Professional Documents
Culture Documents
60(2) 177–198
Courage and Compassion in © 2010 American Association for
Adult and Continuing Education
the Striving for Authenticity: Reprints and permission: http://www.
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States of Complacency, DOI: 10.1177/0741713609349933
http://aeq.sagepub.com
Carolin Kreber
Abstract
Synthesising Martha Nussbaum’s study of the emotions and the capabilities approach
to human development with Charles Taylor’s claim that authentic identities ought to
be constructed dialogically against “horizons of significance,” the author identifies
critical features of authenticity that are then applied to the context of adult educators,
learners, and pedagogies. With the purpose of surfacing the context-transcendent
structure underlying the experience of struggling for authenticity, the article takes
as its point of departure the context of coming out about one’s sexual orientation.
The metaphor of “coming out” is subsequently extended to the process of striving
for authenticity also in other contexts.This striving involves overcoming complacency
and compliance and engaging in contestation, has both a psychological and sociological
dimension, and is associated with the civic virtues of courage and compassion. The
author also speculates on why authenticity is perceived as a timely notion by many
adult and higher education professionals.
Keywords
authenticity, identity, recognition, pedagogy, policy
Maybe all men and women ponder the meaning of life; but some, for good historical
reasons, are driven to ponder it more urgently than others.
although at that time to “know thyself,” as Socrates’ famous dictum states, meant to
come to know your place as it was already determined by the wider cosmic order. By
the 18th century, this ancient cosmocentric worldview had given way first to a theo-
centric (giving oneself over to and finding meaning in God) and eventually to an
anthropocentric worldview, whereby self-knowledge and meaning were now seen as
being attainable by looking primarily inwardly and by identifying one’s personal feel-
ings and desires (Guignon, 2004; Hall, 2004). The influence of this 17th/18th century
idea of the human being as a self-encapsulated individual or sovereign subject is still
reflected in current conceptions of authenticity.
Today, reflections on authenticity are more commonly attributed to the Romantics
(most prominently perhaps Jean-Jacques Rousseau) and the Existentialists (foremost
Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard, and eventually Jean-Paul Sartre and
Martin Heidegger). Then again, in the 1960s, Adorno (2003) argued in the spirit of the
Frankfurt School, that Heidegger (1962), in Being and Time (originally published in
1927), had failed to appreciate that it was only by way of critically reconstructing the
evolution of historical forms of consciousness that people could recognize their real
emancipatory possibilities and, hence, become “authentic.” Even more recently, several
philosophers including Charles Taylor (1991) in Canada, Bernard Williams (2004) in
the United Kingdom, and Hubert Dreyfus (2000), Charles Guignon (2004), and Martha
Nussbaum (2000, 2004) in the United States (although Nussbaum implicitly and from
an Aristotelian perspective) have built on previous reflections on “authenticity” and
offered insightful interpretations regarding its nature as well as the role it might play
in our (post)modern lives and societies.
Most pertinent to this present study is the observation that over the past few
years the notion of authenticity has also entered the disciplinary discourse of aca-
demics in the field of education. A great number of British (e.g., Barnett, 2007;
Kreber, Klampfleitner, McCune, Bayne, & Knottenbelt, 2007; Nixon, 2004, 2007;
Walker, 2004) and North American academics in adult and higher education (e.g.,
Brookfield, 2006; Chickering, Dalton, & Stamm, 2006; Cranton & Carusetta, 2004;
Dillard, 2006; Dirkx, 2006; Palmer, 1998; Tisdell, 2003) as well as organizational
and school leadership (e.g., Grimmet & Neufeld, 1994; Sergiovanni, 1992; Starratt,
2004) have identified authenticity as a significant concept in what it means to
engage in higher or more worthwhile forms of teaching, learning, and leading.
Although there is variation in the conceptions of authenticity underlying the authors’
perspectives, their shared interest in authenticity is note-worthy and invites some
difficult yet intriguing questions: Why do adult and higher education professionals
feel a need to draw our attention to “authenticity” these days? What is so compel-
ling about this notion? Are we, to lean on the opening quote by Terry Eagleton,
particularly driven, possibly for good historical reasons, to ponder the meaning in
our teaching or learning practices more urgently now than we once were? Might
authenticity offer a solution or meaningful response to what we perceive as the
most significant challenges facing us at present in the field of adult and higher
education? If so, can authenticity be attained by searching exclusively internally,
that is within ourselves, or does it require looking also beyond the self—and if this
were true, where else might we look?
One purpose of this conceptual study, therefore, is to speculate on some of the broader
contextual/political factors that might account for this increased interest in authentic-
ity among adult and higher education professionals. My other purpose is to explore
whether authenticity is indeed an ideal that professional educators, learners, and edu-
cational institutions (via their pedagogies, broadly conceived) should seek to strive
towards and to reflect on what this striving might entail. My intent, therefore, is to
enquire into the meaning of authenticity generally and the struggle that might underlie
the process of becoming authentic in adult and higher education in the midst of factors
that make such striving difficult. My final and overall purpose is to explore how the
notion of “authenticity” might contribute to the advancement of theory and practice in
adult and higher education.
I will address the first two related purposes in reverse order. I shall first look into
the relationship between individuals and society to highlight problems with narrow
interpretations of authenticity. I will also explore the responsibility of both individuals
and society in working towards and allowing for authenticity (e.g., Eagleton, 2007;
Guignon, 2004; Nussbaum, 2004; Taylor, 1991). In a later section of the article, I apply
some of the emerging concepts to the field of teaching and learning in adult and higher
education.
With the purpose of surfacing the general or context-transcendent structure under-
lying the experience of struggling for authenticity, I take as my point of departure the
context of coming out about one’s sexual orientation. As a way into this discussion, I
chose a narrative approach based on an autobiographical account. The metaphor of
“coming out” is subsequently extended to the process of striving for authenticity in
other, also educational, contexts. Important work has been carried out by colleagues in
adult and higher education with the intent to challenge homophobia and heterosexism
in educational institutions as well as wider society and to raise awareness of the per-
sonal and political challenges associated with the recognition of different sexual
identities (e.g., Bettinger, Timmins, & Tisdell, 2006; Grace, 2001; Grace & Wells,
2007; Hill, 2006). This work has had an undeniable influence on the way we have
come to think about diversity and the nature of inclusive practices in adult and higher
education, and continuation of such work is critical if we want our research and prac-
tice to make it possible for learners to make a difference and experience a sense of
agency for renewing the world. The point of intersection between these colleagues’
work and the present article is a shared motivation to identify the challenges associ-
ated with confronting heterosexism and struggling for recognition. This being said, the
focus of this article is not sexual orientation. The intent here is to, firstly, by way of a
concrete example offered as a narrative, identify the context-transcendent structure that
underlies the experience of becoming authentic and, secondly, to identify the political
and also pedagogical implications for recognizing differences generally. Hence, what is
at stake in the autobiographically based narrative is the structure of the experience more
so than the particular story floating on the surface. I offer my own experience of
struggling over coming out at work, within the particular context of sexual orientation,
as an example of an academic who is working through her emotions and thoughts
when trying to understand how to live her life as an adult educator and colleague more
authentically. The structure underlying this experience might resonate with the experi-
ence of colleagues (or learners) who were struggling for authenticity in contexts other
than sexual orientation. A parallel approach was employed by Martha Nussbaum
(2004) in her book Upheavals of Thought, which she opens with the particular experi-
ence of struggling with her mother’s unexpected death with the purpose of helping
readers appreciate the nature and general structure of emotions and the role they play
in ethical deliberation.
Rather than employing the narrative as data from which to generate theory (e.g.,
Nash, 2004) or analyzing the account “to discover internal patterns and inconsisten-
cies” (Brookfield, 2008, p. 97) in my reflections and actions, I am using the narrative
principally as a stylistic heuristic by which to draw the reader into the topic and call
attention to dimensions of authenticity that have been highlighted in the contemporary
philosophical literature. By implication I suggest that the explicit purpose with which
I employ the narrative in this conceptual study renders otherwise justified worries over
the accuracy of my recollections irrelevant.
The more heavily theorized and main part of the article then departs from the
specifics of the narrative to discuss aspects of authenticity that transcend particular
experiences, including some to which the narrative itself did not speak.
The narrative reveals states of complacency, compliance, and contestation and
shows that authenticity was yearned for from a state of perceived inauthenticity
(Barnett, 2007). It also casts doubt on a conception of authenticity as being exclu-
sively about attaining greater self-knowledge and self-fulfilment suggesting that
authenticity might also have an important social dimension. In the widest sense,
the story speaks to the relationship between authenticity and public deliberation. I
shall draw on several relevant philosophical and educational texts to inform my
discussion.
an all too familiar voice whispering into my ear, “Here they go again, these gay people,
sharing with everyone that they are different. What’s with them?”
My pen-friend’s response was clear and to the point: “So you prefer living with a
lie.” There was a lot of force in that statement. Living with a lie made me a liar. That
one sounded even worse. It hurt a bit, too. After all, I never denied anything and I pre-
sented myself as “pro-LGBT rights” in the department or in my classes when these
issues happened to come up. As well, over the years I had become somewhat more
open, and when somebody actually asked me directly, I would disclose; but I was only
too aware that these opportunities presented themselves on rather rare occasions, which
is to say, practically never (except, of course, with the few colleagues who had become
friends over the years). At that time I found some comfort by telling myself that it did
not really matter: “After all, what I have disclosed about myself in the department are
those aspects of self that should count here and my private life is nobody’s business.”
Except that I also knew that, firstly, people’s private lives (particularly so-called “straight”
lives) do bubble up at work all the time and, secondly, that most colleagues (and prob-
ably students as well) inferred that I was “straight” because I did not say otherwise and
also did not fit the stereotype by which mainstream (straight) culture often chooses to
define women who deviate in some aspects from this (straight) culture.
My e-pal had put her finger on a sore spot that had been causing me concern for
some time. I wanted to see it as my own personal issue, one that would not affect
anyone but myself (“Isn’t it just a matter of being a bit more private?”), one that I
could live with, more or less well depending on the day. On some level, of course, I
had a sense that not challenging people’s assumptions and beliefs despite knowing that
they were misguided bordered on betrayal or disloyalty, although it was not really
clear to me whom, or rather what, I was betraying or being disloyal to. Also, while
I did not deny who I was, I did let others in the department do the drumming for the
cause (planning LGBT events, raising LGBT issues in department meetings, etc.).
Despite my insights, there was also a great deal of self-deception. Part of my prob-
lem surely was that I did not know how to come out and set the record queer, which
probably is also to an extent personality-related. But it was only a part of it, and a
small one at that. Today, I have to say that for someone in my privileged position,
someone lucky enough to hold a secure continuing academic post in a relatively safe
and enlightened university education department, there were no serious reasons to not
move beyond the lie. What I did not see at the time, or rather did not see strongly
enough, was why I ought to.
Complacency
On one level, one may argue, my being quiet and accepting the fact that people
thought my identity was mainstream is an example of pure complacency. The think-
ing here goes something like this: “Nobody ever asks me, so how could I be lying.”
Of course, enjoying the benefits that go along with being part of dominant culture can
be comfortable too. Perhaps my actions were similar to Heidegger’s (1962) view of
unauthenticity or “everydayness” (as compared to inauthenticity, the latter referring to
deliberate deceit) and Nietzsche’s (1883) notion of following the herd. The unauthen-
ticity, if one can call it that, was then not deliberate betrayal but was rather the result
of being nonreflective. Complacency, in this context, is about not wanting to push or
challenge oneself too much. It is a sense of self-betrayal or delusion where underlying
assumptions are neither fully identified nor questioned. But was I just complacent?
The narrative suggests not.
Compliance
My sporadic and nagging doubts about the way in which I justified my actions also
imply that I was experiencing a form of compliance. My actions did not feel quite
right, suggesting that I was aware of a sense of betrayal, at least on some level, but
I did not break out of conforming to the norm or of what seemed to be the expectation.
In this sense, I preferred complying with dominant culture. Basically, I did not want to
unnecessarily rock the boat. As well, I think now, I did not want to be one of “these
gay people who tell everyone that they are gay.” I cared about what people might say
about me behind my back. This last point was actually very hard to admit to myself:
Why should this matter to me? As academics, aren’t we usually quite prepared to
defend our own views or convictions and express them in discussion (i.e., in public)—
after all, this is what we learned to do not the least through years of studying and
working in higher education environments. However, in this case, it was more difficult
somehow; it mattered to me on a different or deeper level. What was involved here
was not an abstract intellectual argument but my own identity.
So while complacency is principally about not wanting to challenge oneself, compli-
ance is primarily about consciously submitting to and not wanting to challenge norms
and expectations.
Contestation
My later decision to do something about this situation, specifically to discuss my dis-
comfort and seeking input from my e-pal novelist, can perhaps be considered first
steps toward contestation. Given that she was a professional writer who had come out
in public years ago, at a time when it was much harder and far riskier to do so and
potentially damaging to her career, I anticipated when sharing my doubts with her that
she would hold strong views and would not encourage my silence. My interactions
with her brought the issue to a level where my assumptions could be critically ques-
tioned, not only by her but, importantly, by myself. While complacency refers to not
being willing to push or challenge oneself, and compliance to not being willing to
challenge others (including norms and expectations), contestation refers to challeng-
ing both oneself and others (including norms and expectations).
What I came to see more clearly over time was who or rather what I was betraying
through my actions. In his insightful book Being Authentic, Guignon (2004) argues
that the reason we value authenticity is that “being authentic plays a fundamental role
in nurturing and sustaining the kind of society in which something like authenticity
as an ideal is possible” (p. 161). Being authentic, thus conceived, has two related
aspects: first, getting clear about what one’s own deliberations lead one to believe, and
second, honestly and fully expressing this in public places. As Guignon (2004) fur-
ther elaborates:
By not making explicit my own difference, by swimming mainstream, and hence not
deliberately challenging what one may call an entrenched or widely shared stereotype
of gays or lesbians, I did not betray myself primarily, nor primarily my colleagues,
but I was essentially betraying authenticity as an ideal. I was honest with myself, but
I did not meet the second criterion. By hesitating in finding the courage within me to
fully, meaning also publicly, come out about my own difference, I was betraying
exactly what I was wishing for: a society where certain forms of difference, such as
sexual orientation, do no longer matter. This was so because for it not to matter it first
has to be made explicit and to matter! The latter point gains additional purchase
through reference to the work of Charles Taylor (1991), which also serves to situate
the narrative within a broader societal and theoretical context.
In The Ethics of Authenticity, Taylor (1991) explores on what basis one might decide
which identities ought (or ought not) be formally recognized within a given society.
He also calls attention to the importance of public deliberation of values. A significant
concept in his discussion of formal recognition of different identities within a society
is that of “horizons of significance,” which he sees as the ultimate criteria against
which decisions regarding recognition should be made. They present, as Taylor (1991)
further explains, “a picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be, whereby
terms such as better or higher offer a standard we ought to desire” (p. 16). Taylor
(1991) argues that authenticity is not the same as creative self-definition (which nowa-
days it is often construed as). While an exclusively subjectively constructed identity is
based on what I deem to be significant (to myself), what is truly significant, Taylor
suggests, I alone do not determine. Authentic identities need to be constructed around
larger horizons of significance that transcend my own subjectivity. If Taylor means to
say here that identities, to be recognized, must be bound by horizons that are both pre-
given and eternal, many readers might find this troublesome (because this would mean
that a society puts a priori constraints on who gets recognized, which, by definition,
means that it is based on inequality). On the other hand, we all can think of certain
ways of being, or “identities,” that we would not wish to see recognized in a society
that identifies with fundamental principles of democracy, such as equality (e.g., most
of us would not wish to grant formal recognition to holocaust deniers, or fundamental-
ists, for example, who do not grant this very right to others). The issue of constraints
to the recognition of differences is therefore both an important and at the same time
highly contested one (for an interesting discussion of this point, particularly the dis-
tinction between “a politics of equal dignity” versus “a politics of difference”; see
Cooke, 1997). The point I wish to focus on here is the extent to which horizons of sig-
nificance (which present the whole of our socially constructed traditions and cultural
views) themselves can become subject to public deliberation. My reading of Taylor
(1991) is that these horizons themselves are open to deliberation in the public sphere.
While, to paraphrase Taylor, I alone do not determine what is significant and identities
should be constructed also around horizons of significance that transcend my own sub-
jectivity, public deliberation of what is significant, over time, may lead to changes in
what is considered a shared background of things that matter to us in a society. In a
recent e-mail exchange, Charles Guignon commented that the view I articulate above
is “exactly that of Gadamer, and, as a Gadamerian, I would totally agree. . . . Also, as a
Gadamerian, Taylor should agree” (personal communication, January 30, 2009).
approach to human development, Martha Nussbaum (2000) further proposed that the
three capabilities of bodily integrity, emotions, and affiliation, which all address
directly people’s need for opportunities to experience and develop the capacity for
sexual expression/satisfaction as well as the capacity to love and experience emotional
health, are essential for living a good life. According to this reasoning, all people,
regardless of sexual orientation, would need to experience environments within which
to nurture these capabilities. While it is unknown whether this argument would, for
Taylor (1991), have justified recognition of same sex marriage (given the deep tradi-
tions associated with the institution of marriage), one would assume it would have led
him to look favourably on the recognition of same-sex unions. (As an aside, I add that
he wrote The Ethics of Authenticity [Taylor, 1991] well over a decade before his own
country, Canada, recognized and legalized same-sex marriage, next to Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Spain.)
Importantly then horizons of significance represent a shared set of culturally con-
structed fundamental values by which a community (or society) decides to guide itself.
As has become clear by now, Taylor is actually quite sceptical of a notion of authentic-
ity that links the idea of “being true to and defining oneself” immediately to claims for
formal recognition, irrespective of the horizons of significance that are deemed essen-
tial in a given society. Authenticity needs to be construed differently, therefore, without
losing the worthwhile aspect that being true to oneself entails. Taylor proposes that an
authentic identity is not just created by looking inwardly (that is, subjectively) but
involves self-definition in dialogue around horizons of significance. This means that
we come to define ourselves and seek recognition against a background of issues that
really matter to us as members of a given society. My reading of Taylor, as discussed
before, is that what is recognized as “mattering” is itself open to deliberation.
same as being confirmed for one’s views; greater authenticity will sometimes mean to
have changed one’s own views. In terms of “recognition,” one might want to say that
we recognise one another when we listen to one another’s views. This I would say is
the “weaker” (though no less important) meaning of recognition. The “stronger” form of
recognition, as in the recognition of same-sex marriage, actually depends on the wea
ker form. By “coming out,” that is by engaging in contestation and debate, one becomes
part of a larger process that is aimed at preserving and allowing for a life that makes
possible authenticity as a moral ideal, one that a society can choose to guide itself by
(Taylor, 1991). “Coming out” publicly is as essential for authenticity as the more inter-
nal process of freeing oneself from the “they” (Heidegger, 1962), separating from the
herd (Nietzsche, 1883), or being “disencumbered” by dominant voices (Barnett, 2007);
both processes matter.
that is to the fulfilment of our typically human faculties (Nussbaum, 2000, 2004).
Likewise Eagleton (2007) argued that human flourishing is ultimately reciprocal; we
work towards our own flourishing by helping others with their flourishing.
on the bases of race, sex, etc.); being able to live with and towards others; being able
to imagine the situation of someone else and experiencing compassion; and by exten-
sion, having the capacity for both justice and friendship.
Precis
Before exploring the various ideas addressed so far for their applicability to the con-
text of teaching and learning in adult and higher education, it might be helpful to
briefly revisit them and their connections. From Taylor (1991), we get the insight that,
firstly, the formal recognition (in its “strong” sense) of identities is tied to socially
constructed horizons of significance; second, identities, therefore, need to be con-
structed dialogically (rather than by looking only inwardly); and thirdly, political
participation and public deliberation of issues of importance to society is critical to a
democracy. One might also say that Taylor argues that we shall not be complacent and
ignore larger horizons of significance. Extending Taylor’s (1991) argument, I pro-
posed that the horizons of significance, while they provide a framework against which
decisions can be made, need not be seen as something we passively comply with
either; instead, although these horizons do provide needed standards, they themselves
can be deliberated and contested, and thereby, over time, may change. An example is
offered by the recent re-definition of marriage (as not being restricted to two people of
the opposite sex) in some countries.
Guignon (2004) proposed the idea that as people make explicit what they believe
and stand for, and offer their reasons in public (in other words as they “come out”
publicly), they do not only act authentically but contribute to a society in which authen-
ticity, and by extension, public deliberation of differing values, is possible. I noted that
as part of this “coming out” process, one might not just influence others but also be
influenced by others and, hence, change one’s own deeply held views, which in turn
contributes to one’s own authenticity.
Drawing on Nussbaum’s work, my intent was to show that the universal values
upon which the capabilities approach to human development is based, as manifested
by the 10 categories of capabilities she outlines, could, if deliberated (and found con-
vincing) in public, become part of our “horizon of significance” on whose basis we
make decisions about how to organise our societies’ social services (including educa-
tion). Nussbaum herself is clear about offering her list of capabilities in a Socratic
fashion and highlights the need for further deliberation on these.
So what I would like to conclude here, in a synthesis of Nussbaum’s and Taylor’s
respective analyses, is that the right to “happiness,” the right to living a fulfilling life,
or “human flourishing,” should or could be a “horizon of significance” (Taylor, 1991)
against which to recognise each other (in its weaker sense) and to organise social serv-
ices including education (se also Walker, 2006). Moreover, I suggest that living
authentically involves, next to living a “happy,” meaningful, and fulfilled life, a will-
ingness to “come out” to oneself and others and thereby an openness to engage in
public deliberation and contestation. This involves both courage and compassion.
These ideas, I suggest, have profound implications for teaching and learning in adult
and higher education.
ethical and democratic political imagination . . . so that they are able to see the
world from other points of views, understand themselves in relation to the
world, and grasp their own agency in relation to knowledge and action in an
uncertain world. (p. 145)
includes developing higher-order thinking skills and the personal qualities and dispo-
sitions that go along with the concept of developing criticality. He and Baxter Magolda
both recognize the epistemological and ontological dimensions of student learning.
Baxter Magolda (1998) argues that students need to develop self-authorship, which
she defined as “a way of making meaning of one’s experiences from inside oneself”
(p. 152). Importantly, self-authorship hinges not only on the student’s intellectual
development but also on the individual being able to engage in constructive and mean-
ingful relationships with those who hold a different point of view. “Critical being” and
“self-authorship” require a willingness to push oneself forward (avoiding compla-
cency) and to challenge received wisdom and expectations (avoiding compliance),
thereby engaging in contestation and deliberation. In other words, it involves “coming
out” publically.
In the next section, I will extrapolate from the ideas discussed so far to speculate on
some of the reasons why professionals in adult and higher education consider authen-
ticity such a compelling idea, particularly during these times.
Turning to the role of educators, Nixon (2007) argued that their “conditions of
work which are often deeply alienating and inauthentic” (p. 22). Below I feature in
point form some plausible contextual factors that might contribute to this felt sense
of alienation and inauthenticity among educators:
More generally, many observers feel a growing tension between higher education’s
intellectual, critical, theoretical, and moral purposes, and those that are more practical
and economic in nature and oriented toward providing a service to society (e.g.,
Rowland, 2006; Walker, 2006). While both to critique (or contest) and to serve (or
comply) are important, there is a growing sense that the former is being lost as economic
imperatives take over.
These larger contextual issues, one might argue, trickle down and make them-
selves felt in the particular contexts in which we work and our students learn.
Constraints on choice regarding matters of curriculum (or research) and constraints
on what is considered worthwhile knowledge to be shared can easily be seen as lead-
ing to alienation on the part of both educators and learners. Being forced into
situations where we cannot make decisions based on our best convictions is therefore
a plausible factor promoting inauthenticity. This sense of inauthenticity, in turn,
makes some of us yearn for greater authenticity. Such inauthenticity, therefore, is
often a matter of compliance with external expectations, although over time, it can
develop into complacency, whereby we do not even realize that we conform to exter-
nal demands. Such a state might then perhaps more accurately be referred to as
unauthenticity. Students adopting so-called surface and/or strategic approaches to
their studying (Marton, Hounsell, & Entwistle, 1997) with the motivation of meeting
course requirements in courses overloaded with content so as to secure good grades
(as contrasted from deep approaches engaged in with the motivation to understand,
analyze, and evaluate) is a good example of them being compliant (inauthentic)
with the course structure or eventually simply falling into complacency. Likewise,
educators orienting their teaching practice on entrenched departmental or institu-
tional teaching and learning traditions can be seen as an example of compliance (as
when these traditions or practices are enacted out of fear of the consequences of chal-
lenging existing norms) or of complacency (as when these traditions or practices
have become so internalised that envisioning alternatives without external input has
become impossible).
One concern relates to the importance of “coming out” about one’s own views or
“difference.” “Coming out,” as we saw, has two components: “coming out” to oneself
(and, relatedly, confronting the truth about oneself) and “coming out” in public in a
sense of making one’s views or difference known so that it can be deliberated in the
public sphere (Guignon, 2004). Oftentimes, we tend to think of authenticity only in
terms of the former, reflecting what I would call a psychological interest in authentic-
ity (the focus is on the self-knowledge, growth, development, or individuation of the
person) rather than a sociological interest (the focus is on the role of authenticity in
group relations). Guignon’s (2004) observation that authenticity involves not just
looking inwardly (as in finding our “true self”) but has a social dimension is relevant
here in understanding the two interests.
A second concern, which I argued is a plausible motivation for present interest
among adult and higher education professionals in authenticity, is bound up directly
with the notion of recognition, as well as courage and compassion. As several philoso-
phers and educationalists remind us, authenticity is not simply a matter of asserting
one’s own claims to recognition but also of supporting others in raising their claims to
recognition. From an ethical point of view, authenticity (also within the context of
education) has always been linked in some way to courage and compassion, to justice
and the common good (see Grimmet & Neufeld, 1994; Guignon, 2004; Nixon, 2007;
Starratt, 2004; Taylor, 1991; Walker, 2006).
Final Comment
Authenticity does not refer to a single phenomenon (as in looking only inwardly to find
one’s true self). Part of what is intriguing and compelling about this notion is indeed its
multidimensionality and complexity; and by acknowledging this, authenticity can sug-
gest new possibilities for theorizing about, and improving upon our practice in, adult and
higher education. As Walker (2006) reminds us, our professional responsibility as educa-
tors involves not just pointing to the roots of the problem but “we ought to connect such
research to practical attempts to improve higher (or add ‘adult’) education” (p. 130).
What I tried to do in this article is not just explore the meaning of authenticity (Kreber
et al., 2007) but open up a more in-depth discussion about how and why authenticity mat-
ters to us in adult and higher education and how we may want to act upon these insights.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.
References
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Bio
Carolin Kreber is Director of the Centre for Teaching, Learning and Assessment at the Univer-
sity of Edinburgh where she is also Professor of Higher and Community Education.