Si 1985 8 2 223

Emotion as Lived Experience
Author(s): Norman K. Denzin

Source: Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 1985), pp. 223-240
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction
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EMOTION AS LIVED EXPERIENCE*
Norman K. Denzin
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
The place of the lived body in emotional experience is examined. Four layers, or levels, of
lived-emotion are identifid. (1) sensible feelings, (2) feelings of the lived body, (3) intentional
value-feelings, (4) feelings of the self or the moral person. An account of lived emotionality
given by James Joyce is analyzed. The importance of a phenomenological and interactionist
view of self, emotionality and social experience is indicated.
Until quite recently the emotionsper se have received inconsistent attention in the symbolic
interactionist literature (Denzin, 1980, 1983b, 1984a). However sporadic and unsustained
this early attention may have been, James, Cooley, Dewey and Mead did give emotions
’
serious attention in a significant number of places. Mead and Dewey attempted to revise
and elaborate James’s theory of the emotions within an expanded interactionist-pragmatist
view of the social act. Cooley extended James’s views of self-feelings into his theory of
the looking-glass self. Mead, in turn, criticized Cooley for using assertive self-feeling as
an explanation of self-reflexivity, rather than recognizing self-feeling as a part of the
problematic itself to be explained. Blumer (1969:16, 62, 11l), while not focusing on the
emotions explicitly, has repeatedly drawn attention to the centrality of self-feelings and
self-indications in the formation of social action. Shibutani (1961) offered a quasi-theory
of emotionality in his model of sentiments and social action, as did Turner (1970). Gerth
and Mills (1964) attempted a merger of Mead and Freud on the emotions. Stone (1962,
1976, 1981) and Gross and Stone (1964) positioned value and mood centrally in the
theory of the social act. Strauss (1959) examined self-feelings in the organization of
identity transformations. Goffman (1959, 1%7, 1971, 1974, 1981) studied self-performance,
embarrassment, the insanity of place, and forms of emotional self-talk, attempting to
locate emotionality in the interactional and the ritual order (1983).
~ ~~~
* Direct all communications to: Norman K. Denzin, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, Urbana,
IL 61801.
Symbolic Interaction, Volume 8, Number 2, pages 223-240.

Copyright 0 1985 by JAI Press Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISSN: 0195-6086

224 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION Vol. 8/No. 2/1985
More recently Scheff (1979), Hochschild (1983b) and Shott (1979) have offered broader
interactionist statements of the interactionist point of view. They have argued, paradoxically,
that there has not been an interactionist treatment of the emotions. But the interactionists
have addressed the emotions, even if some think they have not (see Kemper, 1981, 1983;
Hunsaker, 1983:438-39; Denzin, 1980). Indeed Hochschild (1983b:212) suggests that
while Mead did not talk about the emotions, he cleared the way for their study.
However, sociological treatments of emotion have not benefitted from the works of
phenomenologists and existentialists (Heidegger [ 19271 1962, 1977, [ 19751 1982; Scheler,
[1913] 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 1963, 1964; Sartre, [1939] 1962, [1943] 1956). It is my
intention to address this literature and, in doing so, provide a phenomenology of the body
and the emotions which is consistent with interpretive interactionism (Denzin, 1983a). I
will attempt to restore the human body to a central place in the symbolic interactionist
conception of emotionality (see Schmitt, forthcoming). And, I will suggest how a merger
or alignment with the work of the phenomenologists may advance this understanding of
emotionality and social life (see Denzin, 1980, 1983b, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1984d,
1986). I will address the following topics: (1) the work of Heidegger, Scheler, Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre on emotion; (2) emotion’s body; (3) an instance of embodied emotionality
as offered by James Joyce (1976:396-97); (4) the four levels of lived emotion; and (5)
the methodological and theoretical implications of this point of view for interpretive
interactionism (Denzin, 1983a).
THE PHENOMENOLOGISTS ON EMOTION

The objective relativism of Mead (Mead, 19825) and the main tenets of symbolic in-
teractionist thought as presented by Blumer (1969) are compatible with the phenomenology
of Heidegger (1962, 1982), Sartre ([1943] 1956), Merleau-Ponty (1963, 1964), and
Scheler ([1913] 1970). Mead’s unit of analysis (the social act) and Blumer’s triadic
theory of interpretive meaning (act, object, self) locate emotionality in the field of
experience that confronts the interacting individual (Denzin, 1984b). Emotionality arises
out of inhibited, interpreted social acts in which the subject inserts self-conversations
between the perception of experience and the organization of action. In these conversations,
feelings directed to the self mediate action and interpretation. Emotionality becomes a
social act lodged in the social situation. Lived experience is the unit of analysis for Mead
and Blumer, as it is for Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Scheler.
Self-feelings for Mead, James, Blumer, and Heidegger ([1975] 1982:137) may be seen
as having a three-fold structure: (1) a sense of feeling in terms of self-awareness; (2) a
sense of the self feeling the feeling; and (3) a revealing of the moral, inner, interactional
meaning of this feeling for the self and its on-going plan of action.’ In these inner feelings
of self, a deep, feeling self is revealed to the subject. These feelings cut to the core of
the person, revealing profound inner meanings the subject holds toward himself. Hence
a circuit of selfness attaches the person to the world (Denzin, 1983b3407). In that circuit,
emotionality, self, and meaning are revealed. The subject is anchored to the world through
this interactional circuit that joins his inner and outer streams of experience with the
experiences of others.

Emotion as Lived Experience 225
Deep and surface meanings of the person are thereby revealed in this interaction process.
In this article deep and surface refer to the private, inner self and the public, observed
self, respectively. These terms are used phenomenologically and are not meant to imply
that one domain of action and experience is more “real” or “authentic” than the other.
These points will be discussed in further detail below.
Surface meanings reflect the taken-for-granted feelings of the person; that is, the
glossed, structural self of Goffman (1961). But the deep, inner, moral self, the self of
deep pride, shame, guilt, anger, remorse, or ressentiment is given in those interactional
experiences that reflect turning point moments for the subject (Scheler, [1912] 1961;
James, [1904] 1961; Heidegger, [1975] 1982; Straws, 1959; Garfinkel, 1967).
Emotionality, as a social process, is in the structure of experience the subject confronts.
Emotion is self-feeling having the three-fold structure as outlined before: that is, a sense
of feeling, a sense of self feeling the feeling, and a revealing of the interactional meaning
of the feeling to the self. Emotion and emotionality are neither in the subject, nor in the
body. They are located in the relationship the subject has with himself and with his lived
body. This is the body as experienced, which, while a physical entity, is also an existential
reality. The physiological body is not just a structure of sensations, but it is a lived body
that is given meaning by the subject in the world of interaction (Merleau-Ponty, 1963;
Plessner, 1970; Strasser, 1970).
There is a double structure to emotion’s movement: a feeling of self that emotion
reveals to the self, and the movement into a line of action that enacts emotionality and
feeling. On the basis of emotionality the subject is led to act morally, on behalf of himself
and on behalf of others. Emotionality draws the subject into social, moral, and emotional
relations with others (see Denzin, 1984a:240-246).
These others are termed emotional associates. They are others who are implicated in
the subject’s emotional world of experience. They may be witnesses to an emotional
experience, or others with whom the subject shares the experience after the fact. They
may be intimate significant others (Sullivan, 1953), orientational others (Kuhn, 1964),
situation-specificothers (Denzin,1982), contemporariesof the person (Schutz and Luckmann,
1973), persons in a “we” relationship with the person (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973),
distant “theylike” others (Heidegger, [ 19271 1962, [ 19751 1982), or complete strangers,
significant only because they are present while an emotional event occurs (Schutz, 1964).
Emotional associates may be co-participants in the emotional practices or emotional
projects of the person. Or they may be the interpreters of the individual’s emotional
experiences. The emotional associate is a significant emotional other because his presence
in the subject’s emotional experience becomes an integral part of that experience. These
others aid in and contribute to the embodied feelings the subject experiences in the
emotional situation.
I draw attention to the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre because
their perspective, more so than the interactionists, calls for an analysis of the lived body
as it enters into the emotional experience.
The lived body, which is Merleau-Ponty’s (1963, 1968:256) term, is a body-for-the-
person, a body-for-others (Sartre, [1943] 1956), a physiological body, and a sounding
board for bodily sensations. It is a psychic body (James, [1890] 1950, Vol. 2:471; Sartre,

226 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION Vol. 8iNo. 211985
[1943] 1956:338; Denzin, 1984a:116). The subject has a three-fold relationship to his
body: he is his body, he is in his body, and he is outside his body (Plessner, 1970:35-
36).
By saying the subject is his body, as well as being in and out of his body, reference
is made to a two-fold process. First, the subject may lose himself in his embodied
emotionality, experiencing a version of what Scheff ( 1979:63) calls “underdistanced”
emotion. On the other hand, the subject may rise above his emotional experiences, and
bring reflective, interpretive meaning to his emotionality and the bodily-based sensations
he feels; being not exactly an “overdistanced” emotion (Scheff, 1979:62-63), such
emotional experiences give rise to reflected, redefined emotionality (Denzin, 1984a:103-
104). In both instances the subject draws on the resources of his body for the interpretations
he brings to the emotionality he is experiencing. That is, as a desiring, feeling, interpreting
self, he brings meaning to his embodied experiences as he interprets them. As Mead
would argue, he joins his mind, his body and his lived sensations in the emotional
experience. Through the process of emotional sociality he makes a facticity, or lived
event, out of the emotionality he interprets and defines. Like his self, his emotionality
enters the social situation as a symbolically objectified social process.
The social phenomenologial study of emotionality begins -not with the physiologial
body, or with structures external to the individual-with the lived experiences of the
subject in the social situation. Emotion is understood to refer to self-feelings that are
grounded in the social acts the subject directs to his self and has directed to her by others
(Denzin, 1984b).
The subject in the phenomenologist’s account of emotionality is in the social situation,
as it is for Mead, James, Cooley, Blumer, and recent interactionists. He is interacting
with himself and with others. Reflective and non-reflective self-interactions (Sartre, [ 19391
1962) stand at the center of his emotional experiences. In every case the meaning of his
emotional experiences lie in his inner self-conversations.
Summarizing these comments, the phenomenologist and the interactionist share a com-
mitment to understand emotionality from within as lived experience. The resources for
empirical analysis are drawn from the lived experiences of interacting individuals. These
experiences are woven through the biographical structures of the subjects in question
(Sartre, [1960] 1981). The phenomenological point of view offers to the interactionist
the commitment to uncover from within the structures of emotionality. It is understood
that these structures are only interactional approximations, and in every instance different
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964). However, the experiential structure that stands at the center of
every emotional experience is the self. The phenomenologist shares this position with
the interactionist.
EMOTION’S BODY
As the foregoing suggests, the importance of the human body for the study of emotion
is not disputed. Emotions are embodied experiences,drawing upon the three-fold relationship
the subject may have with his body as outlined above. What is disputed are the interpretations
to be brought to the study of the body. Those investigators (Scheff, 1979; Kemper, 1981)

who emphasize the physiological and chemical transformations that accompany emotional
experience contribute little to a symbolic interactionist understanding of the emotions.
They sever the body from the lived consciousness, the self and the structures of embodied
experiences of the person. Embodied experience-the subject’s current felt attachment
to the situation in which he finds himself-is a moving, unfolding process that turns back
upon itself, trapping the subject in emotional feelings that are both desired and not desired.
As a process, embodied experience reaches outward to carry the subject into the field of
experience that attaches him to others. His body is both the vehicle for this movement
forward and the structure that radiates and expresses the feelings that he feels. Hence
embodied experience is situated, circular, temporal and dialectical, for it turns back upon
itself, affirming, denying and elaborating what is and is not felt.
Emotion’s body, as the phrase suggests, is at the heart of embodied experience (Sudnow,
1979). It provides the point of reference for all lived emotional experience (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968:256). Emotion’s lived body is owned, cared for, dressed by the person
(Denzin, 1984a:108). It is the subject’s presence in the world; although seen by others,
it cannot be fully grasped by the person. Emotion’s lived body is an expressive, instrumental,
affective embodiment and extension of the subject’s inner and outer streams of experience.
It consists of structures of behavior, movements, mannerisms, gestures, and feelings that
are uniquely the person’s. This lived body is temporal structure that moves through the
social situation, yet it is interwoven with the subject’s emotions, moods and self-definitions.
The subject has a circular relation with emotion’s lived body. What he defines in it-
a pain, a sensation, a discomfort-comes to take on a localized meaning in a part of his
body and in his consciousness. Once interpreted, this feeling is given new meaning for
it is externalized, symbolized, and made a social object in the field of experience of the
subject.
Emotion’s lived body is a corporeal schema for lived experience. It is a structure of
lived experience, a repertoire of choreographed actions, movements, and feelings (Denzin,
1984a:llO). The lived body, which anchors emotion’s presence in the subject’s inner
and outer worlds of experience, is said to be lived from the inside as it is expressed
externally and symbolically to the world of others. It is, in Sartre’s senses ([1943] 1956)
both a body-for-the-person and a body-for-others.
Emotion’s lived body has a four-fold structure: it is a physical body for the person; a
lived presence for the subject in his inner field of experience; an enacted ensemble of
embodied actions for others; and an ensemble of moving action for the subject. These
four structures may be termed respectively as the physical body, the lived-phenomenological
body, the enacted body for others, and the enacted or lived body for self (Denzin,
1984a:111). Each of the four forms of emotion’s lived body provides a distinctly different
mode of lived emotion. These modes, which will be discussed, are: (1) sensible feelings
of sensations, (2) feelings of the lived body, (3) intentional value-feelings, and (4) moral
feelings of self.
By way of review, emotion’s lived body, has the following characteristics: (1) it is the
point of reference for all of the subject’s embodied emotional experiences in the social
situation; (2) it is the symbolic, corporeal, temporal and dialectical extension of the
subject’s presence in the situation; (3) it is lived from the inside as it is symbolically

expressed to others; and (4) its four-fold structure, as understood phenomenologially,

corresponds to four modes of lived emotion, giving rise to a stratificationof lived emotion
in the emotional life-world of the subject. Before taking up these four modes of lived
emotion, it is necessary to place an instance of lived emotion before the reader. I turn
next to an account of such experience as written by James Joyce (1976).
STEPHEN DEDALUS’S EMOTIONAL CRISIS

Consider now the following account offered by James Joyce (1 976396-397) of the
emotional experiences felt by Stephen Dedalus as he resolves the crisis concerning his
decision not to become a priest in the Catholic Church. Each of the structures of emotion’s
body are given in this account as is the three-fold relationship the subject can have with
his body.
He sprang from the bed, the reeking odour pouring down his throat, clogging and
revolting his entrails. Air! The air of heaven! He stumbled towards the window,
groaning and almost fainting with sickness. At the washstand a convulsion seized him
within; and, clasping his cold forehead wildly, he vomited profusely in agony.
When the fit had spent itself he walked weakly to the window and, lifting the sash,
sat in a comer of the embrasure and leaned his elbow upon the sill. The rain had
drawn 0% and amid the moving vapours from point to point of light the city was
spinning about herself a soft cocoon of yellowish haze. . . .
He prayed. . . .
His eyes were dimmed with tears and, looking humbly up to heaven, he wept for
the innocence he had lost.
When evening had fallen he left the house and the first touch of the damp dark air
and the noise of the door as it closed behind him made ache again his conscience,
lulled by prayer and tears. Confess! It was not enough to lull the conscience with a
tear and a prayer. He had to kneel before the minister of the Holy Ghost and tell over
his hidden sins truly and repentantly. Before he heard again the footboard of the
housedoor trail over the threshold as it opened to let him in, before he saw again the
table in the kitchen set for supper he would have knelt and confessed. It was quite
simple.
THE FOUR MODES OF LIVED EMOTION

The four modes or levels of lived emotion are given in Joyce’s description of Stephen’s
experience. I will take up each mode or level in turn, beginning with sensible feelings.
Sensible Feelings
Sensible feelings reference sensations felt in the lived body, but they are not deliberately
produced. They are extended throughout, or located in the body, as pain is for example,
but they do not originate in the self-conversations of the subject. They are part of the
lived body. Others cannot directly share in them, nor know how they are felt by the
person. As Wittgenstein (1953:89) observes, “Only I can know whether I am really in

pain; another person can only surmise it.” In this sense these feelings are indirectly private
for others who cannot know if the pain they have felt in a similar situation is the pain
felt by the subject who now says he is in pain. However, these sensations are public to
the extent that the word pain designates for the other an experience they have had in the
past. Such expressions as “Ouch”, “Damn! That Hurts!”, “Oops, I burned myself!”,
and so on, are “response cries” and forms of self-talk (Goffman, 1981:78-122) which
allow the subject to establish an “emotional footing” (Denzin, 1984a:265; Goffman,
1981:124-157) in the social situation. The speaker makes a claim in such utterances to
the sensible feelings he has just felt in emotion’s body. Still, as Wittgenstein (1953:88-
89) argues, the meaning of the pain that is felt by the speaker in his inner experience
cannot be given in ordinary, referential language. It must be given, instead, in indirect
expressions, such as “Ouch” or “That Hurt!”. The language of sensible feelings is a
glossed, indexical language (Garfinkel, 1967).
Sensible feelings, such as pain, cannot be re-felt or altered by the person. Rather, they
are experienced anew each time they appear within the subject’s field of experience. Like
Peirce’s category of firstness (1931, Vol. 1:280-305), sensible feelings carry the same
variation as all concrete experience; that is, the subject recognizes the pain when it
reappears, knowing that while it is not the same pain as before-for it is different-it
is a variant on the pain he has felt previously. He makes this recognition at the symbolic
levels of secondness and thirdness (Peirce, 1931) and in so doing alters the meaning he
gives to the sensation that is felt. It thereby becomes a different pain.
Pain, for example, has its own inner time, its own intensity, its own duration, its own
internal signals, rhythms, and inner and outer meanings (Sartre, [1943] 1956:333-335).
Sensible feelings are related to the subject in a “doubly indirect manner” (Scheler, [ 19161
1973:330-331). They are located in a part of the body, but not in the symbolic self
process. They are, however, reflected upon by the subject. In this regard sensible feelings
may become symbolic tokens or symbolic representations of other events occurring in
the subject’s world, including the appearance of a psychsomatic pain when a field of
tension is about to be entered.
The sensible feelings felt by Stephen Dedalus included the small of the odour “pouring
from his throat,” the “clogging and revolting of his entrails,” near fainting, a convulsion,
vomiting, walking weakly, and the feeling of tears in his eyes. These feelings were not
deliberately produced by Stephen-they were a critical part of the emotional field of
experience that surrounded his emotional transformation of self. These feelings of revulsion,
near fainting and of crying lent credence and authenticity to the emotional experience
that was felt. In this respect sensible feelings ratify for the subject the emotionality that
is felt. These feelings are part of the inner, self, and moral feelings that Stephen experienced.
They become a part of the total emotional experience; for when Stephen remembers this
moment he will remember the physical sensations that accompanied his changes in self-
definition.
Because sensible feelings originate in the subject’s body they have the appearance of
being the emotion that is felt. As the above analysis suggests, they are not. They are,
rather, part of embodied emotional experience. Sensible feelings anchor emotion’s body
in the immediacy of the subject’s felt present. Sensible feelings position the body of the

person directly in emotionality. Such feelings, however, are not to be confused with
feelings of the lived body, the next level of lived emotionality that I will consider.
Feelings of the Lived Body

Feelings of the lived-body, while accompanied by complexes of sensible feelings, cannot
be reduced to sensible feelings for they are feelings of the lived body as a totality. They
are not located in a particular part or section of the subject’s body, but are given in the
total extension of the body as a unitary field of experience. Such feelings are captured
by the terms sorrow, sadness, despair, happiness, or intense anger. Stephen’s springing
from bed, stumbling towards the window, groaning, and clasping his “cold forehead
wildly” as he vomited profusely in agony, depict the experiencing of lived feelings. The
specific sensible feelings that he felt in this experience were felt as a vivid backdrop to
his total lived feeling of being, in Joyce’s words, “in agony.” In this respect the meanings
of events to the person are given in lived feelings, for they point to what is coming. In
Stephen’s case this is a total revulsion of self and the rejection of a previous self. Sensible
feelings fuse with a total state of mind, synthesizing the sensations of the lived body into
a single, drawn-out act, for Stephen, the act of vomiting.
Because feelings of the lived body express an orientation to the interactional world of
experience, they are accessible to others and they can furnish the foundations for socially
shared feelings (Scheler, [1916] 1973:338-339). Others are able to vicariously share in
the subject’s feelings. This is not the case for sensible feelings. Lived feelings communicate
an emotional definition of the situation that others can enter into. Hence they move
emotionality out of the private, inner world of pure sensations into the public realm of
interaction and emotional intersubjectivity. The subject can communicate and “give”
these feelings to others, thereby allowing them to enter into a field of emotional experience
with him.
Intentional Val ue-Feelings

Intentional value-feelings are feelings about feelings, and might be termed meta-feelings,
or interpreted emotions. They are felt reflections, cognitive and emotional, about feelings.
They are symbolic objectifications of emotional experiences the subject has felt or will
feel in the future. Turning back on his experience of vomiting in agony, Stephen has a
feeling about those feelings. He feels self-loathing, guilt, inner pain, the feeling of
innocence he has lost. These are feelings about the embodied emotional experience he
has passed through. In a similar fashion a parent who grieves for the death of his son,
months after his son’s funeral, brings before himself a set of feelings about an event, a
memory and a relationship that has been experienced. Intentional value-feelings are not
separated from experience as such, but they transcend specific interactional emotional
episodes.
In intentional value-feelings the subject seeks to isolate the core meanings an instance
of emotionality has for him. He interprets that meaning and the feelings he has about
that feeling. In this respect intentional, or meta-feelings are given to the subject as feelings
which are free from any specific emotional state. He feels sadness while the specific
instance of being sad has passed. This feeling of sadness is produced through self-

Emotion as Lived Experience 23 1
conversations, but is not necessarily (although it may be) accompanied by sensible feelings
and feelings of the lived body. Such additional feelings would transform the thoughts of
the feeling into a fully embodied emotional experience.
Hence, these feelings about feelings are separate from concrete experience, once the
universal form of the experience has been experienced and conceptualized. Thus there
is the universal form of Stephen’s agony, the concrete form of that experience, and the
feelings about that experience he holds at a later point in time. The concrete form of the
experience came to him through sensible feelings and feelings of the lived body. The
layer of emotionality (feelings about these feelings) that rests, as in Peirce’s thirdness,
upon sensible and lived feelings, becomes an emotion about an emotion. This layer of
non-visceral feeling is a universalizationof an e m ~ t i o nIt. ~assumes a gestalt, or configuration
on the subject’s field of experience, becoming an emotional abstract, or emotional ideal
that transcends specific instances of lived emotionality (Denzin, 1984a:281). Such abstract
emotional gestalts are to be contrasted to the “gestalt” of sensible feelings of the lived
body as a unitary experience. In both the abstract and the specific sense of an emotional
gestalt, the “horizon” of the emotion is brought before the subject, as in emotional
memory (Denzin, 1983b:407).
Intentional value-feelings reference value equalities, or inclinations to feel in a specific
way, but they are not the actual feelings, although they do yield a value or meaning that
can be given to a feeling, once it is felt. Intentional value-feelings, transcend, or go
beyond specific emotional experiences. This transituational, atemporal quality allows
them to reference emotional careers, or emotional modes of being in the world (Hochschild,
1983b). Ressentiment (Scheler, [19121 1961), a cluster of emotional experiences, including
anger, wrath, envy, jealousy, and fear directed towards others, which is experienced over
and over again by the subject, yet continues to exist as a “state-of-mind’’ or orientation
towards others, is an intentional value-feeling. Love, intense attraction to another, sexual
desire, loathing and hatred, and the sentiments, as described by Shibutani (1961), Turner
(1970) and Franks (in press) reference intentional value-feelings. Their meanings may
be rooted in the culture or the group of the subject. They are part of the subject’s
interpretive framework and exist as orientations toward the world, independent of specific
interactional experiences (Denzin, 1980).
The experiencing of intentional values, the showing of grief or intoxication at a funeral
generates experiences, feelings and values that others can share and participate in. These
public expressions are indications of inner emotionality. Stephen Dedalus sought the
innocence he had lost. He sought to be forgiven for his sins, and he felt the overwhelming
need to make a confession. In these desires he expressed intentional value-feelings regarding
himself and the inner moral meanings he held towards himself. By making the confession
he could alter the transgressions of self he had committed. The confession could clear
the way for an emotional experience that would help redefine him in his own eyes. The
original self-distain and agony created the necessity to reinstate the lost value-
feeling of well-being. In this sense one emotional experience gives rise to the need for
another.
It must be understood that the subject is haunted by these feelings and the conceptions
he holds of them. The lived experiences which are meant to bring these values or feelings
into existence never, or seldom, fully actualize the experience that was sought or intended.

232 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION Vol. 8iNo. 2/1985
The ideal always eludes the subject. It is always just out of reach, too often annihilated
by the very experience it is meant to produce. The subject, like Stephen, suffers in silence,
chattering away incessantly and inwardly about the feeling and about himself (Denzin,
1984a:123). Sartre offers an example of this dilemma: “What we call ‘noble’ or ‘good’
or ‘true’ suffering and what moves us is the suffering which we read on the faces of
others, better yet in portraits, in the face of a statue, in a tragic mask. It is suffering
which has being” (Sartre [1943] 1956:91).
Feelings of the Self and the Moral Person
Intentional value-feelings originate in values that are outside actual emotional experience,
located, as indicated, in the culture or the interpretive framework of the subject. Feelings
of the self or the moral person originate in the self of the subject; although they are
interiorizations of these broader interpretive schemes. They are lodged in the inner stream
of consciousness. They do not have to move through or be given in or by the lived body,
in sensible feelings or in intentional value-feelings. They are, however, closely attached
to the latter. Self-feelings make the selfhood of the subject an object of emotional con-
sciousness. The person draws his focus of attention into and onto himself as a distant
object in his field of experience. Stephen Dedalus does this as he weeps for the innocence
he has lost, tells himself that he has to confess, and feels the ache of his conscience.
The need to reveal his sins to another indicated that the moral meanings he directed
towards himself, and felt as a result of the experience he had just passed through, were
undergoing transformation.
The self, understood as referring to that process that unifies the stream of thoughts the
subject has about himself around a single pole, or point of reference, is not-a-thing, but
a process. The self is consciousness conscious of itself, refemng always to the sameness
and steadiness of something continuously present to the subject in his thoughts. The self
entails inner moral feelings the person directs toward herself as a moral object in her
own world and in the world of other^.^ Feelings of the self cluster around these moral
feelings, for the subject reveals herself to herself through the feelings of these feelings.
However, the self is not in consciousness. Rather it is lodged in the world, in front of
the person, in experiences yet to be taken. Its presence in the world haunts the subject,
and draws her forward, in a circuit of selfness into the world (Sartre, [1943] 1956: 102-
105.) As she turns back on herself, in reflection, and feels herself feeling, she gives
meaning to herself and catches a glimpse of herself. It is these meanings that she draws
inward, to her self.
Two levels to the self, the surface and the deep, may be distinguished. The surface,
public self is given to others through the subject’s communicative acts (Goffman, 1959),
and managed through emotional-management rules (Hochschild, 1983a,b). The deep,
inner, moral self is revealed through self and moral feelings which involve a feeling for
the self as a distinct moral object and subject in the world (Heidegger, [1975] 1982: 132;
Hegel, [I8071 1931: 667). The self of the moral person is the self that has dignity, self-
respect, self-responsibility and an inner sense of moral worth (Heidegger [1975] 1982;
135-137; Denzin, 1984a: 83). Moral self-consciousnessor value-awareness is at the core

of the person at this deep level. The moral feelings of the morally self-reflective subject
involve a respect for the moral codes of the everyday lifeworld. This moral law “embodies
the core features of human nature including such matters as honor, respect, freedom,
dignity, love, shame, the ritual, the sacred, the civil, and personal responsibility as
embodied in the moral code of the person and society” (Denzin, 1984a: 84; see also,
Shils, 1975; Durkheim, [1912] 1973; Reizler, 1950; Cooley, [I9021 1956; Geertz, 1973.)
By subjecting himself to this moral code the subject gains self-dignity and self-respect.
This internalized self-respect, which comes from the inner and outer moral codes of the
world of daily interactional life, constitutes the inner meanings of the moral person.
To argue that the inner moral self is a myth, as Goffman (1961: 152) does, and to
assume that it is in and through role distance that the individual expresses the “sacred”,
personal part of himself, is to trivialize the meaning of moral and sacred in everyday
life. For the moral person is neither captured by roles, nor a performer of roles. Rather
he is a human being in the world feeling and expressing in his innermost self, those
embodied emotions that give him a sense of moral worth, or, of unworthiness. In these
experiences a depth of self is revealed and felt that annihilates roles and makes superficial
concepts such as role distance and situated self.
The phenomenologist is not suggesting that the inner, moral, or deep level of the self
is more authentic, or more real than the surface, outer expressions of self. Each level is
real as it is lived by the subject. However, many sociological descriptions of the self
remain on the level of public, observable acts. In contrast, the world of lived-experience
is lost to sociological inquiry.
Many sociological descriptions of the self are inherently debunking. They foster a view
of self as being totally socially constructed. The self is viewed as a precarious entity
fashioned through social discourse. There is no face behind its various masks. So too,
morals are seen relativistically and ritualistically. They are reduced to roles and performances
and the institutions wherein they take place.
What is called for is an interpretive perspective which includes within its purview the
rich and elaborated world of the inner self. Interpretive interactionism provides phenom-
enological accounts of lived experience. Such accounts, while incapable of resolving
philosophical questions and disputes concerning the authenticity of these experiences,
depict the self as a complex structure that cannot be reduced to its social roles, its rituals
and its acts. Further, the world of lived experience is a world of passion, feeling and
engagement, a world lost to the sociological inquirer who describes life merely from the
o~tside.~
Consider the following statement given by John Berryman, (1973:86), the poet, while
he was in treatment for his alcoholism:
I see absolutely no hope unless I can learn to accept the First Step. . . . But with my
infinite self-cons and mental distortions, many recognized in the last ten days but how
many unrecognized and going strong? How can I know whether I do or not? All I
can say is that I finally seem to believe as solidfacts that I am powerless over alcohol
and that my life is unmanageable,out of all control, insane, has been for many years.
For Christ’s sake tell me whether this belief of mine is real, and whether I can depend
on at least it. I am a dependent man. I need something besides God.

Some days after this statement was written Berryman killed himself. The inner moral
despair felt by Berryman, including whether or not he was deceiving himself concerning
his alcoholism, reveals a self disclosing itself to itself at a deep level of anguish. Such
feelings and disclosures transcend the surface self that is given by Goffman and others.
A deeper wrenching of the self from its inner moral meanings is offered by Malcom
Lowry (1947:223-289). His protagonist, the Consul states:
that bloody nightmare he was forced to carry around with him everywhere upon his
back, that went by the name of Goffrey Firmin. . . . deliver me from this dreadful
tyranny of self. I have sunk low. Let me sink lower still, that I may know the truth.
Teach me to love again, to love life. . . . Let me truly suffer. Give me back my
purity, the knowledge of the mysteries, that I have betrayed.-kt me be truly lonely,
that I may honestly pray. . . . Destroy the world! he cried in his heart.
In these two accounts the surface and deep levels of the self are dramatized, for in
both instances Berryman and Lowry doubt and ask if they have plummeted the depths
of their innermost being. They seek to set aside the surface deceptions of self that they
have foisted upon themselves. They seek to escape themselves so as to find an inner
moral core of meaning and being that is solid and firm. They point to the distinct
experiences of surface and deep selves, as outlined above (see Denzin, [1984fl for a
detailed analysis of these two cases).
A circuit of selfness and a circuit of self-feelings connects these two levels or layers
of the self (Denzin, 1983b: 407). In this circuit the feelings felt at the surface level of
the self are experienced as charades or masks, that nullify or disqualify the deep, inner
feelings the subject chooses and desires to feel.
Deep, inner moral feelings, which define the moral worth of the person, are to be
distinguished from surface self-feelings, which are momentary, interactional productions.
The deep, inner, “total” person (Scheler, [1916] 1973: 344) is given in moral feelings.
The person experiencing inner turmoil seeks to feel and express these deep feelings of
self. Hence their importance for an interactionist phenomenology of self, emotionality
and everyday life.
IMPLICATI0NS
The point of view I have elaborated is interactionist and phenomenological. It locates
the self, at its surface and deep levels, at the center of the emotional process. Elsewhere
(Denzin, 1984a, c) I have suggestedhow this perspective might be applied to an understanding
of the emotionally divided and violent self. I have also suggested how a theory of social
organization and moral sociality might be developed from this orientation. And, I have
elaborated a theory of hermeneutic understanding, based on the analysis of emotional
intersubjectivity that my position suggests.
Other important lines of inquiry are implied. First, how are the languages of emotion
and the languages of self interwoven such that private and public expressions of meaning
are possible? Second, how is emotionality taught and how are the feelings of self interiorized

and made part of those biographical structures we call persons? Third, how is the lived
body felt, as embodied emotionality experienced? (Denzin, 1984d). Fourth, how can the
picture of emotionality as outlined in this article be applied to the more fundamental
problematic of understanding everyday life in the post-capitalist epoch? That is, what
may this point of view tell us about meaning and existence, biography and society at this
moment in time? This problematic remains to be addressed.
It is clear, that the “golden age” of empiricism and hard science paradigms is over in
the social sciences (Geertz, 1983; Denzin, 1983a, 1984e). New approaches are taking
hold and they are called by a variety of names: cultural hermeneutics, humanistic sociology,
cultural marxism, feminist theory, the “new” social psychology, post-structuralism, phen-
omenological sociology, and interpretive interactionism (see Morgan, 1983; Bertaux,
1981; Bertaux and Kohli, 1984).
These approaches challenge existing sociological paradigms. Each attempts to secure
a new and firmer position for the human being in sociological inquiry. Each also speaks
to the emotions and the emotionality of human experience. These new approaches take
as their subject matter everyday life as it is lived in the post-modem world. They examine
human beings making choices, fighting for meaning, giving and losing freedom, forming
attachments, living and dying and transmitting life, producing and reproducing universal
emotional experiences in the workplace and in the human family. This subject sets before
us the universalizing themes of human existence. Whether farcical or serious, tragic or
comic, admirable or pathetic, this subject sketches and lives in a lifetime the meanings
and experiences available to any other subject who might have occupied her space and
her historical moment. The meanings of these experiences are embedded in emotional
experience, as are the transformations of self that are attached to them. Herein lies the
importance of these remarks. To understand and interpret the current historical moment
requires an interpretive grasp of self, emotionality and social experience. It has been my
intention to speak to just such an interpretive approach in these comments.
NOTES
1. See James (1894, [I8901 1950, Vol. 11: Chap. 25, [1904] 1961), Cooley ([1902] 1956),
Dewey (1894, 1895, 1922), and Mead (1895, 1909, 1910, 1919-1930, 1982). I am grateful, here,
as elsewhere in this manuscript, for the clarification offered by David R. Franks and the reviewers
of Symbolic Interaction.
2. Moral: of or relating to character or conduct considered as reflective of the moral codes and
laws of everyday life. A moral act conforms to or is directed towards that which is regarded as
right, virtuous, ethical and appropriate to the situation-at-hand. The moral law or moral code
embodies the core features of human nature as upheld by the social structures and the culture of
the individual. Honor, respect, freedom, dignity, love, shame, the ritual, the sacred, and personal
responsibility are embodied in the moral code of the person and society (Denzin, 1984a: 84;
Durkheim, 1912; Shils, 1975; Reizler, 1950;Scheler, [ 19161 1973). Internalized self-respect, which
arises from yielding to the external moral law of daily affairs constitutes the inner meaning of moral
at the deep level of the self. I communicate this meaning of moral with great difficulty.
3. David Franks suggested the parallels with Peirce in this section, as well as the term “gestalt.”

s
236 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION Vol. WNo. 2/1985
4. Here as earlier, I ask for the reader’s suspension of critical judgement regarding a clear
meaning for the term moral. Heidegger (I19751 1982: 131) employs the Latin phrase Personalitas
moralis. Drawing from Kant, he argues that the moral person goes beyond the psychological person
of scientific discourse, revealings man’s deeper, inner meaning as a being in the world.
5 . My thanks to reviewer B of Symbolic Interaction for the phrasing and wording of the above
three paragraphs.
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Emotion as Lived Experience

Author(s): Norman K. Denzin

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Symbolic Interaction, Volume 8, Number 2, pages 223-240.

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THE PHENOMENOLOGISTS ON EMOTION

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expressed to others; and (4) its four-fold structure, as understood phenomenologially,

STEPHEN DEDALUS’S EMOTIONAL CRISIS

THE FOUR MODES OF LIVED EMOTION

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Feelings of the Lived Body

Intentional Val ue-Feelings

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Feelings of the Self and the Moral Person

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[I8951 The Rules of Sociological Method. New York Free Press.

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