The Buddhist Conceptions of "Subject" and "Object" and Their Moral Implications

Author(s): David J. Kalupahana

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 38, No. 3, Fiftieth Anniversary, Department of
Philosophy, University of Hawaii (Jul., 1988), pp. 290-306
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398868
Accessed: 03-02-2016 00:36 UTC

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398868?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
David J. Kalupahana The Buddhistconceptionsof "subject" and "object"
and theirmoral implications

Thomas Nagel beginshis recentwork,The ViewfromNowhere(Oxford,1986),

witha criticismof the perennialsearchforobjectivity not onlyin relationto
our conceptionof theobject,but also to our conceptionsof thesubjectas well
as the moral life.Philosophers,startingwiththe obvious distinctionbetween
subjectivelifeand objectiveexperience,have moved in different directionsin
formulating theirviewsof the world.The in
pendulum swung different
has di-
rections.If we startfromthesubjectiveside,we are said to be confronted with
theproblemsof skepticism, idealism,or solipsism.If we are to beginwiththe
objectiveside, we are facedwitha different set of problems.We need to ac-
commodatethe individualand his perspectiveas well as the perspectivesof
othersin a worldthatis generallylooked upon as beingneutral,objective,and
perspectiveless.Nagel focuseson thesecondapproach.
It is thissecondversionof theproblemthatparticularly me. It is the
interests
obverseof skepticismbecause thegivenis theobjectivereality-or theidea of
an objectivereality-and whatis problematicby contrastis subjectivereality.
Withoutreceivingfullacknowledgment thisapproachhas beenveryinfluential
in recentanalyticphilosophy.It accordswell witha bias towardphysicalsci-
enceas a paradigmofunderstanding.
But if underthe pressureof realismwe admitthat thereare thingswhich
cannotbe understoodin thisway,thenotherways of understanding mustbe
sought.One way is to enrichthe notionof objectivity.But to insistin every
case thatthemostobjectiveand detachedaccountof a phenomenonis thecor-
rectone is likelyto lead to reductiveconclusions.I have arguedthattheseduc-
tiveappeal of objectiverealitydependson a mistake.It is notthegiven.Reality
is notjust objectivereality.Sometimes,in thephilosophyofmindbutalso else-
where,the truthis not to be foundby travellingas faraway fromone's per-
sonal perspective as possible.1

Nagel's effortto resurrectthehumanperspective without,at thesame time,

allowingit to deteriorateintoan idealismor a formof solipsismwillcertainly
be in conformity withthatof themainlineBuddhisttraditiontraceableto the
Buddha and continuedby such disciplesas Moggaliputta-tissa (thirdcentury
B.C.), Nagarjuna (secondcentury A.C.),Vasubandhu(fourthcenturyA.C.), and
Dignaga (fifthcenturyA.C.). The reason is thatthephilosophicalatmosphere
in India beforeand duringthesixthcenturyB.C., againstwhichBuddhismwas
responding,was not verydifferent fromthe gestaltagainst which Nagel is
reacting, even though the formermaynot appear to be as sophisticated as the
latter.The searchforultimateobjectivityand the need to accommodatethe
subjectwithinthatobjectiveperspective, as it was in theCartesianenterprisein
Westernphilosophy,led some of the Upanisadic thinkersto relyupon some
formofintuitionto establishtheultimaterealityoftheself(dtman).
In thebeginningthiswas onlytheself(dtman)in theformof a person.Looking
aroundhe saw nothingelse thantheself.He firstsaid "I am." Therefore,
even

DavidJ. Kalupahanais ProfessorofPhilosophy

at theUniversity
ofHawaii.
East and West,volume38,no.3 (July1988).? bytheUniversity
Philosophy ofHawaii Press.All rightsreserved.

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
291

to thisday whenone is addressedhe says that"thisis I" and speaks whatever

othernameshe mayhave."2
This does not look verydifferent fromtheCartesianenterprise. Here we find
theordinaryself-awareness beingplaced inside a casketmade of stainless
steel
and preservedas a permanentand eternalmentalsubstance,a selfthatcan be
comprehendedthroughan intuitionthatallows no room fordoubt. However,
in theIndian speculation,unlikein theCartesiansystem,it was thisverysame
ultimatelyreal selfthat also constitutedthe realityof everything in the uni-
verse.The realizationof theonenessor unityof theself(atman)therefore im-
pliesan intuitiveunderstanding thatthemysterious entitywithintheindividual
is identicalwiththemystery thatis inherentin all phenomena.
In more recenttimes,the Cartesian"ghostin the machine"came to be re-
pudiatedas a resultof a landmarktreatisebyGilbertRyleentitledTheConcept
of Mind (Hutchinson,1949).3The privatemetaphysicalsubject,the agentbe-
hindhumanexperienceand action,came to be abandonedin favorof a public
conceptwhichthecommunityof philosophers,leavingall theirprejudicesbe-
hind,wereable to analyze and forwhichtheycould assignpubliclyverifiable
meaning.In thatprocessthe ghostin the machinewas eliminatedalong with
certainpartsof themachine.This positivistic approachis whatcontributedto
the behavioristicmodel of explanationadopted by the psychologistswitha
scientificbent of mind, and which is now being challengedby people like
Nagel. In the ancientIndian tradition,a similarattemptto eliminatethe Up-
anisadic versionof the "ghost in the machine" led to an equally positivistic
doctrinepropoundedby the Materialists.For the Materialists,the objective
realityconsistsnot simplyof matter,but also of theprinciplethatgovernsthe
behavior of material bodies. This mysteriousprincipleis referredto as
"nature"(svabhdva).4As in thepositivisttraditionin theWest,theMaterialists
wereenthusiasticabout eliminatingnot only the "ghostin themachine",but
evena partof themachine,thatis, thepsychologicaland moralexperiencesof
humanity.
Nagel would be pleased to learn that his problemwas also the Buddha's
problem,even thoughthe solutionsare not the same. The Buddha was con-
frontedwiththeories,some of whichweretheresultsof individualperspective
(ditthi),likethoseof theUpanisadicthinkers, and someotherswhichsupposedly
avoidedanysuchindividualperspective (aditthi),likethoseoftheMaterialists.5
No doubt,themiddlepath betweenthetwo extremesof individualperspective
and no perspectiveis not an easily circumscribed perspectiveso long as our
attemptis to achieveultimateobjectivity. This means thatthereis something
radicallywrongwithour searchforultimateobjectivity itself.
The firstattempton thepartof theBuddha was to avoid thesearchforulti-
mateobjectivity regardingthesubject.This is one aspectof hisdoctrineofnon-
selfor nonsoul(anatta). It is intendedto getridof the"ghostin themachine"
without,at thesame time,abandoninganypartof themachine.The machineis

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
292 Kalupahana

the psycho-physical personalityconsistingof the fivebasic constituents, the

physicalbody (rtupa),feeling or sensation(vedand),perception(saiin), dis-
positions(sahkhdra),and consciousness(viKiindna).6 These are not radicallydis-
tinguishableultimateelements.Instead,theyrepresent fivemutuallydependent
aspectsoftheconscioushumanpersonality.
The Buddha's definition of thephysicalbodyhas objectiveas wellas subjec-
Objectively, madeup ofthefourprimary
tivefeatures. it is elements(mahdbhuta)
and thederivedelements(updddya-rupa).7 Subjectively, it represents
thefunc-
tionof beingaffected. This functionis explainedby theuse of theverbruppati,
"is affected,"in the definition of the conceptof rupa or physicalform.8This
twofolddefinition, objective and subjective,enabledthe Buddha to retainthe
physicalpersonalityas necessaryconditionfortheobjectiveidentification of a
humanperson,whileat thesame timeallowingthatobjectivepersonality to be
relatedto thesubjectiveaspectsof humanlife.The Buddha seemsto be reluc-
tantto speak of a humanpersonindependent of a physicalorganism.A purely
immaterial(ariipa) personalityis a mentalfabrication(manomaya).9Physical
is thusone of the importantmeans of preserving
identification the objectivity
of the humanperson.The sensationsand perceptions,understoodin a non-
reductiveway,accountforthesharedexperiencesof humanbeings.Beingde-
pendentupon the physicalpersonalityfortheiroccurrence,thesesensational
and perceptualexperienceshave theirlimitations. Such limitationsprovidethe
occasion forthegenerationof whattheBuddhacalled dispositions(sahkhdra),
and thesedispositionsrepresent a watershedbetweenthesubjectiveand objec-
tiveaspectsof theself.Servingas themostimportant factorin theindividuation
of a humanpersonality, thedispositionsaccountforthefactof subjectivity. At
the same time,by placingits indelibleimpressionupon the objectivelyidenti-
fiablephysicalpersonalityas wellas thecommonlysharedsensationsand per-
ceptions,thesedispositionsenable a humanpersonto revealtheobjectivity of
thatsubjectiveself.The Buddha's explanationof thismostsignificant aspectof
thepersonality readsas follows:

Dispositionis so called because it processesmaterialform(rupa),... feeling

(vedand),... perception(sanna),... disposition(sahkhara),... consciousness
(vinnina),whichhas alreadybeen dispositionally conditioned,into its present
form.0

In otherwords,thepersonality consistingof thefiveaggregatesthathas come

to be as a resultof past dispositionalconditioning(abhisahkhatam)is continu-
allyprovidedwithan individuality or unitybytheactivityofthedispositions.
Accordingto Nagel, "We are in a sense tryingto climb outside of our
own minds,an effortthat some would regardas insaneand thatI regardas
philosophicallyfundamental."11For the Buddha, such steppingout can be
achieved only by a carefulexaminationof the dispositionaltendenciesthat

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
293

bringabout theunityas wellas theindividuality of a person.The individualis

not merelya "bundle of perceptions,"but also a bundlethatis integratedby
thedispositionaltendencies.
Finally,we are leftwiththeproblemof re-identification. The physicalbody
certainlyhelpsin theobjectivere-identification of the human personality.Yet
that objectivere-identification can turnout to be extremelysuperficialand
could be even misleadingif we are to ignorethe re-identification that takes
place subjectively on the basis of consciousness (viinnna).The Buddha char-
acterizedthisconstantprocessof re-identification as the"stream of conscious-
ness" (viinninasota),12an idea thatwas to becomethecentralthemeof William
Jameswhenhe triedto disposeofthemetaphysical conceptionofself.13
Once again,thedispositions(sahkhira)thatare responsiblefortheindividu-
ation of the subjectivestreamof consciousnessalso turnout to be the mirror
throughwhichthe objectivityof that streamis reflected. It is forthisreason
thattheBuddha combinedthedispositionsand thestreamof consciousnessto
speak of the"streamof becoming"(bhavasota),'4whichis anotherway of ex-
plainingthepsychophysical personality.
The doctrineof the fiveaggregates(khandha),therefore, represents two im-
or
portantaspects processes, one of deconstruction intended to show the ab-
sence of a permanentand mysteriousselfor a ghostin the machine,and the
other of reconstruction or re-integration that attemptsto retainthe entire
machinery withoutleavingbehindwhatNagel calls the"irreduciblefeatureof
reality,"namely,consciousness.15 The mannerin whichtheseelementsare de-
as
fined, explainedabove, eliminated thepossibilityof theirreductionintoulti-
matelyfurther unanalyzableconstituents as materialand mentalsubstances.
to note thateventhoughthefiveaggregates-physicalform,
It is significant
feeling,perception, disposition,and consciousness-can be looked upon or are
understoodas concepts,thatveryfunctionofconceivingis notincludedamong
theaggregates.
As pointedout earlier,the Buddha was willingto providea subjectivede-
finitioneven of thephysicalbody. However,he avoids doing so in thecase of
conception.Here one may noticean importantpoint of comparison(or even
contrast)betweenthe Buddha and the psychologistJames.James,the psy-
chologist,was reluctantto use theword'concept'becauseit "is oftenused as if
it stood for the object of discourseitself,..."6 He thereforespeaks of the
"conceivingstateof mind."17 If thatwerethecase, in theBuddhistscheme,it
could finda more appropriateplace among the aggregates.Yet it did not.
Jameshimselfproceedsto qualifyhis statement immediately, saying:"It prop-
erlydenotesneitherthementalstate nor what the mental state butthe
signifies,
relationbetweenthetwo,namely,thefunctionof thementalstate signifying in
just that particularthing."18The Buddha's definitionof conceptionis less
complicatedand is couched in ratherimpersonalterminology.Instead of

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
294 Kalupahana

speakingabout a conceivingstateof mindor theindividualact of conceiving,

the Buddha speaks of "conceptiontakingplace" (sankhamgacchati).19The
reasonforthisdefinition willbecomeevidentas we proceedwiththeanalysisof
the various conceptions.This impersonaldefinitionof conceptionwill also
have significant implications fortheBuddhistphilosophyof language,whichis
the
beyond scope of thisarticle.
In the so-called Theravada tradition,the continuedtendencyto reifythe
psychophysical personalityinto a metaphysicalselfor soul was counteredby
the BuddhistphilosopherMoggaliputta-tissa whenhe criticizedthe theoryof
the personalists(pudgalavdda).20His Kathavatthu, compiledduringthe third
century B.C., begins witha lengthy refutation
ofthistheory.
The firstcenturyA.C. witnessedthe finalizationof the Vajracchedikd-
prajniipamitd, generallyregardedas a Mahayana text.The termvajra (dia-
mond) occurringin the titleexpressesthe basic themeof the work,namely,
deconstruction. It is indeed the symbolismused by the Buddha in the early
discourses.In fact,the processof deconstruction is immediatelyfollowedby
reconstruction, and thesetwo processesappliedto theconceptionof a human
personare presentedas follows:
Personalexistence,personalexistence,as no-existence
thathas been taughtby
theTathagatas;fornot,O Lord,is thatexistencenon-existence? Thereforeit is
called"personalexistence."2
The processis presentedin threestepsand has led to muchconfusionand mis-
understanding among Buddhistscholars.The threestepsmay be explainedas
follows:
1. Personalexistence= ontologicalcommitment or the attemptto reachulti-
mateobjectivity.
2. No personalexistence= deconstruction or theabandoningof thatultimate
objectivity.
3. Therefore,"personalexistence"(in quotes) = reconstruction or restatement
withoutontologicalcommitment, thatis, therecognition thatitis merecon-
ception.
Similarly,Nagarjuna emphasizedthe appeasementof the methodsof self
and selfhood(atmitmani-naya).22 So did Vasubandhuwhenhe identified the
objectivity-seekingfacultyof mind(manas) as thegeneratorof thefourkinds
ofdefilements: self-view,self-love, and self-confusion.23
self-pride,
Withthisexplanationof thehumanpersonality or thesubject,it willbe pos-
sible to move on to the Buddhistconceptionof theobject.The Buddhistview
of the object bears littleresemblanceto what is available in the more recent
philosophicaltraditions,and may even appear to be ratherexotic,especially
aftertheWesterntraditionhas come to burythecontributions of a philosopher
likeGeorgeBerkeley.
To returnto Nagel: "The aim of objectivity would be to reacha conception
of theworld,includingoneself,whichinvolvedone's own pointof viewnot es-

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
295

sentially,but onlyinstrumentally, so to speak: so thatthe formof our under-

standing would be specificto ours,but itscontents wouldnotbe." 24
In spiteof Nagel's attemptin theearlierpartof thebook to remainsatisfied
withlimitedobjectivity, especiallyin theexplanationof thehumanself,ethics,
and science,he seemsto be determinedto adopt an extremely rationalistap-
proach toward the object. "What there is and what we, in virtueof our nature,
can thinkabout are different He
things."25 says: "I want to resistthe natural
tendencyto identify the idea of theworldas it reallyis withtheidea of what
can be revealed,at the limit,by an indefinite increasein objectivityof stand-
points." 26
Indeed thetone in whichNagel began his work,namely,a criticismof posi-
tivistsciencethatdoes not allow roomfor"the subjectivity of consciousnessas
an irreducible featureof reality,"seemsto changeas he proceedsto analyzethe
natureof the objectiveworld.While he was willingto let go the ghostin the
humanmachine,he is not preparedto letloose theghostin theworldmachine.
The earlyIndian thinkersas well as Descarteswereconsistentin theirphilo-
sophicalenterprise in tryingto retaintheghostsin everyinstance.
In contrastto thesedifferent theories,includingNagel's, the Buddha, who
abandonedtheghostin thehumanmachinewithhis theoryof nonself(anatta),
was, forthesake of consistency as well as forepistemological reasons,equally
preparedto renounceany conceptionof mystery associatedwiththe objective
world.Accordingto him,just as muchas steppingoutsideof oneselfwill en-
able one to understandand appreciatethetruthabout theindividualsubject,a
similarsteppingout of theobjectwillbe conduciveto thebetterunderstanding
and appreciationof theobjectitself.This is thereasonfortheBuddha's exten-
sion of the doctrineof nonself(anatta) to the objectiveworld as well. The
demystification of the selfor the desolidification of the conceptof selfwent
hand in hand withthe demystification and desolidification of the conceptof
theobject.
In orderto restrainthe tendencytowardsolidification of the objectiveex-
perience into incorruptible and ultimately real objects, the Buddha recom-
mendedthe adoption of a perspectivethat resemblesthe Berkeleyanmethod
in Westernphilosophy.Accordingto Buddhism,in themeditationsthateven-
tuallybringabout more accurate knowledgeand understanding, the initial
as well as themost essentialstep is the avoidance of the substance/quality or
primary/secondary distinction.Explainingthe restraintof the sense faculties,
theBuddha says:
Havingperceiveda materialformwiththeeye,a personremainsnon-grasping
on to a substanceor mysterious cause (nimitta)and perceivablequalities(an-
uvyanjana).If he dwells withthe facultyof sightuncontrolled,covetousness
and dejection,evil unhealthystatesof mind,mightpredominate.So he fares
along controllingit;he guardsthefacultyof sight,he comesto controloverthe
facultyof sight.(This statementis repeatedwithregardto the othersensesas
well,includingmind,mano.)27

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
296 Kalupahana

This does not mean the transcendence of sense experience,as some inter-
pretersof Buddhism make it out to be, fortherestraint is called forafterthe
complete act ofperceptionhas taken place,not before.It is onlyan admonition
to give up the wild-goosechase, thatis, the searchfora mysterious entityor
cause (nimitta)to whichtheperceivedqualities(anuvyanjana)are supposedto
belong.A Berkeleyanapproach is further reflectedwhenthe Buddha advised
one ofhisdisciples,Bahiya,to adoptthefollowing method:

Then, Bahiya,thusmustyou trainyourself:"In theseen therewillbe just the

seen; in theheardjust theheard;in thereflected in thecog-
just thereflected;
nizedjust thecognized."That is how, Bahiya,you musttrainyourself.Now,
Bahiyawhenin theseentherewillbe to youjust theseen;... just theheard;...
just the reflected;...just the cognized,then,Bahiya, you will not identify
yourselfwithit. Whenyou do not identify withit,you willnot locate
yourself
yourselftherein.When you do not locate yourselftherein,it followsthatyou
willhave no "here" or "beyond"or "midwaybetween,"and thiswould be the
end ofsuffering.28

This Buddhistapproach,however,differs fromthatof Berkeleyin thatthe

eliminationof a mysterious substanceto accountforthe identityand the re-
identification of the object is not followedby the introduction of an equally
mysterious conception of God. The as
identity wellas thecontinuityof theob-
ject is explained in terms of the of
principle dependence(paticcasamuppdda), to
whichwe shallreturnsoon.
As it was withtheconceptionof the subject,we observein theliterature of
some of the laterBuddhists,especiallythe Sarvastivadins, an attemptto reify
the object. The Sarvastivadaconceptionof substance,denotedby the term
svabhtva,a termthatwas utilizedbythepositivistMaterialistsofpre-Buddhist
India, is well knownto the studentof Buddhism.The more prominentphi-
losophersof thetraditionmentionedearlierreactedagainstthisconceptionof
theobjectin thesame way as theydid withregardto thereification of thesub-
ject. Moggaliputta-tissa's Kathavatthu containsone whole chapterdevotedto
a criticismof the Sarvastivadanotion of existence(atthitd).29The Vajrac-
chediki utilizesthe methodof deconstruction and reconstruction mentioned
earlierin treatingthe problemof the object or "the elementof the world"
(lokadhdtu).30 Followingthe Buddha's admonitionrelatingto therestraint of
the senses,referred to earlier,Nagarjuna concludeshis analysisof the objec-
tive elements(dhdtu)encouragingthe appeasementof the conceptionof the
object (drastavopasama).31Similarly,the psychologistVasubandhu reminds
his readersthathere the subjectof discourseis a "conceptionof the object"
(visaya- vijnapti).32
Reificationof concepts,whetherthesepertainedto thesubjector theobject,
has been a pervasivetendencyamong most philosophers.The Buddhistdoc-
trinesof thenonsubstantiality of theperson(pudgala-nairdtmya) and thenon-

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
297

substantiality of elements(dharma-nairdtmya) servedas two powerfulfenders

againsttheconstantly emerging hazardsofreification.
For the Buddha, the constantattemptto introducea mysterious substance
in the explanationof the subjectivelifeas well as objectiveexperienceis the
work of the tender-minded. The tender-minded are the victimsof anxiety
(paritassand)in relationto thingsthatdo not existeithersubjectivelyor ob-
jectively.33 The tough-minded approach is to renouncethe searchfor"things
as theyare" and confineoneselfto whatis given,thatis, "thingsas theyhave
cometo be" (yathabhutam).34
Vasubandhu'scharacterization of theobjectas a concept(vijnapti)is rather
significant, forwith it he is focusingattentionon one of the most significant
theoreticalsolutionsto the problemof objectivityattemptedby the Buddha.
We have already pointedout the mannerin whichthe Buddha describeda
concept (sahkhd)as somethingthat is neitherultimatelysubjectivenor ulti-
matelyobjective.We also comparedthe Buddha's view of conceptswiththat
of WilliamJames.A conceptionis thus distinguishable fromimaginationor
daydreaming.Vasubandhuclarifiesthestatusof conceptionthus:"The deter-
minationof mutuallyrelatedconceptsis based upon mutualdomination(or
dependence).In dream experiencethoughtis overwhelmedby torpor.Hence
the difference in fruit."35A genuineconceptis not simplythe arbitrary crea-
tionof theindividual'smind;it is also dependentupon theobjectof experience
as well as recognitionand agreementby a communityof intelligent human
beings.Lookingupon conception in thismanner, the Buddha was able to step
outsideboth the subjectand the object. It also enabled him to deal withnew
situationsand new perspectiveswithoutfallinginto any dogmaticslumber.
Dogmatism(ditthi)is theresultof allowingthevehicleof conception,namely,
theconcept,to be solidifiedthrougha processofreification.
Jamesstrucka similarnotewhenhe maintained:"The factsare unquestion-
able; our knowledgedoes growand changeby rationaland inwardprocesses,
as well as by empiricaldiscoveries.Where the discoveriesare empirical,no
one pretendsthatthe propulsiveagency,the forcethatmakes the knowledge
develop, is mere conception."36Unfortunately, James was unaware that
the Buddhistpsychologistof the fourth centuryA.C., Vasubandhu,had com-
piled a whole treatiseentitledthe "Establishmentof Mere Conception"
(Vijnaptimatratdsiddhi), not to justifyany formof idealism,but to elaborate
upon the Buddha's view of conceptionas a means of steppingoutside the
metaphysicalsubject (pudgala-nairdtmya) as well as the metaphysicalobject
(dharma-nairdtmya).37 Here again, Vasubandhu was preceded by his illus-
triousco-religionist, Nagarjuna,who equated conception(prajnapti)withde-
pendentarising(pratTtyasamutpdda), foritis a way of emptying thesubjectand
object of substantialistimplications(=emptiness, and
sutnyata) representing a
middlestandpointbetweenextremes(madhyamdpratipat).38

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
298 Kalupahana

If the negativedoctrineof nonsubstantialism (andtmavdda)that represents

a steppingoutside of both subject and object may sound unfamiliarto the
modernWesternstudentof philosophy,morecumbersomeis thepositivedoc-
trineof dependentarising(pratTtyasamutpdda). Yet, it can be understoodin
termsof the morefamiliarcategoryof causationprovidedone is preparedto
shedthesubstantialist or essentialistperspectives.
Skepticismregarding causal explanations, especiallyin thearea of perceptual
is
experience, rampant in the traditional Indian schools as well as in some of
the modernWesternphilosophicaltraditions.Once again such skepticismis
theresultof thepursuitof excessobjectivity thatNagel is complainingabout.
In themodernworld,themostprominent advocateof suchskepticism has been
BertrandRussell.Nagel expressesthisdilemmawhenhe says:"The same ideas
thatmake thepursuitof objectivity seemnecessaryforknowledgemake both
objectivity and knowledgeseem,on reflection, unattainable."39This dilemma
is inevitableso longas we deal withan objectivity thatis excessiveto thepoint
of being absolute,while human knowledgeremainsundeniablylimitedand
relative.If objectivityis not as excessiveand absolute,skepticismmay not
appear to be so troublesome.
Here theproblemis createdbythescienceof logicthatderiveditsinspiration
fromthe two-valuedlogic of Aristotle.In thisparticularsystem,whichinci-
dentallyis not so alien to thetraditionalIndian logicalsystem,whereabsolut-
ismreignedsupremein discussionsrelatingto 'existence',it is possibleto speak
of the true and the false distinctionappearingin the followingform.If the
statement"all swans are white"is true,the statement"some swans are not
white"is falsein thesensethatthelattercontradicts theformer. Here,theterm
"all" (sarvam)is used in an absolutesense.Thus, wheneverthereis a need to
accountforpossibilities(whichmaybe otherwise), it is necessaryto introduce
counterfactualaftercounterfactual, an attemptthat some modernphiloso-
phersnowlook upon as beingfutile.40
The Buddha was clearlyawareof theproblemsrelatingto theabsolutistcon-
ceptionof "all" or "everything" (sabbam). His empiricismas well as his ex-
of
planation conception, as mentioned earlier,preventedhim fromabsolutiz-
ing even the conception of "all." Questionedby a metaphysician by thename
of Janussonispecifically on theproblemof "all" (sabbam),theBuddha replied
that as far as he was concerned"all" meantthe eye and materialform,ear
and sound, nose and smell,tongueand taste,body and tangible,mind and
concept-that is, thesix formsof senseexperience.Pressedby Janussoniwith
questionsregardingother definitionsof "all," the Buddha insistedthat he
would avoid any such definition, thereasonbeingthattheywould be beyond
experience(avisaya).4 It is forthisreasonthatwhenevertheBuddhawas com-
pelled to utilizeuniversalterms,thatis, to use theconceptionof "all," he, as
far as we can know fromthe available discourses,always qualifiedit as "all
this" (sabbam idam). Modern Buddhistscholars,misledby medievalHindu

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
299

thinkerslike Udayana Acarya,have failedto realize the epistemologicalsig-

nificanceof this qualification.This qualification,as I have pointedout else-
where,is faithfully followedby a disciplelike Nagarjuna.42It is also clearly
reflectedin Vasubandhu's descriptionof realityas "this is a mere concept"
(vijnaptimatram evaitad).43
The avoidanceof anyabsolutisticnotionsof truthdoes notmean thewhole-
heartedsponsorshipof skepticism, eitherin its absoluteformas reflected in a
philosopher like Sanijayaor in its less severe form portrayed in the Jainalogic
of syddvdda,whereeverything is a possibilityor a "maybe," untilthe attain-
ment of "omniscience"(kaivalya). The difficulty consists in discoveringa
middle path betweenthese extremes.In the firstplace, the Buddha had to
admit that everyrationalhuman being needs to recognizecertainthingsas
beingtrueand othersas beingfalse.Otherwisehumanlifewould be chaotic.
Therefore,to thequestionas to whetherthereis a varietyof truths(regarding
thesamematter),theBuddhadeclaredthat"truthis one and thereis no second"
(ekam hi saccam na dutTyam atthi).44Secondly,it was necessaryto prevent
this truthfromdeteriorating into an absolute truthas reflectedin the state-
ment:"This alone is true,everything else is false" (idam eva saccam mogham
annam),45 which leavesno room for changeas wellas possibilities. The Buddha
realizedthenecessityto accountforchangeas wellas creativity noveltyin
and
the explanationof experience.His conceptionof truthand the methodby
whichthat truthis to be clarified,namely,logic, had to accommodatesuch
creativityand novelty.
This task was accomplishedby the Buddha by dissolvingthe absolutistic
true/falsedichotomyand replacingit witha trichotomy: thetrue,theconfused,
and thefalse-the firstaccountingforwhatis available in thepresentcontext,
the second allowingforthe possible,and the thirdexplainingthe impossible.
The Buddha refersto truthas sacca, the confusionor the confusedas musd,
and thefalseas kali.
This repudiationof the absolute true/false distinction, comparableto one
unsuccessfully attemptedby William James in Western philosophy,46 seemsto
leave theBuddha witha methodof providingtruth value to propositionsthat
appearsverydifferent fromthemethodsadoptedin theessentialistor absolut-
isticsystems.
An extremely interestingpassage in theAhguttara-nikaya (misinterpreted by
K. N. Jayatilleke47 because of his carelesshandlingof theterminology used by
theBuddha)illustrates theBuddha'sstandpoint.
The passage readsas follows:

I knowwhathas been seen,heard,thought,cognized,attained,soughtand re-

flectedupon by thepeople includingtheasceticsand brahmans.If I knowwhat
has been seen ... by thepeople ... and I wereto say: "I do not knowit," that
would be confusion(musa) on mypart.And ifI wereto say: "I knowit and I
do not knowit," thattoo would be confusionon mypart.[However,]ifI were

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
300 Kalupahana

to say: "I neitherknow it nor do not know it," I would be committing

a sin
(kali) on mypart.48
The truthvalues assignedto thelast threestatements seemto
by Jayatilleke
withtheterminology
be inconsistent used by theBuddha to characterize
them.
The fourstatements may be summarized as follows:
1. I knowp.
2. I do notknowp.
3. I knowand do notknowp.
4. I neitherknownordo notknowp.

Accordingto theBuddha,if(1) is true,thenboth(2) and (3) are confusions

(musa) and (4) alone is false(kali). Comparedwiththe termmusa,the term
kali expressesthe heightenedsense of epistemologicalsin. If proposition(2)
then
wereto be characterizedas thecontraryof (1), as is done by Jayatilleke,
even(3) wouldbe a contrary, and (4) alone wouldbe a contradiction.
The fourpropositionsmaybe statedas follows:
1. p (true)
2. - p (contrary)
3. (p. - p) (contrary)
4. - (p. - p) (contradictory)
The questionremainsas to whytheBuddha did not characterize(3) as con-
tradiction(kali), even thoughJayatilleke
seemsto interpret
it as such.Jayatil-
leke formulatesthe propositionsas follows,leavingroom forassigningtruth
valueto each one ofthem:
1. p(true)
2. notp (contrary)
3. bothp and notp [?](contradictory)
4. neitherp nornotp [?](excludedmiddle)
It is our contentionthattheconclusionsderivedby Jayatilleke froman anal-
ysisof theBuddha's statement reflect
notonlyhis failureto observetheimpor-
tantdistinctionbetweenthe two terms"confusion"(musa) and "sin" (kali),
but also his enthusiasmto adopt theessentialist
true/falsedichotomyas wellas
the methodof providingtruthvalue to propositionsratherindiscriminately.
For the Buddha, the true/false dichotomyneeds to be modifiedwheneverthe
evaluationinvolvesboth knowledgeand description,thatis, empiricalstate-
ments.An empiricalstatement wouldbe contradicted onlyby a statementthat
represents a total negationof both knowledge and description,and for the
Buddha thiswould also involvea denial of all possibilitiesof knowingor de-
scribing,whichis theeffect of thefourthproposition.By describingthefourth
propositionas "(epistemological)sin" (kali), the Buddha was probablycon-
demningtheJainasforgivingtruth-value to it. For the Buddha, a trulycon-

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
301

tradictory statementimpliesnot onlyindescribability as thisor that,but also

the absence of any possibilityof knowingthroughempiricalmeans. There-
fore,Jayatilleke's attemptto givetruth-value to proposition(4) [~(p. _ p)]49
is based upon the true/false distinctionas well as the systemof evaluation
adopted in the essentialistsystemsof epistemologyand would not be appro-
priate in the Buddha's anti-essentialist teachings.Proposition(3), (p. - p),
does not ruleout thepossibility of knowledgealtogether and is therefore
a con-
trary ratherthan a contradiction.
The foremostamongBuddhistlogicians,Difiniga,who attemptedto formu-
late theideas expressedby theBuddha in moreconcretelogicallanguage,was
actuallypreservingthe fundamentalspiritof the Buddha's rationalizations
whenhe presentedthehetu,theprobandum,beforeproceedingto workout the
proof.50
Withsuch a definition of existenceor truth,the Buddha could formulatea
theory of causation or dependenceand even utilizecounterfactuals without
making them overwork. This fact is clearlyexpressedin his generalformula-
tionoftheprincipleofdependence:

When thatexists,thiscomes to be; on the arisingof that,this arises. When

that does not exist,this does not come to be; on the cessationof that,this
ceases.51

It may be notedthatthesecondstatement of theprecedingquotationserves

thefunctionofa counterfactual.
What is mostimportantin the precedinganalysisis thatthe truthvalue of
a concept,a statement,or a propositionis determinedon a contextualbasis
ratherthanin an absoluteway. This has importantbearingson the Buddhist
theoryof linguistic convention,a subjectthatis outsidethescope ofthepresent
article.We will focusour attentionon its significance in the area of ethicsor
moraldiscourse.
In the Upanisads,whilethe searchforultimateobjectivityreachedits cul-
minationin theconceptionof dtman,theultimaterealityof thesubjectas well
as theobject,a similarsearchin thearea ofethicsgave riseto theconceptionof
brahman.52 Brahmanwas thesourceof thefourfoldcaste system.The creation
of the dharmaor the moral law beingsubsequentto the creationof thecaste
system,the latteris seen to take precedenceover the former.Therefore,the
caste specifiesthe dutywhichservesas the foundationof morality.This con-
ceptionof dutycame to be elaboratedin the Bhagavadgita,whereits onto-
logicalstatusis preservedleavingno roomforthehumanperspective.
The Buddha was inclinedto use thetermdharmato referto themoralideal,
since he had verylittlesympathywith the Hindu caste system,which gave
meaningto the Upanisadic termbrahman.For him,thetermdharma,used in
an ethicalsense,denotedgood, in both its concreteand its ideal forms.53Its
negation,a-dharma,meantbad or evil.For theBuddha,good is whatproduces

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
302 Kalupahana

good consequences(attha),54and such consequencesare dependentlyarisen,

that is, theydepend upon various factorsoperatingwithineach context.A
pragmaticcriterionof good, therefore, has to be contextualas well. For this
reason, dharma as the moral ideal was never looked upon as an Absolute.In-
deed,graspingon to any conceptionof good as theultimately real,theuniver-
sallyvalid,and eternally existentis criticized
by theBuddha.This idea is clearly
expressedby himin his discourseon the "snake simile"addressedto a monk
named Arittha,available both in Pali and Chinese.55He insiststhata person
has to "abandon eventhegood, letalone evil." Utilizingan appropriatesimile,
thesimileof theraft(kulla),theBuddha arguesthata personbuildsa raftonly
forthe purpose of crossingover a stream.If, aftercrossingover,the person
wereto carrytherafton his shoulderswhereverhe goes,insistingthattheraft
was usefuland, therefore, he should not abandon it, that personwould not
understandthefunctionof theraft.56 This meansthattheusefulnessof theraft
is contextualand concrete.Apart fromthe context,the rafthas no meaning,
and itis notpossessedof absolutevalue. The pragmatist Jamesstrucka similar
notewhenhe said that"thereis alwaysa pinchbetweentheactualand theideal
whichcan be gottenridofbyleavingpartoftheideal behind."57
What does the Buddha mean by abandoningthegood? Most scholarstake
thisto mean thetranscendence of bothgood and eviland theattainment of an
ineffablestatecomparableto the brahman.If thisinterpretation is correct,it
would mean that the epistemologyand the conceptualanalysiswhichwere
adopted in determining thesubjectand objectare inappropriatein the sphere
of moral discourse,and the Buddha can be rightlyaccused of being incon-
sistent.Therefore,"abandoningthegood" needsto be understoodin a totally
different way.
The raw materialson thebasis of whichwe arrivedat a reasonableconcep-
tionof a humanpersonweresubjectiveas wellas objective.Similarfactsserved
as theraw materialforour conceptionof theobject.The verysame epistemo-
logyand conceptioncall forthepreservation of threefactorsin arrivingat any
conceptionof morality.These are: (1) theconceptionof theindividualhuman
person,whichwe have alreadyarrivedat as a viable philosophicalconcept
withouthavingto sacrificethehumanperspective; (2) theconceptionof theob-
jectiveworld,including other human for
persons, objectivity is not completely
abandoned, and (3) the of
reality new and varyingcontextualsituations(that
is, thepossibilities)thatcontinueto unfoldbeforehumanityas a resultof de-
pendentarisingand whichneedsto be accountedfor.These constitutetheraw
materialthatgoes to producea reasonableconceptionwheneverhumanbeings
are called upon to makemoraldecisionsorjudgments.
Thus, a reasonablemoraljudgmentwillrequirea carefuldecisionregarding
the mannerin whichwe incorporateany one of thesefactorswheneverthat
particularfactorbecomesrelevantto thesituationwithoutrulingit out before-
hand. This can be done only when we realizethat,as in the case of factual

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
303

truths,whatis involvedin a moraldecisionis also a conception.The Buddha

used the termvohdra(=vyavahdra) to referto moral conception,58whilehe
reservedthe termsahkha,as noted earlier,to referto conceptionrelatingto
facts.Realizingthatmoralconceptionsare morevariablethanconceptionsre-
latingto facts,theBuddha was willingto speak of an ideal moralstandardas a
usefulguide.Thus,we have thetermdhammaused in thepluralto referto con-
creteconceptionsof the good, while the same termused in the singularas
dhammorefersto theideal good. It is onlytheneed to modifytheideal (dham-
mo) whenthatideal comes intoconflictwiththeconcretegood (dhamma)that
is impliedin the Buddha's admonitionto "abandon thegood." It is not a call
to renounceany and everyconceptionof thegood. This is the reason forthe
Buddha's statement thata personshouldaspireto be moralor virtuous(sTlavd)
ratherthanto beingone who is made up of moralsor virtues(sllamaya).59It is
anotherway of statingthefactthatconcretemoral situationsare not derived
fromultimateand absolutemorallaws. Instead,theso-calledabsolutelyobjec-
tivemorallaws are abstractions fromconcretemoralsituations.
We have alreadyseenhow the Vajracchedikiavoidedmetaphysical assertion
and metaphysicalnegationby explainingthe statusof conceptionrelatingto
theselfas well as theworld.The same methodis applied in thecase of moral
discourse,and in doingso the Vajracchedikd utilizesa quotationfromtheear-
lier discourseon the simile of the raftand the need to abandon the good
(dharma).60This is a morefaithful philosophicalexplanationof the Buddha's
moral discourse(dharmakdya), presentedat a timewhen popular Mahayana
was elevatingitto thelevelofa transcendent or ultimatereality.
The relationshipbetweenthe concretemoral situationsand a moral ideal
was explainedby Nagarjunawhenhe claimedthat"withoutrelyingupon con-
vention (vyavahira) the ultimatefruit(paramdrtha)is not taught."61 As
pointedout earlier,thetermvohdra(= vyavahdra)was used by theBuddha to
referspecifically to moralconceptionor convention.Nagarjuna's explanation
here of the relationshipbetweenconcretemoral situationsand a moral ideal
resonateswiththatof the Buddha and servesas a correctiveto theeverrecur-
ringabsolutismin ethics.
Finallywe come to Vasubandhu,whoseworkis devotedprimarily to thees-
tablishment of "mereconception"(vijnaptimdtra). Even thoughhe is utilizing
different terminology, theideas he expressesare thoseof his predecessors.Ac-
to
cording him, in the sphereof moral discourse,as in discussionsof factual
truths, a "mere conception"is to be distinguished from"mentalfabrication"
(parikalpita),for a "mere conception" is the resultof mutual dependence
(paratantra);thatis, it involvesthesubject,theobject,and thecontextas well
as agreementamong different subjects. However, what is ultimatelyac-
complished or achieved (parinispanna)cannot, in any way, go beyond or
transcendsuch mutualdependence,for"in the absence of any conceptionof
theconcrete(moral)situation,the(moral)ideal is also notperceived."62

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
304 Kalupahana

The understanding just presentedof thesubject,the object,and themorals

willenable us to appreciatethecontentsof theBuddha's firstdiscourseto the
world.In thisdiscourse,popularlyknownas the "Establishmentof the Con-
ceptionof Righteousness"(Dhammacappavattana), the Buddha speaks of two
extremesof behavior:self-indulgence and self-mortification.63 Self-indulgence
is characterizedas beinglow, vulgar,individualist, ignoble,and unfruitful (in
the long run). It represents excessiveselfishness stemming from a perspective
thatleaves no room fortheobjectiverealityof otherhumanpersonsor of the
world at large. Contrastedwith this formof behavioris self-mortification,
describedas beingpainful,ignoble,and unfruitful. This is theresultof an ex-
cessivealtruismthattendsto ignoretheobjectivity ofthehumanperson,to dis-
solvehimcompletely in an excessively objectiveworld.Selfishness and altruism
in theirextremeformstherefore represent two different extremesaccordingto
whichwe perceivetheindividualand theworld.
An extremeformof selfishness is easilycondemned.Yet a similarly extreme
formof altruismis rarelydenounced.The Buddha was aware of thiswhenhe
characterizedselfishness as beinglow, vulgar,and individualist, and described
self-mortificationas beingsimplypainful.Excessivealtruismmayeventually be
traced back to excessiveskepticismregardinghuman knowledge,which,in
turn,can feedheroism.In the Indian context,thispositionis reflected in the
Hindu religioustext,the BhagavadgTta as well as in the Buddhisttext,the
SaddharmapundarTka-sutra.
RationalistNagel believesthattruthmustlie eitherin skepticismor in her-
oism or in both.64Hence he is able to justifya positionwherethe so-called
morallifecan overridethegood life.65If by themorallifeNagel meansan ex-
cessivelyobjectivemoralprinciplecomparableto one soughtforbyKant,with
whomhe has greatsympathy, thegood lifewould represent theconcretelifeof
human happiness,whetherit be of an individualperson or a specificcom-
munityof persons.Indeed,it is theexcessiveobjectivity of thatmorallifethat
compelsNagel to favorthe overriding of thegood lifeby themorallife.The
Buddha,who was less inclinedto adopt sucha rationalistpositionand favored
the modificationof the ideal when it comes into conflictwiththe concrete,
looked upon bothselfishness and altruismas beingignobleand unfruitful. For
him, the noble and fruitful way of lifeis represented a
by carefully conceived
middlepaththatwillcontribute to thewelfareof oneselfas wellas of others.66
Thisis a moreenlightened formofethicalpragmatism.

NOTES

1. Thomas Nagel, The ViewfromNowhere(New York and Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,

1986),p. 27.
2. Brhaddranyaka Upanisad,1.4.1,in S. Radhakrishnan,
ed. and trans.,ThePrincipalUpanisads
(London: Allen& Unwin,1953).
3. GilbertRyle,TheConceptionofMind(London:Hutchinson,1949),pp. 15-16.

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
305

4. SvetdsvataraUpanisad,1.2,in Radhakrishnan,ThePrincipalUpanisads.
5. Sutta-nipata,ed. D. Andersonand H. Smith(London: Pali TextSociety,1913),840.
6. Samyutta-nikdya, ed. L. Feer (London: Pali TextSociety,1884-1904),3.86.
7. Ibid.,3.68.
8. Ibid.,3.86.
9. Dfgha-nikdya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter(London: Pali Text Society,
1890-1911),1.77.
10. Samyutta-nikdya, 3.87.
11. Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere,p. 11.
12. Dfgha-nikdya, 3.105.
13. William James,The Principlesof Psychology(Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard Uni-
versity Press,1983),pp. 219-278.
14. Samyutta-nikdya, 1.15.
15. Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere,p. 7.
16. James,Principles, p. 436.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Digha-nikdya,1.202; Majjhima-nikdya, ed. V. Trencknerand R. Chalmers(London: Pali
TextSociety,1887-1901),1.190.
20. Vajracchedikd-prajndpdramitd, ed. and trans.by Edward Conze (Rome: Institutoitaliano
peril Medio ed EstremoOriente,1957),p. 36.
21. Kathavatthu, ed. A. C. Taylor(London: Pali TextSociety,1894-1897),I.1.1-1.23.
22. Miulamadhyamakakdrika, XVIII.2 (hereaftercited as Kdrikd);see David J. Kalupahana,
Ndgarjuna.The Philosophyof theMiddle Way(Albany,New York: StateUniversity of New York
Press,1986).
23. Trimsikd, 6; see Kalupahana, The Principlesof BuddhistPsychology(Albany,New York:
StateUniversity ofNew York Press,1987).
24. Nagel, The ViewfromNowhere,p. 74 (emphasismine).
25. Ibid.,p. 91.
26. Ibid.
27. Dfgha-nikdya, 1.70;Majjhima-nikdya, 1.180if.
28. Uddna,ed. P. Steinthal(London: Pali TextSociety,1948),8.
29. Kathdvatthu, 1.6.1-6.4.
30. Vajracchedikd, p. 38.
31. Kirikd,V.8.
32. Trimnikd, 2.
33. Majjhima-nikdya, 1.136.
34. Samyutta-nikdya, 2.17.
35. Vim.atikd,18.
36. James,Principles, p. 439.
37. Vimsatikd, 10.
38. Kdrikd,XXIV.18.
39. Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere,p. 67.
40. Saul Kripke,"CounterfactualTheoriesof Knowledge"(Paperread beforethe University of
Hawaii, DepartmentofPhilosophyColloquium,22-23 January1987).
41. Samnyutta-nikdya, 4.15; see David J. Kalupahana, "A BuddhistTract on Empiricism,"Phi-
losophyEast and West19,no. 1 (January1969):65-67.
42. Kalupahana, Ndgdrjuna, pp. 326-328.
43. Kalupahana, ThePrinciplesofBuddhistPsychology, p. 273.
44. Sutta-nipata, 884.
45. Majjhima-nikdya, 1.169.
46. See William James,The Will to Believe (Cambridge,Massachusetts:Harvard University
Press,1979),p. 89.
47. K. N. Jayatilleke,Early BuddhistTheoryof Knowledge(London: Allen & Unwin, 1963),
p. 346.

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
306 Kalupahana

48. Ahguttara-nikdya, ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy (London: Pali Text Society,1885-1900),
2.25.
49. Jayatilleke,EarlyBuddhistTheory, p. 345.
50. See RadhikaHerzberger, Bhartrhariand theBuddhists (Dordrecht:Reidel,1986),p. 135.
51. Majjhima-nikdya, 1.262-264,etc.
52. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad,1.4.11ff.
53. Majjhima-nikdya, 1.415-417; Theragdthd, ed. H. Oldenbergand R. Pischel(London: Pali
TextSociety,1883),304.
54. See David J.Kalupahana, A Path ofRighteousness: Dhammapada(Lanham: Maryland:Uni-
versityPressofAmerica,1986),pp. 39-40.
55. Majjhima-nikdya, 1.130-142;ChungA-hanChing,54.1 (Taisho,1.763b-766b).
56. Majjhima-nikdya, 1.135;ChungA-hanChing,54.1 (Taisho,1.764c).
57. James,The WilltoBelieve,p. 153.
58. Samyutta-nikiya, 1.14-15.
59. Majjhima-nikdya, 2.27.
60. Vajracchedikd, p. 32.
61. Karika,XXIV. 10.
62. Trimsika, 22.
63. Samyutta-nikdya, 5.420.
64. Nagel, The ViewfromNowhere, p. 69.
65. Ibid.,p. 169.
66. Dhammapada,166,in Kalupahana, A PathofRighteousness.

This content downloaded from 150.131.192.151 on Wed, 03 Feb 2016 00:36:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions