CASE DIGESTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
No table of contents entries found.

VI.STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

A. The Legislative Department

i. Composition, Qualifications and Term of Office

• Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486

VI.STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

A. The Legislative Department

i. Composition, Qualifications and Term of Office

• Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486

• Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)

• Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)

• Alaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)

• Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)

• Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

• Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013

• Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)

• Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)

• Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)

• Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766

• Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013)

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

• Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015

• Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)

• Akbayan v HRET, 612 SCRA 375 (2010)

• Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)

• Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 612 SCRA 375, 11 February 2010
ii. Organization and Discipline
• Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)
• Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
• Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924)
• De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)
• Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)

iii. Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

• Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)
• Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
• People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875
• Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
• Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
• Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
iv. Powers and Limitations on Powers
• Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003
• Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008
• Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
• Arnault v Nazareno, G.R. L-3820
• PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19,
2012
• Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (549
SCRA 77 AND 564 SCRA 152

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

• Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
• Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)
• Belgica (G.R. 208566, 2013)
• Araullo v Abad (G.R. 209287)
• Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty [LAMP] v. The Secretary of
Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, Apr. 24, 2012,
• Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358
• Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
• Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

v. Non-legislative Powers and Special Bodies

• Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

• Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732
• Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)
• Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)
• Velasco v Belmonte, G.R. 211140 (2016)
• Ty-Delgado v HRET G.R. 219603 (2016)

B. The Executive Department

i. The President

• Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)

• Estrada v Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738 (2001)
• Makalintal vs PET 635 SCRA 783 and 651 SCRA 239
• Pormento v Estrada, 629 SCRA 530 (2010)

ii. Powers and Limitations

• Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

• Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760

• Saguisag v Ochoa, G.R. 212426 (2016)
• Funa v Ermita, 612 SCRA 308 (2010)
• Funa v Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013
• De Castro v JBC, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)
• Velicaria-Garafil v O.P. GR 203372, Jun 16, 2015
• Manalo v Sistosa, GR 107369 (1999)
• Hontiveros-Baraquel v Toll Regulatory Board, GR 181293, Feb 23, 2015
• Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et
al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
• Kulayan v Tan, 675 SCRA 482 (2012)
• Ampatuan v Puno, 651 SCRA 228 (2011)
• Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo 668 SCRA 504 (2012)
• Lagman v Medialdea, GR 231658, Jul 4, 2017
• Monsanto v Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190 (1989)
• Risos-Vidal v Comelec, 747 SCRA 210 (2015)
• Saguisag v Ochoa, Jr. GR 212426 and 212444, Jan 12, 2016
• Bayan v Executive Secretary, GR 138570, Oct 10, 2000
• Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission, GR 192935 (2010)

C. The Judicial Department

i. Appointments

• Chavez v JBC, 676 SCRA 579 (2012 and 696 SCRA 496 (2013)
• Jardeleza v Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 (2014) and Resolution, GR 213181,
Jan
21, 2015
• Villanueva v JBC, GR 211833, Apr 7, 2015

ii. Judicial Independence

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

• Re: COA Opinion on the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased

for
the retired Chief/Associate Justices of SC, 678 SCRA 1 (2012)
• Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule 111, RA
10154
requiring government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of cases from CSC, 706 SCRA 502 (2013)

• Re: Save the SC Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v

Abolition of Judiciary development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal
Autonomy UDK-15143, Jan 21, 2015
• Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the GSIS from
payment of
legal fees, 612 SCRA 193 (2010)
• Pimentel v LEB, G.R. No.230642, September 10, 2019

D. The Constitutional Commissions

i. Common Provisions
• Cayetano v Monsod, GR 100113 (1991)
• Gaminde v COA, GR No. 140335 (2000)
• Brillantes v Yorac, GR No. 93867 (1990)
• CSC v DBM, GR 158791
• Funa v Duque 742 SCRA 166 (2014)
ii. The Commission on Elections
• Sarmiento v COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307
• Ambil v Comelec GR No. 143398
• Brillantes v Comelec, GR 163193 (2004)
• Sandoval v Comelec, GR 133842
• Al Haj v Comelec, GR No. 151046

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

iii. The Civil Service Commission

• General v Roco, GR No. 143366 (2001)
• CSC v Salas, GR 123708
• Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC, GR No. 159940 (2005)
• Vistan v Nicolas 201 SCRA 524
• Domingo v Zamora, GR 142283 (2003)
• OP v Buenaobra, GR 170021 (2006)
• Capablanca v CSC, GR 179370, Nov 19, 2009
iv. The Commission on Audit
• DBP v COA, 231 SCRA 202
• Bustamante v COA, 216 SCRA 164
• DBP v COA, GR No. 88435 (2002)
E. Accountability of Public Officers
i. Impeachment
ii. The Sandiganbayan
• PD 1606
• Nunez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433
iii. The Ombudsman
• Roxas v Vasquez, GR No 114944
• People v Velez, GR No. 138093
• Ledesma v CA GR No. 161629
• Ombudsman v Madriaga, GR No. 164316
• Caoibes v Ombudsman, GR 132177, Jul 19, 2001
iv. The Special Prosecutor
• Zaldiva v Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843
• Orap v Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252
F. National Commissions

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

i. Commission on Human Rights

ii. National Language Commission
iii. National Police Commission

5 of 6

iv. Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities

• Carino v CHR, GR 96681
• Canonizado v Aguirre, GR No. 133132 (2000)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)

Facts: In this case, Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint
against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago regarding the speech the
latter delivered on the Senate floor. On the other hand, Senator
Santiago did not deny making those statements. However, she invoked
parliamentary immunity contending that it was delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue: Whether or not Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary
action?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is
not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. The immunity she claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." The
Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere
with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.
The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)

Facts: This tackles the case of the four legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur, wherein each district has populations of
over 250,000 thousand. In this regard, there was a law reapportioning
the composition of the first and second legislative districts in the
province of Camarines sur and thereby creating a new legislative
district from such reapportionment or the Republic Act 9716. Pursuant
to this law, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured to create an additional legislative district for the
province, which resulted in a decrease in the population of the first
district to 176,383. Petitioners then argued that RA 9716 is
unconstitutional contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a minimum population
of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. Accordingly,
petitioners contend the reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the
first district of Camarines Sur with less than 250,000 in population.
In respondents’ defense, they contended that the 250,000-population
requirement applies only to the creation of legislative districts in a
city, and not in provinces.
Issue: Whether or not the population of 250k an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province?
Ruling: No. In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995), the Court
clarified that while Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution requires a
city to have a minimum population of 250k to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250k to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why
the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts
in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250k to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Aldaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
Facts: This case revolves around the topic of Republic Act 9591 which
was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. The
Congress relied on the Certification of Alberto Miranda, Region III
Director, of the NSO, projecting that Malolos City's population in
2010 will reach more than 250,000 to satisfy the constitutional
threshold as established by Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
congress also employed the 2007 Census of Population Progress

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Enumeration Report and Certification of the City of Malolos Water

District, both dated July 31, 2008, and August 22, 2008. The Comelec
maintains that these population indicators are reliable and
authoritative, and hence cannot be challenged in court.
Issue: Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to
judicial review?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that if laws creating legislative
districts are unquestionably within the ambit of its judicial review,
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfil
this obligation, the Court must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with
the constitutional limitation. It is well settled that the passage of
apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. To
deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to
contend that the Court has no power to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
Facts: As illustrated in this case, Angel Naval was elected and served
as a member of Sanggunian, Second from 2004 to 2010. Camarines Sur
district. RA 9716 was passed sometime in 2009, reapportioning the
legislative districts of Camarines was passed. Eight of the ten towns
were selected from Camarines Sur's second district. to establish a
third district. The second district included the remaining two towns
as well as the Gainza and Milaor are from the first district. Naval
campaigned and won as a Democrat in the 2010 elections. Sanggunian
from the third district. She ran again in 2013 and was re-elected to
the same position. position. When Naval's election was called into
question because to the three-term limit, she said that she was merely
there to help.
Issue: Whether Naval’s election for the year 2013 is valid?
Ruling: No. The Court held that RA 9716 created a new second district
for Camarines Sur, but it merely renamed the third district which
elected Naval into the position. Therefore, she was elected by the

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

same inhabitants in the same territorial jurisdiction. The three-term

limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible. The rule
answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in
the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the
freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be
called statesmen.

Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

Facts: This case discusses when Cagayan de Oro previously had only one
legislative district. However, its Congressman Constantino Jaraula
backed legislation in 2006 to create two legislative districts in CdO
instead. Because the statute (RA 9371) was passed, two legislative
districts were established. Rogelio Bagabuyo challenged the law's
constitutionality, and he promptly petitioned the Supreme Court to
prevent the COMELEC from applying the law in the next elections.
Bagabuyo claimed that the 2nd district was established without a
plebiscite, as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in this case?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that a plebiscite is not required in this
case. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the
criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government
unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013)
Facts: Petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes was elected and sworn in as
Marinduque's representative. However, prior to the elections, COMELEC
revoked her certificate of candidacy due to ineligibility. She was not
eligible to run for the seat because she was not a Filipino citizen.
Regina was opposed to the Comelec's jurisdiction claiming that the

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has exclusive

jurisdiction over her qualifications.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to investigate
Regina’s qualifications as representative of Marinduque?
Ruling: No. The Court held that HRET's constitutional jurisdiction
extends to the qualification of its members, who are appointed only
after a constitutionally and legally based declaration. HRET has sole
and exclusive authority over the qualifications of its members.
However, Regina's proclamation is no longer legal because, before to
the elections, the Comelec's decision to annul her certificate of
candidacy became final. As a result, there is no foundation for her
proclamation, hence she was not elected to the House of
Representatives.
Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
Facts: This case revolves around the May 2007 elections wherein
petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list
representatives provided by the Constitution. The latter, sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections. In proclaiming the winners and
apportioning their seats, the Comelec considered the following rules:
(1) In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); (2) Pursuant
to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list
elections shall be entitled to one seat; (3) If a party-list garners
at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least
6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6
rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation
Party vs Comelec; (4) In no way shall a party be given more than three
seats even if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-
list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). Moreover, the COMELEC
declared the BANAT’s petition moot and academic and declared further
that the total number of seats of each winning party-list will be
resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before
the Supreme Court assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Sec 5(2), Art VI of the Const. mandatory?

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

(2) Whether or not the three-seat limit provided in Sec 11(b) of RA

7941 constitutional?
(3) Whether or not the 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to
congressional seats prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
(4) Whether or not major political parties participate in the party-
list elections?
Ruling:
(1) No. The court ruled that 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in Sec 5(1) of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress.

(2) Yes. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats

that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, is a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections.

(3) The court held that as to the guaranteed seats, yes; but, as to
the additional seats, no. The 2% threshold vote for additional seats
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. It
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec
5(2), Art VI of the Const. and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”

(4) No. By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue to disallow

major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Notably however, neither the
Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibit major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers
of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.

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AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR

Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)

Facts: In this case, there is a political party called “Ang Ladlad”,
which is composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays bisexuals or transgendered individuals. In 2006, they
applied for registration with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as
a party-list organization under the RA 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a law that mandates the state to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system. The COMELEC denied the
application twice contending that accrediting Ang Ladlad would expose
our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of
our faith and cited the following grounds: (1) they tolerate sexual
immorality, citing provisions of the Bible and the Koran; (2) they
collide with Articles 695, 1306, and 1409 of the Civil Code, and
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and (3) that the LGBT sector is
not enumerated in the Constitution and in the Party-List System Act.
In Ang Ladlad’s defense, they claimed their compliance with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC and argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity. Ang Ladlad then appealed
the COMELEC’s decision to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation be
denied?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Ang Ladlad complied with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors [in the Constitution and RA
7941] is not exclusive. Taking note of the size of the LGBT sector and
the extensive affiliation of Ang Ladlad, the Court ruled that Ang
Ladlad sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. It was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Morality referred to in
the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious. Otherwise,
if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
compel the non-believers to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, the government would thereby tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. On the other hand, COMELEC
has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s

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admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to

irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. COMELEC’s reference to
purported violations of our penal and civil laws is flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. The remedies for which are a prosecution under
the RPC or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings [and not denial of accreditation]. In ruling for
the accreditation Ang Ladlad, the Court further cited the equal
protection clause, the guarantees of freedom of expression and
association, and our international obligation to protect and promote
human rights.
Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
Facts: In this case, Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) filed its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 Elections
with the Commission on Elections they also filed its Certificate of
Nomination along with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.
On the other hand, the COMELEC published Resolution No. 8807, which
established the procedures for petitions to disqualify a party-list
nominee for the May 10, 2010 elections. certiorari petitioners Liza L.
Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by
Teodoro Casi, filed a petition for disqualification against Arroyo
with the COMELEC in accordance with Resolution No. 8696, in relation
to Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List
System Act). The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the
party-list organization factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented; the nominee must also be a Filipino citizen
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, citing the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC. The certiorari petitioners decided that Arroyo
cannot be regarded a member of the underprivileged and
underrepresented sector, particularly the sector that the AGPP
represents, tricycle drivers and security guards, because he is not
simply a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent
member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses
Energy Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House,
namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources, Ethics
and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works
and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means. Moreover, petitioners
Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (mandamus petitioners) sent
a letter to the COMELEC Law Department requesting a copy of the
documentary evidence submitted by AGPP in accordance with Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8807. Thereafter, the COMELEC Law Department responded
that the AGPP had not yet submitted any documentary evidence required
by Resolution No. 8807. The mandamus petitioners asked the COMELEC and
its Law Department to act in accordance with Section 10 of Resolution

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No. 8807 and declare AGPP nominees disqualified for failing to comply
with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. Section 6 of the Resolution
requires the party-list group and the nominees to submit documentary
evidence proving that the nominees belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, as well as the sectoral party,
organization, political party, or coalition that they wish to
represent. It further states that the COMELEC Law Department will
require party-list groups and nominees to submit the necessary
documentation. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Arroyo's
petitions for disqualification in its Joint Resolution. It pointed out
that Section 9 of RA 7941 only required the nominee to be "a bona fide
member [of the party or organization for which he seeks to represent]
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the elections." The
petitioners filed their Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction with the Supreme Court. They sought to compel the COMELEC
to disqualify the AGPP nominees on the basis of their failure to
comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, as well as to stop the
COMELEC from granting the AGPP due course in the May 10, 2010
elections. Additionally, the certiorari petitioners petitioned the
Supreme Court in two (2) separate certiorari petitions to annul the
COMELEC Second Division's May 7, 2010 joint resolution and the COMELEC
en banc's July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed their
petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPPs nominee. In the
meanwhile, AGPP received the required proportion of votes in the May
10, 2010 elections to secure a single seat. As AGPP's first nominee,
Arroyo was granted a seat in the House of Representatives. Thus, the
COMELEC, acting as the National Board of Canvassers, declared Arroyo
to be the AGPP's validly elected party-list representative in the
House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs nominee after his proclamation and
assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives?
Ruling: Yes. The court said that consistent judicial holding is that
the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-
list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they
are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their
party. Hence, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications end sand the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that

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the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule
upon Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766
Facts: In this case, to overturn several Comelec resolutions
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list contest, 52 party-list
groupings and organizations filed separate petitions with the Supreme
Court. In its contested resolutions issued in October, November, and
December of 2012, the Comelec determined, among other things, that
these party-list parties and organizations failed to represent a
marginalized and disenfranchised population. Their nominations were
not from a marginalized or underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups were not authentically reflective of the
sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the May 2013 party-
list election?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
cases were remanded back to the COMELEC because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court. In
determining who may participate in the party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented sector.”
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

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4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. V. Comelec, 201
SCRA 786 (2013)
Facts: The SENIOR CITIZENS nominees signed an agreement named
"Irrevocable Covenant" in May 2010 that lists their candidates and
specifies how their authority will be divided. It included a decision
of which candidate will fulfil the terms outlined in the power sharing
agreement. Due to the term-sharing arrangement, Kho's time serving as
a member of the HR was shortened to 1 year and 6 months. As a result,
Kho submitted his resignation, which will take effect on December 31,
2011. In the meanwhile, on February 21, 2012, COMELEC Resolution was
published. Section 7 Rule 4 thereof stated that vacancies caused by
term sharing agreements among Nominees from winning party-list
organizations or groups are prohibited. the 12th of March 2012, the
Kho's resignation from the SENIOR CITIZENS Board of Trustees was
recalled, and he was given permission to represent the party-list
indefinitely. COMELEC decided to CANCEL the registration of the
candidate despite the recall of resignation because it regarded the
term sharing agreement to be against public policy.
Under the Party-List System of Representation, SENIOR CITIZENS.

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Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of
its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that there was no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of
non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-
sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto,
it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily the COMELEC En Banc imposed penalties.
As a matter of fact, how can SENIOR CITIZENS disobey when their
nominees didn't follow through on their commitment? There was
therefore no apparent breach of any election law, rule, or regulation.
Therefore, it is evident that SENIOR CITIZENS has been disqualified
and that its registration and accreditation have been revoked without
any legal justification.
Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015
Facts: Isidro Lico, the first nominee, took the oath of office after
Comelec declared Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list
organizations. Prior to being named one of the successful party-list
organizations, Ating Koop released a Resolution that contained a term-
sharing agreement that its nominees had signed. The three-year term
stipulated that petitioner Lico would hold the position of Party-list
Representative for the first year. Then when held its Second National
Convention, it introduced amendments which would short the three-year
term of the incumbent members then was replaced by the Rimas group.
Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, a petition
was filed expelling him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from
allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee
cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as
factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under
Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. Comelec Second Division
upheld the expulsion of petitioner while Comelec en banc dismissed the
petition holding that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico
from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from
Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the petition. However, it upheld the
validity of his expulsion.

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Issue: Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a

Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization?
Ruling: No. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the
HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of
members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In
this case, the Comelec proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list
group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the
House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the Comelec,
that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)
Facts: The registration of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list organization
was revoked by Comelec. It was noted that ABANG LINGKOD has not
demonstrated a history of advancing the cause of the weak and
oppressed, and
underrepresented; that it just provided images of some purported
activities it engaged in following the May 2010 elections. It further
asserted that ABANG LINGKOD had failed to demonstrate that any of its
nominees were themselves underrepresented and marginalized, or that
they had participated in initiatives to better the situation of the
groups they purportedly represented.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system
for the latter’s failure to prove its track record?
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that contrary to the Comelec's claim,
sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of
the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented
by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent. There is thus no basis in law and
established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration
under the party-list system still comply with the track record
requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that
groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show
their track record as a group.

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Akbayan v HRET, 612 SCRA 375 (2010)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)

Facts: In this case, there is a petitioner who was a resident of
Concepcion, Tarlac for over 50 years and it is also stated in his
birth certificate Concepcion, Tarlac is the birthplace of both his
parents. For the 1992 congressional elections, he indicated in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac
for 52 years. For the 1995 elections, he also ran for the Congress
representing the new 2nd district of Makati City. He stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he has resided “in the constituency
where” he sought “to be elected” for only “10 months.” However, he has
just transferred to a leased condominium in Makati from his residence
in Tarlac. On the other hand, private respondents filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that he lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman mandated in Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution. After such petition, petitioner amended
his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating there that he has been a
resident in said place for 1 year and 13 days. Meanwhile, elections
were held, and he garnered the highest number of votes. However,
COMELEC, acting on the private respondents’ petition, suspended his
proclamation permanently.
Issue: Did Aquino satisfy the constitutional residence requirement in
the 2nd district of Makati City as mandated by Art VI, Sec 6?
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that the essence of representation
is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district. Clearly, petitioner’s
domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac, and the same is not easily
lost. That coupled with the fact that he himself claims to have other
residences in Metro Manila and that he claims to be resident of the
condominium unit in Makati for only a short length of time “indicate
that” his “sole purpose in transferring his physical residence” is not
to acquire a new residence of domicile “but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the 2nd district of Makati City.” The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment
of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of
identification— sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement [of the

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condominium unit in Makati (instead of buying one)] was effected all

belie his claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution.
Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 612 SCRA 375,
11 February 2010
Facts: In the 2007 elections, the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
and the Bantay party-list group, which both won seats in the House of
Representatives, first nominated Daryl Grace Abayon and Jovito
Palparan. Respondents contested the eligibility of Abayon, Palparan,
and their respective party-list organizations in two separate quo
warranto applications. Both Abayon and Palparan contested the HRET's
authority, arguing that the party-list, not them as its nominees, was
elected to the House of Representatives. On both petitions, the HRET
issued an order rejecting the petition against the party-list groups
on the grounds that the Party-List System Act gave the COMELEC
authority over the question of the party-list group's eligibility.
However, it upheld its authority about the issue of Abayon and
Palparan's qualifications.
Issue: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats
in the lower house of Congress?
Ruling: YES. The members of the House of Representatives are of two
kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts"
and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the
party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. Once elected, both the district
representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are
"elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)

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Facts: This case illustrates the time when the Senate held its
election of officers wherein Senator Fernan was declared duly elected
Senate President. Thereafter, the Senate failed to arrive at a
consensus on the matter of the Minority leader for which Senator Tatad
and Senator Guingona of the PRP and Lakas-NUCD-UMDP83 (both “minority”
parties, LAMP being the “majority”) respectively were being
considered. After 3 session days of debate on the issue, Senate
President Fernan formally recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader upon receiving information that all Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators
signed in agreement for the latter. Senators Santiago and Tatad of the
PRP instituted this present petition for quo warranto alleging that
Guingona had been usurping a position which, to them, rightfully
belongs to Tatad. They assert the definition of “majority” in Art VI,
sec 16(1) of the Constitution refers to a group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Sen. Pres. and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships, therefore those otherwise comprise the “minority.”
Accordingly, they are of the view that Guingona, having voted for
Fernan, belongs to the “majority.” In view thereof, they assert
Article VI, sec 16(1) has not been observed in the selection of the
Minority Leader.
Issue: Whether or not Guingona unlawfully usurp the position of
Minority Leader in the view that Art VI, sec 16(1) of the Constitution
was not observed?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that in dismissing the petition, the term
“majority” simply “means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total”. Art VI, sec 16(1) does not delineate who comprise
the “majority” much less the “minority”. Notably, the Constitution [in
Art VI, sec 16(1)] is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.
All that it says is that “each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred [to the House] xxx. In the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines xxx this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto.
Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts: The resolution was filed by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and
lists the charges against the Senate President Avelino and directing
an investigation into the matter. There were 24 senators in the
Senate; however, only 22 were present on the day of the session when
Senator Tañada was scheduled to deliver his one-hour privilege speech.

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Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to assert his right to speak during

the session's opening remarks a speech, but Senator Avelino continued
to disregard him and declared that he would order the arrest of
everyone who spoke without first being acknowledged. Moreover, a
commotion started. A motion to adjourn was rejected. Then suddenly,
with only 12 senators remaining in the chamber, Avelino pounded his
gavel before exiting the chamber with his followers. The senators who
were still present continued the meeting (known as a "rump session")
and decided to appoint respondent Senator Cuenco as acting Senate
President after declaring the position of Senate President vacant.
Senator Avelino asks the court to remove respondent Senator Cuenco and
recognize him as the rightful Senate President in this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the rump session is a continuation of the morning
session?
(2) Whether or not the rump session was not a continuation of the
morning session, was there a quorum when Senator Avelino was ousted
and Senator Cuenca was elected as the Senate President?
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Court ruled that a minority of ten senators cannot stop a
resolution that had their unanimous support from being passed by the
other twelve senators by adjourning the chamber.
(2) Yes. In view of Senator Confesor’s absence from the country, for
all practical considerations, he may not participate in the Senate
deliberations. Therefore, an absolute majority of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum; that is, 12 senators in this case
constitute a quorum. Even if the 12 did not constitute a quorum, they
could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members.
If one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt [that there is a
quorum] then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
since, at most, only 11 will side with Senator Avelino. It would be
most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of
the Senate.
Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924)
Facts: As discussed in this case, Senator Jose Alendrino (also the
Petitioner in this case) was appointed by the Governor-General to
represent the 12th denatorial district. Respondents are members of the
Philippine Senate including, among others, Manuel Quezon; Faustino
Aguilar, Senate Secretary; Bernabe Bustamante, Sgt. At Arms; and
Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Senate. However, the Philippine

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Senate composed of the respondent senators adopted a resolution

depriving petitioner of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for a period of one year. The petitioner
claimed that the resolution previously mentioned is invalid and has no
impact at all. He asks the court to enjoin the respondents, issue a
temporary restraining order, declare the resolution null and unlawful,
and issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction. The respondents
were represented by the Attorney-General, who raised a challenge to
the court's jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction
annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine
Senate to reinstate him in his official position?
Ruling: No. The Court held that the writ will not lie from one branch
of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the
legislative body, its members, or officers, to compel the performance
of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore
pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have
exclusive control. It has been held that where a member has been
expelled by a legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective
of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement.
In Severino v. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros (prayer for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General
to call a special election as provided by law), the Court rules that
we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of
these islands, as the head of the executive department, in the
performance of any of his official acts.
In State of Mississippi v. Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States (prayer to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson from executing
certain Acts of Congress), the US Supreme Court ruled that the
Congress is the Legislative Department; the President is the Executive
Department. Neither can be retrained in its action by the Judicial
Department, though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper
cases, subject to its cognizance. The US SC has no jurisdiction of a
bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.
In French v. State of California (prayer for mandamus by duly elected
senators to compel the Senate of California to admit them as members),
the US SC ruled that the judicial department has no power to revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof.

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No court has ever held, and no court will ever hold that it possesses
the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any
particular action. Also, if the Court does not have any authority to
control the Philippine Senate, it has likewise no authority to control
the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the
same.
However, the Constitution has purposely withheld from the Legislature
and the Governor-General the power to suspend an appointive member.
Suspend is not included in the terms “punish” for the Legislature
(Organic Act section 18) and “remove” for the Executive (Organic Act
sections 16, 17). This is because punishment by way of reprimand or
fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving
the constituency or representation. Expulsion, the same, while giving
the constituency the opportunity to elect anew. But suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded means by which to fill the vacancy.
De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)
Facts: In this case, a Criminal Case No. 18857 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan
Del Sur for violation of section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. In this
regard, there was a filed Motion to Suspend the Accused Pendente Lite
after the Congressman pleaded not guilty. The Sandiganbayan granted
the mentioned motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the
Congressman. However, the Speaker did not comply and as a result, the
Sandiganbayan then issued a Resolution requiring him to appear and
show the reason why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Through his counsel, the Speaker filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can
only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to the
House Resolution No. 116. After this, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
Speaker in contempt of court.
Issue: Whether or not the Speaker was correct in invoking the
principle of Separation of Powers and claiming that he can only act as
may be dictated by the House as a body?
Ruling: In the case of Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled
that the principle of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. But the order of
suspension prescribed by such law is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. In
another case (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is
different in terms of nature and purpose. Thus, it is imposed not as a

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penalty but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of

a valid information. The purpose is to prevent the accused public
officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts
of malfeasance while in office. The suspension or expulsion is a
House-imposed sanction against its members, and it is just a penalty
for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity. It is held that the
principle of separation of powers simply put to prevent one branch
from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)
Facts: In this case, Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint
against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago regarding the speech the
latter delivered on the Senate floor. On the other hand, Senator
Santiago did not deny making those statements. However, she invoked
parliamentary immunity contending that it was delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue: Whether or not Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary
action?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is
not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. The immunity she claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." The
Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere
with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.
The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.
Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

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Facts: In this case, the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.

(PHILCONSA) filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General and
the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently
enjoin the mentioned individuals from authorizing or passing in audit
the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act 4134
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives. The budget
for 1965–1966 put into effect the raise in compensation for the
Speaker and House of Representatives members mandated by RA 4134,
which was only passed the year before in 1964. The petitioner claims
that its implementation violates Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution (which is now Section 10). The justification offered was
that the terms of the eight senators elected in 1963 who participated
in the adoption of RA 4134 would have ended on December 30, 1969,
while the terms of the House members who took part in the passage of
the same Act ended on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Whether or not Section 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution
requires not only the term of all the members of the House but also
that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully
expired before the increase becomes effective?
Ruling: The Court held that in establishing what might be termed a
waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same
sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between
them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the
provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators
and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form
and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and
the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of
office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must
have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation
provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the
full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will
have expired.
Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
Facts: According to this case, Petitioner was re-elected to a third
term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not
entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term

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by virtue of this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay.

He lost his next bid and filed for retirement claim. House of
Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved amount.
Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for
reconsideration was denied, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that to grant retirement gratuity to
members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed
on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their
term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in
effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by
the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875
Facts: In this case, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is detained in the federal prison while an appeal is
being processed over his conviction for statutory rape on two charges
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts. Despite having been found
guilty in the first instance of a non-bailable offense, the accused-
appellant filed this motion asking to be permitted to fully carry out
the responsibilities of a congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings.
Issue: Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in
general?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that immunity from arrest is not enjoyed
by one who has been convicted. Rape is punishable by more than six
years imprisonment; hence immunity from arrest cannot be invoked.
Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
Facts: In the 1980 elections, petitioner Adaza and respondent Pacana
were chosen as governor and vice governor, respectively, with mandates
scheduled to end in 1986. Both candidates submitted their nominations
for the BP elections as Mambabatas Pambansa on March 27, 1984, and
Adaza won and was elected as MP. After the BP elections, Pacana
returned to his local government position and took the oath of office
as governor of Misamis Oriental. He began carrying out his
governorship duties in July 1984. With the argument that the
petitioner is still the rightful tenant of the governor's office and
will serve out his entire term until March 1986, the respondent is
being asked to resign from his position.

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Issue: Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as a

Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of
both offices simultaneously?
Ruling: No. The Court held that a member cannot accept an incompatible
position unless he gives up or waives his congressional seat. The
intention of the provision is to stop a member from favoring another
branch of the government at the expense of the legislative. In other
words, because the offices of legislator and governor are
incompatible, the petitioner is unable to perform both duties.
Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
Facts: Several International Pipe Industries directors filed a quo
warranto complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC)
on May 25, 1979, disputing the results of the directors' election that
had taken place on May 15. They claimed that the votes had not been
correctly tabulated counted therein. At the SEC conferences,
Assemblyman Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for the
complainants, the elected directors protested arguing that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel before any
administrative body. Fernandez then inhibited himself from appearing
as counsel for the group and instead on May 31 filed an Urgent Motion
for Intervention for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a
legal owner of IPI shares with a legal interest in the matter in
litigation having bought 10 shares of stock from one of the directors
with the deed of sale signed on May 15 and notarized on May 30. The
SEC Commissioner subsequently granted the motion allowing Fernandez to
intervene in the proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not Fernandez as a stockholder of IPI, can appear
and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional
provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such
courts or bodies?
Ruling: No. It was held that by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel but
theoretically for the protection of hi ownership of hares in respect
of the matter in litigation. However, under the facts and
circumstances immediately preceding and following his purchase of the
shares, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
“appearance as counsel before an administrative body (SEC).”
Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
Facts: In this case, Richard Gordon while still a senator, won the
election for chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross. Then,
petitioners submitted a petition asking for the Senate to declare

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Senator Gordon's seat to have been forfeited. They claim that by

accepting the PNRC Board of Governors presidency, he no longer
qualifies as a senator under Section 13, Art. The Constitution's
Article VI. Senator Gordon claimed in his Comment that the petition
was already blocked by prescription and that the petitioners lacked
standing to file what seemed to be a quo warranto action.
Additionally, he claimed that Section 13, Art. 1, does not apply to
the PNRC and that it is neither a government-owned nor controlled
organization. Since volunteering for the PNRC is neither an office nor
an employment, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in this
instance employment.
Issue: Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art.VI of the
Constitution?
Ruling: No. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private
individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to
membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65
years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing P35,
P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether
residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Sec. 5 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended by P.D. No. 1264, provides that membership in the
PNRC shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines
regardless of citizenship. Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned,
privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC
is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003
Facts: In his petition, petitioner Macalintal asks that specific
provisions of R.A. The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Public
Law No. 9189, is unlawful. Since public funds will be used and
appropriated for the implementation of said law, the Court affirms the
petitioner's right to file the current petition, stating in essence
that the petitioner has presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people. He raised these following
arguments: (1) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and
party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-
President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4

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of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and

Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
(2) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section)
to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall
promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
(2) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections,
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Court ruled that Congress should not have allowed COMELEC
to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing
of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the
hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII
of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(2) No. It was held that by vesting itself with the powers to approve,
review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA
No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left
with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008
Facts: The passage of R.A. 9335 is what this case all about. It is a
law that improves the BIR and BOC's capacity for revenue generating
and collection. Using a system of rewards and penalties, this law
seeks to motivate bureau officials and staff to surpass their income
goals. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC were tasked to promulgate
and issue IRRs of R.A. 9335, which is to be approved by a

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congressional oversight committee created for the purpose. The ABAKADA

GURO PARTY LIST, et al. invoke their rights as taxpayers in filing
this petition to challenge the validity of R.A. 9335, a tax reform
legislation. Among other contentions, they assail the creation of the
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the committee’s creation permits legal participation in an otherwise
executive function.
Issue: Whether or not the creation of a congressional oversight
committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers as it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.
Ruling: Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies
to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce
have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statuteand are just as binding
as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have
the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of
RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
Facts: In this case, it was claimed that Benjamin Romualdez, his wife,
and the Marcoses benefited themselves unfairly and illegally at the
expense of the Filipino people. that they attained with the aid of
Ricardo Lopa and the Bengzon Law Office. After that, Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile made a speech under oath in which he claimed that Lopa
had taken control of several government-owned companies in violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The speech includes a
motion to investigate the problem. The Blue Ribbon Committee or the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers will be handling the
motion. Enrile then took advantage of the Senate's privilege hour and
insisted on having an investigation into the situation. Bengzon and
Lopa's argument was denied by the SBRC.
Issue: Whether or not the inquiry that Is sought by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee should be granted?

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Ruling: No. It was heled that the speech of Enrile contained no

suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to investigate a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In
other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory,
particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really
“in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress.
Arnault v Nazareno, G.R. L-3820
Facts: In this case, the Buenavista and Tambobong estates purchases by
the government were the subject of a Senate investigation. The
apparent irregularity of the government paying Ernest Burt, a non-
resident American citizen, a total of Php1.5 million for his alleged
interest in the two estates, which only came to Php20,000.00 and which
he seemed to have forfeited anyway a long time ago, was an intriguing
question that the Senate sought to answer. The Senate investigated who
was to blame for the transaction and who gained from it at the expense
of the government. As a result, Arnault was charged with contempt of
the Senate and committed to the care of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
for detention until he responds to the inquiries. He thereafter filed
a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session?
Ruling: Yes. It was ruled that the Senate has the right to hold him in
contempt for a length of time after its legislative session has ended.
The Senate is a permanent body that continues to function even after
the regular dissolution of Congress or the House of Representatives.
The power of the Senate to penalize for contempt in situations where
it is constitutionally permissible to do so, such as the one at hand,
has no time limit.
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19,
2012
Facts: As tackled in this case, the Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a
government- sequestered organization in which the Republic of the

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Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. For the period

from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), regularly received cash dividends from
POTC. Unfortunately, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004,
PHC sustained a P7-million loss attributable to its huge operating
expenses. By 2005, PHC’s operating expenses had ballooned
tremendously. Likewise, several PHC board members established
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly owned PHC subsidiary
to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the appropriate
accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT. In view of the
losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect
its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the Congress,
introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors. Respondents,
Senate Committees, submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312,
where it noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the
management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the
respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the
PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was
negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government’s
interests in the said corporations. Committee Report No. 312
recommended the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over
the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the
Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance
(DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC
and PHILCOMSAT.
Issue: Whether or not Committee Resolution No. 312 should be
nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been
hastily approved by the respondent Senate?
Ruling: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides the Senate
or the House of Representative’s power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. The respondents Senate Committees’ power of inquiry
relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution. The Court explained that such conferral of the
legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in
this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all
powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The Senate
Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or more than jurisdiction when it submitted

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Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to

conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be
faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution
was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to
these legislative inquiries has long been settled.
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (549 SCRA
77 AND 564 SCRA 152
Facts: Respondent Senate Committees filed a motion for
reconsideration of the March 25, 2008, Decision of the Court in which
Romulo Neri was found in contempt for his unwillingness to respond to
three specific questions about the contentious ZTE-NBN deal. The court
ruled that the presidential communications privilege applies to the
communications that the three inquiries generated, hence the
respondents' contempt order was null and void. Respondents now argue
that the data gathered by the three questions is required for them to
carry out their legislative duties.
Issue: Whether respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three questions are critical to the
exercise of their functions?
Ruling: No. The Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, the Court
cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed
privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness during a
legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent
Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient
of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as
a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by the
Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption
of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need
for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege. The
presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on
the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by
demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited
by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to
enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized
assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the
power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending
Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills
could not be determined without the said information sought by the
three (3) questions. The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3)
questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the
President. While it may be a worthy endeavour to investigate the
potential culpability of high government officials, including the

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President, in each government transaction, it is simply not a task for

the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws,
not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our
Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role.
Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature
adjudicate or prosecute.
Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
Facts: In this case, a first-year law student at the University of
Sto. Thomas, passed away, allegedly because of hazing by the Aegis
Juris Fraternity. Senator Zubiri submitted SR No. 504, denouncing the
student’s passing and ordering the relevant Senate Committee to launch
an investigation in support of legislation that would hold those
responsible accountable. Moreover, Senator Aquino IV filed SR No. 510,
titled: " A Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to
Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of
Horacio Tomas Castillo III Allegedly Due to Hazing-Related
Activities.” The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs,
chaired by Senator Lacson, as well as the Senate Committee on Public
Safety and Security will conduct the inquiry. Invitations to the Joint
Public Hearing were extended to the petitioner and a number of other
people by the Committees on Justice and Human Rights, Constitutional
Amendment, and Revision of Codes. Petitioner attended the senate
hearing. In the course of the proceedings, Senator Poe asked
petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity, but he
refused to answer the question and invoked his right against self-
incrimination. She manifested that petitioner's signature appeared on
the application for recognition of the AJ Fraternity and on the
organizational sheet, indicating that he was the president.
Petitioner, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination.
Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by
Senators Villanueva and Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled that the motion
was properly seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at arms was ordered
to place petitioner in detention after the committee hearing.
Thereafter, petitioner apologized for his earlier statement and moved
for the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of
the AJ Fraternity, but he was not aware as to who its president was
because, at that time, he was enrolled in another school. Senator
Villanueva repeated his question to petitioner but the latter, again,
invoked his right against self-incrimination. Thus, petitioner was
placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms.
Issue: Whether or not the period of detention under the senate's
inherent power of contempt is indefinite?

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Ruling: The Court held that there is a genuine necessity to place a

limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by the
Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in
aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states
that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must
respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein.
Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-
preservation and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as
such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. Even arguendo
that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is
not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress
only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an
obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said
witness. It is when the restrictions during detention are arbitrary
and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. An indefinite
and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive
restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of
contempt is of utmost importance. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislations are intended to affect or change.
Thus, the Court must strike a balance between the interest of the
Senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative
inquiries. The balancing of interest requires that the Court take a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation. These interests
usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms
on the one hand, and the government's promotion of fundamental public
interest or policy objectives on the other. The Court finds that the
period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power
is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process
may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of
investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject.
Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry,
then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly
exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes,
the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no
more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness. In fine, the
interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative
inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively
exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against
recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a

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contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional

rights of the said witness. In addition, if the Congress decides to
extend the period of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a
witness beyond the duration of the legislative inquiry, then it may
file a criminal case under the existing statute or enact a new law to
increase the definite period of imprisonment.
Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)
Facts: This case involves the project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group. The
Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before the
Senate on September 29, 2005. On September 28, 2005, the President
issued EO464, effective immediately which, among others, mandated that
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government
shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Secretary
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not
yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the
investigation. Both faced court marshall for such attendance.
Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order 464 contravenes the power of
inquiry vested in Congress?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that Legislature’s power to conduct
inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
Section 21 of the Constitution. The power of inquiry in aid of
legislation is inherent in the power to legislate but there are
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the
rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government
to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way
for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power,
the President. Section 1 of EO 464 is valid. Under Section 22 of
Article VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. However, Section 1 cannot be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary. Section 2b is invalid because it enumerates

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persons. Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to

specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
Belgica (G.R. 208566, 2013)
Facts: In this case, several concerned persons demanded that the PDAF
be annulled since it was unconstitutional and the most likely source
of the congressmen's kickbacks. The petition was unfortunately
rejected because there was "no relevant evidentiary support that
illegal misuse of PDAF has been a common exercise of unscrupulous
members of the congress." The allegations that "the government has
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel" were the focus of the
National Bureau of Investigation's investigation into the Napoles
scandal, which was followed by criminal investigations. After these
investigations were launched, the Commission on Audit released its own
findings of a three-year audit covering the legislators' PDAF from
2007 to 2009. Moreover, the total releases amounting to billions of
pesos spurred several petitions to be lodged before the SC to declare
the “Pork Barrel System” as unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the constitutional provision on the
nondelegability of legislative power?
Ruling: Yes. the Court held that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
“No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which
they can dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in the Bengzon case and given that the 2013
PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,

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keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,

the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
Araullo v Abad (G.R. 209287)
Facts: In this case, Secretary Florencio Abad responded to Senator
Jinggoy Estrada's admission that some senators, including himself, had
received millions as a perk for supporting the chief justice's
impeachment by stating in a statement that the money released to the
senators had been a part of the DAP, a program created by the DBM to
hasten economic expansion. The DBM also highlighted the legal
justifications for the DAP's use of savings, noting that these savings
came from both government-generated savings and unprogrammed money.
Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates Section 29, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”?
Ruling: No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of
the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to
the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage
under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to
implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing
more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Appropriation is the act
by which Congress designates a particular fund or sets apart a
specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public
treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense. In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money
may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law
refers to “the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues
from the State to its creditors.” The President, in keeping with his
duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during
the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did
not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had
been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through
the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power

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vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the

Constitution.
Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty [LAMP] v. The Secretary of Budget
and Management, G.R. No. 164987, Apr. 24, 2012
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358

Facts: Jean Arnault filed this habeas corpus suit against Balagtas,
the director of prisons. In accordance with a Senate resolution
finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to reveal the identity of a
person with whom he conducted business in connection with a government
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong properties, Arnault was
imprisoned. The related case Arnaultvs. details Arnault's detention
circumstances. Nazareno (1950), which upheld the legislature's
authority to declare someone in contempt if they disobey or refuse to
follow a court's order during a legislative investigation. Arnault
eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in
relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry,
the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations,
adopted Resolution No. 114.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the
Senate?
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure?
Ruling:
1. No. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review
the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate
in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to
fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of
P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially
charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the
Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI
on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and
held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate

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in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. There is an

inherent fundamental error during action that the lower court
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings
of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of
legislation or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in
what is known as the legislative process. The Judicial department has
no right or power or authority to do this, in the same manner that the
legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of
the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would
be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of
powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when
judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a
violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an
arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
2. Yes. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate
him as a punitive measure. Although the resolution studiously avoids
saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to
coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident
that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly
punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the
resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. The
legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered
implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body
obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended
legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of
its power and authority? The legislative department should not be
constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal,
every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant
and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to
judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming
within the reach of constitutional limitations. The judgment appealed
from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court
allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the
petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the
respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.
Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)

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Facts: The case revolved around the topic of Republic Act No. 10354 or
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012,
famously known as the RH Law. This law aims to inform and give free
access to every person in the country about contraception, women’s
health, population control, and the like. However, it was challenged
by different groups as, according to them, it violated various
constitutional rights (such as the rights to life, health, freedom of
religion and speech, and privacy). In this regard, through an order,
the Supreme Court prevented the law from going into effect pending a
final judgment.
Issue: Whether or not Whether the RH law is unconstitutional, with
regards to the Delegation of Authority to the FDA?
Ruling: NO. The RH Law is not unconstitutional with regards to the
delegation of authority to the FDA. The Court ruled that FDA does not
only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so.
Health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health products.”
Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety
of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant
to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to
the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the
declared policy of the RH Law, Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and
the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Facts:

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Issue:
Ruling:

Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

Facts: In this case, 22 senators-elect from the LABAN coalition who
were up for election in the 1987 congressional elections, and
petitioners filed a challenge with respondent SET. The senators
attacked now occurred to be every member of the SET's legislative
branch. Later, petitioners submitted a Motion for the Disqualification
or Inhibition of All Senators-Members thereof to SET because they are
all respondents and therefore interested parties. Thus, this petition
after SET rejected the motion. Petitioners contend that SET engaged in
a serious abuse of discretion, and they propose amending the
Tribunal's rules to allow the contest to be decided by only three
members of the Tribunal considering public policy concerns, fair play
standards, and due process laws.
Issue: Whether or not the Senators-members be disqualified?
Ruling: No. The Court held that SET must continue taking cognizance of
the case with its current Senators-members. Here is a situation which
precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues without inviting the same objections to
the substitute’s competence. However, the amendment proposed would, in
the context of the situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only 3 Members, all Justices of this Court, who would remain whose
disqualification is not sought. It is unmistakable that the
“legislative component” [of the SET] cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contest without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. Thus, the
proposed mass disqualification/inhibition, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Electoral Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a
duty that no other court or body can perform. This, to the Court’s
mind, is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to
perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. The charge that SET gravely abused its discretion in its
denial of the petition for [mass] disqualification/inhibition must
therefore fail.
Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732

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Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

Velasco v Belmonte, G.R. 211140 (2016)

Facts: A petition for mandamus was submitted by Lord Allan Jay Velasco
against Hon. To administer Velasco's oath in the House of
Representatives and to substitute Velasco's name for Regina Ongsiako
Reyes in the roll of members of the House of Representatives,
respectively, Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. and Secretary General
Marilyn Barua-Yap were given orders. Reyes' certificate of candidacy
was revoked by a Comelec ruling prior to the filing of this petition
because she did not meet the citizenship criterion to be eligible to
run for the position of Marinduque's representative in the House of
Representatives. Reyes subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court,
challenging Comelec's authority to determine her eligibility to serve
as a member of the House of Representatives. The Comelec is authorized
to inquire over Reyes' qualifications because the Supreme Court
decided against her and declared that her certificate of candidacy had
been properly revoked, therefore there was no basis for its
proclamation in the House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not Speaker Belmonte and Sec Gen Yap can be
compelled by mandamus?

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Ruling: Yes. The Court said that a petition for mandamus will prosper
if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty,
and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof. The decision of the Comelec which
attained finality, and that of the Supreme Court, made the
administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of Reyes’ name in the
roll of members of House of Representatives, a ministerial duty. The
administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or
judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec Gen Yap. They
are legally bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of
the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in
view of the ruling rendered by SC and the Comelec’s ruling, now both
final and executory.
Ty-Delgado v HRET G.R. 219603 (2016)
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

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