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Meltzer 2002
Meltzer 2002
In the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century,
Friedrich Nietzsche formulated, and Max Scheler further developed, the concept of
ressentiment. Nietzsche linked this emotion with the rise of Christian morality, while Scheler
linked it primarily with the formation of the bourgeois ethos in Western Europe. The present
paper endeavors to show similarities and differences between the emotion thus designated
and the more commonly recognized emotion of resentment. Moreover, conceptual analysis
of these emotions necessarily leads to consideration of the social situations likely to give rise
to each, as well as their likely outcomes. This latter discussion strongly suggests a needed
modification of Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s conceptualization of ressentiment.
Resentment, Murphy and Hampton (1988, p. 56) point out, is ‘‘a protest
against the demeaning action but also a defense against the action’s attack on
one’s self-esteem.’’ For resentment is a reaction to treatment that is defined
as disrespectful, contemptuous, spiteful, or insolent, and thus tending to
lower one in the eyes of others (see Barbalet 1998 for a fuller discussion of
this point). Like the reflexive emotions of shame and embarrassment,
resentment is a reaction issuing from discreditation; however, unlike shame
(discredited self) and embarrassment (discredited self-presentation), which
involve adverse self-judgments, resentment is a consequence of explicit or
implicit adverse judgments by others. The object of this reaction is, as Haber
(1991, p. 48) points out, ‘‘the defiant reaffirmation of one’s rank and value
in the face of treatment calling them into question.’’ Again, drawing upon
insights from Goffman (1967, p. 31), as ‘‘a ritually delicate object,’’ the self
prompts those who define some action as disparaging ‘‘to lead themselves
into duels.’’ Certainly, some of the actual duels occurring historically were
prompted by resentment. As we shall later show, however, such retaliatory
action is not always the case in resentment and is even more unlikely in
ressentiment.
In this initial characterization of resentment we do not intend to reify the
emotion; as we shall later show, this emotion—like all others—is identifiable
only as it arises in certain social situations. Today, most sociological treatments of
emotions accord with McCarthy’s (1989, p. 67) caution against the entification of
242 BERNARD N. MELTZER AND GIL RICHARD MUSOLF
emotions, i.e., the view that they exist as entities that can be defined and observed
apart from their cultural and ideational contexts. In fact, as Franks (1985, p. 165)
asserts, ‘‘The name we give to an emotion reflects the particular aspect of [a]
situation that we selected for focus.’’
Several other emotions have often been conflated with resentment despite
some differences. Haber (1991, p. 30) points out that anger, for example, shares
the element of displeasure, but, unlike resentment, it does not necessarily involve
absence of justification. Similarly, Rawls (1971, p. 533) holds that envy shares
with resentment a sense of hurt or loss, but lacks a moral principle for its arousal.
These differences, however, are somewhat obscured by the frequent occurrence
of both anger and envy (as well as fear) as concomitants or, even, components of
resentment. Both Nietzsche and Scheler specify that ressentiment (a form of
resentment that we shall soon describe) comprises feelings of hatred, wrath, envy,
revenge, and the like.
Additionally, Haber (1991, p. 37) characterizes resentment as primarily
confined to injury to oneself (or someone closely related), while viewing injury to
others not closely related as inciting indignation. Interestingly, the Ambonwari of
Papua New Guinea (Telban 1993) lack words for such general terms as emotion
and thought, as well as for jealousy, envy, and self-pity, which are referred to as
‘‘not being cared for’’ (or ‘‘feeling bad’’); however, the various forms of ‘‘not
being cared for’’ are viewed as wrongful treatment by others and give rise to
feelings termed resentment.
Complicating the conceptualization of resentment is the fact that we find it
useful to distinguish both a generic meaning (which we have delineated above)
and a specific meaning for it. In its generic sense, resentment can be usefully
treated—as we shall soon indicate—both as a short-term form (for which we
retain the designation ‘‘resentment’’) and a long-term form (which, following
Nietzsche [1887] (1956), we designate ressentiment). For reasons of conve-
nience, and to avoid confusion, we shall use ‘‘resentment’’ as the specific,
fleeting form of the emotion, as opposed to ressentiment. One of our narrators
voiced an illustrative experience of this form:
In my sophomore year . . . my roommate was sloppy, dirty, and wouldn’t help clean her
mess. . . . I confronted her about it and she threw a fit about us not caring about her feelings. A
very heated argument occurred and she stormed out of the room and I haven’t seen or heard
from her since. (Female, 21 years old)
Such usage differs from the employment, by some scholars, of the two
concepts as synonymous (see, for example, Solomon 1995; Gerth and Mills
1953; Betz 1991; Yankelovich 1975; Reiser 1993; Ashforth 1992).
Most treatments of resentment have focused on its arousal in interpersonal
situations. Moreover, such arousal tends to issue from incidents of put-downs,
RESENTMENT AND RESSENTIMENT 243
rebuffs, slurs, snubs, insults, and other relatively minor injuries. The resultant
resentment is likely to be transitory, as described in phrases such as ‘‘taking
umbrage’’ or ‘‘feeling piqued.’’ In contrast, ressentiment is more likely to persist
and to become intensified.
Ressentiment
The concept ressentiment was introduced in a special technical sense by
Nietzsche [1887] (1956) and was developed sociologically by Max Scheler
[1915] (1961). No English (or German) word adequately expresses the same
nuances of the term—nuances giving it a breadth and depth of meaning absent
from resentment. While French-language dictionaries we consulted define the
term simply as resentment, a few English-language dictionaries that include it
define it in such ways as the following:
A feeling of bitter anger or resentment together with a sense of frustration at being powerless to
express this hostility overtly. (Webster’s New World College Dictionary 1997)
An oppressive awareness of the futility of trying to improve one’s status in life or society.
(Random House Dictionary 1967)
A generalized feeling of resentment and often hostility harbored by one individual or group
against another, especially chronically and with no means of direct expression. (The American
Heritage Dictionary, Abridged 1982)
The time lag is usually related to the ongoing, lasting nature of many
injustices leading to ressentiment—as opposed to the more sporadic, isolated
acts usually eliciting resentment—as well as to feelings of impotence. Solomon
(1994), reviewing Nietzsche’s ideas, indicates that the long-term repression or
suppression of acts of revenge tends to greatly intensify ressentiment.
Illustrative of such intensification is the following comment by a Korean
battered wife:
Until he comes back at night, I can’t sleep. I can’t eat. I can’t rest. I hate and hate. . .. For 14
years of our marriage, this feeling has built up. . . . I just want to kill him. (Cho 1987, p. 249;
cited in Denzin 1989, p. 57)
may be interpreted by the ‘‘wronged’’ party in ways that inhibit the emotion. For
example,
. . . when jostled by a crowd, . . . your resentment might be inhibited if you are too tired or busy
or fearful, or simply inured to life in the big city. . . . In contrast, you might think the other was
pushed, didn’t realize, didn’t mean to. . . . These things would provide reasons for the inhibition
of resentment. (Fischer and Ravizza 1993, pp. 122–3)
Similarly, Watson (1993, p. 122) points out that we are likely to inhibit
resentment if we deem the ‘‘wrongdoer’’ to be acting uncharacteristically because
of extraordinary circumstances, or as psychologically abnormal or morally
underdeveloped such as children, being under great strain, being psychotic, being
hypnotized, or having been unfortunate in one’s formative circumstances. In
other words, we tend to excuse or forgive otherwise resentment-inducing actions
when the agent is seen as not being responsible for his/her injurious behavior (see
Strawson 1974; Watson 1993 for discussions of this point). In other words, as in
many other kinds of situations, we tend to excuse acts that are ‘‘accidental,’’
unintended, nonmalicious, or otherwise lacking in mens rea.
Several students of ressentiment link its occurrence with the experience of
career-failure. Shaeffer (1988), in a highly conservative defense of the economic
status quo, states:
When a civilization experiences [significant economic] growth over a period of decades or
centuries, those who have contributed the least develop powerful resentments as they find
themselves significantly behind those who have worked, saved, risked, and prospered. (p. 8)
In 1997 the . . . Department of Civil Service changed their hiring process. For college
graduates, this means that an [employing agency] will key in the degree(s) they are looking for
250 BERNARD N. MELTZER AND GIL RICHARD MUSOLF
to fill a specific employment position. Prior to 1997 my undergraduate degree qualified me for
numerous jobs. . . . I have been resentful since 1997 when I realized the limits that [the change
imposed on me]. . . . I have expressed my concerns to Civil Service Personnel. . . . (Female,
49 years old)
[In high school,] the varsity [basketball] coach fired my [highly esteemed junior varsity] coach
based on her sexual preference. . . . We (several players on the team, along with our parents and
lawyers) got the varsity coach fired, . . . still what he did will always be in my mind. . . .
(Female, 18 years old)
Thus, ressentiment may issue in action when the conditions from which it
derives become defined as mutable and defeasible, that is, when corrective action
is perceived to be practicable.
Conclusion
We have discussed conceptual differences between two emotions
subsumed by resentment, one of which we portray as a relatively simple
feeling and the other as somewhat more complex. By ‘‘resentment’’ (the
simpler form) we have indicated what is usually a short-term reaction to
affronts to the self.10 By ressentiment, on the other hand, we have (following
Nietzsche and Scheler) denoted a chronic feeling of affront linked with
vengeful desires that cannot be readily consummated. While resentment can
occur in any situation of social interaction (including, of course, interpersonal
interaction) in which one’s self is assailed by others, ressentiment tends to be
induced by more durable, intense, and, on occasion, abstract sources, including
social–structural features.
Contrary to the views of both Nietzsche and Scheler, who saw
ressentiment as engendering reluctant resignation and passivity, we have
followed the lead of a few scholars who point to ressentiment as a potential
source of individual and, especially, collective action and social change. This
252 BERNARD N. MELTZER AND GIL RICHARD MUSOLF
ENDNOTES
1
Literary critics, too, have given attention to these emotions; illustrative of these are Jameson
(1976) on the novels of George Gissing; Beauchamp (1982) on a Jack London work; Pinkerton (1970)
on Katherine Ann Porter’s portrayal of black ressentiment; Bertonneau (1998) on The Bostonians;
Horne (1990) on Dombey and Son; and Weisberg (1972) on Hamlet’s indecision.
2
Cooley’s (1922, pp. 269–70) brief treatment of resentment as the product of injury to one’s
self-feeling omits the necessity of a sense of injustice or unfairness. Thus, he mentions resentment
evoked by being caught in a lie, being observed in an act of cowardice, or becoming the recipient of
charity or pity.
3
Similarly, in his analysis of the important role of ressentiment in the life of the Roman emperor
Tiberius, Marañon (1956) treats the emotion as a deep-seated personality trait, its usual onset in
adolescence, that becomes ‘‘the director of our behavior, of our slightest reactions’’ (p. 9).
4
Runciman’s (1972) distinction between egoistic relative deprivation (feelings of being deprived
relative to fellow in-group members) and fraternal relative deprivation (feelings that one’s in-group is
deprived relative to some out-group) is called to mind here.
5
Note that several scholars cited here do not differentiate between resentment and ressentiment.
6
Weigert (1983, p. 348) speculates that vandalism and arson by juvenile delinquents against
schools, parks, graveyards, etc., may be expressions of ressentiment through attacks on and
defacements of symbols of adult society.
7
Marañon (1956, p. 9) quotes Don Miguel de Unamuno as follows: ‘‘Among the deadly sins
resentment does not figure, and yet it is the gravest of all. . . .’’ Marañon (1956, pp. 10–17) goes on to
maintain that the following array of undesirable traits are associated with resentment (which he
conflates with ressentiment): lack of generosity, poor endowment with the capacity for affection; of
mediocre moral quality, timidity, incapacity for gratitude, hypocrisy, lack of understanding, and (in
men) sexual failure, physical imperfection, and asthenic body type.
8
However, citing Lukacs, Frank (1992, p. 100) points out that ‘‘Nietzsche. . . discovered that the
whole class consciousness of the proletariat is a [ressentiment] of slaves,’’ thereby putting a different
‘‘spin’’ on these ideas.
9
Cynicism, too, may initiate inaction. As Goldfarb (1991, p. 20) reminds us, the widespread
conviction that ‘‘forces behind the scenes completely control the human order’’ stands for proof that
‘‘there is little or nothing ordinary mortals can do about it.’’ It would appear that such cynicism-related
passivity is unlikely to disappear or diminish as long as the cynicism itself remains. However, who
among us does not know cynics who have become ‘‘born again’’ idealists?
10
A preponderance of the personal experience narratives we collected described instances of this
type, although this is not clearly reflected in the few illustrative reports we have used.
RESENTMENT AND RESSENTIMENT 253
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