Consti Digests Done Table

CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
A. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

I. COMPOSITION, QUALIFICATIONS AND TERM OF OFFICE
Powell v McCormack, 395 US

486……………………………………………………………………………………………………………6
Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1 (2009)
………………………………………………………………………
Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)
………………………………………………………………………………
Alaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
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Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
……………………………………………………………………………………………
Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)
……………………………………………………………………………………
Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013)
………………………………
Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
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Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)
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Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
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Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR
203766…………………………………………………………………………………………………
Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA
786(2013)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015…………………………………………………………………………………
Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)
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Akbayan v HRET, 612 SCRA 375 (2010)
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Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)
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Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 612 SCRA 375,
11 February
2010………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
II. ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE
Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)

…………………………………………………………………………………
Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
………………………………………………………………………………………………
Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924)
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De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)
………………………………………………………………………………………
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III. PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875
Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
IV. POWERS AND LIMITATIONS ON POWERS
Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003

Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008
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Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

Arnault v Nazareno, G.R. L-3820
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19,
2012
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (549 SCRA
77 AND 564 SCRA 152
Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)
Belgica (G.R. 208566, 2013)
Araullo v Abad (G.R. 209287)
Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty [LAMP] v. The Secretary of Budget
and Management, G.R. No. 164987, Apr. 24, 2012,
Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358
Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
V. NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS AND SPECIAL BODIES
Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732
Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)
Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)
Velasco v Belmonte, G.R. 211140 (2016)
Ty-Delgado v HRET G.R. 219603 (2016)
B. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

I. THE PRESIDENT
Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)

Estrada v Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738 (2001)
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Makalintal vs PET 635 SCRA 783 and 651 SCRA 239

Pormento v Estrada, 629 SCRA 530 (2010)
II. POWERS AND LIMITATIONS
Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)

Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760
Saguisag v Ochoa, G.R. 212426 (2016)
Funa v Ermita, 612 SCRA 308 (2010)
Funa v Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013
De Castro v JBC, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)
Velicaria-Garafil v O.P. GR 203372, Jun 16, 2015
Manalo v Sistosa, GR 107369 (1999)
Hontiveros-Baraquel v Toll Regulatory Board, GR 181293, Feb 23, 2015
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al.
v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
Kulayan v Tan, 675 SCRA 482 (2012)
Ampatuan v Puno, 651 SCRA 228 (2011)
Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo 668 SCRA 504 (2012)
Lagman v Medialdea, GR 231658, Jul 4, 2017
Monsanto v Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190 (1989)
Risos-Vidal v Comelec, 747 SCRA 210 (2015)
Saguisag v Ochoa, Jr. GR 212426 and 212444, Jan 12, 2016
Bayan v Executive Secretary, GR 138570, Oct 10, 2000
Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission, GR 192935 (2010)
C. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

I. APPOINTMENTS
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Chavez v JBC, 676 SCRA 579 (2012 and 696 SCRA 496 (2013)
Jardeleza v Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 (2014) and Resolution, GR 213181, Jan
21, 2015
Villanueva v JBC, GR 211833, Apr 7, 2015
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Re: COA Opinion on the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased for
the retired Chief/Associate Justices of SC, 678 SCRA 1 (2012)
Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule 111, RA
10154 requiring government employees to secure a clearance of
pendency/non-pendency of cases from CSC, 706 SCRA 502 (2013)
Re: Save the SC Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement v
Abolition of Judiciary development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal
Autonomy UDK-15143, Jan 21, 2015
Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the GSIS from payment
of legal fees, 612 SCRA 193 (2010)
Pimentel v LEB, G.R. No.230642, September 10, 2019
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Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486

Facts: Petitioner Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was asked to step aside
from his seat in the House after the investigation reporting his
prohibited acts that were not part of his job as a chairman anymore.
Following some discussion, the House passed House Resolution No. 1,
directing the Speaker to form a Select Committee to evaluate Powell's
eligibility, by a vote of 363 to 65. Powell was not allowed to take
office until the House acted on the Select Committee's report,
although the resolution did stipulate that he would be paid all member
salaries and allowances during that time. The committee conducted
three hearings to gather information on Powell’s case. According to
the Committee's recommendation, Powell should be sworn in and assigned
to a seat in the 90th Congress, but he should also face censure by the
House, a $40,000 fine, and loss of seniority. Moreover, the House
approved House Resolution No. 278 in its revised form, eliminating
Powell and ordering the Speaker to inform the Governor of New York
that the position was vacant. As a result, Powell and thirteen voters
from New York's 18th Congressional District filed this lawsuit in the
US District Court for the District of Columbia. In accordance with the
lawsuit, House Resolution No. 278 was in violation of Art. I, 2, cl.
1, as the resolution went against the requirement that House members
be chosen by the citizens of each State, and Art. The petitioners
claimed that I, 2, cl. 2, lays out the exclusive requirements for
membership.
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Issues:
Whether or not the House of Representatives exclude a duly elected
member if the member has satisfied the standing requirements of age,
citizenship and residence as articulated in Article I Section 2 of the
U.S. Constitution?
Whether or not the House have a textual commitment in the constitution
to determine the qualifications of its members?
Ruling:
No. The Court stated that the goal of the actions taken against Powell
was to keep him out of the chamber, not to remove him. It is crucial
to understand this distinction since, as stated in Article I, Section
5, the House can remove members. But the goal of the procedures in
this instance was not expulsion. Chief Justice Warren concluded that
the House lacked the authority to exclude Powell because he had been
duly elected by his constituents and satisfied the constitutional
qualifications for House membership after reviewing the Framers'
discussions on the matter.
Members of Congress, including Speaker of the House John W. McCormack,
were among the Defendants-Respondents. They contended that the House
has extensive authority to ascertain membership criteria under Article
I, Section 5 of the Constitution. The plaintiff asserted, and the
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) agreed, that the
Constitution's limitations on qualifications stem from the
ratification discussions and the historical context of the framers.
The Supreme Court also points out that by holding otherwise, the
framers' choice to require a two-thirds majority vote for expulsion
would be invalidated.
Facts: In this case, Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint
against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago regarding the speech the
latter delivered on the Senate floor. On the other hand, Senator
Santiago did not deny making those statements. However, she invoked
parliamentary immunity contending that it was delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue: Whether or not Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary
action?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is
not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. The immunity she claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
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provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall,

in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." The
Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere
with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.
The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.
Aquino III v Comelec, 617 SCRA 623 (2010)
Facts: This tackles the case of the four legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur, wherein each district has populations of
over 250,000 thousand. In this regard, there was a law reapportioning
the composition of the first and second legislative districts in the
province of Camarines sur and thereby creating a new legislative
district from such reapportionment or the Republic Act 9716. Pursuant
to this law, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured to create an additional legislative district for the
province, which resulted in a decrease in the population of the first
district to 176,383. Petitioners then argued that RA 9716 is
unconstitutional contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a minimum population
of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. Accordingly,
petitioners contend the reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the
first district of Camarines Sur with less than 250,000 in population.
In respondents’ defense, they contended that the 250,000-population
requirement applies only to the creation of legislative districts in a
city, and not in provinces.
Issue: Whether or not the population of 250k an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province?
Ruling: No. In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995), the Court
clarified that while Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution requires a
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city to have a minimum population of 250k to be entitled to a

representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250k to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why
the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts
in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250k to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Aldaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
Facts: This case revolves around the topic of Republic Act 9591 which
was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. The
Congress relied on the Certification of Alberto Miranda, Region III
Director, of the NSO, projecting that Malolos City's population in
2010 will reach more than 250,000 to satisfy the constitutional
threshold as established by Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
congress also employed the 2007 Census of Population Progress
Enumeration Report and Certification of the City of Malolos Water
District, both dated July 31, 2008, and August 22, 2008. The Comelec
maintains that these population indicators are reliable and
authoritative, and hence cannot be challenged in court.
Issue: Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to
judicial review?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that if laws creating legislative
districts are unquestionably within the ambit of its judicial review,
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfil
this obligation, the Court must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with
the constitutional limitation. It is well settled that the passage of
apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. To
deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to
contend that the Court has no power to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
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Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the

Constitution.
Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
Facts: As illustrated in this case, Angel Naval was elected and served
as a member of Sanggunian, Second from 2004 to 2010. Camarines Sur
district. RA 9716 was passed sometime in 2009, reapportioning the
legislative districts of Camarines was passed. Eight of the ten towns
were selected from Camarines Sur's second district. to establish a
third district. The second district included the remaining two towns
as well as the Gainza and Milaor are from the first district. Naval
campaigned and won as a Democrat in the 2010 elections. Sanggunian
from the third district. She ran again in 2013 and was re-elected to
the same position. position. When Naval's election was called into
question because to the three-term limit, she said that she was merely
there to help.
Issue: Whether Naval’s election for the year 2013 is valid?
Ruling: No. The Court held that RA 9716 created a new second district
for Camarines Sur, but it merely renamed the third district which
elected Naval into the position. Therefore, she was elected by the
same inhabitants in the same territorial jurisdiction. The three-term
limit rule provided by the Constitution is inflexible. The rule
answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in
the hands of the few, while at the same time giving to the people the
freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be
called statesmen.
Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

Facts: This case discusses when Cagayan de Oro previously had only one
legislative district. However, its Congressman Constantino Jaraula
backed legislation in 2006 to create two legislative districts in CdO
instead. Because the statute (RA 9371) was passed, two legislative
districts were established. Rogelio Bagabuyo challenged the law's
constitutionality, and he promptly petitioned the Supreme Court to
prevent the COMELEC from applying the law in the next elections.
Bagabuyo claimed that the 2nd district was established without a
plebiscite, as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in this case?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that a plebiscite is not required in this
case. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod
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pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the

criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government
unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative
districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013)
Facts: Petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes was elected and sworn in as
Marinduque's representative. However, prior to the elections, COMELEC
revoked her certificate of candidacy due to ineligibility. She was not
eligible to run for the seat because she was not a Filipino citizen.
Regina was opposed to the Comelec's jurisdiction claiming that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has exclusive
jurisdiction over her qualifications.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction to investigate
Regina’s qualifications as representative of Marinduque?
Ruling: No. The Court held that HRET's constitutional jurisdiction
extends to the qualification of its members, who are appointed only
after a constitutionally and legally based declaration. HRET has sole
and exclusive authority over the qualifications of its members.
However, Regina's proclamation is no longer legal because, before to
the elections, the Comelec's decision to annul her certificate of
candidacy became final. As a result, there is no foundation for her
proclamation, hence she was not elected to the House of
Representatives.
Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
Facts: This case revolves around the May 2007 elections wherein
petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list
representatives provided by the Constitution. The latter, sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections. In proclaiming the winners and
apportioning their seats, the Comelec considered the following rules:
(1) In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative
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districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list

representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); (2) Pursuant
to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list
elections shall be entitled to one seat; (3) If a party-list garners
at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least
6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6
rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation
Party vs Comelec; (4) In no way shall a party be given more than three
seats even if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-
list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). Moreover, the COMELEC
declared the BANAT’s petition moot and academic and declared further
that the total number of seats of each winning party-list will be
resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before
the Supreme Court assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Sec 5(2), Art VI of the Const. mandatory?
(2) Whether or not the three-seat limit provided in Sec 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
(3) Whether or not the 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to
congressional seats prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
(4) Whether or not major political parties participate in the party-
list elections?
Ruling:
(1) No. The court ruled that 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in Sec 5(1) of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress.
(2) Yes. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats

that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, is a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections.
(3) The court held that as to the guaranteed seats, yes; but, as to
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the additional seats, no. The 2% threshold vote for additional seats
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. It
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec
5(2), Art VI of the Const. and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”
(4) No. By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue to disallow

major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Notably however, neither the
Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibit major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers
of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)

Facts: In this case, there is a political party called “Ang Ladlad”,
which is composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays bisexuals or transgendered individuals. In 2006, they
applied for registration with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as
a party-list organization under the RA 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a law that mandates the state to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system. The COMELEC denied the
application twice contending that accrediting Ang Ladlad would expose
our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of
our faith and cited the following grounds: (1) they tolerate sexual
immorality, citing provisions of the Bible and the Koran; (2) they
collide with Articles 695, 1306, and 1409 of the Civil Code, and
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code; and (3) that the LGBT sector is
not enumerated in the Constitution and in the Party-List System Act.
In Ang Ladlad’s defense, they claimed their compliance with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC and argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity. Ang Ladlad then appealed
the COMELEC’s decision to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation be
denied?
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Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Ang Ladlad complied with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors [in the Constitution and RA
7941] is not exclusive. Taking note of the size of the LGBT sector and
the extensive affiliation of Ang Ladlad, the Court ruled that Ang
Ladlad sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. It was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Morality referred to in
the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious. Otherwise,
if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
compel the non-believers to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, the government would thereby tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. On the other hand, COMELEC
has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. COMELEC’s reference to
purported violations of our penal and civil laws is flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. The remedies for which are a prosecution under
the RPC or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings [and not denial of accreditation]. In ruling for
the accreditation Ang Ladlad, the Court further cited the equal
protection clause, the guarantees of freedom of expression and
association, and our international obligation to protect and promote
human rights.
Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
Facts: In this case, Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) filed its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 Elections
with the Commission on Elections they also filed its Certificate of
Nomination along with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.
On the other hand, the COMELEC published Resolution No. 8807, which
established the procedures for petitions to disqualify a party-list
nominee for the May 10, 2010 elections. certiorari petitioners Liza L.
Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, and Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by
Teodoro Casi, filed a petition for disqualification against Arroyo
with the COMELEC in accordance with Resolution No. 8696, in relation
to Sections 2 and 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List
System Act). The certiorari petitioners argued that not only must the
party-list organization factually and truly represent the marginalized
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and underrepresented; the nominee must also be a Filipino citizen

belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, citing the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC. The certiorari petitioners decided that Arroyo
cannot be regarded a member of the underprivileged and
underrepresented sector, particularly the sector that the AGPP
represents, tricycle drivers and security guards, because he is not
simply a member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent
member of the House of Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses
Energy Committee; and, (c) a member of key committees in the House,
namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources, Ethics
and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security, Public Works
and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means. Moreover, petitioners
Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (mandamus petitioners) sent
a letter to the COMELEC Law Department requesting a copy of the
documentary evidence submitted by AGPP in accordance with Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8807. Thereafter, the COMELEC Law Department responded
that the AGPP had not yet submitted any documentary evidence required
by Resolution No. 8807. The mandamus petitioners asked the COMELEC and
its Law Department to act in accordance with Section 10 of Resolution
No. 8807 and declare AGPP nominees disqualified for failing to comply
with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807. Section 6 of the Resolution
requires the party-list group and the nominees to submit documentary
evidence proving that the nominees belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, as well as the sectoral party,
organization, political party, or coalition that they wish to
represent. It further states that the COMELEC Law Department will
require party-list groups and nominees to submit the necessary
documentation. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Arroyo's
petitions for disqualification in its Joint Resolution. It pointed out
that Section 9 of RA 7941 only required the nominee to be "a bona fide
member [of the party or organization for which he seeks to represent]
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the elections." The
petitioners filed their Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction with the Supreme Court. They sought to compel the COMELEC
to disqualify the AGPP nominees on the basis of their failure to
comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, as well as to stop the
COMELEC from granting the AGPP due course in the May 10, 2010
elections. Additionally, the certiorari petitioners petitioned the
Supreme Court in two (2) separate certiorari petitions to annul the
COMELEC Second Division's May 7, 2010 joint resolution and the COMELEC
en banc's July 19, 2010 consolidated resolution that dismissed their
petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPPs nominee. In the
meanwhile, AGPP received the required proportion of votes in the May
10, 2010 elections to secure a single seat. As AGPP's first nominee,
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Arroyo was granted a seat in the House of Representatives. Thus, the

COMELEC, acting as the National Board of Canvassers, declared Arroyo
to be the AGPP's validly elected party-list representative in the
House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs nominee after his proclamation and
assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives?
Ruling: Yes. The court said that consistent judicial holding is that
the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-
list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they
are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their
party. Hence, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications end sand the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that
the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule
upon Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766
Facts: In this case, to overturn several Comelec resolutions
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list contest, 52 party-list
groupings and organizations filed separate petitions with the Supreme
Court. In its contested resolutions issued in October, November, and
December of 2012, the Comelec determined, among other things, that
these party-list parties and organizations failed to represent a
marginalized and disenfranchised population. Their nominations were
not from a marginalized or underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups were not authentically reflective of the
sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the May 2013 party-
list election?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that COMELEC merely followed the
guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
cases were remanded back to the COMELEC because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court. In
determining who may participate in the party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
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1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

(1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented sector.”
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
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Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. V. Comelec, 201

SCRA 786 (2013)
Facts: The SENIOR CITIZENS nominees signed an agreement named
"Irrevocable Covenant" in May 2010 that lists their candidates and
specifies how their authority will be divided. It included a decision
of which candidate will fulfil the terms outlined in the power sharing
agreement. Due to the term-sharing arrangement, Kho's time serving as
a member of the HR was shortened to 1 year and 6 months. As a result,
Kho submitted his resignation, which will take effect on December 31,
2011. In the meanwhile, on February 21, 2012, COMELEC Resolution was
published. Section 7 Rule 4 thereof stated that vacancies caused by
term sharing agreements among Nominees from winning party-list
organizations or groups are prohibited. the 12th of March 2012, the
Kho's resignation from the SENIOR CITIZENS Board of Trustees was
recalled, and he was given permission to represent the party-list
indefinitely. COMELEC decided to CANCEL the registration of the
candidate despite the recall of resignation because it regarded the
term sharing agreement to be against public policy.
Under the Party-List System of Representation, SENIOR CITIZENS.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of
its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that there was no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of
non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-
sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto,
it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily the COMELEC En Banc imposed penalties.
As a matter of fact, how can SENIOR CITIZENS disobey when their
nominees didn't follow through on their commitment? There was
therefore no apparent breach of any election law, rule, or regulation.
Therefore, it is evident that SENIOR CITIZENS has been disqualified
and that its registration and accreditation have been revoked without
any legal justification.
Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015
Facts: Isidro Lico, the first nominee, took the oath of office after
Comelec declared Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list
organizations. Prior to being named one of the successful party-list
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organizations, Ating Koop released a Resolution that contained a term-

sharing agreement that its nominees had signed. The three-year term
stipulated that petitioner Lico would hold the position of Party-list
Representative for the first year. Then when held its Second National
Convention, it introduced amendments which would short the three-year
term of the incumbent members then was replaced by the Rimas group.
Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, a petition
was filed expelling him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from
allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee
cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as
factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under
Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. Comelec Second Division
upheld the expulsion of petitioner while Comelec en banc dismissed the
petition holding that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico
from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from
Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the petition. However, it upheld the
validity of his expulsion.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
Member of the House of Representatives from his party-list
organization?
Ruling: No. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the
HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of
members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In
this case, the Comelec proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list
group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the
House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the Comelec,
that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)

Facts: The registration of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list organization
was revoked by Comelec. It was noted that ABANG LINGKOD has not
demonstrated a history of advancing the cause of the weak and
oppressed, and
underrepresented; that it just provided images of some purported
activities it engaged in following the May 2010 elections. It further
asserted that ABANG LINGKOD had failed to demonstrate that any of its
nominees were themselves underrepresented and marginalized, or that
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they had participated in initiatives to better the situation of the

groups they purportedly represented.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system
for the latter’s failure to prove its track record?
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that contrary to the Comelec's claim,
sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of
the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented
by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent. There is thus no basis in law and
established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration
under the party-list system still comply with the track record
requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that
groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show
their track record as a group.
Akbayan v HRET, 612 SCRA 375 (2010)
Facts: The first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list, which was
elected to the House of Representatives in the 2007 elections, is
Daryl Grace J. Abayon. In opposition to Abayon, respondents filed a
quo warranto petition with respondent HRET. Because Aangat Tayo is the
wife of an incumbent representative for a congressional district, she
does not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
according to their argument that she is ineligible for a party-list
seat in the House of Representatives. Instead of Abayon, who was
merely its nominee, Aangat Tayo was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives. According to Abayon, any inquiries over her
qualification as the initial nominee were internal worries of Aangat
Tayo.
Issue: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the
question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
Ruling: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for
in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes
a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, identifies who the “members” of that House are: Sec. 5.
(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
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the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a

uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the
HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By
analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against
Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.
Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)
Facts: In this case, there is a petitioner who was a resident of
Concepcion, Tarlac for over 50 years and it is also stated in his
birth certificate Concepcion, Tarlac is the birthplace of both his
parents. For the 1992 congressional elections, he indicated in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac
for 52 years. For the 1995 elections, he also ran for the Congress
representing the new 2nd district of Makati City. He stated in his
Certificate of Candidacy that he has resided “in the constituency
where” he sought “to be elected” for only “10 months.” However, he has
just transferred to a leased condominium in Makati from his residence
in Tarlac. On the other hand, private respondents filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that he lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman mandated in Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution. After such petition, petitioner amended
his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating there that he has been a
resident in said place for 1 year and 13 days. Meanwhile, elections
were held, and he garnered the highest number of votes. However,
COMELEC, acting on the private respondents’ petition, suspended his
proclamation permanently.
Issue: Did Aquino satisfy the constitutional residence requirement in
the 2nd district of Makati City as mandated by Art VI, Sec 6?
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Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that the essence of representation
is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district. Clearly, petitioner’s
domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac, and the same is not easily
lost. That coupled with the fact that he himself claims to have other
residences in Metro Manila and that he claims to be resident of the
condominium unit in Makati for only a short length of time “indicate
that” his “sole purpose in transferring his physical residence” is not
to acquire a new residence of domicile “but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the 2nd district of Makati City.” The
absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment
of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of
identification— sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement [of the
condominium unit in Makati (instead of buying one)] was effected all
belie his claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution.
Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 612 SCRA 375,
11 February 2010
Facts: In the 2007 elections, the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
and the Bantay party-list group, which both won seats in the House of
Representatives, first nominated Daryl Grace Abayon and Jovito
Palparan. Respondents contested the eligibility of Abayon, Palparan,
and their respective party-list organizations in two separate quo
warranto applications. Both Abayon and Palparan contested the HRET's
authority, arguing that the party-list, not them as its nominees, was
elected to the House of Representatives. On both petitions, the HRET
issued an order rejecting the petition against the party-list groups
on the grounds that the Party-List System Act gave the COMELEC
authority over the question of the party-list group's eligibility.
However, it upheld its authority about the issue of Abayon and
Palparan's qualifications.
Issue: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the
eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats
in the lower house of Congress?
Ruling: YES. The members of the House of Representatives are of two
kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts"
and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
This means that, from the Constitution’s point of view, it is the
party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. Once elected, both the district
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representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like

manner. Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are
"elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)
Facts: This case illustrates the time when the Senate held its
election of officers wherein Senator Fernan was declared duly elected
Senate President. Thereafter, the Senate failed to arrive at a
consensus on the matter of the Minority leader for which Senator Tatad
and Senator Guingona of the PRP and Lakas-NUCD-UMDP83 (both “minority”
parties, LAMP being the “majority”) respectively were being
considered. After 3 session days of debate on the issue, Senate
President Fernan formally recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader upon receiving information that all Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators
signed in agreement for the latter. Senators Santiago and Tatad of the
PRP instituted this present petition for quo warranto alleging that
Guingona had been usurping a position which, to them, rightfully
belongs to Tatad. They assert the definition of “majority” in Art VI,
sec 16(1) of the Constitution refers to a group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Sen. Pres. and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships, therefore those otherwise comprise the “minority.”
Accordingly, they are of the view that Guingona, having voted for
Fernan, belongs to the “majority.” In view thereof, they assert
Article VI, sec 16(1) has not been observed in the selection of the
Minority Leader.
Issue: Whether or not Guingona unlawfully usurp the position of
Minority Leader in the view that Art VI, sec 16(1) of the Constitution
was not observed?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that in dismissing the petition, the term
“majority” simply “means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total”. Art VI, sec 16(1) does not delineate who comprise
the “majority” much less the “minority”. Notably, the Constitution [in
Art VI, sec 16(1)] is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
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manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.

All that it says is that “each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred [to the House] xxx. In the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines xxx this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto.
Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts: The resolution was filed by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and
lists the charges against the Senate President Avelino and directing
an investigation into the matter. There were 24 senators in the
Senate; however, only 22 were present on the day of the session when
Senator Tañada was scheduled to deliver his one-hour privilege speech.
Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to assert his right to speak during
the session's opening remarks a speech, but Senator Avelino continued
to disregard him and declared that he would order the arrest of
everyone who spoke without first being acknowledged. Moreover, a
commotion started. A motion to adjourn was rejected. Then suddenly,
with only 12 senators remaining in the chamber, Avelino pounded his
gavel before exiting the chamber with his followers. The senators who
were still present continued the meeting (known as a "rump session")
and decided to appoint respondent Senator Cuenco as acting Senate
President after declaring the position of Senate President vacant.
Senator Avelino asks the court to remove respondent Senator Cuenco and
recognize him as the rightful Senate President in this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the rump session is a continuation of the morning
session?
(2) Whether or not the rump session was not a continuation of the
morning session, was there a quorum when Senator Avelino was ousted
and Senator Cuenca was elected as the Senate President?
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Court ruled that a minority of ten senators cannot stop a
resolution that had their unanimous support from being passed by the
other twelve senators by adjourning the chamber.
(2) Yes. In view of Senator Confesor’s absence from the country, for
all practical considerations, he may not participate in the Senate
deliberations. Therefore, an absolute majority of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum; that is, 12 senators in this case
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constitute a quorum. Even if the 12 did not constitute a quorum, they

could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members.
If one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt [that there is a
quorum] then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
since, at most, only 11 will side with Senator Avelino. It would be
most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of
the Senate.
Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924)
Facts: As discussed in this case, Senator Jose Alendrino (also the
Petitioner in this case) was appointed by the Governor-General to
represent the 12th denatorial district. Respondents are members of the
Philippine Senate including, among others, Manuel Quezon; Faustino
Aguilar, Senate Secretary; Bernabe Bustamante, Sgt. At Arms; and
Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Senate. However, the Philippine
Senate composed of the respondent senators adopted a resolution
depriving petitioner of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for a period of one year. The petitioner
claimed that the resolution previously mentioned is invalid and has no
impact at all. He asks the court to enjoin the respondents, issue a
temporary restraining order, declare the resolution null and unlawful,
and issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction. The respondents
were represented by the Attorney-General, who raised a challenge to
the court's jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction
annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine
Senate to reinstate him in his official position?
Ruling: No. The Court held that the writ will not lie from one branch
of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the
legislative body, its members, or officers, to compel the performance
of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore
pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have
exclusive control. It has been held that where a member has been
expelled by a legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective
of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement.
In Severino v. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros (prayer for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General
to call a special election as provided by law), the Court rules that
we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of
these islands, as the head of the executive department, in the
performance of any of his official acts.
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In State of Mississippi v. Andrew Johnson, President of the United

States (prayer to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson from executing
certain Acts of Congress), the US Supreme Court ruled that the
Congress is the Legislative Department; the President is the Executive
Department. Neither can be retrained in its action by the Judicial
Department, though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper
cases, subject to its cognizance. The US SC has no jurisdiction of a
bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us.
In French v. State of California (prayer for mandamus by duly elected
senators to compel the Senate of California to admit them as members),
the US SC ruled that the judicial department has no power to revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof.
No court has ever held, and no court will ever hold that it possesses
the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any
particular action. Also, if the Court does not have any authority to
control the Philippine Senate, it has likewise no authority to control
the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the
same.
However, the Constitution has purposely withheld from the Legislature
and the Governor-General the power to suspend an appointive member.
Suspend is not included in the terms “punish” for the Legislature
(Organic Act section 18) and “remove” for the Executive (Organic Act
sections 16, 17). This is because punishment by way of reprimand or
fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving
the constituency or representation. Expulsion, the same, while giving
the constituency the opportunity to elect anew. But suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded means by which to fill the vacancy.
De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)
Facts: In this case, a Criminal Case No. 18857 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan
Del Sur for violation of section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. In this
regard, there was a filed Motion to Suspend the Accused Pendente Lite
after the Congressman pleaded not guilty. The Sandiganbayan granted
the mentioned motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the
Congressman. However, the Speaker did not comply and as a result, the
Sandiganbayan then issued a Resolution requiring him to appear and
show the reason why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Through his counsel, the Speaker filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can
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only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to the

House Resolution No. 116. After this, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
Speaker in contempt of court.
Issue: Whether or not the Speaker was correct in invoking the
principle of Separation of Powers and claiming that he can only act as
may be dictated by the House as a body?
Ruling: In the case of Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled
that the principle of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. But the order of
suspension prescribed by such law is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. In
another case (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is
different in terms of nature and purpose. Thus, it is imposed not as a
penalty but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of
a valid information. The purpose is to prevent the accused public
officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts
of malfeasance while in office. The suspension or expulsion is a
House-imposed sanction against its members, and it is just a penalty
for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity. It is held that the
principle of separation of powers simply put to prevent one branch
from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Facts: In this case, Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint
against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago regarding the speech the
latter delivered on the Senate floor. On the other hand, Senator
Santiago did not deny making those statements. However, she invoked
parliamentary immunity contending that it was delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue: Whether or not Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary
action?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is
not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. The immunity she claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." The
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Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere
with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.
The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.
Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)
Facts: In this case, the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.
(PHILCONSA) filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General and
the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently
enjoin the mentioned individuals from authorizing or passing in audit
the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act 4134
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives. The budget
for 1965–1966 put into effect the raise in compensation for the
Speaker and House of Representatives members mandated by RA 4134,
which was only passed the year before in 1964. The petitioner claims
that its implementation violates Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution (which is now Section 10). The justification offered was
that the terms of the eight senators elected in 1963 who participated
in the adoption of RA 4134 would have ended on December 30, 1969,
while the terms of the House members who took part in the passage of
the same Act ended on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Whether or not Section 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution
requires not only the term of all the members of the House but also
that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully
expired before the increase becomes effective?
Ruling: The Court held that in establishing what might be termed a
waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same
sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between
them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the
provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators
and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form
and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to
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consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one

single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and
the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of
office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must
have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation
provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the
full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will
have expired.
Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
Facts: According to this case, Petitioner was re-elected to a third
term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not
entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term
by virtue of this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay.
He lost his next bid and filed for retirement claim. House of
Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved amount.
Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for
reconsideration was denied, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that to grant retirement gratuity to
members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed
on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their
term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in
effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by
the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875
Facts: In this case, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is detained in the federal prison while an appeal is
being processed over his conviction for statutory rape on two charges
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts. Despite having been found
guilty in the first instance of a non-bailable offense, the accused-
appellant filed this motion asking to be permitted to fully carry out
the responsibilities of a congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings.
Issue: Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in
general?
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Ruling: No. The Court ruled that immunity from arrest is not enjoyed
by one who has been convicted. Rape is punishable by more than six
years imprisonment; hence immunity from arrest cannot be invoked.
Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)

Facts: In the 1980 elections, petitioner Adaza and respondent Pacana
were chosen as governor and vice governor, respectively, with mandates
scheduled to end in 1986. Both candidates submitted their nominations
for the BP elections as Mambabatas Pambansa on March 27, 1984, and
Adaza won and was elected as MP. After the BP elections, Pacana
returned to his local government position and took the oath of office
as governor of Misamis Oriental. He began carrying out his
governorship duties in July 1984. With the argument that the
petitioner is still the rightful tenant of the governor's office and
will serve out his entire term until March 1986, the respondent is
being asked to resign from his position.
Issue: Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as a
Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of
both offices simultaneously?
Ruling: No. The Court held that a member cannot accept an incompatible
position unless he gives up or waives his congressional seat. The
intention of the provision is to stop a member from favoring another
branch of the government at the expense of the legislative. In other
words, because the offices of legislator and governor are
incompatible, the petitioner is unable to perform both duties.
Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
Facts: Several International Pipe Industries directors filed a quo
warranto complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC)
on May 25, 1979, disputing the results of the directors' election that
had taken place on May 15. They claimed that the votes had not been
correctly tabulated counted therein. At the SEC conferences,
Assemblyman Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for the
complainants, the elected directors protested arguing that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel before any
administrative body. Fernandez then inhibited himself from appearing
as counsel for the group and instead on May 31 filed an Urgent Motion
for Intervention for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a
legal owner of IPI shares with a legal interest in the matter in
litigation having bought 10 shares of stock from one of the directors
with the deed of sale signed on May 15 and notarized on May 30. The
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SEC Commissioner subsequently granted the motion allowing Fernandez to

intervene in the proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not Fernandez as a stockholder of IPI, can appear
and intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional
provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such
courts or bodies?
Ruling: No. It was held that by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel but
theoretically for the protection of hi ownership of hares in respect
of the matter in litigation. However, under the facts and
circumstances immediately preceding and following his purchase of the
shares, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
“appearance as counsel before an administrative body (SEC).”
Liban v Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
Facts: In this case, Richard Gordon while still a senator, won the
election for chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross. Then,
petitioners submitted a petition asking for the Senate to declare
Senator Gordon's seat to have been forfeited. They claim that by
accepting the PNRC Board of Governors presidency, he no longer
qualifies as a senator under Section 13, Art. The Constitution's
Article VI. Senator Gordon claimed in his Comment that the petition
was already blocked by prescription and that the petitioners lacked
standing to file what seemed to be a quo warranto action.
Additionally, he claimed that Section 13, Art. 1, does not apply to
the PNRC and that it is neither a government-owned nor controlled
organization. Since volunteering for the PNRC is neither an office nor
an employment, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in this
instance employment.
Issue: Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art.VI of the
Constitution?
Ruling: No. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private
individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to
membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65
years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing P35,
P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether
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residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Sec. 5 of the PNRC

Charter, as amended by P.D. No. 1264, provides that membership in the
PNRC shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines
regardless of citizenship. Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned,
privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC
is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003
Facts: In his petition, petitioner Macalintal asks that specific
provisions of R.A. The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Public
Law No. 9189, is unlawful. Since public funds will be used and
appropriated for the implementation of said law, the Court affirms the
petitioner's right to file the current petition, stating in essence
that the petitioner has presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people. He raised these following
arguments: (1) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and
party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-
President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4
of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
(2) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section)
to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall
promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?
(2) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections,
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Court ruled that Congress should not have allowed COMELEC
to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing
of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
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President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the
hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII
of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning
candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.
(2) No. It was held that by vesting itself with the powers to approve,
review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA
No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left
with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008

Facts: The passage of R.A. 9335 is what this case all about. It is a
law that improves the BIR and BOC's capacity for revenue generating
and collection. Using a system of rewards and penalties, this law
seeks to motivate bureau officials and staff to surpass their income
goals. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC were tasked to promulgate
and issue IRRs of R.A. 9335, which is to be approved by a
congressional oversight committee created for the purpose. The ABAKADA
GURO PARTY LIST, et al. invoke their rights as taxpayers in filing
this petition to challenge the validity of R.A. 9335, a tax reform
legislation. Among other contentions, they assail the creation of the
oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the committee’s creation permits legal participation in an otherwise
executive function.
Issue: Whether or not the creation of a congressional oversight
committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers as it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.
Ruling: Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies
to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce
have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statuteand are just as binding
as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have
the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
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calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In

exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of
RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
Facts: In this case, it was claimed that Benjamin Romualdez, his wife,
and the Marcoses benefited themselves unfairly and illegally at the
expense of the Filipino people. that they attained with the aid of
Ricardo Lopa and the Bengzon Law Office. After that, Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile made a speech under oath in which he claimed that Lopa
had taken control of several government-owned companies in violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The speech includes a
motion to investigate the problem. The Blue Ribbon Committee or the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers will be handling the
motion. Enrile then took advantage of the Senate's privilege hour and
insisted on having an investigation into the situation. Bengzon and
Lopa's argument was denied by the SBRC.
Issue: Whether or not the inquiry that Is sought by the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee should be granted?
Ruling: No. It was heled that the speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to investigate a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In
other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory,
particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa
Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really
“in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress.
Arnault v Nazareno, G.R. L-3820
Facts: In this case, the Buenavista and Tambobong estates purchases by
the government were the subject of a Senate investigation. The
apparent irregularity of the government paying Ernest Burt, a non-
resident American citizen, a total of Php1.5 million for his alleged
interest in the two estates, which only came to Php20,000.00 and which
he seemed to have forfeited anyway a long time ago, was an intriguing
question that the Senate sought to answer. The Senate investigated who
was to blame for the transaction and who gained from it at the expense
of the government. As a result, Arnault was charged with contempt of
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the Senate and committed to the care of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms

for detention until he responds to the inquiries. He thereafter filed
a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.
Issue: Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session?
Ruling: Yes. It was ruled that the Senate has the right to hold him in
contempt for a length of time after its legislative session has ended.
The Senate is a permanent body that continues to function even after
the regular dissolution of Congress or the House of Representatives.
The power of the Senate to penalize for contempt in situations where
it is constitutionally permissible to do so, such as the one at hand,
has no time limit.
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19,

2012
Facts: As tackled in this case, the Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a
government- sequestered organization in which the Republic of the
Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. For the period
from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), regularly received cash dividends from
POTC. Unfortunately, POTC suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004,
PHC sustained a P7-million loss attributable to its huge operating
expenses. By 2005, PHC’s operating expenses had ballooned
tremendously. Likewise, several PHC board members established
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a wholly owned PHC subsidiary
to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the appropriate
accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT. In view of the
losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect
its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the Congress,
introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors. Respondents,
Senate Committees, submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312,
where it noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the
management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the
respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the
PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was
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negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government’s

interests in the said corporations. Committee Report No. 312
recommended the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over
the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the
Privatization Management Office (PMO) under the Department of Finance
(DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC
and PHILCOMSAT.
Issue: Whether or not Committee Resolution No. 312 should be
nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having been
hastily approved by the respondent Senate?
Ruling: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides the Senate
or the House of Representative’s power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. The respondents Senate Committees’ power of inquiry
relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution. The Court explained that such conferral of the
legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in
this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all
powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The Senate
Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or more than jurisdiction when it submitted
Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to
conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be
faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution
was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to
these legislative inquiries has long been settled.
Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (549 SCRA
77 AND 564 SCRA 152
Facts: Respondent Senate Committees filed a motion for
reconsideration of the March 25, 2008, Decision of the Court in which
Romulo Neri was found in contempt for his unwillingness to respond to
three specific questions about the contentious ZTE-NBN deal. The court
ruled that the presidential communications privilege applies to the
communications that the three inquiries generated, hence the
respondents' contempt order was null and void. Respondents now argue
that the data gathered by the three questions is required for them to
carry out their legislative duties.
Issue: Whether respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three questions are critical to the
exercise of their functions?
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Ruling: No. The Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to

investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, the Court
cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed
privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness during a
legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent
Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient
of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as
a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by the
Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption
of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need
for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege. The
presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on
the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by
demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited
by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to
enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized
assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the
power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending
Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills
could not be determined without the said information sought by the
three (3) questions. The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3)
questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the
President. While it may be a worthy endeavour to investigate the
potential culpability of high government officials, including the
President, in each government transaction, it is simply not a task for
the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws,
not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our
Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role.
Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature
adjudicate or prosecute.
Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
Facts: In this case, a first-year law student at the University of
Sto. Thomas, passed away, allegedly because of hazing by the Aegis
Juris Fraternity. Senator Zubiri submitted SR No. 504, denouncing the
student’s passing and ordering the relevant Senate Committee to launch
an investigation in support of legislation that would hold those
responsible accountable. Moreover, Senator Aquino IV filed SR No. 510,
titled: " A Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to
Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of
Horacio Tomas Castillo III Allegedly Due to Hazing-Related
Activities.” The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs,
chaired by Senator Lacson, as well as the Senate Committee on Public
Safety and Security will conduct the inquiry. Invitations to the Joint
Public Hearing were extended to the petitioner and a number of other
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people by the Committees on Justice and Human Rights, Constitutional

Amendment, and Revision of Codes. Petitioner attended the senate
hearing. In the course of the proceedings, Senator Poe asked
petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity, but he
refused to answer the question and invoked his right against self-
incrimination. She manifested that petitioner's signature appeared on
the application for recognition of the AJ Fraternity and on the
organizational sheet, indicating that he was the president.
Petitioner, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination.
Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by
Senators Villanueva and Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled that the motion
was properly seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at arms was ordered
to place petitioner in detention after the committee hearing.
Thereafter, petitioner apologized for his earlier statement and moved
for the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of
the AJ Fraternity, but he was not aware as to who its president was
because, at that time, he was enrolled in another school. Senator
Villanueva repeated his question to petitioner but the latter, again,
invoked his right against self-incrimination. Thus, petitioner was
placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms.
Issue: Whether or not the period of detention under the senate's
inherent power of contempt is indefinite?
Ruling: The Court held that there is a genuine necessity to place a
limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by the
Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in
aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states
that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must
respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein.
Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-
preservation and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as
such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. Even arguendo
that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is
not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress
only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an
obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said
witness. It is when the restrictions during detention are arbitrary
and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. An indefinite
and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive
restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of
contempt is of utmost importance. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislations are intended to affect or change.
Thus, the Court must strike a balance between the interest of the
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Senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative

inquiries. The balancing of interest requires that the Court take a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation. These interests
usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms
on the one hand, and the government's promotion of fundamental public
interest or policy objectives on the other. The Court finds that the
period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power
is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process
may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of
investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject.
Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry,
then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly
exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes,
the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no
more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness. In fine, the
interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative
inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively
exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against
recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional
rights of the said witness. In addition, if the Congress decides to
extend the period of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a
witness beyond the duration of the legislative inquiry, then it may
file a criminal case under the existing statute or enact a new law to
increase the definite period of imprisonment.
Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)
Facts: This case involves the project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group. The
Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before the
Senate on September 29, 2005. On September 28, 2005, the President
issued EO464, effective immediately which, among others, mandated that
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government
shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Secretary
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not
yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
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Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the
investigation. Both faced court marshall for such attendance.
Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order 464 contravenes the power of
inquiry vested in Congress?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that Legislature’s power to conduct
inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
Section 21 of the Constitution. The power of inquiry in aid of
legislation is inherent in the power to legislate but there are
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the
rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government
to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way
for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power,
the President. Section 1 of EO 464 is valid. Under Section 22 of
Article VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. However, Section 1 cannot be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary. Section 2b is invalid because it enumerates
persons. Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
Belgica (G.R. 208566, 2013)
Facts: In this case, several concerned persons demanded that the PDAF
be annulled since it was unconstitutional and the most likely source
of the congressmen's kickbacks. The petition was unfortunately
rejected because there was "no relevant evidentiary support that
illegal misuse of PDAF has been a common exercise of unscrupulous
members of the congress." The allegations that "the government has
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel" were the focus of the
National Bureau of Investigation's investigation into the Napoles
scandal, which was followed by criminal investigations. After these
investigations were launched, the Commission on Audit released its own
findings of a three-year audit covering the legislators' PDAF from
2007 to 2009. Moreover, the total releases amounting to billions of
pesos spurred several petitions to be lodged before the SC to declare
the “Pork Barrel System” as unconstitutional.
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Issue: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the constitutional provision on the
nondelegability of legislative power?
Ruling: Yes. the Court held that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
“No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular Auditor held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which
they can dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in the Bengzon case and given that the 2013
PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
Araullo v Abad (G.R. 209287)
Facts: In this case, Secretary Florencio Abad responded to Senator
Jinggoy Estrada's admission that some senators, including himself, had
received millions as a perk for supporting the chief justice's
impeachment by stating in a statement that the money released to the
senators had been a part of the DAP, a program created by the DBM to
hasten economic expansion. The DBM also highlighted the legal
justifications for the DAP's use of savings, noting that these savings
came from both government-generated savings and unprogrammed money.
Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates Section 29, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”?
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Ruling: No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to

stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In the context of
the DAP’s adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to
the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage
under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to
implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing
more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Appropriation is the act
by which Congress designates a particular fund or sets apart a
specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public
treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense. In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money
may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law
refers to “the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues
from the State to its creditors.” The President, in keeping with his
duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during
the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation. The pooling of savings pursuant to the
DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did
not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had
been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through
the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty [LAMP] v. The Secretary of Budget
and Management, G.R. No. 164987, Apr. 24, 2012
Facts: Petitioners claim that because the General Appropriations Act
for 2004 (GAA of 2004) is silent, it forbids the direct or automated
distribution of lump funds to certain senators and congressmen in
order to fund projects. It does not give individual members of
Congress the authority to suggest, pick, and determine which projects
and programs should get funding from the PDAF. According to LAMP, this
circumstance violates the idea of the separation of powers because
Congressmen are effectively interfering with the executive branch by
accepting and using funding for projects of their choosing. Moreover,
legislation has no bearing on the right to suggest and choose
initiatives. "It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of
constitutional sanction," making it illegal and requiring no less than
misconduct to be assumed. RESPONDENT'S POSITION: LAMP's opinions about
the implementation of PDAF should not be based solely on rumors
propagated by the mainstream media denouncing the sins of pork barrel.
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On the other hand, the respondents argued that LAMP's opinions about
the implementation of PDAF should not be based solely on rumors
propagated by the mainstream media denouncing the sins of pork barrel.
Issue: Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of
Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
Ruling: No. In determining whether or not a statute is
unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of
validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the
nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear
and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case
of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality,
the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law]
based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not
only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.”
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof
was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of
funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support
that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot
indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is
outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to
recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The
list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with
the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This
demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation
laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in
establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and
thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of
a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the
budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the
Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358
Facts: Jean Arnault filed this habeas corpus suit against Balagtas,
the director of prisons. In accordance with a Senate resolution
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finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to reveal the identity of a

person with whom he conducted business in connection with a government
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong properties, Arnault was
imprisoned. The related case Arnaultvs. details Arnault's detention
circumstances. Nazareno (1950), which upheld the legislature's
authority to declare someone in contempt if they disobey or refuse to
follow a court's order during a legislative investigation. Arnault
eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in
relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry,
the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations,
adopted Resolution No. 114.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the
Senate?
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure?
Ruling:
1. No. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review
the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate
in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to
fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of
P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially
charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the
Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI
on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and
held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate
in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. There is an
inherent fundamental error during action that the lower court
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings
of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of
legislation or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in
what is known as the legislative process. The Judicial department has
no right or power or authority to do this, in the same manner that the
legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of
the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would
be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of
powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when
judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a
violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an
arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
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2. Yes. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate

him as a punitive measure. Although the resolution studiously avoids
saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to
coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident
that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly
punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the
resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. The
legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered
implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body
obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended
legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of
its power and authority? The legislative department should not be
constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal,
every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant
and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to
judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming
within the reach of constitutional limitations. The judgment appealed
from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court
allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the
petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the
respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.
Imbong v Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146 (2014)
Facts: The case revolved around the topic of Republic Act No. 10354 or
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012,
famously known as the RH Law. This law aims to inform and give free
access to every person in the country about contraception, women’s
health, population control, and the like. However, it was challenged
by different groups as, according to them, it violated various
constitutional rights (such as the rights to life, health, freedom of
religion and speech, and privacy). In this regard, through an order,
the Supreme Court prevented the law from going into effect pending a
final judgment.
Issue: Whether or not Whether the RH law is unconstitutional, with
regards to the Delegation of Authority to the FDA?
Ruling: NO. The RH Law is not unconstitutional with regards to the
delegation of authority to the FDA. The Court ruled that FDA does not
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only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so.
Health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health products.”
Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety
of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant
to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to
the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the
declared policy of the RH Law, Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and
the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Facts: In this case, a writ of mandamus is filed by petitioners
Lorenzo Tañada and others to compel Respondent Juan Tuvera, et al. to
publish a variety of executive orders, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation, and administrative
instructions issued by the President's office in the Official Gazette.
They refer to the people's right to information guaranteed by the
constitution as well as the idea that laws become enforceable once
they are published in the Official Gazette. The Respondent argued in
opposition to the petition that because the laws themselves set their
own effective dates, publication in the Official Gazette was not a
necessary condition for the legislation to become effective. In light
of the fact that Article 2 of the Civil Code stipulates that
legislation shall take force as well when otherwise provided, the in
question presidential issuances contain particular stipulations about
the date they are to go into effect. Thus, their effectiveness does
not depend on its publication in the Official Gazette.
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Issues:
Whether or not the publication in the Official Gazette is required in
order to for the presidential issuances to become valid and effective.
Whether or not non-publication shall render the presidential issuances
invalid and ineffective even though they have been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that even while the law specifies the date
of its effectiveness, Article 2 of the Civil Code does not negate the
need for publication in the Official Gazette. The Official Gazette is
where laws are published, according to Commonwealth Act 638. Without
such notice and publishing, the Latin proverb "ignoratia legis non
excusat" cannot be used, especially when the legislative process is
not open to the public. This makes such publication important.
Additionally, the Respondent is required by the phrase "shall" in
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 to uphold the right of the public to
know about matters of public concern. All presidential orders of a
public nature or with broad applicability must be published, as
required by law. Due process demands this kind of disclosure, meaning
that someone cannot be legally obligated until after he has been
formally and expressly informed of the text of the law.
No. The Court decided that carrying out or upholding presidential
directives before they are published in the Official Gazette is an
actual event that has implications and cannot be reasonably
disregarded. A fresh judicial ruling that an absolute retroactive
invalidity principle cannot be justified in its entirety cannot always
erase the past.
Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)
Facts: In this case, 22 senators-elect from the LABAN coalition who
were up for election in the 1987 congressional elections, and
petitioners filed a challenge with respondent SET. The senators
attacked now occurred to be every member of the SET's legislative
branch. Later, petitioners submitted a Motion for the Disqualification
or Inhibition of All Senators-Members thereof to SET because they are
all respondents and therefore interested parties. Thus, this petition
after SET rejected the motion. Petitioners contend that SET engaged in
a serious abuse of discretion, and they propose amending the
Tribunal's rules to allow the contest to be decided by only three
members of the Tribunal considering public policy concerns, fair play
standards, and due process laws.
Issue: Whether or not the Senators-members be disqualified?
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Ruling: No. The Court held that SET must continue taking cognizance of
the case with its current Senators-members. Here is a situation which
precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues without inviting the same objections to
the substitute’s competence. However, the amendment proposed would, in
the context of the situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only 3 Members, all Justices of this Court, who would remain whose
disqualification is not sought. It is unmistakable that the
“legislative component” [of the SET] cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contest without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. Thus, the
proposed mass disqualification/inhibition, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Electoral Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a
duty that no other court or body can perform. This, to the Court’s
mind, is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to
perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. The charge that SET gravely abused its discretion in its
denial of the petition for [mass] disqualification/inhibition must
therefore fail.
Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732
Facts: For the office of Representative for the 4th District of
Pampanga in the 1987 elections, respondent Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was declared winner over opponent
petitioner Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP). After the ballots
were revised, reexamined, and reappreciated, Bondoc filed a protest
with HRET and was declared the winner over Pineda. Rep. Camasura of
the LDP was one of the HRET members who voted in favor of Bondoc's
proclamation. Camasura was dismissed from the party after it was
determined that he had completely betrayed the LDP. At the LDP's
request, his election to the HRET was also revoked. The promulgation
of Bondoc as winner was then cancelled due to the consequent lack of
the required concurrence of five members of the Tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of
a political party, change that party’s representation in the HRET?
Ruling: No. The Electoral Tribunal was created to function as a
nonpartisan court. To be able to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction,
the tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction xxx is not to be
shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. They must
discharge their functions with complete xxx independence—even
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independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence

“disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline” are no valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Rep. Camasura for having cast a “conscience vote”, the House of Reps
committed a grave abuse of discretion violative of the Constitution
and thus the expulsion is null and void. To sanction such interference
by the House of Reps in the work of the HRET, would reduce the it to a
mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power.
Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)
Facts: In the Leyte 4th district representative election, the
petitioner received more votes than the respondent, Locsin. During the
disqualification lawsuit, the petitioner prevailed. Request for
suspension of petitioner's proclamation was made by respondent. The
Comelec ex parte order suspended the petitioner's proclamation. Later,
Comelec found that the petitioner had engaged in vote-solicitation,
and as a result, disqualified him. Locsin, the respondent, was
declared the winner. However, the decision was overturned on the
petitioner's application, and a new resolution found the respondent's
proclamation to be void. While petitioner affirmed his right to the
office he obtained, respondent publicly displayed his defiance and
disobedience to the ensuing resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction in the instant case.
Ruling: No. (a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en
banc. To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent
Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for
Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter. In Puzon vs. Cua,[110] even the HRET
ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been
made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal
that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of
the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately
applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC
pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC,
whether issued by a division or en banc; (b) The instant case does not
involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner
is to file a petition for quo warranto with the HRET. A petition for
quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.[111] In the case at
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bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue
that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office. A
petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has
been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest
number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of
such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the
subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections
to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent
nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is
the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell
petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto
proceeding.
Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)
Facts: Carlos Cunanan was appointed as acting Deputy Administrator of
the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, who claims to be a career employee with more than
thirty (30) years in the government service, as acting Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He then met the requirements and
took on the responsibilities of the position. He received an ad hoc
appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, from
the President on November 6, 1961. Said ad interim appointment was
denied by seven (7) members of the House of Representatives and six
(6) Senators acting in the capacity of the Commission on Appointments.
Without the permission of petitioner in this case, respondent Jorge
Tan, Jr., who was appointed by the President as acting deputy
administrator of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources'
Reforestation Administration executed the duties of said office.
Because the position of Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, was
not vacant when the petitioner was designated to it, the petitioner
filed a quo warranto action against the respondent shortly after.
Issue: Whether or not the rejection of petitioner's ad interim
appointment by the thirteen (13) members of Congress, purporting to
act as the Commission on Appointments, valid or not?
Ruling: It was ruled that the Congress has the authority to reorganize
the Commission of Appointment in any way it sees fit, considering the
proportionate representation of members of the Commission in relation
to their party affiliations. They refused the right of a third party
because of their reorganization, though. To address this, the Supreme
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Court declared the petitioner's reinstatement and commanded the

respondent to leave and hand over the in-question office.
Velasco v Belmonte, G.R. 211140 (2016)
Facts: A petition for mandamus was submitted by Lord Allan Jay Velasco
against Hon. To administer Velasco's oath in the House of
Representatives and to substitute Velasco's name for Regina Ongsiako
Reyes in the roll of members of the House of Representatives,
respectively, Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. and Secretary General
Marilyn Barua-Yap were given orders. Reyes' certificate of candidacy
was revoked by a Comelec ruling prior to the filing of this petition
because she did not meet the citizenship criterion to be eligible to
run for the position of Marinduque's representative in the House of
Representatives. Reyes subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court,
challenging Comelec's authority to determine her eligibility to serve
as a member of the House of Representatives. The Comelec is authorized
to inquire over Reyes' qualifications because the Supreme Court
decided against her and declared that her certificate of candidacy had
been properly revoked, therefore there was no basis for its
proclamation in the House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not Speaker Belmonte and Sec Gen Yap can be
compelled by mandamus?
Ruling: Yes. The Court said that a petition for mandamus will prosper
if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty,
and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof. The decision of the Comelec which
attained finality, and that of the Supreme Court, made the
administering of oath of Velasco, and removal of Reyes’ name in the
roll of members of House of Representatives, a ministerial duty. The
administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the
Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or
judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec Gen Yap. They
are legally bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of
the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in
view of the ruling rendered by SC and the Comelec’s ruling, now both
final and executory.
Ty-Delgado v HRET G.R. 219603 (2016)
Facts: In this case, the Supreme Court found Pichay guilty on four
counts of libel in September 2008. For the May 2013 elections, Pichay
submitted his certificate of candidacy in October 2012 for the
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position of member of the house of representatives for Surigao del

Sur's first district.
Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay before

COMELEC in February 2013 citing the conviction for libel, a crime of
moral turpitude, and the fact that the 5-year period prohibiting him
from running for office had not yet passed. In response, Pichay
claimed that the petition for disqualification was late and that libel
does not always require moral turpitude because the main basis for his
conviction was his assumed duty as the publisher's president. Pichay
was officially recognized as a lawfully elected member of the HR in
May 2013. Then Ty-Delgado submitted a quo warranto plea in ad cautelam
form to HRET, reiterating Pichay's eligibility. The petition for
disqualification was denied by COMELEC due to a lack of jurisdiction.
HRET determined that Pichay's libel conviction did not include moral
turpitude, but it did rule that it had jurisdiction over the current
quo warranto case.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET erred in its decision.
Ruling: We find merit in the petition. A sentence by final judgment
for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code: Sec. 12.
Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense
for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate
herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.7 Although not every
criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of
the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while
crimes mala prohibita do not.
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Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)
Facts: This case talks about the time in February 1986, when the
Aquino administration's top priority was to retrieve the mysterious or
illicitly acquired money that was allegedly accumulated by the late
President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, as well as their loved ones,
acquaintances, and business partners. Therefore, on February 28, 1986,
then-President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) No. 1, which
was the first EO issued by her after the Marcoses were overthrown. The
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was established and
given the mandate to support the President in "recovery of all ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover
or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship." This Court has deemed it appropriate to throw aside
formalities and technicalities that only serve to obstruct or delay a
fair and impartial conclusion in each of the PCGG's purportedly ill-
gotten money cases. This Court favors having the Sandiganbayan decide
such issues based only on the merits. However, the pursuit of
substantive justice for the Filipino people and all parties involved
should now be steadfast and unwavering, rather than just legalisms or
formal perfection. The government began its hunt for and return of
such ill-gotten wealth nearly twenty years ago. It is therefore past
time for these cases to be definitively resolved on the merits. Let the
evidence of any fraudulent activity, unlawful accumulation,
misappropriation, fraud, or unlawful acquisition be revealed right
away. Let the ownership of these monies and other assets be
ascertained and settled once and for all, without any needless delays
or vexing procedural detours.
Issue: Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and
inhibited acts as a president during his term of office.
Ruling: Yes. It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a)
in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial
either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in
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other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.

[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at
bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents,
respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently
take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions. The
sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of
respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth
could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand
E. Marcos as President could not receive any other emolument from the
Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84]
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source.[85] In fact, his management of
businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate
funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not,
during their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise
provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession,
participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business,
or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear
as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate
jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or
controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his
pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall
be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may
not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or
manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be
subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally
and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima
facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. Respondents argue that
petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential
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elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As

the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should
thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in
favor of respondent Marcoses. We hold that it was not for petitioner
to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because,
as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better
position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income.
And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should
have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as
petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known
lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in
determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of
the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of
those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of
proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent
Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to
file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to
successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would
reward them for their violation of the law.
Estrada v Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738 (2001)
Facts: It all started in October 2000 when Estrada was accused before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee of wrongdoings involving bribery,
illicit gambling, and other sorts of corruption. Estrada was impeached
by the Hor on November 13, 2000. The Senate started the impeachment
process on December 7, during which time more serious accusations of
graft and corruption against Estrada were made. The impeachment
process was only put to an end on January 16, 2001, when 11 senators
who supported the President were able to suppress evidence that was
detrimental to Estrada. Senate President Pimentel resigned after
voting against Estrada, and the impeachment process was rocked as a
result. The prosecution panel as a whole left. PNP and AFP likewise
stopped endorsing Estrada on January 19 and joined the throng at EDSA
Shrine. On May 14, 2001, Estrada demanded that a snap presidential
election be held in conjunction with local and congressional
elections. He went on to say he was not going to run in this election.
With the statement that Estrada had "constructively resigned his
post," the SC announced on January 20 that the presidency was vacant.
As the 14th President, Arroyo took the oath of office at noon in front
of the audience at EDSA. Later on, Estrada departed Malacañang Palace
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with his family. Following his collapse, Erap submitted a petition for
prohibition along with a prayer for WPI. It requested that the
respondent Ombudsman not take any more action in matters brought
against him until after his presidency has ended. Additionally, he
asked for a ruling that would "confirm Estrada as the legitimate and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines, temporarily
unable to carry out the duties of his office."
Issues:
Whether or not Estrada resigned as President.
Whether or not Arroyo is only an acting President.
Whether or not the President enjoys immunity from suit.
Ruling:
(1) Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts
of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the
Palace. Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President
Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation. SC
declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be
doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press
release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was
leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or
omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
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(2) The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its
support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination
of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83
declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the
Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability. The Court
therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In
fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
(3) The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of
the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.
Makalintal vs PET 635 SCRA 783 and 651 SCRA 239
Facts: In this case, Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a motion for

reconsideration regarding the previous ruling of the SC that found the
creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by the SC as
constitutional. In his motion, Macalintal contended that the creation
of the PET by the SC did not fall within the ambit of the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He also
contended that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power, and thus, its
members violate Section 12, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the creation of PET, with its own budget allocation, a
seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, violates Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution.
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Whether or not the PET performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Ruling:
(1) No. The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the
Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal. x x x x
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is
equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous
occasions. x x x x
The PET, as a constitutional body, is independent of the three

departments of government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary –
but not separate therefrom.
(2) PET performs judicial functions.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. x x x x
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to
the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial
power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided
in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. x x
x x
The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides
that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-
Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In
the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article
VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET,
from the same prohibition.
Pormento v Estrada, 629 SCRA 530 (2010)
Facts: In the elections held in May 1998, Estrada was chosen as the
Republic of the Philippines' next president. He ran for president
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once more in the May 2010 elections. Pormento filed a petition for
disqualification in opposition to Estrada's candidacy. Both his
petition and his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En Banc) were
dismissed by COMELEC (Division). Pormento then submitted the current
certiorari petition to the court. Meanwhile, Estrada managed to run
for president in the May 10, 2010 elections, finishing with the
second-highest total of votes.
Issue: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for
presidency in the May 2010 elections according to the phrase in the
Constitution which states that "the President shall not be eligible
for any re-election.
Ruling: Private respondent was not elected President the second time
he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the
phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second
(whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or
substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will
benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies.The Court is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules
of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents
a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the
proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May
10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of the elections, private respondent was not elected President
for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or
practical purpose.
Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)
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Facts: The Roppongi property, one of the four properties in Japan that
the Philippine government purchased under the terms of the Reparations
Agreement with Japan, is the subject property in this case. Through
Reparations Contract No. 300, the aforementioned property was
purchased from the Japanese government. It comprises of the building
and land used for the Philippine Embassy's Chancery. As planned, it
housed the Philippine Embassy until it was moved to Nampeidai because
to significant renovations needed for the Roppongi building. A
committee headed by President Aquino was established to investigate
the use and disposition of Philippine government properties in Tokyo
and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
Issue: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents,
have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
Ruling: The President is not authorized to transfer important
government real estate at their own discretion. A statute passed by
Congress must permit and approve any such conveyance. Legislative and
executive support are needed. It is accurate to say that the Roppongi
property's value stems more from its symbolic significance to all
Filipinos, both civilians and veterans, than from the exorbitant
prices that Tokyo real estate commands. The President and Congress
must agree on a policy decision regarding the ultimate sale of the
Roppongi and adjacent assets. The regulations pertaining to the
conversion and dispose of property under public dominion must be
strictly adhered to, given the significance and value of the
properties.
Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760
Facts: According to this case, only around three years after Pres.
Marcos was replaced by Aquino, who expressed on his deathbed his
desire to pass away in the Philippines. However, Pres. Aquino has
steadfastly defended his decision to forbid his and his family's
return to the country, citing the grave ramifications of doing so at a
time when the government's stability is under attack from many angles
and the economy is only now starting to grow and prosper. The Marcoses
are currently attempting to stop the Pres. Aquino's ruling, citing
their freedom of residence and freedom of movement as provided by the
constitution.
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Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the

constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
Ruling: Yes. It would not be accurate to state that “executive power”
is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Although the Constitution imposes limitations of the
exercise of specific powers* of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive
power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s
powers as protector of the peace. The President is also tasked with
xxx ensuring domestic tranquility xxx. The demand of the Marcoses to
be allowed to return to the Philippines xxx must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. There exists factual basis for the President’s
decision. The Court cannot xxx pretend the country is not besieged
from within xxx. xxx the catalytic effect of the return of the
Marcoses xxx may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would
break the camel’s back. With these before her, the President cannot be
said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously xxx in determining
that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. The Court voted
8-7. The Court enumerated the specific powers of the President: the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices,
the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under
the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign
loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements,
the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art VII, Secs 14-23] (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 689)
Saguisag v Ochoa, G.R. 212426 (2016)
Facts: In this case, a resolution addresses the motion for

reconsideration and aims to overturn the court's decision in Saguisag
et al. Executive Secretary in a case dated January 12, 2016.
Petitioners contend that this Court erred in holding that the US-
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Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was not a

treaty. Regarding this, petitioners move that the 1987 Constitution's
Section 25, Article XVIII, prohibits foreign military posts, troops,
and facilities; therefore, the EDCA must take the form of a treaty in
order to be enforceable. They also restate their positions regarding
taxes, nuclear weapons, and telecommunications. Evidently,
petitioners' dissatisfaction with the Decision that the EDCA
incorporates the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is the primary
justification for the Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioners
contend that the EDCA's provisions are not covered by the purportedly
narrow VFA and MDT provisions because allows for a more expansive
configuration than the VFA for military bases, personnel, and
facilities, and it the creation of US military installations.
Issue: Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
Ruling: The court ruled that petitioners detail their objections to
EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the
VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
(1) Agreed Locations; (2) Rotational presence of personnel; (3) U.S.
contractors; (4) Activities of U.S. contractors. We ruled in Saguisag,
et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these
provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject
matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a class
of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25
restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate
concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are
concluded. As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,
executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation
of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty; (2) pursuant to or upon
confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or (3) in the exercise of
the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior
constitutional or legislative authorizations.The special nature of an
executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international
agreements. International practice has accepted the use of various
forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from the
traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that
no longer necessitate ratification. An international agreement may
take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of
notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement,
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modus vivendi, or some other form. Consequently, under international

law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement
or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of
determining international rights and obligations. However, this
principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing
treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is
relegated to a mere riation in form, or that the constitutional
requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional
constitutional directive. There remain two very important features
that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them
into terms of art in the domestic setting. First, executive agreements
must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents
puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under
serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce
the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to
defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn,
executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that
are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they
purport to implement. Second, treaties are, by their very nature,
considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of
the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements,
which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the
same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a
later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An
executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that
are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless
subject to the supremacy of the Constitution. Subsequently, the
Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s
validity, in that as an executive agreement it fell within the
parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole
web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It
suffices to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA
deserves treaty status under the law. We find no reason for EDCA to be
declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal
regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the
government’s continued policy to enhance our military capability in
the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
Funa v Ermita, 612 SCRA 308 (2010)
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo named respondent Maria Elena

H. Bautista (Bautista) as the Department of Transportation and
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Communications' (DOTC) Undersecretary on October 4, 2006, replacing

Agustin R. Bengzon. On October 23, 2006, the agency selected Bautista
as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport with Special Order No.
2006171. After Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., the then-MARINA Administrator,
resigned, Bautista was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Office
of the Administrator, MARINA, while also serving as DOTC
Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging
the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
prescribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold
any other office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the
pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her duties and
responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
The petitioner contends that Bautista violates Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, as this Court has read and stated in Civil
Liberties, by holding concurrent posts as DOTC Undersecretary and
MARINA OIC. Citing Achacoso v. Macaraig as support, the petitioner
also argues that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC
of Marina was only meant to be transitory, such a designation must not
violate a standing constitutional restriction. Temporality is not
included as one (1) of the exceptions to Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. Temporary designations can last for months or
even years because there is no maximum period for them. Additionally,
the petitioner claims that the positions of MARINA Administrator and
DOTC Undersecretary are incompatible. Lastly, the petitioner argues
that it is quite likely that the challenge in this case will be
dismissed for lack of merit by simply rescinding the interim
appointment or designation.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s appointment as MARINA OIC is
valid.
Ruling: No. Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. On
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the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: Sec. 7.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. Thus, the Court ruled these
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his
official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other
public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members
of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President
and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said
class stricter prohibitions.
Funa v Agra, 691 SCRA 196 (2013)
Facts: Dennis Funa claimed that Alberto Agra was named as the Acting
President by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Secretary of Justice subsequent
to Agnes Devanadera's resignation. After four days, President
Concurrently, Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Solicitor General.
Two days later, Funa commenced this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was
unconstitutional and void for being in violation of Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution.
Ruling: It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting
or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13 plainly indicates that
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far
as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was
concerned.In this regard, to hold an officemeans to possess or to
occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the
office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section
13 itself, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to
all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for
it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe
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differently is to "open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of

an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the
Executive Department and of limitations on the President’s power of
appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of
government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or
controlled corporations."
De Castro v JBC, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)
Facts: In this case, the 2010 presidential election is forthcoming.

C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or seven days after the
presidential election. January 2010, the JBC begun to take
applications for the position of C.J. Meanwhile, strong objections to
Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J. Puno’s successor arose. The instant
petitions were thus filed questioning her authority to appoint a new
C.J. in the light of the ban imposed on presidential appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the
end of the President’s term under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Section 4(1),
Article VIII which provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and Section 9,
Article VIII which provides that the President shall issue
appointments to the Judiciary within 90 days from submission by the
JBC of the list of nominees. It is further argued that there is no
imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice considering that
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the
situation of having the next President appoint the successor. It
provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of his
inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall
devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until
such disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed and duly
qualified. It is also argued that there is no need for the incumbent
President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of
C.J. Puno because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90
days mandated in Section 4 (1), Article VIII remaining (the period
that remains of the 90 days counted from C.J. Puno’s retirement after
the end of GMA’s term).
Issues:
Does the ban on making presidential appointments under Section 15,
Article VII extend to appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in
the rest of the Judiciary?
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Does Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 dispel the imperative

need to appoint a new C.J.?
Does the fact that there will still be about 45 days after the
prohibition period to comply with the mandate of the President to fill
vacancies in the SC dispel the need for Pres. GMA to appoint C.J.
Puno’s successor?
May the JBC be compelled by mandamus to submit to Pres. GMA a short
list of nominees now?
Ruling:
(1) No. We reverse Valenzuela.¹ Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the SC, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. The exchanges
during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show
that the filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period was
made a true mandate for the President. This was borne out of the fact
that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement.
Further, the usage in Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word “shall”—
an imperative—should not be disregarded. Given the background and
rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, undoubtedly,
the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend
the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer
be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and appointments to the
Judiciary for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The fact that
Sections 14 and 16 of Art VI² refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 of the same
also applies only to the Executive Department. This is consistent with
the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context. If the framers intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments, they would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition. To hold that Section 15 extends
to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department
for it will tie the Judiciary and the SC to the fortunes or
misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a
presidential election.
(2) No. The express reference to a Chief Justice [in Section 4(1),
Article VIII] abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting
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Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise,

they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently,
to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to
forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice
soonest is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution. Said Section
12 only responds to a rare situation in which the new C.J. is not yet
appointed, or in which the incumbent C.J. is unable to perform the
duties and powers of the office.
(3) No. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the
coming vacancy occurring from C.J. Puno’s retirement by 17 May 2010.
It ignores the need to apply Section 4 (1) to every situation of a
vacancy in the SC.
(4) No. For mandamus to lie, there should be unexplained delay on the
part of JBC in performing its duty; and there has been no delay on the
part of the JBC in submitting the list of nominees for C.J. to the
President because the vacancy in the office has not yet occurred. The
President is constitutionally mandated to fill vacancies in the SC
within 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancies. Thus, it is
mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees
on or before the occurrence of the vacancy in order to enable the
President make the appointment within the 90-day period therefrom.
This is a ministerial duty of the JBC. JBC therefore has until the date
C.J. Puno retires, or 17 May 2010, to submit the list nominees to the
President.
Velicaria-Garafil v O.P. GR 203372, Jun 16, 2015
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed more than 800

people, including the petitioners, to various government positions
before the elections in May 2010. The 1987 Constitution prohibits
midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII. For the 2010
elections, the deadline for appointments that might be used was March
10, 2010, and the ban began on March 11 of that same year. Under this
clause, there is an exception that permits temporary nominations to
executive posts where keeping the offices vacant may jeopardize public
safety or public service. None of the petitioners assert that this
exception applies to their appointments. In accordance with Article 2
of the Constitution, President Aquino recalled, withdrew, and revoked
appointments made by President Macapagal-Arroyo. The officers and
employees who were affected by EO 2 were informed that they were
terminated from service effective the next day. Several petitions were
filed seeking to declare the executive order as unconstitutional and
for the declaration of their appointment as legal.
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Issue: Whether or not petitioners' appointments are valid.

Ruling: Yes. The following elements should always concur in the making
of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of
the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence
of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment;
and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements
should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made,
whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These
steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a
single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks
even one step.
Manalo v Sistosa, GR 107369 (1999)
Facts: Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the
permanent appointments issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to
the respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police who
were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director
without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the Local
Government Act of 1990. Former President Corazon C. Aquino signed
Republic Act 6975, which established the Department of Interior and
Local Government, into law on December 13, 1990. Accordingly, on March
10, 1992, the fifteen (15) respondent police officers were appointed
to positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief
Superintendent to Director by the President of the Philippines, acting
through Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon at the time. The
respondent police officers were appointed on a permanent basis. The
aforementioned police officers took the oath of office and were
assigned to their respective positions without having their names
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for approval. After that,
payments for their wages and other benefits were approved by the
Department of Budget and Management, which was led by Salvador M.
Enriquez III, the Secretary at the time.
Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the President were
valid even without the confirmation of Commission on Appointments.
Ruling: Yes. Appointments are valid. PNP, herein respondents, do not
fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the
confirmation by Commission on Appointments. Section 116 Article VII
provide for four groups of government to be appointed by President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
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public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-
settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first
group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first
category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of
other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Hontiveros-Baraquel v Toll Regulatory Board, GR 181293, Feb 23, 2015
Facts: As per P.D., the Philippine National Construction Corporation

(PNCC). Legislators and the Union of PNCC oppose the said transfer of
authority to Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) to perform the
operations of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Toll Expressways was
granted the right, privilege, and authority to construct and operate
toll facilities in a series of agreements. They contend that the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) awarded SOMCO a Toll Operation Certificate that
is wildly erratic and that the government suffers greatly from the
transfer of power.
Issue: Whether or not the TRB has the power to grant authority to
operate a toll facility.
Ruling: TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll
facility. In Francisco v. TRB, the court held: It is abundantly clear
that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of
P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a
qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and
operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating
permit or TOC. First, there is nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D. 1894 that
states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion of all
others. Second, if we were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is
only the operation and maintenance of the toll facilities that is
vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording of
P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC the right, privilege and
authority to construct, operate and maintain the North Luzon, South
Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities. Third,
aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative
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franchises for toll facility projects, TRB is also empowered to

modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on the franchise of
PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest
calls for it.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al.
v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
Facts: In this case, toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other

cetacean species that live in the waters in and surrounding the Tañon
Strait are the petitioners, collectively referred to in the petition
as the "Resident Marine Mammals." Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza
Eisma-Osorio, who together will be referred to as "the Stewards"), who
are their friends and legal guardians and who purport to have empathy
for and desire to safeguard the aforementioned marine species, join
them. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has also expressed her
desire to be a co-petitioner notwithstanding her strong pledge and
commitment to defend the Tañon Strait in the ASEAN Charter. On June
13, 2002, the Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-
102) between JAPEX and the Government of the Philippines was signed by
the DOE. Geological and geophysical investigations of the Tañon Strait
were part of this contract. Surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data were all included in the
investigations. Along with conducting geophysical and satellite
surveys, JAPEX also sampled oil and gas in Tañon Strait with DOE's
help. For the purpose of exploring, developing, and producing
petroleum resources in a block spanning over 2,850 square kilometers
offshore the Tañon Strait, DOE and JAPEX formally changed GSEC-102
into SC-46 on December 21, 2004. JAPEX agreed to drill a single
exploratory well during the project's second subphase. For the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait, the DOE and
JAPEX were granted an ECC by the DENR Region VII EMB on March 6, 2007.
Four months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX started drilling an
exploratory well near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province,
reaching a depth of 3,150 meters.15 The drilling continued until
February 8, 2008. The petitioners maintain that SC-46 is
unconstitutional because it breaches Article XII, Section 2, of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987
Philippine Constitution and statutes.
Ruling: The Court has previously settled the issue of whether service
contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal,
the Court held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in
the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact,
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portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional

Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4,
Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service
contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety
measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime. In summarizing the matters discussed in the
ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in
place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The
following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such
service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards, among which are these requirements: (1) The
service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law
that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements,
presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country. (2) The
President shall be the signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different
levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the
President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose
timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the
aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null
and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987
Constitution.
Kulayan v Tan, 675 SCRA 482 (2012)
Facts: In Patikul, Sulu, three members of the International Committee

of the Red Cross (ICRC) were abducted near the provincial capitol.
Three armed men, who were later identified as members of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG), apprehended Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and
Marie Jean Lacaba while they were ostensibly inspecting a water and
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail. To investigate the
kidnapping incident, a Local Crisis Committee was established. Later,
it was renamed the Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee). Under
the direction of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Sulu Provincial
Governor, the Committee met. Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009,
issued by Governor Tan, established a state of emergency in the
province of Sulu. The Human Security Act (R.A. 9372) was invoked by
the Proclamation to justify its pronouncement, which characterized the
kidnapping episode as a terrorist act. Additionally, it made use of
Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which
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gives the Provincial Governor the authority to implement emergency

plans in the event of both man-made and natural disasters, as well as
to request assistance from the relevant national law enforcement
agencies to quell disturbances and acts of lawlessness. Tan requested
in the Proclamation that the PNP and the CEF erect chokepoints and
checkpoints, carry out broad searches and seizures, including arrests,
and take other necessary steps to protect public safety. The
petitioners, Jamar Kulayan et al., argue that Sections 1 and 18 of
Article VII of the Constitution, which give the President exclusive
authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the
chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, render Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines
ultra vires and, as a result, void.
Issue: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers
of President.
Ruling: It has already been established that there is one repository
of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This
means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized
to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI,
of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out
powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is
still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,
making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader.
The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,
Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and
administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training and
talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct
military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he
would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces
to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the
foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under
the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code.
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Ampatuan v Puno, 651 SCRA 228 (2011)
Facts: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre,

then Pres. In her 1946 Proclamation, Arroyo ordered the PNP and the
AFP "to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution
and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence"
in the designated areas, as well as "the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency."
She also issued AO 273 "transferring" the Office of the President's
supervision of the ARMM to the DILG three days later. She then issued
AO 273-A, which modified the earlier AO (relating to the DILG's
oversight of the ARMM, the term "transfer" in AO 273 was changed to
"delegate").
Issue: Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency
powers when she called out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindano, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City.
Ruling: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency
powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war
or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof
the President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant
to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
Fortun v Macapagal-Arroyo 668 SCRA 504 (2012)
Facts: On November 23, 2009, 57 innocent civilians were shot and

buried beneath shoveled earth by highly armed men thought to be led by
the Maguindanao ruling Ampatuan family. President Arroyo issued PP
1946 on November 24, 2009, in response to this slaughter, proclaiming
a state of emergency in Cotabato City, Sultan Kudarat, and
Maguindanao. President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. PP 1959 on
December 4, 2009, imposing martial law and revoked the right to a writ
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of habeas corpus in Maguindanao, except for those areas controlled by

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. President Arroyo delivered her
report to Congress on December 6, 2009. Congress met in joint session
on December 9, 2009, to examine the legality of the President's
action. However, before Congress could act, the President issued PP
1963 two days later, on December 12, 2009, ending martial law and
regaining the right to writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is constitutional?
Ruling: The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not
unavoidable for two reasons:
First. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the
joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review
and validate or invalidate the same. The pertinent provisions of
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall,
within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he
shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for
only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report
his action in person or in writing to Congress;
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3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene

within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of
reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the President’s
proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse,
or extend the same if Congress deems warranted. It is evident that
under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President
has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress
can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on
the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently,
although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to
defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court
step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here,
President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.
Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the
Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.
Second. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The
military did not take over the operation and control of local
government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law
or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who
were arrested during the period were either released or promptly
charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed
with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point
is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in
a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment,
the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a
determined and amply armed government presence.
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In Lansang v. Garcia, the Court received evidence in executive session

to determine if President Marcos’ suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in 1971 had sufficient factual basis. In Aquino,
Jr. v. Enrile, while the Court took judicial notice of the factual
bases for President Marcos’ proclamation of martial law in 1972, it
still held hearings on the petitions for habeas corpus to determine
the constitutionality of the arrest and detention of the petitioners.
Here, however, the Court has not bothered to examine the evidence upon
which President Arroyo acted in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely
because it felt no need to, the proclamation having been withdrawn
within a few days of its issuance. Notably, under Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the
filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus – The Supreme Court
may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing. More than two years have passed since
petitioners filed the present actions to annul Proclamation 1959. When
the Court did not decide it then, it opted for a default as was its
duty, the question having become moot and academic. The problem in
this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation
and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned
without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic. Of
course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that
ordinarily would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do
not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial
review. The proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar
Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like
sabre-rattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary use of
political power.
Lagman v Medialdea, GR 231658, Jul 4, 2017
Facts: In this case, Proclamation No. 216, issued by President Rodrigo

Duterte on May 23, 2017, suspended the right to a trial by jury and
imposed martial law on the whole island of Mindanao. As mandated by
the Constitution, the president gave Congress a written report on the
facts supporting the proclamation of martial law on May 25. The Maute
terrorist group's attack in Marawi City served as the primary impetus
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for the declaration. The Maute organization is an affiliate of ISIS,

according to the report, and it wants to create an Islamic caliphate
in Marawi City (with the potential to expand its influence throughout
the entirety of Mindanao). It also mentioned the decades-long
lawlessness and unrest that have afflicted Mindanao.
Issue: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privelege of writ
of habeas corpus.
Ruling: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information
and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of
factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information
mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual
bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only
has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of
Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The
petitioners’ counterevidence were derived solely from unverified news
articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources
shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has
consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed,
and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose
other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged
false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the
Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion
exists.
Monsanto v Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190 (1989)
Facts: On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Salvacion

A. Monsanto, who was Calbayog City's assistant treasurer at the time,
and the other three defendants guilty of the sophisticated crime of
estafa by falsification of official papers. They were also sentenced
to three years in prison and P3,500 in fines. President Ronald Reagan
gave her an unconditional pardon on December 21, 1984. Mateo. In light
of the aforementioned amnesty, the petitioner wrote to the Calbayog
City treasurer asking to be reinstated to her previous position as
assistant city treasurer, which was still open. Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran contended that the petitioner must pay
the civil indemnification; quoting Revised Penal Code expressly
provides that ‘a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
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payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.’

(Sec. 36, par. 2).
Issue: Whether or not public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment?
Ruling: The petitioner's disqualification from having public
employment has been lifted because of the pardon, but it cannot go
farther than that. She will need to reapply and go through the normal
process for a new appointment to be reinstated in her previous role as
assistant city treasurer.
Risos-Vidal v Comelec, 747 SCRA 210 (2015)
Facts: After being impeached, former President Estrada was forced to

resign. For the offense of plunder, he was found guilty. President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo offered the private respondent here her
complete pardon during her administration. Petitioner Attorney
questioned Estrada's certificate of candidacy for the City Mayor of
Manila post. Risos-Vidal claimed that he was ineligible to run for
public office because of his conviction. Regarding Estrada's pardon,
the COMELEC exercised discretionary judicial notice.
Issue: Whether former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be
voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo?
Ruling: The petition for certiorari lacks merit. The pardoning power
of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of
Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses
the power to grant pardons. It is apparent from the constitutional
provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was
no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can
be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President. In Cristobal v. Labrador
and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935
Constitution, wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the
President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present
1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject
to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
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cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court

reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby
establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a
presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative
action." Thus, it is unmistakably the longstanding position of this
Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the
President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court,
except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution. This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the
President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through
legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a
proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the
President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption"
that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment
of a law. The Articles 36 and 41 of the of the Revised Penal Code
cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power
and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes. The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s
interpretation that the said Articles contain specific textual
commands which must be strictly followed in order to free the
beneficiary of presidential grace from the disqualifications
specifically prescribed by them. It is well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From
the words of a statute there should be no departure. It is this
Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue
which declares that former President Estrada “is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the
requirement of express restoration.” A close scrutiny of the text of
the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties
are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted
the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
RPC, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this jurisdiction, the right to seek
public elective office is recognized by law as falling under the whole
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gamut of civil and political rights. From both law and jurisprudence,
the right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered
as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier
statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits
no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of
the pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political
rights – including the right to seek elective office. Furthermore, the
disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance
of the absolute pardon granted to him. Risos-Vidal maintains that
former President Estrada’s conviction for plunder disqualifies him
from running for the elective local position of Mayor of the City of
Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent
absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively
restored his right to seek public elective office. This is made
possible by reading Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12
of the OEC. While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section
40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who
has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run
for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third
preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and
to seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially
true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and
political rights” as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory
or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word “whereas.” Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and
therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment
of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
A preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin
of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
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operation much less prevail over its text. If former President Arroyo
intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise
never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since
former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the
decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. Absent any contrary evidence,
former President Arroyo’s silence on former President Estrada’s
decision to run for President in the May 2010 elections against, among
others, the candidate of the political party of former President
Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and acceptance of the pardon speaks
volume of her intention to restore him to his rights to suffrage and
to hold public office. Where the scope and import of the executive
clemency extended by the President is in issue, the Court must turn to
the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From
a detailed review of the four corners of said document, nothing
therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is
actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant
of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned commitment not to
seek public office will result in a revocation or cancellation of said
pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the
prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted.
It was not used as a condition to the efficacy or to delimit the scope
of the pardon. Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say
that the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in
the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon
which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited
pardon. To reiterate, insofar as its coverage is concerned, the text
of the pardon can withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions
of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
Saguisag v Ochoa, Jr. GR 212426 and 212444, Jan 12, 2016
Facts: In this case, a resolution addresses the motion for
reconsideration and aims to overturn the court's decision in Saguisag
et al. Executive Secretary in a case dated January 12, 2016.
Petitioners contend that this Court erred in holding that the US-
Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was not a
treaty. Regarding this, petitioners move that the 1987 Constitution's
Section 25, Article XVIII, prohibits foreign military posts, troops,
and facilities; therefore, the EDCA must take the form of a treaty in
order to be enforceable. They also restate their positions regarding
taxes, nuclear weapons, and telecommunications. Evidently, petitioners'
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dissatisfaction with the Decision that the EDCA incorporates the VFA
and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is the primary justification for the
Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioners contend that the EDCA's
provisions are not covered by the purportedly narrow VFA and MDT
provisions because allows for a more expansive configuration than the
VFA for military bases, personnel, and facilities, and it the creation
of US military installations.
Issue: Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.
Ruling: The court ruled that petitioners detail their objections to
EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the
VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
(1) Agreed Locations; (2) Rotational presence of personnel; (3) U.S.
contractors; (4) Activities of U.S. contractors. We ruled in Saguisag,
et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these
provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject
matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a class
of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25
restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate
concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are
concluded. As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,
executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation
of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded
(1) to adjust the details of a treaty; (2) pursuant to or upon
confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or (3) in the exercise of
the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.
The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior
constitutional or legislative authorizations.The special nature of an
executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international
agreements. International practice has accepted the use of various
forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from the
traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that
no longer necessitate ratification. An international agreement may
take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of
notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement,
modus vivendi, or some other form. Consequently, under international
law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement
or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of
determining international rights and obligations. However, this
principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing
treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is
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relegated to a mere riation in form, or that the constitutional

requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional
constitutional directive. There remain two very important features
that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them
into terms of art in the domestic setting. First, executive agreements
must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents
puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under
serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce
the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to
defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn,
executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that
are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they
purport to implement. Second, treaties are, by their very nature,
considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of
the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements,
which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the
same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a
later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An
executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that
are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless
subject to the supremacy of the Constitution. Subsequently, the
Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s
validity, in that as an executive agreement it fell within the
parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole
web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It
suffices to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA
deserves treaty status under the law. We find no reason for EDCA to be
declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal
regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the
government’s continued policy to enhance our military capability in
the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise.
Bayan v Executive Secretary, GR 138570, Oct 10, 2000
Facts: The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was signed by the United
States of America and the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippine
government regarded the deal as a treaty, and then-President Joseph
Estrada ratified it with support from two thirds of the Senate's
members. The VFA outlines how US personnel and forces who are in the
Philippines are treated. It lays out the rules that will regulate
these visits and goes on to specify the rights of the American and
Philippine governments with regard to criminal jurisdiction, aircraft
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and vessel mobility, and the import and export of supplies, equipment,
and materials. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates
§25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in
the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.”
Issue: Whether or not the VFA unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. The VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first
two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the
Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII]
requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a
treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges
the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the
United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to
accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle
that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is
inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx xxx xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.
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For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges

the VFA as a treaty and binds itself further to comply with its
obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with
the mandate of the Constitution.
Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission, GR 192935 (2010)
Facts: President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1, creating the

Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010. The President, Congress,
and the Ombudsman will receive the findings and recommendations of the
aforementioned PTC, which is merely a branch of the Office of the
President, which was entrusted with looking into allegations of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees,
as well as their co-principals, accomplices, and accessories during
the previous administration. PTC, however, is not a quasi-judicial
organization and is not authorized to decide, arbitrate, settle, or
make awards regarding disagreements between parties. Its duties
include conducting investigations, gathering, evaluating, and
recommending evidence. It can issue subpoenas, but it cannot issue
arrest warrants or even cite someone for contempt. It cannot determine
for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Petitioners contends the
Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that: (1) It violates
separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation; (2) The
provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated
authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of
the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like
the Truth Commission; (3) The E.O illegally amended the Constitution
when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating
and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
(4) It violates the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or not the said E.O is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the
equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to
which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
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former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry.
Chavez v JBC, 676 SCRA 579 (2012 and 696 SCRA 496 (2013)
Facts: When two representatives from Congress started to sit in the
JBC in 1994, one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, each with one-half (1/2) of a vote, the JBC grew from having
seven members to eight. Subsequently, in two different meetings in
2000 and 2001, the JBC En Banc resolved to grant each member of the
House of Representatives and Senate one complete vote. As legislative
representatives, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) are seated in the JBC at the same
time. In this case, the petitioner has questioned this practice. It is
their theory that the two houses, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of "Congress,"
such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Respondents argued that
the phrase "a representative of Congress" is the central point of
contention. As the preferred system selected by the Framers,
bicameralism necessitates the use of each house's separate powers in
carrying out its prescribed function of enacting laws. Therefore, one
representative from each of the two Houses, which make up the entire
Congress, should be meant when "a representative from Congress" is
mentioned in Section 8(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of
the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the
1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional. One of the primary
and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It
is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be
clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a
representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members
of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature
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would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms,
so provided. Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to
each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body
of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be
modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate
or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in
the JBC. Considering that the language of the subject constitutional
provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort
extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds
of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from
the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to
conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. With the respondents’ contention
that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and
House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the
context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While
it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and
that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of
judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean
the entire legislative department. The framers of Constitution, in
creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection
of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature
to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one
voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each,
would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” It is clear,
therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
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seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether
with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress
with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending
appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution
is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be
the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and
caprices of the government and the people who run it. Notwithstanding
its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the
interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified.
Jardeleza v Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 (2014) and Resolution, GR 213181, Jan
21, 2015
Facts: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announced a call for
nominations and applications for Associate Justice Roberto Abad's
impending retirement. Among the contenders was the current Solicitor
General of the Republic, Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza). He was
therefore interviewed. He did, however, receive calls from a few
Justices informing him that Chief Justice Sereno would be using the
unanimity rule against him. It is brought up because Jardeleza's moral
character is under doubt. In the meeting, Associate Justice Roberto
Abad was set to retire, and Justice Carpio revealed some confidential
information that cast doubt on Jardeleza's honesty. Jardeleza said
that if due process was followed, he would stand up for himself. The
plea was turned down, and he was left from the shortlist. Because the
JBC and CJ Sereno acted with severe abuse of discretion in omitting
Jardeleza, even though he had received enough votes to be eligible for
the job, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with motion for
TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list.
Issue: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the
course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to
an application is raised.
Ruling: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui
generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s
entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside the unique
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and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class

of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain oneself is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is
raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the
fulfilment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Its
adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies
the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the
JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it
faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected
to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an
objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the
person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the
only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of
soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza
should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President
for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence
arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and
the basic tenets of due process. True, Jardeleza has no vested right
to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC
failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
Villanueva v JBC, GR 211833, Apr 7, 2015
Facts: The petitioner applied to be a judge in a second level court,
but since he was ineligible, JBC did not list his name among the
applicants. This is since the petitioner in this case only held the
office of judge for more than a year, and the JBC gave precedence to
incumbent judges who had held their positions for at least five years.
The petitioner contested the JBC's ability to add a fifth requirement,
citing the fact that the previous qualification was already mandated,
among other things.
Issue: Whether or not the policy of Judicial Bar Council requiring
five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional
Ruling: The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the
petitioner is constitutional since as stated in the Sect. 8 (5), Art.
VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary.
Consequently, it was also stated in the said provision that only the
persons nominated by the JBC is transmitted to the president that will
choose whom to nominate as judge in the judiciary.
Re: COA Opinion on the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased for
the retired Chief/Associate Justices of SC, 678 SCRA 1 (2012)
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Facts: The Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the
Commission on Audit (COA) found an underpayment amounting to P221,021
which resulted when five (5) retired SC justices purchased from the SC
the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency. The
COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division
of the SC of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division
erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35
dated April 23, 1997, and its guidelines, in compliance with the
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-
1201, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum
No. 98-569-A dated August 5, 1998. In her Memorandum, Atty. Candelaria
recommended that the SC advise the COA to respect the inhouse
computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first
time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG
Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and
disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a
matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired CA
Associate Justices, the COA upheld the inhouse appraisal of government
property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal
autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy,
among others, contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the
allocation and utilization of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its
own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized
authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or
required by law during the discharge of its functions. To allow the
COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal of its property
would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.
Issue: Whether or not the COA should respect the in-house computation
based on the CFAG formula.
Ruling: Yes. The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under
Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority,
however, must be read not only considering the Court’s fiscal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on
judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings
on these matters. Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays
in our system of government as the sole repository of judicial power,
with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government is attended with grave abuse of
discretion, no less than the Constitution provides several safeguards
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to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained. The

Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the SC of its
jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the
Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of
tenure of the members of the judiciary. The Constitution also mandates
that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and grants the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial
personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision
as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the
judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules, and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Constitution protects the salaries of the Justices and judges as
well by prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their
continuance in office, and ensures their security of tenure by
providing that “Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office.” With these guarantees, justices and judges can
administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by
their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge
of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the
corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. One of the most
important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant
of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from
discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically
preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the
Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts,
the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose
of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a
general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the
purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference
by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy
amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If
the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of
adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that
purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of)
legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush
appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion
of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial
independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through
the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. In Bengzon
v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of
fiscal autonomy in the following manner: As envisioned in the
Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on
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Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of

full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power
and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse
such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means
freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy
given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude. The
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have
the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and
utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and
cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders.
We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should
cease to be a meaningless provision. The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy
is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and
of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative
control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court
En Banc’s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12 01
reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in
allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices
of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts. By way of a long
standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and
faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically
designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been
recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an
established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has
previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of
the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the
Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its
power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative
authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s
internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage
the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as
provided by law and by its own grants. Thus, under the guarantees of
the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief
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Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms,
conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor. In the context of
the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s exercise of its
discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on
how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed
of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the
Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage
the Judiciary’s own affair.
Facts: Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services of the
Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on the applicability
to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 10154 which states:
Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall
seek Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from
his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the
Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from the Office of
the President.
Issue: Whether the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-

Pendency of Administrative Case from the CSC embodied in Section 7,
Rule III of the IRR of RA 10154 is inapplicable to retiring employees
of the Judiciary.
Ruling: Yes. Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution exclusively

vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel. As such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance
with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them
for any violation thereof. As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its
custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring
court personnel. In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the
subject provision – which requires retiring government employees to
secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative
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case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to
employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the
Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision
over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already
required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a
superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared
state policy of RA 10154. To further clarify the matter, the same
principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/nonpendency of
administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some
court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court
Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to
retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of
court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the
exclusive province of the Judiciary. It must, however, be noted that
since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative
supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a
clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed
by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the
Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the
ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.
Facts: In this case, the proposed legislation would eliminate the
Judiciary Development Fund and establish a "Judiciary Support Fund,"
with Congress deciding how to use the money that would be collected
and deposited into the national treasury. The letter dated August 27,
2014, signed by Mijares, was used to bring this matter before this
court and was sent to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court. The letter is headed: Petition for Mandamus with
Manifestation to Invoke the Constitution's Mandated Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy; docketed as UDK-15143. Petitioner
argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant
usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme
Court."; that Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by
abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme
Court." Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to
"REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of
existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy
as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and
general welfare of the people."
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Issue: Whether or not the Court may judicially review proposed bills.
Ruling: No. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for
judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The
requisites are:(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power;(2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;(3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants
the outright dismissal of this petition.
No actual case or controversy
For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a
justiciable controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a
violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for
judicial determination. Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants
this court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary
Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its powers
granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review
proposed bills because a bill is not a law. A proposed bill creates no
right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed
bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitution alright or
duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional
or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering
an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of
judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Under the separation of
powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or
from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its
internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise
of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the
filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each
chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of
approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled
bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of
specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of
private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial
review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.
No Locus Standi
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed
by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule
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3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that

"every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put,
the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result." Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is
passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is
laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite
standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may
only affect the judiciary. This court, however, has occasionally
relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved are of
"transcendental importance" to the public.
Not of transcendental importance
Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus,
in Francisco v. House of Representatives: There being no doctrinal
definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive
determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. None of the determinants in
Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by petitioner
are merely speculative and conjectural. In addition to the
determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that there is a clear
or imminent threat to fundamental rights.
Mandamus not proper
The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is
ministerial. An act is ministerial when it does not require the
exercise of judgment and the act is performed in compliance with a
legal mandate. In a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on
petitioner to show that one is entitled to the performance of a legal
right and that respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act.
Mandamus will not lie "to compel an official to do anything which is
not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law." In this
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case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed
for. Hence, this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of
judicial review since there is no actual case or controversy.
Re: Petition for recognition of the exemption of the GSIS from payment
of legal fees, 612 SCRA 193 (2010)
Facts: In accordance with Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the
ROC, the GSIS requests an exemption from paying the legal fees imposed
on GOCCs. The OSG is required to reply on the GSIS' petition and
contends that it should be denied. The GSIS bases its petition on
Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997). The Office
of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) filed a report and recommendation
regarding the GSIS petition and the OSG's response in response to this
court's ruling. The OCAT states that there is no legal foundation for
the GSIS's request for exemption from paying legal fees.
Issue: Whether or not the legislature can exempt the GSIS from legal
fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government units.
Ruling: No. Unlike its individual members, the GSIS is a corporate
body with a personality all its own. Its rights, powers, and functions
belong to it alone and are not shared by its members; the rights of
its members are not its rights. More importantly, the Congress would
have had to violate fiscal autonomy, another crucial institutional
guarantee of the Court's independence, to carve out an exemption for
the GSIS from paying legal expenses. Therefore, legal fees are not
only a crucial source of funding for the Court but also a crucial
component of its financial independence. The 1987 Constitution also
stripped Congress of its authority to add to, amend, or repeal
pleading, practice, or procedure regulations.
Pimentel v LEB, G.R. No.230642, September 10, 2019
Facts: In this case, petitioners challenged R.A. 7662's
constitutionality, usually known as the 1993 Legal Education Reform
Act, which established the Legal Education Board. The creation of LEB
itself, LEB issuances and memoranda establishing law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Section 7 (g)
of RA 7662, the adoption of a continuing legal education system based
on Sections 2 (2) and 7 (h) of RA 7662, and the establishment and
implementation of the national law school aptitude test known as the
Philippine Law School Admission Test, or PhilSAT, are specifically
targeted by petitioners as unconstitutional. This is because LEB is
empowered under Section 7 (e) of RA 7662 to "prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission."
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Issue: Whether or not the regulation and supervision of legal

education belong to the Court.
Ruling: No. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been
historically and consistently exercised by the political departments.
The historical development of statutes on education unerringly
reflects the consistent exercise by the political departments of the
power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas of education,
including legal education. Legal education is but a composite of the
entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because it is
a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason
to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political branches. Two principal reasons
militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and
supervision of legal education: First, it assumes that the court, in
fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as
a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the
practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary
to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise
devoid of legal anchorage. Second, the Court exercises only judicial
functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a power
that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void
RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education
and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial
activism. As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under
the Constitution covers the practice of law and not the study of law.
The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support
the argument that the Court directly and regulates legal education, it
merely provides academic competency requirements for those who would
like to take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of
its police power that has the authority to regulate and supervise the
education of its citizens and this includes legal education.

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CASE DIGESTS

A. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Powell v McCormack, 395 US

Daryl Grace J. Abayon v. The Honorable House of Representatives

II. ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE

Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)

III. PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

IV. POWERS AND LIMITATIONS ON POWERS

Makalintal v Comelec, GR 157013, Jul 10, 2003

Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

V. NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS AND SPECIAL BODIES

Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

B. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)

Makalintal vs PET 635 SCRA 783 and 651 SCRA 239

II. POWERS AND LIMITATIONS

Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)

C. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486

provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall,

city to have a minimum population of 250k to be entitled to a

Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the

Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the

districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list

(2) Yes. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats

(4) No. By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue to disallow

Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)

and underrepresented; the nominee must also be a Filipino citizen

Arroyo was granted a seat in the House of Representatives. Thus, the

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. V. Comelec, 201

organizations, Ating Koop released a Resolution that contained a term-

Abang Lingkod v Comelec, 708 SCRA 133 (2013)

they had participated in initiatives to better the situation of the

the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a

representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like

manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.

constitute a quorum. Even if the 12 did not constitute a quorum, they

In State of Mississippi v. Andrew Johnson, President of the United

only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to the

consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one

Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)

SEC Commissioner subsequently granted the motion allowing Fernandez to

residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Sec. 5 of the PNRC

Abakada group Party List v Purisima, GR 166715, Aug 14, 2008

calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In

the Senate and committed to the care of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms

PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19,

negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government’s

Ruling: No. The Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to

people by the Committees on Justice and Human Rights, Constitutional

Senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative

Ruling: No. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to

finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to reveal the identity of a

2. Yes. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate

independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence

Court declared the petitioner's reinstatement and commanded the

position of member of the house of representatives for Surigao del

Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay before

Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)

other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.