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Department of Education

Introduction to the
Philosophy of the
Human Person
Intersubjectivity
Second Quarter - Week 3

Stephen M. Bueno
Writer Annie D.
Pesito Validator
Mariel Eugene L. Luna
Editor and Layout

Schools Division Office – Muntinlupa City


Student Center for Life Skills Bldg., Centennial Ave., Brgy. Tunasan, Muntinlupa City
(02) 8805-9935 / (02) 8805-9940
This module explores the philosophical dimension of intersubjectivity. Here we will
adapt the existential-phenomenological approach about interrelatedness. This includes the
discussion of the concept Being-with-other and other major themes of
intersubjectivity.

At the end of this module, you should:


1. Realize that intersubjectivity requires accepting differences accepting
differences and not imposing on others. (PPT 11/12-Ilc-6.1)

2. Explain t h a t a u t h e n t i c d i a l o g u e m e a n s a c c e p t i n g o t h e r s
e v e n if they are different from themselves, (PPT 11/12-Ild-6.1)

3. Performs activities that demonstrate an appreciation for the talents of people


with disabilities a n d those from the underprivileged sectors of society. (PPT
11/12-Ild-6.3)

To be given by the teacher in class.

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In the previous module, we have learned that being human poses a lot of limitation,
although this givenness is a fact of life, human person can and in some sense
transcend such human limitation in various ways. The development of human
potentialities i s one aspect which can transcend this limitation. In order to do this, we
need to achieve human freedom to attain such conditions. The development of self-
determination is an essential aspect of human freedom.

In this module, we will focus another aspect of human person that is his/her being
with other human person. Intersubjectivity is an important topic in understanding
the nature of the human person. In philosophy, it poses some problems of both
epistemological and ethical dimension. Intersubjectivity emphasizes the significance of
the other as a subject similar and not different from the perceiving subject.

Introduction
In the world we dwell in we encounter human beings; wherever we go, we come
across them; they look at me, gesture me, and address me. Their looks, words, gestures
m a k e me stop. I am the project of my world, and through my projects I make the world
a cultural world. As soon as I encounter others in my world, I realize that he is not a
worldly thing which receives meaning from my history as the creator of culture. What is
my relationship to others? What does man have to do with his fellow man?

What is Intersubjectivity?
The word “intersubjectivity” is derived from the combination of the two Latin words
inter and subiectum which means “among, between, together with person”.
Intersubjectivity i s defined by Scheff (2006) as “the sharing of the subjective states by
two or more individual.” Accordingly, intersubjectivity refers to the variety of possible relations
between people’s perspectives. This also refers to the agreement in the sense of having
shared of a definition of an object (Mori and Hayashi, 2006); it also refers to mutual
awareness of agreement or disagreement and even the realization of such understanding
and misunderstanding (Laing, 1996).

Intersubjectivity varies from different perspectives, it can be viewed in


anthropological, sociological, psychological, as well as philosophical one. Here we will
only explore the philosophical view.

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Philosophical Perspective of Intersubjectivity
The concept of intersubjectivity has epistemological and ethical status. The
epistemological problem of the other or intersubjectivity can be summed up in the
following questions:

§ How do I know other’s mind? Other selves?


§ How is reciprocity of perspectives possible?
§ How is mutual understanding & communication possible?

Accordingly, the concept of intersubjectivity in an epistemological sense can be


defined as that which several or all other subjects have in common, understood as a
common apparatus or negatively defined. The epistemological problem of
intersubjectivity took its form in the Cartesian paradigm of the problem of the other
mind which is addressed accordingly in social theory.

In the ethical point of view, intersubjectivity recognizes the other (autonomous)


subjectivities or consciousness. We enter into ethical relations with other precisely
to the extent that we recognize that they exist in their own right and have projects
of their own, that they are not reducible to our thoughts about them but are
precisely.
‘Other.’

Themes of Intersubjectivity
In existential phenomenology the concept of intersubjectivity is develop into
themes. Theme is a generalization of experiences in the interaction between subject
and the other. The suggested theme below are the internal dynamics of human inter-
relationship.

1. To exist is to co-exist
Man and the world in existential phenomenology constitute a unity of
reciprocal implications. [man is not isolated and view the world in ivory tower]. The
meaning, proofs, and demonstration of interhuman relationship has many different
dimensions.

2. My World as Our World


I am being-in-the-world, but the worldly meanings of my world constantly
refer to other human beings. Whatever actions I am doing in this world always
pertain or has relationship with other people. My world, therefore, apparently is not exclusively
my world, and your world is not only yours, but the world of existence is our world.

3. We Exist Together
The encounter with the other reveals that other to me as “not a thing,” but as
existence, as a source of sense of meaning. Because other is not a thing, he is my
companion and, therefore, I can speak of “we”.

4. Encounter with the Other as the Other


The unconcealedness of the other as the other is an “open door” through
which finally the phenomenologist e n t e r s . In order to explain the presence of the
other as the other, for the encounter with the other directly and immediately
d i s t i n g u i s h e s itself from the encounter with a mere thing. In this encounter the other
reveals himself directly as the other, as not-a-thing, as a conscious-being-in-the-
world.

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Other and The Other
One of the issues which intersubjectivity i s a concern is the question, “How
the subject sees or treats the other subject? The answers to this question draw attention t o the
problem looking the other subject as the other or the concept of othering.

A. Otherness
Otherness is defined as the rationalization by which a dominant in-group
(“Us,” the Self) constructs one or many dominated out-groups (“Them”, Other) by
stigmatizing a difference – real or imagined – presented as a negation of identity
and thus a motive for potential discrimination. The creation of otherness (also called)
othering consists of applying a principle that allows individuals to be classified into two
hierarchical groups: them and us. Power relationships are central to the
construction of otherness. Only the dominant group is in a position to impose the
value (its identity) to the other of such imposing discriminatory measures. The power
relation is one-way direction and cannot be in reverse, for instance, if the Other of
Man is Woman, and if the Other of White Man is the Black Man, the opposite is
not true.

The Western vocabulary which refers to “other” which sets human person an
outside of you are plenty, some of these are: Ethnocentrism, Exotic, Exotism, Other,
Othering, In-group/Out-group, Oriental, Savage, Barbarian, Race, Terrorist,
Gender, Segregation, Ghetto, Territory, Continent, Identity, We, Us, They, Them. The
Tagalog translation of being other are the pronoun sila, kami, tayo, tayo-tayo, and sa
inyo.

B. The Other
Another avenue in which human relatedness can be viewed is by taking into
account that a human person as “the other.” As an opposite of the “other”, “the other”
refers to treating an individual as a human person, as a same being or a subject.

1. I – Thou and I – It Relationship


Martin Buber (1878 – 1965) Martin Buber was an Austrian-born Israeli
Jewish philosopher best known for his philosophy of dialogue, a form of
existentialism centered on the distinction between the I–Thou relationship and the
I–It relationship.

In the first case, the address is objectifying. It constitutes t h e other as an


object (an ‘It’) to be experienced and used. In the second instance, by contrast, a
mutual relationship is initiated. Following from this, moreover, the first case
entails that the other is experienced as consisting in parts and being located in
space, that it is mediated by a knowing consciousness, whilst in the second case
is immediate and space is shared with the other, who is present as a whole. The other
is not experienced in this case.

2. Dialogue
It is a recognition that the other is a distinct person, as thou. It does
not reduce the other as an it or a thing. We do not control and manipulate. According
to Buber, it stresses the importance of silence, listening and sensitivity. A
dialogue includes non-verbal communication. A dialogue is personal encounter,
experience of communion A dialogue includes conversation with your dog, a tree,
yourself, or God. The aim of dialogue is not to transform the other, instead to
preserve the other as they are. A dialogue is open to disagreement,
misunderstanding, difference of perspective. But the point is to understand the
other. The I –thou relationship is giving of the self, opening up to the other, the
letting the thou immersed to the I.
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3. Encounter
In the genuinely human sense “encounter” is filled with an affection of which
there is no trace in the “we” of indifference. Used in this genuinely human sense, the
term indicates a kind of participation in the personal existence of the other for
whom I care. This is precisely what is missing in the “we” of indifference. For example,
He “bumps” into me who am standing close to the entrance [of a train]. Perhaps, it is
possible that something entirely different happens between the two of us. It
may happen that a “feeling” grows between us, if only because I make an effort
somehow to make room for him/her, or because a friendly smile on his face, or
because of the tone in which he says: “I am sorry.”

4. Love
Loving is also an encounter. “Loving encounter”, when a boy leads a blind
man across the road, when a total stranger goes out of his way to show me the road,
when a soldier deprives himself of something to give comfort to a prisoner, he leads
ways. The loving encounter always presupposes the appeal of the other to my
subjectivity. A call goes out from him, embodied in a word, a gesture, a glance,
a request. No matter, however, in what form the appeal of the other is embodies,
it always implies an invitation to transcend myself, to break away from my
preoccupation with myself and my fascinated interest in myself.
In loving, what the other tries to appeal to me is his/her subjectivity [his
meaning]. His subjectivity itself is the appeal that is addressed to me. It is a plea
that I participate in his subjectivity. Marcel endeavors to e x p r e s s this plea
in words: "Be with me." It is the call of the other to go out beyond the
confines of myself, to support, strengthen and, as it were, increase his
subjectivity by participating in it. Love is the ready availability of my subjectivity,
its belonging to the subject which the other is. But in giving and surrendering
myself, it is revealed to me what my selfhood really is. My real self is the
available self. Love is a paradox can be considered in this sense: in loving I am
giving myself to you which means losing myself to the beloved but it is also an
opening up of my subjectivity to another possibility adding up to my subjectivity,
destiny or moving forward.
5. Empathy
The experience of the other which direct us with similarities of the other.
Empathy allows us to recognize the other, and recognized what the other might have
been going through.

6. Responsibility
According to Immanuel Levinas, the face compels us to respond the needs
of the others. The face suggest vulnerability, t h r u it we recognize what it needs.
The face speaks to us and obliges us to answer its call. Levinas calls substitution
as the act of putting ourselves in the place of other. Here he distinguishes
substitution from the usual act of empathy. For him, empathy starts from the I, places
the I into the situation of the other, goes back to the I. While is substitution, the
action does not stop in the I. The I will go back to the other to address its needs, so
there is no longer a movement back to the I. For Levinas, responsibility is a respond
to the call of the face, without expecting anything in return from the other. We do
not require the other to reciprocate when we act. We provide help and assistance to
the other not because of moral law. According to Levinas, it is through the face of
the other.

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Language of Otherness

Direction: Match column A to Column B. Write your answer on a separate piece


of paper.

Column A Column B
1. ETHNOCENTRICSM A. Roles and attribute set by society to men & women
2. EXOTIC B. Belonging to a different civilization
3. OTHER C. A person who belongs to a specific group
4. OTHERING D. Prejudice raised against a race or ethnic group
5. IN-GROUP E. Belonging to a foreign country
6. RACISM F. A person who don’t belong to a group
7. GENDER G. Being superior to a different group
8. GHETTO H. Member of dominated out-group
9. SAVAGE I. Having a character of the East
10. BARBARIAN J. Create an in-group and out-group
11. OUT-GROUP K. Group considered to be less advance & violent
12. ORIENTAL L. Person who values other culture than one’s own
13. XENOCENTRISM M. Slum area occupied by minority group
14. ALIEN N. Lacks the quality of civilized person
15. SEGREGATION O. Enforce separation of different racial group
in a community.

Direction. Show what you have learned by answering the following questions
below:
A. Check your Knowledge
Using your own words define:
1. Other.
2. the other.
3. Dialogue
4. Empathy
5. intersubjectivity

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B. Check your Understanding
1. Is there any possibility where it can be said that an individual can be alone or
not dependent on the other? If yes, explain. If no, why?
2. What is the distinction between empathy and the “substitution” of Levinas?
3. Give one example of an I-It relationship based on your personal experience
with the other. Explain.

Writing Reflection Paper


In Module One, you have learned how a philosophical reflection paper was made.
There were also some paper samples to give you an idea what a paper would look like
and can be used as your guide in creating your own reflection paper.

Your task in this module will be writing a philosophical reflection paper on the
topic, intersubjectivity. Follow the suggested writing guidelines to help you in this
writing task. Afterwards, your reflection paper will be graded accordingly. Don’t
forget to check the rubric for this activity, so that you might have an idea how
your paper is graded in this task.

To be administered by the teacher in class.

References

Books
Crossley, Nick. Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Being. London: Sage
Publications Ltd., 1996.

Luijpen, William. Existential Phenomenology. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquene


University Press, 1960.

Sammut, Gordon, Paul Daanen, and Fathali M. Moghaddaum. Eds. (2013).


Understanding the Self and Others: Explorations in Intersubjectivity and
Interobjectivity. London: Routledge, 2013.

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