G.R. No.

217158 - March 12, 2019 the government” due to these reasons: (1)
bundling of such bids would limit the financial
GIOS VS. DOTC
capability of qualified Filipino corporations since
Petitioner/s Gios-Samar, Inc. the price would be higher, thus it violates the
Represented by “constitutional prohibitions on the anti-dummy
Gerardo Malinao (its and the grant of opportunity to the general
Chairperson) public to invest in public utilities” by citing
Respondent/s Department of Article 12, Section 10 of the 1987 Philippine
Transportation and Constitution; (2) bundling would open the door
Communications for monopolies, which also violates the
(DOTC) and Civil constitutional prohibition on monopolies as
Aviation Authority of
provided in Section 19, Article 12 of the
the Philippines
Constitution; (3) bundling is unreachable for
(CAAP)
medium-sized Filipino corporations and will
Topic/s Role of the Judiciary
as Interpreter of “surely perpetrate an undue restraint of trade”;
Laws (4) when the agency and committee involved
Relevant Legal The doctrine of (DOTC and PBAC) decided to open the option of
Doctrine/s hierarchy of courts bundling without legal authority, they gravely
abused their discretion of using jurisdiction; and
(5) lastly, such bundling mocked the concept of
Facts: public bidding as it made it higher than the
DOTC and CAAP aimed to improve the regional normal reasonable price.
airports by executing concession agreements On the other hand, the DOTC argued the
with the private sector. On December 15, 2014, following: (1) there is no justiciable controversy
they started their objective by posting an in the petition because there has been no actual
invitation about such plan of developing and bidding yet when the petitioner filed it, which
maintaining the airports. It will be conducted makes it premature; (2) there is no legal
through competitive bidding, in which the standing for petitioner to sue; (3) the contention
bundled projects (composed of two bundles: of the petitioner that the bundling violated the
Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo and Bundle 2: anti-dummy issues provided in the constitution
Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol/Panglao) are just speculative; (4) in connection to the
will be awarded to the bidder by undergoing a previous argument, the agency said that the
pre-qualification process. bidding process is not affected by the Section
The mechanic in the bidding process is that 11, Article 12 of the constitution; (5) it does not
either bidders may bid for only one bundle or also violate the prohibitions on monopolies or
both bundles. combinations in restraint of trade; and (6) the
CAAP and the DOTC itself contended that there
Three months after the invitation and seventeen were no grave abuse of discretion.
days after the issuance of the instructions to
bidders, through a representative, petitioner Additionally, according to the CAAP, instead of
Gios-Samar filed a petition as a taxpayer to filing the petition before the proper trial court
urgently prohibit the bidding that will be first for the factual issues to be scrutinized first,
conducted by the DOTC and CAAP “to not cause the petitioner instead files it before the
irreparable damage and injury to the coffers of Supreme Court, which violated the basic
fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts.
Thus, the petitioner did not have the legal
capacity to file the suit which makes the petition
have no cause of action.
The petitioner answered those arguments by
asserting that filing the petition before the
Supreme Court is a matter of concern for the
public interest and transcendental importance.
Furthermore, filing it even before the conduct of
the bidding is the very purpose of it since there
have already been groups that pre-qualified to
the bidding. The petitioner also insisted that he
had the legal standing to file the suit since he
has Malinao as his duly authorized
representative.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition violated the basic
fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts?
Ruling:
Yes. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates
that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is
allowed only to resolve questions of law,
notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or
transcendental importance of the action.
This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it
is a constitutional filtering mechanism
designed to enable the Court to focus
on the more fundamental and essential tasks
assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
Thus, although the SC, the CA, and the RTC have
concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, parties are
directed, as a rule, to file their petitions
before the lower-ranked court. Failure to
comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal
of the petition.
This doctrine operates to: (1) prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent
further overcrowding of the Court's docket; and
(3) prevent the inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases which often have to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as the court
better equipped to resolve factual questions.
The Supreme Court has allowed litigants to
seek direct relief from It upon allegation of
"serious and important reasons." through the
following circumstances:
(1) when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time; (2) when the issues
involved are of transcendental importance; (3)
cases of first impression; (4) the constitutional
issues raised are better decided by the Court;
(5) exigency in certain situations; (6) the filed
petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ; (7) when petitioners rightly claim that
they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law that could
free them from the injurious effects of
respondents' acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression; and (8) the petition
includes questions that are "dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of
were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy."
The court is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond
its function to make its own findings of certain
vital facts different from those of the trial court,
especially based on the conflicting claims of the
parties and without the evidence being properly
before it. While the petitioner asserts that the
arguments it raises involve legal (as opposed to
factual) issues, the court’s examination of the
petition showed otherwise. Petitioner's
arguments against the constitutionality of
the bundling of the Projects are
inextricably intertwined with underlying
questions of fact, the determination of which
require the reception of evidence.
To summarize, when a question before the
Court involves determination of a factual issue
indispensable to the resolution of the legal
issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the
question regardless of the allegation or
invocation of compelling reasons such as
transcendental importance. It must first be
brought before the proper trial courts or CA.
Given that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts and cannot resolve these factual issues at
the first instance, it resolved to dismiss the
petition.
G.R. No. L-45081 - July 15, 1936
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
Petitioner/s Jose A. Angara
Respondent/s The Electoral
Commission, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo, and Dionisio
C. Mayor
Topic/s Role of the Judiciary
as Interpreter of
Laws
Relevant Legal Separation of Powers
Doctrine/s
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Angara together with the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio Mayor were the candidates for the
position of member of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas during the 1935
elections. Petitioner was then proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers as the member-
elect of the National Assembly. Thereafter, he
took his oath of office.
After issuing the Resolution No. 8 by the
National Assembly, which confirms the election
of those who have not received any protest
before adopting the mentioned resolution,
respondent Ynsua filed a Motion to Protest
petitioner Angara before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission then again issued its
Resolution No. 9, stating that any protest that
was not submitted on or before that day will not
be considered.
On the other hand, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Protest before the Electoral
Commission and argued that the Motion to
Protest filed by respondent Ynsua was out of
the prescribed period since the latter was filed
on December 8, 1935.
Seven days after, Ynsua replied an Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal contending that there is no
constitutional provision excepting a protest
against an elected member of the National
Assembly upon confirmation.
When Petitioner replied to the said answer of
respondent Ynsua, the Electoral Commission
issued a resolution denying the former’s Motion
to Dismiss the Protest.
Petitioner then filed for an issuance of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the Electoral Commission
from taking further cognizance of the protest of
respondent Ynsua. According to Angara, the
constitution bestows exclusive jurisdiction on
the National Assembly to “regulate the
proceedings of election contests” and the
Electoral Commission has the power that is
limited to the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly only. Therefore, the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear the
case, as argued by the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle
in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that
the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to
be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government.
In cases of conflict between several
departments and among agencies, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not nullify an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution. This is in truth all that is involved
in what is termed “judicial supremacy". Judicial
Supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies
and is the power and duty to see that no
one branch or agency of government
transcends the Constitution, which is the
source of all authority.
In the case at bar, there is an actual
controversy because it involves a conflict of
a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly and the Electoral
Commission on the other. The Electoral
Commission is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional
mechanism adopted by the people and that
it is not subject to constitutional restrictions.
The Electoral Commission is not a separate
department of the government. Thus, the court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission.
To conclude, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for a writ of prohibition against the
Electoral Commission with costs against the
petitioner.
G.R. No. 217910 - September 03, 2019
Falcis vs. Civil Registrar General
Petitioner/s Jesus Nicardo M.
Falcis, III
Respondent/s Civil Registrar
General
Topic/s Role of the Judiciary
as Interpreter of
Laws
Relevant Legal Legal Standing
Doctrine/s

Facts:
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of
the provisions of the Family Code specifically
Articles 1, 2, 46 (Paragraph 4), and 55
(Paragraph 6) by filing a petition before the
Supreme Court.
In one of his arguments, he cited various
separate opinions of different Justices from
their earlier decided cases and claimed that the
resort in filing such petition was appropriate.
According to him, the Supreme Court should
follow a fresh approach to its judicial power
since his petition is a constitutional case
attended by grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, he also asserted that the issues he
raised were of such transcendental importance
as to warrant the setting aside of procedural
niceties.
He argued that his petition complied with these
requisites of judicial review: (1) actual case or
controversy; (2) standing (due to him being “an
open and self-identified homosexual” who
challenged the constitutionality of the Family
Code since it has a “normative impact” on the
status of the same-sex marriage in the
Philippines); (3) raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the very lis mota of the
case is the constitutional question.
He reiterated that there is a facial challenge on
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as they
regulate fundamental rights such as “the right
to due process and equal protection, right to
decisional and marital privacy, and the right to
find a family in accordance with religious
convictions.”
On the other hand, respondent, Civil Registrar
General prays that the petition will be dismissed
as it is just a personal matter to petitioner since
he failed to show the actual case or controversy
and injury-in-fact but still sought an opinion
from the Supreme Court.
Petitioner together with petitioners-intervenors,
LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church),
Reverend Crescencio "Ceejay" Agbayani, Jr.
(Reverend Agbayani), Marlon Felipe (Felipe),
and Maria Arlyn "Sugar" Ibañez (Ibañez) filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit
Attached Petition in Intervention. Through the
motion, petitioners-intervenors asked the court
to allow them to be involved in the proceedings
since (1) they offer further procedural and
substantive arguments; (2) their rights will not
be protected in a separate proceeding; and (3)
they have an interest in the outcome of this
case.
Thereafter, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed
seeking the same reliefs as those in Falcis'
Petition, namely: (1) the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the
Family Code; and (2) the invalidation of Articles
46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the self-identification of
petitioner as a member of the LGBTQI+
community gives him standing to challenge the
Family Code.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner did not meet the requisite of
direct injury hence he does not have legal
standing. To possess this, he must show “a
personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.” The requirement of direct
injury guarantees that the party who sues has
such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy and, in effect, assures “that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult impact” is insufficient to establish the
constitutional questions.” connection between the Family Code and his
alleged injury.
The requirements of legal standing and the
actual case and controversy are both “built on Wherefore, all the petitions are dismissed.
the principle of separation of powers, sparing as
it does unnecessary interference or invalidation
by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by
its co-equal branches of government.”

Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the

outcome of this case” is not the direct injury
contemplated by jurisprudence as that which
would endow him with standing. Mere
assertions of a “law’s normative impact”;
“impairment” of his “ability to find and enter G.R. No. 209287 – July 1, 2014
into long-term monogamous same-sex
relationships”; as well as injury to his “plans to Maria Carolina vs. Benigno Simeon
settle down and have a companion for life in his
Petitioner/s Maria Carolina P.
beloved country”; or influence over his
Araullo, Chairperson,
“decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT
Bagong Alyansang
friendly country” cannot be recognized by this
Makabayan; Judy M.
as sufficient interest. Petitioner’s desire “to find
Taguiwalo, Professor,
and enter into long-term monogamous same-
University of The
sex relationships” and “to settle down and have
Philippines Diliman,
a companion for life in his beloved country”
Co-Chairperson,
does not constitute legally demandable rights
Pagbabago; Henri
that require judicial enforcement. This Court will
Kahn, Concerned
not witlessly indulge the petitioner in blaming
Citizens Movement;
the Family Code for his admitted inability to find
Rep. Luz Ilagan,
a partner.
Gabriela Women's
Petitioner presents no proof at all the Party Representative;
immediate, inextricable danger that the Family Rep. Carlos Isagani
Code poses to him. His assertions of injury Zarate, Bay An Muna
cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly Party-List
linked to the imputed cause, the existence of Representative;
the Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Renato M. Reyes, Jr.,
Code is the definitive cause of his inability to Secretary General Of
find a partner is plainly non sequitur. Bayan; Manuel K.
Dayrit, Chairman,
Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent Ang Kapatiran Party;
to direct injury. Petitioner fails to show how the Vencer Mari E.
Family Code is the proximate cause of his Crisostomo,
alleged deprivations. His mere allegation that Chairperson,
this injury comes from “the law’s normative Anakbayan; Victor
 Villanueva, Convenor, Moreover, there was a revelation from Senator
Youth Act Now Jinggoy Ejercita Estrada regarding the incentive
when voting in favor of the Impeachment of
Respondent/s Hon. Paquito N.
Chief Justice Renato Corona, which was taken
Ochoa, Jr., Executive
from the DAP as claimed by Secretary Abad.
Secretary, Hon.
Florencio B. Abad, Because of this, it was discovered that non-
Secretary, executive projects were also funded by the DAP
Department of which was supposedly for the projects inside
Budget and the executive branch only.
Management, Hon.
This is where petitioner filed before the
Enrique T. Ona,
Supreme Court various petitions questioning
Secretary,
the validity of the said above-mentioned
Department of
program. She together with different individuals
Health, Hon. Armin
contended that the DAP is unconstitutional as it
A. Luistro, Secretary,
violates the “no money shall be paid out of the
Department of
Treasury except in pursuance of an
Education, Culture
appropriation made by law”.
and Sports and Hon.
Manuela. Roxas Ii, Issue:
Secretary,
Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
Department of
applicable.
Interior and Local
Government Ruling:
Topic/s Role of the Judiciary Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
as Interpreter of This doctrine recognizes the existence of the law
Laws or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
Relevant Legal Doctrine of Operative
produced consequences that cannot always be
Doctrine/s Fact
disregarded. It nullifies the void law or executive
act but sustains its effects. Thus, it provides an
exception to the general rule that a void or
Facts:
unconstitutional law produces no effect.
Due to the country’s slow-moving projects, the
The court finds that this doctrine is applicable to
government came up with a program called the
the adoption and implementation of the
“Disbursement Acceleration Program” to speed
program.
up its project funding. In this program, if a
certain department in the government takes too However, this doctrine does not always apply
much time in implementing a program then the and is not always the consequence of every
funds initially allocated to it will be withdrawn declaration of constitutional invalidity, according
by the Executive. These funds become savings to Justice Brion. Hence, it can only be invoked in
and will be reallocated to other projects. situations where the nullification of the effects
of what used to be a valid law would result in
inequity and injustice; but where no such result
would ensue, the general rule that an
unconstitutional law is ineffective should apply.
Therefore, it can apply only to the PAPs that can
no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries
relied in goof faith on the validity of the DAP. It
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and
implementors of the program, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by
the proper tribunals determining their criminal,
civil, administrative, and other liabilities.
The case revolved around the topic of Republic
Act No. 10354 or the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, famously
known as the RH Law. This law aims to inform
and give free access to every person in the
country about contraception, women’s health,
population control, and the like.
However, it was challenged by different groups
as, according to them, it violated various
constitutional rights (such as the rights to life,
health, freedom of religion and speech, and
privacy).

In this regard, through an order, the Supreme

Court prevented the law from going into effect
pending a final judgment.
G. R. No. 204819 - April 8, 2014

Imbong vs. Ochoa

Issue:
Petitioner/s James M. Imbong
and Lovely-Ann C. Whether or not the Court can exercise its power
Imbong, For of judicial review over the controversy.
Themselves And In
Ruling:
Behalf Of Their Minor
Children, Lucia Carlos The Power of Judicial Review
Imbong And
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its
Bernadette Carlos
judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should
Imbong and
submit to the legislative and political wisdom of
Magnificat Child
Congress and respect the compromises made in
Development Center,
the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of
Inc.
a majoritarian democratic process" and
Respondent/s Civil Registrar "characterized by an inordinate amount of
General transparency." The OSG posits that the
authority of the Court to review social
Topic/s Role of the Judiciary legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is
as Interpreter of "weak," since the Constitution vests the
Laws discretion to implement the constitutional
Relevant Legal Power of Judicial policies and positive norms with the political
Doctrine/s Review departments, in particular, with Congress. It
further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling
in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Facts: Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are
improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature. Moreover, the OSG submits that as
an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper
considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and
that the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive. It
claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech- regulating
measure.
In many cases involving the determination of
the constitutionality of the actions of the
Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought
that the Court temper its exercise of judicial
power and accord due respect to the wisdom of
its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle
of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle
in our system of government, which obtains not
through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. Thus, the 1987 Constitution
provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines; (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of
powers among the three branches of
government.
In its relationship with its co-equals, the
Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation
of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their
functions and of their respect for the other
branches of government, in striking down the
acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. It
has also long been observed, however, that in
times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred,
if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address
this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court
to respect the acts performed by a co-equal
branch done within its sphere of competence
and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation - but only at a very
limited and specific point - to determine
whether the acts of the executive and the
legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results. The Court must demonstrate its
unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the
Constitution. In this connection, it bears adding
that while the scope of judicial power of review
may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may
be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form
of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is
simple and goes back to the earlier point. The
Court may pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their
collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that
they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of
them by the Constitution. If after said review,
the Court finds no constitutional violations of
any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review. This is in
line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides: Section
1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears
enforceable, and to determine whether or not emphasizing that the Court does not have the
there has been a grave abuse of discretion unbridled authority to rule on just any and
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on every claim of constitutional violation.
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
Government. power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an
As far back as Tanada v. Angara, the Court has
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
unequivocally declared that certiorari,
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
opportunity; and (d) the issue of
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper,
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
acts of legislative and executive officials, as
case.
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling Actual Case or Controversy
was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the
Aldaba v. COMELEC, Magallona v. Ermita, and
subject petitions do not present any actual case
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote: In
or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
implemented. They claim that the questions
on the ground that it contravenes the
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
ripe for adjudication since no one has been
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
charged with violating any of its provisions and
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
that there is no showing that any of the
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that
settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial review of the RH Law is premature. An
judicial rather than political. The duty (to
actual case or controversy means an existing
adjudicate) remains to assure that the
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once
for determination, not conjectural or
a "controversy as to the application or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
interpretation of constitutional provision is
amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that
raised before this Court (as in the instant case),
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In
intellectually challenging. The controversy must
the scholarly estimation of former Supreme
be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on
Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial
the legal relations of parties having adverse
review is essential for the maintenance and
legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
enforcement of the separation of powers and
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a
the balancing of powers among the three great
legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
departments of government through the
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a
definition and maintenance of the boundaries
real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
of authority and control between them. To him,
question or issue. There ought to be an actual
judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
and substantial controversy admitting of specific
medium of participation - or instrument of
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing
distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case
or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something
has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to himself as a result of the challenged action.
He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of In The
Province of North Cotabato v. The Government
of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass
upon the issues raised as there was yet no
concrete act performed that could possibly
violate the petitioners' and the intervenors'
rights. Citing precedents, the Court
ruled that the fact of the law or act in question
being not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not
necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty. In this
case, the Court is of the view that an actual case
or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the
RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not
only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the
petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial
challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure. The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial
challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the
First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right
to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of
the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are
externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines
originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart
in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental
Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing
petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and
to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would
diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental
Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged
by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them, and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive. The petitioners, for their part,
invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. In relation to locus
standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the
rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his
own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the
doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest." In Coconut Oil Refiners Association,
Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit
may be allowed to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only
an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of
the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus s tandi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured
or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue
of transcendental importance is invoked. The
rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than
one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue
in the public interest, albeit they may not have
been directly injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act. As held in
Jaworski v. PAGCOR: Granting arguendo that the
present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that we set aside the technical defects
and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on
the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents, not only to the public, but also to
the bench and bar, the issues raised must be
resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH
Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the
freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues
of contraception and reproductive health have
already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life
of the mother and the unborn which is primarily
at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise
judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life
of either the mother or her child is at stake,
would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions
because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive
reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65,
over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the
constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-
one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure. To belittle the challenge, the
respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth
or population control measure, and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as
they are inseparable. Despite efforts to push the
RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court
sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As
stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need
to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modem family planning products
and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared
towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying
objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number
of births in the country. It cannot be denied that
the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and
post-natal care as well. A large portion of the
law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy. The Court, thus, agrees with the
petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is,
in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed,
remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation. As earlier
explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including
pre-and post-natal services, prevention and
management of reproductive tract infections
including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in
the Magna Carta for Women." Be that as it may,
the RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr.
v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G Escudero, it was written: It is well-
settled that the "one title-one subject" rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. The
rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control
the population growth.
As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2
of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State
recognizes and guarantees the human rights of
all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the
right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the
principle that the title of a law must not be "so
uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act." Considering the
close intimacy between "reproductive health"
and "responsible parenthood" which bears to
the attainment of the goal of achieving
"sustainable human development" as stated
under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
Wherefore, the petitions are Partially Granted.
The Power of Judicial Review
In many cases involving the determination of
the constitutionality of the actions of the
Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought
that the Court temper its exercise of judicial
power and accord due respect to the wisdom of
its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle
of separation of powers.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the
subject petitions do not present any actual case
or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented. They claim that the questions
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and
ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and
that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected
by its operation. In short, it is contended that
judicial review of the RH Law is premature. An
actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must
be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a
legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a
real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case
or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and
the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial
challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure. The Court is not persuaded.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged
by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them, and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive. The petitioners, for their part,
invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. In relation to locus
standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the
rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his
own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the
doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest." In Coconut Oil Refiners Association,
Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit
may be allowed to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only
an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise
judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life
of either the mother or her child is at stake,
would lead to irreparable consequences.
 natural or modem, however, are clearly geared
towards the prevention of pregnancy.
Declaratory Relief
Wherefore, the petitions are Partially Granted.
The respondents also assail the petitions
because they are essentially petitions for Yes. The court may exercise power of judicial
declaratory relief over which the Court has no review. Thus, in this case, the court believes that
original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most an actual case or controversy exists and is ripe
of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs for judicial determination.
and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case Wherefore, the petitions are Partially Granted.
has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the

constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one
title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure. To belittle the challenge, the
respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth
or population control measure, and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as
they are inseparable. Despite efforts to push the
RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court
sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As
stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need
to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modem family planning products
and methods. These family planning methods,