Partisan Politics in the Last Decades of the Roman Republic:

The Dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar and the Augustan Settlement

Gregory D. Mansi M.A.

California State University, Northridge
2015
 Introduction

The history of the last decades of the Roman Republic leading to the establishment of Rome as an

imperial state remains a subject of intense scholarly debate. Speculation and opinion embrace nearly

every aspect of Roman society during this most tumultuous period. For centuries there had been a

struggle between two political ideologies in Rome. In the turbulent decades following of deaths of the

Gracchi brothers traditional republican institutions were irreversibly fractured. Those decades

witnessed the rise of Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Caesar, two individuals vying for personal control of

the state. Sulla's aim, it is clear, was a restoration of the traditional republican institutions and the

means to which he attempted that restoration were to be temporary. Caesar's intention, arguably, was

the permanent and hereditary centralization of the powers of the state into the hands of a single person.

In the pages that follow I will examine the dictatorships of both Sulla (138-78 BC) and Caesar (100-

44 BC) in light of the changing political atmosphere of Rome in the last two centuries BC. Both these

men aimed at restoring order and stability but were only temporarily successful. Temporary, this

analysis will show, because they made destructive errors in both perception and judgment

undermining their personal goals. Their only lasting success lay in their responsibility for eliminating

any possibility that the Republic might survive. In order to accomplish this goal each of these men

altered the definition of an almost forgotten dictatorship using that extraordinary magistracy to enact

partisan reform measures, the nature of which served only to exclude significant segments of the

Roman population. These two leaders were the end products of the Republic's self-destructive

expansionist policies begun in the middle of the third century BC. The process of restoring order and

repairing the damage of the civil wars would fall to Caesar's heir, Octavian. His reforms carefully

avoided any appearance of kingly or dictatorial power incorporating the successes of both Sulla and

i
Caesar. In 27 he was awarded the additional name Augustus symbolizing both the admiration of the

population and the cementing of his auctoritas.1 He was now sole ruler of an empire carefully cloaked

in the trappings of a republic.

Sulla still held out hope that the Republic could be saved. His reforms were as reactionary as those

of the Gracchi. While he did bring about a transitory stability in the republic, so craved after decades of

turmoil, he either ignorantly or willfully ignored centuries of popular political gains. While he had no

desire for permanent personal authority he mistakenly believed that his reform measures, re-

establishing the traditional senatorial prerogatives, would be permanent. He grossly underestimated

the popular desire for more egalitarian governance and it wasn’t long after his retirement before his

own adherents abandoned his reforms and removed, once again, the authority of the senate. Sulla

catastrophically underestimated the power of the popular movement in Rome setting the stage for

Caesar.

In 49 BC, after years of preparing himself for leadership in Rome, Caesar entered that city with an

army at his back. Rome's second civil war had begun. Following the political disturbances of the

twenty years after Sulla's retirement, Caesar, embracing the new demagogic politics of his era,

embarked on an equally partisan and exclusive populist program. Unlike Sulla he saw the impending

end of the Republic. Once firmly in control and riding the wave of popular resentment, his aim was

clearly to reverse Sulla's reestablishment of aristocratic authority. His further alteration of the office of

dictator established his personal authority in Rome. He meant to make that authority not only

permanent but, arguably, hereditary. It was to his great misfortune that he mistakenly disregarded the

power of the weakened senate and the influence it wielded behind the scenes. Further, he

1
P. A. Brunt and J. M. Moore, Res Gestae Divi Augusti: The Achievements of the Divine Augustus. (London: Oxford University Press,
1967), 10
ii
miscalculated the rejection of the Sullan reform measures as having effectively and permanently

diminished the Senate as an influential legislative body, and grossly underestimated the desire of the

Romans for a sense of stability not seen since before Rome embarked on a course of empire.

It would be Caesar's adopted son Octavian who would utilized the successful methods of both

Sulla and Caesar while cleverly avoiding the perception of tyranny which plagued his predecessors. He

too, like Caesar, saw the inevitability of the collapse of the Republic. His control of all legislative and

military decision making was accepted with little criticism largely because of his diligence with regard

to establishing friendly relations with the oligarchy in the Roman Senate as well as the commoners

throughout his empire. In the end he attained the security for the state which Sulla aimed for and the

permanence of authority which Caesar desired.

A note about the ancient sources.

For the earliest accounts of the Roman Republic down to 293 BC, I relied primarily on Livy (59 BC -

AD 17), in particular Books 2 through 10 in his monumental History of Rome. Of the original 142 Books

only 35 have survived. For the missing books, 11-20 covering the years down to 220 BC, I turned to the

Periochae (summaries), written sometime in the 4th century AD and the Greek writer Dionysus of

Halicarnassus (c. 60 BC - c. 7 BC), whose Roman Antiquities, fills in some of the gaps of that period. In

addition, Book 1 of Polybius' Histories is used for an account of the period from about 246 BC down to

216 BC, including an account of the First Punic War and the beginnings of the period of Roman

expansion outside Italy. Only Books 1-5 of his account survive. Both Cassius Dio (AD 155 - 235) and

Appian of Alexandria (AD 95-165) fill in many of the gaps lost in Polybius' account. After 146 BC there

are no accounts written that have survived.

iii
 Appian's Civil Wars provide the only real account of the events which led to the end of the republic

in which he offers an account of the wars against Mithridates ending the career of Marius and

propelling` Sulla to the highest office in Rome. In addition to the more annalistic traditions I have

relied on Plutarch (AD 46-120), who's writing, less history than biography, offer valuable insight with

regard to the personalities examined here. His Parallel Lives, although criticized heavily, particularly by

modern readers, as moralistic, offers a wealth of information of the period concerned here. I have

utilized, to a limited extent, some excerpts from Sallust (86 BC – c. 35 BC), particularly in relation to the

period of the Jugurthine War (112 BC-105 BC), although as a populist and partisan of Caesar his work

is somewhat lacking in objectivity. Cicero (104 BC - 43 BC) is useful in relation to the politics of the last

decades of the republic but I have chosen to avoid personal perspectives and autobiographical sketches

unless they can be corroborated by other sources. All dates in both the body and notes of the pages that

follow are B.C. unless otherwise stated.

iv
 The Middle of the Republic

Following the first Punic War, and the Carthaginian treaty of 241, ceding Sicily, Rome began its

long march toward a provincial empire establishing self-administering provincial governments,

headed by governors and proconsuls (with imperium). By divesting administrative control of its new

acquisitions into the hands of regional governors it was left without the necessary constitutional

oversight it had when its borders were limited to the shores of Italy. In a very short space of time,

Rome became addicted to the great wealth derived from their newly acquired territories however few

Romans benefited. The road to empire soon began to reveal a marked difference with the policies that

united Italy into a federated republic. Prior to the acquisition of Sardinia and Corsica in 227, Rome had

a policy of incorporating conquered people as either citizens or closely associated confederates.

By the middle of the third century this policy had drastically changed. E. Badian went so far as to

suggest that "No administration in history has ever devoted itself so whole-heartedly to fleecing its

subjects for the private benefit of its ruling class as Rome in the last age of the Republic".2

As Rome progressed from the capital of a group of Italian cities into a Mediterranean empire, and

dramatically increased its sphere of authority outside Italy, it became the depository of enormous

amounts of tribute from those new territories under its direct control. This, coupled with the fact that

in 367 the consulship became open to men of plebeian status, transformed the political atmosphere of

the Republic considerably.

2
E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic. 2nd Ed. (United States: Cornell University Press, 1971), 87. cf. William A. McDevitte., ed.
2015. ‘Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, XLIII, vii. 10 -viii. Perseus Digital Library. Accessed March 18.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0149%3Abook%3D43%3Achapter%3D7. 9. "Caius Lucretius had
carried off in ships, to Antium, the plunder amassed by such sacrilege, and had dragged persons of free condition into slavery; the property of
the allies of the Roman people was subjected to rapine and plunder every day. For Hortensius, pursuing the practice of Caius Lucretius, kept
the crews of his ships in lodgings both in summer and winter alike; so that their houses were filled with a crowd of seamen, and those men
who showed no regard to propriety, either in their words or actions, lived among the inhabitants, their wives, and children.”
1
 A new group of leaders began to emerge, many from the ranks of the cavalry or equites who came

primarily from the provinces and municipalities of Italy. They became the backbone of the business

interests in Rome and dealt, for the most part, with banking, trading and tax farming, the publicani. 3

The capitol was becoming wealthy beyond all expectations and with it a level of luxury to those in

power.4 The aristocratic senatorial element combined with the financial component created a political

grouping which was unprecedented in Roman politics prior to the reforms of Tiberius and Gaius

Gracchus.5 The astonishing influx of wealth, in the hands of what was now the "new rich", particularly

from exploited provincial holdings resulted in an increased level of corruption as yet unseen in Rome.

L.R. Taylor, expounding on Sallust's seemingly constant theme of Roman decay following the fall of

Carthage, notes that "[T]he prizes of empire enriched and corrupted the senators and the knights, who

together exploited the provinces, and at the same time resulted in the impoverishment of the common

people of Rome and Italy". 6

The level of prosperity of the Republic was not derived from any outstanding domestic economic

policies. On the contrary, Rome was becoming increasingly and solely dependent on its newly acquired

provincial territories. The provinces provided all that was necessary to maintain the "imperial"

lifestyle. Rome had established control over the entire Mediterranean area but it was showing itself

more and more incapable of governing this vast territory. Administrators were corrupt; Italy itself was

3
Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949) , 3ff
4
Livy. History of Rome. xxxix, vi 3-9. In Naphtali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold. 1990. Roman Civilization: Selected Readings: The Republic and the
Augustan Age. 3rd ed. Vol. 1. (United States: Columbia University Press. 1990), 490. "At the end of the year 187, after the new magistrates had
been elected, Gnaeus Manlius Vulso celebrated his triumph over the Galatians on the fifth of March. The reason why he deferred his triumph
to so late a date was his anxiety to avoid prosecution under the Petillian Law while Quintus Terentius Culleo was praetor, and the possibility
of being burned by the flames of the verdict by which Lucius Scipio was condemned." The Petillian Law related to the handling of booty
obtained from the various campaigns in Asia Minor. On the status of bakers. cf. Pliny, Natural History xviii, xi. 107. "There were no bakers at
Rome until the war with King Perseus, more than 580 years after the founding the city. The ancient Romans used to make their own bread, it
being an especial occupation of the women, as even now among many peoples."
5
G. Gracchus elevated the power and status of the equites when, as part of his sweeping reforms, he gave them the right of jury duty in the
criminal courts, stripping this power from the ranks of the aristocracy.
6
Taylor, Party Politics, 4. " Senators, as governors of provinces or as members of the governors' staffs, and knights as bankers…brought back
to Rome the fabulous wealth of the provinces, the gold and silver of Spain and Macedonia, the riches gained from the bounteous agricultural
products of Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa." cf. Lewis and Reinhold. Ed., Roman Civilization, 242. Appian, Civil Wars, I. i. 7.
2
becoming divided by an ever-deepening gulf between rich and poor, and by a too grudging

enfranchisement policy. The machinery of government at Rome, designed for a small Republic, had

proved woefully inadequate for the guidance of a huge empire. Additionally, as the traditional small

family farms in Italy were steadily replaced by great land owners, the peasantry was left in ruin. The

populations of allied regions in Italy and provinces abroad became by this time increasingly aware of

their status, not as citizens of Rome but as subjects.7 After Rome had finally defeated Hannibal in the

battle of Zama (202), it levied reprisals against the disloyal allied communities, furthering their

animosities and leading to the great social and political crises of the last century. 8

By the middle of the second century factional struggles within the Republic had become so severe

that the authority of the Senate was severely weakened. No longer were the educated, worldly men of

noble descent alone looked to for political and social guidance and stability. The center of Roman

government, at least in appearance, now shifted from the marble floor of the Senate to the grassy fields

of the assembly and its popularly favored leaders, although in reality the authority of the Senate

remained for the entire republican period the real decision making body in Rome and her provinces, a

fact which Caesar would largely ignore and regret. What is ultimately so interesting and ironic in

relation to this period of social and political shifting is the political vacuum created by the weaker

Senate and senatorial class. It was not, as would be expected, filled by the recently empowered

populares, but from some of the oldest aristocratic families in Rome. 9

7
Badian, Roman Imperialism, 17f. Badian's opinion, contrary to the prevailing Marxist historiography of his time, is that the Roman
government was not necessarily the beneficiary of wealth derived from allied communities. There were few complaints from the allies and
provincials in relation to equality and citizenship until the demagogues of the 120's stirred the pot of discontent.
8
Foster, Benjamin Oliver. 2015. ‘Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, XXVI. xvi. 5-13, xxxiv. Accessed March 12.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0155%3Abook%3D9%3Achapter%3D38.
9
Taylor, Party Politics, 14f
3
 The Late Republic

In 133, a year which marked the beginning of what would be a general shift in the internal power

structure in Rome, Tiberius Gracchus, an aristocrat by birth, was elected tribune. Along with his

brother Gaius, the Gracchi had produced a political whirlwind with their insistence that the Assembly

of Tribes take a more active role in the administration of the Republic. Politicians with new ideas now

appeared opposing the senatorial politicians of the old school.10 Although the people of Rome had for a

long time the ability to legislate in the Assembly, there were few who had the political will to act on

behalf of the general population and those who did often found themselves in a political wasteland.11

Something drastically changed in Roman politics after 122. Throughout Italy and the provinces

most aristocratic and popular leaders feigned at representing the people of the empire and their desire

for the maintenance of a republican form of government. Conscious of the weariness of the public

certain individuals, using and misusing either their inherited nobility or their newly gained political

status, worked to promote their own agendas and at capturing notoriety and wealth, sometimes by

force and oratorical persuasion, sometimes by utilizing state issued largess. The idea of birth-right in

relation to political achievement was becoming less important.

The Senate weakened its own integrity further by opening up traditionally aristocratic offices to

certain wealthy popular leaders and military men. Post Gracchan Rome witnessed the rise of

demagogues, astute and capable, building political careers as military leaders and developing their

own clientela by promising tangible rewards for political support.12 Land grants were offered to

10
Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman. Translated by Peter Needham. (United States: Harvard University Press, 1985), 13, cf., S. A.
Handford, trans., Sallust: The Jugurthine War/The Cataline Conspiracy. (London: Penguin Books. 1963), 78. "So when Tiberius and Gaius
Gracchus…sought to establish the liberty of the common people and expose the crimes of the oligarchs, the guilty nobles took fright and
opposed their proceedings by every means at their disposal, using now the Italian allies and 'Latin' communities, now the Equestrian Order,
who they had seduced from the people's cause by holding out to them the hope of being allowed to share their own privileges. 41.5
11
Taylor, Party Politics , 13
12
Taylor, Party Politics, 21. "They…the Gracchi, Marius, Cinna, Pompey for most of his career, and Caesar…were all, except perhaps the
Gracchi, seeking personal power rather than establishment of the rights of the sovereign people".
4
soldiers in return for honorable and faithful service and political support, not to Rome itself, but to the

individual commander. Powerful plebeians were now entering the tight orbit surrounding the center of

power in Rome with great success. They secured for themselves the necessary following and courted a

client base from the weaker members of the patrician class. Gelzer points arguably, "the very fact that

they had clients of their own did more than anything else to make them the social equals of the

patricians". 13 These extraordinary commands were given to certain military men by the ruling

oligarchy as a result of the continuous warfare facing the republic. This situation resulted in a shifting

of the power base from the traditional oligarchic rule of the Republic to "the figure of the victorious

general" who obtained his political support based more on ability than heredity. 14 Political support

was now based on which constituency best suited the personal aims of those vying for power. The

path to political success rested on capturing the support of the various populations within the city of

Rome and its immediate surroundings. The peasantries of the areas outside Rome, unable to

participate were treated indifferently by politicians in Rome.

The violent struggle for control, initiated by the Senate during the Gracchan revolts of 133 and 123

set the stage for the political difficulties which lasted until the peaceful settlement of Augustus.

Appian, in his Civil Wars, describing the inauguration of political violence in Rome, focused the blame

in no small part on the aristocracy who feared for the dismemberment of their power structure and

status. The political strife in Rome after 133 quickly degenerated into chaos and changed little

throughout the century.15 Rome was in the midst of a centuries old constitutional crisis. Most of the

organs of state were now functioning in a way which would have been completely unrecognizable to

13
Gelzer, Caesar, 3
14
Ibid., 10
15
Appian, Civil Wars, I, Introduction 2 in Lewis and Reinhold. Ed., Roman Civilization, 270f. " Repeatedly the parties came into open conflict,
often carrying daggers, and from time to time in temples, the assemblies, or the Forum, some tribune, praetor, consul, or candidate for these
offices, or some person otherwise undistinguished, would be slain. Unseemly violence prevailed almost constantly, together with shameful
contempt for law and justice. "
5
the sixth century B.C. Roman.16 Under these conditions, Rome was in no position to deal effectively

with serious internal difficulties particularly on the eve of the re-emergence of great turmoil inside the

borders of Italy herself.

Magister Populi: The Dictator

Before examining Sulla and Caesar and their respective roles in the last decades of the Republic, a

brief but careful examination of the origin and nature of the office of dictator should be undertaken to

offer a contrast with the political atmosphere of the late Republic.

The constitutional Republic of Rome had managed the great transition from purely oligarchic rule

to a more inclusive and more representative government. In 509 the Romans took to the task of

reorganizing their new government. The comitia centuriata, a body which plebeians had a vote, elected

two consuls, each serving as colleagues for one year terms.17 A consul, while he served in office, could

not be removed and was free of any possible prosecution in relation to that office.18 The initial powers

assigned to them were absolute but soon after certain limitations were enacted designed to avoid both

the appearance and the reality of the tyranny suffered under the kings. 19

With the Valerio-Horatian Laws (449) the plebeian magistrates and the assembly became an integral

and influential part of the Roman Republic. It was then decided that in order to remedy the aristocratic

imbalance of the office of consul the people would be allowed to elect, from either class, military tribuni

16
Arthur Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican, 2nd. Ed., (London: Routledge, 2005), 140
17
Earnest Carey, trans., The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. IV, 84 (Heinemann: London; Harvard University Press: Cambridge,
Mass., 1937), 525. The Consuls were L. Iunius Brutus and L. Tarquinius Collatinus. It was the consul Brutus who advised the gathering; "…
not to make one man's judgment the supreme authority over all, but to entrust the royal power to two men, For the rulers will be less arrogant
and vexatious when the power is divided between two and each has the same authority; moreover, mutual respect, the ability of each to
prevent the other from living as suits his pleasure, and a rivalry between them for the attainment of a reputation for virtue would be most
likely to result from such equality of power and honour.
18
Once his term had expired, however, charges could be brought against him for any misconduct while he served.
19
R.M. Ogilvie and Betty Radice, trans., Livy: Rome and Italy: Books VI-X of The History of Rome From Its Foundation (Ab Urbe Condita). 6th ed.
(United Kingdom: Penguin Group, USA, 1982), 113f. The Valerian Law enacted by Publius Valerius Publicola in 507, allowed a Roman citizen
the right of appeal to the people should he or she be condemned by a magistrate. This law eliminated the authority of the consuls to
pronounce any sentence in which death was the penalty without consulting with the comitia centuriata thereby removing that one detestable
vestige of the Tarquin kings.
6
militum consulari potestate, military tribunes with consular power. That practice ended with the

passage of the Lex Licinia in 367. Livy writes; "This year will be noteworthy as the one in which a 'new

man' held the consulship, as well as for the creation of two new magistrates, those of praetor and of

curule aedile. These offices the patricians sought for themselves in return for one of the two consulships

which they had conceded to the plebeians".20

The realization was soon made that occasionally certain special interests would side with this or

that consul who did, in some cases, lead to the inability to come up with workable solutions to the

problems facing the Republic.21 Further, written in to the laws establishing the office of consul was the

right of either consul to veto decisions and commands of the other.22 This had the effect of further

weakening the executive.

Judging from the original law authorizing the appointment of a dictator, lex de dictatore creando, the

office itself was conceived as a short term solution to intractable problems which the ordinary offices of

the state could or would not solve.23 In order to avoid delaying solutions, the dictatorship was an

appointed rather than an elective office, and the potential candidate had to be nominated by the consul.

This had the added benefit of allowing restrictions and even removal without the usual factional

24
politics which often accompanied elections. An analysis by Ronald Ridley suggests that it was either

of two men, T. Larcius or M. Valerius appointed as Rome's first dictator.25 All other sources prefer

20
Ogilvie and Radice, trans., Livy: Rome and Italy, 97. cf., Finley Hooper. Roman Realities. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), 55ff.
21
Hooper. Roman Realities, 41
22
Right of Intercession. A further provision of the Valerian Law of 507.
23
Earnest Cary and Herbert B. Foster, trans., Dio's Roman History, Vol. I. (Cambridge, Mass: Loeb Classical Library Harvard University Press,
1914), 108f. cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, LacusCurtius. Roman Antiquities. V .59-77. 2015. Accessed March 15.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/DionysiusV, 70. , Ogilvie, and Radice, trans., Livy: Rome and Italy, 1982, 124f.
24
A. W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic. (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1999), 110. cf. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans., Polybius. The
Rise of the Roman Empire (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 254. Ogilvie and Radice, Livy: Rome and Italy, 1982, 190, 298. The nomination was so
important that in one instance the senate joined forces with the tribunes of the people in order to compel the consul to appoint a dictator.
25
Ronald T. Ridley. "The Origin of the Roman Dictatorship: An Overlooked Opinion." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Neue Folge, 122. Bd.,
H. 3/4 (1979), 303-309. The latter only mentioned as a possibility in Livy, writing in the late 1st century BC, and Sextus Festus who wrote his
history sometime in the late 4th century AD. Ridley is suspicious of these sources largely due to the temporal distance from the period.
Ridley is suspicious of these sources largely due to the temporal distance from the period. As to the exact date or person who first held this
office the sources are mixed. Some claim that it was Manius Valerius Maximus. According to Livy, "The precise date of this is not known…
7
Larcius and modern historians for the most part follow that conclusion, albeit Mommsen was an

exception.26

The consuls for the year 509 began a series of successful military operations aimed at the Sabines.27

Within six years they had broken the Sabine threat but immediately new difficulties began to arise with

other Latin territories. In addition to the mounting external problems plaguing the young Republic, a

growing resentment was being felt between the ruling aristocracy and the lower classes. With these

new threats the population offered an ultimatum; the consuls must cancel their growing debts or face

the possibility of a general refusal to take up arms.28 It is at this point, one of tremendous internal

anxiety that the decision was made to appoint a dictator.29 Since Roman military commanders were by

law restricted from acting within the boundaries of the city, the consuls, always subject to partisan

political alliances, were in many cases ineffective. By placing all authority, administrative, political

and military, in the hands of a single person it would have the effect of quieting opposing alliances and

of providing the necessary singular authority to deal with difficult problems at home.30 There is no

indication in any of the ancient records that would suggest that the population of Rome had any input

into the development of this new office. In fact, Livy suggests that the purpose of this appointment
The oldest authorities, I find, state that the first Dictator was Titus Lartius and that Spurius Cassius was his Master of the Horse." What is
interesting to note is that the office itself must have been a matter of law prior to its use for the first time since Livy, relying on his sources,
claims that "Men of consular rank were appointed to these offices, for that was what the law demanded…" cf. William Purdie Dickson. trans.,
"The Project Gutenberg EBook, The History of Rome, Book II, by Theodor Mommsen." www.gutenberg.org. June 1, 2006. Accessed March 11,
2015. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10702/10702.txt.
"In the light of these regulations the dictatorship is doubtless to be conceived as an institution which arose at the same time with the
consulship, and which was designed, especially in the event of war, to obviate for a time the disadvantages of divided power and to revive
temporarily the regal authority…"
26
Ibid., 303. cf. William Smith, LLD, William Wayte, G. E. Marindin, Ed., A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (London: J. Murray,
1890), 631. Mommsen's view is that M. Valerius was in fact the first elected to that office but his name was removed because of the fallacy that
a person who did not hold the consulship could be appointed dictator.
27
Ogilvie and Radice, trans., Livy: Rome and Italy, 122f. The Sabines were an ancient Italic tribe located in the mountainous country east of the
Tiber River. The consuls were Marcus Valerius and Publius Postumius.
28
Ibid., 107.
29
"The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus." V.73 Http://penelope.uchicago.edu/. Accessed March 11, 2015.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/5D*.html#73. The justification for this appointment as a
curative for serious internal problems would become the precedent. cf. Aubrey De Sélincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome: Books I-V
of The History of Rome from Its Foundation (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1971), 124-125.
30
De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, 1971, 125. cf. Cary and Foster, trans., Roman History, 107. Dio insinuation that this
appointment met with the approval of the people of Rome is unlikely given the aristocratic makeup of the government at this time.
8
was two-fold: aristocratic intimidation of the general population in Rome in an effort to quell their

increasingly violent protestations, and to send a strong message to the Sabines. 31 The aristocracy used

the threat of imminent danger from outside to control the growing antagonism felt by the population at

large over internal issues.

Several classifications of the office of Dictator evolved as justifications for its use. The most

common was rei gerundae cause, "for getting things done" or "carrying on the business of state". Along

with the title, the appointees were empowered with the imperium as it was defined by the Lex Curiata.32

The broad nature of this classification and the number of times it was used would suggest this

appointment could and was made for virtually any reason.33 There were other classifications used as

justification for appointing a dictator, most of which were non-emergencies. In the absence of the

consuls, certain governing acts of which only the consul had constitutional authority, had to be

performed. In those cases a dictator was occasionally appointed with very specific duties and the

expectation of voluntary resignation upon completion. 34

There are differing historical opinions as to the constitutional nature and prerogatives of the Roman

dictator. For this purpose of this study, however, I will limit the discussion to the prevailing theory;
31
De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, 1971, 124. cf. Hooper, Roman Realities, 42
32
Benjamin Oliver Foster, trans.," Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome", IX. 38,39. Accessed March 11, 2015.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0155%3Abook%3D9%3Achapter%3D38.
33
Of the 102 appointments to the office of dictator, 59 were rei gerundae causa, not including six in which we are unsure of the designation but
in all likelihood were the same. The dictators in those cases were Marcus Aemilius Barbula, appointed in 292 and again in 285 and Appius
Claudius Caecus and Publius Cornelius Rufinus, 291 BC and for a second time in 285 BC. These appointments occurred while Rome was
embroiled not only in significant political turmoil at home but the third of their Samnite Wars (298-290 ) and
The Pyrrhic War (280-275 ).
34
Smith, Wayte, and Marindin , A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, 633. They included holding elections, comitiorum habendorum
causa, religious rituals, clavi figendi causa, and quieting seditious acts, seditionis sedandae et rei gerundae causa. In addition to these classifications
there was ferigrum constituendarum causa, appointing holidays, ludorum faciendorum causa, for officiating at the public games, quaestionibus, for
the purpose of criminal jurisdiction, and legendo senatui, for filling a vacancy in the senate.
It is striking to note that as power generally slipped from the hands of the senate between 494 and 202 the appointment of a dictator
specifically comitiorum habendorum causa, "for holding elections", was used on more than twenty occasions. Adding to that the number of
times political elections played a role in the appointment rei gerundae causa during this same period and a pattern begins to appear which
suggests that the office had evolved into a political weapon in whose hands major legal and legislative changes could and were made. This
law did not, however, do anything to solve the constant dissension among the consuls in relation to both civil and military decisions. Up to
202 BC this political chaos was readily applied as a concrete excuse for at best temporarily focusing power typically to the benefit of the
patrician class. For specific instances of this see for the period between 494 to 404 see De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, 1.9,
2.17, 2.30, 3.26, 4.14, 4.26, 4.31, 4.47, 4.57.
9
originally the office was designated a temporary revival of the kingship in order to focus the power of

the state into the hands of a sole decision maker, thereby eliminating the disagreement and delay of the

separated powers of the republic.

Upon appointment, the dictator's authority over the consuls and the praetor was unquestioned and

absolute.35 It is clear from the earliest sources that the dictator held the imperium, broadly defined as

"power of command". From the beginning of the Republic until about 218 the authority of the consuls

was in fact dismissed as long as the dictator was in power.36 Mommsen, relying primarily on Livy as

his source, held the position that the dictatorship was designed from its inception to work in unison

with the consulship as a collega maior. This view is correct but only after the Second Punic War when

the nature of the power of the dictator was altered as a result of the expansion of the Republic. By the

late third century, the consuls did not automatically abdicate authority. There was a shared, yet

hierarchical imperium with the consul's authority dominant over the praetor and the dictators over the

consul all subject to the approval of the senate.37

The office of dictator did retain some extraordinary prerogatives. He had more independence from

the senate, freedom from prosecution for any actions as dictator, and the ability to sentence

wrongdoers without their decision being subject to appeal by the people.38 As to the limits of the

dictator's authority it was restricted to six months and its powers were limited by the term of the

35
Theodor Mommsen. 2015. ‘The History of Rome. Book II’. Edited by Michael S. Hart. www.gutenberg.net. Accessed March 14.
http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10702/pg10702.html. Mommsen held that the authority of dictator was shared with the consulship
which made their respective offices a collega maior with each of the offices, including the praetor, acting independently. He admits, however,
that the power of the dictator was in this arrangement above that of both those offices.
36
Keyes, Clinton Walter. 1971. ‘The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship on JSTOR’. Studies in Philology 14 (October): 298–305.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4171715. 298. cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities. V . 59-77. 2015. Accessed March 15.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius V. 70. Cf. Polybius, LacusCurtius. Histories. 2015. Accessed March 15.
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/polybius. III, 86.6-87.
37
Ibid., 301
38
Wayte, and Marindin , A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities , 632. cf. ‘LacusCurtius, Polybius’ Histories’ 2015, iii.86.8 Polybius states
that the dictator, in relation to his position vis-à-vis the senate, could act completely on his own. " …and that while the consuls require in
many matters the co-operation of the Senate, the Dictator is a general with absolute powers, all the magistrates in Rome, except the Tribunes,
ceasing to hold office on his appointment". This description of the independence of the dictator, in this case Quintus Fabius Maximus (c. 280 -
208 BC) pre-dates the alteration of that office as theorized in (Keyes 1971).
10
consul. Moreover, the dictator had no authority over the treasury, and he was not allowed to leave

the boundaries of Italy as fearing he would amass a large military contingent under his direct

command. 39 That fear was enough to justify altering the nature of that office by limiting its absolute

authority.40 These changes were made quietly and without legislation. It is not an accident of history

that from 201 until 82 there are no dictators appointed as this period corresponds with that

new trend. 41 So why then, in the last century BC did that extraordinary magistracy returned to Rome?

The Social War

The history of the republic from 133 to the principate of Augustus is one of reactionary politics and

programs. The Gracchan movement was a reaction to aristocratic dominance. Its aim was a

diminution of the senatorial prerogative in the governance of Rome. It achieved the goal of placing

most authority into the hands of the tribunate in the hope of correcting the wrongs facing those least

represented. 42 Its success was fleeting. Soon after the deaths of the Gracchi brothers Rome again fell

into chaos. The rich land-owners reasserted their dominance over the provinces where fresh hostilities

soon erupted into full scale military conflicts.

Of all the crises Rome faced from none were as politically and socially consequential to the

Republic as the Social War (91-88). Conditions on the Italian peninsula were tumultuous at best. Ever

since Rome embarked on empire building the people inhabiting Italy proper had been steadily ignored.

Part of Rome's provincial policy was to categorize Italians into three groups; Roman citizens, Latins

39
De Selincourt, trans., Livy: The Early History of Rome, 1971, 216, 321. cf. Ioannis Zonarae, Epitome Historiarum, 7,13. In Cary and Foster,
trans., Roman History, Vol. IV, 107. "The office of dictator extended for a period of not more than six months, in order that no such official by
lingering on in the midst of so great power and unhampered authority should become haughty and be carried away by a passion for sole
leadership".
40
This period, from 200 to 103 saw no less than 16 major wars, more than the combined wars of the fifth thru the end of the third centuries BC
producing several powerful soldier/politicians. As to the cause, there is a direct correlation to the number of foreign wars and the
establishment Roman provincial system, begun around 241 BC.
41
The last dictator, until Sulla in 82 BC was Gaius Servilius Geminus, dictator comitiorum habendorum causa, in 202.
42
Plutarch, Lives, trans. and edited by Bernadotte Perrin. Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Loeb Classical Library. 1914), 167.
"The wild beasts that roam over Italy," he would say, "have every one of them a cave or lair to lurk in; but the men who fight and die for Italy
enjoy the common air and light, indeed, but nothing else; houseless and homeless they wander about with their wives and children".
11
and Italian Allies.43 It is with the Italian allies that the struggle centered, conquered people to whom

citizenship was not offered and who suffered most from the indifference of the both the aristocracy and

the popular leaders in Rome despite the fact that they contributed greatly to Rome's many military

adventures. 44

All previous attempts at securing for the Latin allies any formal recognition as citizens or even any

clear path towards inclusion in the greater Roman family met with failure at the hands of the most

conservative elements within the Senate, the ranks of the equites and even among the commoners in

Rome.45 Drusus' failed attempt in 91 to propose legislation offering relief to the Latin allies met with

his assassination and the outbreak of the Social War.46 This conflict was widespread, although certain

allies remained loyal to Rome. According to Diodorus the largest of these Italian allied cities,

Corfinium, formed the independent state of Italia. Having established this new state within the

boundaries of Italy itself, what followed was essentially a civil war.47 It wasn't long after the first year

of hostilities (90) that the Romans, fearing that even the loyal allies were becoming increasingly

discontent with their inferior status, conceded to their demands of citizenship but for only those who

had remained loyal during the crisis.48

43
Christopher J. Dart. The Social War, 91 to 88 BCE: A History of the Italian Insurgency Against the Roman Republic. (United Kingdom:
Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 44f
44
Handford, trans., Sallust, 152. "It is true that, in the absence of a representative system, few would have been able to use votes if they had
them. There were, however, social and legal advantages to be gained from citizen rights- for example, protection against acts of oppression on
the part of magistrates and army officers. Apart from this, it was a matter of prestige and equity: they bitterly resented their exclusion because
it was a gross injustice". cf. Thomas Africa, The Immense Majesty: A History of Rome and the Roman Republic, (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1974), 154
45
Ibid., 153. Unlike the earlier revolt of the Italian allies in 340, precipitated by Rome's refusal to admit the populations of Latium to the rights
of citizenship based on religious grounds, in 91 the justification was simply based upon protection of monopoly rights and immunities.
46
John Carter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars. I.38 (London: Penguin Group , 1996) , 22. Marcus Livius Drusus (d. 108)
47
‘Diodorus Siculus, LacusCurtius. Diodorus Siculus, (fragments covering the period 91 - 88 ) Book 37 - Translation’. 2015. University of
Chicago. Accessed April 6. http://attalus.org/translate/diodorus37.html.
48
The lex Iulia. (90) Although the loyal Italian allies received citizenship, the senate attempted to limit the number of voting rights of the new
territories by carefully limiting the tribal units in number. Appian, Civil Wars, I. vi. 49, in Lewis and Reinhold., Ed., Roman Civilization, 285. "
The Romans did not enroll these new citizens in the thirty-five existing tribes, lest they should outvote the old citizens in the elections, but
incorporated them in ten new tribes, which voted last. So it often happened that their vote was useless, since a majority was obtained from
the thirty-five tribes that voted first." Further legislation would follow. The Lex Plautia Papiria, in 89 granting full rights to every Italian who
petitioned the praetor within sixty days of its passage.
12
 The discontent of the Roman allies was not however entirely solved and those concessions would

have a lasting and negative impact on the political and economic future of the Republic. In addition to

the limitations of their voting rights, the allies now found themselves among the much larger Roman

citizenship. 49 The new citizenry, scattered all over Italy, held no real participation in the governing of

the Republic. Neither through legislation or participation in the various magistracies did the new

citizens of Rome have a real voice. All those benefits conferred on Roman citizens , grain distribution

as well as participation in the games, were made largely unavailable to the newly enfranchised Latin

communities. The reason for Roman concession here was both obvious and prudent. Fresh hostilities

with Mithridates of Pontus were emerging during this time and the Romans could not deal with

internal problems of that scale, particularly when at any moment the allies could refuse to send military

troops to deal with more pressing problems outside Italy.

By 88 the Social War was over. Sulla, having been successful, was overwhelmingly elected

consul. 50 While this was a tremendous achievement, Sulla had much greater ambitions. Recognizing

his success in ending the war against the Latin allies and conscious of his enormous popularity the

51
senate approved his appointment to that command against Mithridates of Pontus. While away,

Sulla's great opponent Marius schemed with the leading anti-Sullan senators in Rome to have the

49
Tenney Frank, 'Roman Census Statistics from 225 to 28 B. C.', Classical Philology, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 1924), pp. 329-341
Published by: The University of Chicago Press, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/262658, 333. Census figures show an increase in
Roman citizenship from roughly 394,000 before the war, 86/85, to approximately 900,000 by the calculation of 70. According to Frank,
however, "relying on two incidental references in Cicero, the citizens were apparently compelled to make the journey to Rome if they wished
to be enrolled. Hence, the 900,000 given by Livy's epitome is again far from being a complete list. Those who lived at or near Rome doubtless
gave in their names. Of citizens who lived far away, we may assume that those who desired to register property that might qualify them as
equites or as citizens of the upper "classes" in the assembly would take the journey.
50
Diodorus, fragment. 37.25. " Lucius Sulla bravely and gallantly performed most notable actions, and his fame and renown was celebrated all
over the city. The people of Rome judged him worthy of the consulship, looking upon him as a man eminent for both his valour and his skill
as a general; in summary, it was clear that he was likely to reach the highest pitch of glory." cf. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman
Republic, 7.
51
Arthur Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican. 2nd Ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), 45f. cf. Rex Warner, trans., Plutarch: The Fall of the Roman
Republic: Six Lives: Sulla. 6.9 (United Kingdom: Penguin Group, 2005), 64f .
13
command transferred to himself. Moreover, along with the popular demagogue L. Cinna, consul in 87,

he proceeded to embark on an agenda aimed directly at the supporters of Sulla.

Sulla's justification for saving the republic was grudgingly accepted by a population exhausted by

turmoil and wanting nothing less than stability. At the head of an army, and for the first time in its

republican history, Sulla entered Rome, to many, as a liberator. 52 While the people of Rome were

undoubtedly pleased that the hostilities between the various political factions may be coming to an

end, they could not have envisioned the level of turmoil created under the leadership of their one-time

hero. He routed the Marian "populist" party with a program of proscription which outraged and

terrified the population of Rome. 53

Crisis of the last century:

Lucius Cornelius Sulla

In 82 Sulla was appointed dictator legibus faciendis et rei publicae constituendae causa.54 His intention,

it is clear from the sources, was the restoration of stability in Rome. While in agreement with Keaveney

that Sulla was at heart a reformer, his suggestion that his dictatorship in no way changed the

fundamental nature of that ancient office but merely reshaped it to function within the circumstances

facing him in the first century is misleading. 55 For Keaveney, Sulla's voluntary abdication from that

office as evidence of his loyalty to its traditional function ignores Sulla's own suggestion that the

appointment was made without constraint of any time limit.56 While there is almost unanimous

52
Taylor, Party Politics, 18f.
53
Warner., trans., The Fall of the Roman Republic, 99.
54
Dictator for the making of laws and for the settling of the constitution. There is a great deal of speculation, both in the original sources and
modern historiography vis-à-vis Sulla's appointment. Some suggest that Sulla quietly demanded the title. Appian tells us that "…Sulla went
somewhere outside the city and told the senate to choose the so-called interrex. They chose Valerius Flaccus and expected him to set in train a
consular election; but Sulla wrote instructing him to make known to the people that he, Sulla, thought it advantageous at this present moment
that the city should have the magistracy they call the dictatorship…" In John Carter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars. I.98, 54f.
55
Keaveney, Sulla, 139
56
Ibid., 139
14
agreement that Sulla never intended on making his dictatorship permanent, the deliberate exclusion of

the traditional six month time limit served as a model for Caesar a generation later.

Moreover, the distinction, legibus faciendis et rei publicae constituendae causa, attached to his new office

was unprecedented. It was the first time that any dictator was able and allowed to alter the Roman

Constitution.57 Keaveney theorized that this was "a natural outcome of what may, not unfairly, be

described as Sulla's political philosophy". 58 While this may be a correct analysis, it belies the fact that

Sulla did fundamentally alter the ancient tradition of that office. I find myself in agreement more with

Baker's appraisal that the office which Sulla assumed was not that of dictator in any traditional sense

but an absolute monarchy, holding all the powers once held by the kings. 59

Sulla's initial instincts were correct.60 Aware of the popular revulsion due to his actions against the

Marians, he made every effort to legitimize his appointment through the Comitia. 61 Moreover, he

continued this appearance of legitimacy throughout his time as dictator by appointing, or putting up

for election, a consul to serve as his colleague. While Sulla went to great lengths to foster the

appearance of republican governance he was in fact in complete control over all legislative activity.62

With the memory of proscriptions there was no one in Rome who would challenge his authority.

The historiography on Sulla focus primarily on his bad acts and while those actions deserve

criticism and contributed to the ultimate failure of most of his program, his greatest mistake lay in the

fact that his stated desire to return stability to the government ran counter to his legislative acts. Erich

57
Gelzer, Caesar, 27. A distinction Sulla assigned to himself.
58
Ibid., 138
59
G.P. Baker, Sulla the Fortunate: Roman General and Dictator (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), 259
60
Warner, trans., The Fall of the Roman Republic, 96.
61
John Carter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars. I, 99, 55. "The Romans unwillingly accepted this sham of an election as a token pretence of
freedom and chose Sulla as despot with absolute power for as long as he wished".
62
Frederik Juliaan Vervaet. 2004. ‘The Lex Valeria and Sulla’s Empowerment as Dictator (82-79)’. Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz 15 (1): 37–84.
doi:10.3406/ccgg.2004.858., 75. cf. G.P. Baker, Sulla The Fortunate: Roman General and Dictator. (New York, Cooper Square Press, 2001), 278f .,
John Carter, trans., Appian, The Civil Wars, I, 100. 55f. "In a show of observing the traditional constitution Sulla permitted the people to vote for
consuls…He himself was like a king over them; the axes were carried in front of him, twenty-four for a dictator, the same number that
preceded the old kings…"
15
Gruen offers cautionary advice not to dismiss Sulla's program as reactionary. In his view his program

reflected efforts to avoid future difficulties between rivalries for political office, both in the senate and

tribunate, which had plagued the republic for generations. 63 Looked at in total, however, it does not

strain the bounds of credulity to suggest that Sulla's reforms, particularly those aimed at the tribunate

and equites, was a reaction to his perceived mistreatment at the hands of Marius and the

popular party. 64

His partisan program favoring the aristocracy could not succeed. Sulla must have believed that he

could be successful in erasing three centuries of shared government. Judging from his reform

measures Sulla saw traditional aristocratic absence from power as the cause of the turmoil which

plagued the republic, particularly that period of its history when the new plebeian nobility gained the

most traction, during the tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.65 Instead of fostering a

continuation of egalitarian policies achieved through centuries of struggle Sulla's aim was a revival of

the traditional prerogatives of the aristocracy. The only way to achieve this was through the

elimination of those popular organs of government which were at odds with his program.

Of his many acts, limiting the power of the tribunate was paramount. He mistakenly believed, and

Keaveney agrees, it was the tribunate which was the cause of Rome's turmoil and that by returning the

republic to the rule of the aristocracy he could set the clock back to a time when Rome was

unquestionably more stable and unified. 66 Gruen's assessment of the tribunate is probably more

accurate. He correctly states that very few tribunes had ever engaged in the kind of agitation which

63
Erich S. Gruen,. The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (United States: University of California Press. 1995), 8. Gruen offers cautionary
advice not to dismiss Sulla's program as reactionary. In his view Sulla's program reflected his efforts to avoid future difficulties between
rivalries for political office that had plagued the republic for generations. For evidence of this see Sulla's treatment of the Italians after the
Social War.
64
Keaveney, Sulla, 29
65
Ibid., 140f
66
Ibid., 140. The office of the tribunate had assumed much wider powers since its creation and in some cases, through the actions of
individuals like the Gracchi, Sulpicius Rufus and Drusus, had threatened the structure of the republic.
16
could be damaging to the republic as a whole. In fact, it would only take the veto of one tribune to halt

any legislation damaging to the aristocracy who, by the time of Sulla, had held a majority of its seats.67

Restrictions and fines were adopted to curtail the rise of ambitious popular politicians. In addition,

he ordered that no one should be allowed to hold the consulship for two successive years. 68 The

number of senate seats was nearly doubled and the number of criminal courts, removed from the

equites and handed over to the senate, was increased dramatically. 69

Adding to the error of his decision to pursue his damaging partisan policies was his trusting those

reforms to an inexperienced senate he was responsible for creating. 70 Further, he under-estimated the

ambition of men vying for leadership roles who, following in the footsteps of other popular leaders,

would at the first opportunity undermine his efforts. Contrary to his own desire for stability, he opened

the door to renewed partisanship and eventually civil war. It was his own adherents and in particular

Pompey and Crassus, who were the first to begin the dismantling of his program not long after his

retirement and death.

Gaius Julius Caesar

A descendant from one of the oldest patrician families in Rome, Caesar, was a very young and

ambitious man when Sulla became dictator of Rome. Anxious of the relationship between the young

Caesar and Marius, a cousin by marriage and enemy of the aristocratic party in Rome, Sulla, very early

on, blocked Caesar's attempts at entering into the political arena. 71 Identifying himself with the

Marian party, and ever determined for popular favor, which by now was the established path to
67
Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, 22f
68
Ibid., 8. This piece of legislation was directed at the protracted consulships of Marius.
69
Carter, Appian: The Civil Wars, I. 100, 55
70
Gelzer, Caesar, 28
71
Robert Graves, trans., Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, The Twelve Caesars ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957, revised by James B. Rives, 2007), 1
" Everyone knows that when Sulla had long held out against the most devoted and eminent men of his party who interceded for Caesar, and
they obstinately persisted, he at last gave way and cried, either by divine inspiration or a shrewd forecast. 'Have your way and take him; only
bear in mind that the man you are so eager to save will one day deal the death blow to the cause of the aristocracy, which you have joined
with me in upholding; for in this Caesar there is more than one Marius.'"
17
leadership in Rome, Caesar spent a literal fortune on spectacular games.72 Vestiges of the Marian party,

although subdued by Sulla, were still alive in Rome at this time. In a spectacular feat of political

propaganda, Caesar successfully revived the spirit of that faction with himself at its head.73 His aim

was the consulship but without the backing of more prominent political figures there would be no way

of achieving that goal. In another political stroke of genius, Caesar reconciled the wealthy Crassus and

popular military hero Pompey, two of the most powerful men in Rome. These two men had a falling

out following the Third Servile War of 71 in which Pompey took credit for its success.74 He then

secured a marriage contract between his daughter Julia and Pompey.75 Crassus, an aristocrat of

enormous wealth helped to finance the propaganda machine of this new "triumvirate". Pompey,

always it seems on the outskirts of the alliance, utilized his wide influence and clientela he had so

assiduously worked to obtain throughout his long military career. Caesar, although the junior

member, was the main component of the political trio and through the aid of his partners and he

secured for himself the consulate in 59.76

At the end of his year in office he secured for himself the proconsulship of Gaul where from 58 to

51. While Caesar was in Gaul Crassus was killed in battle against the Parthian Empire (54). The death

of a triumvir exasperated tensions which had always existed between Caesar and Pompey.77

Eventually Pompey, realizing that the differences between the two were irreconcilable and fearing the

72
Warner, trans., Fall of the Roman Republic, 259
73
Ibid., 259f.
74
Ibid., 125
75
Ibid., 267
76
Christian Meier, Caesar: A Biography. (Harper Collins. New York. 1982), 71 His colleague for the year was Bibulus. Relations between the
two were hostile. cf. C. Meier. 'Caesar divi filius and the Formation of the Alternative in Rome'. In K. A. Raaflaub and M. Toher. Ed. Between
Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate ( Berkeley University of California Press, 1990), p.60. "Caesar…broke with the
Senate and the constitution in the year 59. He had to do so if he wanted to succeed in passing his laws. However, whether or not he got along
well with the Senate does not appear to have made much difference to him; by then he had already distanced himself from the ruling
oligarchy in Rome. In his isolation he took the Roman aristocracy's ideal of achievements (or dignitas) very seriously, even absolutely; thus he
no longer respected the limits set for personal ambition by the aristocratic society. First in Gaul and hen in high-ranking and often
incompetent princepes what one man could achieve. Since there was no cause and no alternative to which he could find himself, his
legitimation could only be his own person - which forced him to prove his greatness everywhere."
77
Carter, trans., Appian: The Civil Wars, I, 1-4, 2f.
18
extraordinary popularity of Caesar, broke with him and re-joined the aristocrats. The resulting contest

between the two culminated in the battle of Pharsalus in 48. 78 Witnessing the destruction of his forces

Pompey fled to Egypt where shortly thereafter he was assassinated while trying to go ashore. 79

Caesar was now alone at the top. He had accomplished, with few exceptions, the defeat and

complete capitulation of his enemies. Even with these achievements, he was not one to sit on his

hands. On the contrary, as Plutarch asserts, these accomplishments "were incentives and

encouragements to go on, and raised in him ideas of still greater actions, and a desire of new glory, as if

the present were all spent".80 Smarter, more subtle and certainly more tactful than Sulla, Caesar was

well aware of the level of fatigue felt by the Roman people concerning the civil wars and he used that

to his great advantage.

Of Sulla's ultimate goal there can be little doubt as is plainly evidenced by his resignation and

departure from the political scene shortly after his reform movement had somewhat hardened. It

would later crumble as a more populist political wing of the senatorial ranks began again to gain favor.

Caesar, judging from his extensive reforms, was in for the long haul. His plans indicate a fundamental

re-structuring of many social and political institutions throughout the empire.

A growing negative sentiment to his "edicts" soon developed among the closed political establishment

in Rome sparking concerns of oppressive dictatorial power.81 In both Plutarch and Suetonius we read

that the primary cause of anxiety among the people of Rome in general, and those of the senate and

political establishment in particular, was his perceived arrogance. Most of the source evidence would

suggest that while Caesar feigned republican virtues it was evident to many that he was slowly

78
For details on the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 see ibid., II, 29-90, 84ff.
79
Warner, trans., Plutarch, Pompey , 246f
80
Ibid., Caesar, 259
81
Ibid., Caesar, 305. Plutarch remarks that Cicero, on one occasion, "when someone in his company chanced to say the next morning Lyra
would rise, replied, 'Yes, in accordance with the edict'".
19
shedding any pretense towards maintaining what was left of republican government. His apparent

and mounting contempt for the senate was unconcealed. Adding to the tension were a good number of

key men who desired to crown Caesar. He of course denied royal ambitions and on several occasions

seemed annoyed at those senators who made charges of kingly aspirations.82 His enemies never

ceased in their attempt to plot his eventual downfall. They succeeded in convincing some of Caesar's

83
closest intimates to murder the dictator.

Gelzer's appraisal of Caesar is probably correct. He shows us a man of enormous personal

ambition who was willing to play every side of every issue, even, in some instances at the expense of

his most ardent supporters. As a politician with great ambition in Rome towards the last decades of

the first century, it was quite common for ambitious politicians to adopt measures best suited to their

class, status and party. What is different about Caesar, as Gelzer shows, was his indifference to what

commonly motivated politicians. He would adopt any position which worked towards his personal

ambition and had a personality which could not allow him to accept good counsel or outside checks on

his ambitions.

There has been much controversy in relation to Caesar's actions as to whether or not he had a plan

from early on in his career to set himself up as sole ruler of Rome. Gelzer warning not to read so much

into every small action of Caesar with regard to his personal, political, and military actions is prudent

but one cannot ignore the one convicting piece of evidence to the contrary. With absolute control in

Rome he had himself appointed dictator for ten years in 47, for life a month before his assassination 44

BC and at the hands of those powerful senators he treated with such indifference.

82
Graves, trans., Suetonius, 38f cf. Plutarch Lives, p.267f. Not the least of which was Antony himself who on several occasions made the
attempt at public gatherings.
83
Ibid., 40. More than sixty joined the conspiracy against him, led by Gaius Cassius and Decimus and Marcus Junius Brutus. At first they
hesitated whether to form two divisions at the elections in the Field of Mars, so that while some hurled him from the bridge as he summoned
the tribes to vote, the rest might wait below and slay him; or to set upon him in the Sacred Way or at the entrance to the theater. When,
however, a meeting of the Senate was called for the ides of March in the Hall of Pompey, they readily gave that time and place the preference.
20
 It has become somewhat fashionable in certain modern academic circles to portray Caesar as a great

defender of Roman Republican virtue and a political and social reformer dedicated to the interests of

the down-trodden. Any reforms that Caesar either initiated in the past or planned for in the future

were designed to help Caesar. He was a demagogue of the highest order.

The Augustan Settlement

The years between the death of Caesar in 44 to the establishment of the Principate of Augustus in 30

witnessed political alliances, intrigues, assassinations and proscriptions. During this tumultuous

period rose the Second Triumvirate of M. Antonius, J. Caesar Octavianus, and M. Lepidus, who for two

years battled the murderers of Caesar until finally overtaking the last of them at Philippi in 42. Rome

was now divided between them but it was not long before serious dissention among them led to

violence. Finally, in 31, Octavian and Antony met at Actium. The outcome was disastrous for Antony.

On October 30, 30, he took his own life leaving Rome to the rule of one man.

Tacitus describes the transition from the Republic to the Principate of Augustus. After the death of

Brutus and Cassius, there was no longer any army loyal to the Republic; Sextius Pompey 84 had been

crushed at Sicily; and, with Lepidus deposed and Antony dead, "even the Caesarian party had no

leader left except the 'Caesar' himself, Octavian". Laying aside the triumvir and parading as a consul,

and professing himself satisfied with the tribunican power for the protection of the plebs, Augustus

enticed the soldiers with gifts, the people with grain, and all men with the allurement of peace, and

gradually grew in power, concentrating in his own hands the functions of the Senate, the magistrates,

and the laws. 85 Like Sulla he accomplished all this on the pretext of a new republic but he was in fact

84
The son of Pompey the Great
85
Tacitus, The Annals of Imperial Rome. I. 1. Translated by Michael Grant. United Kingdom: Penguin Group (USA, 1973), 32
21
Rome's new monarch. He did not take the title of king nor did he assume the title of dictator which,

since the days of Sulla had evoked equal levels of anxiety throughout the Roman world.86

Instead he assumed the title Imperator, a designation which meant absolute authority but did not

have the emotional effect of the former titles. The Roman people have always had a gift for euphemism

and Augustus knew how to utilize it. 87 He based his power on a combination of proconsular imperium,

which gave him complete and unmatched command of the armies and tribunician authority, providing

him with the traditional 'sacrosanctity' of that office and more importantly the appearance of being the

representative of the people. During the more than forty years of his reign, Augustus restored the

Roman world. 88 He revived the Republican institutions in Rome, although in such a weakened state

that his authority was never threatened. All the Roman magistracies were filled as usual but the

highest offices, consul and tribunate, were peopled through nominations made directly by him. With

both consular and tribunical powers, Augustus had the authority to legislate and as censor he controlled

the Senate by regularly updating the membership at will.89

His recognition of the Senate involved the construction of a semi-hereditary aristocracy from which

he chose his most able administrators and military leaders. 90 Since the number of Senators was

"swelled by a low-born and ill-assorted rabble " he restored it to its former limits and distinction by two

purges, one according to the choice of the members themselves, each man naming one other, and a

second made by Agrippa and himself. 91

86
Augustus. Res Gestae Divi Augusti,I,5. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 21
87
Augustus preferred the designation princeps, the more informal term, with its overtone of republicanism, after the traditional princeps
senatus. This title offered the distinction of 'first citizen', primus inter pares, rather than ruler "over" subjects.
88
Christian Meier. 'C. Caesar divi filius and the Formation of the Alternative in Rome'. In K.A. Raaflaub and M. Toher. Ed. Between Republic and
Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate. (University of California Press. Berkeley. 1990), 56. "There can be no doubt that he
created a new order that took root broadly across all of Roman Society. Thus after the crisis of about one hundred years based on social and
political power a manifest alternative to the traditional order was shaped in the form of the principate of Augustus.
89
Cassius Dio. Roman History, LIII- xvii, I-xviii, 3, xii. 3-7
90
Lewis and Rhinehold. Roman Civilization, 577. The dates of the purges are 29-28, 18, and 13.
91
Suetonius. The Lives of the Caesars. xxxv. Translated by Molly Dauster and J.C. Rolfe. (United States: Barnes & Noble Inc. 2004), 67
22
 Augustus's financial reorganization of the empire began in the provinces, ravaged by one hundred

years of constant warfare. On many occasions he supplied the treasury with his own personal funds.92

He reformed the tax collection services severely restricting the publicani and replaced them with

equestrian procurators charged with tax collections. His building program was immense and must have

served well the interests of the Roman people who had witnessed only destruction throughout the last

century of the Republic. As Christian Meier points out; "[R]easonably enough, Augustus at first took

over only external duties, the defense of the border provinces. This offered two advantages; it further

increased his credit, and it helped the Romans realize, whenever unrest arouse in the capital, that the

93
saving hand of the princeps was indispensable in the domestic sphere as well". Augustus died in 14

AD leaving behind him a restored world diligently obtained through force of political will and extreme

intelligence.

The dictatorship was returned to Rome after a 120 year absence as a direct result of the disease of

Rome's provincial system begun in the middle of the second century which brought to Rome centuries

of turmoil and unrest solved only by the genius of Augustus. The office itself was altered by both

Sulla and Caesar because they understood that the traditional understanding of the nature and limits of

the dictatorship would be insufficient to deal with the difficulties facing the republic in the last century

BC. They reasoned that that extraordinary magistracy was the only means by which they could push

through their personal political agendas given the fractured nature of Rome's political institutions at

Cf. Cassius Dio. Roman History LII, xlii, 1-7. In Lewis and Rhinehold, Roman Civilization, 557f. Agrippa was chosen by Augustus as colleague
in the consul.
92
Augustus. Res Gestae I. 15., 25. "Four times I came to the assistance of the treasury with my own money, transferring to those in charge of
the treasury 150,000,000 sesterces. And in the consulship of Marcus Lepidus I transferred out of my own patrimony 170,000,000 sesterces to the
soldiers' bonus fund, which was established on my advice for the purpose of providing bonuses for soldiers who had completed twenty or
more years of service."
93
Christian Meier, 'C. Caesar divi filius', 56

23
that time. The choice of Sulla and Caesar to pursue partisan solutions ultimately led to their personal

and political failures.

The aftermath of each of their partisan programs led to renewed civil strife. These errors in

judgment and perception were the final elements in a process of republican disintegration. The

Augustan settlement was an amalgamation of the more practical qualities of both Sulla and Caesar.

His great success lay in the fact that he was able to solidify a fractured state by centralizing virtually all

decision making while at the same time managing to maintain the impression that the republic was

functioning as it should. This pretense would be slowly eroded over the next few centuries until again

the empire was threatened from abroad when there would be no Augustus to save it.

24
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