (1976), suggests thatthe reificationof public life
occasioned by alienated industrial labor meant personal relation-
ships were relegated to the private sphere: "The split in society
between 'personal feelings' and 'economic production' was inte-
grated with the sexual division of labour. Women were identified
with emotional life, men with the struggleforexistence."42
37 As cited in William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (New York: Braziller,
1972), 111. Sandra Harding similarlyobserves that"it is the scientificsubject's voice

thatspeaks with general and abstractauthority;the objects of inquiry 'speak' only in
response to what scientistsask them, and they speak in the particularvoice of their
historicallyspecific conditions and locations" (The Science Question in Feminism
[Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1986], 124).
8 Horkheimer and Adorno, 84.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.,245.
248; see also 14, 21.
41 Ibid.,
Eli Zaretsky,Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life (New York: Harper &
42
Row, 1976), 64.
362

Winter1990/SIGNS
Women'sconnectionwitheconomiclife has been nearlyuni-

versally "productionfor use" ratherthan "productionfor ex-
change"-that is, theirlabor has preparedmaterialforimmediate
use by the household ratherthan for use as a commodityfor
exchangeor formonetary payment.Such a practice,theoristshave
argued,tends to create a psychologythatvalues the objects of
productionemotionallyin a way that alienated productionfor
exchangecannot.Since in thecapitalistera itis largelywomenwho
engagein use-valueproduction, itmaybe a basis fortherelational,
contextuallyoriented epistemologythat contemporary theorists
ascribe to Westernwomen.43 The relegationof women,emotions,
and values to the private sphere, to the margins,allowed, as
Horkheimer, Adoro, and othershavenoted,masculinepracticesin
the public political and scientificsphere to proceed amorally,
"objectively,"withoutthe restraintof "subjective"relationalcon-
siderations,which are in any event elided or repressedby the
dominantdisciplines.
Like CarolynMerchant,Horkheimer and Adornorecognizethat
the witch-hunts of the earlymodernperiod were symptomatic of
thenew need to erase and subdue anomalous,disorderly(and thus
feminine)nature.Horkheimerand Adornoconsiderthatthe erad-
ication of witches registered"the triumphof male societyover
prehistoricmatriarchal and mimeticstages of development"and
"of self-preserving reason... [in] the masteryof nature."44 Mer-
chantsuggestswitchesrepresentthataspect ofnaturethatdid not
fitintotheorderlypatternofthemathematical paradigm;theythere-
forewere seen as dangerouslyrebellious:"Disorderlywoman,like
chaoticnature,needed to be controlled."45
Merchantnotes that Bacon, one of the formulators of the
experimentalmethod,used the analogyof a witchinquisitionto
explain how the scientistmanipulatesnaturein orderto extract
information fromit.He wrote:"For youhavebutto followitand as
itwerehoundnaturein herwanderings, and youwill be able when
43Nancy C. M. Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power: Toward A Feminist Historical
Materialism (New York: Longman, 1983), 152, 246. On use-value production, see
Karl Marx, Capital, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings,ed. David McLellan (Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress, 1977), 422-23. See Harding, 142-61, fora useful summary
of what she calls "feministstandpointepistemologies." They are rooted, she notes,
in the assumption derived fromHegel's notion of the master/slaveconsciousness
that "women's subjugated position provides the possibility of a more
complete and
less perverse understanding" (26). Women's historical experience of
silence, of
being in the "slave" position vis-a-visthe "master" may provide a basis forempathy
with other silenced voices, such as those of animals.
44Horkheimer and Adorno, 249.
45Merchant (n. 31 above), 127.
363

you like to lead and driveherafterwardto the same place again."46

The imageofnatureas a femaleto be dominatedcould notbe more
explicit.
The mathematical paradigmimposedthe imageofthe machine
on all reality.It was Descarteswho mostfullydeveloped the idea
thatnonmentallife-forms functionas machines,whichsome ofhis
followers(La Mettrie,e.g., in L'hommemachine) carriedto its
extreme.Tom Regan critiquesthe Cartesianview at lengthin The
Case for Animal Rights;47it is clear that the notion of animals as
feelingless,unconsciousrobots(whichRousseau,amongothers-
see above-rejected) legitimated(and continues to legitimate)
atrociousscientificexperimentation. One earlyanonymouscriticof
Descartesnoted:"The [Cartesian]scientistsadministered beatings
to dogs withperfectindifference and made funofthosewho pitied
thecreaturesas iftheyfeltpain.They said theanimalswereclocks;
thatthe cries theyemittedwhen struckwere onlythe sound of a
littlespringthathad been touched,but thatthe whole body was
withoutfeeling.Theynailed thepooranimalsup on boardsbytheir
fourpaws to vivisectthemto see thecirculationoftheblood which
was a greatsubjectofcontroversy."48
In a recentarticle,"The CartesianMasculinizationofThought,"
Susan Bordo describes Cartesian objectivismas an "aggressive
intellectual'flightfromthe feminine.'49 "The 'great Cartesian
anxiety'[seen especially in the Meditationsis] over separation
fromthe organic female universe of the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance.Cartesianobjectivism[is] a defensiveresponsetothat
separationanxiety."5In the process "the formerly female earth
becomes inert res extensa: dead, mechanicallyinteractingna-
ture.... 'She' becomes 'it'-and 'it' can be understood.Not
of
throughsympathy, course, by but virtue of
oftheveryobject-ivity
'it.' "51
Naturalrightstheory,likewisean expressionofEnlightenment
rationalism,similarlyimposes a machinegridupon politicaland
moralreality.Recentfeministtheoristshave criticizedthe neutral
and objective pretenses of the liberal theoreticaltraditionfor
leavingouttheanomalouscontextin whicheventsoccur,inscribing
orignoresthehistorical
theminsteadin an abstractgridthatdistorts
environment. For example,CatharineA. MacKinnonhas criticized
168.
46 Ibid.,
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (n. 3 above), 3-33.

47
48Ibid., 5.
49Susan Bordo, "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society 11, no. 3 (Spring 1986): 439-56, esp. 441.
50 Ibid.
51
Ibid.,451.
364

Winter1990/SIGNS
thetraditionalliberalinterpretation ofU.S. constitutional law forits

neutralapproachtojustice. She urgesthatwe "changeone dimen-
sion ofliberalismas it is embodiedin law: the definition ofjustice
as neutrality
betweenabstractcategories,"forthisapproachignores
the"substantivesystems"-thatis, thereal conditionsin whichthe
abstractionsoperate.MacKinnontherefore rejects,to use herexam-
ple, the idea that "strengthening the free speech of the Klan
strengthens the freespeech ofBlacks."52 This thesisis invalid,she
maintains,because it equates "substantivepowerlessnesswith
substantivepower"5 throughthe use of a mechanisticconceptual
model. Thus, MacKinnon,like the culturalfeministsdiscussed
below, rejects the "mathematizing"elisions of Enlightenment
rationalism in favorofa viewthat"sees" theenvironmental context.
Had the vivisectionists describedabove allowed thisepistemolog-
ical shift,they presumablywould have "seen" the pain-the
sufferingand emotions-oftheanimals,whichthemachineabstrac-
tionthroughwhichtheywere viewingthemignored.
Unfortunately, contemporary animal rightstheorists,in their
relianceon theorythatderivesfromthe mechanisticpremisesof
Enlightenment epistemology(naturalrightsin the case of Regan
and utilitariancalculation in the case of Singer) and in their
suppression/denial of emotionalknowledge,continueto employ
or
Cartesian, objectivist,modes even while they condemn the
scientificpracticesenabled by them.
Two oftheearliestcriticsofCartesianmechanismwerewomen:
MargaretCavendish,the Duchess of Newcastle (1623-73), and
AnneFinch,Lady Conway(1631-79). Finch emphatically rejected
the Cartesianview; she feltthatanimalswere not "composed of
'mere fabric'or 'dead matter,' but had spiritswithinthem'having
knowledge,sense, and love, and diversotherfacultiesand proper-
ties of a spirit.'"5 Cavendish,an untutoredgenius, challenged
Descartesdirectly. She methimwhileshe and herhusbandwerein
exile in France in the 1640s,and she laterexchangedletterswith
him about his Treatise on Animals. In one of his letters,dated
November23, 1646,he is promptedby herto defendhis notionof
animalsas machines:"I cannotsharetheopinionofMontaigneand
otherswho attribute understanding or thoughtto animals."55
52 Catharine A.
MacKinnon, "Pornography,Civil Rights, and Speech," Harvard
Civil Rights/CivilLiberties Law Review 20, no. 1 (Winter 1985): 4.
3 Ibid., 15. See also Donovan (n. 12
above), 2-3, 28-30.
M [Anne
Finch], The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy
(1690), as cited in Merchant,260.
55Descartes, Philosophical Letters, trans. and ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford:
Oxford UniversityPress, 1957), 44.
365

AsKeithThomas(inManand theNaturalWorld)recognizes,Cav-
endishwas one ofthefirst toarticulatetheidea ofanimalrights.56 Her
biographer, Douglas Grant,notes: "Her writings. . . constantlyil-
lustratehersensibilityto nature[and] itscreatures:how she feltfor
'poorWat,'thehuntedhare ... thestag;herpityfortheirunnecessary
sufferingsmakingherspeakoutina century whencrueltytoanimals
was all too common."57 "As forman,who huntsall animalsto death
on theplea ofsport,exerciseand health,"she asked,"is he notmore
crueland wild thanany birdofprey?"5
The resistanceof Finch and Cavendish to the impositionsof
early modern science were not isolated accidents, I propose.
Indeed, ifwe accept Michel Foucault'scontentionthatthe ascen-
dancyof the scientificdisciplinesand theirattendantinstitutions
was a historicalprocessofcolonizationthatintensified throughthe
postmedievalperiod, reaching a height in the late nineteenth
century, we must read Finch and Cavendish's critiques as an early
feministresistanceto a processthatinevitablymeantthe destruc-
tion of women's anomalousworlds.The suppressionof women's
social realitieseffectedby the pseudoscientificmedical theories
(especiallythose ofthe sexologists)ofthe late nineteenthcentury
was thefinalstagein whatFoucaulthas labeled the"medicalisation
de l'insolite"-the medicalizationofthe anomalous.59 This process
itselfinvolvedthe social impositionofsexologistparadigmsanalo-
gous to the scientificimpositionof the mathematicalmachine
paradigmon all livingforms.
Perhapsthisis whymanywomenoftheperiodseem tohavefelt
a kinshipto animals.Bothwere erased (at best) or manipulated(at
worst)to behave in accordancewith paradigmsimposed by the
lords-whethervivisectorsor sexologists.Womenin fact
rationalist
became the primaryactivistsand energizersof the nineteenth-
centuryantivivisection movement,which should be seen, I pro-
56Thomas (n. 13 above), 128, 170, 173-74, 280, 293-94.

57 Douglas Grant,Margaret the First (Toronto:TorontoUniversityPress, 1957), 44.
58Ibid., 124. The principal sources of Margaret Cavendish's writingson animal
rightsare her Poems and Fancies (1653; 2d ed., 1664), Philosophical Letters (1664),
and The World's Olio (1655). Her empathetic imagination extends to plant life, to
which she also imputes a formof consciousness (see esp. "Dialogue between an
Oake, and a Man cutting him downe," in Poems and Fancies).
59
Michel Foucault, La Volonte de savoir, vol. 1 of Histoire de la sexualite (Paris:
Gallimard, 1976), 61 (my translation). For studies of female sexual deviance as
defined by nineteenth-centurysexologists, see George Chauncey, Jr.,"From Sexual
Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the Changing Conceptualization of
Female Deviance," Salmagundi 58/59 (Fall 1982/Winter1983): 114-45; and Lillian
Faderman, "The Morbidificationof Love between Women by Nineteenth-Century
Sexologists,"Journal of Homosexuality 4, no. 1 (Fall 1978): 73-90.
366

Winter1990/SIGNS
pose, as one manifestation of a counterhegemonic resistanceun-

dertaken by women against the encroachmentsof the new
disciplines.Justas sexologistsanatomizedwomen'sworld"oflove
and ritual,""entomologizing"it (to use Foucault's term) into
variousspecies and subspecies of deviance,so vivisectorsturned
animalbodies intomachinesfordissection.
In her studyof the nineteenth-century English antivivisection
movement,The Old Brown Dog, Coral Lansbury argues that
women activiststhus identifiedwiththe vivisecteddog: "Every
dog or cat strappeddown forthe vivisector'skniferemindedthem
of theirown condition."It was an image of dominance.Indeed,
pioneerwomandoctorElizabeth Blackwellsaw ovarectomiesand
othergynecologicalsurgeryas an "extensionof vivisection."For
the suffragists, "the image of the vivisected dog blurred and
became one withthemilitantsuffragette beingforcefedin Brixton
Prison."60
The dominanceover nature,women,and animals inherentin
this scientificepistemology,which requires thatthe anomalous
otherbe forcedintoorderedforms,maybe rootedin the Western
male maturation processthatrequiresmento establishtheirauton-
omous identityagainst the maternal/feminine. Hanna Fenichel
Pitkin'srecentanalysisof the psychologicaldevelopmentof Ma-
chiavelli,a prototypicalformulator of postmedievalsecularism,is
most instructivein this regard.She reveals that "Machiavelli's
writings showa persistent preoccupationwithmanhood."6' "Ifvirtu
[manliness] is Machiavelli'sfavoritequality,effeminato ... is one
ofhis mostfrequentand scathingepithets."62 In The PrinceMachi-
avelli assertsthata leader rules "eitherby fortuneor by ability
rtrti impliesmanipulative
(virtu)."6i anda certainmacho
rationality
willingnessto exertmilitarycontrol.Fortuna,on the otherhand,
representsthe nonrational, thatwhichis unpredictable,all thatis
otherto the exertionofrationalcontroland masculinedomination.
In anothercelebratedpassage in The Prince Machiavelliasserts:
"Fortuneis a woman and in orderto be masteredshe mustbe
jogged and beaten."64
60
Lansbury (n. 7 above), 82, 89, 24.
61
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the
Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universityof California
Press, 1984), 125. Pitkin's analysis relies on the work of "object-relations" neo-
Freudian feministssuch as Nancy Chodorow, Dorothy Dinnerstein, and Jane Flax.
62Ibid., 25.
63Machiavelli, The Prince and Selected Discourses, ed. Daniel Donno (New
York: Bantam, 1966), 13.
64 Ibid., 86-87.
367

In an unfinishedpoem thattreatstheCirce legend,Machiavelli

opposes the worldofwomen,nature,and animalsto the civilized
worldofpublic order,the worldofmen. PitkinnotesthatCirce is
seen as a witchwho has thepowertoturnmen intobeasts;muchis
madebyMachiavelliofthe"contrast betweenherfeminine, natural
world,and the worldofmen whichis politicaland the productof
human artifice.... Juxtaposed to the masculine world of law and
liberty[is] theforestworldwheremenare turnedintoanimalsand
held captivein permanentdependence."65 "Male culture,"there-
fore,"symbolizes controlover nature."66
culture,thewholevi-
Pitkinconcludes,"Civilization... history,
vere civile thatconstitutethe worldofadult humanautonomyare
... male enterprises won from and sustained against female
power-the engulfingmother... women as the 'other'.... The
struggleto sustaincivilization... thusreflects thestruggleofboys
tobecomemen."67 In "GenderandScience" (1978)EvelynFoxKeller
similarlyarguesthatthe autonomyand objectivity ofthe male sci-
entistreflectthebasic dissociationfromthefeminineaffective world
required in the male maturation process.68
Beyondthisontogenetictheoryis thephylogenetic thesisdevel-
oped by Rosemary Radford Ruether that civilization
patriarchal is
builtuponthehistorical emergence ofa masculineego consciousness
thatarosein oppositionto nature,whichwas seen as feminine.Sex-
ism,shenotes,is rootedinthis" 'waragainstthemother,' thestruggle
ofthetranscendent ego to freeitself
from bondage to De-
nature."69
velopingtheexistentialist notion ofthe transcendentmasculine pour
soi, and the immanentfeminineen soi, Ruetherurges(therebyre-
jectingSimonede Beauvoir'sthesisin The SecondSex) thatthecon-
tinualculturalattemptto transcendthefeminineis whathas led to
our presentecological and moralcrisis.
65Pitkin, 124, 128.
66Ruether,Sexism and God-Talk (n. 31 above), 76.
67Pitkin,230.
68Evelyn Fox Keller, "Gender and Science" (1978), in Discovering Reality:
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology,Metaphysics, Methodology,and the Philos-
ophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1983), 187-205, esp. 197. Hunting is, of course, the quintessential riteof passage in
the male maturationprocess. As Barbara A. White notes in The Female Novel of
Adolescence (Westport,Conn.: Greenwood, 1985), 126-27, "many initiationstories
[involve] a hunt [where] the protagonistdestroysa 'feminineprinciple.' " Numerous
feminist theorists have connected hunting with male dominance. See Charlotte
Perkins Gilman, His Religion and Hers (1923; reprint,Westport,Conn.: Hyperion,
1976), 37-38. A more recent scholarly studyis Peggy Reeves Sanday, Female Power
and Male Dominance: On the Origins of Sexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1981), 66-69, 128-30.
69
Ruether,New Woman/NewEarth (n. 31 above), 25.
368

Winter1990/SIGNS
The fundamental defectin the "male ideologyoftranscendent

dualism"is thatitsonlymode is conquest."Its view ofwhatis over
againstitselfis notthatoftheconversation oftwo subjects,butthe
conquestof an alien object.The intractability of the otherside of
the dualismto its demandsdoes not suggestthatthe 'other'has a
'nature'ofherown thatneeds to be respectedand withwhichone
mustenterintoconversation.Rather,this intractability is seen as
that of disobedientrebellion."Thus, "patriarchalreligionends
... with a perceptionof the finitecosmos itselfas evil in its
intractability"to technological,scientificprogress.70
In herrecentbookBeyondPower(1985) MarilynFrenchargues
that"patriarchy is an ideologyfoundedon theassumptionthatman
is distinctfromthe animal and superiorto it. The basis forthis
superiority is man'scontactwitha higherpower/knowledge called
god,reason,orcontrol.The reasonforman'sexistenceis to shed all
animalresidue and realize fullyhis 'divine' nature,the partthat
seemsunlikeanypartownedbyanimals-mind,spirit,orcontrol."71
Frenchsees a sadomasochisminherentin thisculturalimpulseto
mutilateor kill offthe animal/feminine in the self.Accordingto
French,patriarchal societyhas reacheda frightening impasse:"Our
culture,which worshipsabove all else the power to kill, has
reachedthe pointofwishingto annihilateall thatis 'feminine'in
ourworld."72
Recent culturalfeministtheoristshave identifiedalternative
epistemologicaland ontologicalmodesthatmust,I believe,replace
the mode of sadomasochisticcontrol/dominance characteristicof
patriarchal scientificepistemology. Ruether,forexample,urgesthe
developmentof new ways of relatingto natureand to nonhuman
life-forms."The projectofhumanlife,"she says,"mustcease to be
seen as one of'dominationofnature.'... Rather,we have to finda
new languageofecologicalresponsiveness,a reciprocity between
consciousnessand the worldsystemsin whichwe live and move
and have our being."73In Sexism and God-Talk(1983), Ruether
suggeststhathumanconsciousnessbe seen not as different from
other life-forms but as continuouswith the "bimorphic"spirit
inherentin otherlivingbeings.
70
Ibid., 195-96.
71 French (n. 31 above), 341. Coral Lansbury recognizes the inherentconnection
between vivisection and sadomasochistic pornography and, indeed,
analyzes a
number of late nineteenth-centuryworks of pornography that include scenes of
vivisection (n. 7 above), chap. 7.
72
French, 523.
73Ruether,New Woman/New
Earth, 83.
369

Our intelligence is a special, intense formof... radial

energy,butitis notwithoutcontinuity withotherforms;it is
the self-consciousor "thinkingdimension" of the radial
energyof matter.We mustrespondto a "thou-ness"in all
beings. This is not romanticismor an anthropomorphic
animismthatsees "dryadsin trees,"althoughthereis truthin
the animistview. ... We respondnotjust as "I to it,"but as
"I to thou,"to the spirit,the life energythatlies in every
being in its own formof existence.The "brotherhoodof
man" needs to be widened to embracenotonlywomenbut
also the whole community oflife.74
Ruethercalls for"a new formofhumanintelligence,"one based

on a relational,affectivemode popularlycalled "right-brain think-
ing," which moves beyond the linear, dichotomized, alienated
consciousnesscharacteristic ofthe "left-brain" mode seen in mas-
culinistscientificepistemology. Linear, rationalistmodes are, Ru-
etherenjoins,"ecologicallydysfunctional."75 Whatis needed is a
more "disordered"(my term-if ordermeans hierarchicaldomi-
nance) relationalmode thatdoes notrearrangethe contextto fita
masterparadigmbut sees, accepts,and respectsthe environment.
In The Sacred Hoop: Recoveringthe Femininein American
Indian Traditions(1986), Paula Gunn Allen findsin those tradi-
tions attitudestoward nature that are quite differentfromthe
alienationand dominancethatcharacterizeWesternepistemology
and theology.God and thespiritualdimensiondo nottranscendlife
but ratherare immanentin all life-forms. All creaturesare seen as
sacredand entitledto fundamental respect.Allen,herselfa Laguna
Pueblo-Sioux,recallsthat "when I was small,mymotheroftentold
me thatanimals,insects,and plants to be treatedwiththe kind
are
ofrespectone customarily accordsto high-status adults."Nature,in
herculture,is seen "not as blind and mechanical,butas awareand
organic."There is "a seamless web" between "humanand nonhu-
man life."76
Ratherthanlinear,hierarchical, mechanisticmodes,Allen pro-
poses a return to the achronologicalrelationalsensibilitycharac-
teristicof her people. Recognizingthat "there is some sort of
connection between colonizationand chronologicaltime,"Allen
observesthat"Indian timerestson a perceptionof individualsas
partofan entiregestaltin whichfittingness is nota matterofhow
gearteeth mesh with each otherbut ratherhow thepersonmeshes
74 Ruether,Sexism and God-Talk, 87.
75
Ibid., 89-90. See also Gina Covina, "Rosy Rightbrain'sExorcism/Invocation,"
in Covina and Galana, eds. (n. 30 above), 90-102.
76 Allen
(n. 31 above), 1, 80, 100; see also 224.
370

Winter1990/SIGNS
withthe revolvingofthe seasons,the land,and the mythicreality

thatshapes all lifeintosignificance.... Women'straditional occu-
pations, theirartsand crafts,and theirliteratures
and philosophies
are more oftenaccretivethan linear,more achronologicalthan
chronological, and moredependenton harmoniousrelationships of
all elementswithina fieldof perceptionthanwesternculturein
general.... Traditionalpeoples perceivetheirworldin a unified-
fieldfashion."77
In her recentstudyof contemporary women's art,Womenas
Mythmakers (1984), Estella Lauterhas identified
the contoursofa
new myththatinvolveswomenand nature."Many ofthese artists
accepttheaffinity betweenwomanand natureas a starting point-
in fact,creatinghybridimagesofwoman/animal/earth untiltheold
distinctionsamongthe levels in the GreatChain of Being seem
unimportant."78 RecognizingSusan Griffin's Woman and Nature
77
Ibid., 154, 243, 244.
78
Estella Lauter,Womenas Mythmakers: Poetryand Visual Artby Twentieth-
CenturyWomen(Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press,1984),18.A separatestudy
could be writtenon animalsin women'sfiction.In a numberofworksanimalsare
used to avengeinjuriesdone to women;e.g., EdithWharton's"Kerfol"(1916),in
The Collected Short Storiesof Edith Wharton,ed. R. W. B. Lewis (New York:
Scribner's,1968), 282-300; or Sylvia Plath's "The Fifty-ninth Bear" (1959), in
Johnny Panicand theBible ofDreams(New York:Harper& Row,1979),105-14. In
othersthewoman/animal identificationis explicit.See MaryWebb,Gone to Earth
(fox)(1917;reprint, New York:Dalton,1974);Radclyffe Hall, TheWellofLoneliness
(fox)(New York:Covice, Freed, 1929); Ellen Glasgow,The ShelteredLife (ducks)
(GardenCity,N.Y.:DoubledayDoran,1932);Zora Neale Hurston,TheirEyes Were
WatchingGod (mule) (1937; reprint,Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978);
WillaGather, A Lost Lady (woodpecker)(New York:Knopf,1923); HarietteArnow,
Hunter'sHorn(fox)(New York:Macmillan,1949).In manyofGlasgow'snovelsthe
animal/woman connectionis a centralissue. See JosephineDonovan,TheDemeter-
Persephone Mythin Wharton, Cather,and Glasgow(University Park:Pennsylvania
StateUniversity Press,1989),esp. chap. 5. In manyworksby women,animalsare
women'sclosestcompanionsand oftenthereis a kindof psychiccommunication
between them(especiallywhen the women are witches).See Annie Trumbull
Slosson,"AnnaMalann,"in Dumb Foxgloveand OtherStories(New York:Harper,
1898),85-117; MaryE. Wilkins(Freeman),"ChristmasJenny," in A New England
Nun and OtherStories(New York:Harper,1891), 160-77; SarahOme Jewett,"A
WhiteHeron,"in The Countryof thePointedFirs,ed. WillaGather(1925; reprint,
GardenCity,N.Y: DoubledayAnchor,1956),161-71; VirginiaWoolf,"The Widow
andtheParrot:A TrueStory," in TheCompleteShorterFictionofVirginiaWoolf,ed.
Susan Dick (San Diego: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich,1985), 156-63; Rose Terry
(Cooke),"Dely's Cow,"in "How Celia ChangedHerMind"and SelectedStories,ed.
ElizabethAmmons(New Brunswick, N.J.:RutgersUniversity Press,1986),182-95;
Susan Glaspell,"A Juryof Her Peers,"in AmericanVoices:AmericanWomen,ed.
Lee R. EdwardsandArlynDiamond(New York:Avon,1973),359-81. SarahGrand's
TheBethBook(1897;reprint, New York:Dial, 1980)andvariousworksbyElizabeth
StuartPhelpsWard(n. 29 above) are explicitlyantivivisectionist. See Lansburyfor
further worksin thisarea. FlanneryO'Connorexposedthemale hubrisinvolvedin
371

(1978) as prototypical,Lauter detects in contemporarywomen's

literatureand art "an image of relationships among orders of being
that is extremelyfluid without being disintegrative."79
In these works, boundaries between the human world and the
vegetable and animal realm are blurred. Hybrid forms appear:
women transform into naturalentities,such as plants, or merge with
animal life. Lauter finds "surprising numbers of women" poets
have a "high degree of identificationwith nature,withoutfear and
without loss of consciousness." Many of these artistshave revali-
dated ancient mythicfiguresthat emblematize aspects of women's
relationship with nature: Demeter/Kore,Artemis/Diana,Daphne,
Circe. The earth is seen not as "dead matterto be plundered, but
wounded matter from which renewal flows. The two bodies,
women's and earth's, are sympathetic."80
The women artistsand the feministtheoristscited here point to
a new mode of relationship; unlike the subject-object mode inher-
ent in the scientific epistemology and the rationalist distancing
practiced by the male animal rights theorists, it recognizes the
varieties and differencesamong the species but does not quantify
or rank them hierarchically in a Great Chain of Being. It respects
the aliveness and spirit (the "thou") of other creatures and under-
stands thatthey and we exist in the same unified field continuum.
It appreciates thatwhat we share-life-is more importantthan our
differences. Such a relationship sometimes involves affection,
sometimes awe, but always respect.
hunting;see "The Turkeys,"in Complete Stories (New York:FarrarStraus & Giroux,

1971), 42-53. Other significantworks include Colette's Creatures Great and Small,
trans. Enid McLeod (London: Secker & Warburg,1951); Virginia Woolf's Flush: A
Biography (London: Hogarth, 1923); and May Sarton's The Fur Person (1957;
reprint,New York: New American Library,1970). See also Zahava, ed. (n. 30 above).
Ellen Moers in Literary Women ( Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977) notes "a rich
untapped field remains to yield a fortunein scholarly dissertations,and that is the
animals in the lives of literarywomen. George Sand had a horse ... named Colette;
Christina Rossetti had the wombat; Colette had all those cats; Virginia Woolf was
positively dottyabout all sorts of animals. But it is their dogs who will serve the
purpose best-Elizabeth Barrett'sspaniel named Flush; Emily Dickinson's 'dog as
large as myself' " (260). The most promisingrecent theoreticalapproach to the issue
of women's connection with animals is that proposed by Margaret Homans in
Bearing the Word: Language and Female Experience in Nineteenth-CenturyWom-
en's Writing(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1986). Using Lacanian theory,
Homans urges that women and nature are linked as "the absent referrent"in
patriarchal discourse. Her discussion of Heathcliffs sadistic treatmentof birds in
WutheringHeights is especially suggestive. She observes that Cathy's aim is "to
protectnaturefromfigurativeand literalkillingat the hand ofandrocentriclaw" (78).
79Lauter, 19.
80Ibid., 177, 174.
372

Winter1990/SIGNS
In "MaternalThinking"Sara Ruddick urges thata maternal

epistemology, derivedfromthe historicalpracticeof mothering-
thatis, caringforan otherwho demandspreservation and growth-
can be identified.She calls it a "holding" attitude,one that"is
governedby the priority of keepingover acquiring,of conserving
thefragile,ofmaintaining whateveris at handand necessaryto the
child'slife."Ruddickcontrasts the "holding"attitudeto "scientific
thought,as well as... to the instrumentalism of technocratic
capitalism."Maternalpracticerecognizes"excessive controlas a
liability," in sharpdistinction to scientificmodesofmanipulation.8
The maternalethicinvolvesa kindofreverential respectforthe
process oflifeand a realization thatmuch is beyondone's control.
Citing Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil as her philosophicalprede-
cessors,Ruddickcalls thisan ethicofhumility. It is an attitudethat
"accepts not onlythe facts of damage and death,but also the facts
of the independentand uncontrollable,developingand increas-
inglyseparateexistencesofthelives it seeks to preserve."Ruddick
calls suchan attitude"attentivelove,"thetraining toask,"Whatare
you goingthrough?"82 Were vivisectionists to ask such a question,
we would nothave vivisection.
In a recentarticleEvelynKellerdrawssimilardistinctions toRud-
dick's in her observationsof Nobel prize winner Barbara Mc-
Clintock's"feminine"scientific practice(whichcontrastsso mark-
edly to the aggressivemanipulationof natureproposedby Bacon,
seenatitsworstinlab animalexperimentation). McClintockbelieves
in "lettingthe materialspeak to you,"allowingit to "tell you what
to do next."She does notbelieve thatscientistsshould"imposean
answer"upon theirmaterial,as requiredin themathematical para-
digmoftraditionalscientificepistemology;rather,theyshould re-
spondto itand retainan empatheticrespectforit.3It is interesting
thatnumerouswomenscientistsand naturalists who have worked
withand observedanimallifeforyears-such as JaneGoodall,Dian
Fossey,Sally Carrighar, FrancinePatterson,JanisCarter-exhibit
this ethic implicitly:a caring,respectingattitudetowardtheir
"subjects."84
81 Sara
Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking,"Feminist Studies 6, no. 2 (Summer 1980):
350-51. See also her Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (Boston:
Beacon, 1989).
82Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," 351, 359.
3 Evelyn Fox Keller, "Feminism and Science," Signs 7, no. 3
(Spring 1982): 599.
84See Jane Goodall, In the Shadow
of Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1971), The
Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1986); Dian Fossey, Gorillas in the Mist (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1983); and Sally Carrighar,Home to the Wilderness (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1973). See Eugene Linden, Silent Partners (New York: Times Books, 1986), on
Patterson and Carter. Janis Carter spent eight years tryingto reintroduce Lucy, a
373

Finally, Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice (1982) suggests

thata feminineethic is one rooted in a "mode ofthinkingthatis con-
textual and narrativeratherthan formaland abstract."85What she
names a "moralityofresponsibility"is in directcontrastto the "mo-
ralityof rights"seen in Regan's animal rightstheory.In the former,
a femininemode, "moralityand thepreservationoflifeare contingent
upon sustaining connection ... [and] keeping the web of relation-
ships intact." She contraststhis with the "rights" approach (which
is seen in her studyas more characteristicallymasculine) thatrelies
upon "separation ratherthan connection," and on a "formallogic"
of hierarchicallyranged quantitative evaluations.8
Gilligan, Ruddick, Lauter, Allen, Ruether, and French all pro-
pose an ethic that requires a fundamental respect for nonhuman
life-forms,an ethic that listens to and accepts the diversity of
environmentalvoices and the validityoftheirrealities. It is an ethic
thatresistswrenchingand manipulatingthe contextso as to subdue
it to one's categories; it is nonimperialistic and life affirming.
It may be objected that this ethic is too vague to be practicable
in decisions concerning animals. My purpose here, however, is not
to lay out a specific practical ethic but, rather,to indicate ways in
which our thinking about animal/human relationships may be
chimpanzee who had learned sign language, to the wild in West Africa.She tells her
moving storyin "Survival Training forChimps," Smithsonian 19, no. 5 (June 1988):
36-49. Goodall recentlyissued a sharp condemnation of the treatmentof chimpan-
zees in American laboratories. See her "A Plea forthe Chimps," New York Times
Magazine (May 17, 1987). Also of interest is Cynthia Moss, Elephant Memories:
ThirteenYears in the Life of an Elephant Family (New York: Morrow,1988); and Sue
Hubbell's relationship with her bees, seen in A Country Year: Living the Questions
(New York: Random House, 1986).
85 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1982), 19. Foi a further

discussion ofthe ethic proposed in culturalfeministtheory,see Donovan, "The New
Feminist Moral Vision," in Donovan, Feminist Theory (n. 12 above), 171-86.
86 Gilligan, 59, 19, 73. Another importantwork that develops a cultural feminist
ethic is Nell Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral
Education (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).
Unfortunately,however, while Noddings believes the caring ethic she endorses is
enhanced by a celebratory attitude toward the female domestic world, which
includes, she notes, "feeding the cat," she nevertheless specificallyrejects the main
tenets of animal rightstheory,including not eating meat. It is clear thather "caring"
ethic extends only to humans; the arbitrarinessof her position can only be attributed
to an unexamined speciesism. Nodding's book, while admirable in other ways, is
weakened by this bias, therebyillustratinghow feministtheorymust be informedby
animal rightstheory if we are to avoid the hypocrisies and inconsistencies of the
tea-ladies condemned by Singer (for Noddings evinces affectionforher pets even
while endorsing carnivorism[154]).
374

Winter1990/SIGNS
reoriented.Some maypersist:suppose one had to choose between

a gnat and a human being. It is, in fact,preciselythis kind of
either/orthinking thatis rejectedin theepistemologyidentifiedby
culturalfeminism. In mostcases, either/ordilemmasin real lifecan
be turnedintoboth/ands. In mostcases, dead-endsituationssuchas
those posed in lifeboathypotheticalscan be prevented.More
however,it is clearthatthe ethicsketchedherewould
specifically,
mean feminists mustrejectcarnivorism; thekillingoflive animals
forclothing;hunting;the trappingof wildlifeforfur(largelyfor
women'sluxuryconsumption);rodeos; circuses;and factory farm-
ing; and thatthey must support the drasticredesigningof zoos (if
zoos aretoexistat all) toallow animalsfullexercisespace in natural
habitats;thattheyshouldrejecttheuse oflab animalsfortestingof
beautyand cleaningproducts(such as the infamous"LD-50" and
Draize tests) and militaryequipment,as well as psychological
experimentation suchas thatcarriedout in the Harlowprimatelab
at the UniversityofWisconsin;thattheyshould supportefforts to
replace medical experimentsby computermodels and tissue cul-
ture; that they should condemn and work to prevent further
destructionof wetlands,forests,and othernaturalhabitats.All of
these changes must be part of a feministreconstruction of the
world.
Naturalrightsand utilitarianism presentimpressiveand useful
philosophicalarguments fortheethicaltreatment ofanimals.Yet,it
is also possible-indeed, necessary-to groundthat ethic in an
emotionaland spiritualconversationwith nonhumanlife-forms.
Out of a women's relationalcultureof caringand attentivelove,
therefore,emergesthebasis fora feminist ethicforthetreatment of
animals. We should not kill, eat, torture,and exploit animals
because theydo notwantto be so treated,and we knowthat.If we
listen,we can hearthem.
DepartmentofEnglish
of Maine
University
375


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