Guiani v.

Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 146897-917
August 6, 2002

FACTS: Petitioners filed petition for certiorari, seeking annulment of the Orders of the Sandiganbayan on
February 15, 2001, based on the following grounds:
a. The delay of almost six (6) years to resolve the preliminary investigation disregarded the Ombudsmans
duty, as mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act no. 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him.
Such delay violated the above-mentioned accused’s rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the
cases filed against them.
b. There is no prima facie evidence to establish probable cause to warrant the filing of the twenty-one (21)
information against herein petitioners.
c. The failure to arraign accused-petitioner Datukan Guiani after he posted bail on 18 February 2000
constitutes violation of his right pursuant to Republic Act 8493 as well as Section 1 of Rule 116 of the new
rules on Criminal Procedure.

This started when Office of the President asked the Ombudsman on 1992 to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the several irregularities found by the Commission on Audit during their
physical inspection on the DPWH-ARMM implementation of regional, provincial, and district impact
projects with the infrastructure seed money of P615Million. Thus, the COA-ARMM instituted a complaint
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices (RA 3019).

In July 1998, Graft Investigation Officer II recommended the indictment of petitioners which was later
approved by the Ombudsman leading to the criminal information filed against petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan, which directed the prosecution to submit adequate proof of the existence of probable cause
within sixty days therefrom.

The petitioners then voluntarily submitted the themselves by posying their respective surety bonds after
the Sandiganbayan did not act on their Omnibus Motion to defer their issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
their arraignment considering that they have not submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the said court.

In February 2001, SC issued a resolution requiring respondents to comment on the petition and
temporarily restraining the Sandiganbayan from conducting further proceedings in criminal cases. Thus, the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, on behalf of the Ombudsman, submitted its comment and explained the delay (1992-
1998) of the preliminary investigation.

Petitioners then filed their reply and invoked the rulings in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, Angchangco, Jr. v.
Ombudsman, Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, and Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan in support of the claim that
their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases which was accordingly has been violated.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the delay violated the accused’s (petitioners) rights to due process and to a speedy disposition
of the cases filed against them.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan had not established a probable cause to warrant the filing of the
information against the petitioners.
3. Whether the Sandiganbayan failed to arraign Datukan Guiani after posting bail on 2000, constituting
violation of his right pursuant to RA 8493 and Sec. 1 of Rule 116 of the New Rules on Crim Pro.
HELD: 1. NO. The petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of the case was not infringed.

Well-settled is the rule that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. In the
determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced
are: the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay.

Petitioners raised their objections to the perceived delay in the resolution of the complaints against them
only on September 27, 1999, when they filed their Omnibus Motion with the Sandiganbayan. It would appear,
therefore, that petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay in the proceedings.

The right to a speedy trial as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, except when
otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived. It must therefore be asserted. Thus, if there was a delay
in the trial of the case, petitioners are not entirely without blame.

Furthermore, the right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the
same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. A party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.

Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
motion to quash the information against them on the ground of violation of their constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of the case. It correctly held that the Tatad doctrine does not apply in this case as it was politically
motivated which rendered the delay oppressive.

2. SC is not a trier of facts. It shall not pre-empt the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to receive
evidence and resolve the merits of the criminal cases pending before it.

3. Contention is untenable and positions are inconsistent. Petitioner Guiani cannot complain that he was
not promptly arraigned by the Sandiganbayan after he participated in the filing by all petitioners of an Omnibus
Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of their arraignment. The Sandiganbayan had scheduled the
arraignment of petitioners on February 22, 2001, and would have proceeded had it not been for the TRO issuance
by the SC.

WHEREFORE, petition was DISMISSED, the TRO was LIFTED, and the Sandiganbayan was directed to
proceed with the arraignment of the accused in their criminal cases.
NOTES:

Republic Act No. 6770             November 17, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Republic Act No. 8493             February 12, 1998

AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

RULE 116 – New Rules on Criminal Procedure

Arraignment and Plea

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The
arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall
be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.

(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. (1a)

(d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty shall be entered for him. (n)

(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to
whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or complaint. The accused shall be
arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10)
days after arraignment. (n)

(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining,
determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of the offended party to appear
despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty
(30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a
motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in
computing the period. (sec. 2, cir. 38-98)