Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment: Will the Real Emotion Please Stand Up?

Author(s): June Price Tangney, Debra Mashek and Jeff Stuewig

Source: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2005), pp. 44-48
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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 COMMENTARIES
tion,what we want to thinkof ourselves. Here is one
of my examples. Jane is deeply resentful of her room
mate Mary, who is smarter and prettier.But she also
insists that she "hates" Mary. She refuses to accept the
suggestion that she resents her. I think that the same
sort of explanation serves here. Because resentment is
an emotion of defensiveness and inferiority (as the
philosopher Nietzsche argued at great length). Ha
tred, by contrast, is a more noble emotion, not an
emotion of inferioritybut an emotion of righteous
ness, carrying with it even the implications of good
versus evil. So how would Jane want to thinkof her
self, as inferior or as righteous? But it is not as if the
emotions are the same. It is the pragmatics of the as
cription thatprovide the interesting story.
Sabini and Silver (this issue) are on something im
portant, something never adequately developed by
Bedford and others, who got an early glimmer of the
extent towhich emotion ascription is not just naming
private inner states but saying something in part deter
mined by the linguistic environment. But the authors
can pursue this thesis in a great many interesting and
valuable directions, so long as theydo not insiston first
over-simplifying the emotions or the rich nature of
emotional experience and the fascinating interconnec
Shame,Guilt, and Embarrassment:
Will theReal Emotion Please Stand Up?
June Price Tangney, Debra Mashek, and JeffStuewig
Department ofPsychology
George Mason
Sabini and Silver's (this issue) targetarticle under
scores the complexity of human emotion-and human
cognition about human emotion. Citing numerous em
pirical and theoretical examples, Sabini and Silver ar
gue that the relationship between emotional experience
and language is not isomorphic. There is not a
one-to-one correspondence between the emotions we
experience and thewords we use to describe those ex
periences. With this observation, the authors have put
their finger on one of themost challenging aspects of
conducting research on emotion. Much emotion re
search, especially research on the self-conscious emo
tions, hinges on self-report.Yet, in thedomain of emo
tion,we can be easily misled by words.
What is a "Real" Emotion?
We agree with Sabini and Silver (this issue) that
there is good reason to question whether each
44
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tions between theway we identify and ascribe emo
tions and the individuation of emotional experience.
Note
Robert Solomon, Department of Philosophy, WAG
316, University of Texas, 1Univ. Sta. C3500, Austin,
TX 78712. E-mail: rsolomon@mail.utexas.edu
References
Bedford, E. (1963). Emotions. In D. Gustafson (Ed.), Essays inPhilo
sophical Psychology (pp. 77-90). New York: Doubleday-Anchor.
Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling ofWhat Happens: Body and Emo
tion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt
Brace.
James, W. (1890). Emotion. Principles of Psychology. New York:
Dover.
Nietzsche, F. (1997). Human, All to human (R. J. Hollingdale,
Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Sabini, J.,& Silver,M. (1997). On thepossible non-existence of emotions:
The passions. Journalfor theTheory of Social Behavior, 27(1).
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). The interaction of cognitive and
physiological determinants of emotional state. Psychological
Review, 69, 379-399.
University
lexicalized emotion termnames a differentexperiential
state. The wide variety of emotion words no doubt
arises not only from the diversity of human internal
emotional experiences, per se, but also from differ
ences in situational context, observer's perspective,
and unfolding tertiaryappraisals-of theemotion-elic
iting situation, of the emotional experience, or of the
initial appraisals that gave shape to the ensuing emo
tion.We are especially intrigued by the notion that the
lexicon of human emotion is rich, in part, because of
the unique perspectives of observers. Third party ob
servers often have access to unique types of informa
tion thatmay give them special insight,particularly in
instances likely to engender defensive, self-protective
reactions (e.g., as in the case of shame and envy). At
the same time,when interpretingand labeling the emo
tional experiences of others, observers ultimatelymust
refer back to their own personal emotional experi
ences. If an observer does not personally have a subjec
tive sense of how sadness is distinct frommelancholy
 COMMENTARIES
(or how envy is distinct from anger), it is unlikely the
observer will interpretand describe someone else's in
ner experience as melancholic (or angry). That is, the
richness of the self's emotional world informsour abil
ity tomake nuanced judgments of others' emotional
worlds. The factwe are able to do this suggests that the
nuanced language may reflect real and importantvaria
tions in emotional experiences.
Which pairs of emotion terms represent "true" dis
tinctionsbetween "real" emotions? Scientists have yet
to come to any consensus as to what constitutes the
"basic" emotions, nor is thereany emerging consensus
regarding the specific criteria by which one would ele
vate an affective term to the class of "real" emotion, as
opposed to minor emotion variants and mere syn
onyms (Ekman, 1994; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Tracy &
Robins, 2004b). Our position regarding the classifica
tion of emotions is more pragmatic. Distinctions be
tween emotion terms are important to the extent that
theycontribute to thedevelopment of a coherent useful
scientific understanding of human emotion.
Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment
DistinctEmotions?
In 1988 (the year of the firstorganized meeting of
empirical researchers interested in shame-the Mac
Arthur Asilomar Conference), the answer was by no
means clear. Little systematic research had been con
ducted on these self-conscious emotions, and virtually
none of theextant empirical work had been integrated.
Today, there is considerable empirical research
(drawing on multiple methods) indicating that these
are indeed useful distinctions. Phenomenological rat
ings of physiological reactions, affective experiences,
perceptions of self and others, and motivations for sub
sequent action argue strongly against the notion that
shame and embarrassment are merely "different inter
pretations of the same raw feeling," and that"the expe
riences underlying shame and embarrassment are the
same" differingonly in interpretationof the situational
conditions that surround them. Furthermore, these
emotions are associated with differentways of experi
encing interpersonal contexts, differentways of con
struingemotion-eliciting situations, and, perhaps most
important,differentmotivations for subsequent action.
Research drawing on multiple methods indicate that
shame and embarrassment are not simply synonyms
describing slight incarnations of the same construct
(Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Busswell, 1996; Miller,
1996; Miller & Tangney, 1994; Tangney, Miller,
Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). They are conceptually, em
pirically, and phenomenologically distinct.
For example, whenyoungadultswere asked tode
scribeand ratepersonalshame,guilt,and embarrass
ment experiences(Tangneyet al., 1996), embarrass
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ment differed from shame on fully 22 (71%) of the 31
experiential dimensions. Results indicated that al
though embarrassment was less painful and more fleet
ing than shame, embarrassment was more likely to be
accompanied by physiological changes (e.g. blushing,
increased heart rate). There were fewermoral implica
tions in embarrassment than in either guilt or shame.
Embarrassment followed events forwhich people felt
less responsible and thatwere more unexpected. In ad
dition, embarrassment involved a greater sense of ex
posure.When embarrassed, people were more likely to
feel thatothers were looking, and theywere more fo
cused on others' judgments. Nonetheless, participants
perceived others' evaluations tobe more benign in em
barrassing situations. In particular, participants be
lieved thatothers were likely to be amused by the em
barrassing events, whereas shame- or guilt-inducing
events were amusing to no one. Perhaps of most im
port, people's motivation or "action tendencies" dif
fered depending on which emotion was experienced.
Relative to embarrassment, when feeling shame, peo
ple were more motivated to hide from others.When
feeling guilt, they were more motivated to make
amends.
Intensity of affect failed to account for these ob
served differences.When ratings of emotional inten
sity were factored out, striking differences between
shame and embarrassment remained. In short, the fact
that shame is a stronger feeling than embarrassment
does not account for the shamed individual's inclina
tion tohide, to feel isolated fromothers, and to feel dis
gusted with themselves.Moreover, compared to those
experiencing guilt, shamed individuals remainedmore
likely to feel small and inferior to others, to experience
physiological changes, and to feel exposed, even when
the intensityof the affectwas controlled for.
Similarly, experiential differences among these
emotions could not be explained simply by the degree
to which shame, embarrassment, and guilt-eliciting
events were perceived as involving moral transgres
sions (vs., say, violations of social norms). Consistent
with theory, shame and guilt were more likely to in
volve a sense of moral transgression thanwas embar
rassment. But when themorality dimension was fac
tored out, differences among the emotions along the
other experiential dimensions were, if anything,more
pronounced.
The evidence that shame and guilt are distinct emo
tions is even more substantial and comes from empiri
cal studies employing a range of methodologies -in
cluding qualitative case study analyses (Lewis, 1971;
Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz, Mascolo, &
DeRivera, 1995), content analyses of shame and guilt
narratives (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1990;
Tangney, 1992; Tangney,Marschall, Rosenberg,
Barlow,& Wagner, 1994), participants'
quantitative
ratings
of personalshameandguiltexperiences(e.g.,
45
 COMMENTARIES
Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Tangney, 1993;
Tangney et al., 1996; Wallbott & Scherer, 1988, 1995;
Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983), analyses of partici
pants' counterfactual thinking (Niedenthal, Tangney,
& Gavanski, 1994) and psychological and behavioral
correlatesof emotiondispositions,shame-proneness
and guilt-proneness (Stuewig & McCloskey, 2004;
Tangney, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney &
Mashek, 2004; Tangney & Stuewig, 2004; Tangney,
Stuewig, Kendall, Reinsmith, & Dearing, 2004;
Tangney,Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992).
This is not just a question of semantics. These are
real differences with real implications formotivation
and behavior. For example, research indicates thatfeel
ings of guilt are apt to prompt apologies and repara
tion,whereas feelings of shame are apt to prompt de
nial and escape. People appear better able toempathize
with others when experiencing guilt than shame. In
contrast, shame is uniquely associated anger and a pro
pensity to externalize blame.
It is difficult to reconcile the above findings with
Sabini and Silver's (this issue) assertion that "Shame,
guilt, and embarrassment are not, then, the names of
three,distinct experiential states." All told, in the case
of shame, guilt, and embarrassment, the semantics of
emotion seem to capture meaningful variations along
multiplerelevant -including physiologi
dimensions
cal reactions, subjective "raw" experience, attributions
and appraisals, audience perceptions and concerns,
and, not least,motivations for subsequent behavior.
Guilty is as Guilty Does?
Sabini and Silver (this issue) also argue for dis
pensing with guilt as an emotion distinct from shame,
largely because there is another dictionary definition
of the noun "guilt"-guilt in a factual sense. Essen
tially,Sabini and Silver argue thatone dictionary def
inition drives and defines another dictionary defini
tion. That is, guilt the feeling is what people
experience when they are guilty in the factual sense.
And because guilt the feeling (Meaning #1) doesn't
bear a one-to-one correspondence (or co-occurrence)
with the fact of guilt (Meaning #2), guilt the feeling
(Meaning #1) ismeaningless. But this state of affairs
should not arouse too much suspicion. Many, many
words in the English language have multiple mean
ings. Some are more closely related than others. We
may use the term "guilt" to refer to a particular feel
ing thatwe thinkpeople should (or believe people of
ten do) experience upon having committed a crime or
transgression. But it is also not necessary to insist
that the fact of guilt unerringly results in the feeling
of guilt,inorderforthelattertobe meaningful.In
fact,in our ongoingresearchwith jail inmateswe
findmeaningfulvariationin theirfeelingsofguilt
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this in spite of the probability thatmost of the partici
pants are legally guilty of criminal transgression.
There are very few types of situations that reliably re
sult in the same emotion for all of humanity. Insults
may result in anger formany people, but insults can
also elicit shame, embarrassment, pride (e.g., Al
Franken may take pride in Bill O'Reilly's accusation
thathe is a knee-jerk liberal) or no emotional reaction
at all! On the flip side, insults are not the only type of
event that causes feelings of anger (e.g., Averill,
1988; Berkowitz, 1989). People become angry when
frustrated, thwarted, treated unjustly, or when simply
stung by a bee-all in the absence of any hint of an
insult. Suggesting the need for a one-to-one relation
ship between eliciting event and emotional experi
ence is bound to be problematic, theoretically and
empirically.
Moving Forward
We are pleased to see Sabini and Silver (this issue)
presenting new and interesting ideas relating to some
of the self-conscious emotions. We agree with Tracy
and Robins (2004a) that these emotions, while central
to psychological functioning, have been under-re
searched, and that"... the time is ripe to devote greater
attention to self-conscious emotions" (p. 104).
What is needed tomove forward our knowledge of
emotional experience, and thewords used to describe
these experiences? In our view, systematic empirical
inquiry building on clear theoryusing multiple meth
ods would be most helpful. Answers to the pressing
questions about emotion are not likely to be found just
in the face, nor just in thenature of the emotion-elicit
ing situation, nor just in the cognitive appraisals.
Multi-pronged, interdisciplinary investigation offers
tremendous promise.
In the 1960's and 1970's, emotion researchers cham
pioned thenotion thatone kind of arousal served as the
base forall emotional experiences-a position thatcon
tributed to and was informed by the now famous
Schacter and Singer (1962) studies. At that time, re
searchers were focusing on a narrow set of biological
markers-primarily those involving autonomic arousal.
With the increasing availability of powerful
psychobiological measurement tools, now is an exciting
time in the study of emotions-many other biological
markers can now be assessed. Whether employing the
methods of neuroimaging or psychoneuroimmunology,
researchers can evaluate a number of differentphysio
logical concomitants of emotional variants. For exam
ple, Kemeny, Gruenewald, and Dickerson (2004) have
argued that the self-conscious emotions are related to
important psychobiological
processesand thatshame
and guiltmay be differentiated
physiologically.
More
specific,ina recent
experimental
studytheyfoundthat
 COMMENTARIES

induced shame, but not guilt or general negative emo cedents and facial expressions of emotion. Cognition and Emo
tion, 10, 155-171.
tion,was related to higher levels of proinflammatory
Kemeny, M. E., Gruenewald, T. L., & Dickerson, S. S. (2004).
cytokine activity (Dickerson, Kemeny, Aziz, Kim, & Shame as the emotional response to threat to the social self: Im
Fahey, 2004). Although, none of us are experts in plications for behavior, physiology, and health. Psychological
biopsychology or neuropsychology we expect thatstud Inquiry, 15(2), 153-160.

ies employing brain-based measurement strategieswill Kemeny, M., Gruenewald, T., & Dickerson, S. (2004, January). The

further inform the debate. Of course, knowing what physiological impact of threats to the social self and shame. In
J.L. Tracy & R. W. Robins (Chairs), Current Directions in re
brain areas are associated with a particular experience is
search on self-conscious emotions. Symposium conducted at
only a piece of the larger puzzle. For example, if one themeetings of the Society of Personality and Social Psychol
were to find that shame and guilt are indeed associated ogy, Austin, TX.
with the same brain areas, the debate over the unique Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: Inter
national Universities Press.
ness of these emotional experiences would nevertheless
Lindsay-Hartz, J. (1984). Contrasting experiences of shame and
continue. After all, we already know these two experi
guilt. American Behavioral Scientist, 27, 689-704.
ences are profoundly differenton the subjective level.
Lindsay-Hartz, J., de Rivera, J.,& Masc?lo, M. (1995). Differenti
The subjective interpretationof physiology may be just ating shame and guilt and their effects on motivation. In J. P.
as important-if notmore so-than thebase physiology Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), Self-conscious emotions:
Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 274-300). New
(e.g., Schacter & Singer). Again, thebest bet is to tackle
York: Guilford.
these questions on multiple levels ranging from the
Miller, R. S. (1996). Embarrassment: Poise and peril in everyday
brain, to the subjective, to theobserved.
life.New York: Guilford.
Moreover, the fieldof emotion researchwould bene Miller, R. S., & Tangney, J.P. (1994). Differentiating embarrassment
fitfroma clearer linguistical frameworkwhen referring and shame. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 13,

to the construct of "emotion." As evidenced by Sabini 273-287.

and Silver, phrases such as "mental state," "bodily
state," "emotion," "feeling," "raw feeling," "emotional
experience," and "experiential state" are often used in
terchangeably.Ultimately, the semantic struggle to dif
ferentiate"real" emotions will be more productive once
experimental domain of interest is clearly articulated.
Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J. P., & Gavanski, I. (1994). "If only I
weren't" versus "If only I hadn't": Distinguishing shame and
guilt in counterfactual thinking. Journal of Personality and So
cial Psychology, 67, 585-595.
Ortony, A., & Turner, T. J. (1990). What's basic about basic emo
tions? Psychological Review, 97, 315-331.
Schacter, S. & Singer, J.E. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiologi
cal determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review, 69,
379-399.

Stuewig, J.,& McCloskey, L. A. (2004). The impact ofmaltreatment

on adolescent shame and guilt: Psychological routes todepres
Note
sion and delinquency. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Tangney, J. P. (1991). Moral affect: The good, the bad, and the
June Tangney, George Mason University, Depart
ugly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61,
ment of Psychology,, 3F5, 4400 University Drive, 598-607.

Fairfax, VA 22030. E-mail: jtangney@gmu.edu
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(2004). Immunological effects of induced shame and guilt. Psy published manuscript.
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(Eds.), The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental ex
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 COMMENTARIES

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