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    Cardona - Painis - Karaka - Rules - Agency - Animation

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    GEORGE.CARDONA PANINI’S KARABAS: ‘ AGENCY, ANIMATION AND IDENTITY* Sabda-pramanaka vayam|yac chabda aha tad asmakam pramdnam Mahabhasya paspasa (I.11.1-2), ad 2.1.1 (1366-12-13) P&nini’s grammar contains a section of rules introducing kdraka class names (samjfid). This is the most interesting part of thé Astddhyayt with respect to semantics and grammar. For the classifications provided therein serve to connect certain semantic relations with grammatical expressions.! Six kdraka names are defined: apddéna, sampradéna, karana, adhikarana, karman, and kartr, in this order.? For thé present discussion, let us cofsider the following twelve-rules. [1] 1.4.23 -karake Bo ([2]1.4.24 dhruvam apdye’padanam [3] 1.4.27 varandrthdngm tpsitah (apadanam 24) “ t [4] 1.4.32 Karmand:yam abhipraiti sa sampradénam [5] 1.4.36 sprher ipsitah (sampradénam 32) oe a [6] 1.4.37 krudha-druhérsydsitydrthdndm yam prati kopah, (sagnprad, dnam 32) . [7] 1.4.38 krudha-druhor upasrstayoh karma [8] 1.4.42 .sddhakatamam karanam [9] 1.4.45 adharo’dhikaranam [10].1.4.46 adhisth-sthasdm karma (adhdrah 45) [11] 1.4.49, kartur tpsitatamam karma [12] 1.4.54 svatantrah karta 2s [1] 1.4.23 is a heading (adhikdra) whereby’the names apdddria eté. intro- duced in subsequent rules apply to things when they are kdrakas.* Things are kdrpkas when they play certain roles in the accomplishment of an action‘. A thing may bé classed in one way if it functions in a certain way with respect to any activity at all; or it may belong to a certain kdraka class if it functions in a given way with respect to. a- parficular-activity; ‘tid a karaka classification may apply only if a certaii avtion-is denoted by particular items, I: tabulate rules [2] 1.4.24-[13] 1.4.54 below, using Journal of Indian Philosophy 2. (1974) 231-306. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 232 GEORGE CARDONA the term kdraka to refer to the nominata of the names apdddna etc. (of. Cardona, 1970a:65, n. 1). Rule Karaka Particular action, verb or class of Category verbs name [2] A stable point. Departure Apadina 13] What (an agent) wishes to Actions denoted by verbs Apadina reach (through the the act of meaning ‘ward off” warding off) [4] One whom (an agent) Sampradana intends as goal of the object (of his action) (5] A thing desired sprh ‘yearn for’ Sampradana {6] One toward whom anger Actions denoted by verbs Sampradina is felt with the meanings of krudh “be angry’, druk ‘wish harm to’, irgya ‘not tolerate’, asiiya “find fault with’ [7] One toward whom anger krudh, druh used with a Karman is felt preverb . 18] | The means par excellence (of Karana accomplishing an action) ® [9] A substratum? Adhikarana [10] A substratum (Si ‘lie’, sthd “be in place’, Karman ds ‘be seated’ preceded by adhi [11] What the agent most wishes Karman” to reach (through his action) [12] (That kdraka which is) Kartr® independent (relative to others involved in an action) 1. The kdraka classifications noted are used to account for the proper distribution of verbal and nominal endings. After a verb root, abstract, L-members (Jakdra) — subsequently replaced by finite endings or par- ticipial affixes — are introduced if an agent (kartr, [12] 1.4.54) or an object (karman, [11] 1.4.49, [7] 1.4.38, [10] 1.4.46) is to be denoted; if, however, the action denoted is, in a given derivation, objectless (akarmaka), an L-member is introduced to denote merely an activity (bhava): [13] 3.4.69 lah karmani ca bhave cékarmakebhyah (kartari 67) After a nominal base, the second triplet of endings (dvitfyd) that is, accusative endings ~ is introduced if an object is to be denoted; and the third triplet of endings (#rttya) — instrumental endings - is introduced if either an agent or instrument (Karana, [8] 1.4.42) is to be denoted: PANINIS ‘KARAKAS’ aa [14] 2.3.2 karmani-dvitiyd [15] 2.3.18 kartr-karanayos trtiyd However, the denotation of agent etc. by a postnominal affix is sub- ordinated to the expression of these by post verbal endings; [14] 2.3.2, [15] 2.3.18 apply to introduce endings if an agent ér object is not, in a given derivation, denoted by a verbal ending:® [16] 2.3.1 anabhihite ‘When ... is not denoted’. . The fourth (caturtht), fifth (paficamt), and seventh (saptamt) triplets of nominal endings (i.¢., dative, ablative, locative endings) are respectively introduced on condition that a sampraddna ([4} 1.4.32, [5] 1.4.36, [6] 1.4.37), apddéna ({2] 1.4.24, [3] 1.4.27), or adhikarana ({9] 1.4.45) is to be denoted: 1 [17] 2.3.13 caturtht sampradane [18] 2.3.28 apadane paficamt [19] 23.36 :saptamy adhikarane cat 2. Rules [2] 1.4.23-[12] 1.4.54 occur in the section of the Astddhyayt headed by [20] 1.4.1 a kadardd eka samjiia [21] 1.4.2 vipratisedhe param karyam [20] 1.4.1. provides that only one of the names (samjfid) stated in sub- sequent rules (up to 2.2.38) may apply at once; that is, simultaneous membership in more than one of the classes set up in this section is forbidden. [21] 1.4.2states that, if two operations conflict, the subsequently stated one ¢akes preference; see Cardona (1970a:43~48). In the present context, then, these two rules provide the following: :a thing ‘which: is eligible for membership in two or more Karaka categories simultaneously is assigned to one only, the -one stated subsequently in the section [2] 1.4.24-{12] 1.4.54. In varttikas 30-35 on [20] 1.4.1, Katyayana ives, with reference . [2] 1.4.24-{12] 1.4.54, reasons for having [20] 1.4.1 (and [21] 1.4.2) apply (Bh. 1301.21: kani punar asya yogasya prayojanani). -3. Let us consider first straightforward instances which involve the fol- 234 GEORGE CARDONA lowing condition: the semantic correlate of a kdraka name is the same for two distinct categorizations (columns two and four of the chart given in Section 1.1); that is, rules [6] 1.4.37, [7] 1.4.38 and [9] 1.4.45, [10] 1.4.46. Given that the man named devadatta is the object of someone’s anger (vam prati kopahi), he may belong either to the sampradanaclass ([6] 1.4.37) or the karman class ({7] 1.4.38) for the purpose of deriving a sentence meaning ‘He is angry at Devadatta’, depending on how one chooses to say ‘is angry’. If the simple verb krudh is used, one says w devadattdya krudhyati But if one uses abhikrudh then (2) devadattam abhikrudhyati is derived. In deriving (1), a dative ending (caturtht) is introduced to denote a sampradéna ([17} 2.3.13), but (2) is derived by introducing an accusative ending (dvitlyd) to denote a karman ([14] 2.3.2). Simildrly, if a mountain (parvata) functions as the locus (ddhdra) of sitting, it can be categorized either as adkikaraya ([9] 1.4.45) or karman ({10] 1.4.46), depending on whether the act of sitting is denoted by the simple verb as or the compound adhyas. Hence, (3) parvata aste contains the locative form parvate ([19] 2.3.36), but @ . parvatam adhyaste contains the accusative parvatam ([14] 2.3.2). According to Panini, each of the paired sentences (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) has the same semantic content as the other: in both (1) and (2) Devadatta is the object of anger, and both (3) and (4) convey that a mountain is a locus of sitting. This being so, Devadatta and the mountain qualify for being classed as sampradana and adhikarana also when one is deriving (2), (4). Were this classification allowed, however, one would derive, in ad- dition to (2) and (4), also (2%) *devadattdyabhikrudhyati ‘ (4*) ~~ *parvate'dhyaste with dative and locative forms, as in (1), (3). Rules [20] 1.4.1, [21] 1.4.2 PANINI’S ‘KARAKAS? bib preclude this: something is allowed to belong to only one kdraka category in any given derivation; where two categorizations can apply simulta- neously, that one provided by a subsequent rule takes precedence. In deriving (2) and (4), then, Devadatta is classed uniquely as karman, as is the mountain.12 In more traditional terms, Panini’s rules thus account for the fact that ee abhikrudh and adhyas ‘govern’ accusatives instead oflcativesr# ee 4, Consider now the following sentences, (5) asina chinatti devadattah ‘Devadatta cuts with a sword (axe)’. - © asi§ chinatti ‘The sword (axe) cuts’. fo) devadattah sthélydm pacati ‘D. is cooking (something) ina pot’. (8) sthalt pacati ‘The pot is cooking (something)’. (© and (8) are, on the authority of Katyayana and Patafijali (seen. 15), sentences which a speaker can use correctly. The sword, which is used as an instrument ({8] 1.4.42) of cutting, and the pot, used as a locus ((9] 1.4.45) in which things are cooked, are here spoken of as agents ({12] 1.4.54) of these actions.\4 Whether one speaks of swords and pots as agents of cutting and cooking, however, the fact remains that these implements do not function totally independently (svatantra); even when ‘one uses (6), (8), one understands that the sword cuts when wielded by someone and the pot cooks when someone has put food in it and set it to cooking. Moreover, as is clear from the above, such implements are not agents without simultaneously functioning as instrument and locus. Hence. two karaka classifications can apply for each. If this were allowed, one would also allow the derivation of (6*) — *asi$ chinatty asind (8*) — *sthali pacati sthdlyam [20] 1.4.1, [21] 1.4.2 preclude deriving (6*), (8*) as alternants of (6), (8):5 5, Of the same type as the sentences noted in Section 1.4, but also more complex, are the following. 9) devadatto dhanuso nirgataih Sarair laksyam vidhyati ‘D. pierces the target with arrows shot from his bow’. 236 GEORGE CARDONA, (10) devadatto dhanusa laksyam vidhyati ‘D. pierces the target with his bow’. : (11) kamsa-patryd uddhrtam annam bhuikte ‘He is eating food (which he has) taken out of a vessel’. (12) kamsa-pdtryam ... bhuikte As reflected in (9), shooting a target with bow and arrow involves two activities: having the arrows leave (nirgam) the bow and piercing (vyadh) the target with them. The bow (dhanus) is the point of departure ((2] 1.4.24) relative to the movement of the arrows, which are the instruments ([8] 1.4.42) of piercing. Hence, (9) contains the ablative dhanusah ({18] 2.3.28) and the instrumental Saraih ([15] 2.3.18). Similarly, two activities are involved in the situation conveyed by (11): taking food out (uddhr) of a vessel and eating (bhu) it; relative to the act of removing the food, the vessel is a point of departure ([2] 1.4.24), so that (11) contains the ablative kamsa-patrydh ([18] 2.3.28). Now, (10) and (12) can be viewed as elliptic versions of (9) and (11) respectively or as each containing asingle verb denoting a nexus of activities (cf. Ud. cited in n. 16). In either case, a bow (dhanus) is now spoken of as an instrument ([18] 1.4.42) of the action denoted by vyadh and a vessel (kamsa-pdtrt) is spoken of as a locus ([9] 1.4.45) relative to the activity denoted by bhuj. However, a bow cannot be considered to function as instrument of hitting a target without at the same time being considered a point of departure for arrows shot from it; nor can a vessel from which one eats be viewed as a locus of eating without also being considered that from which food is taken (contrast grhe bhunkte ‘He is‘eating in his house’). The bow and vessel are thus still eligible for being classed as apddéna, so that, in addition to (10), (12), one could possibly derive (20*) *... dhanusd dhanuso ... vidhyati (12*) *kamsa-patryam kamsa-patryah ... bhunkte Such wrong derivations are precluded by [20] 1.4.1, [21] 1.4.2.16 6. AccordingtoKityfiyaina and Pataiijali (followed by all later Paniniyas), then, Panini’s stating rules [2] 1.4.24-[12] 1.4.54 in the particular order shown and under the heading of [20] 1.4.1, [21] 1.4.2 serves to provide a single kdraka classification in cases where semantically a dual classifica- tion is possible. The examples cited by earliest commentators in their PANINI’S ‘KARAKAS’ 237 discussions of Panini’s kdraka definitions are of two general types: (a) two sentences convey the same semantic relations among given nominals and verbs but require distinct syntactic classifications in order to allow correct case endings to be introduced (Section I.3); (b) things which are susceptible of more than one kdraka classification are assigned to one category only. Under (b), the activity in question can be simple (Section I.4) or complex (Section I.5). 7. Ihave spoken above of a simple activity as opposed to a complex one in order to bring out the difference between the sentence types considered an Sections 1.3 and 1.4. However, Paniniyas have considered that all activities are composites. The root pac ‘cook’, for example, is said to denote everything involved in cooking: the internal conscious effort of the agent, putting a pot on a stove (or hearth), putting water and grains init, blowing, heating, etc. It is when these things are being done that one says pacati (‘is cooking’) of someone.1? These component activities are, of course, sequential; hence, it is said that the unity of that whichis called an action is a mental construct.1® Further, Paniniyas accept that a root can be used: to refer to any of the component activities which make up a composite action.1° A distinction is also made between a principal agent (pradhdna-kartr) and subsidiary agents (guna-kartr), respectively associated with a com- posite activity (pradhdna-Kriyd ‘principal action’) and its components (guna-kriyd). The principal agent is that kdraka which, when all other participants in‘an-activity are present, sets them into play.2° For example, if Devadatta is cooking rice if a pot with firewood, it is he who puts the pot on the stove, fills it, etc.; he is the principal kdraka, the agent of the composite action. The firewood (edha), pot (sthdif), and rice grains (tandula) function respectively asinstrument ([8] 1.4.42), locus ([9] 1.4.45), and object ({11] 1.4.49): (13) deyadattas tandulan edhaih sthdlyam pacati However, sentences such as (8) or (14) edhah pacanti ‘The firewood is cooking...’ are also used. In these, the principal agent is not expressed. Instead, there are subsidiary agents. In such cases the root pac is considered to denote 238 GEORGE CARDONA component activities: the containing of grains in (8) and burning up to the point where the grains are soft in’(14)."1 The situation described in Section I.5 can now be viewed as follows. A sword or a pot is normally an instrument or locus of cutting or cooking. Yet a speaker may wish to speak (vivaksd, see n. 14) of these as indepen- dent (svatantra) kérakas, that is, agents ({12] 1.4.54). Even then, however, these can only be considered subsidiary agents, which simultaneously fill other roles. In order to avoid a double classification which would result in the derivation of incorrect sentences, then, kdraka definitions are stated under [20] 1.4.1, [21] 1.4.2.2 8. I think it is clear from the above that rules [20] 1.4.1 and [21] 1.4.2 cannot be eliminated by letting a speaker’s intention (vivaks@) carry the burden. One may wish to speak of instruments and loci as agents, but this does not thereby’ alter the fact that they do function as instruments and loci. If a speaker’s intention alone were appealed to, sentences such as (6*), (8*) would be allowed by the grammar. It is equally clear, however, that vivaksd is not to be rejected as non- sensical. Sentences such as (5)-(12) are all correct usage. In them, more- over, single objects are spoken of as playing different roles in activities. Since the grammar has as its purpose to account for the language as people use it, the concept of vivaksd, which amounts to nothing more than the way things are spoken of, is valid. And rule ({21] 1.4.2 recognizes this. In this connection, it is worthwhile reemphasizing a point made before (Cardona, 1967, Kiparsky-Staal, 1969:109), namely that Panini’s kdraka classifications are not principally ontological. Paniniyas stress that the karaka rules class things not as they are but as they are spoken of.2# Here consider again sentence (10), for the derivation of which [21] 1.4.2 has to be used. As I have noted (Section 1.5), the bow here functions as point of departure relative to the movement of arrows, hence is spoken of as being instrument of piercing (vyadh). Now, although [21] 1.4.2 has to be used, there is no ontological conflict involved; the bow does not play two roles at once relative to a single action.*4 ' 1 The distinction between principal and subsidiary agents (Section I.7) and PANINI’S ‘KARAKAS’ 239 the view that one considers in grammar things only as they are-spoken about (Section L8) are of interest for considering animation with respect to agency. For there is here a major point of disagreement between grammarians - Paniniyas in particular — and Naiyayikas. The latter maintain that agency (kartrtva) is a property only of animate sentient beings; thé former do not hold this view.°5 Corisider the sentences (15) devadatto gramam rathena gacchati ‘D. is on his way to the village by chariot’. (16) devadattena gramo rathena gamyate ‘id. (passive)’ Both convey the act of going (3rd sg. pres. gacchati) relative to which the agent, instrument, and object respectively are Devadatta, a chariot (ratha), and a village (gréma). The accusative (-am) and instrumental (-ina) endings contained in grdmam, rathena denote ah object ({14] 2.3.2) and an instrument ({15] 2.3.18) respectively, and the verb ending -ti denotes an agent.?6 In (16), the verb ending -te denotes an object; hence ([16] 2.3.1), the instrumental ending -ina (in devadattena) is introduced to denote an agent. ‘Now, an object (karman) is that which an agent most wishes to reach (kartur ipsitataman, (11) 1.4.49). The agent Devadatta is an animate sentient being (cetandvat) who is capable of wishing to reach (dpium icchati) something through the action he performs. Devadatta is also the principal (pradhdna) karaka of the action denoted in (15)-(16): the . agent (Kartr). It is he who uses the chariot and reaches the village, thereby setting into play other kdrakas involved (Section 1.7). Bhartrhari enu- merates the features which contribute to the independence (svdtantrya) of the agent (kartr) as opposed to other kdrakas: he functions as kdraka prior to other participants (instrument etc.); suppresses the agency of other kdrakas, whose participation is subordinated to him; he brings to an end the activity of other kdrakas; he cannot be substituted for (in the sacrifice), while other kdrakas can be; a sentence may denote no other kéraka but denote an agent alone.?? Now consider sentences" (17) _ratho gramam gacchati ‘The chariotis on the way to the village’. (18) rathena gramo gamyate 240 GEORGE CARDONA In their structure, (17), (18) are like (15), (16). Yet, it is licit to ask how the village can now function as object ([11] 1.1.49) of going performed by” an agent which is a chariot. For a chariot is not capable of wishing to reach anything. If the class of agents (Kartr) as defined in [12] 1.4.54 included only those things which, when taking part in an activity, set other participants i play, only principal agents would be so classed. Consequently, Pa grammar could not serve to derive sentences such as (6), (8), (17), (18).28 Yet, ds we have seen (Section 1:4), Panini states rules [2] 1.4.24-[12] 1.4.54 in a particular order and under the heading of [20] 1.4.1, [21] 1.4.2 in order to allow the derivation of sentences such as (6), (8). One must conclude that the class of agents (Karty) includes anything which can be spoken of as functioning independently with respect to an action.2° Of course the very ordering of kdraka rules shows that a distinction is recognized between what may be called true agents and others. 1. Sanskrit has not only sentences of the type (6), (8), where instruments and loci are spoken of as agents, but also sentences, the derivation of which — in Panini’s system — requires an object to be classed as agent. Some background is required for a discussion of this type. Sentences such as (19) devadatta odanam pacati ‘D. is cooking rice gruel’. (20) devadattena pacyata odanah ‘id. (passive) are by now well known and require no comment. However, there are also sentences in which the root pac is not accompanied by an object; e.g., the active (21) devadattah pacati ‘D. is cooking’. which answers to the question devadattah kim karoti ‘What is D. doing? The passive of this is (22) devadattena pacyate Here the ending -te (replacing the L-member /af) is introduced to denote an activity (bhava, [13] 3.4.69). Since an agent is here not denoted by a verbal affix, itis denoted by an instrumental ending ([16] 2.3.1, [15] 2.3.18): devadattena. This form pacyate of (22) is identical with the passive pacyate PANINI’S ‘KARAKAS 241 in (20), although the verb endings of these forms have been introduced under different conditions. Both forms contain the dtmanepada ending te and the affix yak. The following rules allow these elements to occur. [22] 1.3.13 bhéva-karmanoh (atmanepadam 12) [23] 3.1.67 sarvadhatuke yak (bhava-karmanoh) [22] 1.3.13 is a restriction (niyama): of the verb endings which can replace an L-member (by 3.4.77-78: lasya, tip-tas-jhi...), those endings called dtmanepada occur only if an object (Karman) or activity (bhava) is denoted. An Gtmanepada ending such as te (< ta) also belongs to the class of affixes called sarvadhatuka. [23] 3.1.67 provides that the affix yak is intro- duced after a root which is itself follewed by a sdrvadhdtuka denoting an object or activity: pac-te + pac-ya-te. The following sentences are comparable to (19) and (20). (23) devadattah kusiilam bhinatti ‘D. is breaking the grain pot’. (24) devadattena kusiilo bhidyate (25) devadattah kedaram lunati ‘D. is cutting the grain field’. (26) devadattena kedaro liyate In addition, the following are to be derived (27) bhidyate kusiilah (svayam eva) ‘The grain pot is breaking : (of itself)’. (38) Hayate kedarah (svayam eva)®° The forms bhidjate, lityate of (27), (28) are identical with those of (24), (26). Should, then, the first two sentences be derived in the same way as the second two? If this is accepted, then the te of bhidyate, liiyate in (27), (28) denotes an object, as in (24), (26). The phrase svayam eva could then be interpreted as equivalent to dtmand, an agential instrumental, like devadattena in (24), (26). This analysis, however, is in accord neither with P&nini’s statements nor Sanskrit usage. A sentence such as (29) namate dandah “The stick bends’. is to be derived. The form namate contains the dtmanepada ending te, like bhidyate; however, instead of -ya- it contains the affix -a- as in bhav-a-ti (‘becomes, is’). This affix (Sap) is introduced by 242 GEORGE CARDONA [24] 3.1.68 kartari Sap (sdrvadhatuke 67) which states that Sap occurs after a root which is followed by a sdrvadhatuka denoting an agent. If namate is analyzed as containing the ending -te denoting an object, so that (29) is interpreted as equivalent to namate danda dtmand, then [24] 3.1.68 cannot serve to introduce the required affix -a-. One could claim, of course, that this objection could be overcome by modifying the grammar. However, consider now the following sentences: (30) devadattena bhinnah kusilah ‘The grain holder was broken by D-. 1) —_kusillena bhinnam ‘The grain holder broke’. In (30), the affix na (

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