Mediation of Civil Wars

About the Book and Author

As civil wars become forums for international conflicts and ideological
rivalries, their containment and resolution is an increasingly important
requisite for international peace. This book explores mediation as a means
toward resolving such wars. Dr. Assefa argues that the sovereign
sensitivities of incumbent governments, the risk of international
legitimization of insurgents, and the need for reconciliation rather than mere
containment demand special mediation efforts.
Using the Sudan civil war as a case study, the author reconstructs a
successful mediation process through examination of confidential archival
materials and through his extensive interviews with the mediators. The
conditions that caused the Sudan civil war exist in many developing
countries. Therefore this in-depth analysis provides an important insight in
assessing and managing similar conflicts.
Hizkias Assefa is a consultant in conflict resolution and assistant
professor in the Graduate Program of LaRoche College, Pittsburgh,
specializing in management and international affairs. He is also coauthor of
a forthcoming book entitled Extremist Groups and Conflict Resolution—
The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia (1987).
 Mediation of Civil Wars

Approaches and Strategies— The Sudan Conflict

Hizkias Assefa
First published 1987 by Westview Press

Published 2018 by Routledge

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Copyright © 1987 by Hizkias Assefa

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Assefa, Hizkias.
Mediation of civil wars.
(Westview special studies in peace, conflict,
and conflict resolution)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Civil war. 2. Mediation, International.
3. Sudan—History—Civil War, 1955-1972. I. Title.
II. Series.
JX4541.A86 1987 341.5'2 86-15807

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-01133-8 (hbk)

To Gretchen, Sarah and Martha
 Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PART ONE - THEORY OF MEDIATION

1. INTRODUCTION
2. PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION OF
CIVIL WARS

Identity and Characteristics of the Contestants

Duration of the Conflict
Stalemate
Interests at Stake
Characteristics of the Mediator
Skills of the Mediator
Summary and Conclusion

PART TWO - CASE STUDY

3. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

Geography and Population

Turkish Rule and the Slave Trade
The Mahdist Period
From Condominium Rule to Independence

4. THE CIVIL WAR AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

The Mutiny of 1955 and Its Aftermath

Independence, the Multi-party System and Its Consequences
Emergence of the Anya Nya
The Round Table Conference and Its Aftermath
Northern Measures and the Spiral of Violence
The Coming of Numeiri and the Rise of the SSLM
External Involvement
 5. EARLY MEDIATION EFFORTS

Pre-1970 Mediation Attempts

Effort by the Movement for Colonial Freedom

6. THE WCC AND AACC MEDIATION

Early Involvement of the WCC and AACC

Early Exploratory Efforts
Preliminary Negotiations
The Addis Ababa Negotiations
The Ratification Process

PART THREE - THEORY AND PRACTICE

7. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION

PROCESS

Factors That Led to the Success of the WCC/AACC

Mediation

Factors dealing with the nature and process of the

conflict
Internal political factors
External political factors
Idiosyncratic factors of the key personalities in the
conflict
The mediators

Factors That Led to the Failure of the MCF Mediation

8. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIATION

THEORY AND THE SUDAN CASE STUDY

The Characteristics of the Parties

The Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict
The Characteristics and Skills of the Mediator

9. CONCLUSION
EPILOGUE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Index
 Acknowledgments
This work would not have been possible without the cooperation and
assistance of many people. I am infinitely grateful to the peacemakers in
this study — Canon Burgess Carr, whom I interviewed in Cambridge,
Mass; Mr. Dwain Epps, in New York; Mrs. Barbara Haq, in London; Dr.
Leoplodo Niilus, in Geneva; Mr. Kodwo Ankrah, in Kampala; and Mr.
Samuel Bwogo, in Khartoum. They not only shared their time and their
thoughts with me but also allowed me to enjoy their generosity and
humanity which has left me with a sense of deep respect and inspiration.
I must also express my deep appreciation to Dr. Chris Mitchell, London;
Dr. Louise Pirouet, Cambridge, England; Dr. Storrs McCall, Montreal; and
Dr. Raphael Badal, Khartoum, for sharing their views and materials on the
Sudan as well as for their hospitality. Thanks must go to Dr. Jerome
Laulicht, who read an earlier draft of this manuscript and made a number of
valuable suggestions; and to Dr. Richard Cottam, Dr. Daniel Cheever, Dr.
David Gould, and Dr. Alex Weilenmann, all of Pittsburgh, from whom I
benefitted a great deal in discussing this subject matter. My thanks to Joan
Friedman who edited this manuscript with humor and enthusiasm.
I am very grateful to Mr. Ninan Koshy, Mr. Eric Weingartner, Mr. Ans
Van der Bent and the Commission of the Churches for International Affairs
of the World Council of Churches for their assistance and for facilitating my
research in Geneva. Special thanks go to Mr. Dwain Epps for his contagious
enthusiasm and support which helped keep my interest going during the
first stages of this work when I had many doubts about the feasibility of the
undertaking.
Then, I would like to thank my family. I cannot express enough gratitude
to my wife, Gretchen Van Evera, who has been my discussant and source of
support, without whose help, understanding, and encouragement this work
might not have been a reality. I would like to express my deep appreciation
for the help and encouragement I received from Mary Van Evera as well as
the inspirations I have derived from her example. My special gratitude and
affection also for my daughters: Sarah, who patiently tolerated the
competition of this book for my attention, and Martha, who held back
coming to this world until the week this book was completed. My thanks to
my brother, Solomon, for helping in and enduring the final stages of the
book's preparation. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my
mother, Abeba Reda, who showed me the importance of reconciliation; and
to my father, Assefa Wolde Gebriel, who instilled in me the values of
perseverance and scholarship, and who, together, taught me that there is
more than one side to an issue.
Hizkias Assefa
 Part One
Theory of Mediation
 Chapter 1
Introduction
Frank Hubbard, a nineteenth century caricaturist, remarked: "peace has
its victories no less than war, but it does not have as many monuments to
unveil." Almost a century later, the famous philosopher John Dewey,
seemingly trying to convert this observation into a guide for behavior,
suggested that "the only way to abolish war [is] to make peace heroic."
The need to make peace heroic has become even more imperative in the
nuclear age since we live in a world where our preparations and skills in
waging destructive conflicts have surpassed our efforts and skills in waging
peace. This book pays tribute to the heroism of peacemaking by unveiling
one monument that had been shrouded in mystery for some time and by
identifying some approaches to the containment of conflict. It examines
mediation as a method for the resolution of internationalized civil wars and
analyzes the various conditions that facilitate its success. It then presents a
case study where mediation was successfully utilized in an intractable
internationalized civil war and examines the approach from the perspective
of theory and practice.
There are several reasons why this study focuses on mediation and on
civil wars. Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to define
these two concepts as they will be used in the subsequent analysis. It is
difficult to define mediation precisely since it incorporates processes
common to other third party interventions. Some authors have distinguished
among five kinds of third party conflict resolution mechanisms: good
offices, inquiry, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.1 While it is easy to
distinguish between mediation, arbitration, and adjudication, the distinction
between mediation, inquiry, and good offices is not so clear. In fact, the last
two appear to be either components of mediation or to differ from it only in
the degree of noncoercive initiative permitted to the third party. Then terms
such as "conciliation" (which some view as a combination of mediation and
inquiry)2 and "intermediation" (which does not have any technical
definition)3 are often used interchangeably with "mediation". In this study,
the term mediation will include good offices and inquiry, and will be
defined as an intervention in a conflict, by an actor not a party to the
dispute, aimed at helping the parties resolve their conflict peacefully
through negotiation and compromise.
The second concept calling for definition is the notion of civil war. It has
been defined as a war fought between different geographical areas, political
divisions, or ideological factions within the same country.4 In the literature
one finds terms such as internal wars used interchangeably with civil wars.
For example, for Janos, internal war is a concept that includes civil war, and
he defines internal war as a "violent conflict between parties subject to a
common authority and of such dimensions that its incidence will affect the
exercise or structure of authority in the society."5 Even though Janos'
definition is more precise, it has some limitations. It could hardly be said
that in civil wars of secession the insurgents are subject to the same
authority as their opponents. The authority exercised by the incumbents
over the secessionists seems to be only de jure and not de facto in most
instances. Moreover, many authors warn about the futility of trying to draw
strict boundaries between internal wars and external or international wars.
For example, Kelly and Miller point out that "only conceptually can there
be a purely internal war, although, as affected by the variables of goals,
scope, and duration, there are obviously greater and lesser degrees of inner-
outer permeability in such wars."6 Keeping these limitations in mind, the
term internal war shall be used in the subsequent analysis as a more generic
term that includes civil war.
The reasons for this study's focus on mediation and civil wars are as
follows: First, the significance and the gravity of civil wars seem to be on
the increase.7 One commonly thinks that large scale wars are the result of
direct conflict between the superpowers. However, even minor or isolated
internal conflicts have the potential to lure in major powers, thereby
escalating the destructiveness of the conflict and even at times endangering
international peace and security.8 There have been many examples of such
conflicts since the end of World War II: Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, East
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Lebanon, Jordan, Cuba, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Rhodesia, Zaire, Ethiopia, Chad, etc. In
some of these conflicts, nuclear weapons were even considered as options
by some decision makers to "win" these intractable wars. It seems that the
ideological divisions in the world today foster the perception that the
outcome of every political struggle in every part of the world is of vital
concern to each of the ideological blocs. Moreover, modern technology is
steadily decreasing the significance of national boundaries for military
strategy and ideological commitments. As a result, internal wars become
forums for larger conflicts such as racial, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, or
cold war rivalries. Conflicts in remote areas tend suddenly to acquire
strategic importance, and wars that might at first seem insignificant,
become breeding grounds for larger conflicts and violence.
Some argue that the nuclear era has made all-out international wars
extremely dangerous, and that internal wars reduce the risk of such
confrontations by allowing states to wage their conflicts indirectly through
local political movements and rebellions elsewhere.9 There might be some
validity to this argument However, as illustrated in the examples cited, the
danger that internationalized civil wars pose to global peace and security is
still so grave that they cannot be accepted as substitutes for direct interstate
wars. Methods for their avoidance or peaceful resolution must be found.
The second reason for the focus on civil wars is that to date, most of
these conflicts have been waged in poor, third-world countries. Conflicts
that might have spent themselves out, were it not for international
intervention, continue on for years. Consequently, they exacerbate the
already abysmal poverty of these countries by destroying their fragile
economic bases and inflicting endless misery upon generations of people.
Thus, from the perspective of the people of these countries, a way out of
such conflicts becomes even more imperative. In addition, the type of civil
war which is examined in this study, war of secession, is a problem that has
been plaguing many African countries. Therefore, a study of the peaceful
termination of such wars would be particularly relevant to many afflicted
countries.
Thirdly, mediation was made the focus of this study because it seems to
be the most appropriate mechanism to resolve internal wars when compared
to all the other third party and even non-third party conflict resolution
devices. The other major third party conflict resolution mechanisms,
adjudication and arbitration, are not relevant for the resolution of large-
scale, violent social conflicts such as civil wars. It is very difficult to
imagine civil wars being resolved through court litigation or by the decision
of an arbitrator.
 Fourthly, when one examines other conflict resolution mechanisms that
do not involve third parties, there are further grounds for arguing that
mediation is a preferable method. Non-third party mechanisms range from
outright victory or loss by one party to the conflict at one end of the
spectrum, to voluntary negotiation and bargaining at the other. An outright
military solution could hardly be said to resolve the conflict even though it
may terminate it. Since the underlying problems behind the conflict are not
dealt with, the dictates of the victors in the confrontation will prevail only
until the vanquished muster enough power to reverse the situation or to
force some sort of accommodation. Even if the losers fail to reverse the
power relationship, a coerced solution contains the seeds of future conflict
and tension. The other end of the spectrum of non-third party mechanisms
consists of negotiation and bargaining. These could be the most ideal means
of settling large-scale social conflict if they involve compromise and
accommodation. However, the process of negotiation, when it does not
involve third party intermediation, is fraught with many problems that
prevent its success or even limit its frequent use.
The problems in negotiation arise partly from the patterns of
communication inherent in the process itself. The mode of communication
between the parties in a negotiation tends to encourage a contest of wills.
Messages sent by the parties to each other embody a large amount of
distortion because they frequently tend to be implicit and discrete, using
threats, warnings, bluffs, and sometimes outright misinformation.10 It is
difficult to come by concessions and compromise because they might lead
to the perception that the party who makes the concession is weak.
Moreover, the lack of external sources of information uncolored by the
hostilities, stereotypes, suspicions, fears, and prejudices of the conflicting
parties limits the range of options and alternatives that might be apparent to
the negotiators. Because of these shortcomings, the success of direct
negotiations between conflicting parties can be severely limited.
Mediation, on the other hand, incorporates some of the beneficial aspects
of negotiation while rectifying its shortcomings. It maintains aspects such
as the parties' independence in decision-making, their full participation and
involvement in the resolution process, and the potential for dealing with the
root causes of the conflict. But, at the same time, it remedies the defective
communication that afflicts the negotiation process. The mediation process
can filter out the distorted messages, encourage open and frank interactions,
expand the range of options and alternative solutions, provide face-saving
devices for concession, and, in general, make compromise and
accommodation an attractive instead of a disgraceful option. It encourages
commitment to the results of the negotiations by creating a forum in which
the parties are able to present their cases fairly and justly.
Although, from the various means of conflict resolution mechanisms
discussed, mediation seems to be both the most appropriate and the most
beneficial method of dealing with civil wars, unfortunately the full potential
and advantages of this method have not been fully exploited. In fact, very
few civil wars have been resolved through mediation or even through
negotiated settlements.
In order for mediation to be utilized more frequently as an effective
method of resolving civil wars, it must be thoroughly understood and its
theory more fully developed. At this point, let alone the theory, even the
literature on the subject is scant and in disarray. This book attempts to
contribute to the systematic theorization of mediation by synthesizing the
fragmentary literature and developing a series of hypotheses that determine
the success of mediation of civil wars. Then an actual case of a mediated
civil war is presented in order to analyze the possible correspondence
between the existing theory and actual practice.
This study consists of three parts. Part One presents a bird's-eye view of
the state of mediation theory and goes on to develop a series of hypotheses
about necessary and sufficient conditions that contribute to the successful
mediation of civil wars. The hypotheses are developed by synthesizing the
various claims and postulates presented in the fragmentary literature, and
reconciling, to the extent possible, some of the contradictions. This part
then concludes by reflecting on the viability of mediation as a means of
resolving civil wars in light of the presented hypotheses about the
conditions required for its success. Various methods of organizing these
hypotheses are suggested and the impact of such arrangements on the
viability of mediation is examined.
Part Two is primarily factual and historical. It presents a case study of the
Sudan Civil War (1955-72) which was waged for seventeen years and
claimed over 500,000 lives before it was finally settled through mediation.
Very little is known about this civil war and even less about its resolution
process. Chapter three examines the root-causes of this conflict while
chapter four explains the actual dynamics and development of the conflict.
The subsequent chapters of Part Two deal with the peace process. Chapter
five presents an account of mediation efforts that were attempted but failed
to bring about a resolution, while chapter six describes the mediation
process that was finally able to bring about a negotiated settlement.
Existing writings on the conflict resolution process in the Sudan Civil
War are very scanty. Several authors have dismissed the whole process by
superficially mentioning that some third party mediation was involved
towards the latter phases of the conflict. As Paul Wehr points out, the
tendency of historians has been to write chapters vividly detailing and
describing the war process but devoting only paragraphs to the termination
process.11 The Sudan Civil War is a classic illustration of this tendency.
Because there has not been much prior research on the mediation process,
that part of the case study is based mainly on original information from
primary sources. The method utilized to gather the information was to
interview the key third party actors in the mediation process and to examine
letters, correspondence, internal memoranda, minutes and reports of
meetings, and unpublished documents. The documentary information and
the archival materials were used to build the basic structure for the
presentation of the case study. Whenever gaps in the sequence of events in
the documentary materials were found, or the documents were unclear,
information from the interviews was used to clarify or fill in the gaps.
The case study is presented in a factual and narrative style with
maximum description and minimum interpretation and analysis. The aim
behind this style of presentation is, as far as possible, to let the story stand
by itself, uninfluenced by the theoretical discussion of Part One, so that the
results of the examination of whether or not there is any correspondence
between the theory and practice is not unduly biased.
Part Two has several purposes. Primarily, it serves as a contribution to the
sparse data-base of systematically studied and analyzed cases of peacefully
resolved civil wars which is essential for theory construction in this vital
area. Secondly, it serves as a factual base in which to search for evidence
that supports or contradicts the hypotheses generated in Part One. Of
course, at this stage of the theory of mediation of civil wars, the only thing
that can be done is to compile evidence and not to validate or reject any
hypotheses. The dearth of case studies or available data does not allow us
that luxury. Thirdly, the case study sheds light on a practically unknown
conflict resolution effort which has many interesting facets and provides
many useful insights into similar conflicts.
In Part Three, theory and practice are tied together. Chapter seven begins
the analysis by looking at the case study and, without reference to the
theory of Part One, identifies those factors and circumstances that stand out
as being important for the success of the conflict resolution process as well
as those that led to the demise of earlier efforts. The basis for the
identification of the factors in this chapter are the opinions of authors and
observers of the Sudan conflict and its settlement process. Chapter eight
expressly and consciously reexamines the case study using the structure and
hypotheses of Part One. It analyzes which hypotheses were supported and
which were contradicted by the evidence in the case study. If a hypothesis is
contradicted by the evidence, an alternative formulation or an entirely new
hypothesis is suggested.
Chapter nine concludes the study by making some general observations
about the lessons that could be learned from the Sudan experience for the
mediation of similar conflicts elsewhere and providing some suggestions
for future research.
1
"Good offices" has been defined as a technique of peaceful settlement of conflict whereby a
third party acts as a go-between, transmitter of messages, and provider of meeting place, with
the aim of bringing about direct negotiation between the parties. Jack C. Plano and Ray Olton,
The International Relations Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1982),
216.
"Inquiry" is a formal and impartial determination of the facts underlying a dispute in which the
third party reports his/her findings to the parties with the aim of clarifying the basis for the
conflict. Ibid., 217.
"Mediation" is a procedure whereby a third party aids the disputants in finding a solution by
offering specific proposals as possible terms of settlement. Ibid., 218.
"Arbitration" is a mechanism whereby the parties willingly submit to a third party for a decision
on their dispute, and agree in advance to be bound by the decision. They also specify in
advance what the issues of the dispute are and the procedure to be followed. Ibid., 252.
"Adjudication" is settling a dispute by submitting it to determination by an established court of
law. Ibid., 249.
2
Ibid., 231.
3
David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol.7 (New York:
Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, 1968), 509.
4
Piano and Olton, 164.
5
Andrew Janos, "Authority and Violence: The Political Framework of Internal Wars," in Internal
War, Problems and Approaches, ed. Harry Eckstein (London: The Free Press, 1964), 130.
 6
George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller, Internal War and International Systems: Perspectives on
Method, Occassional Papers in International Affairs, No. 21 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for
International Affairs, Harvard Univ., August 1969), 5. See also Modelski, "International
Settlement of Civil Strife," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. James Rosenau
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), 149; and Robert R. Randle, The Origins of
Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements (New York: The Free
Press, 1973), 207-208.
7
See Keith Sutter, An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1984), 1. Small and Singer point out that for the 68 years period between 1871 and 1939, 40
civil wars took place, while during the 31 years between 1946 and 77 alone 37 civil wars
occured. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Conflict in the International System;
Historical Trends and Policy Futures," in Explaining War: Selected Papers from the
Correlates of War Project David Singer and Associates (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
1979), 68.
8
Small and Singer substantiate this view with data for the period between 1946-1977. During
this time, 37 civil wars took place and 63% of them were internationalized. Ibid.
9
Evan Luard, ed., The International Regulation of Civil Wars (New York: New York Univ. Press,
1972), 9.
10
The series of studies by Deutsch and Krauss have illustrated how the use of threats and
counterthreats in the bargaining process tend to lead to the escalation of the conflict, to fiercely
competitive behavior and even to the failure of the bargaining process itself. Morton Deutsch and
Robert Krauss, "Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (1962):
52.
11
Paul Wehr, Conflict Resolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), xv.
 Chapter 2
Preconditions for Successful
Mediation of Civil Wars
In this chapter a series of hypotheses that identify conditions for the success
of mediation of civil wars will be developed. Before moving on with this
task, a brief overview of the state of the theory in this aspect of mediation
will be helpful.
Mediation theory is still in its infancy. There is a dearth of case studies,
and only few attempts at systematic and overarching theories exist. Of
course, one can find a good deal of isolated and disconnected research on
various aspects of mediation. However, they are full of contradictory
claims, and frustrate attempts to fully understand and effectively utilize this
valuable conflict resolution mechanism.
Moreover, the great bulk of the existing literature deals unevenly with
different aspects of mediation. For example, it treats international and labor
mediation extensively and ignores other contexts of mediation such as civil
wars. Given this lack of information, a serious question arises as to whether
valuable insights could be gained by transferring experiences from one
context of mediation to another. One determinant of the justifiability of
such transfer is, no doubt, the analogy of the context from which the
experience is transferred. Rose and Rose point out various criteria that
distinguish internal conflicts from international conflicts, and according to
these criteria, internal wars seem to share more characteristics with
international conflicts than with internal conflicts such as labor-
management disputes.12 Especially in wars of secession, where the
insurgents are trying to create their own new state, the actors in the conflict
are states or state-like actors. It has been noted that civil wars have an
important international component and are becoming increasingly
internationalized.13 Therefore, whenever a gap exists in the theoretical
discussion of mediation of civil wars, an attempt will be made to determine
whether it may be filled by looking at experiences in the mediation of
international conflicts.
Two veins of theory exist in the literature that identify factors that make
mediation successful. Proponents of the first assume that the success or
failure of mediation depends heavily on the mediator. Based on this
presumption much of the literature attempts to identify desirable
characteristics and skills for the mediator and to outline appropriate tactics
and strategies that could be utilized in mediation.14 The second group
challenges these premises concerning the importance of idiosyncratic
factors to successful mediation arguing that the scope for effective
mediation is much narrower and that, in certain kinds of disputes, the
attributes and tactics of the mediator could be only marginal factors at best
Thus, they attempt to identify various environmental factors to explain the
success of mediation efforts.15
The aim of this chapter is to develop a series of hypotheses which
identify conditions that facilitate success in the mediation of civil wars.
Works that attempt to isolate conditions favorable to the success of
mediation in general are very few; and there has been practically no effort
to examine how those conditions relate to civil wars. Modelski's work is the
only one that comes close. However, it does not deal with mediation per se,
but with conditions that favor negotiations for peaceful settlement of
internal wars. Since whatever is conducive to the peaceful settlement of an
internal war will also be useful for its mediation, Modelski's work will be
used as a point of departure for the analysis undertaken in this chapter. As
the analysis progresses, the factors identified by Modelski will be critiqued
and expanded by relating and synthesizing them with other relevant works.
The following sections examine conditions which could be identified as
essential for the success of mediating civil wars:

Identity and Characteristics of the Contestants

It has been argued that settlement can occur only between parties whose
"identity" or "personality" has been well defined. The difficulty in settling
outbreaks of political violence, such as riots, arises because in such
situations the corporate personality of at least one of the parties is elusive
and thus "there is no one to settle with."16
Similarly, in a civil war or insurgency against a government, it is usually
difficult to define clearly the "identity" of the insurgents or rebels. For the
purposes of third party intermediary intervention, it does not suffice merely
to identify the corporate personality of the contestants. Possibly more
difficult, a second step must be taken: the clear identity of the
representatives and the spokespeople of the conflicting parties must be
established.
In addition to establishing the clear identity of the parties, the
cohesiveness existing within each conflicting party is also important If there
is disunity within the parties, it may be impossible even to clearly identify
them in the first place. The requirement of inner cohesion also implies some
kind of stability within the power structure of each of the parties. Such
stability could give the representatives of the parties more flexibility to
compromise and to bind their constituencies. Unless enough stability exists,
it is difficult for both the mediator and the protagonists to know whether
any commitment made at this point would ever be implemented in the
future.
It is generally agreed that leaders of internally noncohesive groups tend
to be more aggressive and to provoke conflict with outsiders in order to be
able to forge inner cohesion.17 In such situations, therefore, it is not
surprising if mediation fails, since the leaders of such groups are likely to
resist any attempts to resolve the conflict. Even though the inner unity of
the conflicting parties does not necessarily bring about the success of a
mediation effort, there is no doubt that its lack will hinder it.
The absence of an intense personality conflict among the leaders of the
conflicting groups has also been viewed as a factor contributing to the
success of a mediation effort. If disputes between groups become
personalized, emotional irrationality takes over, and face-saving and
intransigence become serious preoccupations for the parties. "Even if any
settlement is reached, it is viewed as untrustworthy."18 Although it cannot
be doubted that such personal animosity is a problem in mediation, its effect
could be mitigated if the mediator is adept in intervention skills, which, as
will be shown later, is an essential prerequisite for successful mediation.
The mediator could temper the prevailing personality conflicts by
controlling the communication process, by facilitating indirect
communication, by filtering out the rhetoric and anger that hinder
compromise between the parties, and by encouraging the parties to focus on
their convergent interests. This does not suggest that such tactics of the
mediator could erase the problem entirely. The intensity of hostility would
determine whether the mediator could effectively mitigate these negative
effects on the mediation process.
In an insurgency situation, sometimes the very clear identification of the
parties may be counterproductive. The more clearly the insurgents are
identified, and the more closely they approximate the position of the
incumbents (i.e., the existing government), the more reluctant the
incumbents will be to deal with them for fear of conferring upon them a
status of equality.19 Such difficulty has bogged down many negotiation and
mediation efforts. One of the problems mediators have, therefore, is how to
bridge the gap between the "rebels" and the government without threatening
the sense of sovereignty of the latter. Some approaches will be discussed
later. (See section on Characteristics of the Mediator below.)
In the context of the identity and characteristics of the parties, some have
argued that the self-sufficiency or the dependency of the conflict parties on
outside sources for support to wage their conflict has a bearing on whether
or not mediation intervention will succeed. Frei argues that the possibilities
for success in mediation become higher the more one or both conflicting
parties are dependent on or are supported by outside parties.20 Even though
the specific reasons he gives for this view may not be totally acceptable,21
the hypothesis is a plausible one. Especially if the dependency is high, it
could create a sense of vulnerability and insecurity in the conflicting
parties, arising from the fear that support might be terminated due to
internal political factors of the support-givers. Such a sense of vulnerability
could make a negotiated settlement of the conflict an attractive option and
could serve as an entry point for intermediary effort

Duration of the Conflict

It has been argued that settlement is feasible only when internal wars
have lasted more than a certain minimum duration. "Settlements most often
seem to follow upon an initial test of strength in which the several parties'
capacity for mischief and violence has been demonstrated in action."22 A
certain minimum duration is also an essential precondition for the
involvement of third party actors, of conciliatory mechanisms, and of
international plans and resources.23 Even though there has been no precise
definition of "minimum duration," the implication is that if the conflict does
not last for a certain period, it may not be important enough to require the
attention of third party intermediaries.
However, merely the age of the conflict may not be enough. It may also
be important to examine whether or not the intensity of the conflict has
been increasing or decreasing during its lifetime. Frei has observed that in
cases where the level of intensity increased over time, mediation had very
little chance of success. On the contrary, where there was tension for a
certain length of time (three years or more in his study), but the intensity
did not escalate, it had a greater chance to succeed.24
Other than the chronological age, a second indicator of duration could be
the stage at which the positions of the conflicting parties begin to harden.
According to this measure, it is important for the mediator to offer his or
her services at the earliest stage of the conflict before contending positions
have become firm.25 Once positions have been stated in public, it is difficult
for the intermediary to facilitate compromise because the parties would lose
face by backing down from their publicly-stated positions.
This prerequisite of minimum duration, seems to be rather formidable,
requiring a great amount of precision timing on the part of the mediator. It
demands that the conflict last long enough for the conflicting parties to test
each other's strength, and that there be enough "blood-letting" for both
contenders to recognize that their objectives cannot very easily be attained.
But it requires that the conflict should not last long enough to raise its
intensity level too much or harden the stated positions. This question of
"fine-tuning" will be discussed again later in the section on "Timing of
Intervention".

Stalemate
 One of the most important preconditions for effective third party
intermediary intervention is stalemate. It has been defined as a state of
affairs:

in which neither side, given its aims, has the resources to overwhelm the
other (absolutely, or without incurring unacceptable losses)....Stalemate
creates between the parties that situation of balance without which
negotiations cannot properly begin. (Emphasis added.)26

Dealing with this concept is very confusing because it has been given a
multitude of connotations and implications by various authors.
One concept interchangeably used with stalemate is "power parity."
Many have argued that the probability of the success of an intermediary's
effort is related to the existence of at least a rough parity of power between
the conflicting parties.27 They justify this argument by saying that if there is
a marked difference in power between the contenders, the stronger party
would expect total victory and would have no incentive to accept
mediation. The stronger party may even view the mediator as a stumbling
block towards the achievement of victory and may either not cooperate with
him or her, or may tend to use the latter as an instrument for facilitating
surrender.28 "It goes strongly against the grain of human nature to seek a
negotiated solution when one can be imposed merely by demanding it"29
On the other hand, power parity could also be competitive and escalatory
and thus endanger the success of mediation. The balance of power theory
has been criticized on the grounds that it leads to escalation and show down
of force in an attempt by each party to upset the balance since each party
has an equal chance of winning or losing.30
Part of the apparent inconsistency between these two lines of argument
arises from the confusion created by the interchangeable use of the terms
"parity" and "stalemate". These two terms do not necessarily have the same
implications. Power parity could exist merely at the level of untested
perceptions; while stalemate implies that the parity has been actually tested
by confrontation and that the conflict is deadlocked. If the balance exists
merely on a perceptual level, it is likely to be competitive and escalatory.
Therefore, especially when viewed in conjunction with the other
precondition identified so far, "that the capability of the parties for violence
and mischief must be demonstrated", it makes more sense to talk of
"stalemate" rather than mere "parity of power" as a precondition for
successful mediation.
However, mere stalemate does not seem to be enough. Its existence may
not necessarily lead to a search for mediation unless the state of deadlock
created exacts a "high and rising cost" from the protagonists.31 The desire to
cut the rising cost provides an incentive to settle the conflict. However, if
the intervention takes place too long after the parties have decided to incur
the "high and rising cost", each party could resist political settlement
because the more it has spent in pursuit of its goals the more it will hesitate
to withdraw. Withdrawal from the conflict might be considered a "betrayal
of those who have already lost their lives," and might imply an admission
that they have spent all their resources on something unattainable.32 This
would reflect poorly on the political judgment of the leaders of the
conflicting parties and could threaten their ability to stay in power. Thus,
intervention must take place at the time when the parties are expecting a
high and rising cost, but before it is incurred. This calls again for precision
timing and finetuning.
Based on the concept of equality of power, a mediation strategy known as
"empowerment," which has special relevance for civil wars, has been
developed. Where power is grossly asymetrical in its distribution, it is
argued that the third party must help the weaker party empower itself before
meaningful negotiation and settlement can occur. Wehr explains the concept
of "empowerment" as follows:

The empowerment model of conflict regulation rests upon the principle

that balance is desirable in a conflict situation.... It operates primarily in
conflict situations that are grossly asymmetrical, where there is
domination of the weak by the strong....As the desperate and the
oppressed gain some sort of power base in the conflict, some legitimate
leverage of countervailing force, the conflict becomes more amenable to
negotiated, nonviolent settlement... [The empowerment of the weak], by
whatever means, increases both his own acceptability as a party in the
conflict and his options for dealing with his opponent.33
Modelski uses the same idea with regard to internal wars. He contends
that the requirement of stalemate could appear very restrictive if left to
happen of its own accord, since it rarely occurs by itself. However, he says
it is possible to contrive a stalemate by international action. "The
international system can induce such a situation, because its resources are
superior and because a sufficient amount can be diverted in aid of the
weaker party..."34
Modelski's notion of contrivance, though intriguing, raises many
problems, at least when it is applied to third party intermediary intervention.
First, it does not seem realistic to reify the international system as a body
that automatically harmonizes the activities of its actors in order to create a
stalemate when civil wars arise. Second, such contrivance, if at all possible,
might escalate the conflict, and, as already noted, the escalation might be
inimical to the mediation effort. Third, a question arises about how the
mediator could be involved in "empowerment" or "contrivance of
stalemate" without jeopardizing his or her neutral position in the conflict.
How can the mediator maintain neutrality, and therefore acceptability, in the
eyes of the stronger party, while taking sides with the weaker party to face
up to its opponent?
It seems that if Modelski's strategy could be used at all, it must be only in
a marginal sense. That is, at least in an civil war situation, the third party
must not attempt to induce stalemate in a conflict where one party is
obviously and disproportionately weaker than the other. Doing so would
obviously increase the intensity of the conflict. But in situations where the
balance of power between the contenders is almost equal, or the occurrence
of stalemate is imminent, the third party may encourage it by lending subtly
a small amount of its resources to the weaker side. The intent would be to
expedite the process of stalemate and make it visible to the parties, more
quickly, and to persuade them that they have no hope of success except
through negotiation. In this way, it might be possible to "contrive" stalemate
without significantly intensifying the conflict.
Moreover, power-equity is not only created in the battlefield. In fact, the
role of the equalizer and the empowerer becomes even more important in
the negotiation process. Goals and objectives that could not have been
attained by force may be achieved by skillful negotiation and at the
bargaining table. In most instances, even after a stalemate has been
established in the war front, there may not be parity in the negotiation
because one of the parties, usually the insurgents, is not able to present
itself as a bargaining partner equal to the government. The "rebels" usually
lack either resources (information, finances, organization) or skills
(qualification and experience in diplomatic negotiations) or both. Results
attained through such negotiations are likely to be lopsided or manipulated
to the detriment of the weaker party. Such a situation may not only
perpetuate the underlying problems that caused the conflict in the first
place, but may also create doubts about the credibility of the negotiation
process and of the agreement itself. This could ultimately sow the seeds of
future discontent and conflict. Under these circumstances, the third party
could rectify the imbalance by empowering the weaker party so that the
latter could conduct the negotiations equally and fairly. Strategies such as
helping the unorganized or weaker party formulate consensus negotiating
positions, providing expert counsel and assistance, providing information so
that the party is enabled to make realistic demands and decisions could be
used to create the equality necessary for the fairness and integrity of the
peace process.
Regarding the danger that "empowerment" might affect the neutrality of
the third party, both Wehr and Modelski suggest that the "empowerment"
actions be undertaken by an actor, other than the intermediary, who is
willing to work in conjunction with the latter for the benefit of the conflict
resolution process.35

Interests at Stake
Some argue that the issues of the conflict have an important bearing on
the success or failure of mediation. The claim is that some issues lend
themselves to mediation and others do not. The definition of these issues,
however, is replete with contradictions. In abstract, one might argue that
some issues are basically zero-sum, leave no room for accommodation and
therefore no space for negotiation and compromise. Disputes arising from
core values deeply held by the parties might serve as an example of this
situation since they end by being basically judgments of right and wrong.
Territorial issues have also been considered to belong in the category of
nonmediatable issues. It has been argued that the reason for the
intractability of the Middle East conflict is the territorial nature of the
issues.36 Comparatively, economic and power-sharing conflicts lend
themselves to negotiation and mediation. However, even such a broad
classification is unsatisfactory. Issues that ostensibly appear zero-sum at the
beginning could be converted into positive-sum issues by the involvement
of a skillful mediator who could help the parties reduce their perceptual
rigidities and mutual incompatibility by redefining the issues in new and
interesting ways. Also, the nature and characteristics of the issues could
change or acquire different negotiable dimensions as the conflict
progresses. In the context of civil wars, it is possible to argue that wars of
secession and territorial independence might be among those issues having
the appearance of a zero-sum game, and might therefore be difficult to
mediate. It is easy to imagine why a state may be unwilling to negotiate its
own disintegration. However, the conflict could start as a movement for
secession, and the point of settlement could be political autonomy within
the framework of one state, which is comparatively more amenable to
negotiation. It is risky, therefore, to dismiss any issue as being inappropriate
for mediation.
Instead of looking at the content of the issues, a more helpful way of
determining their appropriateness for mediation might be to look for their
complexity or multidimensionality. It is possible to contend that a complex
or multidimensional issue lends itself to mediation because it creates more
possibilities for tradeoffs. Since not all the dimensions of the issue may be
of equal importance to the two parties, a willingness to compromise on
some of the issues in return for concession on the others might be created.
Alternatively, if it is a single issue conflict or is presented as such in the
negotiations, it would generate the perception of "lose-all" or "win-all" and
the mediator's flexibility would be severely restricted. One strategy
emanating from this is that the mediator could break up the issue into
negotiable sub-units and start to negotiate from the less difficult sub-issues
and work up to the more difficult ones. This could build a benevolent cycle
of good will, flexibility, confidence in the process, and an attitude of
cooperation.

Characteristics of the Mediator

 This broad category subsumes many characteristics about which there is
a fair amount of consensus. Briefly, the following have been viewed as
requisites for the successful mediator:37

1. impartiality regarding the issues in the dispute;

2. independence from all parties to the conflict;
3. the respect38 of and acceptability to all protagonists;
4. the knowledge and skill to deal with the issues;39
5. possession of the required physical resources, e.g., meeting site,
transportation and communication facilities, persons for verification
and inspection services;
6. international support for the mediator; and
7. leverage, i.e., the possibility for the mediator to put pressure on one or
both parties to accept a proposed settlement.

While there seems to be general agreement about the importance of the

first six characteristics, the importance of leverage has been controversial.
For some people, the issue of leverage rests at the center of the success or
failure of mediation.40 The possession of the "instruments of coercion" or
the ability to reward or punish the conflicting parties for the decision to
accept or reject a settlement proposal has been considered a major factor
contributing to the effectiveness of mediation. But, others have argued that
"intellectual dexterity and persuasiveness in dealing with such problems as
the transmission of information and the dissolution of tactical rigidities" are
more important for the success of mediation.41 Yarrow even goes a step
further and argues that in certain instances the mediator's lack of political
power might even facilitate success rather than hinder it. He states that the
credibility and sincerity of the mediator could be enhanced because of his
or her nonpolitical nature and inability to "call down sanctions of any kind."
Such a lack of power provides the mediator the possibility "to permit an
open and relaxed relationship between human beings."42
In the context of civil wars, some kind of leverage would no doubt
enhance the persuasiveness of the mediator. This does not mean, however,
that the availability of leverage makes the "intellectual dexterity" to deal
with mediation problems unnecessary. Nor does it suggest that leverage has
to be used automatically. In fact, there are strong arguments for vigorous
restraint Excessive use of leverage might cast doubts upon the neutrality of
the mediator, and create suspicion that he or she has a vested interest in the
outcome of the conflict.43 Walton argues further that high pressure
negotiations or agreements induced by the high leverage exerted by the
intermediary could inhibit a lasting agreement characterized by the
internalization of changed attitudes.44
The exercise of leverage does not require that the mediator command
enormous resources. Part of the mediator's leverage emanates from the
respect the parties have for him or her and their reluctance to jeopardize the
mediator's continued involvement by constantly rejecting the latter's
proposals. Sometimes, the mere ability to mobilize international public
opinion could be a source of tremendous leverage since it might influence
the views of allies and aid-givers to the parties. Thus, leverage should not
be viewed in terms only of control of material resources.
The other characteristic of a mediator considered crucial for the success
of the intervention is the international support behind the effort. In the
context of interstate conflict, many authors have suggested that a "plurality
of states", the "Secretary General of the UN or other designated people", or
other international organizations be those to play the role of third parties.45
The rationale is that the mediator who receives his or her mandate from an
international organization is less likely to offend the parties' feelings of
sovereignty than if the mandate came from one state. It is argued that when
pressure is exerted in the mediation process, it is better that the pressure be
exacted by an international organization because the conflicting parties then
have less reason to be "personally insulted". Besides that, the pressure-
related mediation intervention can be presented as an action of a higher
institution. It is also argued that the parties recognize the impartiality of a
mediator more quickly when he or she is sent by an international
organization than by an individual state.46
It is questionable, however, whether these observations would be totally
applicable to conflicts between states and insurgents. In most civil wars, the
sovereignty feelings of the governments involved in the conflict will be
even more pronounced since the incumbents consider the war to be an
internal affair, and not a matter for the involvement of other states or
international organizations. One stumbling block in the mediation of civil
wars is the fear by governments of conferring legitimacy and a status of
equality upon the "rebels" if they should sit and negotiate with them. This
fear would be even more accentuated if the mediation effort were
undertaken by political actors in an international political environment
where the insurgents could potentially gain de facto international
recognition and status merely be interacting with these mediators. In such a
case, one wonders whether the involvement of bodies such as the UN or
other international political organizations might be counterproductive to the
success of the mediation effort. On the other hand, the assumption of the
third party role by nonpolitical, nongovernmental international
organizations could have a salutary effect in reducing the anxiety of
governments in dealing with "rebels" and could facilitate the mediation of
civil wars.47 Interaction between the intermediary and the "rebels" would
not lend international legal and political status to the latter, and the
negotiations would be less threatening to the incumbents. The great
advantage of this approach is that the intermediaries from these
organizations could have the benefit of access to resources and skills that
may not be available to single state mediators, but at the same time they can
avoid the risks that intervention by international political organizations
entail.

Skills of the Mediator

Wehr provides a detailed enumeration of the knowlege and skills required
of a successful mediator. These are:
(a) conflict situation analysis, i.e., identifying parties, issues and goal clarification;

(b) empathy: ability to understand positions of antagonists without subscribing to them;

(c) listening: "active listening," helping parties to vent hostility and frustration;

(d) sense of timing; judging when conflict is receptive to intervention, when negotiations are
appropriate;

(e) trust and credibility development establishing "credentials," trust relationships with conflict
parties and between them, intervenor objectivity;

(f) mediation: scheduling negotiations, helping negotiators formulate "yesable propositions,"

clarifying and getting parties to agree to trade-offs, insuring full implementation of an agreement;
 (g) communication: facilitating and validating communication among conflict parties, accurate
verbal and non-verbal messages;

(h) imagination: the capacity for elimiating impasses through imaging creative alternatives,
recombining alternative solution or parts thereof, priority goals reranking,

(i) joint-costing: helping conflict parties to accurately assess the costs of conflict to each, and the
potential benefits of resolving it; and

(j) crisis management minimization of hostility and violence in extremely tense conflict
situtations through such measures [as] ...controlling access to weapons of violence on all sides,
[and] rumor control.48

Even though it might be impossible to find a mediator who satisfies all

these requirements, a successful mediator should have a substantial package
of these resources.
"Sense of timing" is only one of the requisite skills for a mediator.
However, for some authors the question of timing one's intervention is so
critical that the success or failure of mediation hinges upon it. But
unfortunately, the claims made about appropriate timing are so
contradictory that they defy the operationalization of the concept.
The argument for timing is that each conflict situation has entry points
where intervention can best begin, and that, in many situations, the time for
initial intervention is critical to its success. Therefore, some have suggested
that the best time to intervene is quite early in the conflict process before
the positions of the contenders become firm so that withdrawal, retreat, or
compromise can be gracefully made.49
Others have argued that the parties must have enough time to show their
capacity for force before the conflict becomes ripe for mediation. In other
instances, the proponents of early intervention have admitted that early
intervention is not always beneficial. "Some of the most brilliant
achievements of mediation have been possible only because an impasse was
allowed to develop and continue to the point where both parties were so
anxious for an exit from the deadlock that mediation was crowned with
success."50
It has also been argued that intervention is effective when the parties are
still willing to forgo the object of their conflict for the sake of some other
value. This supposedly occurs at a stage where their "investment" in their
objective is low. "It is in this phase that arbitration and other routinized
methods of conflict resolution are usually operative."51 But when
investment in the conflict objectives begins to rise rapidly, the chances for
settlement are supposedly at their lowest. However, "if a stalemate situation
has been reached and expectations of success are low, then favorable
opportunities for peaceful settlement recur."52 Thus, according to the above
arguments, there are two possible entry points: the first, before "valuations"
rise, the second, after stalemate has been achieved.
Another useful time for intermediary intervention has been identified as
the period when the political leadership of the conflicting parties changes.
Such a period has been associated with settlement of disputes, some of
which might have seemed very far from settlement before the change.53 The
rationale is that sometimes a leadership finds difficulty withdrawing from
its commitment to pursue the group's objective, even in the face of apparent
failure, for reasons such as prestige, desire not to lose face, fear of betrayal
of those who have already lost their lives, etc. However, if there is a change
of leadership, whether through regular or irregular channels, it brings into
office leaders who have not made such heavy personal commitments to the
pursuit of the previously-stated objectives and who therefore, can abandon
them more easily. This change in personnel might make possible what
Modelski calls the "rearrangement of aims".54 It would be too limiting to
contend that a mediator should intervene only when there is a change of
government. But it should be seen as an important opportunity for effective
intervention, if and when it occurs.
From all these contradictory claims and counterclaims, not many
guidelines can be derived concerning the timing of mediation intervention
in civil wars. The concept is too difficult to deal with because it requires the
coordination of many subjective assessments of both the parties and the
mediator. Key points such as "before positions harden", "when valuation of
the object is low", "when valuations start to rise", "when parties start to
expect rising costs", etc. are very subjective notions. The mediator could
have trouble establishing the occurence of these points since the parties'
public rhetoric may be different from what they privately entertain. The
third party might be able to ascertain these situations after the fact, but
according to the theories already discussed, intervention would then be too
late.
On the other hand, some objective indicators of timing such as "the
change of government", "the arrival of stalemate", or "deadlock", etc. might
be easier to establish. For the intermediary, therefore, the more prudent
approach would be to become involved as soon as the more objective
indicators are established rather than to wait until all of the requirements of
timing are satisfied. He or she could then monitor the conflict from close
range and adjust his or her actions by trial and error. This keeps alive the
prospects for mediation, and constantly reminds the parties that they have
an option to negotiate.

Summary and Conclusion

The discussions in the previous sections illustrate some of the dilemmas
of mediating civil wars. The dilemmas arise because governments involved
in civil wars are caught in the confounding position in which they are afraid
to negotiate directly with the insurgents whom they call "rebels" because
this might be tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of the rebels' cause.
They fear the creation of a precedent that might encourage other dissident
groups to violence. In addition, these governments are wary of the
involvement of third parties as intermediaries because this might be
interpreted as allowing an infringement on their sovereignty in matters they
consider to be internal affairs. They are also afraid that external
involvement might provide international status to the rebels and recognition
of "a state of belligerency" that might encourage other states to assist the
insurgents much more openly. These governments, therefore, feel
reluctantly that force is the only arbiter of their conflict with the insurgents
even though the material and human cost of the conflict might be
intolerable. When mediating a civil war, the third party must tread carefully
among such schizophrenic attitudes about the desirability of the mediation
effort. These constraints, which appear to be unique to civil wars, call for an
extremely subtle and sensitive approach lest the mediation effort be branded
as meddling in the internal affairs of the government concerned.
Keeping such difficulties in mind, the other conditions essential for the
success of mediation of civil wars may be summarized by organizing them
into three groups: conditions concerning the nature and characteristics of a)
the conflict parties, b) the conflict itself, and c) the mediator. Under the first
group of characteristics, the following conditions were pointed out:
 -that the parties to the conflict are clearly identifiable and inwardly
united,
-that the personality conflict among the leaders of the contending groups
is of low intensity, and
-that the parties are dependent on external sources for aid to wage their
conflict.
Under the second group called the nature and characteristics of the
conflict, the following conditions were identified as requisites for success:
-that stalemate must exist accompanied by the parties' perception that the
cost of nonsettlement will be high and rising,
-that the nature of the issue should not be essentially zero-sum,

and
-that the issues for the negotiation be multiple and many-sided.
Under the third group, the characteristics and skills of the mediator, the
following conditions were identified:
-that the mediator should manifest the variety of skills and characteristics
listed on page 22 and page 26.
-that the mediator should have leverage over the conflict parties,

and
-that the mediator be a representative of a nonpolitical, nongovernmental
international body or at least have the backing of such an institution.
The underlying claim of the discussion so far is that if these conditions
exist, mediation of civil wars has a higher likelihood of success. A question
arises, however, whether the list of conditions needing to be satisfied is too
formidable to make mediation appear impracticable in many situations
which may not manifest all the required characteristics. One wonders,
therefore, whether all the conditions enumerated are equally important or if
they could be ranked according to their importance to the success of the
mediation effort.
By examining the strength of the arguments about the importance of
these conditions marshalled by various authors, it might be possible to
narrow down the list to a smaller set of conditions without which mediation
would have no chance of success.
The existence of stalemate was considered to be a very important
condition by many authors, even though it was framed in many different
ways. (See, for example, Young, Cot, Modelski, Ott, Wehr, Liska, and
Touval cited earlier.) Of course, in order for stalemate to facilitate
successful mediation, it was argued that it must be paired with other factors
like high and rising cost for nonsettlement and a relatively low intensity
level of conflict.
This does not mean, however, that even such an elaborately qualified
stalemate condition alone is sufficient It must be accompanied by a
mediator who is well-qualified and possesses all the required resources.
Even though the sufficiency of the characteristics and qualifications of the
mediator has been disputed in the literature,55 it cannot be denied that
chances for successful mediaton would be higher if the required condition
of stalemate was supplemented by a well-qualified and skilled mediator.
In addition, there is consensus among many authors that some issues are
mediatable and others are not. Even though there has been no final
agreement on exactly what these issues are, it seems to be established that
they must be essentially non-zero-sum and that they must be
multidimensional.
While each of these three conditions may be insufficient to make
mediation of civil wars successful, viewed cumulatively or jointly, a group
of conditions can be formulated (consisting of stalemate, qualified and
skilled mediator, and the nature of the issues), which could be considered
both necessary and sufficient This way, it could be argued that a mediation
effort would be worthwhile in all situations where at least these three
conditions are satisfied, even though ail the other characteristics are not
present.
Moreover, a further examination of the long list of conditions reveals that
the mediator is not entirely dependent on the existence of all of them before
intervention. Some of the conditions could, to a certain extent, be
influenced by the mediator. For example, there might be situations where
stalemate might have existed in fact, but that the parties might continue
their fighting, either because of their lack of awareness of the stalemate, or
out of the unrealistic hope that they will attain their objectives. The
mediator can more quickly avail of the benefits of stalemate by using his or
her skills and trusted relationship with the parties to articulate and make
visible to them the existence of stalemate and to impress upon them that the
continuation of their conflict might not lead to the attornment of their
objectives.
 The condition called "the clear identity and inner cohesion of the conflict
parties" could also be influenced by the intermediary. As part of the
empowerment strategy, the intermediary could help resolve disagreements
between factions within the conflict parties, by aiding them to negotiate
their differences and to fomulate common positions with the mediation
process in mind. This would encourage not only a wider support for the
mediation, but also foster inner cohesion which is one of the important
requisites for success.
Thus, the pessimism about the feasibility of mediating civil wars which
might arise from the apparently long list of conditions that must be satisfied
may not be justified. This, hopefully would encourage more frequent resort
to mediation as an approach to peacemaking than has been the case in the
past.
12
See Arnold and Caroline Rose, "Intergroup Conflict and Its Mediation," International Social
Science Bulletin 6 (1954): 28.
13
See George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller, Internal War and International Systems: Perspectives
on Method (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs - Harvard University, 1969);
James Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J., Princeton
University Press, 1964), Chapter 3; Keith Sutter, An International Law of Guerilla Warfare
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984); and Small and Singer, "Conflict in the International
System; Historical Trends and Policy Futures," in Explaining War: Selected Papers from the
Correlates of War Project (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).
14
See for example Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis
(Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univ. Press, 1967); J.P. Cot, International Concilliation (London:
Europa Pubications, 1972); Arthur S. Meyer, "Functions of the Mediator in Collective
Bargaining," in Industrial Peacemaking (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962);
Elmore Jackson, Meeting of Minds: A Way to Peace through Mediation (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1952); Roger Fisher, International Mediation: A Working Guide (Boston: International
Peace Academy, 1978); and Ann Douglas, Industrial Peacemaking (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1962).
15
See Marvin Ott, "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases," International
Organization 26 (1976): 596-618; and Carl Stevens, "Mediation and the Role of the Neutral,"
in Frontiers to Collective Bargaining, eds., John T. Dunlap and Niel W. Chamberlain (New
York: Harper & Row, 1967); see also Daniel Frei, "Erfolgsbedingungen fur
Vermittlungsaktionen in Inlernationalen Konfiikten," Politsche Vierterljahresschri 16 (1975).
16
George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal Wars," in International Aspects of Civil
Strife,ed., James Rosenau (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), 142.
17
See for example Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, III.: The Free
Press, 1956), 73 & 88. The same view is expressed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C.
Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969),
27.
18
Oti, 616.
19
Ibid.
20
Frei, 454.
21
His reason is that the supporters, especially when they are super powers, have a common
interest in not letting local conflict escalate to the nuclear level and perhaps also a common
tacit agreement not to risk the influence they have gained through the conflict by its
intensification.
22
Modelski, "International Settlement," 142.
23
Ibid.
24
Frei, 463.
25
Jackson, 27.
26
Modelslci, "Intenational Settlement," 143.
27
See Joseph Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management (The University of Georgia Press,
Athens, 1980), 240; Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers (Princeton N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
1983), 9; Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis, 43-44; George
Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press,
1962), 204; and Ott, 616.
28
Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison, Politics and the International System, An Introduction
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 284. See also Arthur Meyer, "Function of the Mediator in
Collective Bargaining," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 13 (1960): 60.
29
Modelski, "International Settlement," 149.
30
See A.F.K. Organski World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 293; and Quincy
Wright, "The Escalation of International Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution 9 (1965),
441-442.
31
See Ott, 616.
32
Frank Edmead, Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation, UNITAR, PS No. 2, (New
York: UNITAR, 1971), 9.
33
Paul Wehr, Conflict Regulation (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1979), 37-38. See also Roger
Fisher, International Conflict for Bginners (New York: Harper & Row 1969); and Adam
Curle, Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971).
34
Modelski, "International Settlement," 143.
35
This model is analogous to national systems where the government assumes the role of the
prosecutor and the judge at the same time, but different arms of the government assume these
duties, A similar pattern exists in the division of labor between the General Assembly and the
Secretariate of the UN in handling international conflicts.
36
Touval, 8.
37
The list is based on the abridged summary provided by Ott, 599.
38
For Wehr, respect includes credibilty as someone with past success in settling disputes. Wehr,
50. Moreover, Frei adds a qualification here and warns that too much respect could be
 detrimental. He contends that success in mediation is hindered if the mediator is either too
prominent or too insignificant.
39
See the next section for a detailed discussion of this characteristic.
40
See Frei, 482; and Cot, 12, for example.
41
Young, "Intermediaries, Additional Thoughts on Third Parties," 56.
42
C. H. Yarrow, Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ.
Press, 1978), 256.
43
Some observers have criticized the use of excessive leverage in the Mid-East negotiations of the
early 1970s by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger because it created a situation in which
each party was negotiating with Kissinger rather than with each other for whatever
concession the United States would give them. See Roger Fisher, "Playing the Wrong Game?"
in Dynamics of Third Party Intervention, ed., Jeffrey Rubin, 95-121.
44
Robert Walton, Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontations and Third-Party Consultation,
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.)
45
See Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiation: Principles and Practice (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1966), 100; and Frei, 484.
46
Ibid.
47
Yarrow, 278.
48
Wehr, 51-52.
49
Jackson, Meeting of Minds, 28.
50
Ibid., 28.
51
Edmead, 15.
52
Ibid.
53
Edmead, 16.
54
Ibid. Edmead, however, points out situations where this may not be the ease. He contends that
even though political leadership may change, bureaucratic and military leadeships are often
more permanent, and, depending on their importance in the society, may cause the original
commitment to persist.
55
See Ott, 597; and Touval, 17.
Part Two
Case Study
 Chapter 3
The Origins of the Conflict

Geography and Population

In the following discussion, the "South" or "Southern Sudan" will refer to
the three southern provinces of the Sudan, namely, Bahr el Ghazal,
Equatoria, and Upper Nile, while the "North" or "Northern Sudan" will refer
to the rest of the country.
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa with an area of 976,750 square
miles. It shares boundaries with the Red Sea and Ethiopia in the east; Kenya,
Uganda, and Zaire in the south; the Central African Republic and Chad in
the west; and Libya and Egypt to the northwest and to the north respectively.
The Sudan is irrigated by the two Niles: the White Nile flows northwards
from Uganda where it enters the country at Equatoria province, and the Blue
Nile flows north from Ethiopia, joining the White Nile at Khartoum.
Generally speaking the people of Northern Sudan are called Hamito-
Semites "who like to think of themselves as Arabs; descendants of
successive waves of Arab migrations, they probably went first into Egypt
and then drifted southwards to settle and intermarry with the original
inhabitants, the Nubians, who were darker and often negroid."56 Arab
influence is believed to have entered the region around the eighth century,
when Arabs began to cross the Red Sea and settle in the North
where they intermarried with the local tribes.57 Today the Northerners speak
Arabic and have an Islamic culture which has traditionally looked towards
Egypt and Mecca.
South of the 12th parallel, however, the people are primarily Nilotic and
are African in their features, outlook, and culture. They share ethnic and
cultural similarities with the border populations of the neighbouring
countries. According to Mohamed Omer Beshir, the people of the Southern
Sudan are classified into three categories: the Nilotics, Nilo-Hamitics, and
Sudanic. In the 1956 census, the only one taken between the beginning of
independence and 1972, seventy-five percent of the total population of
10,263,000 were recorded as Arabized Northerners practicing Islam while
twenty-five percent were recorded as Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanic
peoples who were either Christian or Animist.58

Turkish Rule and the Slave Trade

The conflict between the North and the South Sudan took place against a
background of slavery, domination, deceit, and hostility. It is important to
understand this history in order to appreciate the subtle factors that escalated
the civil war to greater and greater violence once armed confrontation began
in 1955.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Sudan was not the political entity
it is today and had no fixed boundaries.59 About the fifteenth century,
Sennar, an ancient city in Northern Sudan, was the capital of a very strong
"arabized-negro" nation of the Fung. This nation extended north to the
border of Egypt, which was, at that time, under the Ottoman Empire. The
Fung Kingdom was seriously declining by the end of the eighteenth century
and it was eventually conquered in 1820 by Mohammed Ali, an Albanian,
who was the Viceroy of Egypt for the Ottoman Empire. In trying to establish
independence from the Arab faction in Egypt, he decided to build an army of
slaves and freed slaves who would be entirely loyal to him. Having
exhausted most of his resources in attempting to conquer Mecca, "he turned
his eyes southwards to the Sudan, the still unknown land from whence came
slaves, and which was rumored to contain gold and ivory in plenty,"60
Mohammed Ali thus began to make slave raids and to contract for the
delivery of young men from the Sudan, as slaves, to build an army which he,
as a foreigner in Egypt, could trust. As many as 5,000 captives were taken in
one of these raids. Some were kept in the army while others were sold.61
However, slavery was nothing new in the Sudan. Previous to the reign of
Mohammed Ali, slaves were either captured in war, bought in the slave
markets of Sennar, or taken on a much smaller scale during slave raids,
mainly for domestic work or labor in the fields.62 Nonetheless, Mohammed
Ali was responsible for starting the slave trade on a mass scale. His
administration in the Sudan was reported to have been specifically geared
for this purpose. It has been estimated that during the ninteenth century,
Arab slavers carried off about two million people from Southern Sudan.
Failing to find the fabled riches of the Southern Sudan, Mohammed Ali
relied upon the slave trade to provide him with wealth.63
Commencing in 1821, Mohammed Ali sent armies, commanded by his
sons, to the South to capture slaves in large numbers.64 "There was much
devastation in the South during this period, and inter-tribal warfare was
encouraged and exploited to facilitate the acquisition of slaves."65
By 1847, the "anti-slavery" sentiment that had begun in Europe had also
influenced the Sultan at Constantinople and he forbade slave trading in his
empire. But this trade was a very big business in the Sudan which would not
be easily stopped. In fact, the possession of firearms enabled the slave
traders to penetrate even further south. Some slave traders had become
powerful merchant-brigands, with their own forts and private armies of
enlisted slaves. Between 1869 and 1879, a tough struggle took place
between the Egyptian government, which had employed several European
soldiers and administrators, and the slavers.66
In 1869, the new ruler of Egypt, Khedive Ismael, employed Sir Samuel
Baker, an Englishman, to lead an expedition to the South to stop the slave
trade. Even though he was unsuccessful in suppressing it, he was able to
stretch Egyptian control to the borders of Uganda. In fact, according to
Albino, the slave trade had increased by 1870 and an estimated 12,000 to
15,000 slaves per annum were exported northwards to Kordofan or Darfur.67
Sir Samuel was succeeded by General Gordon, who was first named
Governor of one of the Southern provinces of the Sudan and then, Governor
General of the whole of the Sudan. His primary goal, like that of his
predecessor, was to pacify the country and suppress the slave trade; and he
seems to have succeeded in at least breaking up many of the slave
companies that had overrun the South.68

The Mahdist Period

The next significant episode in Sudanese history is known as the Mahdia.
In 1881, Mohammed Ahmed Ibn Abdallah, a native of Darfur, an area in the
western province of the present Sudan, announced that he was the long-
expected "Mahdi" or "Messiah" and called upon many chiefs and notables to
unite and follow him. His followers came to be called the Ansars, meaning
helpers. According to Wai, the Mahdi attracted many followers "mainly
because of tribal discontent with oppressive taxation [by the Egyptians],
grave disruptions caused by the slave trade, and deportation of traders (all
these measures were inflicted on the Northern Sudan by the Turkish-
Egyptian regime)."69
The Mahdi's influence spread over the Bahr el Ghazal and the surrounding
areas. He first led a revolt against the Egyptians whose garrisons generated
hatred by their harsh and overbearing attitude towards the Sudanese.70 He
managed to unite the many diverse Muslim tribes and organize them to fight
against the Egyptians. He brought Darfur and Bahr el Ghazal under his
control. Then, after some fighting with Ethiopia, he started marching
towards Khartoum. Britain, realizing the growing strength of the Mahdi,
tried to persuade Egypt to evacuate its officials and merchants for their
safety. General Gordon, who had left the service of Egypt in 1876, was now
sent again to Khartoum to undertake the evacuation. "In an effort to placate
the Mahdist elements, Gordon issued proclamations recognizing the Mahdi
as Sultan of Kordofan and the independence of the Sudan from Egypt.71'
Nevertheless, this did not stop Mohammed Ahmed from surrounding
Khartoum, attacking and ransacking the city, and eventually killing General
Gordon.
At the time of the Mahdi's death, he was planning an invasion of Egypt.
His successor, the Second Mahdi, continued the "holy war" and controlled
almost all of the Sudan. In 1888 he launched an invasion of the South as far
as Equatoria. But there, he met stiff resistance from the local tribes, the
remnants of the Egyptian army and the Belgians from their colony, the
Congo. Wherever possible, the Second Mahdi attempted to force on the
Southerners both Islam and legalized slavery. This caused tremendous
hostility on the part of the Southerners. According to O'Ballance, the
southern negro tribes fought very hard against the impositions and
oppressions of the Mahdists.72
While occupied with their expansion in the South, the Mahdists, in an
attempt to spread their faith, were also fighting a war against Ethiopia. In
1889, the Mahdists were defeated at the Battle of Tuski. They were also
faced with many rebellions, even in their own strongholds like Darfur and
Kordofan, and along the White Nile.
Many historians believe that the Mahdists formed the first national
movement in the Sudan. According to Beshir, even southern tribes, who had
"no kinship to the Arabs, joined the revolt [of the Mahdi] against an
oppressive and unpopular government and by 1880, the whole South was
united against Egyptian rule."73 Thus, he concludes, the Mahdi revolution
was national rather than sectional. Wai, however, argues against this
conclusion by questioning the motives behind the cooperation between the
Southerners and the Mahdists. He contends that the cooperation should not
be construed as solidarity between the two, that for the South, the war
against the Turks and Egyptians was a war against foreign plunderers and
intruders, while for the North, it was a religious and political war.74 Collins
also points out that the cooperation of convenience between the South and
the North should not be taken for Sudanese nationalism because the
Southerners were not eager to replace the oppressive rule of the Egyptians
with that of the Mahdists.75
The defeat of the Mahdists, and the rebellions they were facing
everywhere, effectively eliminated their threat to Egypt. But in the
meantime, an Egyptian officer, Colonel Ahmed Arabi, led a revolt against
Khedive Ismael, the Egyptian ruler, who was in great financial difficulties
and foreign debt. In response to Arabi's revolt, a British expedition under the
command of General Wolseley was sent to restore the Khadive's power. The
rebellion was quashed and in return the Khedive renounced much of his
power to the British. He also sank into deeper and deeper financial
difficulties and ended up making Egypt virtually a British protectorate.
At this time the "scramble for Africa" by European colonial powers had
reached its high point. The British initiated a reconquest of the Sudan for
Egypt. Under the name of the Khedive, they sent expeditions into the Sudan
and, after a series of battles, were able to destroy the Mahdist forces. The
Second Mahdi was killed in 1899. Even though the British invaded the
Sudan under Egypt's claim to rule the country, they were reluctant to hand it
over to Egypt once it was reoccupied. They formulated a plan for a joint rule
of the Sudan by Egypt and Britain which came to be known as the
Condominium Agreement of 1899. In reality, however, it was "a polite
fiction for British control over the entire Sudan" since it was they who
wielded the power.76 Lord Kitchener was appointed the Governor General
and all provincial heads were British, while some secondary positions were
assigned to the Egyptians. Gradually, the territory of present-day Sudan took
shape when the Condominium government delineated the country's borders
by a series of agreements with the neighbouring countries.

From Condominium Rule to Independence

The period when the Sudan was ruled by the Condominium Agreement is
significant for understanding the dynamics of the conflict which later came
to engulf independent Sudan for seventeen years. Under Condominium rule,
the Sudan was divided into six provinces each governed by a military officer
with considerable powers. The first task of the Condominium administration
was to pacify the country, and this took several years. According to Wai, the
Southerners "presented stiff resistance against the imperialist forces....
[They] were not easily willing to accept colonial rule nor the system of
taxation that came with it."77 As the country was pacified, the practice of
slavery declined even though some historians indicate that it still existed in a
different form. O'Ballance points out that a former slave was usually
enchained by economic circumstances even though he was legally free to
leave his master. Therefore, a large number of technically freed slaves, or
descendants of slaves, were found working as unpaid servants or laborers for
their old masters because they had nowhere to go or had no means of earning
their sustenance.78
During the Condominium rule, Christian missionaries started to enter the
Sudan in large numbers. By the middle of the 1800's, Pope Gregory XVI
was sending the first Catholic missionaries to Southern Sudan fearing "that
Islam or even the Protestants might reach the inhabitants before
Catholicism."79 Even though Mohammed Ali and his successors were
comparatively lenient on the Christian missionaries trying to come into the
Sudan, the zeal of the Mahdists made it difficult for them to get a foothold in
the areas influenced by the Mahdi. The Catholics began to establish mission
schools in 1850 even though their influence was limited. However, after the
Mahdists were defeated and while the British were establishing control over
the Sudan, many American and English missionaries began flocking to the
South. Missionaries were allowed to establish churches and schools in the
Muslim parts of the North, but were restricted from proselytizing. However,
in the South they had freedom of action, and the South was parceled out to
the various religious orders and denominations in "missionary spheres of
influence."80 This division was not popular among leaders of the Roman
Catholic orders, who thought that they should have more territory and be
allowed to expand.81
Under the Condominium rule there was no one consistent policy of
education for the Sudan, particularly for the South. Therefore the
government left education to be handled by the missionaries, each in their
own way. In order to enter schools the pupils in the South had first to accept
Christianity. Thus, access to education was impossible for the large number
of Animists and others who could not accept Christian beliefs.
In 1926, the government decided to subsidize the mission schools rather
than to open government schools. The aim was to open the mission schools
even to non-Christians. But in practice, Southerners still had to be Christians
to get any education at all. In 1918 the Condominium administration
proclaimed English as the official language of the South. Moreover, the
official day of rest in the South was changed from Friday, the holiday when
the Mahdists controlled the South, to Sunday.
In contrast, there were both government and many religious schools in the
North and pupils were not pressured to accept Christianity in the religious
schools. Instruction was also given in Arabic. In general, literacy was much
higher in the North than in the South. In 1902, a college was founded in
Khartoum which provided higher education in English. Clerical and other
personnel needed by the British to help run the country were trained at this
college. But there were very few high schools in the South, and the few
Southern students who finished secondary school were sent to Uganda rather
than to Khartoum for higher education.82
 Many point to this period as one in which the development of the North
took an increasingly disparate course from that of the South. This was true to
some extent even during Egyptian rule when the North was the trade center,
whereas the South was a ground to be exploited and enslaved. Scherf,
however, argues that it was in large part through British policy in the Sudan
that divisions between the North and the South were greatly widened.83
Having lost America as a cheap source of cotton for their textile industry, the
British saw a great potential in the Sudan as a substitute. As a result, in
Gezira, south of Khartoum, cotton plantations were started, which proved to
be successful.84 A railway system was established in the North for
transporting the cotton and for the manufactured products coming from
Britain. Trade routes were developed between Northern Sudan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Libya and Ethiopia, while "there was to be no hurry in
administrative, educational and economic development of the South."85
Unlike the North, the South was inaccessible. The British did not see it as
a source of raw materials and minerals, and the Southerners did not appear to
provide ready markets for British exporters. Thus, the British did not find it
advantageous to invest in the South.
During the Condominium rule, the British administration seemed to be
confused about the way in which the three Southern provinces should be
handled. There were talks of severing the South and merging it with either
Kenya or Uganda as "a large nominally Christian Negro belt [that would]
stand as a barrier against the Muslim North."86 At the same time, the British
administration adopted a policy of treating the North and South separately
even though they were nominally under the same administration. In 1902,
the British began to consider them as two entities in different stages of
development and progress.87 In 1922, the South was formally declared to be
a "closed district", and the administration practically forbade Muslim traders
and others from entering. The Permits to Trade Order was issued in 1925,
further controlling entry into, and trading in, the South.88 The rationale was
that these measures were aimed at protecting the Southerners from Northern
exploitation.89
In the social arena, the British administration was taking more drastic
steps. It discouraged all references to Arab culture such as the use of Arab
names, language, clothing, and customs. Southerners were encouraged to
return to tribal law, family life, and custom wherever possible. English
increasingly replaced Arabic as the lingua franca of the region, even though
the British Governor General himself, is reported to have admitted: "I have
now fully appreciated the difficulties of ever making English the lingua
franca of the South. Wherever I penetrated...I found Arabic in ready use by
the local spokesmen of the people..."90
Some observers have pointed out that these policies of segregating the
North and the South created artificial barriers between the two regions,
which might have evolved a homogeneous culture through assimilation.91
Wai, however, argues that the need was not to expand Arab influence, but
rather to revitalize the local culture and customs, which the British policy at
least claimed to do. He contends that colonialism could not be blamed for
creating a barrier between the North and South since there was no
harmonious relationship between them, even before the British took over.
The most deplorable part of the Southern Policy, for Wai, was that it did not
strive to bring about economic and social development in the South as it did
in the North. This not only alienated one region from the other, but also left
the South dangerously exposed to domination by the North after the policy
of segregation was abandoned.92
At the beginning of the World War I, when Turkey declared its alliance
with Germany, Britain declared Egypt as its protectorate, and the Khedive of
Egypt was deposed. In 1922, Egypt regained its independence and Ahmed
Faud was proclaimed King. The Condominium Agreement was still in force,
even though Egypt continued to play only a subsidiary role in the
administration. After her independence, Egypt wanted to assert her rights in
the Condominium Agreement, but this was resisted by Britain. The
Egyptians tried to arouse anti-British sentiment among the Sudanese as a
means of cultivating an alliance with Sudan against the British. In
retaliation, the British reacted by expelling all Egyptian officers, teachers,
and other civil officials from the Sudan, ending whatever control Egypt had
over the Sudan. By 1930, the newly growing anti-British sentiment in
Northern Sudan, incited by the Egyptians, was gaining momentum. The
British, fearing that this sentiment might expand to the South and further
into their British East African Territories, reaffirmed their 1902 policy of
separate treatment for the North and South Sudan. The use of Arabic was
reduced to a minimum and there was strict control over Muslims entering the
South. "By 1935, the policy had become ever more absurd....The Greek
merchants operating in the South were forbidden from selling Arab
clothing."93
 After the suppression of the Mahdi movement, political awakening in the
Sudan was slow. In 1938, the Graduates General Congress, whose
membership comprised secondary school graduates and many government
officials, was established as a political organization. This congress formed
an alliance with the former rival religious groups, the Mahdists and the
Khatima. Another organization called the Black Block also emerged around
this time. Ostensibly a social organization with political aims, its
membership was drawn from the negro groups in the North. However,
Northerners quickly supressed the political arm because of its anti-Arab
character.94
The political demands of the Graduates General Congress were mild and
cautious at first. However, it was encouraged by the growing nationalistic
and independence movements in other parts of Africa and elsewhere. In
1942, it demanded self-determination for the Sudan after the end of the
World War II. Its definition of the Sudan at that time included the South as
part and parcel of the North. According to Wai, the congress entertained the
idea of ruling the South as part of a unified Sudan, and of expanding Islam
and Arab influence along the Nile valley to central Africa.95
However, the congress did not stay united for long, but split into the two
rival groups again. The Khatimas formed a party called Ashikha which
called for unity with Egypt after independence. The Mahdists formed the
Umma Party which stood for complete independence for the Sudan and
opposed any union with Egypt.
After the end of World War II, colonialism was seriously challenged
everywhere and Britain had begun to implement its decolonization policy.
Sudan's turn was coming soon. At this point, however, Britain started to
entertain the possibility of independence for the Sudan as one unit, joining
the North and South. Some British officials justified this new attitude on the
grounds that Southern Sudan would not be economically viable if separated
from the North.96 It was also pointed out that the British administration in
East Africa was not interested in a liaison with Southern Sudan.97 In
addition, Wai points out that the Umma Party, which wanted to maintain a
closer relationship with Britain rather than with Egypt, put a lot of pressure
on the colonial administration not to sever the South from the North after
independence.98 The British government at that time was preoccupied with
making a deal over the Suez Canal. Therefore, it did not want to throw the
Umma Party into the arms of Egypt by separating the South from the
North.99
In December 1946, the British administration dramatically reversed the
policy it had followed for over forty years and, without consulting the
Southerners, abandoned its Southern policy. This decision was implemented
by the adoption of measures diametrically opposed to those that had
prevailed before. Among other things, Northern senior officials were again
introduced into the Southern administration, and trade and movement
restrictions were lifted. The use of Arabic was permitted along with English
as a medium of instruction; equal pay for equal work between Northerners
and Southerners was proclaimed; in the South the existing restriction on
Islam was lifted and freedom of religion was advocated; and the prices of
Southern products were allowed to rise to the world market level.100 The
declared intent behind the new policy was to narrow the gap between the
North and South and to promote a sense of shared citizenship. But this plan
came too late since Britain was planning to grant independence to a united
Sudan within only ten years.101 There was not enough time for the new
policy to have much effect upon the perceptions or the realities of either the
North or South before they were to emerge as one state.
However, it seemed that not all British administrators of the Southern
region agreed to the idea of uniting the North and South. Some were calling
for devices to safeguard the interests of the South in this merger, particularly
since no Southern Sudanese were represented in the decision-making. Some
of these British administrators asked the central government to call for a
conference where Southerners could voice their opinions.102 This conference
was convened in June 1947 in Juba, the capital of Equatoria province. The
conference was attended by the British Governors of the Southern provinces,
seventeen Southern Sudanese chiefs and junior government officials, and six
"well educated Northerners." It is clear from the conference records that the
Southern members did not have as much training or experience in
government as had their Northern counterparts. When they were asked to
participate, the Southerners also protested that their participation in a
common Legislative Assembly with the North would be dominated by the
more trained and economically stronger North.103 Despite these objections,
the record indicates that the Southern members agreed to remaining united
with the North, to a commmon educational policy for both Northern and
Southern regions, and to being represented in the National Legislative
Assembly.
Southern authors point out that this was neither a correct nor a fair
representation of Southern views. For example, Alier points out that the
question of whether the South and North should be united had already been
decided by the British administration and was not an issue in the conference.
The main issue was whether or not the South would be represented in the
proposed Legislative Assembly. The conference was merely serving as a
rubber stamp to give legitimacy to a decision which had been made by the
colonial officials in Khartoum.104 As a matter of fact, one of the former
British Provincial Governors who participated in this conference, later on
writes of how the British administrator, who convened this conference,
reacted when the Southern delegates agreed to join with the North. "I could
see the immense relief of the Civil Secretary [the convenor of the meeting],
and was left with the strongest impression that he had really come less to
consult than to enforce a policy already decided by the central
government."105
In addition to the hidden agenda of the conference organizers, the
Southern delegates to the conference reportedly were not "free agents", but
were hand-picked by the colonial officials of the Southern administration.
The members had no mandate from the Southern people and, with few
exceptions, most of them were illiterate chiefs.106 Albino claims that "every
recess or adjournment was marked by threats, blackmail, and bribery from
the Northern side to the Southerners."107
According to the conference records, Northern members tried to reassure
the Southerners about the advantages of merger and unity, and they
attempted, at great length, to persuade the Southerners of the desirability and
value of their participation in the future Sudan.108 After the conference
ended and before the Legislative Assembly was created, however, the British
Governors of the Southern provinces, who called the Juba Conference,
insisted on the inclusion of specific safeguards for the protection of Southern
political rights in a united Sudan. The British government eventually
consented to give the Governor General of the Sudan the right to veto any
bills endangering the special interests of the Southerners.109
In 1948, a Legislative Assembly was formed with sixty-five elected and
ten nominated members. An eighteen-member Executive Council was
created to govern the country in the so-called "interim period" up to
independence. Out of all the seats in the assembly, only thirteen were
occupied by Southerners. In 1951, the Anglo-Sudanese Constitutional
Amendment Commission was established to map out the stages to be
followed for granting independence to the Sudan. About this time, many
political parties began forming in the country.
Hearing of the Sudan's approaching independence, King Farouk of Egypt
proclaimed himself King of Egypt and the Sudan. Egypt refused to recognize
Britain's plan to grant independence to the Sudan since it was not consulted.
To demonstrate its displeasure, the Egyptian government abrogated the
Condominium Agreement in October 1951. In 1953, a military coup toppled
King Farouk and Egypt became a Republic under General Neguib, who was
half-Sudanese. At negotiations held in Cairo in 1953 between Sudanese,
British, and Egyptian representatives, Neguib agreed to recognize the
Sudan's right of self-determination and signed the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement of 1953 to this effect. Four Northern political parties were
supposed to have participated in the Cairo talks. But again, no Southern
representatives were present or even consulted during the negotiations.110
By 1951, an embryo Southern political party was established. Its
membership expanded in 1953 and it became known as the Southern Party.
In that same year, elections were held for the new National Assembly. The
primary contenders were the National Unionist Party (NUP), the oldest and
pro-Egypt party, and the Umma Party, which was opposed to union with
Egypt. The Egyptian government is said to have almost openly intervened by
spending large sums of money and engaging in propaganda campaigns over
Radio Cairo to persuade the Sudanese to merge with Egypt.111 The two rival
parties tried to recruit Southern support for their objectives. According to
Beshir, a lot of false promises were made and support was openly bought.
Each party reminded the Southerners that the other party was founded by the
descendants of former slave traders or merchant exploiters, and that support
of its rival meant endorsement of such policies by the Southerners.112 Such
campaign techniques bewildered the Southerners and made them suspicious
of the whole process. The NUP eventually won the elections and its leader,
Ismail el-Ahzari became the first Prime Minister of the Sudan in January,
1954. Twenty-two Southerners were elected, twelve from the Southern Party,
six from the NUP, and four from the Umma Party.
The years between 1954 and 1965 were viewed as a transitional period in
which the Sudan was moving towards full independence. The first act of the
new government of Prime Minister el-Ahzari was to form the Sudanization
Committee to recruit Sudanese to fill 800 positions after the colonialists left
the country. In accordance with the strict traditions of British civil service,
seniority, experience, and academic qualifications were to be used as criteria
for selection. Out of the 800 positions filled, only six were given to the
Southerners, and the highest of those six was that of an Assistant District
Commissioner. This was in violation of promises made during the election
campaigns that the Southerners would "be District Commissioners,
Governors, Deputy Governors and in general they [would] have a quarter of
the jobs in the Sudan."113 Reportedly, this not only angered the Southerners
but made more vivid their old fears of being recolonized by the North.
Meanwhile, considerable tension was building between the new
government and the opposition parties. With help from the Umma Party,
Southern Party members toured the South criticizing the NUP, and calling
for Southerners in the NUP to resign. "Everywhere highly inflammable
speeches were made against the Northerners labeling them as oppressors and
'slave traders'."114 The Southern Party called upon all Southern members of
the assembly, regardless of party loyalty, to form the Southern Bloc. In
October 1954, the Southern Party held a conference in Juba, which called
unanimously for federal status for the South. The new NUP-dominated
government issued a warning that, if necessary, it would use force to stop
any attempts to endanger the unity of the Sudan.115
A series of blunders on the government's part, and many unfavorable
incidents, led to further tension and misunderstanding between the North and
South. This led to the Mutiny of August, 1955, which initiated a significant
change in relations between the two regions. The civil war had come to
plague the country and would continue for nearly two decades.
56
Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1977),
17.
57
Theresa Scherf, "The Sudan Conflict: Its History and Development," A document prepared for
the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches,
Geneva, May 1971, 2.
58
Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan, Background to Conflict (Khartoum:Khartoum
Univ. Press, 1970), 5.
59
O'Ballance, 18.
60
Ibid., 19-20
61
Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961),
5.
62
Robert Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers the Southern Sudan, 1898-1918 (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale Univ. Press, 1971), 254.
63
O'Ballance, 20.
64
Richard Lobban, "National Integration and Disintegration: The Southern Sudan," in Three
Studies on National Integration in the Arab World Caesar Farah, et al. (Dartmouth, Mass.:
AAUG, 1974), 15.
65
Scherf, 2.
66
O'Ballance, 21.
67
Oliver Albino, The Sudan, A Southern Viewpoint (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), 11.
68
Scherf, 2.
69
Dunstan Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing Co.,
1981), 30.
70
O'Ballance, 22.
71
Scherf, 2-3.
72
O'Ballance, 24.
73
M.O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (New York: Praeger Press, 1968), 5.
74
Wai, The African Arab Conflict, 30.
75
Robert O. Collins, The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Center
for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv Univ., 1975), 179.
76
David Wm. McClintock, "The Southern Sudan Problem: Evolution of an Arab-African
Confrontation", Middle East Journal 24 (Autumn 1970), 476.
77
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 33-34.
78
O'Ballance, 26.
79
Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers, 288.
80
Ibid, 288-295.
81
O'Ballance, 27.
82
Ministry for Southern Affairs, "Regional Autonomy for the South" A speech delivered by Mr.
Abel Alier, Minister of Supply and Internal Trade, (Khartoum: Government Printing Press,
June 1970), 4-5.
83
Scherf, 3.
84
Ibid.
85
Ministry for Southern Affairs, "Regional Autonomy for the South," 3.
86
O'Ballance, 28.
87
Ibid.
88
Lobban, 18. See also O'Ballance, 28.
 89
Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972(London: David &. Charles, 1974), 18.
90
A letter of the Governor General, June 12, 1927, quoted in Scherf, 5.
91
See for example Beshir, Background to Conflict, Chapter 5.
92
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 36.
93
Lobban, 18.
94
O'Ballance, 32.
95
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 197.
96
Muddathir Abdel-Rahim, The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan, 1899-1947
(Khartoum: Khartoum Univ. Press, 1968), 46.
97
J.S R. Duncan, The Sudan's Path to Independence (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons,
1957), 213.
98
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 198.
99
Richard Owen, "It Is Our Fault: Background to the Southern Sudan," Grass Curtain I (August
1970), 8.
100
The Central Office of Information of the Government of Sudan, Basic Facts About the Southern
Provinces of the Sudan (Khartoum: Government Printing Office, 1964), 16.
101
See Scherf, 6., and Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 41.
102
Beshir, Background to Conflict, 65 and appendix 8.
103
See appendix 9 "Proceedings of the Juba Conference of the Political Development of the
Southern Sudan, June 1947," Ibid., 136ff.
104
Abel Alier, "The Southern Sudan Question," in The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National
Integration, ed., Dunstan Wai (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 16.
105
Owen, 8.
106
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict 43.
107
Albino, 26.
108
Beshir, Background to Conflict, appendix 9.
109
Owen, 8. However, Owen, who was a participant in the Juba Conference, says that the British
government knew that such assurances were useless, "since once British power was removed
history and human nature would override all paper assurances."
110
O'Ballance, 36. See also Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 47.
111
Ibid., 37.
112
Beshir, Background to Conflict, 71.
113
Ibid., 72.
114
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 56.
115
Scherf, 8. See also Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 57.
 Chapter 4
The Civil War and Its Development
The following account is full of incidents which, if examined in isolation,
appear to be trivial. However, the atmosphere in which they took place was
so highly charged that seemingly minor incidents tended to assume greater
significance and to accelerate the conflict into higher spirals. Thus, it is
important to present these details as they occurred since many of them
became salient in the process of the conflict.

The Mutiny of 1955 and Its Aftermath

The Southern Party had met at Juba to call for federal status for the South
under independent Sudan. At the same time, it called for another meeting in
June 1955, to form the Southern Bloc which would be responsible for
pursuing the Southern demands.116 The government was unhappy about
these meetings and attempted to frustrate them. The District Commissioner
of one of the Southern provinces, a Northerner, toured his district and
gathered the signatures of various chiefs for a statement that supported the
government's policy of a united Sudan. Wai details the various forms of
pressure and trickery that he claims were used to obtain the signatures of
the chiefs.117 This statement was given tremendous publicity on Sudanese
government radio. One Southern member of the National Assembly, on
hearing the news, publicly demanded that the chiefs who signed the
document be dismissed from their positions. The chiefs demanded that the
Member of Parliament who denounced them be arrested.
Meanwhile, at the beginning of July 1955, copies of a telegram, allegedly
signed by the Prime Minister, and sent to Northern administrators of the
Southern provinces, began to circulate among Southern politicians. This
telegram allegedly instructed the administrators not to "listen to the
complaints of the Southerners," and "to oppress" and "ill-treat" them. Later
on a commission established to investigate this matter declared that the
telegram was forged by a Southern clerk. It was, however, very widely
circulated and publicized, causing deep anxiety among Southerners.118
According to Eprile, some Southerners took the telegram as authentic.119
On July 15, 1955, the Southern member of the Legislative Assembly who
denounced the chiefs was tried by the chiefs' court on charges of criminal
intimidation, and was sentenced to imprisonment in what was characterized
by some as a farce-trial.120 On hearing the sentence, a crowd of about 700
Southerners assembled at the court house and staged a demonstration in
sympathy with the condemned parliamentarian. The District Commissioner
called police and troops to disperse the crowd and they used tear gas to
break up the demonstration. "The crowd dispersed but small groups raided a
shop belonging to a Northerner and beat up a few Northerners, amongst
them a pregnant woman, who later had a miscarriage.121
The next day the disorders continued. A demonstration was staged by
300 Southerners who had just been dismissed en masse from their jobs in
the Zande Cotton Company. It was said that cut backs were necessary due
to financial difficulties. However, the Southerners pointed to the fact that
during the Sudanization process the Northern Sudanese technical staff in the
same company had increased in number while the Southerners were being
dismissed. The demonstration staged by the dismissed workers was joined
by "hooligans, unemployed and other civilians," and some of them were
reported to have been armed.122 The crowd grew to nearly a thousand.
Again police and army reinforcements were sent in and guns were fired to
break up the demonstration. Two Northern merchants also allegedly shot at
the crowd. In the end, eight demonstrators died and many were wounded.
Instead of attempting to calm the Southerners' fears, the government in
Khartoum circulated and broadcast a threatening ultimatum stating that it
would take more serious action against the "disturbers."123
The Sudan Defence Force (SDF), the main military establishment for the
country, was established in 1925. It was divided into four regions, one of
which was the Equatoria or the Southern Corps based in the three Southern
provinces. The Southern Corps consisted entirely of Southern soldiers.
According to O'Ballance, the rationale of the British administrators was to
use the Southern soldiers as a counter-balance to the predominantly Muslim
element in the army.124 When the process of Sudanization commenced in
the SDF after independence, more candidates began to be accepted in the
Sudan Military College, but the large majority were Northerners. Officers in
both the army and police in the South were mostly Northerners, while all
the non-officers were Southerners. Out of the thirty-three officers for the
Southern Corps, the twenty-four senior officers were Northerners, the nine
junior officers, Southerners.125
During this period of tension, Northern politicians persistently demanded
that Northern troops be sent to quell the disturbances in the South, since the
loyalty of Southern soldiers might prevent their shooting at their own
people. On August 10, a detachment of 500 Northern troops arrived in Juba,
the capital of Equatoria, amid considerable Southern apprehension. As the
first group of Northern soldiers arrived, "many Southern civilians took their
families and left Juba as they thought [that the] troops were coming to kill
them,"126 the meantime, SDF headquarters ordered the transfer of several
detachments of Southern soldiers to the North. It was rumored that this
detachment was going to be disarmed. As was feared, on August 18, the
Southern troops refused to obey the transfer orders and mutiny broke out.
The mutineers broke into ammunition stores and began hunting and
killing Northern officers. The shootings were accompanied by looting and
great panic ensued. About fifty-five people drowned while trying to leave
Torit, the town where the mutiny took place. Some of the Southern soldiers,
who had left their posts in Juba and joined the mutiny, spread the news that
Northerners had shot and killed many Southern soldiers and civilians in
Juba. This agitated many Southerners into taking revenge against the
Northerners for these alleged killings. In the meantime, police had
persuaded Northern merchants and their families to come to the prison
building for protection. On August 20, Southerners invaded the prison
killing and wounding some of the officers and the people inside.127
Subsequently, large numbers of Northerners were reported killed in many
parts of Equatoria.
A commission established by the government to investigate the mutiny
and its aftermath put Northern fatalities at 261 and Southern fatalities at 20,
excluding the 55 who had drowned. The commission's report linked the
killings of the Northerners with the fabricated rumors of civilians being
massacred in Juba. A state of emergency was declared by the government
and Egyptian President Nasser proposed that Britain and Egypt provide
troops to quell the revolt. But London declined and looked instead to the
Sudanese themselves to find a solution.128 Soon after, about 8,000 Northern
troops were sent to the South. The Prime Minister asked the Southern
mutineers at Torit to surrender, but instead, the Southern soldiers asked that
Northern troops be removed from the South. The Prime Minister turned
down the request.129
Southern troops were expecting intervention on their behalf by the
British administration which was still waiting to hand over power to the
newly elected government Instead, the British Governor General sent a
message to the Southerners advising them to surrender and assuring them of
a fair investigation and proper treatment as military prisoners. The
Southerners asked the British to send troops to the South and requested
again the evacuation of Northern soldiers. On August 26, the Governor
General sent a final warning to surrender.130 The mutineers agreed to do so
on August 27. But on August 30, when Northern troops entered Torit to
effect the surrender, "they found the town virtually empty. Southern soldiers
[had] evacuated the town completely as the surrender negotiations were
going on. They were convinced that Northern troops were going to kill
them....So began a resistance movement in the Southern bush. The rest is
history."131

Independence, the Multi-Party System and Its

Consequences

On January 1, 1956, the Sudan became independent, with Ismail al-

Azhari, the leader of the NUP, as its Premier. According to Beshir, Southern
members of the NUP had voted for independence because they had been
promised that their claims for federal status for the South would be given
full consideration.132 In September 1956, the National Assembly appointed
a forty-six-member committee to draft a national constitution; three of the
forty-six were Southerners. These three reiterated their claim to federal
status, but the Northern members rejected it as unfeasible.133 Thereafter, the
three boycotted the committee. The government was faced with
considerable strife among the various political factions in the National
Assembly. The new Premier lost the support of various splinter parties and
some members of his own party defected. In July 1957, the rival Umma
Party had the majority and a new Premier, Abdulah Khalid, was installed.
As a result of the intra-party strife, and the unwillingness of Southern
members of the National Assembly to discuss the constitution without first
settling the federation issue, the constitutional commission failed to
complete its work.
Prime Minister Khalid, like his predecessor, was faced by internal
dissension within his own party and mounting criticisms from the other
parties for his domestic as well as his foreign policy. The failure of the
cotton crop in 1958 and a big foreign exchange shortage exacerbated the
crisis. To avoid a vote of no-confidence, he adjourned the National
Assembly. In addition, rumors were flying that Southern mutineers who had
escaped were about to emerge and start a guerilla war. On November 17,
1958, the short experiment with Westminster-type multiparty democracy
ended with a bloodless coup d'etat led by the Commander of the Sudanese
armed forces, General Ibrahim Abboud.134 Martial law was declared and all
political parties were banned. Abboud formed a government of seven
officers and five civilians. One was a Southerner.
Abboud's coup was favorably received by the North who had been
dismayed by the squabbles and ineffectiveness of the politicians. In the
South, however, it was seen as a step backwards. The military government's
policy towards the South was expressed by its newly adopted slogan "a
single language and a single religion for a single country." The government
undertook Arabization of the South, and attempted to proselytize Islam.
Pressure was put on Southern chiefs to convert, mosques and religious
schools were built, and the Sabbath was changed back from Sunday to
Friday.135 Christian missionaries in the South were suspected of complicity
with Southern protest and resistance against this new policy. In 1961, all
religious gatherings, excepting prayer in a church, were banned, and foreign
missionaries on leave were forbidden to return. Eventually, in February
1962, the Ministry of Interior announced the expulsion of all foreign
missionaries in the South claiming that they threatened the unity of the
Sudan.136
Emergence of the Anya Nya
The political situation in the South continued to deteriorate. Aboud's
policy of repression was causing thousands to flee to refuge in Uganda,
Kenya, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, and Zaire. In December
1960, rumors arose that the government intended to arrest a number of
former Members of Parliament. As a result, many prominent political
leaders and educated Southerners fled from the country.137 The exiles
organized themselves into three groups, one of which came to be known as
the Sudan African National Union (SANU). Its aim was to publicize
Southern problems and to organize guerilla attacks in order to gain
independence for the South.138
Back in the South, an embryo guerilla movement was emerging.
Approximately 500 soldiers of the former Southern Corps, some of whom
had participated in the 1955 mutiny and others who had deserted later, had
retreated to the forests and formed bands of resistance. Since the only way
these guerillas could sustain themselves was by raiding villages for food,
they were hunted by the government as outlaws and bandits. In 1961, 800
people who had been imprisoned for their participation in the 1955 riots
were released from jail. Most of them fled and joined the forest-fighters.
Even though their number was increasing, the forest-fighters were not well
organized and had little knowledge of guerilla warfare. Their activities were
restricted to minor scattered ambushes or attacks on government soldiers.
In September 1963, several of the leaders of the scattered groups decided
to merge their forces under the command of General Taffeng, a non-
commissioned officer in the Sudan Defence Force. The new group called
itself the Anya Nya, meaning "snake poison". In one of its leaflets, this new
organization states: "Our patience has come to an end, and we are
convinced that only use of force will bring a decision....From today
onwards we shall take action ...for better or worse....We do not want mercy
and we are not prepared to give it".139 The Anya Nya established training
camps and focused on recruitment and training. Its members started to blow
up bridges, block roads, ambush Northern troops and punish Southerners
who collaborated with the Northern administration in the South. This
caught a lot of people between two fires. They were penalized by the
government if they did not cooperate, and by the Anya Nya if they did. As a
result, the number of refugees from the South increased. By May 1964,
their number was estimated to be approximately 60,000 and the United
Nations allocated 175,000 pounds sterling for the refugees in Uganda
alone.140
In a few Anya Nya raids on police posts, several policemen were killed.
The most daring action came in January 1964, when they launched an
unsuccessful attack on Wau, a provincial capital. Sixty-one of the Anya Nya
soldiers were captured; the leader and two others were hanged and the rest
sent to prison. These measures succeeded only in cultivating more
popularity for the Anya Nya in the South despite the atrocities they
committed on local people.141
The government rushed more forces to the the South. On February 12,
1964, many Southern police, prison staff, and minor officials were arrested
and 105 imprisoned on charges of subversion. The rest of the Southern
government officials were ordered to move to the North, leaving an almost
entirely Northern and Muslim army and administration to run the South.142
By late 1964, it was estimated that about forty percent of the Sudan
Defence Force (SDF) was in the South.
Despite the setback at Wau, the rebels mounted a series of small attacks
and continued to recruit, train, and regularize their formations. "By the end
of 1964, the Anya Nya was slightly more than a semblance of a guerilla
force."143 The Northern army was making severe reprisals, which also
affected the civilian population. Hundreds of thousands of refugees were
fleeing to neighbouring countries.
In the North, in addition to dissatisfaction with the country's economic
and political problems, public opinion reflected unrest and frustration at the
handling of the Southern situation. All the political parties, with the
exception of the banned Communist Party, however, were more
preoccupied with the military dictatorship than with solving the Southern
problem. The communists rejected the use of force and advocated local
autonomy to solve the Southern problem.144 But,

the military dictatorship-refused to recognize that there was a Southern

problem, continued to denounce the imperialists and missionaries as the
source of the problem. It looked upon the Southern politicians as
stooges and agents of foreign powers and the missionaries, believing
 that the only way of bringing about integration and unity was through
military power.145

Discontent in the North was increasing. Demonstrations, strikes and general

public unrest eventually led to the ousting of General Abboud's government
in October 1964.

The Round Table Conference and Its Aftermath

The overthrow of Abboud's government, or the October Revolution, as it
later came to be known, was the beginning of a new approach to North-
South relations. Al-Khalifa, a former Assistant Director of Education in the
South, was selected as the Prime Minister and he brought with him into the
cabinet some Southerners. The use of force to solve the Southern problem
was rejected, and an attempt was made to stop the fighting and to persuade
the refugees to return by offering them a general amnesty. SANU leaders
expressed their desire to return on the condition that, among other things, a
round table conference between the North and South be convened to discuss
the constitutional relationship between the two regions, with observers
being invited from neighbouring countries, including Egypt.146
On November 10, 1964, the government announced its desire for peace
and negotiation, declared a general amnesty, and sent the two Southern
members of its cabinet to Uganda to explain the new government's policy
and to persuade SANU leaders to return to the Sudan. The government
agreed to SANU's call for a conference, even though it was known that
SANU viewed federation as the only way to solve the Southern problem.147
The Round Table Conference originally scheduled for February 6, did not
begin until March 16, 1965. In the meantime, two opposing views emerged
within SANU: the extremists view advocated separation and negotiation
outside the country; the moderates called for federation and negotiation
either inside or outside the Sudan. Much confusion and quarrelling ensued
among the various Southern organizations about who was to be represented
and how.148 After a lot of internal negotiation, the two factions of SANU, as
well as other organizations such as the Southern Front, sent their
representatives to meet with those from six Northern political parties in
Khartoum. Observers were invited from Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria,
Algeria, and Egypt.149 The Southern groups were divided about their
solution to the Southern problem. The radical element of SANU wanted
independence for the South, while the moderate wing suggested a federal
arrangement with the North. The newly formed Southern Front, created by
Southerners who lived inside the Sudan (as opposed to those in exile)
suggested that the future of the South should be decided by a plebiscite in
the South. Neither were the Northern groups in harmony. But, they were
united in rejecting any suggestion that, in their opinion, would endanger the
unity of the Sudan.
On March 16, the conference began. Many differing views and
suggestions were debated. The participants were unable, however, to reach
an agreement at that time.150 Therefore, on March 29, the conference
decided to appoint a committee of six Southerners and six Northerners to
continue the discussion on the future constitutional relationship between the
North and the South and then to report their suggested solutions to the
conference when it reconvened. In the meantime, some reforms were
suggested by the conferees to the government as a means of improving
North-South relations. These reforms included resettlement of refugees and
the creation of a Southern Development Agency. The plenary conference
was expected to be reconvened three months later and the exiled Southern
political leaders went back to East Africa. William Deng and his SANU
supporters remained in Khartoum. However, for both foreseen and
unforeseen reasons, violence in the South increased during and after the
conference talks.151 None of the recommendations of the conferees were
implemented and the plenary conference never reconvened.
Even though the conference failed to find a solution to the Southern
problem, it had some beneficial consequences. There seems to be a
consensus among both Southern and Northern writers that the conference
provided an opportunity for both sides to sit face-to-face and sound out
each other's views, and to compare each other's perceptions. It provided a
"much better knowledge and appreciation of the extent of the Southern
problem."152
Northern Measures and the Spiral of Violence
Within Khartoum itself, the usual rivalries and quarrels among the
various parties were not abated even by the formation of Khalifa's
government. Riots and violence in the North continued, and Khalifa's
government resigned on June 2, 1965. A new coalition government which
included three Southern ministers was formed by Mohammed Mahgoub.
The period was also characterized by political divisions and confusion
among the Southerners in exile. Personality clashes caused a group to break
away from SANU in exile calling itself the Azania Liberation Front (ALF).
This group grew in strength and claimed to be the only political
organization for the Southern movement with the Anya Nya as its military
arm. The ALF sought assistance from neighbouring countries.
The new Mahgoub government was showing signs of political success in
the North, but the military situation in the South was a different story. Even
during Khalifa's regime, the government was secretly moving more troops
to the South, although the rhetoric called for rejecting a military solution to
the Southern problem.
In the meantime, a development took place in neighbouring Zaire (the
former Belgian Congo) that helped the Anya Nya to become a stronger rival
to the Sudan government In July 1964, the Simba people had revolted
against Tschombe's government in the neighbouring Belgian Congo. These
rebels were supported both by Egypt and Algeria, while the United States
and Belgium cooperated with Tschombe.153 Pressured by the left wing in
Khartoum, Prime Minister Khalifa allowed arms from the aid donors to be
transported through the Sudan to the rebels in the Congo. He also turned the
Sudan into a haven for the rebels.
During this time, the Anya Nya quietly hijacked some of the arms being
secretly transported to the Simbas, Eventually, the Simbas were defeated by
Tschombe and many of them fled to the Southern Sudan. They sold most of
their arms to the Anya Nya for food or for "such diverse and innocuous
commodities as transistor radios and Sudanese beer" or simply abandoned
them.154 In this way, "several hundred automatic weapons and quantities of
ammunition were obtained" by the the Anya Nya enabling them to become
a more effective guerilla force.155 It was also reported that weapons and
ammunition were being stolen or captured by the Anya Nya from the
Sudanese army.156
When Mahgoub became Prime Minister, he adopted a policy of strict law
and order. In his first message to Parliament, the Prime Minister declared
that his government would continue:

to seek a peaceful democratic solution to the Southern problem, and

would end the policy of appeasement and leniency in dealing with the
outlaws and those who support them. It will order complete
disbandment of the army, and end completely the fanatic bands that play
with security. It will order the army to follow the criminals, return the
state of law and order and punish the mutineers.'157

After the Round Table Conference failed, the facade of reconciliation broke
down. On July 8, 1965, an incident occurred between a Northern soldier
and a Southerner in Juba, in which the Northerner was wounded.

This caused the Muslim garrisons to run amok in the town: they
cordoned off certain districts along the Nile Bank, set fire to grass
roofed huts and shot the occupants as they emergedmany were drowned
when they jumped into the river to escape. Rioting did not die down
until late the following day....The Southerners claimed that over 3000
huts were burned, and the official Northern figure of those killed was
1,019 in the two days.158

On July 10, in an unsuccessful Anya Nya attack on the army head quarters
at Juba, government troops claimed they shot twenty-five "outlaws". In
Wau, the capital of Bahr el Gahzal, Southern eyewitnesses described how,
on July 11, 1965, seventy-five Southerners were surrounded at a wedding
party and shot by Northern soldiers. On the afternoon of the same day, the
Anya Nya attacked the army camp at Wau in reprisal. Several Northern and
a few Anya Nya soldiers were killed in the attack. The Anya Nya attack at
Wau caused Mahgoub to take an even tougher stance. He insisted that the
guerillas must be subdued, and on July 19, gave "the rebels an ultimatum to
surrender or face the consequences."159 Subsequently, a number of
atrocities took place in the South. O'Ballance called this period of heavy
death tolls a "black month". The violence in Wau was followed by an
incident in Rumbek on July 20, where soldiers allegedly shot up the town,
killing hundreds. At Warajwok, the men of the village were reportedly
rounded up and 187 shot on August 5, 1965.160 The Anya Nya also
committed atrocities and killings. On August 13, they attacked and killed
several Northerners near Wau. A few days later, they surrounded seventy
government soldiers from Khartoum, killing many before paratroopers
arrived to rescue the survivors.161 Unable to hit the guerillas, the
government soldiers usually made targets of the civilian population. As a
result, they burned many villages and killed or scattered many innocent
civilians.
The month of August was also marked by many violent activities.
Although it is difficult to verify all the claims and counterclaims, large
numbers of casualties occurred, among them many educated Southerners,
even though it was not clear whether the Northerners intended this, or
whether it was accidental. Many mission churches and schools suffered at
the hands of the military. "On the 13th of October, the Church Missionary
Society estimated that about half the churches in the South have been
destroyed."162
The government predicted that the rebels would be defeated by the end of
the year, and increased its budget for weapons and military expenditure in
the South. Government forces claimed large scale victories against the
Anya Nya. Southern leaders in exile claimed that they had driven all the
"Arabs" from the South, with the exception of the military and a few
merchants. At about this time, President Nkrumah of Ghana offered to
mediate between the Anya Nya and the Sudanese government. But Prime
Minister Mahgoub refused the offer on the grounds that the Southern
problem was an internal affair.163
By the end of 1965, it was estimated that in the South there were about
15,000 government soldiers164 and from 2,000 to 10,000 Anya Nya
forces165 Despite several bombing raids made on Anya Nya camps towards
the end of 1965, not much damage was sustained.166
The Anya Nya enjoyed free movement across the boundaries of Ethiopia,
Uganda, the Congo (Zaire), the Central African Republic and, to some
extent, Kenya. They were also allowed to establish military training camps
in some of these countries; and, in some instances, received aid and
encouragement from these governments or their allies.167 Even though
government forces claimed control over the cities, the Anya Nya were
making it difficult to move in the countryside. Between October 1966 and
February 1967, the Anya Nya destroyed approximately thirty-four bridges
and two tanks, stole medical supplies, captured several arms and
ammunition depots, killed or wounded thirty-three policemen and soldiers,
and killed about one hundred civilians.168 According to some accounts, the
government had been forced out completely from some areas and the rebels
were not only living there, but had started cultivation and had clean water
supply guarded by their own soldiers.169
In April 1966, the Prime Minister toured the South. He "could not travel
anywhere...except by plane or under heavy army escort" due to the lack of
security.170 During the tour, he ordered the formation of "peace villages"
where people were asked to come from the countryside and live under the
protection of the army. The aim was to cut the links of the Anya Nya with
the rural population, but the plan did not succeed, A few Southern
politicians who were in Uganda, moved to Southern Sudan and attempted to
form a provisional government for the South. This attempt failed because it
lacked the support of many Anya Nya fighters.
On July 25, 1966, a motion of censure against the government caused
Mahgoub to resign. He was replaced in December by Sadiq al Mahdi, a
descendant of the original Mahdi, the religious leader. The new Prime
Minister announced that he would take a different approach to the Southern
problem, although he would continue the policy of containment of the
rebels and the peace village program. He also declared his policy to be
"aimed at crushing the rebellion, and bringing about a dialogue with those
elements favoring a political solution."171 Skirmishes between the Anya
Nya and government forces continued. A large sweeping operation against
the Anya Nya which lasted fourteen days was carried out. The operation
was claimed to have killed a large number and to have taken 528 prisoners.
Sadiq also tried to restrict the movement of the Anya Nya across the
borders by improving his relations with neighbours like Uganda, the Congo,
the Central African Republic and Ethiopia, countries "in which many
Sudanese political leaders were engaged in hostile activities against the
Sudan."172
 Uganda agreed "to cooperate [with the Sudan] to the extent of conducting
joint operations, by the Sudanese army and the Ugandan armed forces,
against the rebels. The refugees were moved away from the borders and the
Southern exiles were warned against carrying on hostile activities against
the Sudan. In some cases those who continued them were arrested."173 The
Congolese government agreed to cooperate with Khartoum and halt
movement of arms and rebel troops across their common border.174 The
Congolese are also reported to have agreed to cooperate in returning the
refugees who wished to go back.175
In addition, Sadiq also made various agreements with Ethiopia. On July
26, 1966, a joint boundary commission to demarcate the whole frontier
between the two countries was established. In January 1967, the Sudan
Foreign Minister visited Ethiopia and, in return, Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia visited the Sudan in February. Both governments affirmed that
they would not interfere in each other's internal affairs, that the Sudan
would not assist the Eritreans, who were fighting to secede from Ethiopia
and that Ethiopia would not aid the Anya Nya. However, all these
agreements of cooperation between the Sudan and its neighbours did not
last long and the Anya Nya were not much restricted from movement across
the borders.
In the meantime, the Twelve Man Committee, formed by the Round
Table Conference in March 1965, had continued to meet and had produced
a report and recommendations. It suggested that neither separation nor a
centralized government was suitable and recommended various schemes of
power-sharing between the North and South. However, the Prime Minister
did not want to hear these recommendations and the report was not made
public.176
The Communist Party, which had been banned by the previous Prime
Minister was now striving hard for recognition, although neither the
government nor the various political parties wanted to grant them any seats
in the National Assembly. On December 28, 1966, a group of young
communist officers failed in a coup d'etat against the existing government.
One of the officers involved was Colonel Gaafar al-Numeiri, who later
became President of the Sudan. About 400 people were arrested including
Numeiri. In January 1967, the government decided to release all the
civilians and some military officers. Among them was Numeiri who was
relieved of his eastern command and sent to command the infantry school.
"Being told that there would be no further promotion for him simply made
him a more determined revolutionary."177 Premier Sadiq would not allow
the re-establishment of the Communist Party, even though creation of a
Socialist Party was allowed because of demands from crowds
demonstrating in the streets.
In May 1967, Sadiq was defeated in a vote of confidence and
Mohammed Mahgoub returned to power. The reappearance of Mahgoub did
not inspire confidence among Southerners. In fact, it served only as a
reminder of his repressive policies. As expected, "he reintroduced his
former harsh laws and regulations which gave virtual license to his soldiers
in the South to keep order as they thought fit."178
On January 10, 1968, the government announced amnesty for all those
who had taken part in the coup against the government and those who had
fled the country, if they gave themselves up. The promise of amnesty,
however, encouraged no Southern refugees to return. Fighting continued
between government forces and the Anya Nya.
The Anya Nya gradually transformed themselves into a recognizable
guerilla force in the period between 1965 and 1970. During these years they
acted independently of the politicians claiming authority over them. The
force was not well-coordinated within, mainly due to ethnic differences.179
Each command was more or less an autonomous unit and refused to
cooperate with either the other regional commanders or with the politicians.
Southern politicians were also very much divided in their aims. The Sudan
Unity Party and SANU members within the Sudan were willing to accept a
united Sudan. On the other hand, SANU members in exile wanted
separation. The Anya Nya leaders claimed that they were fighting for
complete secession. The Southern Front advocated federation as long as a
plebiscite was allowed in the South.
In order to forge unity, a meeting of Southern politicians was called and
the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) was formed in August
1967, with the aim of establishing a government in the areas controlled by
the Anya Nya. However, besides its lack of firm control over the Anya Nya,
it had little Southern support.180
Moreover, although it was estimated that the Anya Nya had grown to
about 10,000, they were poorly armed and undisciplined, with desertions,
divisions, and quarrels along tribal lines. Most of the diverse groups within
the Anya Nya lacked political education and motivation.181 The SSPG, like
the Anya Nya, was infested with tribal rivalries and was further dividing
and splintering itself. In March 1969, a faction took over its leadership and
renamed the SSPG the Nile Provisional Government, with the express
purpose of fighting for complete independence and Southern unity. In
September 1969, another faction splintered and formed the Anyidi
Revolutionary Government Soon after, two other contending governments
were created, one within the Southern Sudan called the Sue River
Revolutionary Government, the other in exile in East Africa called the
Sudan-Azania Government. Most of these governments claimed to be the
sole representatives of the people of Southern Sudan.182

The Coming of Numeiri and the Rise of the SSLM

Mahgoub's regime in the North did not succeed in ending the political
quarrels and infighting among the various political parties in the
government. Left wing students also clashed with the conservative Muslim
Brothers resulting in fatalities and further unrest. The various parties made
so many demands on the government that, on April 23, 1969, Mahgoub
decided to resign, although he announced that he would stay on as a
caretaker Premier. On May 25, 1969, Colonel Numeiri led a bloodless coup
d'etat and a military junta took power.
Numeiri formed a Revolutionary Council of military officers with a
civilian Premier, Babiker Adawalla, "an anti-American lawyer."183
Adwalla's government contained one Southerner, Joseph Garang, an ardent
communist. The government also contained many members of the newly
formed Socialist Party. Numeiri suspended the constitution, abolished all
political parties, and announced that there would not be a return to multi-
party democracy.
At the beginning of his regime, Numeiri considered the Mahdists, the
Khatima sects, and the fundamentalist Muslim Brothers, to be his primary
enemies. To counteract their opposition, he formed an alliance with the
communists, giving in to many of their demands, including their proposal
for dealing with the Southern problem. Another of their demands was the
admission of Soviet military advisors to the Sudan.184 On May 31, 1969,
Numeiri publicly stated secession was a crime; but, on June 2, he
announced that the South would be allowed to govern itself within the
framework of socialism and a unified Sudan. On June 10, he declared that
the basic problem in the South was "imperialism" and "the manipulation of
the South in order to divide the Sudan," and made what came to be known
as the June Declaration. He promised to grant local autonomy to the South
and proposed a social, economic, and cultural program that would
implement this objective.185
In both North and South, the responses to this declaration were varied
and confused. In the North, the right wing rejected the declaration as a
sellout, while the moderates and the left wing supported it.186 In the South
reaction was also mixed. The Southern political leadership was still
suffering from internal fights and divisions, hence, some groups expressed
their agreement with the basic idea of autonomy and their willingness to go
to Khartoum and negotiate the terms. Other groups flatly rejected the idea
and said that they would not accept anything short of independence. Still
other Southern groups thought the declaration was a trick to make the Anya
Nya surrender.187 Meanwhile, because of the severe quarrelling that had
been going on among Southerners, the Anya Nya had not carried out any
serious attacks or military activities since April 1968. Also, Numeiri's
alliance with the left had opened up a liaison with the Communist Bloc, and
as will be seen later, the Soviet Union was eager to provide ammunition,
military equipment and advisors to Numeiri.
On August 1, 1969, Numeiri announced that his experience as an officer-
in-charge in the South between 1966 and 1967 had convinced him that there
was no military solution to the Southern problem, and gave this as the
reason for his offer of autonomy to the South. On the other hand, he
maintained a stern posture towards the Anya Nya, Although attempts were
made by the Numeiri government to reopen hospitals, rebuild roads and
bridges, start agricultural projects, and create more employment for
Southerners, these were viewed with suspicion and hostility by many
Southerners. The Anya Nya, in the meantime, was becoming united and
reactivated.
During July and August 1969, several plots to overthrow Numeiri were
foiled. On October 26, Numeiri reshuffled his government. He assumed the
position of Premier in addition to his position as the Chairman of the
Revolutionary Council. The marxist, Awadalla, became the Deputy
Chairman. Two Southerners, Joseph Garang and Abel Alier, were brought
into the government As a result of the pressure of the extreme left in his
cabinet, Numeiri was following radical policies such as nationalizing both
Sudanese and foreign firms, and weakening contacts with the West.188
In November 1969, Numeiri's regime began a major offensive against the
Anya Nya, many of whose soldiers were reported killed, but, according to
some foreign newspapers, a sizable number of government soldiers were
also killed, and numerous civilians were massacred by Northern troops.189
Beginning on December 20, 1969, bombing by Soviet-built Migs, machine-
gunning, and the firing of rockets became common. Soviet-built helicopters
were allegedly used to lift troops, to surround villages suddenly, to assault
Anya Nya camps and to block escape routes.190
Unrest in the North continued. By March 1970, the tenth plot in ten
months to overthrow Numeiri was revealed.191 In one of the biggest plots,
on March 27, 1970, the Imam, leading about 30,000 Mahdists, attempted to
assassinate Numeiri, Failing to do so, he asked for Numeiri's resignation.
Numeiri demanded the Imam's surrender, then moved against him with a
large army supported by approximately twenty-five Mig combat aircraft.
About 2,000 Mahdists were reported killed, even though, by some
estimates, the toll was less than 1,000 casualties.192 The Imam was shot as
he tried to escape to Ethiopia. Numeiri was not without foreign support.
The governments of Egypt and Iraq reportedly expressed their willingness
to come to Numeiri's aid, and Libya actually sent a token military force and
some aircraft to the Sudan.193
In the meantime, in the South, during April of 1970 alone, 145,000
Southern refugees left the country.194 Even though in May of 1970, the
government claimed that it captured 502 rebels, the Anya Nya again
attacked government forces and inflicted heavy casualties in July. During
the second half of 1970, many successful attacks were claimed by both the
government and the Anya Nya, even though these claims and counterclaims
are very difficult to verify.195 By September 1970, the Anya Nya were
strong enough to reportedly engage over 3,000 government troops who
were supported by bombers, rockets, and helicopters, for about a fortnight,
instead of their usual hit and run tactics.196 At about this time, the Anya
Nya commander stated: "as our supplies of weapons increased - and not
only weapons but other equipment - the functions of an army became more
possible. Then we began to change into a more organized kind of force,
taking the shape of a regular army."197
In November 1970, it was announced that Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan
were intending to federate their countries. This created further pessimism
and confirmed Southern suspicions that Numeiri associated himself with
Arabs, not with Africans, and that his promise of autonomy was insincere.
The Anya Nya was also changing. Out of the bitter conflict and
confusion among the Southern politicians and military leaders, one man
was consolidating his power: Joseph Lagu, commander of the Anya Nya in
the Eastern Equatoria region. He began his career in the Military College in
Khartoum in 1958, and later became a Second Lieutenant in the Northern
Command. In 1963, he defected to the Anya Nya.198 In 1964, Lagu
splintered off and took over the Eastern Equatoria region where he built up
an efficient, self-contained regional command. He began to work without
instructions from any politician. In October 1969, Lagu, by now a Colonel,
formed the Anya Nya High Command Council whose purposes were to
control and direct the operations of the Anya Nya, to search out and
distribute military material, and to administer the civilian population in the
Anya Nya-controlled territories. He then persuaded the Anyidi
Revolutionary Government to join him and place their forces under him,
while the leaders were given seats in the High Command Council. Next, the
Nile Provisional Government volunteered to dissolve itself "in the interest
of unity" and subsequently "all the rest of the parties followed its example
and declared support for Colonel Lagu's leadership."199 He continued in this
way to win many followers, and to establish a firm control over the whole
of the Anya Nya. Then, in January 1971, he called a meeting of political
and military leaders at which he announced the formation of the Southern
Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and became its leader.200 The SSLM
was to be the political arm of the Anya Nya. At this point, Lagu had
become a Major General and assumed the position of Commander in Chief
of the Anya Nya. He also held the top political position in the SSLM.
Lagu rectified many shortcomings and weaknesses in the Anya Nya. He
gained full control of the various arms supplies filtering through the
boundaries and "he doled out weapons and ammuninition with discretion,
being quick to withhold them if there were insubordination, suspicion of
regional independence or plain banditry."201 In addition, the Israelis were
reported willing to supply arms only through General Lagu to any Anya
Nya group. This helped Lagu to exercise a tighter control over all the Anya
Nya groups.202 Moreover, Lagu was attempting to establish civil
administration over Anya Nya territory. Some schools, training centers,
medical centers, and even some Anya Nya supervised manufacturing
industries were established.203 A few prominent Southern politicians in
exile, or working in the former Southern governments in exile, agreed to
work under Lagu and were appointed to ministerial positions. Soon after,
Lagu had a government working under him. Further, he contacted a number
of the prominent Southerners abroad, some of whom had been representing
the South in their own way, or acting for their own parties or
governments.204 He formalized their relationship with the SSLM by
designating them his personal representatives or ambassadors. Two
personalities that later played a significant role in the SSLM were Mading
de Garang who was appointed the SSLM representative in London, and
Lawrence Wol Wol, SSLM representative in Paris. Domenic Mohammed in
Washington, D.C., Angelo Voga in Kampala, and Job Adier in Addis
Ababa, were also appointed representatives in the U.S., Uganda and
Ethiopia respectively.205
Early in 1970, the Southern Sudan Association (SSA) was formed in
London, sponsored by several British businessmen and politicians, with the
primary purpose of publicizing the Southern cause and attempting to gain
for it international public support. Beginning in May 1970, the SSA began
to distribute a publication called the Grass Curtain edited by Mading de
Garang, the SSLM's representative in London. This journal was widely
publicized and had the effect of raising public consciousness in many
Western European countries about the little-known war in the Sudan. The
Grass Curtain influenced many groups to organize in various countries in
order to alleviate the plight of the Southerners and the Anya Nya. Groups in
Scandanavia took the lead to raise millions of dollars for aid to the South
and to mobilize their governments to support the Southern cause.206
On the military front, the Anya Nya was better organized and better
disciplined than ever before. They claimed that several roads and bridges
were rendered useless, or mined, so that communication between Northern
troops became more and more difficult. This caused the North to be more
dependent on aircraft and helicopters. By the beginning of 1971, Eprile
reported that thirty to sixty Russian planes were being used against the
Anya Nya.207
Even after the harsh blow he dealt the Mahdists, Numeiri was still having
problems in the North. The other group now hostile to him was the
Communist Party, which was supposed to be the largest party of its kind in
Africa or the Arab world.208 He expelled four members of his
Revolutionary Council for collaborating with the communists. On February
12, 1971, he vowed to destroy the party, banned all organizations associated
with it and banished several communist leaders. The Soviet Union sent a
delegation to Khartoum to intercede on behalf of the Communist Party, but
Numeiri was adamant.209 On May 25, 1971, he announced that the
Sudanese Socialist Union was to be the country's only political party.
In a sudden surprise move, on July 19, 1971, Numeiri's government was
overthrown by a group of left-wing officers. The takeover was completed in
twenty minutes. Two military officiers claimed leadership of the coup even
though they were in Britain at the time. However, as they were on their way
back to the Sudan on a British airliner, the plane was ordered to land when
it entered Libyan air space, and the two officers were taken into custody.210
Meanwhile, in Khartoum there were demonstrations demanding the
return of Numeiri. On July 21, Libya and Egypt announced their support for
Numeiri and that they were prepared to intervene if needed. On the other
hand, both Iraq and the Soviet Union recognized and congratulated the new
regime. However, only some of the military had joined the officers staging
the coup. The rest were waiting to see what the situation might bring.
Around this time, Libya transported back to Khartoum the brigade of
soldiers who were serving in the Suez Canal as the Sudanese contingent
fighting with the Arabs against Israel. Their return encouraged pro-Numeiri
forces to take positions against the new regime. Soon after, Numeiri
returned to power, supported, according to one view, by soldiers who were
worried about their religion under a communist regime.211 Once Numeiri
was able to assert his power, all Soviet personnel were ordered to stay in
their quarters. He also took severe measures against people whom he
considered to have played an active role in the July 19 coup. He executed
many of these people, including those detained in Libya, and Joseph
Garang, the Southerner.
 In return for the support Numeiri received from Libya and Egypt to crush
the coup, he expressed his willingness to join the proposed Arab Federation.
On July 29, 1971, Numeiri announced that there was no evidence that the
Soviet Union was implicated in the coup, although, privately, he is reported
to have admitted that the Soviet Union was aware of the coup and supported
it from the start.212 He expressed the wish that relations between the two
would not deteriorate. On August 5, however, Numeiri stated firmly that
there was no place in the Sudan for communism and that he would not
accept the Soviets as colonizers.213 The failure of the coup against Numeiri
"was generally regarded as a setback for Soviet influence in the Middle
East."214
At this point, Numeiri is reported to have "made an astounding about-
face on the political continuum. Much that he had favored became
forbidden, and much that he had opposed became favored. Commercial
interests were denationalized and returned to former owners. The Middle
East situation became much less important to the new government..."215 He
reshuffled his cabinet and gave Garang's place of Minister of Southern
Affairs to Abel Alier, also a Southerner, but more moderate than Joseph
Garang. He also brought two more Southerners into the cabinet. On August
13, a new provisional constitution was promulgated and Numeiri was
"elected" the President of the country. He appointed three Vice Presidents;
one of them, Abel Alier, was the Minister of Southern Affairs. For the three
Southern provinces, three Southerners were appointed as Governors.
Earlier in March, Numeiri had started a diplomatic offensive aimed at
improving the international image of his government--which was being
tarnished by the Grass Curtain --and at weakening international support for
the Anya Nya. Therefore, he had sent a goodwill mission led by Abel Alier
to London, New York, Scandanavia, and the Vatican to explain the
government's policies towards the South.216 Moreover, he started patching
up his relationship with neighbouring countries in order to undercut
supplies coming over the borders to the Anya Nya. His visit to Ethiopia in
November 1971, was reciprocated by Emperor Haile Selassie in January
1972. Their meetings ended in an agreement between the two governments
to stop providing sanctuary to each other's rebels and refugees. As already
mentioned, Eritreans in northern Ethiopia were attempting to secede, and
the Sudan gave them refuge and encouragement. Ethiopia had been
retaliating by doing the same for the Anya Nya. This agreement between
the two heads of states reaffirmed the commitment which both governments
had entered into in 1967 during the premiership of Sadiq el Mahdi.
In the meantime, for reasons to be explained later, relations between
Uganda and Sudan were improving towards the end of 1971. Idi Amin was
having difficulties with the Israelis. He had begun to cultivate a friendship
with Colonel Gadaffi of Libya and to develop sympathy for the Arab cause
in the Middle East war. As the conflict between the Israelis and Amin
intensified, ending with their total expulsion from Uganda, possibilities of
Israeli help for the Anya Nya from Uganda began to diminish. Moreover,
Sudan was harboring anti-Amin forces in the Sudan. Therefore, Amin
decided to reduce the threat by adopting an attitude of cooperation with
Numeiri--restraining the Anya Nya in return for a similar action by Numeiri
against the anti-Amin forces in the Sudan.

External Involvement
The alliance of Numeiri with the Communist Party had provided the
Soviet Union with an opportunity to be involved in the Sudan.

Soviet military pilots ferried military supplies in from Egypt in Antonov

transports. The Russians also gave the Sudan MI-8 civilian helicopters
converted with armour-plating and rocket-launchers, more than 100 T-
55 heavy tanks, as well as howitzers, artillery, and ground rockets. More
than 1000 Soviet Army advisors, helicopter and jet pilots, and ground
crews went to the Sudan... [and] were reported to have served with the
Arab Sudanese combat units in the Southern Sudan.217

The Soviet support alone amounted to $150 million after the Arab-Israeli
war of 1967. In addition, Sudan is reported to have received military aid
from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.218 The Russians were reportedly
encouraging use of their doctrine of massive manpower and firepower on
the small Sudanese army and supposedly this was reducing the efficiency of
the army. Moreover, "the Russians persistently intermixed politics with
training, which grated on the ears of the religious-minded Sudanese."219
In addition to the involvement of the Soviet Union and its allies, the Arab
world was also providing backing to the Sudanese government in its
conflict with the South. Egypt was assisting the growing Sudanese air force,
by soliciting material and financial aid on behalf of the Sudan from the
Arab League nations of Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.220 It was alleged
that "Egyptian, and later Soviet, pilots flew attack missions to the South.221
Algeria also sent military and material supplies to the North.222
The Israelis were involved on the side of the SSLM. Since the Arab-
Israeli war of 1967, there were persistent allegations of Israeli involvement
on the side of the Anya Nya. After the war, they reportedly mounted a
diplomatic offensive in Africa to neutralize African sympathy for the Arab
countries. Thus, they improved their diplomatic relations with many
countries, increased their expert and technical aid, and even started military
training missions in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire. In February 1970,
the African Research Bulletin reported that "Israel is now able to supply
arms and military know-how...to the Christian South Sudanese
guerillas....The supplies are made possible by the 'military missions' Israel
has set up in the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Uganda, and the
Congo."223 The Israelis are reported to have dropped Soviet-made weapons
captured from the Arabs in the Six-Days War from an unmarked DC-3
aircraft at night from either Uganda or Ethiopia. In addition, the Israelis
were reported to have run training camps in Ethiopia and Uganda for the
Anya Nya near the borders. The weapons supplied included heavy machine
guns, hand-grenades, World War II rifles, and land mines.224 This military
help bolstered the morale of the Anya Nya and served to improve their
performance to the extent that they were able to control the countryside and
render the Northern Sudanese soldiers ineffective. Thus, two-thirds of the
Northern Sudanese army, along with Egyptian equipment and
reinforcements were effectively diverted from targeting at Israel. This
maneuver served the principal interest of Israel in the Sudan conflict.225
Some observers also note that Israel was acting as a surrogate for the United
States and other Western powers to deter Soviet expansion in Black Africa.
The Sudan's geographical position in the heart of Africa, and between the
Arab and the African worlds, rendered it an important strategic position for
any power, such as the Soviet Union, who might wish to expand its
influence.
Until 1970, relations between President Milton Obote of Uganda, and
Israel were very good. By 1970, however, Obote was moving closer to
Numeiri, and he turned down the request of an Israeli General to build
training facilities for Southern guerillas in north Uganda.226
In January 1917, General Amin overthrew Obote, and the latter sought
refuge in the Sudan. Amin had visited Israel in 1968, and had come back
impressed and favorably inclined towards the Israeli cause. He threw out
the Russian training mission that was operating in Uganda and replaced
them with Israelis to train his air force. Thus, another opportunity arose for
the Israelis to help the Anya Nya. General Amin reportedly had secret
contact with Colonel Lagu, the most important Anya Nya leader by then,
and Amin even visited his headquarters in the South, accompanied by two
Israeli officers on at least two occasions. He assisted the Anya Nya by
allowing supplies to cross the Ugandan border. On one occasion he
switched medical supplies intended for the Ugandan army to the Anya
Nya.227 O'Ballance claims Amin was able to recruit about 5,000
Southerners to help him overthrow Obote, and after he came to power, he
had about 3,000 Southern Sudanese in his army.228
When the Sudanese government saw the pro-Anya Nya sentiments of
General Amin, it not only gave refuge to Milton Obote, but also helped him
to recruit and train an armed force at a camp in the South which had been
captured from the Anya Nya. Thus, guarded by Northern Sudanese soldiers,
Obote was training forces hostile to General Amin.
On November 11, 1970, while Obote was still in power, an
internationally-known mercenary, Rolf Steiner, was captured in Kampala.
Obote, as a sign of his friendship with Numeiri, handed Steiner over to the
Sudan government. Beshir points out that there was pressure on Obote from
West Germany, Israel, and church organizations not to hand Steiner over to
the Sudan.229 Steiner is reported to have belonged to the Hitler Youth Corps
and the Nazi Storm Troopers. After the end of World War II he joined the
French Foreign Legion and fought in Indochina and Algeria. After that he
was employed as a mercenary and fought first in the Congo and later in the
Nigerian Civil War. During his trial in Khartoum in August 1971, he
testified that he, in cooperation with another British mercenary, Alexander
Gay, was involved in training the Anya Nya and acting as a liaison with
their external supporters. He is said to have testified that he was recruited
by some West German organizations who had raised about $20 million for
aid to the South. He was sent to the South allegedly with the cooperation
and direction of the Verona Fathers in Rome, who were involved in
missionary activities in the South until their expulsion in 1964. He also
testified that he built two airstrips for the transportation of supplies, and
constructed a hospital during his stay in the South.230 Steiner confirmed that
the Israelis had established bases and military training centers in the South
as well as in Ethiopia and Uganda close to the Sudanese borders.231
Similar activities were taking place in other neighbouring countries such
as Ethiopia, Zaire, Chad and even Kenya. Most of these countries had a
sizable number of Southern Sudanese refugees on their borders, and they
either encouraged or tolerated guerilla activities from these refugee camps
against the Sudan army. This might have been because of ethnic or other
affinities with the Anya Nya or because these governments, as in the case of
Ethiopia, may have had their own conflict with the Sudanese government,
and were using the insurgency in the Sudan for their own ends.
In addition, there was peripheral involvement by some Scandinavian and
other Western European countries like Germany, and multinational
organizations like Caritas International and Joint Church Aid, about whom
more will be said in chapter six. In Norway, the Association for Southern
Sudan was established, whose primary purpose was to publicize the plight
of Southern Sudan and to put pressure on governments and political parties
to take political action. The organization took the case of the Southern
Sudan to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and urged the
investigation of the situation in the South by the commission.232 A
committee calling itself the South Sudan Action Committee was established
with its aim, among other things, to awaken "public interest as well as
official concern for the conflict in the Sudan.... [to] work through various
national and international channels...to gather, evaluate and publish material
on the political situation and the humanitarian need in the Sudan."233 By
April 1971, this group had raised between $7 and $8 million to send to the
South.234
The expulsion of the missionaries from the Sudan allegedly angered the
churches, and some of them aided the refugees or the Southern Sudanese
within Anya Nya-controlled territories, sending food, medicine, farming
implements, and other relief materials, some of which obviously got into
Anya Nya hands. This, according to some observers, helped save for the
Anya Nya scarce resources which could be used for the purchase of needed
items for their army and civil administration.235 Wai also points out that in
their efforts to raise funds the church organizations played a role in
publicizing the war.236

Today the same Western European church organizations which ran the
Uli airstrip in Biafra, supply large quantities of medical supplies, food
and clothing to the South Sudan refugees....At considerable risk, part of
this aid is crossing the border illegally into the South Sudan....There are
also plans for a "Uli-type" airstrip inside the South Sudan so relief can
be flown in....The French have relief supply lines all ready and
effective....In the neighbouring countries the United Nations relief
organizations and other bodies such as the Swedish Red Cross and the
World Council of Churches are pooling their resources to help
refugees.237
Beshir particularly mentions Caritas International, Caritas (West
Germany), Action Committee for Africa--Biafra and Southern Sudan (West
Germany), and the Verona Fathers (Italy) as being particularly active in
their support for varied motives. "Some looked at [the conflict] as a
religious war against Islam...and some as a fight against communism,"238
"Some [missionaries] may even have helped the Anya Nya get arms."239
By 1971, a stalemate had been created between the Anya Nya and the
Sudanese army with two-thirds of the Sudanese army tied down in the
South.240 At the same time, war casualties were mounting. By February
1972, some have estimated that as many as 500,000 Southerners had lost
their lives due to the conflict, either because of direct military violence or
dislocation, deprivation and disease; and hundreds of thousands more were
rendered homeless or driven into exile.241 There is no public record of
Northern casualties.
While these events were taking place in the political and military arenas
of the conflict, a process was uderway during 1970 and 1971 that eventually
brought about a negotiated settlement to the war.
116
Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972 (London: David & Charles, 1974), 39.
117
See Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africans Publishing
Co., 1981), 58-S9.
118
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan During
August 1955, quoted in Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 58.
119
Eprile, 39. To substantiate Eprile's interpretation, Wai, a Southern Sudanese, writes; "it is
difficult to establish its [the telegram's] authenticity, but it was not unlikely that the Prime
Minister could have sent such a message to his administration in the South....Moreover, the
substance in the alleged telegram reflected the attitude of some of the Northern
administrators." Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 58.
120
Report of the Commission of Inquiry
121
Eprile, 40.
122
Ibid., 41.
123
Ibid.
124
Edgar O"Ballance, The Secret War in the SudaE: 1955-1972 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,
1977), 39.
125
Ibid., 40.
126
Eprile, 42.
127
Report of the Commission of Inquiry cited in Eprile, 42.
128
David W. McClintock, "The Southern Sudan Problem: Evolution of an Arab-African
Confrontation," Middle East Journal 24 (1970): 466.
129
Report of the Commission of Inquiry
130
Eprile, 45.
131
Ibid.
132
Beshir, 73.
133
O'Ballance, 46.
134
According to Wai, Khalid did not feel he could manage the endless strife among the parties and
form a strong government, therefore "he confided his desire for the army to take over the
government." Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 75.
135
Scherf, 9.
136
Beshir, Background to Conflict, 81-82.
137
Cecil Eprile, "Sudan: the Long War," in Conflict Studies, ed., Brian Cozier, No. 21 (March
1972): 6. An Anya Nya document alleges that there was "a government plan to move one and
a half million Arabs to the Southern Sudan, to be preceded by the mass arrest of all Southern
former Parliamentarians" and that this plan was "revealed to Southern leaders by an Arab
informant." The Anya Nya Strugg: Background and Objectives (South Sudan: South Sudan
Resistance Movement, 1970), 6. What is interesting is not whether these allegations were true
or not but that the Southerners believed them and acted on them.
138
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 90; and Beshir, Background to Conflict, 83.
139
Moharned O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (London: C. Hurst & Co.,
1975), 53.
140
O'Ballance, 61.
141
Beshir, Background to Conflict, 84.
142
O'Ballance, 63.
143
Ibid., 61.
144
Beshir, Background to Conflict, 86.
145
Ibid.
146
A letter from SANU to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, November 1964. Quoted in Beshir,
Background to Conflict, Appendix 10.
147
Ibid.
148
See Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 8-10.
149
Eprile, "The Long War", 7.
150
For a schematic presentation of the positions taken by the various groups in the conference, see
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 102-104.
151
William Deng of SANU reportedly encouraged his supporters within the Anya Nya to increase
their activities in order to "scare" the conferees into accepting federation. See The Economist
(August 14, 1965). See also Keith Kyle, "The Southern Problem in the Sudan," World Today
(December 1966), 515.
152
Beshir, Background to Conflict. 97. See also Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 101.
153
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 6.
154
New York Times December 31, 1965.
155
O'Ballance, 80.
156
Clyde Mark, "Sudan, the Struggle Between North and South," The Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service, Washington, D.C. June 26, 1969.
157
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 26.
158
O'Ballance, 80.
159
McClintock, 471.
160
Eprile, War and Peace, 61.
161
O'Ballance, 83.
162
Ibid., 84.
163
Ibid., 85.
164
Mark, 15.
165
See The Washington Post, Feb. 20, 1966; the Washington Sunday Star, Dec. 25, 1966; and the
New York Times Sept., 12, 1968 for various estimates. McClintock points out that the Anya
Nya had 2,000 fighters and by mid-1960 "was able to tie down about 15,000 regulars and
absorb a major portion of Khartoum's...annual defence budget." McClintock, 470.
166
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 40-41.
167
Ibid., 35-37.
168
Ibid., 37.
169
Ibid. 37.
170
Ibid. 36
171
O'Ballance, 90.
172
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 40.
173
Ibid., 92.
174
McClinlock, 472.
175
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace,41.
176
O'Ballance, 92.
177
Ibid., 93.
178
Ibid., 95.
179
Wai, 110.
180
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 55.
181
Eprile, War and Peace, 55.
182
For a detailed description of the internal divisions and redivisions that were taking place within
the Southern movement, see Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 110-115.
183
O'Ballance, 104
184
Ibid., 105.
185
Peter Mogga, The Addis Ababa Agreement, A Progressive Reconciliation (Khartoum:
Government Printing Press, 1974): 3.
186
Ministry of National Guidance, Policy Statement on the Southern Sudan (Khartoum:
Government Printing Press, 1969).
187
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 145-146.
188
Lobban, 25.
189
See the New York Times, Jan. 2, 1970; and the Christian Science Monitor Jan. 14, 1970, for
details.
190
O'Baliance, 106.
191
Ibid., 106.
192
Eprile, War and Peace, 130.
193
O'Ballance, 107.
194
Ibid., 123.
195
Sec for example, the claims of the Anya Nya's military success in the Grass Curtain 2 (July
1971), and similar claims by the government of the Sudan against the Anya Nya in the
government newspaper, Sudan News (March 1971).
196
O'Ballance, 125-126.
197
Interview given by Joseph Lagu to William H. Dorsey, Sept 5, 1972, "A Southerner's View of
the Sudanese Settlement," in New Middle East (October 1972): 17.
198
Eprile, War and Peace, 99.
199
Dunstan Wai, ed., The Southern Sudan: The Probem of National Integration (London: Frank
Cass, 1973), 163-164.
200
John Waterbury, "The Sudan in Quest of Surplus," American University Fieldstaff Reports, Part
II Domestic and Regional Politics, Vol 21, no. 9., 1976.
201
O'Ballance, 136.
202
Storrs McCall, interview with the author, Balsom Lake, Ontario, Canada, August 6, 1981.
203
Joseph Lagu, "The Dynamics of Cooperation between the Anya Nya and the People," Grass
Curtain 1 (April 1971). See also Eprile, War and Peace, 100-102.
204
Wai, The African-Arab Confict, 212.
205
Eprile, War and Peace, 99.
206
April 28, 1971 memorandum, "News from Norway," World Council of Churches Archives, 2.
207
Eprile, War and Peace, 108.
208
Ibid., 125.
209
O'Ballance, 108.
210
Eprile, War and Peace, 127.
211
O'Ballance, 111.
212
ibid., 113.
213
ibid.
214
Ibid.
215
Lobban, 25.
216
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 83.
217
Wai, African-Arab Conflict, 134-135.
218
Trevor N. Dupuy, Grace R. Hayes, and John A.C. Andrews, The Almnac of World and Military
Power, 3rd ed. (New York: R.R. Bowker Co., 1974), 259-261.
219
O'Ballance, 121.
220
Wai, African-Arab Conflict, 134.
221
O'Ballance, 118.
222
Wai, African-Arab Conflict, 134.
223
Africa Research Bulletin, February 1-28, 1970.
224
Scherf, 24.
225
Wai, African-Arab Conflict, 139.
226
O'Ballance, 127.
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid.
229
Besbir, From Conflict to Peace, 95.
230
Keesing's Contemporary Archives November 13-20, 1971, 24931.
231
O'Ballance, 128.
232
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 90.
233
April 28, 1971 memorandum, "News from Norway", World Council of Churches Archives, 2.
234
Ibid.
235
See the interview with Burgess Carr in chapter six.
236
Wai, African-Arab Conflict, 133.
237
Africa Research Bulletin, February 1-28, 1970.
238
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 91.
239
Tracy Early, "What's Going on in the Sudan?" New World Outlook (September 1971): 17.
240
Wai, African-Arab Conflict, 136.
241
O'Ballance, 13. For different estimates of the casualties of the war, see Leo Kemper, Genocide
(Penguine Books, 1981), 69-70.
 Chapter 5
Early Mediation Efforts
Seventeen years of civil war in the Sudan came to an end in February
1972, when both conflicting parties, the Sudanese government and the
Anya Nya, signed the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern
Sudan at the end of a series of negotiations that lasted approximately two
years. Several organizations played a part in the series of negotiations, but
the World Council of Churches (WCC) and its affiliate, the All Africa
Conference of Churches (AACC) assumed the most important mediatory
role. This and the following chapter will examine the various mediation
efforts in order to fully understand the role of third parties in the Sudan
peace process.

Pre-1970 Mediation Attempts

From the available literature, two minor and two major mediation
attempts may be identified. The first two are minor because there is no
evidence of their development beyond the stage of an offer by a third party
to mediate. The later two are major attempts because the conflicting parties,
as well as the mediators, advanced the process. However, one of the latter
cases failed to result in a negotiated settlement, while the other succeeded.
Falling into the category of minor attempts is an effort by President
Milton Obote of Uganda.242 Obote had visited the Sudan in 1963, and in
successive years had taken part in several reconciliation attempts between
the South and North.243 However, no details are available about the nature
of the efforts nor of their consequences. Again, without offering any details,
O'Ballance states that there was an offer by President Nkrumah of Ghana to
mediate the Sudan conflict, but that the offer was turned down by Prime
Minister Mahgoub on the grounds that the Southern problem was an
internal affair.244 Nothing substantial seems to have come out of either of
these efforts. Since the other two mediation attempts were able to produce
more results, they will be presented in detail in the following sections.

Effort by the Movement for Colonial Freedom

The Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), which in the early 1970s
changed its name to "Liberation",245 is a London based organization
affiliated with the Parliamentary Labour Party, having the backing of about
140 Members of Parliament and about twenty-five large national trade
unions in Britain. According to Barbara Haq, the Secretary General of this
organization, the MCF was established in the 1930s in order to raise British
consciousness about the colonial territories and to provide a platform for
indigenous leaders from these colonies to present their case. President
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and President Jomo Kenyatta used this
organization to educate British public opinion about their demand for
independence and to develop allies in waging their anti-colonial campaigns.
The MCF had also provided such assistance to the Sudan during its
movement towards independence.246
The MCF had little contact with the Sudan after independence in 1956.
However, by 1970, the problem of the Southern Sudan had begun to occupy
the organization's attention.247

In January 1970 a Resolution was received from one of our affiliated

organizations for discussion at our Annual National Delegates
Conference, due to be held in March 1970. The Resolution condemned
the treatment of...the people of Southern Sudan by the Government of
the Sudan.248

Before the resolution was passed, however, the conference decided to hear
the points of view of the parties in the Sudan conflict. The Second Secretary
of the Sudan Embassy in London and Mading de Garang of the Southern
Sudan Association were invited to address the conference and present their
respective points of view. According to Haq, both guest speakers were
seated next to one another in the conference hall and during lunch, and
some informal contact took place between them. After the presentation, the
conference resolved that "the MCF should endeavour to use its good offices
to bring about some kind of rapprochement between exiled Southerners and
the Sudan [government]".249 Barbara Haq was mandated to explore the
possibilities.
The first steps taken were merely exploratory and the MCF served as a
mailpouch between the representatives of the conflicting parties. Haq
writes:

From this time I regularly met Mading de Garang for discussions,

conveyed his feelings to the Ambassador, [the newly appointed
Ambassador of the Sudan Government], and then returned to Mading
with further questions for discussion. He, in turn, discussed these
matters with Lawrence Wol Wol (then in Paris), and with other
Southerners in Britain and America, and directly with Joseph Lagu,
leader of the Anya Nya.250
In April 1970, the newly appointed Minister of State for Southern
Affairs, Joseph Garang (not to be confused with Mading de Garang), visited
Britain and addressed a meeting of the House of Commons. His speech was
later reproduced in the MCF journal and was issued as a pamphlet about the
Sudan. He also held discussions with Haq on the efforts of the MCF. Haq
said that Joseph Garang was skeptical about the desire of Mading de
Garang and other exiled Southerners for a genuine solution to the
conflict.251 Mading de Garang was equally suspicious of the desires and
intentions of the Sudanese government. However, both sides continued their
contact through the MCF in case it turned out that the other side was serious
about negotiating.252
In 1970, the MCF arranged two visits to the Sudan by delegations of
trade unionists and Parliamentarians. The intended purpose was to gather
facts and inform British public opinion about the issues involved in the
Sudan conflict. The first delegation, comprised primarily of British trade
uionists, left for the Sudan in June 1970, at the invitation of the Sudanese
government. Barbara Haq was a member of the delegation. Following her
return, Haq continued to arrange meetings between the Sudanese
Ambassador and Mading de Garang. Since neither of the parties would go
to each other's offices, the meetings took place in Barbara Haq's flat
 On August 10, 1970, Haq wrote a letter to the Minister of Southern
Affairs, Joseph Garang, saying that Mading de Garang and, through him
Lawrence Wol Wol, had expressed their belief that an agreement could be
possible, provided that the government would give a detailed statement of
what it meant by "autonomy for the South", and that negotiations could take
place outside the Sudan in either Tanzania, Uganda, or Zambia.253 In this
letter she implores the Minister of Southern Affairs to agree to the proposal
and suggests that the Minister, the Sudanese Ambassador in London, and
she get together to work on the proposal when the second delegation of the
MCF visited in October. However, Haq makes further statements in this
same letter which suggest some of the motives for the MCF's involvement
as an intermediary in the Sudan conflict. After stating the demands put forth
by Mading de Garang and Lawrence Wol Wol, Haq writes:

Proposals of the nature suggested may not be accepted by all the

leadership of the Anya Nya. But, if a clear offer on the nature of the
autonomy is given to them, there is every chance that a major part
would accept and that remnants then carrying on fighting would become
isolated and more easily crushed...Please give this matter urgent thought
and let us at least try to win over those like Mading and Lawrence who
can, I am sure, be of assistance in developing the South in a united
Sudan. (Emphasis added.)254
In September 1970, Joseph Garang visited London again. Haq arranged a
meeting at her flat between him, Mading de Garang, and the Sudanese
Ambassador. Mading de Garang and his assistant, Lawrence Wol Wol
requested that an independent observer be present at this meeting and it was
decided to invite Brian McDermot, Chairman of the Southern Sudan
Association in England, to be present. The contributions of the independent
observer to the meeting "were not helpful,"255 and on his return to the
Sudan, Joseph Garang is said to have accused McDermot of being involved
with the CIA or British Intelligence.256 Haq believes that McDermot was a
Scottish financier interested in financing the SSLM, in the hopes that a new
government in South Sudan would open trade prospects for himself and
others like him.257
Joseph Garang is reported to have been reluctant to meet with the
Southern representatives. This could be attributed to his ideological
commitment to settling the Southern Sudan conflict only in the context of
the socialist revolution that was allegedly already underway in the Sudan.
An examination of the June 9, 1969 Declaration of President Numeiri,
whose principal authors were the communists including Joseph Garang,
indicates that there was one important prerequisite for granting autonomy to
the South. There must first be:

..a broad socialist oriented democratic movement in the South, forming

part of the revolutionary structure in the North and capable of assuming
the reins of power in that region and rebuffing imperialist penetration
and infiltration from the rear.258

From the perspective of Joseph Garang and other communists, the Southern
politicians "were seen as an obtrusive petit-bourgeois elite, essentially
counter-revolutionary in class terms, and furthermore manipulated by the
imperialist forces who controlled the Anya Nya movement"259 Thus, it was
not clear that Joseph Garang was really interested in opening up any
discussion or negotiation with other Southerners about how to solve the
Southern problem. At a press conference after his first meeting with Haq,
Garang stated that his intention was to "simply encourage the Southerners
to join us in the implementation of regional autonomy."260 On the other
hand, the Southern elites and politicians considered Garang more of a
communist than a Southerner, and that might be why they insisted on
having an independent observer at their meeting with Garang.
Notwithstanding these suspicions and countersuspicions, Joseph Garang
and Mading de Garang met They agreed to allow six Southern
representatives, from various factions and groups inside the country, to
leave the Sudan so that they, along with Mading de Garang and Anya Nya
representatives could map out the future course of possible negotiations. Six
people were chosen by de Garang and a meeting was planned to be held in
either London or Kampala.261
On October 6, 1970, Haq wrote to Joseph Garang announcing the names
of the six people that Mading de Garang had suggested and "in whom they
[the Southerners in exile] have confidence." She also confides the fact that
Mading de Garang:
 realises what an error it was to have brought Mr. McDermot, the
Chairman of the Southern Sudan Association Ltd., along with him when
he met you recently and has agreed not to involve him in any further
discussion. There is a possibility that he will break away from this
Association in any case, as he now realizes that they do not want any
settlement to be reached between exiled Southerners and Sudan.262
In October 1970, the second delegation, this time comprised of Members
of Parliament, who were also MCF members, visited the Sudan. This
delegation was acc-ompanied not only by Haq, but also by the Sudanese
Ambassador in London. Haq says that Mading de Garang was invited to go
with the delegation under a guarantee of safe conduct, but refused to go.263
However, he is reported to have asked the delegation to visit certain places
in the South and talk with certain Southern personalities there. The
delegation visited only two of the nine places it was requested to see, but
did manage to talk with most of the people suggested.264 According to
some observers, it was unlikely that the Sudanese government would have
taken the delegates to places where the military weakness of the
government was manifest, but, supposedly, that was the point that Mading
de Garang was trying to make.265
The delegation, on its return to London on October 28, 1970, issued a
press release:

From all our enquiries we were satisfied that this rebellion has virtually
come to an end in the provinces of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile,
except for small sporadic outbursts. It persists mainly in certain
southern parts of Equatoria....This evidence convinced us that the
rebellion was being fomented and encouraged by external reactionary
forces which are anxious to prevent unity and progress towards a
socialist Sudan.266

The statement was signed by Barbara Haq and concludes by saying: "We
express our sincere hope that Sudan will advance along this path despite all
obstacles, and upon our return to Britain will strive to win solidarity in
support of this aim..."267
On November 5, 1970, Barbara Haq wrote an article in the Nile Mirror:
 It is significant that the Southern problem had not attracted world
attention until May 1969; and that it is only since the Revolutionary
Council declared its aim that reactionary forces, including the CIA, are
throwing all their strength behind organizations like the Southern Sudan
Association Ltd., [of which Mading de Garang and other Southerners
were members] and the Minority Rights Group in London, whose aims
are in direct opposition to those of the people of the Sudan. We
therefore feel it of great importance that our organization [MCF] should
be in a position to oppose the falsehoods emanating from those sources,
by obtaining first hand information such as the British delegation has
been able to acquire during their tour of the South.268
Mading de Garang is reported to have been furious when he saw this
article, and refused to do anything more with the MCF. This seems to have
ended the MCF's involvement in the peace process between the conflicting
parties in the Sudan Civil War.
Describing this situation in a letter dated December 18, 1970 to the
World Council of Churches, who took up the role of the third party after the
MCF involvement was terminated, Mading de Garang wrote: "We have had
the MCF as a go-between in London, but we are finding them to be
committed to the Numeiri Government It is therefore very difficult for any
progress to be made."269
242
Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1977),
92.
243
Mading de Garang also makes note of this attempt by President Obote in his letter to the
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches on
July 30, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva.
244
O'Ballance, 85.
245
After many former colonies became independent, the Movement for Colonial Freeedom
changed its name to Liberation to signify its role and its general concern in the early 1970s.
246
Barbara Haq, interview with author, London, April 17, 1982.
247
This might have been as a result of the publication of the Grass Curtain which had just started
widely publicizing the plight of the Southern Sudan in England.
248
Barbara Haq, "Statement on Activities of Liberation (MCF) on the Question of Resolving the
Problem of Southern Sudan," April 1972.
249
Ibid.
250
Ibid.
251
Ibid.
252
M. Louise Pirouel, "The Achievement of Peace in the Sudan," Journal of East African Research
and Development 6 (1976): 117.
253
Barbara Haq, letter to Joseph Garang, August 10, 1970.
254
Ibid.
255
Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (New York: Barnes &
Noble, 1975), 103.
256
Pirouet, 119.
257
Barabara Haq, interview. Haq does not seem to be alone in this perception. Tracy Early writes in
the New Worid Outlook: "If people in London are backing the Southern Sudan Association,
they are perhaps influenced by the fact that the Soviet Union is taking Britain's place as the
main trading partner of the Sudan and that the Sudan Government has seized British banks
and other commercial interests." Tracy Early, "What's Going on in the Sudan," New World
Outlook (September 1970): 16.
258
President Gaafar Mohammed Numeiri, "June 9th Declaration," in A Revolution in Action:
Regional Autonomy for the South (Khartoum: Government Printing Press, 1969), 6.
259
John Howell, "Horn of Africa, Lessons from the Sudan Conflict," International Affairs 54 (July
1978): 423. Howell points out that this view was never publicity stated explicitly, but it was
clearly stated by Joseph Garang in a talk at the University of Khartoum in March 1970. This
was just before he had his first conference with Barbara Haq in London.
260
Ibid. 424.
261
Barbara Haq, "Statement on Activities," 3.
262
Barbara H»q, letter to Joseph Garang, October 6, 1970.
263
It seems obvious that de Garang would have lost his credibility with the SSLM had he gone.
264
MCF, Press Statement, October 28, 1970.
265
Pirouet, 119.
266
MCF, Press Statement.
267
Ibid.
268
Barbara Haq, Nile Mirror (November 5, 1970), 4.
269
Mading de Garang, letter to Kodwo Ankrah of the WCC, December 28, 1970, WCC Archives,
Geneva.
 Chapter 6
The WCC and AACC Mediation
As relations between the Movement for Colonial Freedom and Mading
de Garang deteriorated, communications between the SSLM and the Sudan
government came to a stand still until the task of "middle man" was
assumed by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa
Conference of Churches (AACC). This chapter describes the activities of
these two organizations, and the evolution of the peace process under their
auspices.
It was around July 1970, that the WCC started to show signs of serious
concern about the situation in the Sudan. This was not, however, the first
time that this organization and its affiliate, the AACC, had acted as third
parties in the Sudan conflict For a better understanding of these
organizations' joint peacemaking effort, a brief look at the history of their
activities would be helpful.

Early Involvement of the WCC and AACC

The WCC had acted as an aid-giver in the Sudan conflict for several
years, along with other organizations which were working to alleviate the
suffering of the victims of the civil war. According to the Ecumenical
Feature Service the WCC had been involved in the Sudan in various
capacities for a long time. It had been concerned with the plight of the
Southern Sudanese caught in the conflict and had attempted to assist the
victims in various ways both inside and outside the Sudan. Programs had
been installed for the displaced Southerners inside the Sudan, and several
million dollars were channeled for relief assistance, provision of personnel,
scholarship aid, and pastoral activities by the AACC to refugees in Uganda,
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zaire.270
 This involvement began about 1965. As mentioned in chapter four,
Abboud's government in 1962 had summarily expelled all the missionaries
working in the South. In addition to this, thousands of Southern Sudanese
had fled to the neighbouring countries due to increased military persecution.
Growing out of this situation, in 1965, "the WCC sent a representative [to
the Sudan] to find out what the WCC could do in light of the continuing
conflict. The result of this visit was a recommendation for increased aid to
refugees, for scholarships, and for the intercessions of Christians around the
globe."271 One year later, in February 1966, the WCC instructed its
Commission of the Churches for International Affairs (CCIA) "to continue
to take all appropriate steps, including approaches to governments, so that
an end may be put to the suffering of the population in the Southern Sudan
and the exercise of religious freedom be ensured."272 Even though the
mention of religious freedom was not favorably received by the government
of Sadiq, which was committed to the Islamization and Arabization of the
South, the WCC started implementing its relief and scholarship program in
November 1966.273 Around this time, many of the expelled missionaries,
most of whom were Roman Catholics, were openly criticizing the Sudan
government for its treatment of the South. However, the WCC was
restrained in its public criticisms of the expulsion of the missionaries as
well as on the situation in the South.274
According to its constitution, the WCC can initiate actions and policies
but does so in consultation with regional ecumenical bodies like the AACC
if the decisions concern the jurisdiction of such councils. In December
1966, the WCC received a report from an AACC goodwill mission which
visited the Sudan at the invitation of the government, extended through its
Ambassador in Kenya. The purpose of this visit was described as observing
the situation and offering the AACC's services in an effort to help attain
peace in Southern Sudan.275 The delegation was received by both the
government and native church officials and had a chance to visit both the
North and the South. The report summarized the delegates' views stating
that they were convinced of "the desire of Southerners for a greater share in
governing the Sudan; the need for a constitution guaranteeing religious
freedom; the need for reconciliation rather than military operations; and the
need for a revision of the 1962 Missionary Act to permit outside help to
strengthen the Sudanese churches." The report also criticized the Anya Nya
for provoking the Sudanese government forces, and reproached the exiled
Sudanese for their mistaken notion that they could solve the problem
through armed confrontation.276
After the AACC's visit, the Sudanese government agreed to replace the
expelled Europeans and North Americans with expatriate African
missionaries.277 The AACC report, however, was hotly contested especially
among ex-missionaries, such as the Verona Fathers, and by Southern
Sudanese politicians in exile.278 "Those who disputed the AACC report
argued that its mission had completely ignored evidence submitted by
Southern Sudanese refugees and representatives of the Anya Nya...and their
point of view. The report was substantially adverse to the Southern
Sudanese secessionist movement."279 There was supposed to be a follow up
visit by the AACC. But this was postponed indefinitely because of political
instability in the Sudan and personnel changes in the WCC and AACC.280
In the meantime, other events taking place outside of the Sudan context
might help one to understand the background of the WCC involvement in
the Sudan peace process. The WCC, in its 1969 meeting in Canterbury,
England, adopted one of its most controversial resolutions: "The Program to
Combat Racism." It resolved that various programs should be established to
help combat racism by giving its victims educational and humanitarian aid
and by giving "voice to the voiceless." A special fund was established to
help "bona fide" liberation movements in Southern Africa on condition that
the movements use the aid for humanitarian purposes only and not to buy
arms. According to the Africa Secretary for the Commission on Interchurch
Aid Refugee and World Service (CICARWS) of the WCC at that time, the
first grant under the program was made in 1970.281
Also, in 1969, the WCC and its affiliated regional council, the AACC,
held their regional conference in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The theme of the
conference was the "Christian Response to the African Revolution," and
dealt with issues like "the abuse by governments and individuals of newly
acquired power in Africa," "the role of the churches in the task of
reconciliation," and many other questions on the role of the churches in
Africa. But the Nigeria-Biafra war and the North-South war in the Sudan
dominated much of the agenda.282
In June 1970, the AACC follow up mission for its 1966 visit was finally
able to take place. By this time, General Numeiri had come to power and a
Minister for Southern Affairs had been appointed. According to the reports
of this second mission, the delegation was warmly received by the Minister
for Southern Affairs and other government officials. Some of whom were
the same officials the AACC delegation had met during their 1966 visit, and
the atmosphere was reportedly cooperative and congenial. The report of this
mission dealt primarily with the affairs of the church in the Sudan such as
the establishment of the Sudan Council of Churches, etc. However, some of
the questions raised would later have bearing on the intermediary role to be
played by this organization. Among other things, questions were raised on
how the churches could explore the meaning of the newly declared policy
of regional autonomy for the South (the June Declaration), and also how the
churches could find out whether the government was sincere concerning
this policy.
On July 2, 1970, Kodwo Ankrah wrote a memorandum to the Director of
his Commission and the Commission of the Churches on International
Affairs warning that "a new Biafra was building up in the Sudan... [and
that] this development might get the WCC involved... [and that they] might
find themselves in the same predicament as in the case of Biafra." He
therefore urged the WCC "to make the first move this time to save the
situation and help towards a lasting solution without going through the
experience of the Biafra tragedy again."283
As the Sudan war escalated and the number of refugees increased, the
plight of the South began to receive international attention mainly due to
the publication of the Grass Curtain. Under these circumstances, the WCC
was under new pressure to send more relief to the South. Thus, on August
20, 1970, Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, the General Secretary of the WCC
announced that his organization was planning to send two or three experts
to the Sudan to assess the needs of the people caught in the conflict, to
determine what kind of aid was urgently needed, and to recommend how
this aid could be delivered.
There was a question of procedure about how these WCC experts were to
go to the Sudan. On August 24, 1970, the General Secretary of the AACC
wrote to the WCC and suggested that the right approach would be for the
local churches in the Sudan to be urged to invite the AACC which in turn
would invite the WCC to visit the Sudan with them. "There is a better
chance that such a plan would be acceptable to the government than a
unilateral initiative of the WCC. AACC has good working relations which
could be exploited in the interest of the churches and the people of the
Sudan."284
On December 17, 1970, Ankrah wrote another memorandum concerning
the planned trip of the relief assessment team. He argued that "it is only a
political settlement negotiated at a round table conference that might lead to
the termination of the civil war without which the aid would achieve very
little, [and recommended] that the AACC/WCC officials at the highest level
visit the government of the Sudan to push for the calling of a round table
conference and possible arrangements to allow relief operations in the
South by the [World Council of] Churches."285

Early Exploratory Efforts

In the meantime, the WCC, through Ankrah, contacted Mading de
Garang, in London to explore possibilities of dialogue between the SSLM
and the government. Towards the end of December 1970, de Garang wrote
to Ankrah in appreciation of the WCC's interest in the matter and
summarized what had transpired under the auspices of the MCF, saying that
the SSLM was "finding the MCF to be committed to the Numeiri
government, [and that] there was no active discussion" going on between
the parties at that time. Concerning the whole process of contacts with the
Sudanese government through the MCF, de Garang expressed a typical
Southern skepticism about the behavior of Sudanese governments, saying:
"it might turn out to be the usual Khartoum approaches to get individuals
entangled in these things and no more!" However, in this same letter, de
Garang expressed a great desire to talk with the government, and suggested
that "it [was] important to get something moving."286
Meanwhile, according to the outlined plan, the General Secretary of the
AACC approached the Presbyterian Church in the Sudan to explore the
possibility of getting an invitation for a joint AACC/WCC team to visit the
Sudan to assess aid needs. The Presbyterian Church contacted the
government for its consent to the visit.
On January 10, 1971, the WCC held its Central Committee meeting in
Addis Ababa. During the conference, the Liberian Embassy there held a
reception in honor of Burgess Carr, the newly elected General Secretary of
the AACC. At the reception, the General Secretary of the WCC, Dr. Eugene
Carson Blake, made contacts with the Sudanese Ambassador and received a
firm assurance that his government would invite the WCC to visit the
Sudan.287
On another front, the WCC, in its Central Committee meeting, passed a
resolution on "Unity and Human Rights in Africa" which had repercussions
on the intermediary role it would later assume. This resolution called upon
international bodies and member churches of the WCC to urge their
governments to "assist the efforts of free African states to attain and
preserve their full self-determination and unity," to refrain from supporting
foreign mercenaries in Africa, and from participating in industrial and
commercial schemes that "entrenched racist and colonial minority regimes
in Africa," and to educate their members about "the threat that such
schemes pose for world peace."288
At the same time, in light of the WCC's 1969 "Program to Combat
Racism" a debate was raging as to how the WCC should treat the Anya Nya
and the SSLM. Some church groups contended that the WCC should
provide humanitarian aid to the Southerners and to the guerilla fighters in
the Sudan regardless of the consequences of the WCC's relations with the
Sudan government. They argued that the WCC had already decided to give
aid to liberation movements in Southern Africa and that it should do the
same to the SSLM in the Southern Sudan since the situations were
similar.289 In contrast to this position, the AACC contended that the WCC
should not act in violation of the principles of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) when it came to aiding the guerillas in the South Sudan. The
OAU considered questions of secessions as internal matters for African
states and that therefore aiding the guerillas would be interference in the
internal affairs of the Sudan. The AACC was thus disturbed about officially
giving aid to the SSLM.
At about this time, an eyewitness report on the situation in the South was
submitted to Church World Service, a U.S. organization involved in relief
work in South Sudan. Allen Reed290 described the growing power of the
Anya Nya and their activities in civil administration and education. He also
described the atrocities committed by, and the retaliation against, the
Sudanese army. He mentioned that the Southern Sudanese did not trust
Numeiri's promise of Southern autonomy because everything he and his
army were doing was totally contrary to his declared promise.291
As a preparation for the visit to the Sudan, the Commission of the
Churches on International Affairs, (CCIA), of the WCC undertook a study
of the Sudan and the conflict. It commissioned a researcher, Theresa Scherf,
along with its Executive Secretary, Dwain Epps, to study the background
and current status of the Sudan Civil War. The resultant document, "The
Sudan Conflict: Its History and Development", provided an analysis of the
background and the issues in the conflict and also tried to clear up various
confusions about the nature of the conflict itself.
On April 2, 1971, a preparatory meeting for the planned visit was held at
the head office of the AACC in Nairobi. At this meeting, the aim of the
mission was defined as twofold: (1) to discuss with the Sudanese
government and church leaders the aid to be given to the Southern Sudan,
and (2) to seek paths to reconciliation. Specifically, it was decided that the
WCC/AACC delegation should "approach the Government of the Sudan
and the leaders of the Anya Nya offering to mediate towards a political
settlement and reconciliation, [and also] to approach some African heads of
state to help in mediating and reconciliation." The mission to the Sudan was
set for the middle of May.292
Around this time, events in Uganda might have reinforced the
WCC/AACC delegation's objectives at that stage. According to Pirouet,
there were two groups in Uganda which were allies of the SSLM. One was
what she called the "Makerere Group" which was comprised of "Dr. Storrs
McCall and others at Makerere University in Kampala, who were SSLM
sympathisers, and through whom was channelled aid for running the civil
administration in Anya Nya held territory."293 The other group was what
she called the Kampala Committee, a church sponsored-group in Kampala
dealing with medical, educational, agricultural, and pastoral aid for the
South.294 These two groups were particularly concerned that the
WCC/AACC mission was going to visit the Sudan at the government's
invitation and, as did the AACC in 1966, they might publish a report
damaging to the SSLM cause. Thus, the Makerere Group sent a series of
protests and letters to the WCC pointing out need to get in touch with the
exiled Southerners and Anya Nya representatives before the deleption's visit
to the Sudan in May. On March 24, 1971, the WCC wrote to the Makerere
Group explaining that the May visit was only a first step in a process and
not the end, that they were going to the Sudan as guests of the government
"to see the Southern part of the Sudan--clearly with views of the North
Sudan Government This then will be the first part of the fact-finding
mission....The delegation will then proceed to find out more about the
situation by other means before any kind of analysis is made or decision
taken."295
However, in view of the 1966 AACC report, this response of the WCC
does not seem to have satisfied the Makerere Group and the Kampala
Committee; and on March 27, Kodwo Ankrah, one of the members of the
WCC/AACC delegation met with the Kampala Committee in Uganda.
According to the minutes of the meeting, Ankrah reassured the Kampala
Committee that the delegation was not going to issue a report like that of
the 1966 AACC mission, and that its objective was to explore
reconciliation, aid to the South, and the meaning of the newly proposed
autonomy for the South.296
While preparations were underway for the May mission, another kind of
pressure on the WCC was building up in Europe and in the United States.
According to Burgess Carr, a conference of the Joint Church Aid (JCA)
took place in New York. The JCA was a consortium of Scandanavian,
American, German, and other European churches, which had raised a lot of
material for relief to Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War. They had
purchased used airplanes, trucks, and smaller vehicles and had a large, well-
coordinated human infrastructure and management to transport aid
materials.297 During the Nigerian Civil War, since neighbouring countries
were not sympathetic to Biafra, JCA was unable to launch its aid shipment
to Biafra from countries adjacent to Nigeria. Hence, they entered into an
agreement with Portugal, a colonial power in Africa at that time, to use one
of its island colonies, Sao Tome, for the relief flights.298 Since there were
claims at that time that South Africa and Portugal were supporting Biafra
against the Nigerian government in the civil war, suspicions existed that
arms were being smuggled into Biafra under the cover of Joint Church Aid
relief.299
The Biafran armed hostilities ceased unexpectedly in 1970 and officials
of the agencies comprising the Joint Church Aid were caught by surprise.
Suddenly they found themselves with stock piles of relief material, food,
clothing, medicine and pilots with contracts. As in the Norwegian example
cited in chapter four, the consortium churches' relief agencies had engaged
in large-scale and very successful media fundraising campaigns. Thus,
when the Nigerian Civil War ended, Carr pointed out, the Joint Church Aid
was considering turning towards the Sudan, another place with similar
problems. The members of this consortium had decided that the WCC was
dragging its feet on the question of aid to South Sudan and were determined
to come to the rescue of "their fellow Christians, who were being
persecuted by the Muslims in the Sudan." Ostensibly, one of their plans was
to begin negotiations with neighbouring countries, such as Ethiopia, in
order to ship materials from there to South Sudan.300
Burgess Carr, who was then the Executive Secretary of the WCC's
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, and who had just
been elected to be the next General Secretary of the AACC in June 1971,
was on a teaching assignment for one term at Union Theological Seminary
in New York. He said that while he was at Union he heard that JCA had
scheduled a meeting in New York to get its plan of aid to South Sudan
endorsed by the United States based Church World Service and later by the
Dutch Interchurch Aid. Carr attended the meeting and gave reasons why
this massive aid was ill-advised. He pointed out that giving aid to the Anya
Nya at this time would only succeed in exacerbating the war in the South
rather than allowing conditions for peace to develop. He told the meeting of
the WCC's and AACC's efforts to seek reconciliation; and pleaded with
them at least to delay the planned aid to the Anya Nya until the
WCC/AACC mission was given a chance. Delegates to this meeting were
said to have raised serious concern with the WCC's cautious approach,
claiming that there was an urgent need for the materials in the South Sudan.
But, eventually they agreed to hold back temporarily on the shipments.301
Meanwhile, on another front, due to increased publicity of the Southern
situation in the European media, President Numeiri decided to send Abel
Alier, his Minister of Works and other high level officials on an extensive
tour of Western Europe. Their mission was to explain to Anya Nya
supporters the government's plan for dealing with the Southern problem
through regional autonomy, and to ask for assistance to settle and
rehabilitate the refugees who might return due to the announcement of the
new policy.302 Alier visited the WCC headquarters in Geneva, the
Scandinavian countries, Pope Paul VI in the Vatican, and even reportedly
established contact with SSLM representatives in Europe such as Mading
de Garang.303
When Alier visited the WCC headquarters on April 21, 1971 the question
of relief aid to the government was discussed. The WCC expressed its
eagerness to help as well as to mobilize assistance from many church donor
agencies. But it also stated that aid through government channels would get
the support of member churches only on the assurance that the material
would reach the people who truly needed assistance. However, since most
of the recipients had either fled from the government or lived in Anya Nya-
controlled territories, there would be a problem in sending aid through
Khartoum unless peace was established in the South.304 This, according to
Ankrah, was meant to underline to the Sudanese government the WCC's
view that peace would be a prerequisite to giving meaningful aid. In this
meeting, Alier was given a copy of the WCC's study on the background and
issues of the Sudanese conflict so that the government could get an idea of
how the WCC understood the conflict issues.305

Preliminary Negotiations
As planned in the Nairobi meeting in April, the WCC/AACC delegation
and the Sudanese government met in Khartoum on May 15, 1971. The
government was represented by the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Minister of Works, Abel Alier, and the Minister of Local Government
Joseph Garang, the Minister of Southern Affairs was not present In this
meeting, the WCC/AACC delegation was said to have been pleasantly
surprised that its study was well-received by the government. Even though
this study was somewhat critical of the government's handling of the
Southern problem, it was described as fair and objective by the government
representatives.306 According to Ankrah, it convinced the government that
the intermediaries "were not acting from ignorance."307
In this meeting, the WCC/AACC delegation first presented to the
government the purpose of their visit and offered their good offices as
outlined in their preparatory meeting in Nairobi. The discussion of this
proposal led to some agreements. Concerning reconciliation there was
agreement that: (a) the government was in favor of the delegates making
contact with Southern representatives in order to establish direct contact for
talks on reconciliation; (b) the government would be willing to talk with
groups who had influence on people in the South and among refugees; (c)
the talks could take place anywhere; (d) the government would agree to a
cooling off period if there were no danger to security; (e) the government
was willing to discuss the details of regional autonomy within the
framework of a united Sudan; and (f) the question of under whose auspices
the talks would take place would be discussed later. The government agreed
to the shipment of aid to areas that were in need only if the aid passed
through Khartoum and under government inspection.308
After the government's agreement to enter negotiations was obtained, the
WCC/AACC delegation thanked the government for its cooperation and
expressed the following view on the aid question. "While no promise could
be given as to the exact nature and extent of help, every effort would be
made to bring the resources of the churches of the world to bear on the
situation in the Sudan."309
After the meeting with the Sudanese government, the WCC/AACC
delegates began to map out their plan for contact and communication. It
was decided that: (a) the AACC in cooperation with groups in Uganda
would make contact with whatever groups were available in Kenya and
Uganda; (b) the WCC would endeavour to contact all groups and individual
Southern Sudanese who had interests and influence in the Sudan situation;
and (c) the General Secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches would visit
and make contact with Southern Sudanese groups and individuals in
Ethiopia with the authorization of the WCC and AACC. After all
reasonable contacts were made and influential people named, a meeting
would be held to discuss the conditions advanced by the government.310
On May 20, 1971, the CCIA Director wrote to Burgess Carr, the new
General Secretary of the AACC, outlining the plan for further action and
raising the suggestion that it might be desirable for the Director to secretly
go to Addis Ababa to seek "the personal feelings and advice" of "our OAU
friends" in order to prepare the diplomatic contexts for the contacts. He also
insisted that secrecy must be the modus operandi for the subsequent steps
towards the reconciliation effort, and proposed "a total publicity blackout",
with some exceptions which might be announced to the media. The
intention was to avoid any internal or external complications by opponents
of the peace process, and to forestall the chance that the conflict parties
might use the beginning of the mediation process to score propaganda
points against the other.311
According to the plan mapped out in Nairobi on May 15, 1971, the
AACC's General Secretary went to Kampala on May 25, to start making
contacts with the Southern groups. He met first the groups of SSLM
supporters, the Kampala Committee and the Makerere Group. The General
Secretary reported the results of the WCC/AACC delegation's visit to
Khartoum and requested help from these groups in contacting Southern
leaders "who had influence over the exiled Southerners and the fighters."312
At this meeting, Dr. Storrs McCall, on behalf of the Kampala Committee
and the Makerere Group, explained to the AACC representatives that the
various splinter fighting groups in the South had been united by the Anya
Nya under General Lagu's leadership; that the Anya Nya and its political
wing, the SSLM, were the only proper spokesmen for the South; and that
"contact [could] be made with them only through [the people] here in
Kampala."313 The Kampala Committee and Makerere Group then agreed to
contact Anya Nya leaders and arrange a meeting for the AACC on June 6,
1971.314
In June, Burgess Carr assumed the post of General Secretary of the
AACC. He was under tremendous pressure from the European and
American churches. "These churches, knowing how vociferous I had been
in battle with them over South African racism, in advocating the 'Program
to Combat Racism' and the debate I had with them over the plans of Joint
Church Aid in New York, that no sooner than my seat was half warm in
Nairobi, they began to innundate me with telegrams and letters saying that
'you were so opposed to white people oppressing black people, what are
you doing now as General Secretary of the AACC when Muslims are
killing Christians in the South Sudan?'" Thus, in early June, Carr said he
contacted the Sudan Ambassador to Kenya and requested the Ambassador
to arrange an interview for him with the President of the Sudan. The
Ambassador arranged the meeting and Can reportedly went to Khartoum to
meet with President Numeiri, Joseph Garang, and Dr. Bakheit, the Minister
of Local Government. He told them of his background, especially
highlighting the role he had played in helping to bring about the "Program
to Combat Racism", his recent confrontations concerning the Nigerian Civil
War,315 as well as his "battle" with Joint Church Aid concerning the
shipment of materials to Southern Sudan and his plea with this consortium
that the peace option must be given a chance before they began to transport
the aid. He then asked the government officials what they and the churches
could do to resolve the conflict before it was escalated further by foreign
involvement. He told the government representatives that his motives were
not entirely altruistic, since he also had to stand up to the challenges of the
European and American churches which were making his job as the
AACC's General Secretary very difficult. The meeting lasted about three
hours, and at the end, the President expressed his appreciation for Carr's
concern, and reiterated his sincere desire to discuss peace with any leader or
group that had "influence over those who were doing the fighting in the
South."316
On June 6, 1971, Carr and his assistant met in Kampala with some
members of the Kampala Committee and the Makerere Group and three
Southerners who claimed to be SSLM representatives appointed by General
Lagu. The AACC officials summarized the proposals made by the
government and asked the SSLM representatives for their reactions. The
minutes of this meeting show that the SSLM representatives were not
immediately cordial to the AACC delegation. They went back to the 1966
AACC report and started pointing out how biased the report was. They also
expressed their concern that the Sudanese government might again be using
this delegation for propaganda purposes. They accepted in principle the
offer for talks, but rejected the government's proposal as to who should be
represented in the talks. They also pointed out that the government's
suggestion that autonomy be the agenda for discussion would bias the
outcome of the talks before they began. They agreed with the government's
offer that the talks could take place anywhere outside the Sudan, since that
would guarantee the safety of their negotiators, and would give
international recognition to any agreements that might be reached. They
even suggested President Kaunda of Zambia and President Mobutu of Zaire
as possible mediators. They rejected any aid that might be sent through
Khartoum because they feared the government would use the material "to
perpetuate their atrocities against us." They argued: "if you want to give aid,
give it to us since we control the majority of the Southerners who are in
need."317
 In the meantime, the WCC had been working on contacts in Europe.
Kodwo Ankrah got in touch with Mading de Garang, the SSLM
representative in London who was also the editor of their propaganda
publication, the Grass Curtain, and invited him to a meeting in Geneva on
May 26, 1971. At this meeting, de Garang was given a report of what had
transpired between the WCC/AACC delegates and the Sudanese
government on May 15, and the strategy laid out by the intermediaries for
contacting Southern leaders.
De Garang explained their previous contact with the Sudanese
government through the Movement for Colonial Freedom and said that
even after the relationship between the MCF and the SSLM had
deteriorated, he had sent a letter to the Sudanese Ambassador in London
explaining the SSLM's preconditions for talks with the government, but had
received no response. He produced copies of two letters, one that was sent
to the Sudanese Embassy and the other written by General Lagu to de
Garang giving him a mandate to represent the SSLM in London vis-a-vis
the Sudanese government. Lagu wrote:

We have been impressed that the enemy now feels our pressure and
would want to have a talk with us. This is the recognition of the
situation, our leadership and the organization...We welcome the idea to
prepare for talks...because we are a people struggling for a cause, and if
that can be achieved by talking we see no reason why we do not accept
to talk....Regard this letter as your mandate to start preliminary talks
with them, you may have one or two other Southerners with you to
assist you. Wol Wol or any other with some experience.318

Then Lagu set the conditions for talks with the Sudanese government as
follows:
(a) cessation of hostilities by the Sudanese army including the
establishment of new posts, construction of bridges and any military
preparations;
(b) that an African or OAU observer team be appointed to move freely in
the South to supervise the standstill;
(c) that all Southern Sudanese convicted of political offenses be set free;
 (d) that the Sudanese government recognize the Anya Nya as the only
body with which to negotiate, and to make such an announcement over the
radio and in the daily papers; and
(e) that the negotiations take place only in an independent non-Arab
African state under an agreed African or OAU chairmanship.319
Although Lagu's letter mentions nothing about the question of autonomy
for the South or a unitary state for the Sudan, de Garang's interpretation of
this letter leads one to believe that the Anya Nya was willing to accept the
idea of one Sudan even though not necessarily a unitary government nor
just a simple autonomy as the government was promising.
One possible reason why the Sudanese government did not respond to the
letter de Garang sent to the Sudanese government through the London
Ambassador is that Joseph Garang, the Minister of Southern Affairs, might
well have withheld the letter because he had very different and specific
ideas on how to solve the Southern problem. He was unwilling to negotiate
with the SSLM before preparing his cadres to organize the South along
socialist principles. Therefore, he deliberately stalled on any talks.320
In the meeting with the WCC, Mading de Garang suggested that he get in
touch with General Lagu and provide the names of Southern representatives
who could be contacted by the intermediaries. The WCC representatives,
however, emphasized their concern that all parties and factions within the
Southern Sudan should be represented. They also urged the formation of a
consensus position within the Anya Nya camp by mending existing internal
problems among the various Southern groups. De Garang informed the
WCC officials that General Lagu was already aware of the visit of the
WCC/AACC delegation to the Sudan, that the WCC had the SSLM's
"complete confidence", and that the SSLM did not doubt the sincerity of the
intermediaries.321 At the end of the meeting, de Garang was given a copy of
the WCC's background study of the Sudan conflict to share with the SSLM
leadership for their reaction.
Contacts were also being made in Ethiopia. Samuel Bwogo, a Southern
Sudanese living in the North, was General Secretary of the Sudan Council
of Churches. Earlier in February, he visited Addis Ababa in his own
capacity to sample the opinion of Southern exiles in Ethiopia and to explore
possibilities for peace talks. He said that a hostel in Addis Ababa run by
missionaries accommodated Southern exiled politicians and Anya Nya
officials on their way to Israel for training and other activities. A meeting
was arranged for him at the hostel with the Southerners who lived in Addis
Ababa. According to Bwogo, it was very difficult to have any discussion in
this meeting because the other Southerners were denouncing him as a
"traitor" and were questioning his right to talk to them about peace. He said,
however, that he was able to get a few to listen.322 After the May 15 visit to
the Sudan, the WCC/AACC wanted to send Bwogo to Ethiopia again to
survey the specific reaction of the Southerners there with regard to the May
15 proposals of the Sudanese government However, de Garang objected to
Bwogo's mission on the grounds that Southerners did not trust Bwogo's
impartiality since he was working under the protection of the Sudanese
government.323
On June 28, 1971, de Garang wrote to the CCIA of the WCC reporting
his contacts with the Anya Nya and SSLM leaders concerning the
government proposals and the response he received. He stated that the
Southern leadership had welcomed the idea of negotiation and accepted the
good offices of the WCC. In response to the proposal made by the Sudanese
government, the SSLM made the following counter proposals: (a) that the
Sudanese government allow some Southerners under its control to leave the
Sudan and to confer with the SSLM so that they might express their views
on negotiations with the government; (b) that the meeting place be Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, or Lusaka, Zambia; (c) that instead of a cooling-off
period, they were willing to go a step further and call a cease-fire with its
terms to be negotiated in advance. Mading de Garang also pointed out that
the Southern leadership would be receptive to discussing the details of
regional autonomy for the South as a starting point for talks. On the
question of relief, the Southern leadership rejected deployment of aid to the
South through government channels on the grounds that the government
would use it to encourage dissension between the Anya Nya and the
Southern civilians. The leadership proposed instead prereconciliation
negotiations be held between the Sudanese government and the SSLM to
determine how the aid should be sent.324
At the same time, Mading de Garang and the WCC were discussing the
question of how to coordinate all these contacts and how to form a common
negotiating stance for the SSLM. It was finally decided to send de Garang
and Lawrence Wol Wol, the SSLM representative in France, to Zaire,
Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia in order to try to formulate a consensus
among the exiled Southerners in these countries regarding the government's
proposal.
At this point, the WCC also began to explore the possibilities for an
acceptable African head of state to host the final negotiations between the
Sudanese government and the SSLM. The CCIA was making exploratory
contacts with the European representatives of President Kaunda of Zambia
and, with the help of the British Council of Churches, they were also
attempting to reach Kaunda directly.325
At this stage, events within the Sudan brought the process to a standstill,
at least for a short time. In July the communist coup to oust Numeiri and
Numeiri's counterattack to regain power took place. Joseph Garang was
accused of being a co-conspirator and was executed. Even though Joseph
Garang had not been too sympathetic towards the Southern movement, the
execution of the Minister of Southern Affairs reinforced many Southerners'
suspicions and fears of Numeiri's intentions. This was reflected in an article
entitled "An SSLM Official Statement" authored by Mading de Garang in
the Grass Curtain. Among other things, it stated that "Numeiri's messianic
delusions for the Sudan will probably know no end," and called upon "all
patriotic Sudanese from North, West, East-Central, and South Sudan to
work together to bring down the dictatorial regime of Numeiri and to
restore to the Sudan the independence and democracy which have been
betrayed by this gang of human butchers."326
Numeiri's actions were confusing also to the intermediaries. It was not
clear to them whether he was making a statement about his attitude towards
the peace process. As a result, it seems that the WCC was unsure whether to
continue the mediation, and whether they should send de Garang and Wol
Wol on the planned visit to East and Central Africa. The WCC was
unwilling to "make vain gestures to SSLM leadership" without assurances
that the Sudanese government still desired to negotiate.327 In the meantime,
however, Numeiri appointed Abel Alier to take the place of Joseph Garang
as Minister of Southern Affairs. Alier had more appeal and commanded
more respect among Southerners than Joseph Garang. This appears to have
encouraged the intermediaries because Alier had received them during their
visit to Khartoum in May, and they were familiar with his views on the
conflict Moreover, Samuel Bwogo of the Sudan Council of Churches
contacted Abel Alier and sent word to the WCC that, in fact, outlooks for
the peace process were even better now, since Alier was more committed to
the idea of reconciliation than Joseph Garang had been.
Thus, on August 6, 1971, the WCC decided to make money available to
de Garang and Lawrence Wol Wol to travel to areas in Central and East
Africa where Southern exiles and refugees lived. The following letter
outlined the details of their mission:
We are pleased that following several conversations with you as the delegated representative of
the Anya Nya in Europe, during which you informed us of the present situation of your
movement; and following the visit of a joint World Council of Churches/All Africa Conference of
Churches mission to Khartoum, where we were given the Sudan government's position on
reconciliation and relief, we are now able to help make your journey to Africa possible. This we
do out of our sincere interest that a peace be established in the Sudan which will make possible a
creative use of the relief assistance to the suffering Sudanese which the churches stand ready to
give as soon as it can be determined that such assistance can be properly supervised and
distributed.

You have been fully informed about our visit to Khartoum, where we were asked to enter into
conversation with you which might lead to negotiations between the two parties in the conflict. It
is our understanding that, despite the events which have occurred in the interim, these positions
remain firm and can be considered those of the Khartoum government We have a standing
invitation to return to Khartoum for further discussions in which we would hopefully be able to
faithfully represent the views of the Southern Sudanese leadership. We therefore look forward to
having a report of your visit on your return. We hope that it will include (a) the reaction of your
leadership to the positions stated by the Khartoum government; (b) the obtaining of a list of
Southerners whom Anya Nya leaders would want to be involved in any negotiations; and (c) the
obtaining of letters of credence stating whom in fact Col. Lagu wishes to authorize to deal with
the WCC/AACC on behalf of the Anya Nya. Allow me to repeat that the WCC has offered its
services to you and to the Khartoum government as a politically disinterested international
humanitarian organization. Our sole motive is to best serve the people of Sudan, North and South,
for which we understand that a lasting peace is indispensable. Please convey our greetings to Col.
Lagu and the other leaders of the Southern Sudan.328

According to Dwain Epps, Executive Secretary of the CCIA at the time,

some people expressed uneasiness about the possible risk of launching the
de Garang and Wol Wol mission. Even though the Sudanese government
wished to get in touch with influential people among the Southerners, some
were fearful that sending these two Anya Nya representatives on this
mission might be construed as an act to unify the South, and thereby to
create a more unified contender to the North in case the negotiations failed.
Thus, there was a fear that it might endanger the neutral position of the
WCC and AACC as intermediaries. However, the benefits to be gained
from the mission outweighed the risk and the WCC decided to sponsor the
mission.329
About this time, Steiner's trial began and, as pointed out in chapter four,
the involvement of various foreign organizations and governments in the
Sudan Civil War began to surface. Especially interesting was his testimony
that Israeli activities in the area were aimed at "creating an obstacle to
efforts to reach an amicable settlement"330 However, neither the details of
nor the manner in which this disruption took place is explained.
By August 30, 1971, de Garang and Wol Wol completed their mission
and presented their report which recorded every opinion of leaders and
groups consulted during their trip. According to their report, there seems to
have been a fair degree of consensus among Southern leaders and exiles to
start negotiations with the Sudanese government Moreover, with the
exception of one dissident in Ethiopia and a small dissident group in Zaire,
there was consensus on the idea of negotiations within the framework of
one Sudan "if the Khartoum authorities [were] serious about finding a
permanent settlement to the conflict" However, the idea of regional
autonomy as a basis for negotiation was rejected, with the majority
preferring "a confederated government or loose federation." On the question
of aid, there was a unanimous position "that no aid by the WCC should be
delivered through Khartoum prior to the commencement of negotiations on
a permanent settlement" for the following reasons:
(a) the aid would not reach the majority of the Southern people now
outside the control of the Khartoum government;
(b) it might be medically interfered with before delivery to the Southern
people; and
(c) it might be used to infiltrate the Anya Nya security lines.
Finally, the report stated that Joseph Lagu had appointed de Garang and
Wol Wol as his representatives and that nine delegates would be chosen by
the SSLM from the three Southern provinces to represent the South at the
talks with the Sudanese government.331
Concerning the WCC's background study on the conflict in the Sudan,
the SSLM expressed their feeling that the report showed understanding of
the situation. They pointed out that some pieces of information had not been
considered and they provided the missing facts. However, they, like the
Sudanese government's representatives, expressed their general satisfaction
about the objectivity of the report.332
 In the meantime, upon his accession to his new post, Alier set up a
political committee to help him spell out the meaning of regional autonomy
promised for the South, which Joseph Garang had long refused to do. The
committee was composed of prominent and influential Southerners inside
the Sudan.333 Dr. Ali Bakheit, the Minister of Local Government, a
Northerner, set up a similar committee to draft his own version of what
regional autonomy for the South should be. Bakheit's draft reportedly
reflected a different kind of thinking from that of Alier's committee and
some Southerners saw it as Bakheit's attempt to sabotage Alier.334 Bakheit's
version was reportedly more restrictive and aimed at minimizing the fear in
the North that Southern autonomy might be too generous and thus a "sell-
out".
At this stage, Bishop Augustino Baroni, Vicar Apostolic of Khartoum,
came to Geneva with a personal message for the WCC from President
Numeiri appreciating the WCC/AACC's role so far, and urging them to
continue their attempts towards bringing reconciliation between the North
and South. The Bishop also brought two allegedly confidential documents
with him, the two documents prepared by Alier's and Bakheit's groups on
the nature of regional autonomy for the South. He showed them to the
WCC as an indication of the thinking in the Sudan.335 The CCIA got copies
of these documents. It was planning to "leak" this information to the SSLM
representatives in the hope that the latter would get some definite clues to
government thinking on the question of autonomy, so that they could
prepare their counterproposal with the government's position in mind.336 On
September 24, 1971, Ankrah visited de Garang in London and showed him
the two documents. Ankrah found out that de Garang had already acquired
one of the documents. De Garang undertook to show the documents to the
higher leadership of the SSLM in order to "study and analyze the two
documents and...prepare a position paper or document which would outline
the arrangements as SSLM sees it."337
After getting the reply and the counterproposals from the SSLM to the
May 15 proposals of the Sudanese government, the joint WCC/AACC
delegation was preparing to visit Khartoum a second time, to make its
report and to explore other possible channels for aid to the South. Samuel
Bwogo of the Sudan Council of Churches contacted the government and
arranged for the WCC/AACC visit on October 14, 1971. A preparatory
meeting was planned for October 13 in Nairobi, Kenya. Before that,
however, some members of the delegation had to meet secretly with
General Lagu in Kampala. According to Niilus, he was not quite sure about
the purpose of the meeting, but they "were being taken from one place to
another, until finally we were suddenly brought into a room where the
General was sitting." (Apparently this was a security precaution.) Niilus
said that he felt that the Anya Nya leader wanted to "check out the
intermediaries," "to have a personal assessment of our personalities," and
"just to find out what kind of people we were." Lagu also wanted to have a
personal assessment from the intermediaries about the seriousness and
sincerity of the government's intention to negotiate. He wondered whether it
was a "trick by the government of the Sudan to buy time." Niilus told Lagu
that even though they could not be completely certain the intermediaries
truly believed that the government meant business. Then Ankrah assured
Lagu saying that if the intermediaries got any indications that the
government was not serious or that it was trying to use them either for
propaganda or for some other ploy, they would let Lagu know and would
withdraw as intermediaries. This, Niilus thought, might have helped
General Lagu realize the sincerity of the intermediaries.338
On October 13, the planned preparatory meeting was held between the
AACC and WCC delegates in Nairobi. It was decided to present the
Sudanese government with a written report on the responses of the SSLM
to the proposals the intermediaries had explored with them. Moreover, it
was decided "to look out for...possible signs of a divide-and-rule policy or
attitude on the part of the government, and whether or not we (the
intermediaries) are just being used."339
The first meeting between the government and the WCC/AACC
delegates took place on October 17, and the latter presented their report to
the government The government representatives in this meeting were led by
Abel Alier who had just been appointed Vice President of the Sudan. The
government requested the delegates to give them time to study the SSLM
response, and in the meantime, asked the delegates to tour the South to
assess the situation there. The WCC/AACC delegation visited the capitals
of the three Southern provinces under government control and talked to
some individiuals and church leaders. "We knew this was a bit of a
propaganda tour by the government since they showed us only what they
controlled and did not take us close to the Anya Nya-controlled
territories."340 However, almost everyone they talked to indicated their
confidence in the churches and the "need to impress upon the government
to seek discussion and dialogue with the rebels or freedom fighters."341
The WCC/AACC delegation returned to Khartoum from the South on
October 22, and had a private meeting with Vice President Alier. During
this meeting the intermediaries were able to tell Alier how they were able to
observe "hidden fear" and "skepticism" on the part of the Southerners
towards the government's intentions, in view of the fact that past
governments had promised much but did not deliver. They also informed
Alier that people in the South were not able to talk to them freely because
of fear of the government police, and that people everywhere had pressed
them to strongly ask the government to open a dialogue with the Anya Nya,
In the meantime, Dr. Niilus also presented the international repercussions of
the failure to settle the Sudanese conflict and how it could be used by South
Africa and Israel to further divide African states.342
In a personal meeting between Alier and the two WCC representatives,
Niilus and Ankrah, Alier explained that the maintenance of security in the
South was becoming a big financial drain on the government Alier also
intimated to the intermediaries that the condition upon which he agreed to
join Numeiri's cabinet was only if a non-military solution were to be sought
for the Southern problem and that he was totally committed to peace.343
On October 23, the Sudanese government representatives which included
the Vice President, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Health, the
Minister of Local Government, and a representative from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs met the WCC/AACC delegates to give the government's
reply to the SSLM's proposal. At this meeting it was agreed that the Vice
President and the Minister of Interior would enter into preliminary,
informal, and confidential conversations with the Anya Nya leaders; that
the venue would be Addis Ababa; and that the determination as to which
head of state would act as the chair for the final negotiations would depend
on the outcome of the preliminary talks. The date for the talks was set for
November 8, 1971. It was also agreed that these, proposals and agreements
be kept totally secret, as any public discussion of these issues could
jeopardize the success of the talks.344
Immediately after the Khartoum visit, the WCC delegation returned to
Geneva and held a meeting with Mading de Garang on October 28 to report
on the results of the second visit by the WCC/AACC to the Sudanese
government. After the report, a plan was laid out whereby de Garang would
leave for Uganda on November 3, to report to Lagu the result of the
WCC/AACC second mission and to ensure that an SSLM delegation be
sent to Addis Ababa for the preliminary negotiations on November 7. Ways
in which the WCC could help defray the transportation costs of SSLM
delegates to Addis Ababa were discussed.
In the meantime, the WCC and the British Council of Churches were
planning how they might help the SSLM representatives retain and pay for
constitutional lawyers to provide legal advice and representation for the
SSLM in the forthcoming negotiations. The British Council of Churches
and the Barrow and Geraldine S. Cadbury Trust in Birmingham, engaged
prominent lawyers for the SSLM and paid for their services. Sir Dingle
Foot, a former Solicitor General for the British government, agreed to be
the legal advisor. The lawyers tried to familiarize themselves with SSLM
thinking about the type of federation or autonomy they found acceptable.
The lawyers who prepared the document for the SSLM were asked to draft
"two alternative schemes, one for a federation comprising four states and
one for a federation comprising two states only."345 This seems to have
been a negotiation strategy by the SSLM in that if their first proposal of a
four states plan were not acceptable, they would fall back upon the prepared
document for the two state plan, the two states being the North and
South.346
While preparations were underway for the November 9 preliminary talks,
Numeiri began a series of diplomatic maneuvers, which were construed by
some as actions intended to improve his bargaining position. He decided to
permanently patch up his differences with Ethiopia which, he believed, was
helping the Southern movement in retaliation for the support the Sudan was
giving to the Eritrean movement. He paid a state visit to Ethiopia on
November 6, 1971. On November 8, Emperor Haiie Selassie and President
Numeiri signed a joint communique agreeing to stop helping each other's
secessionists and to establish a Joint Boundary Commission to solve the
boundary problems between their two countries.
On November 9, 1971 delegates of the Sudanese government, the SSLM,
and the WCC/AACC arrived in Addis Ababa for the agreed-upon
preliminary talks. The Sudanese government was represented by Abel
Alier; Major General Mohammed el Baghir Ahmed, Minister of the Interior
and the ex-commander in chief of the Sudanese armed forces; and two
Southerners in the government who came as observers. The SSLM was
represented by Mading de Garang; Lawrence Wol Wol; Job Adier, SSLM's
Secretary of Education and Cultural Affairs in the Upper Nile region; and
Elsapana Mullah, SSLM's Commissioner of Equatoria province and
personal representative of General Lagu. The intermediary organizations
were represented by Dr. Leopoldo Niilus, Director of the Commission of
the Churches on International Affairs of the WCC; Kodwo Ankrah, Africa
Secretary, Commission on Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service,
and Burgess Carr, the General Secretary of the AACC. The Sudan Council
of Churches was represented by Samuel Bwogo.
According to the reports, the first day of the meeting between the
Sudanese government and the SSLM delegates was tense and the
atmosphere was rather hostile. SSLM representatives seemed to direct their
hostility towards the Southerners in the government delegation.347 It must
be remembered that the SSLM had asked the Sudanese government to allow
a group of Southerners living in the Sudan to discuss with the SSLM the
proposal of a negotiated settlement of the war in the Sudan. But the only
Southerners who came to Addis Ababa were present as government
representatives. This reportedly irritated the SSLM representatives.
According to Bwogo, when the hostilities and irritations flared up and
hindered the talks, Burgess Carr would keep reminding both contestants of
the purpose for which they were meeting. He would bring to their attention
the urgency of getting down to the task of negotiating since further delay of
the peace process only protracted the suffering of people caught up in the
war. He would then appeal to them "to forget the past and look to the
future."348 At the end of that day, the intermediaries were able to arrange
for the government and the SSLM delegates to dine together. At this dinner
the atmosphere was noticeably more relaxed. The delegates had started
"breaking the ice" and feeling comfortable enough to talk with each other
informally.349
In the discussions on the second day, however, a thorny issue arose. The
Anya Nya representatives disagreed with the statement in the government's
offer that negotiation should take place within the framework of a unified
Sudan. The SSLM argued that there was no unity in the Sudan and to talk of
one Sudan was far-fetched and presumptuous. The SSLM also disputed the
concept of regional autonomy and advocated a loose federation instead.350
The talks broke down on this question. But the intermediaries intervened
and began to present for the parties' approval a series of draft proposals
which were debated and reformulated until a version was finally reached
that was acceptable to both parties.351
According to the report of this meeting, "many private conversations
were carried out," particularly between Abel Alier and the personal
representative of Joseph Lagu, resulting in the dispatch of a personal
message by Alier to Lagu, Also, during these private talks, there may have
been vague proposals for an informal cease fire of the nature "if you don't
shoot, we will not."352 Abel Alier's personal message, typed by the
intermediaries and hand-delivered to Joseph Lagu by his personal
representative, expressed the goodwill of the Government to Lagu and
briefly explained what was meant by regional autonomy.

...May I assure you that the government is genuine and determined to

correct the social injustice in the south and give southern Sudanese the
opportunity to run their regional affairs,...and participate fully (on equal
footing with their northern brothers) in the running of affairs in the
central government. It is the desire of all thinking citizens that the south
should now develop in peace and I think you would like this to happen.
You and your colleagues will have a lot to contribute in this peaceful
development. I beg to say in all sincerity that this is the time to start on
the road to peace and prosperity. I therefore invite you most earnestly to
study the government programme carefully and let us have your views
as soon as possible.353
During the informal conversations, Abel Alier also took the opportunity
to renew his personal relationships with Mading de Garang and Lawrence
Wol Wol, the two SSLM representatives in whom General Lagu apparently
had considerable faith. In addition to his "cool and unflappable" personality,
and his reputation for reasonableness and persuasiveness, Abel Alier is
reported to have known de Garang and Wol Wol personally, Before his exile
from the Sudan, de Garang was Alier's client. The former was charged with
being an accomplice to the Anya Nya in the early 1960s and Alier had
defended him at that time as his personal attorney.354
 In the preliminary talks of November 1971, Alier tried to impress on de
Garang and Wol Wol that: (a) President Numeiri was genuinely committed
to a negotiated settlement with the SSLM and to a full implementation of
whatever was agreed upon; (b) there was a better chance to reach a peaceful
settlement with President Numeiri than with any other future leader in the
North; (c) the need for a quick peace agreement without necessarily
sacrificing the basic grievances of the South was imperative; and (d) it
would be foolish for Southerners to live with the illusion that the rest of the
world was going to support them in their struggle for a military victory that
was not in sight.355 According to Wai, since de Garang and Wol Wol were
responsible for the war's publicity in Europe and were "instrumental in
securing financial, material and moral support for the SSLM, they must
have gained General Lagu's confidence and trust. Thus, once both agreed to
a negotiated settlement within a united Sudan, it would not be very difficult
to persuade the Anya Nya command to accept it. Later events proved Alier's
calculations correct."356
Eventually, on November 10, when preliminary talks were concluded, the
intermediaries in consultation with the parties drafted a document whereby
both parties agreed that:
(a) there was "generous sincerity" in the talks;
(b) there was mutual desire and need for peace;
(c) there was a lack of confidence in each other by both sides, but that
there was the recognition of the need by all for restoring mutual confidence;
(d) that there was a basis on which to start negotiations without going
into the past for justification;
(e) that relief to the conflict areas and the manner of its delivery would be
a priority issue to be discussed when official negotiations started;
(f) that official negotiations would start on January 20, 1972 in Addis
Ababa; and
(g) that the SSLM would agree on the principle of one Sudan, if the
details, methods and conditions which would safeguard and ensure the
special interest of the South could be reached through a negotiated
settlement.357
At the end of the meeting, both parties expressed their gratitude to "the
efforts of the WCC and AACC to bring the two sides together...for a
peaceful settlement of the conflict" and asked these organizations "to stand
by and keep on being intermediaries."358 Then the government
representatives handed the SSLM delegates a very general statement of
what constituted the offer of regional autonomy for the South so that the
SSLM could prepare its response.359
Following the preliminary talks, both parties reported to their superiors.
General Lagu immediately nominated a team of eight people, "representing
various shades of SSLM opinion" for the negotiations in January.360
Between the end of the preliminary talks and the beginning of the formal
talks, there was a period of furious activity, as each side apparently vied for
positions and tried to increase its bargaining strength. The Sudanese
government raised its representation in Uganda to embassy level and the
embassy started contacting refugees to persuade them to return to the
Sudan. It also tried to put pressure on Ugandan officials to repatriate those
refugee students whithout sponsors in Uganda so that they could return to
Khartoum and attend schools. Such moves were very unpopular, and angry
students and other refugees stoned some embassy officials.361
In mid-November, Reuters reported that the Sudanese Foreign Minister,
Dr. Mansour Khalid, on his tour of Europe to seek funds for refugee
resettlement, told reporters that "the Sudanese Government has broken the
back of the rebellion in Southern Sudan." As soon as the CCIA heard this
statement, its director wrote Vice President Alier and reminded him that
such a statement could "harm the delicate balance of the present stage of
negotiation" and implicitly requested the government to refrain from
involvement in such activities.362
In the meantime, despite agreement at the preliminary talks that none of
the discussions should be communicated to the media, a rather detailed and
lengthy article appeared in the Financial Times on November 26, 1971,
outlining the spectrum of views of both North and South, on the subject of
the negotiation. Since the article seemed to canvass the prevailing debates
in the country at the time very well, some of these views from the article are
presented in order to show the public opinion context in which the peace
process was taking place.363
The article pointed out that the two sides to the conflict had different
ideas of autonomy, and a newly prepared draft statute was too vague for
anyone either to accept or reject. Numeiri's offer of autonomy had met a lot
of opposition by Northerners who were of the opinion that the North was
sacrificing too much. Other Northerners expressed the fear that once
Southern politicians and administrators got real power into their hands, they
would demand, or be pushed into demanding, more and more autonomous
power until eventually they would make a unilateral declaration of
independence, which Khartoum would be unable to resist without massive
force. Some sectors believed that even if autonomy were granted to the
South, it should not be given to them as a unit, but instead, as separate units
to each of the three Southern provinces as they would then be too small to
pose a political threat to the North.
On the other hand, many Southerners felt that Numeiri's offer of
autonomy had begun to divide the South between insiders and exiles. Some
Southerners inside the Sudan felt that regional autonomy was adequate and
"were being easily seduced by comfortable jobs in toe administration."364
The outsiders claimed that they were not just fighting for the rights of
Southerners to be appointed to certain jobs, but for the South to be totally
free from "Arab domination".
On the military front, the paper reported that the government controlled
the capitals of the Southern provinces but that the army did not control the
countryside and that it seemed very unlikely that the Anya Nya would be
defeated by military force. There was a perception in the North that the
Anya Nya would have collapsed had it not been supported by Israel, the
United States, and the Roman Catholic Church. The article expressed
pessimism about the chances of success for negotiations:

The main demand of the Anya Nya is that the government should
negotiate directly with them. But direct negotiation seems
unlikely....Even President Numeiri's power might not be able to
withstand the shock of negotiating with the rebels.365
On the military front, both sides were quite active during December. The
dry season activities of the Northern troops began then, and the Anya Nya
bases on the border were attacked. Some Northern troops were even
reported to have crossed the Ugandan border in pursuit of the Anya Nya. As
a result, Uganda gave a strict warning to the Sudanese government that it
would use "maximum force" unless the Sudanese soldiers withdrew
immediately.366 At the same time, the SSLM was becoming very successful
in finding international aid. A few of the aid agencies met in Holland on
December 16, to draw up budgets and set up plans to help the SSLM.367
 However, as the news of the attack by the goverment forces began to
reach Geneva, the WCC intermediaries, Niilus and Ankrah, immediately
sent a telegram to President Numeiri, stating that the attack was contrary to
the process of negotiation just started, and that if such military actions were
going to continue, the intermediaries asked to be relieved of their role as
"they could not render their services under such circumstances."368 In
response the Sudanese President sent a telegram on December 25, as
follows:
The President of the Democratic Republic of Sudan and Vice President Abel Alier want to assure
Mr, Niilus and Mr. Ankrah of the following:

1. The adherence of the Government of the Sudan to the terms of the agreement
2. Recent clashes should not be construed as an attempt on our part at escalating the fighting.
3. The Sudan Government highly values your constructive efforts and wish them to continue.
4. The Sudan Government would do nothing to impede these if forts.369

It is interesting to note, however, that General Lagu had an understanding

attitude towards the government's December military offensive. He is
reported to have construed Numeiri's intention as wanting to come to the
peace table with as much military advantage as he could get, and described
Numeiri as the most reasonable leader Khartoum ever had.370
On the political front, "in December 1971, some groups among the
Southern politicians and the Anya Nya opposed the peace initiative and
were refusing to come forward. These groups did not then believe in the
sincerity of the government's intention to implement its policy of regional
autonomy."371 According to Wai, some contended that the Sudanese
government had begun to lose on the military front, and that was why it
wanted to negotiate, and thus the SSLM should press for nothing less than
secession. However, he points out that the principal advocates of this
position were foreigners who were self-styled advisors to the SSLM, and
who were responsible for coordinating aid and relief to the Southern
refugees and students.372
Meanwhile, Abel Alier was taking measures to make the peace talks
more attractive to the SSLM. He sent emmissaries to Europe to invite all
agencies, willing to give aid to the government for resettlement and
rehabilitation of Southern refugees, to participate in a conference to be held
in Khartoum at the same time as the planned negotiation between the
government and the SSLM in Addis Ababa.
On December 22, 1971, a delegation of government officials en route to
other European countries also visited the head offices of the WCC to invite
the WCC and its member bodies to the forthcoming conference. According
to a memorandum on this meeting, the WCC made it known that their
participation would:

depend on the results of the January meeting [negotiations] between the

SSLM and the Government of the Sudan. We expressed our optimism
that the negotiations will succeed, in which case our own participation
is already assured...We made it clear that our member bodies are
anxiously awaiting to see what the January negotiations may bring, and
that if that January meeting fails, WCC will lose its credibility and its
ability to control some of the activities of its member bodies in relation
to their activities in the Southern Sudan.373
Alier also sent a group of Southerners living in the Sudan as emmissaries
to Europe and East Africa to meet with SSLM representatives. The group
met with Mading de Garang and Lawrence Wol Wol and attempted to
persuade them that the opportunity to make peace should not be allowed to
escape. According to Wai, more than anything else, the great advantage of
this meeting was to help each party assess what would and would not be
acceptable to the other.374
Moreover, Alier enlisted the support of the Foreign Minister and
persuaded him to recall all Sudanese Ambassadors for briefing on what was
happening between the SSLM and the Sudanese government and to instruct
the Ambassadors to stop their propaganda activities against the SSLM.375
In the midst of all these activities, there were reports of a Sudan Airways
plane crash in Anya Nya-held territory. Contrary to Northern expectations,
the Anya Nya decided to hand over survivors of the crash to the Sudanese
government through the International Red Cross, some of them staying in
the hands of the Anya Nya until they recovered sufficiently from their
injuries to be able to be moved. According to Bwogo, some of the people
handed over were government police officers in uniform. The people who
returned to Khartoum gave interviews on major media channels in
Khartoum, in which they presented a favorable account of their experiences
under the care of the Anya Nya. This incident very favorably altered
Northern public opinion.376 "The Anya Nya had, of course, been referred to
as 'terrorists' during the Sudan conflict Northerners who feared the
consequences of making agreements with 'terrorists' were reassured by this
incident that the Anya Nya might, after all, be human beings."377
On December 30, the SSLM representative, Mading de Garang, informed
the WCC that his delegation was unable to be ready by January 20, and
asked for postponement This message was relayed to the Sudanese
government and on January 28, the WCC informed both parties that the
date for the talks had been set and agreed upon to be February 15, 1972, in
Addis Ababa. Emperor Haile Selassie, one of the key founders of the
Organization of African Unity, who also commanded great prestige among
African leaders, was approached and was reported to have agreed to chair
the official negotiations. This was acceptable to both parties.
At the beginning of February, Kodwo Ankrah of the WCC visited
Kampala to facilitate the travel arrangements of SSLM delegates for the
formal talks. Burgess Carr of the AACC obtained laissez-passers for them
from the government of Liberia and the WCC paid for their air fares to
Addis Ababa.

The Addis Ababa Negotiations

At last, in early February, the delegations from the Sudanese government
and the SSLM, as well as the representatives of the WCC and the AACC
arrived in Addis Ababa to begin the formal negotiations.
The Sudanese government delegation consisted of Vice President Alier,
head of the delegation; Dr. Mansour Khalid, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Dr. Gaafar Ali Bakheit, Minister of Local Government; General
Mohammed el Baghir Ahmed, Minister of Interior; Brigadier Mirghani
Suleiman; and Colonel Kamal A basher. The SSLM delegation consisted of
Ezbione Mondiri Gwonza, head of the delegation; Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol,
secretary; E. Mading de Garang, spokesman; Colonel F.B. Maggott, special
military representative; Oliver Albino; Angelo Voga; Rev. Paul Puot; and
Job Adier. Among the intermediaries, the WCC was represented by Dr.
Leopoldo Niilus and Kodwo Ankrah, while Canon Burgess Carr
represented the AACC and Samuel Bwogo represented the Sudan Council
of Churches.
The SSLM delegates arrived in Addis Ababa a few days early and the
intermediaries arrived one day before the opening of the negotiations. On
their arrival, the SSLM representatives had learnt that the Emperor was not
going to be chairman. Apparently, the SSLM representatives were told that
the Emperor had agreed only to make his capital and his good offices
available and had not agreed to chair the negotiations. According to Carr,
the Anya Nya believed the Emperor's story and thought that they had been
tricked into coming to Addis Ababa by being told that Haile Selassie would
be the mediator, when actually that was not what he had undertaken to
do.378 It is not clear whether the Emperor had undertaken to be the mediator
and changed his mind, or whether it was a misunderstanding by the parties
who thought that by offering his good offices he had agreed to be chairman.
Some point out that he was counseled against chairing the meeting by his
political advisors. He was reportedly advised that if he did chair the
negotiations and if the Southern Sudanese won a substantial autonomous
state, then the Eritrean secessionist insurgents in Ethiopia might demand a
similar status which was not acceptable to Haile Selassie.379
Whatever the cause, this misunderstanding created an immediate problem
for the start of the formal negotiations scheduled for February 15. Carr said
that he and Ankrah then went to see the Emperor and pleaded with him not
to allow the negotiations to fail for lack of a chairman, that the Emperor
should call the parties and explain to them how he would make his good
offices available to them. The Emperor agreed to send his Foreign Minister
on the first day to deliver an opening speech, and that his personal
representative at the negotiations would act as his liaison.380
Even after the question of the manner of the Emperor's involvement was
settled, there was a question of who was going to chair the day to day
meetings. The Sudanese government delegates suggested that there was no
need for a very large degree of formality, and that the chairmanship could
be rotated between both parties, i.e., someone from the Sudanese
government delegation could be chairman one day and someone from the
SSLM delegation, the next According to Carr, this was forcefully rejected
by the SSLM delegation, who insisted on formality in the negotiations. He
believes that because the SSLM and the Anya Nya had been called rebels
by the Northerners for so many years, they were not happy about
informalizing a negotiation over an issue which determinied their survival
as an organization. In fact, this suggestion by the Sudanese government
delegation seemed to arouse anger and suspicion in the SSLM delegation
about the intention of the Northerners. Thus, a deadlock was already
developing.381
Carr persuaded each delegation to name one person to meet with the
intermediaries to find someone who would chair the negotiations. In the
first meeting, however, the representative of the government delegation
suggested that Carr become the chairman. The SSLM delegation, after
consultation agreed to the proposal with the modification that Carr be called
a moderator instead of a chairman.382
The intermediaries had arranged a reception for February 14, for the two
delegations so that members might get to know each other, as many people
in both delegations were not previously acquainted. The Secretary General
of the OAU, his Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, and several
Ambassadors were invited to the reception to build political and diplomatic
support for the negotiations. In this context, Niilus pointed out that he had
established contacts with a fellow Argentinian who was the Ambassador to
Ethiopia and who was also the Dean of Ambassadors in Addis Ababa.
Niilus said that he used to get in touch with him from time to time as a
source of information and general guidance on what the various embassies
in Addis Ababa were doing concerning the Sudanese conflict and the peace
process.383
The meeting for the formal negotiations started on February 15, at 11:00
a.m. as planned. Ethiopia's Foreign Minister made a welcoming address in
the name of the Emperor. Following this ceremony, the meeting was
adjourned. When it resumed, Carr assumed the chairmanship and Ankrah,
Niilus, Bwogo, and Nebiyelul Kifle, the personal representative of Emperor
Haile Selassie, were seated as observers. Sir Dingle Foot, the lawyer
retained as SSLM's legal advisor, was not allowed to sit in the negotiations
because the Sudanese government's delegation objected.
The position of Southerners in the Northern delegation again became a
point of contention. Some members of the SSLM delegation argued that
since Vice President Alier was a Southerner himself, he should not sit on
the other side of the table, nor should he be the head of the Sudanese
government delegation.384 Also, each delegation expressed doubt about the
mandate and the binding ability of the other's delegation.385 The moderator
played the role of "temper-cooler", and kept reminding the parties that these
contentions were unnecessary obstacles preventing them from getting to the
real issues for which they were assembled: peace and reconciliation.386
At last, Carr began the formal negotiations by giving a sermon drawn
from the traditions of both the Old Testament and the Islamic Koran, and
based on the story of Nehemiah. Carr called upon both parties to forget the
past and to join hands to rebuild the Sudan as Nehemiah had rebuilt the
war-torn walls of Jerusalem.387 He then raised the question of handling
communications with the outside world during the negotiations. He got a
mutual agreement that it was necessary to maintain absolute secrecy
concerning the proceedings of the negotiations. It was also agreed that if
anything were to be given to the press, it would be a prepared statement
approved by both parties and read to the media only by the moderator.
Once these procedural questions were resolved, substantive negotiations
began. First the Sudanese government delegation presented its proposal for
regional autonomy, a very generalized version of which was given to the
SSLM in the preliminary talks in November, 1971. They submitted the draft
prepared by Bakheit, the Minister of Local Government. It must be
remembered that Bakheit's version was more restrictive and gave more
powers to the President of the Republic and little power to the autonomous
government of the South. According to some observers, this might have
been a deliberate negotiation stratgegy by the government delegates. If the
Southerners seriously objected to the Bakheit version, then the plan was to
fall back on Alier's version, which was considered more liberal.388 The
government delegation presented its first document and explained every
article in the draft. With that, Carr adjourned the first day's meeting until
10:00 o'clock the following morning.
The next morning's meeting began with the SSLM's presentation of their
reaction. According to Carr, they "tore the government's proposal to
pieces," According to Ankrah, it was a day "where everyone was getting it
off their chests with accusations and counteraccusations." The
intermediaries listened, but the moderator called for brief adjournments
whenever tempers began to flare. The SSLM had had time to prepare a draft
of their positions. They had brought with them two plans for federation
drafted by their lawyers. Their strategy was to present first a four-state plan,
and if that should prove unacceptable to the Sudanese government, to fall
back on the two-state plan. Thus, in response to the government's position
paper, the SSLM delegates presented their four-state plan. They proposed
that the whole of the Sudan be divided into four regions, the North, South,
West, and East to form the confederation with a central government in
Khartoum. The SSLM was trying to avoid a weak South being pitted
against the whole North, which, as one region, would be economically and
politically stronger. The government delegates emphatically rejected this
plan on the grounds that the SSLM was not the spokesman for the other
peoples in the Sudan and that they could not raise issues on their behalf. In
addition, no other group in the North had asked for autonomy, and it was
outside the purview of the negotiation to decide the fate of other peoples.
The government delegates further contended that, by the same token, the
South should be subdivided into smaller autonomous regions if the SSLM
wanted to pursue its own logic.389
After this, the government delegation presented the version prepared by
Alier and the SSLM presented its two-state plan. The meeting continued
until 8:00 o'clock that evening. Carr then suggested that each delegation
choose three people who would meet together to take the documents
presented by the two delegations and to identify points of agreement in both
the documents and in the discussion thus far. The group would also be
charged with isolating fundamental points of disagreement. The points of
disagreement would then be presented to the larger meeting for discussion
and negotiation until agreement was reached. Three representatives from
each delegation were elected and with this, the plenary meeting for that day
was adjourned until 5:00 o'clock the next afternoon.
That evening, all the delegates and intermediaries had dinner together
and, according to the observations of the intermediaries, the two parties had
become more cordial to one another. The next day, the smaller group met
and began to consolidate the two negotiating documents and to isolate the
issues of contention. While this small group met, the intermediaries were
shuttling back and forth between the two hotels where the delegations were
housed. Their purpose was to explore how the remaining delegates
perceived the differences that had arisen during the previous day's
discussions and to discuss their suggestions on how to bridge the gaps. The
Ethiopian government made vehicles available to the intermediaries for this
purpose. Carr said that he made it a point to meet separately with the
military and political leaders to canvas their opinions.
 The smaller group was able to produce a working draft document,
isolating issues of contention and classifying them into political and human
rights, economic, and military/security issues. As a matter of strategy, it was
decided to deal with the less controversial and less sensitive issues first, and
then move on to the more difficult The plenary negotiation session then
started to take the issues separately, beginning with the political and
continuing with the economic, and last with the military/security issues.
Difficulties in reaching agreement increased as the negotiations progressed
from one issue to another.
On the political issues, the SSLM delegates were able to work out their
differences with the government delegates, and human rights clauses were
inserted into the working document in the form drafted by the SSLM's
attorneys. A problem of procedures to amend the new would-be constitution
for the Sudan aroused a lot of controversy. According to Carr, the debate
continued almost until 2:00 o'clock in the morning. As usual, when the
discussions became heated, Carr would either call for a break or adjourn the
meeting. Then, during the break, the intermediaries would draft a certain
formulation or language that might possibly reconcile the demands of both
sides.
Here it must be reiterated that, as part of their preparation for the
negotiations, Niilus and Ankrah had approached the Organization of
African Unity officials and asked them how the OAU could help them in
their peace making attempts. Niilus said that the OAU officials assured
them that they would help unofficially in whatever way they could, even
though they would formally stay out of the negotiation because the issue of
the conflict was considered to be an internal affair according to OAU
policies. In particular, the Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs of
the OAU, Mohammed Sahnoun, an experienced diplomat, who had taken
part in the negotiations between Algeria and France during the bitter war of
Algeria's independence, offered to give specific advice to help facilitate the
peace process.
Thus, according to Niilus, whenever an impasse was reached, the
intermediaries would confer secretly with Sahnoun, figure out ways to
break the impasse, go back to the negotiation, and try a new way.
Sometimes, after the intermediaries had confided in Sahb noun the specific
problem, he would help them draft a compromise paragraph or two. The
intermediaries would then present this draft to the parties, and this,
according to Carr, sometimes took the parties by surprise. Carrsaid that with
the compromise draft before them, the negotiators would have something
concrete to look at rather than having to dispute in the abstract, and, at
times, they even adopted the compromise draft with some changes.
Eventually, the political and human rights issues to be incorporated in the
country's new consitution were resolved. At this point, Carr asked that all
the delegate; rise and pray together. The negotiation then moved to the next
item on the agenda, the economic issues. Issues of taxation, control of
resources, trade, revenue-sharing and many other questions arose on which
it was more difficult to reach quick agreement. Carr said that there were
trained economists among both delegations and so it was decided to create a
committee of such people to consolidate the contending position papers and
prepare a working draft. The draft was then debated and eventually
provisions were developed that got the approval of the larger group.
Ankrah said that the atmosphere in the smaller groups became very
cordial and cooperative. He said that there were times in the debates when
some Northerners would side with the Southerners against their own
members or even make arguments on behalf of the SSLM as to what was
fair and what was not. According to Ankrah, one member of the Northern
delegation made so many suggestions in favor of the SSLM that he
sometimes confounded the members of his own delegation. Carrsaid that he
decided to make prayers part of the procedure and would ask all members
to stand up and pray silently every time negotiation over a major issue area
concluded in agreement, and after the economic issue was settled, everyone
stood and prayed.
After this came the military/security issues, which proved to be the most
difficult. The question of what would happen to the Anya Nya after the war
ceased had been a serious concern to the SSLM even during the
involvement of the MCF. The first problem, according to Bwogo, was that
the SSLM wanted all the armed forces of the Anya Nya to be absorbed into
the Sudanese army, to form the Southern Armed Forces charged with the
security of the South. But the government refused to make any blanket
commitment to the idea of absorbing all the Anya Nya fighters without
knowing their exact number. Although many estimated that the Anya Nya
had from 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers at that time, according to Ankrah, the
Southerners were very reluctant to reveal the number. They feared to
expose their secrets in case the negotiations failed.
 On the other hand, the government proposed to station 15,000 peace-
keeping troops in the South after the war. Seventy-five hundred of these
would be from the North and the remaining 7,500 from the Anya Nya. The
Anya Nya troops would be divided as follows: 4,500 integrated into the
Sudanese armed forces; and 3,000 would be absorbed into the police force,
become prison wardens, or take on other paramilitary activities. According
to Carr, the SSLM delegates didn't like the proposal because only 4,500 of
their troops would have access to the armory and that, in their minds, did
not provide adequate security for the South should the North again resort to
oppression and domination. The Africa Research Bulletin of that period
reports that "while the Southerners might be flexible on some other issues,
they were not prepared to compromise on the basic demand that the South
should have some system of military security."390
The other issue that provoked considerable dispute was the location of
Northern troops in the South. The government wanted its troops to police
the whole of the South without any restrictions on location. The SSLM
delegates wanted Northern troops to be restricted to the barracks in Juba,
the provincial capital of Equatoria in Southern Sudan. They argued that the
security situation in the South would be adversely affected if the Southern
people, who had been fleeing from the Northern soldiers for years, saw
these same soldiers everywhere.
According to Carr, debate over this issue lasted for almost four days,
even though the meeting was adjourned several times for many private and
small group consultations. In the past, whenever there were adjournments
for consultation, the intermediaries would take advantage of the break to
talk to each party separately. According to Niilus, the intermediaries would
hear the arguments of one party, and if they understood it, would take it to
the other party and explain the argument and vice versa. This, sometimes,
had the effect of narrowing down differences. But this time, none of these
techniques seemed to work.
At last, after the fourth night of debate over this issue, everybody was
exhausted. The Anya Nya delegation's spokesman stated that the meeting
had failed to resolve this important issue, and moved that the meeting be
indefinitely adjourned. To the surprise of the moderator, Vice President
Alier, leader of the government delegation, agreed. There was a definite
sense of impasse, and, according to Carr, it was the "tensest moment of the
entire negotiation." He said that, during the various adjournments and
consultation breaks, he and the other intermediaries had had a chance to
speak separately with the military officials of each party. Ironically, the
military officials in both delegations did not seem as far apart on the
military/security issue as were the politicians. Carr said that none of the
maneuvers of the intermediaries nor that of Sahnoun seemed to be able to
break this deadlock. Then Carr briefly reminded the delegates how much
progress had been made thus far and how much agreement had been
generated, and he insisted that the meeting could not be allowed to fail
because of one issue. He also pointed out that the military officers did not
see the issue as intractable; it was the politicians who were resisting any
agreements, and again, it was the politicians who were calling for an
indefinite adjournment. He then asked the delegates if this call for an
indefinite adjournment meant going back to the battlefield and, if so, Carr
suggested that the decision should be left, not to the politicians, but to the
military officials who were going to do the fighting.
Carr said that a tired and dead silence followed his statement. He then
said that he would construe their silence as a desire not to vote on the
motion of indefinite adjournment and that negotiation would continue. He
would notify the delegates at what time the meeting would be reconvened
the next day. In the meantime, Carr approached the personal representative
of Emperor Haile Selassie to the negotiations and told him that the
negotiation had reached a level where the good offices of the Emperor were
urgently needed, and asked him to make an appointment to see Haile
Selassie at 9:00 the next morning.
At the meeting with the Emperor, Carr explained what had happened and
asked him to use his prestige and influence to break the deadlock. Haile
Selassie was persuaded to see each delegation separately. The Emperor was
willing to see Carr, the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia and the Sudanese
government delegation in the afternoon of the same day. According to Carr,
at this meeting the Emperor told the Sudanese government delegation that
he had been following the negotiations personally through his
representative, that he had been impressed by the achievements so far, and
that he particularly praised the magnanimity shown by the Sudanese
government towards the SSLM's demands, and that that was the right
attitude to have towards solving problems of this nature. He told them that
the moderator had informed him of the impasse, and that he had given
thought to the matter. He would like to suggest a fifty-fifty arrangement
whereby fifty percent of the armed forces in the South would be Northern
troops and fifty percent would be retrained Anya Nya troops. Moreover, he
suggested that the Northern troops be kept in barracks, because the
government was in a position, if it wanted, to dispatch its troops with
expediency no matter where they were located since it had the air force and
other facilities that the Southerners had not. He told them that he had
explored these suggestions in the morning with Burgess Carr and that Carr
had informed him that this might be acceptable to the SSLM, and that he
[the Emperor] anticipated persuading the SSLM to accept this proposal.
The Sudanese government delegation thanked the Emperor for all the
facilities he had made available to them and promised that they would
communicate his advice to their government and would bring a decision to
him the next day. Carr said that after the government delegation left, he
stayed behind with the Emperor to discuss how they should talk to the
SSLM delegation.
When the SSLM delegation came in, Haile Selassie again reviewed the
achievement of the negotiations thus far, and praised them for their spirit of
compromise. He reiterated that his government had helped the Anya Nya
despite the risk of developing a bad relationship with his neighbours and at
the expense of exacerbating the problems in his own country;391 and how it
would be to the interest of everybody involved to terminate the war
peacefully. He then told them of his fifty-fifty proposal to the government
delegates, saying that the latter had said that it might be acceptable to them
if the SSLM delegation agreed: he was therefore asking the SSLM to agree
to this proposition. He told them that his government was committed to
their security and he gave his personal guarantee against any reprisals or
repression of Anya Nya returnees. The SSLM delegation thanked the
Emperor for his concern and agreed to communicate the proposal to their
superiors and inform him of the decision.
Carr said that, at that point, the standing rule of secrecy of the
proceedings and discussions was somehow violated. He said that the
intermediaries began to hear on the BBC and to read in several newspapers
about the substance of the discussions between the delegations and the
Emperor. Carr said that even though the government of Ethiopia might have
had an interest in publicizing its mediatory role, he suspected that only a
member of a delegation could leak details of the substantive issues. The
intermediaries gathered both delegations again and shared with them their
serious concern about information leaking out, saying that this was not only
a breach of the agreed upon rule of procedure, but that it could irreparably
ruin the negotiations in which everybody had been working so hard.
When the meetings resumed, Carr said, there was agreement on the
Emperor's fifty-fifty proposal. However, when they started translating the
percentages into numbers, they again ran into problems. The Sudanese
government delegation said that they would have 15,000 armed forces in
the South, 7,500 of which would include the paramilitary forces. The SSLM
delegates said that they wanted 7,500 of the Anya Nya to be incorporated
into the army in the South with a number equal to those of the government
of officers and commanders from both regions. Carr arranged a separate
meeting with the military officers of both sides, at which he proposed to
have 15,000 troops in the South but to apply the fifty-fifty proposition of
the Emperor in the following way: 6,000 troops would be from the North
and 6,000 from the Anya Nya, all having full access to the armory. The
remaining 3,000 would be paramilitary forces entirely composed of the
Anya Nya. Carr aid that he thought that the nine-to-six ratio might satisfy
the SSLM delegates while the proposal still incorporated the fifty-fifty ratio
composition of the army required by the Sudanese government This
proposal was discussed repeatedly and then submitted to the larger group.
Late in the afternoon, the government delegation received approval of the
compromise from Khartoum. The SSLM delegates reported the new
proposal to their superiors through the good offices of the Emperor and the
Israeli Embassy and eventually received approval.
Now that the number question was settled, the question of location again
became controversial. The government delegates began to insist that if the
number of the Northern contingent was reduced to 6,000 then the
government should be able to locate them all over the Southern Sudan;
while the Anya Nya wanted them only in the barracks. The SSLM
delegation called for a separate gathering of its own delegates. Carr learned
that the SSLM delegation discussed in their own meeting whether it might
not actually be to their benefit if the Northern troops were dispersed rather
than being put in one location. They figured that surprise attacks would be
more difficult for the Northern troops since they would find it hard to
transport themselves. Therefore, the SSLM delegation came out of their
meeting and announced that they would agree to the proposal of the
government delegation to disperse the Northern troops.
 Thus, around midnight everyone agreed over the military/security issue.
At this point, Carr stood up and started to pray aloud, rather than silently as
he had done whenever a major issue in the negotiation was settled. He said
that he was crying as he prayed, and some members of the delegations were
also crying. According to Niilus, Carr, and Bwogo, one of the Generals in
the Northern delegation confessed that he was crying out of remorse for the
slaughter between brothers all these years. Another Minister from the
government's delegation lifted Carr up into the air out of exuberance.392
On the next day, February 27, all of the agreed provisions were compiled,
and the overall document, which came to be known as the Addis Ababa
Agreement on the Problem of the South Sudan, was ready for initialling by
the heads of the delegations who would then take it to their respective
superiors for ratification. The date of ratification was to be March 12, 1972.
Before the initialling took place, however, Carr called Alier aside and
expressed his feeling that it might not be advisable for Alier to initial the
agreement even though he was head of the delegation. Since Alier was a
Southerner, some Northern opponents of this agreement could say later that
the agreement was made only between two Southerners, and might either
attack it on that ground or might make it easy for them to back out of their
commitment to the agreement.393 Alier agreed to have Mansour Khalid, the
Foreign Minister, a Northerner, initial the agreement on behalf of the
Sudanese government.
On February 27, a ceremony held in the ballroom of the Addis Ababa
Hilton began with an inspiring speech by Burgess Carr. The agreement was
then initialed by Colonel Gwonza on behalf of the SSLM and by Dr.
Mansour Khalid on behalf of the Sudanese government Burgess Carr
attested the document as the moderator. The signatures were also witnessed
by the Emperor's representative and by the other intermediaries.
Immediately after the signing, the Emperor congratulated every participant
in the negotiation process, and a reception was held at the head office of the
OAU. Some point out that this was particularly important for the SSLM
because it pve international recognition to the agreement.

The Ratification Process

 After the initialling ceremony, the Sudanese government delegation
returned to Khartoum and the SSLM delegation went back to the
headquarters of General Lagu to report on the agreement and to begin the
ratification process. According to many sources, President Numeiri was
worried about the interval between the initialling of the agreement and its
ratification. He was under the impression that something might happen in
the meantime to upset the SSLM or that they might change their minds394
Thus, he ratified the agreement unilaterally on March 5, and passed a
decree called the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act that
made the Addis Ababa Agreement a law of the country. On March 5,
Numeiri and Alier toured the South to explain to the army commanders and
to the people at large, the agreement that had been signed. Wai points out
that there might have been some justification for Numeiri's worry that
something might happen to upset the agreement. He said that Sudanese
Embassies in some of the neighbouring countries sent reports that a few
hard liners were pressuring Joseph Lagu not to ratify the agreement until
certain changes were made.395 On March 12, Numeiri ordered a cease-fire,
again unilaterally, and ordered the troops in the South to end hostilities.
The interim period, which seemed too long for Numeiri, was too short for
the SSLM, who had difficulty in communicating the agreement to the
Southern exiles. The war had rendered many of the roads inaccessible and
other means of transportation were useless. Moreover:

a great deal of explanation and reassurance was needed among the

Southerners. After all, many of them were taken by surprise; they had
become accustomed to despair and found it difficult to believe the good
news of the peace settlement It was inconceivable to many of them that
a negotiated settlement could ever be reached with the traditional
enemies, the Arabs and the Arabized peoples of the Sudan.396

Thus, the SSLM asked for a two week extension of the ratification date.
Several factions of the SSLM accused the negotiating team of having
exceeded its authority, started to pick flaws in the agreeement, and to
suggest renegotiation. "Some who had not sat through the long process of
discussion and emendation were less realistic about what modification
could be attained."397 However, as soon as news of disagreement within the
ranks of the SSLM started to reach the outside, various church
organizations aided Lagu to travel to the dissident groups of Southerners
and to encourage support by explaining the agreement.398 Church leaders
also pleaded with Lagu himself to ratify the agreement. At the same time,
the Makerere Group pressed Southern opponents of the Addis Ababa
Agreement to support its ratification; they pointed out that the South would
be better helped through aid coming via legal channels rather than in the
ways it had been seeping in thus far.399
Meanwhile, Carr and the other intermediaires came back to Addis Ababa
on March 25, 1972, for the ratification ceremony, which was to take place at
noon on March 26. General Lagu had arrived in Addis Ababa on the 24th
and was staying in a hotel other than the one reserved for him by the
intermediaries. Carr said that Lagu appeared to have been desperately
awaiting his arrival because, immediately after Carr arrived at his hotel,
Lagu called him to ask for a meeting. Carr went to meet Lagu, who was
accompanied by another Southerner who did not participate in the
negotiations. He was also accompanied by an Israeli body guard who, it
appeared, was also his advisor, and who had followed Lagu from Kampala.
Lagu told Carr that he had come to Addis Ababa, not to ratify, but to
renegotiate the agreement. Lagu reportedly pointed out that the agreed
document was not acceptable, that the SSLM delegates who had negotiated
it had exceeded their mandate, that they had not consulted him on all the
phases and points of the agreement, and that he had brought with him a
negotiating document that he would like Carr to deliver to the Sudanese
government delegation. Carr said that he was shocked to hear this and tried
to convince Lagu that it was by this time too late to change the agreement.
But, he said, Lagu was adamant.
In hindsight some writers point out the reasons why General Lagu was
reluctant to ratify the Addis Ababa Agreement on March 27, 1972.
According to O'Ballance, General Lagu was reported to have been quite
satisfied with what had been achieved.400 But, later on, a small but vocal
group of dissidents reportedly started to point out defects in the agreement,
centering on two points. First, the agreement provided for regional
autonomy instead of federation. However, according to Sir Dingle Foot, the
legal advisor of the SSLM delegation, "the effect of certain clauses was
virtually to create a federal status although the word federation was not
used." and in fact he was reported to have been surprised that the SSLM
was able to win so many concessions in the negotiation.401 The second
dissatisfaction regarded security and fear of retaliation on returning exiles
and Anya Nya soldiers. The SSLM negotiators had reportedly tried to
persuade their critics that the parity arrangement for troops to be stationed
in the South and the personal guarantee of the Ethiopian Emperor were
adequate safeguards.
Despite these protests and opposition voiced by some, "there was no
evidence that the mass of the people felt like this--most, including the Anya
Nya, were sick of war, and though extremely cautious to begin with, were
also overjoyed at the thought of peace returning."402 By the time Lagu went
to Addis Ababa, "the dissidents were eventually reduced to a minimum as
several men, who originally opposed the agreement, decided to return to
Sudan and give things a try."403
Carr took the new document submitted by Lagu and tried to learn from
the SSLM delegates who had negotiated the agreement what had caused
Lagu to change his mind. Mading de Garang and Lawrence Wol Wol told
him that confusion had arisen in the Anya Nya camps, and that some
extreme elements within the Anya Nya and the Israeli Embassy in Kampala
had exerted a tremendous influence on General Lagu to repudiate the
agreement and to renegotiate it.
In frustration and anxiety, Carr passed Lagu's new proposal to Abel Alier
and the rest of the government delegation. Alier was reportedly dejected
and expressed his conviction that any further action was useless. At the
same time, Carr contacted the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Minassie Haile,
and Emperor Haile Selassie's personal representative in the negotiatons,
Nebiyelul Kifle, to inform them of what had happened. Carr said that they
spent several hours thinking of various ways to deal with this new and
unexpected problem. It happened that the Emperor's personal representative
in the negotiations was also Chief of the Ethiopian Intelligence Agency. It
must be remembered that during the negotiations the good offices of the
Emperor and the Israeli Embassy had provided the secret communication
links between General Lagu and his delegation in Addis Ababa. Thus,
Nebiyelul Kifle had access to copies of the telex and other messages that
were being secretly exchanged between Lagu and the SSLM
representatives. They finally decided to confront Lagu with the copies of
the messages and to challenge his claim that the SSLM delegates did not
consult him on the issues of the agreement and that he did not authorize
them to agree.
The signing ceremony was scheduled for noon of March 27, but, because
of the latest problem, it was not possible to keep to that schedule. The
international press corps was waiting to witness the signatures to the
agreement. When the schedule was not kept, rumors started flying that the
agreement had failed. At 1:00 o'clock on the 27 th, Carr and Kifle went to
meet Lagu at his hotel where they told him that the Emperor was very much
disappointed by the last-minute obstacles created by the SSLM and that the
Emperor did not believe that the SSLM delegates had exceeded their
mandated authority. Then Kifle reportedly opened his briefcase and showed
Lagu the telex copies of the messages exchanged between Lagu and the
SSLM delegation, demonstrating his awareness of what was happening
during the negotiations and that Lagu had given it his blessings. Carr said
that Lagu immediately abandoned that argument. Instead, he began
reiterating the inadequate provision for security in the agreement and
demanded to see the Emperor on this issue.
A meeting was arranged for 4:30 that afternoon. In that meeting Lagu
told the Emperor that he wanted to clarify that the agreement had the
Emperor's total backing and whether the Emperor also gave his personal
guarantee for the security of Anya Nya troops and other Southerners after
their repatriation. The Emperor repeated his promise. After this, the Foreign
Minister of the Sudan, sent by President Numeiri to represent him at this
ceremony, was called to the Emperor's palace. At 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon, the ratification ceremony took place and General Lagu and
Mansour Khalid signed the ratification document "In a radio broadcast
afterwards General Lagu had special praise for the Emperor 'under whose
wise and determined guidance' peace had come."404 Carr said that that very
day General Lagu's Israeli escort was expelled from the country by the
government of Ethiopia
After the ratification there was considerable press coverage and publicity
congratulating the parties and praising what had been attained. But, as the
intermediaries were packing to leave, they received a message from Foreign
Minister Khalid informing them that another dispute had arisen between
Lagu and the government representatives about the next destination of
General Lagu. Lagu wanted to go back to Kampala while everybody else
wanted him to go to Khartoum with them.405 Carr again got in touch with
the General to persuade him that going to the bushes after the ratification
would indicate that he did not take the peace agreement seriously, and that
the proper thing for Lagu to do was to go to Khartoum since the war was
over. After a flurry of consultations and meetings, Lagu agreed to go to
Khartoum only if the intermediaries went with his delegation, to which they
agreed.
Thus, on April 1, 1972, the intermediaries, Lagu and his entourage, and
the representatives of the Sudanese government all flew to Khartoum.
President Numeiri came to the airport to meet them. Numeiri and Lagu
embraced and started joking with each other. Lagu told Numeiri how well
he looked and Numeiri told him that he felt sorry that Lagu had been living
the hard life and that he would like to send him to his personal physician in
Europe for a medical checkup. At a state banquet held the next day Lagu
was promoted to the rank of Major General, and the intermediaries were
decorated with the Order of the Two Niles, a first-rank medal, by the
Sudanese government in recognition of their role in bringing about
peace.406
The role of the intermediaries, however, did not end at the signing of the
agreement They continued participating in the first stages of the
implementation of the peace settlement. At a press conference on March 3,
1972, the Sudanese government had announced that a joint committee of
delegates from neighbouring countries accommodating refugees, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Council of Churches,
and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was established to supervise
the enforcement of the cease-fire and "to supervise the process of bringing
to the country the refugees and also those who had fled to the bush [the
Anya Nya]."407 Burgess Carr said that they had to fly by helicopter to many
parts of the South to supervise the disarming of the Anya Nya and their safe
return to the government-controlled areas. Moreover, the WCC participated
in the conference held in Khartoum for the coordination of all aid donor
agency efforts in repatriating and rehabilitating the massive number of
refugees who were returning to the Sudan. 1
270
Stephen Whittle, "A Peaceful Prospect for the Sudan," Ecumenical Feature Service (Geneva:
WCC, 1972), 2.
271
Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing Co.,
1981), 142.
272
Theresa Scherf, "The Sudan Conflict: Its History and Development," A document prepared for
the CCIA of the WCC (Geneva: WCC, May 1971), 31.
273
Ibid.
274
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 143.
275
Scherf, 31
276
AACC, Mission to the Sudan," A report on the AACC goodwill mission to the Sudan, (Nairobi,
Kenya, 1966), WCC Archives, Geneva, 25-27.
277
Kodwo Ankrsh, "In Pursuit of Peace in the Sudan," Study Encounter 8 (1972), 4.
278
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 14J.
279
Ibid.
280
Ankrah,"In Persuit of Peace," 4.
281
Burgess Carr, interview with the author, Cambridge, Mass., April 29, 1981.
282
The Proceeding of the AACC Conference in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 1969, quoted in Wai, The
African-Arab Conflict, 210.
283
Kodwo Ankrah, Memorandum to Alan Brash, July 2, 1970, WCC Archives, Geneva.
284
S.H. Ammissah, AACC General Secretary, letter to Alan Brash, Director of Interchurch Aid of
the WCC, August 24, 1970, WCC Archives, Geneva.
285
Kodwo Ankrah, Memorandum to Alan Brash, December 17, 1970, WCC Archives, Geneva.
286
Mading de Garang, letter to Kodwo Ankrah, December 1970, WCC Archives, Geneva.
287
Canon Burgess Carr, speech made at the initialling of the Addis Ababa Agreement, in Peace and
Unity in the Sudan, an African Achievement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Khartoum:
University of Khartoum Press, 1973), 119.
288
CCIA Document no. 49, January 10-21, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva.
289
M. Louise Pirouet, "The Achievement of Peace in Sudan," Journal of East African Research and
Development 6 (1970): 122.
290
Mohamed Omer Beshir calls Allen Reed a missionary "known for his hostility to the Sudan."
Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975), 69.
291
Allen Reed, Report to the Church World Service, January 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva.
292
Minuts of the Meeting, April 2, 1971, 1 & 3., WCC Archives, Geneva.
293
Pirouet, 121.
294
Ibid.
295
Jan Orner, letter to Dr. Louise Pirouet, March 24, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva.
296
Pirouet, 124.
297
An observer described the kind of operation that the JCA was undertaking as a: "very
considerable strength of organized Christian compassion, capable of buying airplanes and
 defying national sovereignties [and as] a political development which churches must begin to
take at least as seriously as the politicians." Canon Taylor, Church Missionary Society, letter
to Dr. Niilus, Director of CCIA, 16 June 1971. WCC Archives, Geneva.
298
Tracy Early, "What is Going on in the Sudan?" New World Outlook (September 1971): 15.
299
Burgess Carr, interview with author, Cambridge, Mass., April 29, 1981.
300
Ibid.
301
Ibid.
302
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 83.
303
Ibid.
304
Kwodo Ankrah, interview with author, Kampala, Uganda, May 5-10, 1982. See also Dwain
Epps, letter to Olle Dahlen, Chairman of CCIA, April 21, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva.
305
Dwain Epps, interview with author, New York City, August 10, 1981.
306
Dwain Epps, interview. Niilus, also reflecting on this reaction, writes: "Surprisingly
enough...both sides in the conflict...read it... [and] both recognized the validity and relevance
of our basic description and thesis - although both of them had different detailed criticism to
offer. I even have the suspicion that it was more appreciated by the parties in the conflict than
by a few outside parties." Leopoldo Niilus, Peace in the Sudan, Reflections on Questions for a
Written Interview, (Geneva: March 12, 1973), 9-10. WCC Archives, Geneva.
307
Kodwo Ankrah, interview.
308
Summary of the Proceedings of the Meeting, May 15, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva
309
Ibid.
310
Ibid.
311
Leopoldo Niilus, interview with the author, Geneva, May 22, 1982.
312
Report of the Meeting, Kampala, May 25, 1971 WCC Archives, Geneva.
313
Ibid.
314
Ibid.
315
According to Carr, as the Africa Secretary of the Interchurch Aid of the WCC, he was in charge
of organizing and transporting relief to Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War. During that war
also, there was a dispute between the consortium called Joint Church Aid and the WCC on
the question of what channels to use to send relief to Biafra. JCA had negotiated with
Portugal to use its colony as a launching place to fly relief to Biafra. At that time the Nigerian
government was able to show evidence that South Africa and Portugal along with France
were involved in the civil war by supplying arms and sending mercenaries to Biafra. Also
during this period, Portugal was heavily involved in its colonial wars in Mozambique,
Angola, and Guinea Bissau. Therefore, in addition to the antipathy of the OAU for the
secessionist movement in Biafra, this liaison between the churches and Portugal was very
much resented by many African governments. In fact, there was a suspicion that arms were
being transported to Biafra under cover of the relief of the Joint Church Aid. It was not clear
whether the churches were cooperating to provide the cover, or whether Portugal and South
 Africa were camouflaging their airplanes with the colors and marks of the churches. Carr said
that he realized how this identification with declared enemies of many African states was
dangerous for the image of the WCC in Africa. So he was able to negotiate on behalf of the
WCC, with the government of an independent African country, the Cameroon, so that the
WCC would be able to send its relief aid from there. He said that even though the idea of
sending relief to Biafra was not popular with the Nigerian government, at least the WCC was
not collaborating with Portugal and South Africa to do it. This, Carr said, improved the
prestige of the WCC in the eyes of many African governments. Burgess Carr, interview.
316
Ibid.
17
Reports of the Meeting, Kampala, Uganda, June 6, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva.
318
Joseph Lagu, Commanding Officer, Anya Nya Armed Forces, letter to Mading de Garang, 30
October 1970, Owiny-ki-bul, South Sudan. WCC Archives, Geneva.
319
Ibid.
320
Pirouet, 123.
321
Minutes of the Meeting, May 26, 1971, Geneva. WCC Archives, Geneva.
322
Samuel Bwogo, interview with author, Khartoum, Sudan, May 13-16, 1982.
323
Minutes of the Meeting, May 26, 1971, Geneva. WCC Archives, Geneva.
324
Mading de Garasg, letter to Dr. Leopoldo Niilus, CC1A, June 28, 1971, London. WCC
Archives, Geneva.
325
R. Eihot Kendall, letter to Kodwo Ankrah, July 9, 1971, London. WCC Archives, Geneva.
326
"An SSLM Official Statement," Grass Curtain August 4, 1971.
327
Dwain Epps, memorandum to Allan Brash, July 20, 1971. WCC Archives, Geneva.
328
Dwain Epps, letter to E, Mading de Garang and Lawrence Wol Wol, August 6, 1971, Geneva.
WCC Archives, Geneva.
329
Dwain Epps, interview.
330
Keesing's Contemporary Archives November 13-20, 1971, 24931.
331
Report on Messrs de Garang and Wol Wol's Mission to Africa, August 30, 1971, Geneva. WCC
Archives, Geneva.
332
Dwain Epps, interview.
333
"Sudan, Secret Southern Talks," Africa Confidential (February 4, 1972).
334
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 152.
335
Leopoldo Niilus, memorandum about appraisals of the present situation in the Sudan,
September 20, 1971, Geneva. WCC Archives, Geneva.
336
Leopoldo Niilus, letter to Burgess Carr, September 20, 1971, Geneva. WCC Archives, Geneva.
337
Kodwo Ankrah, aide memoire on presentation of documents on regional autonomy to Mr. de
Garang, September 24, 1971, Geneva. WCC Archives, Geneva.
 338
Leopoldo Niilas, interview.
339
Report on the Second WCC/AACC Mission to the Sudan, October 13-23, 1971. WCC
Archives, Geneva. In view of the constant skepticism expressed by Southerners about the
intentions of the government and the expressed fear that the government might be trying to
divide the exiled Southerners from the ones within the Sudan, there might be some grounds
for the caution of the intermediaries.
340
Leopoldo Niilus, interview.
341
Report on the Second WCC/AACC Mission to the Sudan, October 13-23, 1971. WCC
Archives, Geneva.
342
Ibid. The Nigerian civil war was a very divisive issue among African states, and this division
was allegedly exploited by countries like South Africa to deflect pressure on them from
African slates for their policies such as Apartheid.
343
Ibid.
344
Ibid.
345
Hatchel, Jones & Co., "Memorandum (or Submission to the Conflict Research Society,"
November 21, 1973.
346
Pirouet, 130.
47
Leopoldo Niilus and Kodwo Ankrah, interviews.
348
Samuel Bwogo, interview.
349
ibid.
350
Pirooet, 131.
351
Report of the Meeting, November 10, 1971, Addis Ababa. WCC Archives, Geneva.
352
Ibid.
353
Abel Alier, letter to Joseph Lagu, November 11, 1971, Addis Ababa. WCC Archives, Geneva.
354
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 155.
355
Ibid.
356
Ibid.
357
"Memorandum of Understanding" between the Sudan Government and the SSLM delegates,
November 9-10, 1971, Addis Ababa. WCC Archives, Geneva.
358
Ibid.
359
The SSLM already had the two detailed versions of autonomy in their possession.
360
Wai, The African-Arab Conflct, 155.
361
Pirouet, 131.
362
Leopoldo Niilus and Kodwo Ankrah, letter to Abel Alier, November 17, 1971, Geneva. WCC
Archives, Geneva.
 363
Philips Bowring, "The Southern Sudan, Anya Nya Now Holds the Key," Financial Times
November 26, 1971, 9.
364
Ibid.
365
Ibid.
366
Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972, (London: David & Charles, 1974), 142-
143.
367
Pirouet, 132.
368
Leopoldo Niilus, interview.
369
Quoted in a letter by Leopoldo Niilus to Mr. Mohammed Taha, Sudan Government Liaison in
Geneva, December 30, 1971, Geneva. WCC Archives, Geneva.
370
Eprile, 150.
371
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 106.
372
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 156.
373
Kodwo Ankrah, memorandum to Alan Brash, December 22, 1971, Geneva. WCC Archives,
Geneva. The implication of this statement seems to be that if the Sudan Goverment and the
SSLM did not succeed in reaching an agreement in January, member bodies of the WCC
might start giving aid directly to the Anya Nya and that the WCC couldn't do anything to stop
it.
374
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 156.
375
Ibid.
376
Samuel Bwogo, interview.
77
Pirouet, 133.
378
Burgess Carr, interview.
379
See Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 157,
380
Burgess Carr, interview.
381
Leopoldo Niilus, interview.
382
Some point out that Mading de Garang bad crossed swords with Carr in a couple of instances
before; thus, be did not find the title "chairman" acceptable and agreed to the term
"moderator",
383
Leopolds Niilus, interview.
384
Samuel Bwogo, interview.
385
Kodwo Ankrah, interview.
386
Samuel Bwogo, interview.
387
The substance of this sermon was recited to the author by Can- and is interesting for its
emotional end inspirational appeal.
 388
Pirouet, 135.
389
Burgess Carr, interview.
90
Africa Research Bulletin, February 1-29, 1972, 2382.
91
This seems an obvious reference to the Eritrean problem, and the aid the Sudanese government was
giving the Eritreans as a retaliation to Ethiopia's aid to the SSLM.
92
Burgess Carr, interview.
393
Carr's judgement and caution seem to have been timely and justified in view of the notions
entertained by some influential Northerners. O'Ballance, for example, reports a conversation
with the former Permier Mahgoub and points out that: "He [Mahgoub] told me that Abel
Alier was the architect of the agreement, and that he bad made it to suit the South and not the
North." Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1977), 159. Given this perception, it seems indeed wise that Alier did not sign the
document.
394
See for example, Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 160; and Eprile, 154 & ff.
395
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 160.
396
Ibid.
397
Pirouet, 138.
398
Ibid., 142.
399
Ibid.
400
O'Ballance, 143.
401
Pirouet, 138.
402
Ibid., 140.
403
Ibid., 142.
404
Ibid.
405
It seems that the government representatives were trying to avoid the situation where Lagu
might go back and be persuaded by one group or another not to terminate the fighting.
406
Elfan Rees, "Exercises in Private Diplomacy," Unofficial Diplomats, Maureen and Joseph
Johnson, eds., (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1977), 126. Carr said that he had received
medals from many other African governments for his role in the Sudan mediation.
407
Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Information and Culture, "Press Conference held by Sayed
Abel Alier, Vice President, about the Addis Ababa Agreement for the Southern Region,"
March 3, 1972, 20.
 Part Three
Theory and Practice
 Chapter 7
Analysis of the Conflict Resolution
Process
In this chapter, the two major mediation efforts presented in Part Two
will be examined and the reasons for their success or failure analyzed.

Factors That Led to the Success of the

WCC/AACC Mediation

In looking at the WCC/AACC's mediation effort, five clusters of factors

can be identified which facilitated its success: a) factors that deal with the
nature and the process of the conflict, b) external factors, c) internal factors,
d) the personality of the parties, and e) the mediators themselves.

Factors dealing with the nature and process of the conflict

One leading factor in the success of the WCC/AACC mediation might

have been the existence of a stalemate between the warring parties. Both
outsiders and the parties to the conflict perceived a "parity of forces"
between the contending parties, and, therefore, a stalemate in the battlefield.
Of course, military parity is very difficult to measure, especially in a
guerilla war. Thus, the concept must be used in a rather liberal sense.
Howell has developed some criteria to establish such parity in a war of
insurgency:

In a guerilla war, parity is reached not necessarily by equality of

strength but at a point where the superior conventional force of the
 counter-insurgent is unable either to eradicate the insurgent or prevent
his continued recruitment of men and continued access to weaponry,
and the insurgent, is unable to wrest control in areas which the counter-
insurgent had determined to hold, and is unable to destroy the political
will of the counter-insurgent to defend.408
In light of these criteria, there were many indicators by about 1969 in the
Sudan Civil War of parity between government and Anya Nya forces.
Estimates vary of the exact number of government forces deployed in the
South. The Sudanese government had over 14,000 soldiers and 6,000 armed
police engaged in the South, and these forces did not have the
reinforcement they needed.409 observer provides an illustration of the
evolution of the armed conflict:

What both sides have in common is weariness with a war that does not
lead to decisive victory for either side, and if it did, would not lead to a
stable political settlement The Sudanese army claimed in January to
have overrun two important Anya Nya base camps near the Uganda
border. But, the Anya Nya now claim that they retook the camps,
causing heavy losses to the Government troops and winning some
defectors. The war does not progress but rather sways on.410

By 1971, it appears that the Numeri government was aware that it could not
totally defeat the Anya Nya without a very prolonged war and constant
repression of the South. As more and more refugees left the country, the
Anya Nya had fewer and fewer problems in maintaining, and in fact
increasing, its recruitment of young Southerners. According to Bell:

The Northern Sudanese did not for a long time believe that they had to
accommodate to the needs and demands of the Southerners. Most
importantly, they did not accept that they must accommodate
themselves to Southern fears because they had to do so rather than
because they chose to do so....For Khartoum, for a decade, the
Southerners were not equals but ragged guerillas, natives, abeeds
[slaves] of the bush, who would in time accept the logic of events and
the decent intentions of Khartoum, who would be coopted or
 intimidated. Finally, the penny dropped in Khartoum with the
realization that simply as ragged guerillas in the bush, the Anya Nya
could continue forever to ruin Sudanese prospects. The Southerners had
compensating assets that offset the power and prestige of the legitimate
government.411
By the time mediation activities began, the government had recognized
that there was never going to be a military solution to the Southern
problem. All they could do "was not more than contain the rebels in the
wilds and to do less would permit an escalation and expansion of disorder
that could not be permitted. Khartoum could not win, but could not afford
to lose either."412
It also seems that the stalemate was becoming apparent to the Anya Nya,
who were growing stronger and more effective over time, but could not
even dream of final victory over the government forces. Assessing the Anya
Nya's prospects to attain its objective of an independent South, an observer
noted, "the Anya Nya had made the South virtually ungovernable, but an
internationally recognized secession was as far away as ever."413 The Anya
Nya could not rely indefinitely upon the provision of arms and weapons
from outside sources, nor could it afford to buy them in large quantities. It
might have been able to overrun a major Sudan army garrison or take over
some towns, but was unable to sustain control for any length of time. The
Anya Nya had the power to continue the war but not to win it, and had to
limit itself to "steer a middle course of protracted guerilla warfare.414
In addition to the existence of stalemate, or as a result of it, both parties
were encountering difficulties in running the war. The cost had become
exorbitant in terms of human lives and in economic terms. The Vice
President admitted that the government was spending a large portion of its
defense budget to maintain security in the South, and that the administration
was running at a deficit.415 Some estimates indicate that the government
was spending about twenty percent of its total revenue on the war, without
including the contributions of Russian and Egyptian military aid.416 As a
result, economic development projects had to suffer in both the North and
the South. Moreover,

Aid from other countries for economic and social development was not
forthcoming. Western European countries, traditional sources of
 assistance, were not enthusiastic in helping the Sudan out of its
difficulties as long as the war continued. The instability caused by the
war in both the North and the South reduced the potential aid from these
countries and from international organizations. The solution of the
Southern problem, the Government hoped, would remove some of the
restrictions on aid and assistance.417
Thus, it was clear that the government did not have the resources it
would need to win the war, and, even if it had, the costs were unacceptable.
Similar resources and economic limitations also deterred the Anya Nya
from winning the war. It seems, therefore, that by the time the WCC and
AACC had intervened, and face-to-face negotiations had started between
the SSLM and the Sudanese government, the continuing stalemate might
have removed from both sides the lure to fight for victory, and have pushed
them to try seriously for a negotiated settlement.

Internal political factors

While the nature, evolution, and characteristics of the war contributed to

the resolution process, other factors inside the government and the Anya
Nya also played a significant role in leading to the success of the
WCC/AACC mediation effort.
It must be remembered that Numeiri's coup d'etat was at first
characterized as a "Socialist Revolution." The members of the Communist
Party had long recognized the Southern problem and, beginning in the mid-
1960s, had advocated an autonomous rule for the South which would allow
for the development of Southern cultures and traditions within a unified
Sudan.418 As the communists were the major advisors to Numeiri, his
announced plans for dealing with the Southern problem drew heavily from
the Communist Party's policy.419 Joseph Garang, an ardent communist, was
made Minister of Southern Affairs to implement the policy of Southern
autonomy. However, as pointed out in the previous chapters, Garang had a
very fixed notion of how this autonomy was to come about As a
precondition to the implementation of autonomy, he wanted to build a
"broad socialist oriented democratic movement" in the South, which was to
be part and parcel of "the revolutionary structure" in the North.
 In hindsight, it could be argued that the communist's policy moved the
conflict one step towards its resolution by suggesting autonomy as a
possible solution, since this suggestion later formed at least the focal point
for the subsequent settlement evolved during the negotiation. However,
Garang's manner of implementing autonomy delayed the eventual
resolution of the conflict because his approach was strongly resented by
Southerners. It was perceived as a diversionary tactic from the real issue of
autonomy, as a means of dividing the South and weakening the Southern
armed struggle.
The coup and countercoup of July 1971, that brought the communists
down, and the traumatic effect of these events on President Numeiri created
a change in the psychological atmosphere in Khartoum. It also changed the
values and priorities of the government in a direction favorable to peace.
Numeiri abandoned his "anti-imperialist" policy and Garang's idea of first
making the South socialist A perception in the government arose that if
concessions were made to the demands of the South, the latter would
eventually find itself economically dependent on the North, and
consequently, Southern leadership would be relying on Khartoum's
patronage. This, it was thought, would eventually make their ideas of
secession unworkable. "A settlement would be bound up with wholesale
Southernization and the creation of new posts for politically influential
Southerners; as a group, and especially as individuals, these Southerners
would develop an interest m remaining Sudanese."420 Along with this
domestic change in perception, Numeiri was slowly changing his foreign
policy by emphasizing African relations instead of single-mindedly
pursuing his historical relations with Arab countries.
Moreover, Numeiri was encountering many internal enemies. The
communists, although the original promoters of Southern autonomy, were
driven into the opposition camp because of the aborted coup of July 1971.
Pro-Arab groups were fearful that Numeiri was taking the Sudan away from
its Arab alliance to new alliances in Africa. The Muslim Brothers,
advocates of an Islamic state, opposed him on the grounds that his actions
were making their goal impossible.421 Tribesmen revolted in the Nuba
mountains of the North. In 1971, a new group calling itself the United
Sudan Africa Liberation Front, began organizing to fight the
government.422 The SSLM reportedly had been in touch with both of these
groups.423
 Thus, Numeiri's insecurity from his fellow Northerners might have
forced him to accommodate to the demands of Southerners so that he could
at least neutralize that conflict and perhaps cultivate their support against
the communists and the Muslim Brothers. In hindsight, what happened in
the North after the Addis Ababa Agreement was signal might give some
credence to this interpretation. After the war was over, Numeiri saw to it
that his most trusted bodyguards were Southerners.424 Also, from the
perspective of the SSLM, since Numeiri's regime had made it possible for
them to attain their objectives, at least, to a large extent, their fate was
inextricably intertwined with that of his government. Hence, they opposed
any group that tried to destabilize the central government. Beshir describes
the situation as follows: "No one on either side could afford a failure of the
negotiations....The political future of everyone who took part depended to
some extent on the talks succeeding. Failure would have been disastrous for
both sides."425
Another factor that might have paved the way for the 1972 settlement
was the Round Table Conference of March 1965. In this conference,
various options to deal with the Southern problem were laid out and
discussed. It could be said that the resolutions of this conference served as a
focal-point for future negotiations. Alier's Proposal for Regional Self
Government for the South, one of the negotiating documents during the
Addis Ababa negotiations, drew heavily upon the recommendations made
by the Twelve Man Committee. This committee, it may be recalled, was
created at the end of the conference with a mandate to study the positions
presented by various groups at the meeting and to come up with
consolidated proposals.426
Other events transpiring in the South also pushed the Sudanese
government seriously to consider negotiations. First and foremost was the
unity of the South. About the middle of 1970, various factions of
Southerners living in the Anya Nya-controlled areas, or in exile, were able
to reach a greater unity among themselves than ever before. Joseph Lagu's
ability to command a wide measure of support was strengthened by the
Israeli decision to channel military aid through him.427 Efficiency of civil
administration in Anya Nya-held territories was improving, and as a result,
support was growing for the Anya Nya. Police and security services as well
as a network of schools and basic medical help were established. The
SSLM distributed seeds, collected taxes, and adjudicated cases.
Resettlement schemes in protected areas were also begun.428 Moreover, in
1970, the Grass Curtain publication in London, was publicizing the war and
gaining international support for the Southern cause. This no doubt
strengthened the SSLM and the Anya Nya. As a result of all this, the SSLM
became a competitor with the Sudanese government and offered itself as a
serious alternative to the Khartoum government in the eyes of Southerners.
On the other hand, the internal divisions and disagreements did not
entirely disappear. There was still some degree of tribal animosity among
the Anya Nya. There were also divisions within the ranks of the Southern
elites--the strong adherents to the idea of secession being the highly
educated elites,429 while those in the lower ranks were more supportive of
federation. Such divisions within the Anya Nya and the SSLM were,
therefore, sources of weakness in the movement. Besides disagreements in
the ranks of the Anya Nya and the SSLM, there were also cleavages among
the moderate insiders, i.e., Southerners who lived under the government's
control, and the hardliner outsiders.430 The government's declaration of
regional autonomy for the South had intensified this cleavage. The insiders
argued that Numeiri's new policy should be given a chance, and were
strongly advocating this position inside and outside the Sudan. The
outsiders insisted that their solution was different from that of the
government, and that, whatever the solution might be, it must be
determined by the agreement of the liberation movement fighters and not
solely by the government The many contentions between these two groups
may have given the Anya Nya and the SSLM a feeling of weakness. Thus,
while the unity of the Anya Nya created pressure on the government to
negotiate rather than to continue fighting, the feeling of weakness within
the SSLM caused similar pressure on them, making them eager to grasp
every opportunity for serious talk whenever it arose.
Another factor internal to the SSLM was the sense of urgency due to the
cholera and small pox epidemics which had broken out in the South. It
called strongly for the establishment of peace in order to effectively deal
with the problem. "Discussions about aid programs and the experience of
cholera and small pox epidemics had probably impressed on Southerners
the urgency of the need for settlement even if this involved
compromise."431
In addition, although it might have been entirely fortuitous and minor, the
occurrence of the plane crash in December 1971, and the politically wise
handling of the situation by the Anya Nya just before the start of formal
negotiations in Addis Ababa, was able to create goodwill in the North. In
some way, it may have contributed to the reduction of obstacles in the
North against negotiating with the South.

External political factors

Other international and regional factors influenced the attitude of both

parties to seek a peaceful solution to their conflict.
Primarily, it could be said that the Sudanese government, and particularly
Numeiri, was under pressure from neighbouring governments concerning
the problems that Southern Sudanese refugees caused in their territories. In
some instances, the influx of refugees into neighbouring countries was so
large that it stretched their already constrained security, education, health
and other social service systems. Each time the hostilities escalated and a
new wave of refugees crossed the boundaries, the neighbouring
governments became even more anxious.432
The Sudan Civil War was perceived by many African governments,
rightly or wrongly, as a racial war between the Arab North and the
indigenous Southerners. Each new government taking power in the Sudan
promised to deal with the Southern problem, but such promises were soon
forgotten and the atrocities of war continued. Foreign criticism of this
situation, particularly by African governments, mounted against the
Sudanese government for its failure to bring about peace. This might have
produced a genuine eagerness on the part of Numeiri's government to
search sincerely for a solution to the Southern problem, especially when it
became evident that military victory was unlikely.
Numeiri took various steps that may have caused tremendous pressure on
the Anya Nya to seek negoatiations. First, he tried to improve relations with
neighbouring governments. In March 1971, the Sudanese and Ethiopian
governments agreed to stop aiding and abetting each other's secessionists.
In November 1971, President Numeiri and Emperor Haile Selassie signed
an agreement whereby each undertook to strictly "observe the principles of
non-interference and respect for territorial integrity" and to discourage the
use of their respective territories for acts directed against the territorial
integrity of the other.433 Numeiri also was patching up his relationship with
Uganda. Towards the end of 1971, Amin of Uganda and Numeiri signed an
agreement whereby the latter undertook to abandon his support for Obote in
return for Amin's curtailment of the Anya Nya's international access
through Uganda.
Meanwhile, the relationship between Uganda and Israel had deteriorated.
Amin apparently resented the strong Israeli influence in his army.
Moreover, Egypt and Libya were working very hard to remove Uganda
from the Israeli fold. In February 1972, Amin visited Libya, where he was
offered massive economic and military aid if he would break his
relationship with Israel. By March 1972, after the Addis Ababa Agreement
was ratified, relations between Israel and Uganda had deteriorated so much
that the Israeli military mission was expelled from Uganda.434 Naturally,
this should have created a serious worry in the minds of Anya Nya leaders
about the possible restriction of their arms supply from Israel, even though
they had managed to evade such restrictions in the past.435 This, in turn,
may have made the prospects nof peace talks more appealing to the Anya
Nya leaders.
On the side of the Sudanese government, the July 1971 communist coup
and Numeiri's suspicion of Soviet complicity had created such a level of
animosity between the two governments that Numeiri decided to reduce his
dependency on arms from the USSR. Following its expulsion from Egypt
the Soviet Union was eventually expelled from the Sudan. The uneasy
relationship between the Sudan and the Soviet Union may have, therefore,
instilled a sense of insecurity in President Numeiri and may have impressed
upon him the need for settling peacefully the conflict with the Anya Nya.
Another external factor may have had a pacifying influence, was the
shadow left behind by the Nigerian Civil War. In the Organization of
African Unity,. the war had brought about a cleavage between those
countries that supported Biafra, at least on humanitarian grounds, and those
that opposed secession. Therefore, many African leaders were reluctant to
take up the SSLM case in OAU forums. On the other hand, the manner in
which the Nigerian civil war came to an end was not very encouraging to
the SSLM, demonstrating, as it did, that such a war could terminate in a
military victory for the government. Moreover, despite years of armed
resistance, the SSLM received no formal recognition from the OAU or any
member state, and such recognition became even less likely after the
Biafran experience. The SSLM had tried to counter the Biafran analogy,
saying that their struggle was different because they were not fighting to
tear apart an African country, but were trying to protect indigenous African
culture from alien invading forces, Arabization and imperialism. They
contended that the Anya Nya was a vanguard against this kind of
neocolonialism.436 Despite such arguments, the SSLM was unable to
mobilize official support for its cause from any independent country in
Africa.
Moreover, even the idea of secession and eventual independence
provided little consolation to many Southerners because of their conviction
that the South could not by itself be economically viable. It was hoped that
one of the bordering countries might invite the seceding SSLM to join or
federate with it. However, no such request came. This again might have
discouraged Anya Nya leaders from continuing the war to attain their
objectives, but rather to seek a negotiated settlement.
Another external factor may have been the efforts of the Movement for
Colonial Freedom. Although it did not succeed in resolving the Sudan
conflict, it could have contributed to acceptance of the possibility of
negotiation in the eyes of both parties. The encouragement and persuasion
of the Makerere Group and Kampala Committee, urging General Lagu to
ratify the Addis Ababa Agreement once it had been negotiated, were
additional factors contributing to the success of the resolution process.

Idiosyncratic factors of the key personalities in the conflict

Other factors relating to the personalities of key role players in the North
and the South also contributed to the success of the conflict resolution
process. Particularily significant was the coming to power of Numeiri,
Alier, and Lagu.
When Numeiri took over the government, one of his announced
objectives was to solve the Southern problem. He had served in the South
as officer in charge in Equatoria province from November 1966, to
December 1967.437 His own experience in the conflict made him realize the
war had become intractable and that there was probably no military
solution. Thus, unlike previous government leaders who saw the war only
from Khartoum, Numeiri had a more realistic view of the conflict. As a
means of dealing with the Southern problem, he made the June Declaration
of Autonomy for the South. At the time of the declaration, many people
believed in the sincerity of his intentions. However, from June 1969, until
the coup and countercoup of July 1971, Numeiri did nothing to make his
promise credible.
Notwithstanding the delay, the fact that Numeiri had a firsthand view of
the war, and that he took the initiative to announce the autonomy proposal,
caused many Southerners, and even the Anya Nya, to believe that Numeiri
was a more realistic and fair person than other Northern leaders and that he
might be the only one who would grant Southerners any concessions.
Another factor contributing to the success of the resolution process of the
Southern conflict was the appointment of Abel Alier as the Minister of
Southern Affairs. Alier was dedicated to the peaceful settlement of the civil
war. He also enjoyed tremendous respect both in the North and the South,
among insiders and those in exile. Before accepting the cabinet
appointment, he set conditions, one of which was that the government
search seriously for a peaceful means of resolving the conflict. He extracted
a guarantee from the government affirming that concrete steps would be
taken to detail and implement the idea of regional autonomy.438 As soon as
he assumed his position, Alier saw to it that a draft proposal for an
autonomous South was worked out by a special committee comprised
mainly of educated Southerners living within the Sudan. This document
indicated to the SSLM that the government was serious in its search for a
solution, and was used as the basis for the negotiations in Addis Ababa.
Compared to Joseph Garang, the previous Minister of Southern Affairs,
Alier was described as a very reasonable, persuasive, and patient man. Alier
must have impressed Southern leaders because he was not only "ready to
admit the previous mistakes in the approach of the Numeiri policy toward
the South but also emphasized candidly the need for a conference between
the government and the SSLM to discuss the nature of regional autonomy
for the Southern provinces."439
On the Anya Nya side, the eventual control of the fighting forces by one
leader, General Lagu, was a positive factor towards the attainment of peace.
Lagu was considered a "born leader" by many, and had had a personal
friendship with President Numeiri. Both men received military training in
the same class at the Sudan Military College in Khartoum in the early
1950's where they were on a first name basis. Both were reportedly in the
same barracks in Juba in 1960.440 That kind of personal relationship and
common background could have created a sympathetic attitude between the
two leaders which may have contributed to a congenial atmosphere for the
negotiations. This could be illustrated by the understanding attitude which
Lagu manifested to reporters when asked about the intensification of
Northern military activity in the South in December 1971, just before the
February peace talks began in Addis Ababa. Lagu responded that "it was
possible that Khartoum's motivation was to come to the peace table with as
much military advantage as it could get;" and he described General Numeiri
"as the most reasonable leader Khartoum had had."441
Moreover, for the first time, both sides were led by people with sufficient
political weight to implement whatever agreement they might negotiate. "It
was Sudan's good fortune to witness the emergence of Joseph Lap as the
Anya Nya strongman at a time when President Numeiri's power position in
Khartoum had become firmly consolidated."442

The mediators

The mediators themselves were a fifth factor strongy contributing to the

success of the mediation effort.
Firstly, the identity and nature of the intermediary organizations were
assests facilitating success. In a conflict between a rebel group and a
government over the issue of secession, the kind of body suitable for the
role of intermediary always becomes a thorny question. The conflict is
usually considered to be an internal issue, and official involvement of any
government or international political body is deemed as interference. That
was one reason that neither the OAU nor any other African government
dared to involve themselves in the Sudan conflict They were afraid of being
blamed for "intervention in the internal political affairs of a sovereign state"
which is proscribed both by the OAU and the UN Charters. The
involvement of such bodies is perceived as giving international political
recognition to the cause of the rebel group, and to give the latter the status
of a de facto independent political entity parallel to that of the government.
This was part of the reason why Premier Mahgoub of the Sudan turned
down the mediation offer of President Nkrumah of Ghana in 1967, by
saying that the Southern problem was an internal affair.443
 In contrast to this situation, the nature of the WCC and the AACC was a
great advantage. They are nonpolitical, although multinational
organizations. Their interaction with the rebel groups would not, prima
facie, confer any political recognition of sovereignty or legitimacy upon
those groups either implicitly or explicitly. Thus, their auspices or good
offices could be acceptable to the Sudanese government without
endangering its international image vis-a-vis the rebels.
Even with this advantage, the WCC and AACC handled their
intervention in a rather sensitive manner. According to Niilus, in order to
dispel any fears that the government might have had concerning questions
of recognition or involvement in its internal affairs, the intermediaries
offered a plan that would give the government a way out by making the
intermediaries a scapegoat. The WCC/AACC team suggested that if their
initial "quiet approach" to the SSLM to offer their good offices were
exploited by the latter to generate any international political advantage, the
intermediaries authorized the government to deny all knowledge of its
alleged interaction with the intermediaries, or to dismiss it by saying;
"There were some well meaning characters around, but we do not know
what they were up to."444 This extra sensitivity and caution on the part of
the intermediaries may have avoided the usual entanglement with issues of
recognition which arise in mediation between rebels and governments. In
addition to their cautious approach, the fact that the intermediaries were
ecumenical bodies presented no risk to the Sudanese government in
accepting their good offices.
One of the paradoxes of the mediation was that Christian ecumenical
bodies were playing a peacemaking role in what was described by many as
a Muslim-Christian conflict, even though it was clear that religion was not
the sole, or even the most important, cause of the conflict. Curiously, it may
have been the religious nature of the organizations which contributed to
their acceptance as intermediaries. According to Niilus, in a conflict where
religion is an important factor in the intercommunal life of the parties, like
that of the Sudan, the intermediaries were better off if they were considered
as "people of religion" rather than politicians, even if they were from a
competing or different faith. This is because people of religion are allowed
to raise moral questions and concerns, such as, right and wrong, just and
unjust, reconciliation, forgiving, human suffering, etc., issues that usually
go beyond political considerations. On the other hand, politicians or
political organizations who tried to deal with such issues might be treated
with suspicion since it is always assumed that they have ulterior political
motives besides the ones publicly stated.445 In view of this, the fact that the
third parties were ecumenical bodies rather than political organizations may
have made credible their concern for reconciliation and the alleviation of
human suffering, and made readily acceptable their offer for mediation.446
In addition, the WCC's image in Africa was enhanced by its activities
such as the Program to Combat Racism,447 its 1971 Resolution on Unity
and Human Rights in Africa, and its humanitarian assistance to Biafra
without taking sides in the conflict. These activities identified it as an
organization that truly had the interests of the African people at heart, and
as one that was working towards the attainment of justice in a continent
which had been exploited and oppressed for centuries. Concerning the
Program to Combat Racism, Colin Legum writes:

The World Council of Churches had played an important part in

bringing about these talks [the Addis Ababa negotiations] a role
facilitated by its recent controversial decision to give support to
liberation movements in Southern Africa. This action gained the
confidence of Numeiri and of the largely Christian leadership of the
Anya Nya.448

Especially given the traditional attitude of the missionaries and the

Christian churches in the South Sudan, who were identified with
colonialism and as being staunchly opposed to the Muslim government in
the North, it was refreshing and attractive to the Sudanese government that
a Christian organization like the WCC rejected the missionaries' perspective
on the conflict and offered its auspices for peacemaking with due sensitivity
towards the government's concerns.
The WCC and the AACC had also repeatedly proved to the conflicting
parties that they had no axe to grind except in the attainment of a peace
acceptable to both parties. If there was any personal interest at all in the
outcome it would have been on the part of Carr, who reportedly approached
President Numeiri on the pretext that European and American churches
were putting pressure on him to live up to his promises given them in New
York at the Joint Church Aid meeting. Even if this could be construed as a
personal interest in the outcome of the negotiations, the intermediaries'
objective was congruent with that of the parties, it could not, therefore, have
endangered the mediation by raising suspicions about the neutrality or the
ulterior motives of the third parties.
Moreover, the intermediaries' ability to maintain their special relationship
with both parties without compromising their own independence was a
great asset Even though the AACC sent a delegation to the Sudan in 1966,
to investigate and report on allegations of Northern religious persecution of
Southerners, it concluded that the situation was not as bad as the
Southerners had claimed. It is true that this report alienated the Anya Nya
because it ignored some of their claims. But on the other hand, it did create
a positive relationship between the AACC and the Sudanese government,
which was later utilized in opening channels of communication to work on
ways of attaining reconciliation. Although the Anya Nya was angered by
the AACC, it had a very good relationship with the WCC. The WCC had
provided humanitarian and educational aid to Southerners in exile, had
adopted programs that recognized African problems, and in general, was
concerned with the plight of Southerners. Thus, despite the fact that one of
the WCC's affiliates had antagonized the Southern movement in the past,
the SSLM could not abandon its special relationship with the WCC. Some
SSLM officials felt "that WCC's newly adopted policy of aiding liberation
movements in Southern Africa and Ankrah's own presence were sufficient
guarantees."449
From the perspective of the other conflicting party also, it was clear that
neither could the Sudanese government afford to ignore the WCC. One of
the WCC's objectives was to send aid to the Southern Sudanese through
Khartoum, even though it had insisted that peace and reconciliation should
be made preconditions for this aid. Control over the way in which aid
reached the needy Southerners was important for the Sudanese government
If the aid was sent through, and distributed by, the Anya Nya this could
have established its legitimacy as a contending government in the eyes of
the Southerners. Moreover, the aid would have benefited not only the
Southern civilian population, but also the guerillas, which would have
reduced the dependency of the latter on the local population for food.
Whatever money the liberation movement might have spent on buying
medicine, shelter, and other necessities, could have thus been utilized for
buying arms, since their basic need would have been taken care of by the
aid.
The WCC's position on the question of aid could not be ignored by either
the Sudanese government or the SSLM, since the WCC could influence not
only its member churches, but other well-organized and well-endowed
agencies, such as the Joint Church Aid. Several times during the peace
process, the WCC/AACC delegation seems to have utilized the aid factor as
an important incentive for the parties to make peace by making
reconciliation a corequisite if not a prerequisite for their promise to provide
relief that would effectively meet the prevailing needs. The logic behind
this position was difficult to contest, since it was obvious that relief and aid
could not be effective if the war continued to undo whatever improvement
the aid might have created. Fortunately, the fact that the aid was contingent
upon the attainment of peace also served as a lever for the intermediaries in
making the ideas of reconciliation, compromise, and agreement more
attractive and urgent to the parties.
Another factor facilitating the success of the mediation effort was the
study sponsored by the WCC called "The Sudan Conflict: Its History and
Development." This document could be viewed as a diagnosis of the
conflict by an independent party. It must be remembered that this study was
given to both parties during the early stages of the peace process, when the
intermediaries were trying to lay the groundwork for negotiations to be
acceptable to both parties. First, the study demonstrated to the parties that
the intermediaries were acting not from ignorance but that they were
familiar with the nature and complexity of the issues, thereby enhancing
their credibility. Secondly, the Sudan conflict was one of those conflicts
with many facets and many confusing labels. For some, it was a war over
colonialism; for others, a race war and genocide; for yet others, a religious
war. The study attempted to put all these aspects into proper perspective,
and dealt with the underlying economic and political dimensions of the
often-stated superficial labels. Both parties appreciated the attempt, and
whatever misperceptions the intermediaries might have had about the
conflict were corrected with the help of the concerned groups.
The intermediaries' study probably had a positive psychological effect on
each of the parties by making them feel that their side of the issue was
understood. It may also have given each party the benefit of understanding
their adversary's position, as stated and viewed by an objective outsider
whom they could trust. It is less likely that either party would distort
statements by neutral third parties about the dynamics of the conflict than if
the same statements were made by the adversary. The study may also have
clarified and focused the objective basis for the underlying issues of the
conflict for each of the parties involved, issues that had become obscured
over time by the camouflage of various labels. It may have enabled each
party to refine its own position by hearing how it sounded to a third party. It
also probably gave each party the opportunity to understand the limited
character of its adversary's motives, concerns, and preferences, rather than
perceiving the adversary as totally unaccommodating. It helped to establish
that the intermediaries were sincere and had no hidden agenda of their own.
An added benefit in this problem-clarification approach by the
intermediaries was that it saved formal negotiating time, by already having
gained the agreement of the parties on what were the issues of the conflict,
rather than leaving these issues to emerge at the conference table. This
approach may also have partially circumvented emotional obstacles that
could have stranded the negotiation's progress, were the parties left to
clarify divisive issues in a face-to-face confrontation.
The mere composition of the mediating team itself was a factor
contributing to successful mediation. It was a great advantage that a team
rather than a single individual assumed the mediatory role. This created a
chance for dividing the labor and allowed each team member to contribute
in an area where he was particularly skilled. The team approach provided an
opportunity for an expanded range of views, options, strategies, and skills
to be considered so that they might deal with the problems arising during
mediation.
Within the team itself, the spectrum of positions expressed in the conflict
were represented. Burgess Carr, because he was the General Secretary of
the AACC, and because of the AACC's past history, was more identified
with the cause or ideal of preserving the unity of African states. He believed
himself to be a "true African" and tried to express his convictions in many
ways. Because of the AACC's views on unity, and the past dealings of the
Sudanese government with the AACC, the government felt that its position
in the conflict could be well understood by the intermediaries. On the other
hand, Kodwo Ankrah, as the WCC's Refugee Secretary for Africa, had
worked for several years with Southern Sudanese refugees in exile by
providing material, educational, and other needed relief and assistance. He
had been well-known and respected among the Southerners for years, since
he was instrumental in the education and training of some of the SSLM
officials. He had had firsthand experience with the suffering of the
Southerners as a result of the war, and was considered to be sympathetic to
their plight. As a result, he commanded great trust by the SSLM and his
presence in the mediation team was a guarantee that their position would be
understood and well-represented among the intermediaries. Niilus, even
though a non-African, was a trained lawyer with keen awareness of the
international situations and forces at work. He was not identified as being
sympathetic to either cause, but commanded respect for his expertise and
the organization he represented.
In considering also the respective personalities and skills of the
intermediaries, it can be seen how they complemented each other and
provided a good ground to facilitate the success of the peacemaking
process. According to Beshir, "The fact that Ankrah and Carr, the
mediators, were both Africans--the first from Ghana and the second from
Liberia--contributed to their success in their roles. Notwithstanding the fact
that they both represented church organizations, they were accepted by the
Northern representatives.450
Personality wise, many observers, including this author find Burgess Carr
to be a very charismatic person and an eloquent orator. Carr "had a presence
of mind to make quick and appropriate remarks and to take advantage of
situations or opportunities that might arise during the negotiations."451
According to Niilus, Carr manifested a highly politically acute mind and a
good sense of reality. Carr "knew how to me his leadership qualities with
the position attached to it, and knew how to show it in the African context
Carr always dressed in a traditional African attire with a head dress and a
chief's stick, a traditional symbol of authority. He had a big car with the
AACC flag on it."452 In the opinion of the other intermediaries, Carr's
clever manipulation of symbols and gestures provided an African context
for the negotiations as well as exerting subtle pressure on the parties.
According to Ankrah, this also exerted a certain degree of pressure on the
negotiators because no one in any of the delegations wanted Carr to brand
him as intransigent.453
Carr had pined his exposure in inter-African politics and diplomatic
circles during the Biafran crisis when he was in charge of negotiating with,
and channeling WCC aid through, many governments and leaders in Africa.
He reportedly knew people in positions of authority in many African
governments. According to Niilus, Carr was the type of person who would
make friends all the way from the shoeshine boys to the prime ministers and
"he got a lot of things fixed in a way that none of us could ever get done,"
and this was a great asset.454 Carr is also reported to have had great skill in
running meetings, and an ability to listen well and to point out the fallacies
in the arguments.
In contrast, Ankrah is a much more low-key, soft-spoken and humble
person. He perceives himself to be a simple man and "a man of the
people."455 Trained in theology and social work, he is seen as a person of
great integrity, and as a very compassionate individual. Despite his
background and better opportunity possibilities, he has chosen to work in
many difficult circumstances that have involved helping victims of mass
suffering and atrocities. According to Epps, "Ankrah had an understanding
of the people's suffering deep in his soul. He was a person that people
trusted."456 Ankrah's colleagues describe him as a straight forward person
who is "not afraid to tell the truth," and "tells it as it is." He was one of the
first people to urge the WCC to assume a peacemaking role in the Sudan
conflict. In addition, he did a lot of background work, particularly with the
SSLM in preparation for the Addis Ababa negotiations.
Niilus, an Argentine citizen, is a trained lawyer and an experienced
practitioner of international relations. In his capacity as Director of the
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, he was involved in
many international issues and was sensitive to the international forces with
which the intermediaries had to contend. He provided information on, and
analysis of, the international aspects of the peace process, in private
consultations with the parties, and during the negotiations. According to
Epps, "When others looked at the issues at hand, Leopoldo looked at the
external forces: what needed to be done in Washington, London, Oslo, etc.,
and analyzed who was interested in seeing the negotiation succeed and who
wanted it to fail."457 Moreover, Niilus is a person of wit and humor. When
the parties locked horns or reached a deadlock in their negotiations, Niilus
would either crack a joke "from his endless catalogue" or tell a pertinent
story that might either make the parties laugh or give them some insights
into their intransigence. His witticisms are reported to have kept up the
spirits of the negotiators at difficult times.458 He is also reported to have
developed a camaraderie and special communication with Vice President
Alier and Dr. Mansour Kahlid, due to their shared legal background, which
helped in developing confidence and trust.
Samuel Bwogo, the General Secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches,
a Southerner, helped a great deal in the background preparations and the
formation of liaisons between the intermediaries and the Sudanese
government Bwogo "had been actively involved in the preparatory
talks....He was at home with the representatives of the WCC and the
AACC, and the Northern and Southern Sudanese representatives. That he
was a Southern Sudanese himself was an added asset."459 However, as a
Southerner living in the North, he seemed to have had some difficulty in
playing an intermediary role due to the misperceptions of the conflicting
parties. Because he was living in the North, the SSLM suspected that he
was an instrument of the Sudanese government, and so would not totally
accept his impartiality in the peace process. The SSLM representatives were
against a mission led by Bwogo, which the WCC/AACC was planning to
send to Ethiopia in order to contact Southern exiles and to explore
negotiation prospects, on the grounds that the SSLM did not trust his
impartiality.460 On the other hand, the government did not trust him as an
intermediary because he was a Southerner. In his interview, Bwogo said that
"he was accused by the Sudan Military Intelligence of passing information
to the SSLM, but Vice President Alier and Dr. Mansour Khalid, the Foreign
Minister, dismissed the claim as nonsense."461 Notwithstanding these
difficulties, Bwogo was able to make a significant contribution in the
preparatory stages of the peace process.
In addition to the personal characteristics of the mediators, the skills and
procedures they employed during their entire intermediary activities were
added factors influencing the nature and content of the negotiation process
and they contributed to its success. For example, at the time when they were
attempting to persuade the two parties to negotiate, the fact that the
intermediaries were able to vouch for the seriousness of the Sudanese
government's intention to seek peace built the SSLM's confidence in the
peace process.462 Moreover, making reconciliation a precondition for aid
was a clever strategy adding an incentive for the parties to negotiate instead
of continuing to fight. Also, the threat of withdrawing from their role as
intermediaries unless the parties refrained from certain behavior and
rhetoric was instrumental in restraining, at least, the escalation of hostilities
that could have endangered the peace process.
Once the peace process arrived at the negotiation stage, the secrecy of
most of the proceedings was important. Both preliminary and final
negotiations were closed to everybody, including the media, with the
exception of a very few observers. In the final negotiation, it was agreed
that the only person to give information to the press would be the chairman,
Burgess Carr, and any information given out was to be decided upon
beforehand by the whole negotiating group. In contrast with the Round
Table Conference of 1965, where the meetings were open and fairly well-
publicized, in the Addis Ababa negotiations "no aggressive speeches were
directed to the public, as at Khartoum in 1965. The fact that the negotiations
were conducted inside closed doors contributed to the frankness of the
discussions. There were no inhibitions."463 The secrecy of the meetings
restrained the parties' temptation to take tough and uncompromising
positions in order to show their loyalty to their respective constituencies. It
also reduced the possibility of anyone's trying to use the conference to
marshal the support of outside governments and organizations at the
expense of the negotiation. In open negotiations, stated positions tend to
become positions of commitment, and concessions tend to be interpreted as
signs of weakness. The mediators in the Sudan conflict seemed well aware
of this.
The way in which the mediators controlled the communication process
during the negotiation was another significant factor in facilitating the
success of the negotiations. One aspect of this was the chairman's balance
of direct and indirect communication between the parties. For example,
when the negotiations tended to become too emotionally charged, or
seemed to be heading towards an impasse, the chairman would then adjourn
the meeting and move to indirect negotiation. During the adjournment, the
intermediaries would shuttle back and forth between the parties for behind-
the-scenes consultations. During this process, the intermediaries were
engaged in interpreting the motives, intentions, concerns, and arguments of
one party to the other. They also provided their understanding, and even at
times their opinions, about the position taken by the parties in the
negotiation. They persuaded the parties by marshalling solid arguments.
Carr and Niilus were reportedly very good at this. Carr, in particular, is said
to have been gifted with the ability to cut through confusing arguments and
to get to the heart of the contentions. Ankrah used "empathy" as an
instrument of persuasion on several occasions. When the parties became
intransigent, Ankrah would attempt to generate understanding for the
adversary's position by asking each party what they would do if they were
in the other's shoes. Once they could see the other party's point of view,
Ankrah would then ask to what extent their own argument or objective was
reasonable. Ankrah is said to have constantly reminded the parties of the
human and material costs of the fighting and to have questioned the motives
behind their international allies and arms suppliers. In situations of serious
deadlock, the mediators would even discreetly consult outside sources--
such as their resource person, the Assistant Secretary General for Political
Affairs at the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity and,
together, they would come up with specific draft proposals to break the
impasse, based on the parties' common or overlapping interests that had
surfaced during the negotiations.
The mediators used this strategy to control the communication process
even during the pre-Addis Ababa negotiations. In two instances, the WCC
informed the Sudanese government that the WCC would withdraw its
intermediary activities if the government did not refrain from propagandists
press statements about the Anya Nya, or if it did not stop the military
offensive it had begun in December 1971.
Another skill that seems to have been utilized by the intermediaries to the
benefit of the negotiation process was the manipulation of the agenda. The
agenda was structured so that the less difficult and "agreement-prone"
issues of contention were discussed first This may have been important in
triggering a "benevolent cycle." That is, this strategy may have helped to
build goodwill between the parties by altering each side's perceptions of its
adversary, encouraging the perception that agreement is possible even with
such a traditional enemy, and starting a more positive and cooperative
pattern of behavior. The result of this strategy also helped the intermediaries
in the later stages of the negotiation. When failure threatened over the
military/security issue, the intermediaries were able to point to agreements
already reached and to warn the parties of the tremendous waste if the
negotiations were allowed to fail. Thus, they were able to keep negotiations
going.
In the Addis Ababa negotiations, the plenary sessions were often broken
up into smaller committees to work on the details of specific issues. This
approach had the benefit of providing efficiency and a sense of
accomplishment. Because the smaller groups could more quickly
consolidate the contending drafts of proposed solutions, they could
formulate a draft proposal for final negotiations in less time than it would
take in the plenary session. An added feature of these committees was that
they brought together people with the same professional backgrounds. For
example, when committees were formed to negotiate economic issues, the
principal members would be those that had experience or formal training in
economic affairs. Similarly, in military and security committees, military
personnel would be the principal participants. This allowed issues to be
debated on their merits rather than purely on political grounds. Secondly,
the small committee negotiations might have been less emotionally charged
since there would be common perspectives, "trade-jargon", and even
evaluation standards among similar professionals. Thus, ideas could be
communicated with less distortion, and as a result lead to a quicker
resolution of the issues under debate. Moreover, this manner of forming the
committees seems to have created possibilities for forming alliances across
delegation loyalties as was evidenced in some of the small committee
negotiations. This could have facilitated empathy, compromise, and
agreement.
Another important strategy contributing to the success of the mediation
process is what was called the "empowerment" of the SSLM by the
intermediaries and other organizations with whom the intermediaries were
working. By this it is meant that, as the SSLM had fewer resources than its
contender, it would have been very difficult to expect bargaining parity
between the two parties at the conference table, regardless of whether or not
a semblance of parity might have been attained in the battlefield. Unlike the
government, the SSLM did not have the necessary tools such as
information, finances, organization, skills, expertise, experience, etc., to
present themselves as equal bargaining partners during the negotiations.
Thus, if the SSLM were left entirely to its own devices, it was questionable
whether the negotiations could have been balanced and fair. The SSLM
may not have been in a position to advance its views in a clear and forceful
manner. The intermediaries seemed to have taken various steps to offset the
skill disadvantages of the SSLM and to remedy some of the apparent
weaknesses that would have reduced its bargaining effectiveness. For
example, the WCC helped the SSLM to forge a consensus position, to the
extent possible, concerning the general terms of any peaceful settlement
with the government. It helped pay the traveling expenses for SSLM's
representatives to various countries where the Anya Nya representative,
SSLM followers, and other exiled Southerners lived, in order to explore
their views regarding negotiations and the conditions for them, so that no
groups were left out or isolated. This action not only reduced the confusion
that would have existed if the SSLM was divided, but also provided
strength to the SSLM's negotiating position as a unified group. It was also
less likely to be subjected to a divide-and-rule strategy by its opponent A
divided SSLM would have been difficult to negotiate with, since the
Sudanese government would have been uncertain whether all SSLM
factions would comply with the results of the negotiations. The
intermediaries' effort to help the SSLM formulate a consensus position was
done, according to some observers, at a considerable risk of antagonizing
the Sudanese government It could have been construed in some circles as
unifying the government's enemies, especially if negotiations failed.
Another "empowering" action by the WCC was its decision to pass to the
SSLM some allegedly confidential information reflecting the spectrum of
opinions and positions existing within Sudanese government circles. This
gave the SSLM a concrete view about what to expect and about which of
their counterproposals would be totally unacceptable to the government.
They were, therefore, able to prepare their own realistic counterproposals.
When they finally faced their more experienced contenders at the
negotiation table, the SSLM negotiators were not taken by surprise and did
not have to surrender their valued objectives without adequate thought or
bargaining. Moreover, the intermediaries sought the help of other
organizations able to provide more organizational and financial support to
the SSLM. For example, with the active cooperation of the British Council
of Churches, they raised funds to enable the SSLM to retain the services of
a prominent London law firm who would help them prepare their
counterproposals to the government's position on autonomy for the South.
They also hired a famous attorney, Sir Dingle Foot, (a former Solicitor
General for the British government and counselor for President Kenyatta
and President Nkrumah during their struggle for independence from
colonialism), to be the SSLM's legal advisor during the negotiations in
Addis Ababa. In addition, the WCC contributed to the payment of the
SSLM delegation's transportation expenses to the final negotiations. The
effect of all these "empowerment" actions by the intermediaries and the
organizations cooperating with them was to rectify the unfair advantage that
the government might have derived during the negotiation from its greater
experience and resources. In addition to the balancing effect, the transfer of
allegedly confidential information by the intermediaries might have
expedited agreements since the parties were made aware of what they could
realistically expect from each other.
The ability of the intermediaries to involve other third parties at very
crucial times during the negotiation was a factor that saved the whole
process from total failure. The idea of utilizing the prestige and resources of
Emperor Haile Selassie, whose advice and recommendations could not
easily be ignored by the two parties, was a valuable weapon in breaking
very difficult deadlocks. The newly budding relationship between the
Emperor and President Numeiri, reinforced by recent mutual state visits,
would have made it difficult for the Sudanese government to disregard the
Emperor's suggestions. At the same time, the SSLM viewed the Emperor as
being friendly to their cause and as a provider of refuge to their movement.
Thus, they too could not have disregarded his advice and recommendations.
Last, but not least, the psychological atmosphere maintained by the
intermediaries throughout the negotiations was a factor that must have had
an impact on the parties involved. The intermediaries were able to maintain
a sense of urgency during the negotiations by periodically citing the
consequences of failure. They would refer to the continuing and impending
human suffering in both North and South, the advantages being derived by
the international enemies of both conflicting parties, and the problems
common to the two parties which required their immediate joint action.
This sense of urgency and tension most likely created an incentive for
conciliatory behavior, and a willingness to consider many alternatives.
Moreover, the chairman, Burgess Carr, is reported to have given many
inspiring sermons and prayer sessions using texts from the Old Testament
that appealed to both Muslim and Christian members of the delegation.
Some of these sermons and prayers were reported to have been delivered
with great passion and evoked so much emotion as to make some of the
participants cry, or even to reproach themselves for past behavior. This
constant appeal to the higher values the parties shared and which
transcended their immediate conflict, was important in creating the
atmosphere of reconciliation and compromise that was characteristic of the
Addis Ababa negotiations.
Having thus analyzed the various factors contributing to the success of
the mediation in the Sudan conflict, one is still left with an important
question. To what extent was mediation important in bringing about the
negotiated settlement of 1972? Could the four clusters of factors presented
above (i.e., "the nature and characteristics of the conflict," "external
political factors," "internal political factors," and "idiosyncratic factors of
the leaders"), have been sufficient to bring about the Addis Ababa
Agreement?
As intriguing as the question might be, it is difficult to provide a
definitive answer since such certainty would require a re-enactment of the
whole process without the mediation. Unfortunately for theoreticians, but
fortunately for the Sudanese, this luxury is unavailable. The only alternative
might be to make reasonable speculations with the aid of hindsight From
hindsight, it can be argued that the first four clusters of factors, in and of
themselves, either singly or jointly, would not necessarily have resulted in
the negotiated settlement.
This claim does not imply that the mediation alone would necessarily
have succeeded in bringing about the agreement either. The other factors
discussed were either prerequisites or corequisites to the success of the
mediation effort. The following analysis will provide reasons why the four
sets of factors by themselves, without the mediation effort, would not have
resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement.
Under the first cluster, the "nature and characteristics of the conflict," it
was contended that the existence of power parity between the contenders
was very important in pressuring them to seek negotiation. But this does not
mean that it could have produced a negotiated settlement It could even be
argued that the existence of parity could have prolonged the conflict until
one of the parties mustered a decisive power advantage over the other.464
In the Sudan case, it is not unreasonable to argue that the SSLM might
have been challenged and encouraged to continue its guerilla war in view of
its gains compared to those of the government forces. Its growth from a
bunch of bandits and outlaws to a rather well-organized insurgency
movement could have induced some of its leaders to think that if they could
achieve so much progress against such tremendous adversities, a few more
years of struggle might give them a decisive edge in the conflict It has been
suggested that some SSLM leaders were resisting dialogue with the
government on the grounds that "the North was willing to negotiate because
its military position was weakening in the South and that, therefore, the
SSLM delegates should press for secession and nothing less than that."465
On the other hand, the fact that the Anya Nya had been allowed to attain
parity could have challenged the Sudanese government to escalate its
fighting or even to undertake an all out operation to "break the back" of the
Anya Nya, as it attempted to do in December 1971. The precedent of the
Nigerian government's total victory over the Biafran insurgents was fresh in
the minds of many African governments, including that of Numeiri.
It might be argued that both parties could not have afforded the economic
and human cost of continuing the war even at the same level of hostility, let
alone to escalate. It is possible, however, that the conflict might have
continued on a lower level of intensity, probably turning into a war of
attrition. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the factors called "the nature
and characteristics of the war," in and of themselves, could have resulted in
a negotiated settlement.
In examining the second group, "external political factors," many authors
point to the agreements signed between the Sudan and Ethiopia and
between Uganda and the Sudan, as very important factors in settling the
civil war.466 According to Stevens, "the signing on 24 March 1971 of a
treaty to prohibit subversive activity led directly to the Addis Ababa
Agreement."467 However, a close examination of this claim reveals that
such actions, in and of themselves, would not have led to a negotiated
settlement.
The treaty between Ethiopia and the Sudan to restrict the Anya Nya and
Eritreans from operating in one another's countries did not emerge for the
first time in 1971, just before the Addis Ababa negotiations. There was a
similar agreement in 1966, when Premier Mahgoub was attempting to
isolate the Anya Nya by diplomacy. However, it did not deter either
government from continuing to support the other's rebels. In March 1971,
another agreement of the same nature was signed in Khartoum by the
foreign ministers of the Sudan and Ethiopia. In November of the same year,
the heads of state of the two governments again affirmed the March treaty.
But all through 1971, the Anya Nya was still able to move freely and to
continue its military operations without any sense of restriction. As far as
restricting Ethiopia's territories to Southern fighters went, an observer
noted:

Less well known, the Israelis were also operating from Ethiopia into the
Upper Nile Province where the fierce Nuer, Anuak, and Murle tribes
were fighting a vicious open campaign against Sudan Government
forces right up to last February [the date of the start of the Addis Ababa
negotiations].468

The Sudanese government did not respect its treaty with Ethiopia either. For
many years, even after 1971, it had continued to support the Eritrean
liberation movement.
Concerning agreements with Uganda and the restrictions on Anya Nya
and Israeli activities, Howell indicates that the "Anya Nya and their
supporters had managed to evade such restrictions in the past."469 President
Obote, the predecessor of General Amin, is reported to have been
unsympathetic to the SSLM. "In Uganda, the Southern Sudanese had never
been afforded recognition...and had often been harassed by the Ugandan
Government"470 President Obote of Uganda was reportedly uneasy about
the escalation of violence along Uganda's northern border because it could
worsen the tensions within northern Uganda itself;471 therefore, he had an
interest in curtailing those military activities. However, against all these
odds, the Anya Nya was still able to operate from across the Ugandan
border. Even if one assumes that the agreement to cutoff external access of
the Anya Nya through Uganda could have been totally effective, the Israelis
were still operating in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zaire. According to Beshir,
arms and military equipment for the Anya Nya were reported to have come
"in large quantities" through the Central African Republic and Zaire as well
as through Uganda and Ethiopia.472 Thus, even if Uganda were closed,
other neighbouring countries could have easily been used as relay stations
or launching pads for any aid to the Anya Nya by Israel or other supporters.
Even if one assumes that the Anya Nya would have had difficulty in
gaining access through the neighbouring countries, it might not have meant
the sudden death of the Anya Nya. There were many reports that some of
the Anya Nya camps were equipped with landing strips and that arms and
supplies were being dropped from airplanes.473 The Anya Nya had
managed to fight and grow against tremendous odds in the past decade and-
a-half, and so it would have been difficult to "snuff it out" in 1972.
O'Ballance, at the conclusion of his study of the Sudan war, asks whether
the war would have "dragged on interminably" had there not been a
negotiated settlement in Addis Ababa. His answer was, "Pride and poverty
are characteristics of the Sudanese people, so one must assume that it could
have carried on endlessly."474
By the same token, examination of the third group, the internal political
factors, which included the coming to power of the communists, the July
1971 coup d'etat, the rebellion of various tribal groups within Northern
Sudan, the growing strength of the Anya Nya, and the divisions within the
ranks of the Southern movement, also shows that these factors, in and of
themselves, could not have produced a negotiated settlement The same
could be said about the fourth group, the idiosyncratic factors of the key
personalities in the conflict, such as the coming to power of Numeiri, Alier,
and Lagu. Each of these leaders had different solutions to the Southern
problem and it is unlikely that a meeting of minds would have occurred and
a negotiated settlement been reached without the aid of the intermediaries.
It cannot be doubted that the four clusters of factors would have created a
great incentive to negotiate; they were admittedly significant reasons why
the Sudanese government and the SSLM were persuaded to attempt
negotiation rather than to continue the armed confrontation. However, the
point is that having a desire to negotiate is different from reaching a
settlement with a spirit of compromise and reconciliation, even though it is
obviously the first step. From what is known about the conflict and the
parties, even if the two parties were willing to negotiate, it would not be
difficult to foresee that many deadlocks and impasses would have made an
amicable settlement practically impossible, at least at the time that the
Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. Even with the active involvement of
the intermediaries many deadlocks seriously endangered the negotiations
and the intermediaries had to struggle to break them. Therefore, it would
not be difficult to imagine that the problems would have been greatly
compounded if the negotiations were unmediated.
The problems inherent in "unmediated negotiation" hindering its
usefulness as a conflict resolution mechanism were pointed out in chapter
one. Particularly, in unmediated negotiations, communications tend to be
discreet and implicit instead of frank and open, and, as a result, reinforce
misperceptions instead of rectify them. Threats, warnings, bluffs, and
sometimes outright misinformation are some of the strategies employed to
send messages to each other. Concessions could imply weakness. The
hostility, stereotypes, the fears and prejudices about each other, and the
absence of an external source of information free from such psychological
constraints, tend to limit the range of alternatives that might be open to the
negotiators to resolve the conflict The parties tend to get locked into a
"contest of wills" where they aim towards the extraction of maximum
advantage from the other party rather than towards an exchange in the spirit
of compromise and reconciliation.
Now if one looks specifically into the Sudan conflict, where there had
been decades of hostility, stereotyping, suspicions, and fears, one would
seriously wonder if the two parties would have been able to reach a
negotiated settlement unaided by third parties. Given the history of
Southern suspicion of Northern intentions and their constant fear of "Arab-
trickery," a question arises as to whether there would ever have been very
serious negotiations had the intermediaries not vouched on various
occasions to the Anya Nya leadership for the earnestness of Northern
intentions. It is questionable whether a negotiated settlement would have
been achieved had the intermediaries not, among other things, translated,
reinterpreted and made palatable some of the government's terms to the
SSLM; had not opened ways to get beyond serious deadlocks by utilizing
their own as well as external resources; had not rectified information and
perception distortions by controlling the pattern of communication; had not
provided inducements and sweeteners for reaching agreement; had not
influenced, possibly, the psychological atmosphere of the negotiations in
order to focus on the real issues of the conflict rather than on the peripheral
and distracting ones; had not empowered the SSLM and created an
impression on the SSLM that a fair and just settlement could be attained
under their auspices; and had not attempted to insulate the negotiation
process from external complicating factors such as aid-givers, the media,
and opponents of the negotiation process. One would wonder whether an
unmediated negotiation could have produced the requisite atmosphere for a
spirit of compromise and for the willingness not to get bogged down in
blame and recrimination had it not been for the intermediaries who not only
kept stressing the urgency for reaching agreement, but also kept making
moral appeals for compromise and reconciliation.
 It was important that the peace process was referred to as
"reconciliation," because the connotation of this term is different from that
of the mere hard bargaining implied by the word negotiation. Reconciliation
implies a willingness to forget and forgive, to accept compromise not
through weakness, but because doing so is considered worthy, judged by
higher principles. Reconciliation implies that one does not necessarily
expect the quid pro quo expected in hard bargaining. This was the spirit in
which the Addis Ababa negotiations took place, and undoubtedly, this spirit
would not have existed in the absence of the third party mediation. The
Sudan Minister of Foreign Affairs, a participant in the negotiations,
captured the essence of the peace process by saying: "We believe that it
needed charity of thought, if we are at all to achieve national reconciliation.
(Emphasis added.)"475
In fact, this spirit of reconciliation is one of the most interesting aspects
of the Sudan peace process. The mediators were able to create this
atmosphere perhaps because of the moral authority ascribed to them by
their representing religious rather than political organizations, and because
they were perceived as legitimate organizations to be concerned about
reconciliation and compromise. Through their sermons and prayers and
their behind-the-scenes diplomacy, they were able to appeal to the
fundamental humanity of the parties. These appeals had such an impact that
they were able to make some of the "granite faced" participants cry and
confess their remorse at having fought and killed their "brothers," and to
make others exuberant about the spirit of compromise that prevailed. The
spirit of reconciliation and empathy generated during the negotiations, was
so great that members sometimes took sides with their adversaries against
their own delegation on certain issues. All these illustrate the unusual
features of the Addis Ababa process, which occur rarely in ordinary
negotiations and mediation.
The methods employed by the intermediaries seem to have had the effect
of what Walton calls "socio-therapy," a process in which an attempt is made
to remedy dysfunction in the social relationships between the negotiators, in
order to terminate persistent disagreements and emotional antagonisms that
distract the parties from the productivity of the negotiations.476 The
intermediaries seem to have attained this objective by making the parties
aware of their common values, and by impressing upon them that the values
they shared were more important than the those that divided them. It can be
said that this peacemaking process was able to elevate conciliation from a
mere pragmatic and mundane level to a more transcendental level of
searching for closer understanding between the parties.
Most conflicts comprise both substantive and emotional components. The
substantive issues tend to be disagreements over more or less objective or
ascertainable situations, while emotional issues involve negative feelings
such as anger, distrust, scorn, resentment, fear, rejection, etc.477 Substantive
issues are usually not as difficult as emotional ones because they can be
handled through cognitive and rational processes such as bargaining,
problem solving, or consulting the opinion of experts or judges. On the
other hand, emotional issues call for an affective process aimed at
restructuring the parties' perceptions and altering the feelings that hinder the
bargaining process. So far, no methods have been developed to deal
effectively with emotional issues in large-scale conflicts such as the one
under study. In smaller scale conflicts, such as interpersonal or small
intergroup conflicts, methods like interpersonal counseling, sensitivity
training, and lately, in conflicts within organizations, human relations
counseling or socio-therapy are being used. However, even for such small-
scale conflicts, these procedures are infrequently utilized, although, so far,
they seem to be the only effective ways at hand to deal with conflicts where
emotional issues predominate. But when it comes to large-scale conflicts,
the luxury of utilizing these methods does not exist. In the Sudan case,
however, through the constant inspirational appeals to the higher moral
principles and values of the parties, the peace process seems to have
benefited, perhaps by accident, from an affective process which appears
similar to the emotional atmosphere that counseling and socio-therapy
sometimes manage to create.
For all these reasons it is argued that the first four clusters of variables
alone would not have succeeded in resolving the Sudan Civil War; and that
the fifth cluster of factors, "the mediators and the mediation process," was a
significant factor in bringing about the success of the negotiations.

Factors That Led to the Failure of the MCF

Mediation
 In contrast to the efforts of the WCC and the AACC, the MCF's as well
as the very little-known efforts of some heads of state such as those of
Presidents Nkrumah and Obote were unsuccessful in producing a negotiated
settlement of the Sudanese conflict The reasons seem to be obvious,
particularly when contrasted with the successful effort, and so it is not
necessary to examine all possible factors that might have contributed to the
failure of these efforts. Thus, the concentration of the subsequent analysis
will be on major reasons only.
The first, and probably most important, reason for the MCF's failure was
its inability to maintain at least an appearance of impartiality in its
mediating role. While the mediation process was underway, the role of the
Secretary of the MCF, who was the official in charge of the intermediary
activities, was changing from that of a facilitator to an advocate for one of
the parties. The MCF ended up adopting the position of the Sudanese
government and publicly taking an anti-Anya Nya stance.
It has been observed that the WCC and AACC representatives were not
entirely disinterested parties either. Their empowerment activities could be
construed as actions of someone who was not totally neutral. However,
these activities were not so blatantly one-sided as to jeopardize their
intermediary position. The MCF, in contrast, went too far in expressing its
endorsement of the Numeiri government's position.
Like the WCC, the MCF conducted its own inquiry into the Sudan
situation by sending two delegations to Khartoum and even to some of the
Southern provinces. Each time the delegations went only at the invitation of
the Sudanese government and saw only what the government wanted them
to see. However, when they returned, their report gave unqualified support
to the Sudanese government and denounced the Anya Nya. The report,
made available to the press, stated that "...evidence convinced us that the
rebellion was being fomented and encouraged by external reactionary
forces which [were] anxious to prevent unity and progress towards a
socialist Sudan" and that "the rebellion [had] virtually come to an
end...except for some sporadic outbursts."478 This report might in some
ways be similar in attitude to the 1966 AACC report made following their
visit to the Sudan. However, by 1971, the WCC seems to have learnt a
lesson about the dangers of presenting such a partisan report In addition to
the press release, the MCF published Joseph Garang's speech to the British
House of Commons in April 1970, which represented the official
government policy on the Southern Sudan, as a pamphlet about the Sudan
conflict. No pamphlet was published representing the SSLM's position.
The MCF not only adopted the position of the Sudanese government, but
was also being used as an instrument to further the government's policy.
Firstly, the visits to the Sudan, sponsored by the MCF, seemed to serve a
propaganda objective for Joseph Garang. This was because the
government's image would appear respectable if influential British
politicians came to the Sudan and broadcast the government's point of view
to the British public. At least, it would have the effect of watering down the
Grass Curtain's impact on international public opinion. Joseph Garang's
letter to Barbara Haq appears to illustrate the Sudanese government's intent
He insisted on the inclusion of prominent personalities in the second MCF
delegation that was to visit the Sudan so that their statements could
neutralize the Grass Curtain's claim. He urged: "It would be a great
achievement to get eminent politicians such as Rep. Prentice M.P. and Sir
Dingle Foot Q.C. to visit the Sudan along with the other MPs."479
Secondly, it seems that the strategy of Joseph Garang, then Minister of
Southern Affairs, was to alienate from the people of the South the political
and military leaders of the Southern resistance movement. Joseph Garang is
known to have viewed exiled Southern politicians as "international
imperialist conspirators" and to have insisted that the establishment of a
socialist Sudan would solve the Southern problem. In fact, Garang had
made it known on several occasions that a socialist-oriented democratic
movement was needed to isolate the Anya Nya and the Southern politicians
in exile from those within the Sudan.480 Given this "divide and rule" policy
of Joseph Garang, a man apparently very much respected in MCF circles,481
it seems that the MCF was consciously or unconsciously cooperating with
Joseph Garang to make this policy a reality. Garang was exploiting the
mediation process for his own purposes and the intermediary was allowing
it Even though it might have been written with good intent, Haq's letter to
Garang on August 10, 1970, seems to support this plan. She wrote: "...if a
clear offer on the nature of the autonomy was given to them, there is every
chance that a major part would accept and the remnants then carrying on
fighting would become isolated and more easily crushed." Even though it is
not clear whether the SSLM saw this correspondence, the various public
statements of the MCF should have made evident its sympathies. There is
no doubt that MCF's partisanship would have diminished its credibility and
trustworthiness in the eyes of the SSLM and therefore made its
intermediary role questionable.
In contrast to the role played by the MCF, the WCC and AACC appear to
have resisted both the bid by any one party to include them in a coalition
against the opposing party, and the exploitation of the mediation process by
any party to gain any propaganda or strategic advantage. It is true that they
used their intermediary position to unite the various claims and interests of
the Southern factions and that this bore a risk of alienating the Sudanese
government equal to that of the MCF's activity in alienating the SSLM.
However, the WCC/AACC were very subtle in their efforts, and what they
did not only made the negotiation process more equitable, but also ended by
serving the best interest of both parties. They were able to instill into the
government faith in the negotiation process, by enabling the SSLM
delegates to negotiate with one voice and with authority to bind their
principals.
The final death knell for the MCF's role as an intermediary was tolled
when Haq published the article in the Nile Mirror accusing the SSLM
representatives of being an organ of the CIA. This angered the SSLM
representatives and they stopped dealing with the MCF. Particularly as
Britain had had a hand in the creation of the Southern problem, any British
organization attempting to help in resolving it should have handled it with
greater sensitivity and skill in order to avoid any suspision or distrust in
either party. The MCF seems to have missed a valuable opportunity.
It is tempting to ask if the MCF's efforts would have produced a different
result if the environmental factors discussed in Part One, such as parity,
stalemate, high and rising cost, leverage over the parties, etc., had existed
during the time of the MCF's involvement It is doubtful that the results
would have been different since the basic tenets of mediation seem to have
been violated on many occasions by the intermediary. The MCF seems to
have had the best interests of the Sudanese people at heart, but was not
sensitive enough to handle its peacemaking role cautiously.
408
John Howell, "Horn of Africa, Lessons from the Sudan Conflict," International Affairs 54 (July
1978): 462.
409
Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (Hamden, Conn.: Anchor Books,
1977), 140.
410
Norman Hart, "Is this a New Movement of Hope for Strife Weary Sudan?" Africa Acts (January
1972), 1.
411
Bowyer Bell, "The Conciliation of Insurgency: The Sudanese Experience," Military Affairs 39
(October 1975): 110.
412
Ibid., 11.
413
"Sudan, Amin, tbe Israelis and Explanations." Africa Confidential, (November 1972).
414
Raphael Badal, "The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan," African Affairs 75
(October 1976): 471.
415
See O'Ballance, 158. See also tbe Report on the Second WCC/AACC Mission to the Sudan,
October 13-23, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva; and John Waterbury, "The Sudan in Quest of
Surplus," American University Fieldstaff Reports, Part II, Domestic and Regional Politics,
21, no. 9 (1976).
416
Peter Russell and Storrs McCall, "Can Secession be Justified?," in The Southern Sudan: The
Problem of National Integration, ed., Dunstan M. Wai (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 109.
417
Moharaed Omar Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (New York: Barnes &
Noble, 1975), 130.
418
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 144.
419
Howell, 422.
420
Ibid., 425.
421
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 124.
422
Bell, 110.
423
Joseph Lagu, letter to Mading de Garang, October 10, 1970. WCC Archives, Geneva.
424
It must be remembered that it was the Palace Guards, composed mainly of Southerners, that
helped Numeiri escape from his place of imprisonment and stage a counter-coup in July 1971.
425
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 125
426
Ibid., 192.
427
Storrs McCall, interview with author, Balsom Lake, Ontario, August 6, 1981; and M. Louise
Pirouet, "The Achievement of Peace in Sudan," Journal of East African Research and
Development 6 (1976): 117.
428
Nelson Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement," African Afairs
76 (April 1970), 160; and Pirouet, 116.
429
Badal, 465.
430
Kasfir, 158.
431
Pirouet, 129.
432
See Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 69-70.
433
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 84-85.
434
Howell, 433-434.
 435
According to Israeli explanations, they were expelled because they refused to provide arms to
Amin to invade Tanzania. Ibid., 434, footnote 43.
436
Grass Curtain 2 (July 1971), 8.
437
O'Ballance, 116
438
See Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 149, and the Report of the WCC/AACC visit to Khartoum,
October 17, 1971, WCC Archives, Geneva.
439
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 150.
440
Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972 (London: David & Charles, 1974), 161.
441
Ibid., 150.
442
Africa Confidential, (November 1972).
443
O'Ballance, 85.
444
Leopolds Niilus, interview with author, Geneva, Switzerland, May 22-26, 1982.
445
Niilus, in his interview, gave this author a similar example from another situation. In the late
1970s the CCIA of the WCC was involved in a human rights violation fact finding mission in
the war in Iraq between the Kurdish rebels and the government of Iraq, because it was
reported that the Iraqi government had grossly violated the human rights of the Kurds. Niilus
said that the Iraqi government took the CCIA representatives to all of the places that they
wanted to see and answered all of their questions to the surprise of the CCIA representatives.
The United Nations had earlier attempted to set up an inquiry on the same question, but it was
not successful in getting the Iraqi government's cooperation for the inquiry. The explanation
given by Niilus for the Iraqi government's willingness to cooperate with the CCIA was that
the government was adamant in not wanting to recognize the authority of any political
organization to investigate a matter it considered an "internal affair." However, dealing with
an ecumenical body such as the CCIA did not pose such a serious threat as the investigation
by the UN did. This could be another illustration of the fact that organizations such as the
World Council of Churches might be the better equipped bodies to deal with issues that might
involve the sensitivities of stales over their sovereignty.
446
At the time Numeiri welcomed WCC intervention, Muslim fundamentalism was not a strong
force in the Sudan. One wonders if the intermediary role of the WCC would have been
acceptable to a leadership dominated by the Muslim Brothers.
447
Concerning the impact that this program had, Niilus writes: The Program to Combat Racism
which has been widely and sometimes violently criticized by the North-Atlantic press and
also some of the "Western" churches made an impact in Africa - on all levels - to an extent
which still has not ceased to impress me. Where past actions by churches and missionaries
had brought the Christian credibility to almost an absolute zero, a new credibility burst
through in an almost explosive way. Several outstanding African leaders have personally told
me that the WCC stand vis-a-vis the racist Southern African regimes had probably profoundly
and positively changed the future of the Christian church in Africa. Some of those African
leaders who had been convinced that the Christian church, after having been an outpost of
colonialism, had also become an outpost of neo-colonialism, suddenly realized that this was
not necessarily and fatally the case because of the Program to Combat Racism activities. And
those leaders who, one lime after another, have made these and similar remarks are mostly
non-Christians, Muslims, or even atheists. In the Sudanese case, the government and other
 forces in the country began to trust us as they became convinced that we had no personal
stake in the matter, that we could not be linked with any outside colonial or neo-colonial
maneuver." Leopoldo Niilus, "Peace in the Sudan", Reflections on questions for a written
interview, (Geneva, March 12, 1973) WCC Archives, Geneva.
448
Colin Legum, "Fighting Ends in Sudan After 17 Years War," London Times 26 February, 1972.
449
Pirouet, 124.
450
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 128.
451
Kodwo Ankrah, interview with author, Kampala, Uganda, May 5-10, 1982.
452
Niilus, in his interview commented jokingly, "in terms of impressive characters, the Emperor of
Ethiopia came first and then Burgess Carr." Some observers have commented that Carr was
quite a fiamboyant and controversial character.
453
Kodwo Ankrah, interview.
454
Leopoldo Niilus, interview.
455
Dwain Epps, interview with author, New York City, August 10, 1981.
456
When this author interviewed Ankrah, Ankrah was living in Uganda amid great violence and
adversity, working as a development officer for the Church of Uganda. He was involved in
reconstruction projects in the country which had been devastated by ten years of Amin's
regime and by the Tanzanian army's invasion. According to some sources, even though
Ankrah had an offer of more lucrative employment with other agencies, he turned it down to
stay where he felt "he was needed more."
457
Dwain Epps, interview.
458
Dwain Epps and Kodwo Ankrah, interviews.
459
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 120.
460
Minutes of the WCC's meeting with the SSLM's European representative, May 26, 1971,
Geneva. WCC Archives, Geneva.
461
Samuel Bwogo, interview with author, Khartoum, Sudan, May 13, 1982.
462
See the details of Lagu's meeting with Niilus and Ankrah in chapter six.
463
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 125.
464
See Geoffrey Biainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 150.
465
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict, 156.
466
See, for example, Howell, 433; Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 84; and Richard P. Stevens,
"The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan's Afro-Arab Policy," Journal of Modern
African Studies 14 (June 1976), 259.
467
Stevens, 159.
468
"Sudan, Amin, the Israelis and Explications," Africa Confidential, (November 1972)
469
Howell, 433.
 470
Ibid., 431.
471
Ibid.
472
Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 64.
473
See Beshir, From Conflict to Peace, 150ff.
474
O'Ballance, 159. Many close observers of the war whom this author interviewed agree with
O'Ballance's conclusion that had it not been for the Addis Ababa Agreement, the fighting
might have continued and other governments might have intervened.
475
Quoted in Niilus, "Peace in the Sudan," Reflections on questions for a written interview, (Geneva,
March 12, 1973), 12.
476
Robert E. Walton, interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontations and Third Party Consulation
(Reading, Mass.: Addison Wiley, 1969), 4.
477
Ibid., 73.
478
MCF, Press Statement, October 28, 1970, 1.
479
Joseph Garang, letter to Barbara Haq, 26 August 1970.
480
Howell, 423.
481
See the eulogy written to him by Thomas Hodgkin, "Joseph Garang," in Liberation, an MCF
publication, (London: October 1971).
 Chapter 8
The Relationship between Mediation
Theory and the Sudan Case Study
In the theoretical discussions of Part One, hypotheses were developed
concerning conditions for the successful mediation of civil wars. These
hypotheses were divided into three groups: characteristcs of the parties, the
conflict, and the mediators. This chapter examines the correspondence
between the theory and the case study to see if there is evidence to
illustrate, support, or contradict the hypotheses.

The Characteristics of the Parties

The first hypothesis in this category states the more clearly identifiable
and inwardly cohesive the parties are, the better the chances of success of
the mediation of civil wars. It was argued in Part One that this hypothesis
also implied that the spokespeople of the conflicting parties were clearly
identified. The case study shows evidence for this hypothesis in the Sudan
peace process. The Anya Nya, even though it represented the Southern
fighting forces, was divided within itself along tribal, political, and other
affiliations. It was not a well-coordinated force since each command was
more or less autonomous and did not cooperate with any of the others.
Moreover, it acted independently of the politicians who claimed authority
over it In turn, the politicians were very much divided in their aims.
Different groups claimed to be the sole representative of Southern interests,
and some even called themselves provisional governments for the South.
However, towards the end of the 1960s, some of these divisions had started
to disappear and a more united Southern movement began to emerge. Thus,
by the time the mediation started, the Southern movement was a more
identifiable and more internally united body than at any previous period.
The spokespeople of the fighting forces and the movement in general were
more easily identifiable. This, by itself, could have been one of the factors
motivating the Sudanese government to start thinking seriously of
possiblities for political settlement with the South.482 It also might have
encouraged the intermediaries to decide to become involved. Of course, the
intermediaries were not satisfied by this apparent unity of the SSLM either.
They took the initiative to insure that the SSLM spoke with at least a
minimal level of consensus which would make their negotiating positions
and mandate more credible. This, in turn, reinforced the desire of the
Sudanese government to negotiate.
In Part One an argument was presented that the very clear identification
of the insurgents could sometimes create a problem for mediation rather
than facilitate it. It was argued that: the more clearly the insurgents are
identified, and the more closely they approximate the position of the
incumbents, i.e., the existing government, the more reluctant will the
incumbents be to deal with them for fear of conferring a status of equality
[and international recongnition] on them. This view seems to prevail not
only in the academic literature, but also in popular political wisdom. For
example, the Financial Times, in analyzing the Sudan situation, stated that
"the main demand of the Anya Nya is that the government should negotiate
directly with them. But direct negotiation seems unlikely....Even President
Humeri's power might not be able to withstand the shock of negotiating
with the rebels."483 Also Kasfir points out that quite a few Northerners
thought that "negotiations with 'terrorists' amounted to undignfied
bargaining over the nation's sovereignty which the government was sworn
to protect."484
However, recognizing or conferring equality on the insurgents, or
providing a precedent for other discontented groups in the country did not
seem as much of a problem as it was made out to be. Numeiri's government
was eventually strengthened rather than weakened by his recognizing and
negotiating with the SSLM. Interestingly, throughout the negotiations, the
Sudanese government representatives addressed the Southerners as the
"Liberation Movement" rather than as rebels or similar names.485 Thus, the
case study does not confirm the hypothesis that the clear identity of the
insurgents per se creates an obstacle to mediation. A question arises,
however, as to whether the situation would have been the same had the
intermediaries been states, or international political bodies. In such a case, it
may be argued that the threat of creating a precedent or of putting the
"nation's sovereignty on the line" might have been more threatening to the
incumbents; and, perhaps then, the hypothesis might hold water.
Another hypothesis presented in the theoretical part claimed that the
absence of intense personality conflict among the leaders of the warring
groups improved the chances of success in mediation, even though it was
argued that this condition may not be crucial if the mediator were able to
display the requisite characteristics and skills. From the analysis of the
Sudan conflict, it was clear that previous acquaintance and good rapport
between General Lagu and President Numeiri, on the one hand, and Abel
Alier and the SSLM's European representatives, on the other, contributed to
the establishment of trust and understanding between the parties during the
negotiations. Thus, the Sudan case can be presented as evidence for this
hypothesis, although it cannot be said what the existence of personal
animosity between the leaders would have done to the mediation process
even with the presence of skillful mediators.
It was also hypothesized that the more the conflicting parties depended
on outside powers, the greater were the chances of successful mediation.
During the Sudan conflict, Numeiri's government was dependent on the
Soviet Union and in some measure on Egypt, Libya, and Algeria for arms
and other military assistance, while the SSLM was heavily dependent on
Israel, a major power in the area. According to some observers, Israel
played the role of surrogate for a superpower, the United States, to contain
Soviet expansion in the "heart of Africa". Thus, both conflicting parties
were, to some extent, dependent upon outside powers. However, both
parties began seriously to consider peace prospects after the super or
regional powers' support became less reliable. It could be argued that
Numeiri's realization of the unreliability of Soviet support, due to his
suspicions that they were involved in the 1971 plot to overthrow him, was
one of the reasons that made him genuinly interested in a negotiated
settlement with the South. Fortunately, no other power jumped in to fill the
vacuum created by the Sudan's declining relationship with the Soviet
Union. Although Numeiri attempted to woo China to fill the gap, their
contribution was negligible.
From the perspective of the Anya Nya also, although Israel was their
strong ally, the Ugandan threat to expel the Israelis and to restrict their
aiding the Anya Nya should have created anxiety about the longrun
reliability of Israel as a source of supply. Such insecurities in both
conflicting parties should have helped to create the impetus for each side to
negotiate rather than to continue their armed struggle. Thus, it could be said
that the more the parties to the conflict realize their sense of weakness as a
result of the unreliability of outside powers' help, the higher the chances of
successful mediation.

The Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict

In this category of essential conditions for the success of mediation, one
of the hypotheses suggested was: the longer the duration, but the lower the
intensity of the conflict, the higher the chances of success of mediating a
civil war. In the Sudan case, the duration of the conflict was long enough
for the parties to "test each other's strength"; and "to demonstrate each
other's capacity for mischief and violence." However, the second part of the
hypothesis requires that the level of intensity should not be so high that the
cleavages are strongly defined and perceptions of mutual incompatibility
reinforced. In the Sudan case, the conflict's level of intensity constantly
increased rather than leveled off. Cleavages and alienation were increasing.
But all these factors did not prevent the attainment of a negotiated
settlement Thus, there was no corroborative evidence in the Sudan case for
the second part of the hypothesis. This suggests that even intense conflicts
should not be ruled out as unfit for mediation.
It was also hypothesized that a stalemate, accompanied by perception of
the high and rising cost of nonsettlement for both parties, must exist in
order for the mediation effort to succeed. The hypothesis was further
qualified by the statement that mediation must be undertaken before the
parties have actually incurred the high and rising cost, so that they do not
feel bound to continue on the same course of conflict because of the price
already paid.
In the Sudan case, it has been shown that stalemate existed when
intermediary activities began and that neither side had the resources to
overwhelm the other without incurring unacceptable losses. The economic,
political, and human costs of continuing the armed conflict in order that
each party attain its stated objective was already high and continuing to rise.
But the second qualifier to the hypothesis, that the mediation intervention
must take place before rising costs are incurred, is not corroborated in the
case study. By the time the mediators intervened, the high costs of the
conflict had already been incurred. Although the parties may have felt that
past sacrifices required that the struggle be allowed to continue, it was clear
that this course of action was not promising for either of them. Thus, the
Sudan case suggests that it might be sufficient to have only two of the
elements of the hypothesis, namely, the existence of stalemate and a high
and rising cost for nonsettlement, in order for mediation attempts to
succeed.
In the context of the stalemate issue, empowerment was also considered
as a possible strategy for third party mediation. A question was raised as to
what extent the mediator could use empowerment without jeopardizing his
or her acceptability as a neutral third party. The theoretical analysis in
chapter two required that the power the intermediary lends the weaker party
must not be so visibly great as to intensify the conflict, and thus, to subvert
the mediation effort. In the Sudan case, this strategy seems to have been
used in the manner prescribed by the hypothesis. The intermediaries helped
the SSLM with financial, informational, and other assistance so that the
insurgents would not be dominated by the resources and experience of the
Sudanese government once the negotiations began. Fortunately, the
intermediaries were not alone in this effort Other organizations contributed,
either in cooperation with the intermediaries, or even without their
awareness. The British Council of Churches assumed the responsiblity of
providing very valuable legal services. The activities of the Kampala
Committee and Makerere Group, in coordinating aid and in assuming the
role of advisors to the budding civil administration of the SSLM were
important empowerment actions, even though done in a partisan spirit. In
addition to helping empower the Anya Nya, these organizations provided a
cover for the intermediaries so that the latter were not accused of taking
sides with the SSLM against the government. Furthermore, just as the
hypothesis prescibes, the actions of the third parties served to increase the
bargaining potential of the weaker party without escalating the war.
Another condition for successful mediation under the category, "nature
and characteristics of the conflict," was the nature of the issues at stake. It
was contended that conflicts over certain zero-sum issues were not
resolvable by mediation, although it was a problem to identify these issues
precisely. It was suggested that a conflict over secession does not easily
lend itself to mediation, as long as the insurgents' goal is that of achieving
an independent sovereign state. In the Sudan case, it seems unlikely that the
intermediaries would have been successful had secession remained the
objective of the SSLM. On the other hand, the issue of autonomy created
space for negotiation that would, in part, accommodate some of the desired
objectives of both parties, and thereby provide room for mediation.
According to some observers, for the Sudanese government everything was
negotiable if the Anya Nya were prepared to accept only the principles of
the existence of a unified Sudan in some form.486
In addition to their nature, the number and complexity of the issues
involved were also hypothesized to affect the success or failure of
mediation: the greater the number and dimensions of the issues in the
conflict, the higher the chances of success in mediation. In the Sudan case,
the issues under contention were many and intricate. However, the fact that
they were complex and multifaceted was an advantage, because a party
could be persuaded to give in or to compromise in some areas in the
expectation that the adversary would reciprocate in others. Moreover, the
fact that there were so many issues gave the mediators a chance to arrange
the agenda so as to create a pattern of interaction that encouraged flexibility
and compromise. It has been pointed out that the fact that the parties were
able to resolve less controversial issues more quickly created goodwill and
cooperation and thereby reduced their confrontational attitude. This might
not have been the case had it been a one issue conflict where the parties
might have adopted a win-all or lose-all perspective. Thus, on this point, the
Sudan case seems to provide support for the hypothesis that the multiplicity
or the multidimensionality of issues in a negotiation contributes to
successful mediation intervention.

The Characteristics and Skills of the Mediator

Finally, the third category of conditions hypothesized that for mediation
to succeed, the mediator should be impartial; independent from the parties;
acceptable to both; have the respect of all the parties; be credible as one
with past success in settling disputes; have the knowledge and skill to deal
with the issues; have the required physical resourcesmeeting sites,
communication facilities, inspection service, etc.; and, must have leverage
over the parties. It has been shown that many of these characteristics were
displayed by the intermediaries in the Sudan conflict and they need not be
repeated. It might be said that none of the intermediaries had had previous
experience in settling disputes. However, the involvement of the WCC in
the Nigerian Civil War, though principally as an aid donor, had sufficiently
acquainted it with the political, economic, human, and international
problems which wars of secession raise in Africa. At least, the WCC
became aware of what to avoid and how to identify focal points for
settlement of such conflicts.
Moreover, Burgess Carr, then Secretary for Africa for the Commission on
Inter-Church Aid at the WCC, had a lot of experience in inter-African
governmental relations during the Nigerian-Biafran conflict while he was in
charge of relief aid for Biafra. The issues he was working on dealt not only
with the quality and quantity of relief material, but also with all of the
ramifications that such aid could have on the policies of that region. Issues
such as the policies of the Organization of African Unity, the anti-colonial
wars going on against Portugal and South Africa at the time, world opinion
and the position of Western churches about the plight of the Biafrans, and,
in general, the humanitarian call to respond to the wants of the needy,
irrespective of political consequences, had to be juggled. He had to
negotiate with many of the African governments in order to find a
politically neutral conduit for the aid, since at that time Portugal and South
Africa were said to be taking advantage of the church cover to transport
arms to the Biafrans. At the same time, he had also to ensure that he was
not undercutting the anti-Biafran positon frequently adopted by many
African governments during the conflict. He traveled on a number of
missions to Emperor Haile Selassie, President Tubman of Liberia, and to all
heads of states who were at the time attempting to resolve the civil war and
he carried messages on their behalf to leaders of the conflicting parties in
Nigeria.487 Moreover, Leopoldo Niilus had been involved in many
international issues as the Director of the Commission of the Churches on
International Affairs, which by its charter is charged with studying and
calling attention to urgent international problems. Therefore, even if the
intermediaries may not have had previous experience in settling disputes of
this nature, per se, their previous involvement in a similar conflict, and their
experience in other national and international conflicts, could have
established some credibility in their ability to understand the nature and
implications of the Sudan conflict.
In the theoretical presentation of Part One, the question of leverage as a
necessary prerequisite for successful mediation was controversial. While
Young argued that it was not a sine qua non, Ott contended that it was
essential for the success of mediation. Yarrow claimed that it might be
precisely the mediator's powerlessness over the parties that would enhance
his persuasiveness, his sincerity of purpose, and even his credibility.
In the Sudan case, however, it does not seem easy to marshall any solid
evidence for either of the contending hypotheses. It is very difficult to argue
that the intermediaries had great leverage over the conflicting parties to
significantly reward or punish the cooperative or uncooperative behaviour
of the parties towards the peace process. They had a limited leverage, vis-a-
vis the Anya Nya, because they could mobilize their own resources and
persuade other organizations to send humanitarian aid and relief. As
happened in the Nigerian Civil War, aid to exiles and refugees in
neighboring countries and to the people in the rebel-controlled areas ends
by also aiding the guerillas. During that war, the channels opened by the
churches for providing aid had been allegedly used as cover for arms
shipments by governments and other organizations sympathetic to the
liberation movement Similar prospects also existed in the Sudan. Thus, the
leverage the intermediaries had over the Anya Nya seems to have been
more important and direct than that over the Sudanese government.
Their leverage with the Sudanese government seems to have been more
indirect and psychological. Delivery of aid to the South through other than
Sudanese government channels, even though intended to be merely
humanitarian, would have ended up supporting the guerillas, and would
have needed the cooperation of the Anya Nya for its distribution. Such a
participation in the distribution of aid would have in turn increased the
legitimacy of the SSLM in the eyes of the Southerners, as a substitute
government to Khartoum, and would have strengthened the civil, health,
and educational administrative structures it was attempting to establish.
Moreover, this aid channel might have served as a gateway and cover for
organizations sympathetic to the Anya Nya even to ship arms. Thus,
whatever the Sudanese government could do to stop direct delivery of any
kind of aid to the SSLM and the Anya Nya would have the effect of
weakening the latter by cutting them off from external aid and reducing the
costs of the government's effort to check the insurgents. This situation
might, therefore, have influenced the view of both conflicting parties, and
this may have been why the intermediaries made the delivery of aid a
precondition to a peace settlement.
In addition, the intermediaries seem to have derived some moral leverage
over the parties because they were perceived by the contenders as legitimate
bodies to seek reconciliation. Moreover, at crucial times, the intermediaries
were able to borrow the leverage of powerful actors like Emperor Haile
Selassie who helped them to break serious deadlocks and to build the
confidence of the parties in the negotiation.
On the other hand, borrowed leverage aside, the power of the
intermediaries by themselves was not so great as to significantly reward or
penalize the parties to the extent that the principal arms suppliers such as
the Soviet Union or Israel could. This lack of controlling power over the
parties may have had the consequence of enhancing the mediators'
persuasiveness, sincerity of purpose and credibility as Yarrow suggests.
According to Yarrow, such a lack of political power can enable the mediator
to facilitate "an open and relaxed relationship between human beings."
Indeed, the Addis Ababa negotiation was a good example of an open
relationship between human beings.
Thus, from the arguments presented above, it might be hard to determine
which of the contending hypotheses about leverage is illustrated by the
Sudan case. The most one can say is that a certain amount of leverage, be it
moral or material, is essential for the effectiveness of the intermediary,
although the amount of this leverage may not have to be very great.
Under the same category of conditions, the ideal package of skills
required of a successful mediator was listed in chapter two. From the
analysis of the peace process in the Sudan, it is possible to see that most of
the skills listed there were used to the extent that they were relevant. In the
same theoretical presentation, many questions were raised about the
contradictory requirements concerning the skill called "sense of timing". In
the Sudan case, mediation intervention took place after stalemate developed
on the war front. It is also true that several changes in leadership occured
that allowed the parties to restructure their aims and move towards the
center where mediation was possible. However, there is no clear evidence
that the intermediaries calculated their intervention to take place at the same
 times as these changes in leadership or when stalemate occurred. This
suggests that instead of waiting on the outside for the appropriate time, it is
preferable for the mediator to be involved, and by trial and error, regulate
his or her activities according to the opportunities and constraints of the
situation.
Lastly, it was hypothesized that the assumption of the role of mediator by
an international nongovernmental, nonpolitical organization would
contribute to the success of mediating civil wars. The Sudan case provides
very clear evidence for this hypothesis. Even though the intermediaries had
support from some officials of the Organization of African Unity, it was
informal and quite invisible. This probably was very favorable to the peace
process. More official support for the intermediaries by any public
international organization could have been counterproductive by bringing
about more open and possibly disruptive discussions of their action, as well
as interference from outside powers about the course and content of the
peace process.
Thus, the Sudan case supports some of the hypotheses discussed in
chapter two, while it contradicts the others. Of course, at this stage of the
theory of mediation of civil wars, it is impossible to validate or reject these
hypotheses. More case studies need to be done before advancing to that
important step.
482
The fact that the insurgents were more clearly identifiable and that they had become more
inwardly united could have been an incentive for negotiating on the side of the Sudan
government, also in another sense. The threat of the insurgents became more and more clear
as they transformed themselves from a disorganized group to a much more internally united
and therefore a stronger force. Since past repression by previous governments had only
succeeded in further unifying or strengthening the insurgents, Numeiri's government might
have considered that continuing to fight the SSLM could not attain the objective of
liquidating the Anya Nya and that negotiations might be the only way out.
483
Philips Bowring, "The Southern Sudan, Anya Nya Now Holds the Key," Financial Times
November 26, 1971, 9.
484
Kasfir, Nelson. "Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement," African
Affairs 76 (1977), 145.
485
Leoploldo Niilus, "Peace in the Sudan," Reflections on Questions for a written interview, March
12, 1973, 12.
486
"Sudan, Amni, ihe Israelis, and Explanations." Africa Confidential, (November, 1972).
487
Burgess Carr, interview with author, Cambridge, Mass, April 29, 1981.
 Chapter 9
Conlcusion
What kinds of tentative lessons, insights, or examples for emulation can
be generated from the Sudan experience? It is true that derivation of
fundamental generalizations about the nature or the mediation of civil wars
cannot be warranted from this study alone. However, it is obvious that no
civil war is unique in all ways and that the observations of this study have
some relevance and application in other situations.
The Sudan experience provides suggestions for mediation strategies and
techniques. It suggests first that, in multi-issue conflicts, the mediator might
be able to generate a cycle of goodwill or a benevolent pattern of
cooperative behavior that could predispose the parties towards agreement
by arranging the agenda in such a way that less controversial issues are
settled first.
Secondly, it suggests that in large-scale and multi-issue conflicts
involving many delegates, it could be beneficial to divide the issues into
smaller components to be negotiatied in smaller committees comprised of
people with similar professional backgrounds. This is because these
similarities in background could lead to less distortion of information and
messages, and to common standards by which to evaluate information.
Such an approach could enhance empathy, understanding, flexibility, and
even cross-organizational loyalties based on the merits of ideas rather than
on rigidly stated organizational objectives.
Thirdly, the Sudan experience also suggests how a mediator might handle
some deadlock situations which arise once the negotiations are underway.
When the parties lock horns, or are unable to make progress in their
negotiations because of mutual intransigence, the mediator, after hearing
both parties' contentions, might present them with a proposed draft
capitalizing on the parties' overlapping interests. If such a draft, after being
debated, is found unacceptable, the mediator can continue to revise and
submit drafts incorporating the parties' specific objections and criticisms
until an acceptable draft is produced. Such a strategy has the great
advantage of identifying focal points which can help the positions of the
parties to converge. It circumscribes boundaries for discussion, and
sharpens the issues for debate. Instead of arguing in the abstract, and in
general terms, this strategy offers the parties something tangible to work
with, thereby forcing them to be concrete and specific. Moreover, the fact
that these proposals are coming from an impartial third party, can even help
reduce the parties' resistance to accept the proposed terms.
A fourth strategy used in the Sudan peace process which is interesting for
the example it sets was the report which resulted from the intermediaries'
preliminary investigation into the Sudan conflict. Needless to say, the
preparation of such a report must involve the participation and feedback of
both conflicting parties. Such a strategy has several advantages. To begin
with, it provides the intermediary with a solid informational base, thus
enhancing his or her credibility as a knowledgeable go-between who
understands the issues, views, perceptions, and positions of the parties.
Also, depending on how the information is reported, the mediator may be
able to establish his or her impartiality and show that there is no hidden
agenda. Very importantly, the report can serve as a diagnosis of the
dynamics of the conflict, thereby helping the parties to assess, without
distortion, the evolution of the conflict and the consequences of various
actions and reactions by the parties. By seeing their own concerns,
perceptions, and positions restated by an impartial intermediary, the parties
can derive insight about the justifiability or unjustifiability of their own
positions. Reading such a report can even provide the conflicting parties
with insight into the merits behind the motives and concerns of their
adversary. This strategy can generate at least some minimal consensus
between the contending parties concerning the key issues at stake. It can
also save negotiating time by avoiding the unnecessary hostilities that occur
during preliminary phases of negotiation when the parties are engaged in
face-to-face confrontation to articulate the issues that separate them.
In addition to the specific strategies and tactics, an insight to be gained
from the Sudan experience is the relationship between impartiality, a
requisite characteristic of the mediator, and the latter's involvement in
empowerment actions. A combination of the two initially appears
contradictory and can raise very thorny problems. A dilemma arises as to
how the mediator should handle his or her role if, due to strict observance
of impartiality, he or she senses that the stronger party is taking advantage
of the weaker party's lack of skills and resources. In such a case, the
WCC/AACC intermediaries' point of view was particularly insightful. Most
of the intermediaries interviewed agreed that in such a situation of
imbalance, the mediator's concern for producing a fair result should
outweigh his or her strict concern for impartiality. In circumstances of an
obvious inequality between the parties, the mediator, by remaining
impartial, would be playing into the hands of the stronger party or, by being
passive, would only be insuring the imposition of injustice. In fact, in such
cases of gross imbalance, the mediator's strict impartiality may not even
serve the best interests of the stronger party, since, in the long run, an unfair
or unjust settlement would collapse from its own weight.
The Sudan experience also provides the insight that the intermediary may
be able to help one party without generating much hostility from the other if
both parties have a high level of trust in the intermediary. As long as he or
she is not leaning substantially to one side, the tolerance of the party against
whom the apparently threatening acts of the intermediary are taken could be
fairly high, if there is a good relationship between that party and the
intermediary.
Concerning the timing of intervention, it has been claimed previously
that the prescriptions were either illusory or unrealistically precise. In some
instances, the concept was also used spuriously. If a mediation effort
succeeds, then the timing is considered to be right; if it does not, failure is
attributed to bad timing. In the Sudan case, when the intermediaries, both
those who succeeded in bringing about the negotiated settlement and those
who failed, were asked how they used the notion of "timing" during their
mediation, the common reply was that there was no one appropriate time
for intervention and that it would not be sensible to refrain from activity
merely because the time was not ripe, because they would not truly know
whether it was ripe without first trying. They pointed out that the best
approach was always to make one's good offices open, and to let the
contending parties know that the intermediaries were at their disposal
whenever needed. But, they felt that the intermediaries should be involved
at every possible occasion in the hopes that one of their many efforts would
produce results if the other factors coincided. Barbara Haq, the MCF
intermediary, suggested that dialogue be allowed to go on, if nowhere else,
at the very low levels of leadership of the contending parties, rather than
waiting to take action only "when the time is ripe."
 Out of all the confusing guidelines for appropriate timing, one specific
lesson from the Sudan case can be drawn. That is, in lengthy conflicts, the
intermediaries should view changes in leadership of one or both parties as
an opportunity to consider serious intermediary steps. In the Sudan case, the
assumption of power by Numeiri, and the transfer of power from Joseph
Garang to Abel Alier, on the one hand, and the ascendancy of Joseph Lagu
to the top leadership of the Anya Nya, on the other, were all times when
there were significant shifts in previously-held policies, and thus, favorable
entry points for serious mediatory intervention.
The Sudan experience also provides insight about the utility of mediation
for the resolution of similar conflicts in other countries. Civil wars have
pestered numerous African countries and will continue do so. In the past
two decades, such problems have plagued Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, Zaire,
Chad, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda. The fears and
anxieties that lock governments involved in civil wars into the perception
that a military solution is the only possible one were discussed earlier.
Numeiri's willingness to negotiate with the SSLM was described both by
internal and external sources as a sellout of Sudan's sovereignty, a
degradation of the country's honor, an encouragement for others to secede,
and many predicted that Numeiri's government could not withstand the
shock of negotiating with rebels, etc. However, Numeiri's recognition of the
SSLM as a legitimate representative of Southern discontent and his
willingness to negotiate with them, did not end up in the trauma every one
had expected. On the contrary, it resulted in strengthening Numeiri's
government. In fact, the Sudan experience seems to have set a reassuring
example that such fears and anxieties about the undesirable consequences
of negotiating with rebel groups may have been exaggerated. It suggests
that such an attempt at negotiation or mediation is not necessarily a sign of
weakness, nor that it would necessarily lead to the weakening of the
incumbent government. It is hoped that this will encourage many
governments involved in counterinsurgency wars to give negotiation and
mediation efforts a chance.
The Sudan experience has some general theoretical implications as well.
Study of this mediation process once again draws attention to the
controversy discussed in chapter two concerning the importance of the
personal aspects of the mediator for successful mediation. It was pointed
out that one school of thought held that the mediator's personality,
characteristics, skills and resources were the key to the success of
mediation, while the contending school, as represented by Ott, held that
these factors were only marginal factors at best.488
As demonstrated in chapter seven, the Sudan experience lends more
support to the claims of the first school, showing that the role of the
mediator is not as trivial as the second school suggests. Ott's conclusion
implies that as long as the environmental factors such as parity, stalemate,
high and rising cost, etc., prevail, the role of the mediator is minimal in
contributing to the success of the peace process. This may have been so in
the cases Ott examined. However, one is liable to arrive at such conclusions
for the wrong reasons. One reason why the mediator's contribution is
dismissed as marginal might be because the observer may not have had
adequate information to assess the role of the third party. Mediation
processes are, in most instances, secret and informal, principally because of
tactical considerations. In most cases, the number of participants is small
and the documentation miminal. Even where available, documents are
confidential and incomplete. In addition, documents cannot capture certain
aspects of the personal and affective interactions between the intermediary
and the conflicting parties.
In doing research, even if the investigator is able to talk to the mediator,
the latter may be hesitant to divulge confidential transactions and
relationships for fear of breaching trust and of jeopardizing his or her future
effectiveness by inhibiting other conflicting parties to seek his or her good
offices. Moreover, as Yarrow points out, the intermediary is inclined to
attribute most of the credit for a successful mediation to the parties, while
renouncing publicity for oneself. The attitude of the WCC about its role in
the Sudan peace process is a good example. In its annual report, the role
which its Commission of the Churches on International Affairs played in
bringing about a negotiated settlement in the Sudan conflict is briefly
described. The report concludes: "The WCC has been hesitant to claim too
much for itself in relation to these activities and that is proper." (Emphasis
added.)
In fact, because of strategic considerations, the intermediaries may not
even describe their actions as mediation. According to Niilus, the
intermediaries in the Sudan conflict purposely chose terms such as
"mailbag" or "go-between" instead of "mediator" to describe their activities.
They thought that this would have the effect of forcing the parties to "own
up" to their responsibilities of making the peace process work, rather than
always expecting the third party to perform miracles and to forge a
settlement. It was felt that this strategy could help avoid the problem of the
parties' tendency to blame the intermediaries for failure to produce an
agreement while the real difficulties might lie with the parties'
unwillingness to give and take.
For all these reasons, the goals of the researcher and the mediator may
not always be congruent. The researcher may not be able to secure adequate
information about the personal aspect of the mediation process in order to
assess properly the role played by the intermediary in bringing about the
final product of the negotiation. Particularly, as was pointed out in chapter
seven, the affective process is what makes mediation unique and difficult
when compared with other third party conflict resolution mechanisms such
as arbitration or adjudication. Unfortunately, however, there is no easy way
for the researcher, especially an outside observer, to conveniently capture
this aspect. Consequently, he or she might tend to magnify the cognitive
and visible elements of the peace process at the expense of the affective and
behind the scenes elements. Under these circumstances, therefore, it is
tempting to dismiss the contribution of the intemediary as nonexistent or
trivial. These problems demonstrate the need for extreme caution in arriving
at conclusions like that of the second school, since there is the danger of
making such a claim for methodological rather than substantive reasons.
Even though the Sudan experience supports the view that the identity,
skills, and characteristics of the third party are important for the success of
mediation, it does not reflect the pessimism entertained by some proponents
of this school of thought concerning the applicability of mediation to many
large-scale conflicts. For example, Young points out that it is not easy to
find well-qualified and skilled third parties to play mediatory roles since
only very few intermediaries fall in such a category. Some conclude from
this that mediation may not be a practical alternative for settling many civil
wars since it is difficult to find an appropriate mediator. The Sudan case
suggests that it is possible to circumvent this constraint by utilizing team
mediation rather than searching for the exceptionally gifted and qualified
mediator. Although no one member of the mediation team may satisfy all
the requirements, the team members, together, could match the attributes,
characteristics, skills, and qualifications of the ideal mediator by
supplementing each other's deficiencies. In fact, mediation, particularly of
large-scale conflicts, may be an undertaking that no one person is capable
of perfoming since the knowledge and experience required would be
beyond the capacity of any one person.
It is even more difficult to find a mediator that possesses not only the
personal qualities and skills but also the resources required to undertake
mediation effectively. Such an effort definitely restricts the potential for
effective mediation intervention to a very few individuals and
organizations. Again, the Sudan case hints at ways to circumvent this
problem by suggesting that resources and leverage could be borrowed or
used by proxy. In the Sudan case, the intermediaries, in and of themselves,
did not possess all of the resources required to conduct the task of the
mediation. However, by coopting Emperor Haile Selassie and some of the
OAU officials into the mediation process, the intermediaries were able to
draw upon and utilize the resources available to these actors at crucial
moments when their own resources were inadequate. Thus one lesson
derived from the Sudan peace process is that by utilizing teams and using
resources by proxy, it is possible to make mediation a viable option in many
more conflict situations.
Moreover, the Sudan experience suggests that in conflicts which entail
large-scale human suffering, humanitarian agencies, such as the WCC, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Oxfam, etc., could have an
important mediatory potential. In this kind of conflict, such humanitarian
agencies have a great advantage over many other organizations in obtaining
access to the conflicting parties. They are often called in by at least one of
the parties to provide relief or rehablitation; or, if they take their own
initiative, their humanitarian mission makes their approach less suspicious.
Such access could provide peacemaking opportunities for these
organizations. They could use their presence to observe and study the
conflict at close range, to get a better idea of the viewpoints and concerns of
the protagonists, to identify key actors and decision makers, to monitor the
process of the conflict and to assess the outlooks for peaceful regulation or
even the resolution of the conflict, and to identify possible entry points for
mediation. Their demonstration of concern for the people's welfare and their
willingness to wrestle with the difficult task of providing rehabilitation and
aid under dangerous circumstances could help to establish the integrity of
these organizations and provides them with a good basis for beginning
intermediary activities. In view of these possibilities, it might, therefore, be
 a worthwhile idea for such humanitarian organizations to dispatch
unofficial observers, along with their relief and rehabilitation aid, to war-
afflicted areas in order to study the conflict and to explore the feasibility of
peacemaking.
With regard to such potentials for peacemaking, certain international
organizations like the World Council of Churches seem to have an added
advantage. This is due to their considerable infrastructure and network that
can be harnessed for intermediary activities. The WCC, through its member
churches, which come from many denominations and over one hundred
countries of the world, can establish access to conflicting parties all the way
from the leaders to the grass roots. The manner in which the WCC
established access to the conflicting parties in the Sudan serves as one
illustration. The WCC first involved a regional organization, the All Africa
Conference of Churches, which in turn involved a national organization, the
Sudan Council of Churches, which in turn had the capability to involve
local churches if need be. Such an infrastructure gives this organization a
valuable asset in terms of pining access not only to the parties but also to
other persons and organizations that could be helpful in peacemaking
efforts. Given such a potential, perhaps international, nongovernmental
bodies like the WCC could be more effective if they were to institutionalize
their peacemaking activities and to bring in more expertise rather than
continuing in the more ad hoc manner of the present.
Lastly, one is faced with the inevitable question of what should be the
next step concerning general theory construction in the area of mediation of
civil wars. At this point, there appears to be no shortcut to compiling more
case studies. The data base must be enriched so that the theory can be
advanced by validating or rejecting the insights and observations derived
from particular experiences like the one that has been studied here.
488
See page 12.
 Epilogue
By the early 1980s, the political climate in the Sudan had drastically
changed and the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement was
encountering serious difficulties. The analysis of the political climate that
prevailed in the Sudan after the ratification of the agreement and the
process of its implementation is a subject that merits a detailed study by
itself. However, a brief overview of some of the key factors that contributed
to the implementation problems might be of interest
The alliance and the coalition structure that created the atmosphere for
the negotiations in 1971 and 1972 had collapsed. The fundamentalist
Muslim Brothers, who were the principal opponents of the Addis Ababa
Agreement, were not as weak or under the control of Numeiri as they had
been in the early 1970s. In 1975 and 1976 they were able to stage coup
d'etats that almost succeeded in overthrowing Numeiri.
After the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, Numeiri had a strong
power base in the South. As the courageous leader that made autonomy for
the South possible, he was considered the bridge between the two
conflicting cultures of the South and North. Thus, he had a strong backing
from Southern politicians. His palace guards were Southerners who even
protected him from uprisings by other groups. As a result, many
Northerners began to identify the South with Numeiri's oppressive regime. "
[A] s Numeiri's rule became increasingly oppressive, the many northern
Sudanese came to refer to the south as the 'rock around our necks.' As long
as the south remained committed to Numeiri's leadership, the north would
have only a slim chance of removing him."489
After the 1976 coup d'etat by the Muslim Brothers, Numeiri began to
accommodate them in order to protect his position, and their influence was
felt more and more in his government. During this time, as a measure of
administrative devolution, the North was being divided into five regions,
each with limited autonomy. However, Northerners felt that, when pitted
against a united Southern region, the Northern regions were much weaker
and were therefore demanding uniformity by redividing the South into three
smaller regions.
 Meanwhile, in the South itself friction was developing among its various
ethnic groups. Towards the end of the 1970s, the former Anya Nya
commander and signatory of the Addis Ababa Agreement, General Joseph
Lagu, and his followers in Equatoria began asking for redivision of the
South. They accused the Dinkas of dominating the government in the
South, of nepotism, corruption, and mismanagement The Dinkas and their
allies opposed redivision arguing that it would only weaken the South
politically. The controversy eventually paralyzed the regional government
in the South and this led Numeiri to dismiss the regional government and
replace it by an interim military government until a new election could take
place. In the election, Lagu's supporters won office and redivision of the
South was again proposed to the central government in Khartoum.
However, the regional congress of the South voted against the redivision
proposal. "The Equatorians [in the regional congress] attempted to blur the
report of this vote to the national congress to read as if redivision was
approved. When the other delegates became aware of this, uproar ensued....
[T]he very deep division among Southerners and the strong support of the
regional government, encouraged Numeiri to decree the creation of three
new Southern regions in May 1983."490 This act by Numeiri was in
violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement which required that any
amendment of the agreement could only be done by the approval of two-
thirds of the regional congress and a plebicite.
To complicate the situation even more, oil was dicovered in 1975 in the
district of Bentui in the Southern province of Upper Nile. Drilling started in
1982 and a huge contoversy arose over the use of the oil revenues.
Southerners claimed that the revenues should be used for the development
of the South especially since the central government had been remiss in
paying the percentage of the national budget that it was obligated to allocate
for the development of the South, an amount that was quite small in the first
place. The central government, however, wanted to declare the oil fields
property of the central government and put the revenues into the central
treasury.
By the early 1980s, Numeiri's government was losing its hold on power.
The economy was in shambles, and there were many demonstrations and
riots in Khartoum in 1981. A state of emergency was declared and many
people were arrested. As his popularity declined, Numeiri's own party
advised him to resign. His response was to dismiss the party and his cabinet
ministers. He also suspended the judiciary as well as the country's penal
code, and in 1983 decreed Islamic Law as the law of the land. Many people
have different interpretations about why he declared Islamic Law. Some say
that this was a way of protecting his power since, by doing this, he was
declaring himself the Imam and people would have to take an oath of
loyalty to him personally as an Islamic leader. Others say that he did it to
fragment the Muslim Brothers by "stealing its Islamic thunder at a time
when [his] regime was coming under strong criticism for its lack of
economic and political direction."491 Others have interpreted it as a tool to
brutally repress political dissent.492 Even though Numeiri had reiterated that
the Islamic law would not apply to non-Muslims, many Southerners felt
that the new law was likely to endanger the religious freedom which was
protected by the Addis Ababa Agreement
While all this confusion was taking place in the North as well as in the
South, in 1983, a large Southern array detachment was ordered to be
transferred to the North for training. Fearing the intentions of the
government, the Southern soldiers refused to move to the North and began
deserting. In some garrisons, the soldiers mutineed and fled to the bushes
where they started an insurgency group called the Sudan Peoples Liberation
Army (SPLA), with its political arm, the Sudan Peoples Liberation
Movement (SPLM). Even though predominantly Southern, this group has
some members from the western Tegion of the Sudan. Dr. Mansour Khalid,
a westerner, and the former Foreign Minister under Numeiri, has joined the
movement According to Khalid, the objective of the movement is to bring
about equitable socio-economic change within the context of a united
Sudan. He insists that the movement is not secessionist, and emphasizes
that it is a nationalist movement even though its origins are in the South.5 In
response to this movement, Numeiri retaliated by organizing local militias
in the South to fight the SPLA. A splinter group broke away from the SPLA
which calls itself Anya Nya II and is now fighting the SPLA with the
assistance of the Sudanese government, as a local militia for the national
army.
Over this decade also, tremendous political changes have taken place in
the international situation surrounding the Sudan. Egypt and Israel signed
the Camp David Accord. Most of the Arab world opposed the accord and
tried to isolate Egypt, while the United States sought to protect the accord
by supporting Egypt and other governments, such as the Sudan, which were
sympathetic to Egypt. Therefore, the Sudan received a great deal of
economic and military aid from the United States. Some have indicated that
part of the military aid was used in attacking the Southern insurgency and
encouraged the Sudanese government to take a military option instead of
seeking a political solution. At the same time, Numeiri's support for Egypt
and his proWest policies brought him to loggerheads with his former ally,
Libya, who was eager to take advantage of internal discontent in the Sudan
to bring about Numeiri's downfall.
On another front, Numeiri did not maintain his promise to the Ethiopian
government to stop aiding the Eritrean insurgents after the Addis Ababa
Agreement was signed. This did not foster good relations between the two
governments. In 1974, the pro-West government of Haile Selassie was
overthrown and replaced by a revolutionary government which Numeiri
saw as a threat. The new Ethiopian regime also perceived the Sudan as a
launching pad for destabilization efforts against it by the West. Thus, as
Numeiri encouraged the Eritreans and other groups opposed to the
Ethiopian government, the latter began to encourage dissident elements in
the Sudan such as Sadiq al Mahdi and later the SPLM.
In 1985, Numeiri was eventually overthrown. The provisional
government that succeeded him abrogated Numeiri's decree of Southern
redivision and offered negotiations with the SPLM using the Addis Ababa
Agreement as a framework. (It is not clear, however, how much support
exists for the abrogation of the decree among Equatorians.) The newly
elected Prime Minister, Sadiq al Mahdi, who has replaced the provisional
government, has reiterated his desire to negotiate with the SPLM. He has
also reportedly expressed his desire to abolish Numeiri's version of Islamic
Law and he has invited the SPLM to participte in a constitutional
conference. So far, nothing seems to have come out of it.
This brief overview of the post Addis Ababa Agreement period illustrates
that any agreement, no matter how it comes about (whether at the end of a
military victory or through a mediated or negotiated settlement), cannot
insulate itself from dramatic changes in the internal and external
environments. In the Sudan case, the leadership that was most sympathetic
to the agreement lost power while those who opposed it have gained
control. Previous allies (such as Numeiri and Libya; Numeiri and the South;
Numeiri, Alier, and Lagu, etc.) have become enemies. A Southern faction
bearing the name of the Anya Nya is fighting on the side of the government
 against the SPLA. Some Southerners are demanding redivision of the South
even though at the time of the settlement it was thought that unity was
necessary for the South to protect itself from Northern domination. Many
factors in the external environment also seem to have encouraged the
agreement's breakdown. No settlement can be easily implemented in such a
hostile and unfavorable environment
It would also be unrealistic to expect that one agreement would be a
permanent solution to a problem of this magnitude. As the parties and their
internal dynamics change, their interests and needs change, and so must the
provisions of the agreement. With hindsight, it may be said that the Addis
Ababa Agreement might have contributed to its implementation difficulties
by not incorporating provisions for the resolution of future problems. There
might be some grounds for such criticism. However, in the final analysis,
where there is no one legal body to enforce agreements, implementation
always depends on the cooperation and goodwill of the parties regardless of
the kinds of provisions included in the settlement. Therefore, the contents of
the accord, per se, may not solve its implementation problems.
The greatest and most useful insights to be derived from the Sudan
experience, however, concern process rather than content, i.e., lessons on
how to approach mediation, how the mediation process works, and how it
facilitates agreement. From this perspective it teaches very valuable lessons
that should encourage such an approach in many conflicts. What the above
problems indicate is not that mediation is unhelpful, but that it needs to be
improved and perfected as more insights are gained from the
implementation of its results.
489
Carol Berger, "Sudan: The North-South Divide," Africa Report (July-August 1985): 74.
490
Andrew Mawson, "Southern Sudan: A Growing Conflict," The World Today (December 1984): 522.
491 Berger, 74.
492 Mauson, 525.
5
Mansour Khalid, "A Plea for Pluralism," Africa Report (July-August 1985): 53.
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O'Fahey, R.S. The Southern Sudan: Symposium of Conflicts in the Middle
African Region London: International Institute of Strategic Studies,
1971.
Owen, Richard. "It Is Our Fault: Background to the Southern Sudan." Grass
Curtain 1 (August 1970): 7-11.
Pirouet, M. Louise. "The Achievement of Peace in Sudan." Journal of East
African Research and Development 6 (1976): 115-145.
Rees, Elfan. "Exercises in Private Diplomacy; Selected Activities of the
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs. In Unofficial
Diplomats, edited by Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
Roden, David. "Peace Brings Sudan New Hope and Massive Problems."
Africa Reports 17, No. 6 (1972): 14-17.
Roden, D. "Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan." Geography
Review 64 (1974): 498-516.
Russell, Peter, and Storrs McCall. "Can Secession be Justified?" In The
Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration, edited by
Dunstan M. Wai. London: Frank Cass, 1973.
Scherf, Theresa. "The Sudan Conflict." A study prepared for the WCC,
Geneva, May, 1971. (Mimeographed.)
Schelling, S. "Another View of the Stubborn War in Sudan." Atlas 20, No. 4
(1971): 35-36.
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Stevens, Richard P. "The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan's
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"Sudan: Agreement with Rebels." Africa Research Bulletin (February 1-29,
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"Sudan: Developments in South." Africa Research Bulletin (July 1-31,
1970).
Sudan News, London: Sudan Embassy, March 1971. (Mimeographed.)
"Sudan: Southern Policy Statement" Africa Research Bulletin (February 1-
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Voll, John Obert Historical Dictionary of the Sudan Metuchen, New Jersey:
Scarecrow Press, 1978.
Wai, Dunstan Mogga, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan. New York:
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Wai, Dunstan Mogga, ed. The Southern Sudan and the Problem of National
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 Index
AACC. See All Africa Conference of Churches
Abboud, Ibrahim, 58, 61, 96
Adawalla, Babiker, 71, 73
Addis Ababa Agreement, 87-148, 156-157, 160-161, 180-183
Adier, Job, 122, 131
Adjudication, 3, 7
Ahmed, Mohammed el Baghir, 122, 131
Aid
development, 154
educational, 168
military, 24, 157, 182, 194, 198-199
relief, 95-96, 99, 103-104, 113, 115, 125, 168-169, 195, 197-199, 207
Albino, Oliver, 131
ALF. See Azania Liberation Front
Algeria, 62, 64, 80, 83
Alier, Abel, 73, 79, 105-106, 114, 117-120, 122-126, 128-131, 134-135, 139, 142-143, 146, 148, 157,
162-163, 173, 193, 204
All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), 95-131, 208
Amin, Idi, 82, 160, 181
Animist, 37, 43
Ankrah, Kodwo, 99-100, 103, 106, 110, 118-120, 126, 128, 130-133, 135-138, 168, 170-172, 175
Ansars, 39
See also Mahdists
Anuak, 181
Anya Nya, 59-92, 97, 101-105 108, 111-113, 115-120, 123-132, 138-142, 145-148, 152-155, 158-
163, 167-168, 175, 177, 180-183, 186-188, 204
Anya Nya High Command Council, 75
Anyidi Provisional Government, 71, 75
Arab Federation, 78
Arabi, Ahmed, 41
Arabic, 31, 37-40
Arabization, 58
Ashikha party, 47
Autonomy, Southern, 72, 91-92, 98, 101-106, 110-113, 116-118, 121, 123, 125-129, 134-135, 145,
155-156, 162-163, 188, 196
Azania Liberation Front (ALF), 64
Azhari, Ismail el, 51
Bahr el Ghazal, 35, 40, 65, 93
Baker, Samuel, 39
Bakheit, Ali, 108, 117-118, 131, 134
Bargaining, 7, 20, 176, 184
Belgium, 64
Britain, 40, 42, 44, 46-48, 56, 88-91, 94
British Council of Churches, 177, 195
Burundi, 204
Bwogo, Samuel, 112, 114, 118, 122, 130-131, 133-134, 138, 142, 173
Carr, Burgess, 100, 103-104, 108-109, 122, 131-148, 167, 170-171, 174-175, 178, 197
Catholicism, 43, 96, 127
See also Christianity
Cease fire, 113, 123, 144
Central Intelligence Agency, 91, 189
Central African Republic, 67-68
Christianity, 37, 43-45
See also Catholicism
Church World Service, 101, 104
Civil Administration, SSLM, 102, 158
Civil war
definition, 4
internationalized, 3, 5
settlement of, 6
significance, 5
See also Insurgency; Internal war
Commission of Inquiry report, 54, 56
Communist Bloc, 72
Communist Party, 61, 69, 70-72, 77-80, 114, 155
Compromise, 7-8, 13-16, 21, 158, 169, 176-178, 183-184
Concession, 7-8, 22-23, 155, 162, 174
Condominium Agreement, 42, 46, 50
Condominium Rule, 42-44
Conflict
analysis of, 26, 169
belligerency, state of, 29
analysis of, 26, 169
cost of, 18, 26-30, 175, 180, 195, 199
duration of, 15-16, 194
dynamics of, 169, 202
escalation of, 174, 181
impasse, 26-27, 174-175, 183
intensity of, 16, 20, 30, 194-195
international, 11
internationalization of, 12
labor-management, 11
territorial, 21
value conflict, 21
See also Issues; Parties; Stalemate
Congo, 40
See also Zaire
Constantinople, 39
Counselling, human relations, 185
Crisis management, 26
Darfur, 39, 40-41
De Garang, Mading, 87-94, 100, 105, 110-118, 121-124, 130-133, 146
Deadlock, 18, 27-28, 133, 139
See also Stalemate
Deng, William, 63
Egypt, 35-42, 44, 46-51, 56, 62, 64, 74, 78, 80, 154, 160, 193
Egypt, Viceroy of, 37
Empathy, 26, 175-176, 184, 201
Empowerment, 19-20, 31, 176, 178, 186, 195, 202
Epps, Dwain, 102, 105-106, 114-117, 172
Equatoria, 35, 40, 48, 93, 162
Equatoria Corps, 55, 59
Eritrea, 69, 79, 122, 132, 140, 180-181
Ethiopia, 35, 40, 44, 59, 67-69, 74, 76, 79, 81, 83, 95, 104, 107, 112-113, 116, 121-122, 132-133,
136, 139, 140-141, 146-147, 159, 171, 173, 180-182
Faud, Ahmed, 46
Federation, 58, 62-63, 70, 116, 121, 123, 135, 145, 158
Foot, Dingle, 121, 133, 145, 177, 187
Frei, Daniel, 15-16, 22
Fung, 37
Garang, Joseph, 71, 73, 78-79, 89-93, 106, 108, 111, 114, 117, 155, 163, 187-188, 204
Germany, 46, 103
Ghana, 62, 164, 170
Good offices, 3, 203
Gordon, General, 39, 40
Graduates General Congress, 46-47
Grass Curtain, 76-77, 79, 99, 110, 114, 158, 161, 187
Gregory XVI, Pope, 43
Guerilla war, 58-61, 65-66, 70, 81-83, 151, 153, 168, 179
See also Insurgency
Hamito-Semites, 35
Haq, Barbara, 88-94, 187-188, 203
House of Commons, British, 90, 187
Humanitarian organizations, 207
Imam, 73-74
Inquiry, 3-4
Insurgency, 13-14, 151, 179
See also Guerilla war
Internal war, 4
Iraq, 74, 78
Islam, 37, 40, 43, 47-48, 134
Islamization, 96
Ismael, Khedive, 39, 41
Israel, 78-83, 112, 116, 120, 127, 141, 145-147, 157, 160, 181-182, 193-196, 199
Issues
affective, 185
agenda, 175, 196, 201-202
arrangement of, 22
cognitive, 185
complexity of, 22, 196
emotional, 206
internal affairs, 25, 29, 101, 137, 164
multidimensionality, 22, 196
positive-sum, 21
 substantive, 206
territorial, 21
zero-sum, 21, 196
Joint Church Aid (JCA), 104, 108-109, 167
Juba, 48-50, 52
Juba Conference, 48, 50
June Declaration, 72, 91, 98, 162
Kampala Committee, 102, 108, 161, 196
Kenya, 35, 45, 59, 67, 81, 83, 95-97, 107-108, 113, 118
Kenyatta, Jomo, 88, 177
Khalid, Abdullah, 58
Khalid, Mansour, 126, 131, 142-143, 147, 173
Kitchener, Lord, 42
Kordofan, 39-41
Labour Party, British, 88
Lagu, Joseph, 75-76, 82, 89, 108-112, 115-128, 144-148, 156-157, 161 161-163, 174, 193, 204
Liberation, 88
Liberia, 170, 198
Libya, 35, 44, 74, 77-80, 160
McCall, Storrs, 102
McDermot, Brian, 91, 93
Mahdi, 39-41
Mahdi, Sadiq al, 68-70, 79
Mahdi, Second, 40-41
Mahdist, 40-43, 46-47, 71, 73-74
Mahgoub, Mohammed Ahmed, 64-71, 88, 164, 180
Makerere Group, 102-103, 108, 144, 161, 196
MCF. See Movement for Colonial Freedom
Mediation
communication patterns, 8, 174
definition, 4
dilemmas of, 29
feasibility of, 207
international, 11, 12
labor, 11
pessimism about, 31
secrecy, 174, 205
team, 170, 206
theory of, 11-12, 204
timing, 16, 26-28, 203-204
transferability, 11
utility of, 204
Mediator
advocate, 186
characteristics, 22
facilitator, 186
impartiality, 173, 186, 195-197, 202
international support, 23, 24
leverage, 23-24, 30, 198-199, 208
mail-bag, as, 205
 personality of, 170, 171
skills, 14, 20, 26, 30, 193, 197, 199
physical resources, 197
Mercenaries, 101, 109
Military College, Sudan, 55, 57, 163
Minority Rights Group, 94
Missionaries, 43, 44, 58, 61, 84-85, 96-97, 112, 166-167
Missionary Act of 1962, 97
Modelski, George, 13, 19-20, 28, 30
Mohammed, Ali, 37-38
Morocco, 204
Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), 88-90, 93-95, 186-189, 203
Muslim Brothers, 71-72, 156
Mutiny of 1955, 52, 56, 59
Nairobi, 97, 102, 106, 108, 118-119
Nasser, Gemal Abdel, 56
National Legislative Assembly, 49, 50-53, 55, 57-58
National Unionist Party (NUP), 51, 52
Neguib, Mohammed 50
Nigeria, 62, 83
Nigerian Civil War, 98, 103-104, 160-161, 166, 171, 180, 197, 198
Niilus, Leopoldo, 106-107, 118-120, 122, 126, 128, 131, 133, 136-137, 139, 142, 164-166, 170-172,
175, 184, 198, 205
Nile Mirror, 94
Nile Provisional Government, 71, 75
Nilo-Hametic, 37
Nilotic, 37
Nkrumah, Kwame, 67, 88, 164, 177, 186
Nuer, 181
Numeiri, Gaafar al, 69-74, 77-82, 92, 94, 98, 100-101, 105, 108, 114, 117, 120-129, 143-144, 147-
148, 155-163, 167, 178, 180, 186, 192-194, 204
NUP. See National Unionist Party
OAU. See Organization of African Unity
Obote, Milton, 87, 160, 181, 186
October Revolution, 61
Organization of African Unity (OAU), 101, 107, 091, 111, 133, 136-137, 145, 161, 146, 197
Ott, Melvin, 30, 198, 204-205
Ottoman Empire, 37
Parties, conflict
cohesiveness, 13, 191
dependency, 15, 194
identity, 11-12, 31, 193-194
personality conflict, 14, 29
Paul VI, Pope, 105
Permits to Trade Order, 45
Portugal, 91, 197
Power parity, 17-20, 203
Racism, Program to Combat, 98, 101, 108, 166-167
Red Cross, International Committee of, 130, 148, 207
Reed, Allen, 101
Refugees, 60-63, 68-69, 74, 79, 83-84, 95-99, 105-106, 115, 126, 129, 148, 152, 159, 170
Regional Self Government, 157
See also Autonomy, Southern
Revolutionary Council, 71, 77, 94
Round Table Conference, 62, 65, 69, 157, 174
Rwanda, 204
Sahnoun, Mohammed, 137, 139
SANU. See Sudan African National Union
Saudi Arabia, 44
Scherf, Theresa, 44, 102
SDF. See Sudan Defence Force
Selassie, Haile, 122, 131-132, 139-140, 146, 159, 178, 198-199, 207
Sennar, 37
Sensitivity training, 185
Simba, 64
Slave trade, 37-40, 42, 52
Socialist Party, 70-71, 77, 91, 93
Socio-therapy, 185
Southern Corps, 55
South Africa, 104, 108, 091, 120, 197
Southern Armed Forces, 138
Southern Bloc, 53
Southern Party, 51-52
Southern Policy, 46
Southern Sudan Association, 89, 91, 93-94
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), 71, 75,
76, 81, 91, 95, 100-147, 154-158, 161, 163, 165, 168, 170-184, 187-189, 204
Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG), 70-71
Sovereignty
equality, 14, 25, 164, 192
infringement of, 29
interference in, 164
recognition of, 25, 164
sensitivities, 24
threat to, 15
Soviet Union, 77-78, 80-82, 154, 160, 193-194, 199
SSLM. See Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSPG. See Southern Sudan Provisional Government
Stalemate, 17-20, 27-31, 151, 153-154, 189, 195
See also Conflict; Deadlock
Steiner, Rolf, 116
Sudan African National Union (SANU), 59, 61-46, 70, 72-73
Sudan Council of Churches, 98, 107, 112, 114, 118, 122, 131, 173, 208
Sudan Defence Force (SDF), 55, 56, 60
Sudan Unity Party, 70
Sudan-Azania Government, 71
Sudanic, 37
Sudanization, 51, 55
Sue River Revolutionary Government, 71
Taffeng, Emilio, 59
Tanzania, 62, 90
Turkish-Egyptian regime, 40
Torit, 56-57
Tschombe, Moise, 64
Tubman, William, 198
Twelve Man Committee, 69, 157
Uganda, 35, 39, 44-45, 59-62, 67-68, 76, 79, 81-83, 90, 92, 95, 102-107, 110, 113, 121, 126, 127,
152, 160, 172, 180-182
Umma Party, 47, 51, 52, 58
United Nations (UN), 24, 60, 84, 164-165
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 83
United States, 64, 101, 103, 104, 127, 194
United Sudan African Liberation Front, 156
Upper Nile, 35, 93
Verona Fathers, 97
Walton, Robert, 24, 185
Wau, 60, 65-66
WCC. See World Council of Churches
Wehr, Paul, 19-20, 26, 30
Wol Wol, Laurence, 89-91, 111-117, 122, 124, 130-131, 146
Wolseley, General, 41
World Council of Churches (WCC), 87, 94-131, 148, 207
Yarrow, C.H., 23, 198-199, 205
Young, Oran, 30, 198, 204
Zaire, 35, 59, 64, 67, 81, 83, 95, 110, 113, 116, 181-182
Zambia, 90, 110
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