MARK W.
GREEN
Logistic Support Analysis-
Lessons to be Learned
THE AUTHOR
is a logistics management specialist in the Systems Assurance
Branch, Quality Engineering Division, Combat Systenis Depart-
ment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division,
Dahlgren, Va. He received his BA in English in 1978 from Mary
Washington College, Fredericksburg, Va. He has completed nu-
merous logistics engineering courses sponsored by the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NavSea), Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command (SpaWar), and professional societies. Since 1978, M i - .
Green has provided integrated logistic support (ILS) management
services to NavSea, SpaWar, and the Naval Air Systems Command
(NavAir)as a Department of Defense (DoD) contractor (1978-88)
and Navy civilian (1988-present) supporting system procurements
in each of the acquisition categories (ACATs) I-IV. He has been
recognized ten times with awardstletters for his superior perfofor-
manre of ILS efforts.
ABSTRACT
For years in Navy system/equipment acquisitions, a pro-
gram requirement that has been particularly troublesome to
program managers (PMs), integrated logistic support man-
agers (ILSMs), and logistic element managers (LEMs) is logis-
tic support analysis (LSA). Performance of the tasks to satisfy
this LSA requirement has dismayed many logistics engineers
and analysts as well.
Unfortunately, what has caused such consternation in the
past is still present and shall negatively impact LSA require-
ments in the future unless some reformation occurs.
A few of the main problems encountered when involved
with an LSA are: the analysis is started too late; the effort is
complex and diverse; the LSA military standards contain am-
biguities, vague descriptions, and other deficiencies; and the
LSA process allows many possible approaches leading to re-
sults with numerous possible interpretations. In many cases,
expensive LSA processes produce data that is neither timely
nor of great use. The result of an inefficient LSA is usually a
banduided end item in the field, one without adequate and cost-
effective support.
This paper addresses LSA-related problems, evidenced
through research and personal experience, and recommends
solutions to enhance the LSA process. This paper also stresses
conducting the appropriate amount of analysis (through tailor-
ing) to derive the ideal supportability system-one of sufficient
performance that maximizes life cycle uffordubility.
INTRODUCTION
w i t h today's declining defense budget, it is essential that
all DoD Services be as prudent as possible in the procure-
ment of services and products. Quite simply, the services
must concentrate on buying only what is needed and, when
doing so, obtain the maximum quality, utility, and cost-ef-
fectiveness. To reach this goal in a procurement, the follow-
ing qualities, as a minimum, are essential in the program:
Military specifications, standards, and other guidance
documents invoked are free of deficiencies and under-
standable to product developers.
Milestones are scheduled wisely and efforts accom-
plished in the proper acquisition phase.
Duplication of efforts (redundancies) is eliminated.
- Requirements are tailored as necessary.
Tailored requirements are accomplished properly and ef-
ficiently.
A major acquisition program requirement, in particular,
that has many times failed to adhere to the important traits
listed above is LSA. Unfortunately, in spite of the efforts
that have taken place over the years to enhance LSA, the
process still leaves a lot to be desired. This paper summa-
rizes some of the problems and dilemmas that logistics man-
agers, engineers, and analysts encounter in an LSA program.
The paper includes reasonable resolutions to these areas of
concern for consideration in current and future improve-
ments of the LSA process.
LSA PROBLEMS AND RESOLUTIONS
PROBLEM
1 : STARTING
Too LATE
Many Navy acquisitions over the years have featured un-
timely LSA programs, ones starting too late [after Phase 0,
Concept Exploration/Definition (CE/D)] to be effective.
With a late start,there is invariably not enough lead time to
Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993 137
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
conduct the LSA sufficiently; therefore, there is insufficient
source data available that is necessary to establish efficient,
cost-effective integrated logistic support (ILS) for the sys-
tem/equipment. ILS, for any program. includes support in
the following ten areas:
Maintenance Planning
Manpower and Personnel
Supply support
Support Equipment
Technical Data (Technical Manuals, Drawings, Supple-
mentary Data)
Training and Training Support
Computer Resources Support
Facilities
Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation
Design Interface (Configuration Management, Standard-
ization, Reliability and Maintainability, Safety, Surviv-
ability, Manned Systems Engineering, Quality Assur-
ance)
With several, if not all, of these major ILS functions es-
tablished by guesswork, rather than by the actual LSA
source data, a logistics nightmare more than likely exists or
will soon become apparent in a program. This trouble wors-
ens as the number of fielded units increases because that
number must be multiplied by as many as ten functions, de-
pending upon how many are problematic due to LSA ineffi-
ciency. Situations such as the following are typical:
Situutiori I-The supply system may not have enough of
one spare part and too many of another when a late started
LSA did not include a spares determination effort based on
mean time between failures (MTBF) data. Excessive sparing
is not cost-effective when there are more spares than can be
used. Conversely, when not enough spares are available,
equipment down-time can be long lasting and jeopardize the
fleet mission; furthermore, an inordinate amount of time and
money is spent procuring these parts when it is accom-
plished in a roundabout way.
Situation 2-The end item is delivered to the fleet with-
out maintenance manuals. The maintenance manuals are
still being developed since the LSA (started too late) did not
provide technical manual source data (i.e., remove/replace
procedures and troubleshooting information) when the man-
ual developers needed to receive it. Therefore, when failures
on a ship occur, there is undoubtedly going to be an exces-
sive amount of down-time while: a troubleshooting walk-
through is arranged with an In-Service Engineering Agent
(ISEA) representative; or costly arrangements (further de-
laying the repair) are made for the ISEA representative to
travel long distance to the ship to fix the problem.
By starting an LSA program later than the nature of LSA
intended, there are significant benefits upon which the ac-
quisition may not capitalize (discussed next).
RESOLUTION
1 : STARTI N PHASE0, CE/D
T o maximize the effectiveness of LSA, the process
1 Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993
GREEN
I I
I I
Figure 1. Logical flow of LSA [I].
should begin as early as possible in the system life cycle, A
logical flow process (Figure 1 ) should begin with the opera-
tional requirement (OR) in Phase 0, CE/D, and continue
through the supportability assessment effort that begins in
Phase 111, Production and Deployment, and extends into
Phase IV, Operations and Support[ I]. The following bene.
fits are derived from beginning an LSA in Phase 0, CE/D:
- An adequate planning period will be ensured.
- An up-front market investigation can be accomplished.
- Realistic and timely budget estimates can be submitted.
- Design may be influenced.
- Adequate lead time will be available to provide required
source data.
Planning Peyiod
Starting the LSA in Phase 0, CE/D, allows sufficient time
to define and plan all approaches, tasks, and funds required
to perform the process and meet its objective:
Examine all elements of a proposed system to determine the
logistic support required to keep that system usable for its
intended purpose; and to influence the design so that both
the system and support can be provided at an affordable cost
PI.
In Phase 0, the LSA Strategy (LSA Task 101)[3] should
be developed and, when it is completed, approved by the
ILSM. Once the ILSM approves the strategy, it is recom-
mended that the strategy be forwarded to one of the follow-
ing: the Deputy Secretary of D e f e n s e (Acquisition)
[DSD(A)]; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition) [ASN(RDA)], or his desig-
natee; or to the commander of the cognizant systems com-
mand (SysCom). One of these will have Program Decision
Authority (PDA), depending upon the ACAT of the pro-
gram (see Table 1). It is also recommended that the strategy
be forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OpNav) sponsor. The dissemination of this document to
high-level authorities creates an early awareness of the LSA
requirements and that progress is underway.
Upon completion/approval of the LSA Strategy, the LSA
Plan (LSAP) (LSA Task 102)[3] should be completed, also
in Phase 0. This plan establishes the course that will be fol-
lowed beginning in Phase 0 and ending in Phase IV. It
schedules all tasks and subtasks[3], allowing adequate lead
time for the end results of each to be available to logistic
GREEN
Tahle 1. PDA for Each ACAT
ACAT PDA
ID DSD(A)
IC ASN( RDA)
I1 ASN(RDA)
111 ASN(RDA) or Designatee
IVM SYSCOM Commander
IVT SYSCOM Commander
managers when required for ILS considerations. It also iden-
tifies all data that will be compiled in the LSA Record
(LSAR) data base if DD Form 1949- I , LSAR Data Selec-
tion Sheet[4], is included as part of the plan; including this
form in the plan is recommended. This early-written LSAP
also schedules, in its milestone chart, LSA working group
meetings and in-process reviews (IPRs). These meetings
allow periodic progress checks and problem resolution peri-
ods to help ensure that the LSA stays on schedule, maintains
efficiency, and remains cost-effective.
After the draft LSAP is prepared and approved by the
ILSM, it is recommended that it be forwarded to the appro-
priate PDA (Table 1) and OpNav sponsor for their aware-
ness of the LSA progress and tasks that are planned for the
future. Should anyone disagree with the terms of this docu-
ment, there is still adequate time to change planning and di-
rection. The main point here is that the LSAP is a dynamic
document that governs the entire course of a program’s
LSA. It should be fully reviewed and approved by all pro-
gram related logistics managers, including those involved at
the principal design activity (PDA), the procuring activity,
and the activity that will probably be assigned as the ISEA
before any LSA tasking (other than the strategy and plan)
begins. This method promotes LSA efficiency and precludes
the haphazard, inefficient approach that has been seen many
times before-that is, trying to conduct all LSA efforts in
Phase 11, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD), before there is even an approved LSA Strategy or
LSAP.
There are certain programs [i.e., ACAT IV or procure-
ments of: small quantity, improved systems/equipment, non-
developmental items (NDI), or commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) units] that may require much more minimal LSA
efforts than others. In programs of this sort, the planning
may be geared lo using existing ILS, only modifying the
necessary; or obtaining all ILS from the contractor since the
buy is so limited in quantity. Even in a program of this na-
ture, an early LSA startup is required. An LSA Strategy and
LSAP are required no matter how brief the documents may
be; there should be no exemptions. It has been stated suc-
cinctly more than once at ILS Management Team (ILSMT)
meetings: LSA is not required it7 this program. There is no
such thing as no LSA in an acquisition! There are programs
that have extremely tailored or informal LSAs but, in all
cases, there are some trddeoffs and studies required. Even in
new improved system procurements (where the original sys-
tem’s ILS is to be utilized), system changes forcing changes
to the in-place ILS must be analyzed. It is not just recom-
mended for this type of program, it is essential, that the LSA
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
Strategy, LSAP, and LSA results, as required, be presented
at Logistic Review Group (LRG) audits or Logistic Readi-
ness Reviews (LRRs)[S], as would be done in major re-
search and development (R&D) acquisitions.
Market Irii~estigatiori
In June of 1986, the President’s Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion on Defense Management (the Packard Commission), in
its final report, emphasized greater use of components, sys-
tems, and services available qf-the-shelf. The report recog-
nized a need for development of new or custom-made items
only when it had been established that those readily avail-
able were clearly inadequate to meet military requirements.
COTS/NDI acquisitions offer four major benefits:
- Quick response to operational needs.
- Elimination or reduction of R&D costs.
- Application of state-of-the-art technology to current re-
quirements.
- Reduction of technical, cost, and schedule risks[h].
Starting the LSA in Phase 0, CE/D, allows adequate time
to plan and conduct LSA Task 203, Comparative Analy-
sis[3], which is a market investigation. This investigation
considers both military and commercial products already in
existence. Results from the investigation must be presented
and decisions made as to whether or not any of the systems
can satisfy the OR in terms of cost and capability. If there is
more than one system that can satisfy the OR, the best sys-
tem (in terms of overall performance, supportability, surviv-
ability, and cost-effectiveness) is chosen for procurement.
All of this effort is to be accomplished prior to initiating a
new R&D procurement that may be totally unnecessary.
[Note: If a market investigation was conducted aside from
the LSA to accomplish another acquisition requirement (ix.,
an Integrated Program Summary)[7], the effort should not
be duplicated. The results of the investigation should be
used to satisfy LSA Task 203 requirements; these results
can be supplemented with additional information if neces-
sary.]
An example of a program that completed the market in-
vestigation with positive findings is the Navy’s Rapid Anti-
ship Missile Integrated Defense System (RAIDS) acquisi-
tion. In this program, a market investigation (LSA Task
203) was conducted during Phase I, Demonstration and Val-
idation (D&V), to identify and evaluate candidate NDI com-
puters considering the OR cost guidelines, required opera-
tional capabilities, and schedule constraints. A comparative
analysis of three military computers and two COTS comput-
ers was conducted. The analysis considered initial and sup-
port costs, performance, suitability (i.e., the availability and
adequacy of technical manuals, training, repair capabilities,
etc.), equipment availability (i.e., production/delivery sched-
ules), and ship installation constraints (i.e., form, fit, weight,
power requirements, etc.). The militarized computers were
rejected primarily because of performance constraints. The
COTS computers were comparable in life cycle support.
The selection of the INTEL 80486 microprocessor-based
technology represented by one of the COTS computers was
Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993 139
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
based primarily on performance and schedule requirements
and ship installation constraints[8].
Realistic und Timely Budget Estimates
Another significant benefit of starting the LSA in Phase 0
is that, with early planning and task definition, it is more
likely that LSA budget estimates will be timely and reason-
ably close to the amounts that will be required. It is of ut-
most importance that these figures be as realistic as possible
with backup data to support all estimates. Without entering
these estimates at all, or entering them late, in the program’s
Logistics Requirements and Funding Summary (LRFS), it is
unlikely that funding will be available when required for
LSA in the future of the program. This is one major reason
why many LSAs have begun too late, have been overly ab-
breviated and not adequate, or have not been performed at
all. With early LSA planning and, hence, early budget esti-
mates incorporated into the LRFS, the LRFS includes LSA
funding requirements when accomplishing its objectives:
Providing visibility of requirements when required for
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submissions.
Informing resource and assessment sponsors of require-
ments.
Supporting LRG/LRR assessments of requirements.
Satisfying existing policy to plan funding requirements.
Serving as the source planning document for inclusion
of funding requirements in the program budget[9].
Therefore, with the great visibility that the LRFS re-
ceives, LSA budget requirements will be given due consid-
eration if requirement entries begin in Phase 0.
Design Influence
By starting the LSA early, the effort can be adequately
planned and tasking to influence design (i.e., LSA Task 303,
Evaluation of Alternatives and Tradeoff Analysis[ 31) may
begin at the proper time-well in advance of the design
freeze. In R&D programs, logistics supportability must be
incorporated into the design up front, or suffer the extra
labor, time, and cost required for corrective action later.
LSA design influencing criteria must be defined on a contin-
uing basis and provided to the engineering, design, and lo-
gistics communities in concert with the evolving design.
A program in which LSA successfully impacted the sys-
tem design was the Aegis Combat System Project. Logistic
criteria from the LSA were defined and distributed iterative-
ly in operation and maintenance design criteria publications.
These publications served as logistic supplements to the
evolving Combat System Specification. The criteria present-
ed in the publications evolved from goal oriented to specific
logistic design criteria as the design evolved. Verbai com-
munications also relayed logistic design criteria to the engi-
neers and designers as the logisticians conducted a 17urzds-on
LSA in the engineering and design community. Evaluations
of the logistic design criteria resulted, for example, in the re-
designing of circuit board extractors to permit one-hand op-
eration, incorporating hand holds into the design of the radar
140 Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993
GREEN
array to facilitate antenna maintenance, and the relocating of
spare waterfall connectors within cabinet designs to facili-
tate maintenance actions[ 101.
Starting the LSA in Phase 0 allows adequate lead time to
perform all required tasks, as required, in the appropriate ac-
quisition phase. This results in the timely availability of all
source data that is required to efficiently establish the entire
ILS system through:
- Determining the impact of specific design features on
logistic support.
- Determining how the proposed ILS system affects relia-
bility, availability, and maintainability characteristics.
- Influencing the design.
- Providing input data for tradeoff analyses, life cycle cost
studies, and logistic support modeling.
- Exchanging valid data among functional organizations.
- Providing source data for the preparation of logistic
products (i.e., technical manuals, provisioning technical
documentation,etc.)[21.
With source data available when required, the ILSM,
LEMs, and other logistics decision makers are in a much
better position to collaborate effectively to achieve these
goals by the time the system enters the fleet: cost-effective,
readily available ILS is in place and Navy Support Data
(NSD) is reached or soon to occur; therefore, periods of in-
terim support are not required or, if required, the time inter-
vals are very short.
PROBLEM
2: LSA PROGRAM
IS COMPLEX
AND DIVERSE
LSA reporting in accordance with Mil-Std- 1388- 1A[3]
consists of a maximum of 15 major tasks that are broken
down into more than 75 subtasks. LSAR preparation per
Mil-Std-1388-2A[ 1 I ] requires the generation of a maximum
of 15 data record sheets totaling 775 data elements. (NOTE:
This superseded standard[l I] is addressed since it is still
used for many system acquisitions that began before it was
obsolete.) Then, the new LSAR standard, Mil-Std-1388-
2B[4], with its relational tables beneath 10 functional areas,
totals 760 data elements. There is certainly no suggestion
here that all tasks/subtasks and data elements are required in
an LSA program. Tailoring is required, in all LSA planning,
that should considerably reduce the amount of analysis re-
porting and recording. However, even after tailoring has
been adequately accomplished, there may still be a very
complex process to conduct. This is particularly true when
assessing the amount of analysis (considering the system,
subsystems, components, and parts and all ILS elements and
tradeoffs) that must be conducted to generate the reports;
then, the data elements in the LSAR must be compiled for
each LSA candidate [or system, subsystem, component,
part, support equipment with an LSA Control Number
(LCN)]. Furthermore, this process is lengthy as it begins in
Phase 0 with a duration that extends into Phase IV, with all
efforts updated/revised iteratively, as required, through the
entire LSA program.
GREEN
Additionally, the LSA process requires diverse technical
analyses in all nine major areas of ILS as well as related dis-
ciplines (such as reliability, maintainability, and configura-
tion management). Along with the extensive ILS-related
knowledge required for the analyses, the LSA performing
activity must be adept in the acquisition process. For in-
stance, it is essential to LSA efficiency that the logisticians
have an awareness of when analyses should be started or re-
vised/updated [i.e., realize the significance of developmen-
tal/operational testing (DT/OT) in the LSA process].
RESOLUTION 2: TAILORA N D MONITOR
PROGRESS
How many times over the years have LSA performing ac-
tivities stated, f t h e y want everything, we’ll give them every-
thing, in reference to an untailored, or inadequately tailored,
LSA program requirement? Well, it is anybody’s guess, but
it would be safe to say that the phrase is a clichC by now.
Over the years, the untailored or inadequately tailored LSA
has resulted in complex and costly LSA programs that could
have been greatly simplified. Tailoring is a must and is the
ILSM’s responsibility to see that it is accomplished. It is ab-
surd and irresponsible to conduct all 15 tasks[3] and gener-
ate all LSAR data[4] when 30% of the tasks and data would
satisfy the needs of the program.
After initially tailoring the LSA to only those tasks, sub-
tasks, and data that are required for a given program, a more
in-depth tailoring effort should be conducted. That is, take
each task that remains and tailor the time interval over
which it is to be performed, if possible. For instance, a
COTS program’s Engineering Development Model (EDM)
in Phase 11, EMD. may not even resemble, from a physical
standpoint, the production version of the future. Since tech-
nology is rapidly changing, and designing with state-of-the-
art equipment is the objective, production contracts for
COTS systems are being let with ,form, ,fit, und function
specifications that do not specify hardware. In these pro-
curements, the physical configuration is not known until
Phase 111, Production and Deployment, when the contractor
saiisfies the form, fit, and function specifications with the
latest, state-of-the-art units. In a COTS program such as
this, an example of tailoring the time interval can be applied
to LSA Task 303.2.7, Repair Level Analyses[3]. It would be
a senseless waste to conduct these repair level analyses on
the EDM when the production system may have all new
hardware. Therefore, it is feasible to tailor the time interval
on this task to a compressed schedule that begins at the
onset of Phase 111 and eliminate any efforts beginning i n
Phase 11.
Tailoring to economize and simplify should not be ac-
complished by one individual. It is recommended that the
draft LSAP (documenting all tasks, subtasks, and LSAR
data requirements after the initial tailoring effort) be routed
extensively for review and to allow other logisticians and
engineers to advise on further tailoring, if practicable. After
all persons concerned havc had a chance to review the draft
LSAP, a meeting with all reviewers is recommended to
reach a consensus on whether or not the additional tailoring
that is proposed should be effected in the final LSAP. Fur-
thermore, the LSA performing activity’s advice on further
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
tailoring should be highly considered. Once involved in the
analysis, those who are technically involved conducting it
may discover some tasking that is not pertinent to the pro-
gram. If not doing certain tasks can be justified (document
the justification and add to the LSA data base), the LSAP
may be revised to reflect this additional tailoring.
It is recommended that the procuring activity meet with
the LSA performing activity shortly after contract award to
discuss LSA strategy. In particular, the ILSM and other
LEMs, as appropriate, should meet with those individuals
who will perform the LSA to discuss this strategy. Because
of the diverse requirements associated with an LSA, an LSA
team is usually established consisting of appropriate person-
nel qualified to analyze related elements or disciplines. If
too few people are assigned to conduct the LSA, and there is
a substantial amount of effort required, it is unlikely that the
LSA will be accomplished efficiently. The procuring activi-
ty should request that more personnel be assigned to the ef-
fort if it is deemed to be under-manned. The procuring ac-
tivity should request LSA IPRs periodically to monitor
progress and determine if all requisite LSA activity is being
conducted efficiently. Certain analyses that are not on
schedule or have an erratic approach might indicate that not
enough manpower is employed or inexperienced individu-
als, or ones without diversified experienced, are involved. It
is the procuring activity’s responsibility to resolve these sit-
uations by requesting more manpower or different employ-
ees that are more highly qualified be assigned to the disci-
plines in question.
These manpower deficiencies have arisen in the past and
still occur today in LSA programs. A typical scenario is that
related to a contractor who underestimated the scope of the
effort and put in an unusually low bid on the LSA effort.
The outcome is usually too few personnel or low-salaried,
inexperienced individuals assigned to the effort. Therefore,
the procuring activity must be watchful of the extremely low
bid on LSA and realize that the selection of that bidder can
be very detrimental to the entire LSA program.
3: LSA REDUNDANCIES
PROBLEM
LSAR Sofhvare System Proliferaticm
Ever since DoD began computerizing its LSAR data
bases, there have been more and more commercially-devel-
oped automated data processing (ADP) systems becoming
available for recording LSA results. The ADP systems first
accommodated the requirements of Mil-Std-l388-2A[ 1 1 J .
The exact number of them is unknown, but they are so plen-
tiful that there is a variety to choose from in three different
categories: Types I, 11, and I I I . A Type I system generally
has less capability (i.e., front cnd dais entry, then V A Y
equipment required for output) and is lower in coct; a Typt.
I11 system generally has thc most capability (i.c., data entry
and all output from a standalone PC) and is higher priced. A
Type I1 system falls in between Types I and 111 in capability
and cost. Since the release of Mil-Std- 1388-2B[4] in March
1991, many of the commercial activities have been develop-
ing software to record the LSAR in the new tabular format;
these, too, are becoming available as Types I, 11, and 111.
Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993 141
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS GREEN

The Government is paying enormous amounts over the
years, in a recurring fashion, in contracts requiring LSAR
generation by these ADP systems. Many times the software
developer includes software charges in the bid on a contract
requiring an LSAR; then, in a case where the developer
leases the system to another contractor, that leasing firm
many times passes the cost and maintenance fees on to the
Government. For instance, in the first quarter of FY92, the
Naval S u r f a c e W a r f a r e C e n t e r , Dahlgren Division
(NSWCDD), Code N712 received a proposal from a con-
tractor to provide LSA support to the Shoulder-Launched
Multipurpose Assault Weapon (SMAW) Mod 1 program. In
this proposal, the contractor stated that the LSAR ADP sys-
tem used would be the Integrated Logistics Support Analy-
sis (ILSA), Type 111. Furthermore, it was stated that the sys-
tem was not being used on any other LSA and it was
expensive for them to maintain. Therefore, for the contrac-
tor to keep it to generate the SMAW LSAR, NSWCDD
would have to pay an additional $5,000 monthly in software
fees.
The Material Readiness Support Activity (MRSA), Lex-
ington, Kentucky has served as the validating activity of
LSAR ADP systems for a number of years. The use of
MRSA’s professional staff to validate all of the incoming
commercial LSAR ADP systems in the past[ 111 was costly
to the Government. Now, MRSA must spend a great deal of
time and money again as the many new LSAR ADP system
software releases[4] require Government validation.
There are other cases of Government activities spending
time and money coordinating all of these ADP systems. One
example is an LSAR System Capability Report[l2], pre-
pared by the Naval Sea Logistics Center (NavSeaLogCen),
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. This report provides detailed
information on five Type 111 ADP systems (LEADS, LISA,
ILSA, SLIC/SLIC parts, and EDCASDILSA). It compares
the five systems in price, warranty, hardware/software re-
quirements, etc. Tables 2 and 3 are samples from the
NavSeaLogCen report[ 121 that compare the price of the
LEADS system to that of the LISA system. So, even after
all of these details were compiled into the report, it still only
addresses five of the many ADP systems available.
Another problem caused by the LSAR ADP system re-
dundancy is the different output formats and styles that the
Government must review and interpret. One may be partici-
pating as a logistics decision-maker on four programs and
receive LSAR output to evaluate that is in four different for-
mats. The reading of inconsistent information is tedious and
increases the likelihood of misinterpretations. In addition,
many times the LSAR repository (ISEA or field activity),
after the end item is fielded, receives a variety of formats
that can not be maintained without major restructures.
Table 2. Price of LEADS
No. of Users cost ($1
1 1 8,000
2 26,000
3 34,000
4 40,000
5 45,000
6 49,000
7 53,000
8 56,000
9 58,000
10 60,000
>I0 +2,000 ea.
quirements of the Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP)
and then identified data requirements of the specific acquisi-
tion element plans. The study showed an 82% redundancy
rate. This duplication of effort is both time consuming and
expensive. In addition, the various plans are produced at dif-
ferent points in the acquisition process; while there are re-
quirements to update these plans, it has been found that, at
any given point in time, conflicting data is contained in pro-
mulgated, approved program documentation[ 141.
The LSA process, in the past and still today, contributes
its share to this duplication of efforts. The following are a
couple of areas in which redundancy frequently occurs:
~ Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA).
- Level of Repair Analysis (LORA).
The redundant FMECA products are the result of inadver-
tently invoking, as a minimum, the following in the con-
tract: Mil-Std-1629, LSA Task 301.2.4[3], and the LSAR B
Tables[ 1 11; the redundant LORA products are the result of
inadvertently invoking, as a minimum, the following in the
contract: Mil-Std-1390, LSA Task 303.2.7[3], and the
LSAR A Tables[ 1 I]. If a FMECA, in accordance with Mil-
Std- 1629, and/or a LORA, in accordance with Mil-Std-
1390, are added to the contract Statement of Work (SOW)
and Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) by persons
not realizing that these items are included elsewhere as LSA
requirements, the procuring activity is about to purchase
several versions of the same data. Typical contract deliver-
ables are a FMECA report in accordance with Mil-Std-1629,
another report on the same FMECA to satisfy the Task
301.2.4 requirement, and then the same FMECA findings
are incorporated into the LSAR B Tables (Data Records B 1

LSA Plus Other Acquisition E ~ o i - t Equuls

s Overkill Table 3. Price of LISA

A streamlining of the acquisition process began in 1991 No. of units License Fec Maintenance Fee Per Year
with the cancellation of a host of requirements associated Per Location (After First Year) ($1
with this process1 13 I. While contributing to the streamlining 1 20,000 3,000
2 30,000 4,500
effort, NavSea identified over 55 plans which a program of- 3 37,000 5.500
fice may be required to produce for a single system ricquisi- 4 44,000 6,400
tion program. NavSea studied and identified the data re- 5 50.000 7,300

I42 Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993

GREEN
and B2 when the old standard[ 1 11 was in effect). The same
duplication occurs with the LORAs and other LSA tasks.
Then, when updatesirevisions are required later, frequently
they are only incorporated into one document. Over time,
the program data base contains a lot of conflicting informa-
tion. as NavSea’s study[ 141 indicated.
Other programs duplicate efforts when too many activi-
ties are involved in the acquisition process. For instance, the
prime item developer, under the contract, is conducting the
LSA and providing other supporting documentation and
data; then, concurrent with this, the procuring activity (not
aware of all that is to be provided by the LSA) tasks techni-
cal support contractors and Government field activities to
support the acquisition as well. In this scenario, often times
one of the other activities begins developing products that
are already underway and to be provided by the prime con-
tractor.
RESOLUTION3: ELIMINATE
LSA REDUNDANCIES
One LSAR Sofhyare ,Yysteni
There is a great need for the procurement of an LSAR
ADP system that is Government owned, controlled. and uti-
lized in all LSAR generation, thus eliminating the use of
many different commercial systems. This new ADP system
would be Government furnished to all contractors with a
clause in the contracts stating it is the only system to be
used for processing the LSAR.
There was a development underway, led by MRSA, for a
system. the Joint Services LSAR ADP System, that would
meet this goal. This software. that was to accompany the re-
lease of Mil-Std-l388-2B[4], was being developed as a rela-
tional data base platform that would provide the following
advantages:
- The system would be easier to changeiupdate.
- The hooks for using interactive systems engineering
tools (e.g., level of repair modeling) would be available.
- One time storage of data elements would improve the
consistency and quality of products.
- Ad hoc report capability would be available.
- Online access and review of LSAR data would be a
quality.
The intent was to export this software to industry and Gov-
ernment users[ 151.
Recent conversations with the Navy logistics community
(i.e., a telephone conversation with an ISEA representa-
tive[ 161) revealed that the development of the Joint Services
LSAR ADP System has been terminated. Whatever the rea-
son(s) (probably budget constraints) is for the work stop-
page in this developmental efcort, hopefully it will be reacti-
vated and completed in the near future. If the thought is that
the design of this ADP system is too costly, then perhaps the
design cost should be compared more closely with total cost
savings achieved by this system in the long term, such as:
- No recurring software charges for commercial systems
in DoD contracts.
- MRSA staff relieved of validation responsibility for nu-
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
merous commercial systems.
No coordination of commercial systems by other Gov-
ernment activities (i.e., NavSeaLogCen report[ 121 not
required).
LSAR by the new system is consistent in approach and
format; therefore, greater interpretation of data.
Greater understanding of LSAR leads to more cost-ef-
fective, timely ILS.
More cost-effective, timely ILS saves operations and
support dollars DOD-wide.
ISEAs and other repositories will not have to restructure
incompatible LSAR data bases when received.
In conclusion, the long term DoD savings from such a
Government LSAR ADP system would far outweigh the
cost up front to develop it.
ConductlDocument LSA Tasks One Time Only
Ensuring that LSA tasks are accomplished only once is
the responsibility of the procuring activity. In a contract, if
tasks such as the FMECA and LORA are required under
LSA, then the procuring activity must make certain that they
are not requested again separately in the SOW and CDRL. If
LSA requirements are in the contract only once, it must be
equally ensured that some other contract (i.e., a technical
support contract) for the same program does not require du-
plication of these efforts. Therefore, before LSA Tasks 301,
401, etc. become contractural requirements, a full review of
the products that result from them should be accomplished.
This is a preventive measure that allows one to know what
not to include elsewhere in the contract.
LSA task results should be documented only once also.
For LSA tasks, it is recommended that Block 16 of the
CDRL include a statement such as: Task results shall be
recorded in the LSAR to the greatest e.\-teiit possible. Perti-
nent overflow information shall he added, as supplenienraiy
information, to the LSA data h a w in a report format. If the
results are in the LSAR, there is no need to summarize them
again on a PC in Wordperfect. For instance, redundancy is
occurring if Sequential Subtask Descriptions, Table CC[4],
are documented in the LSAR, and then they are created a
second time and added as an appendix to the Maintenance
Plan or some other acquisition document. With the one-time
d o c u m e n t i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n a n d results, w h e n e v e r
updatesirevisions are required, they too only have to be doc-
umented once. It negates having conflicting data in the sys-
tem; for example. originally certain data was recorded in
four documents, but a recent revision reworked only one of
the four.
The periodic LSA working group meetings and IPRs, dis-
cussed earlier in this paper, are important sessions in which
the ILSM, in addition to monitoring the progress, can check
to ensure that the LSA is free of redundancies. While being
apprised of all the efforts and products that each LSA partic-
ipant is providing, the ILSM, having knowledge of other lo-
gistics acquisition tasks closely associated with LSA, must
be alert for possible duplication of work. If duplications are
underway, they can be resolved early before incurring a
great waste of resources.
Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993 143
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
PROBLEM
4: DEFICIENT
MILITARY
STANDARDS
[3,4]
Engineers and analysts conducting LSAs and document-
ing the results are faced with the challenge of interpreting
Mil-Std-1388-1A[3] and Mil-Std-1388-2B[4] that are poorly
written in many areas. Throughout the documents, there are
requirement descriptions that are ambiguous, vague, incon-
sistent, or erroneous. The following paragraphs will discuss
a few randomly-selected examples of these faults.
The task description for Task 102[3] requests in Step m
that the following be incorporated into the LSAP:
The procedures (wherever existing procedures are applica-
ble) to evaluate the status and control of each task, and iden-
tification of the organizational unit with the authority and
responsibility for executing each task.
This description does not provide much guidance to the
LSAP preparer due to the phrase in parentheses. First of all,
are there existing procedures in a military standard for this?
If there is an applicable military standard, the description
should refer specifically to it. If not, there are a lot of exist-
ing procedures that are summarized in other approved
LSAPs. Is this what the writer of this military standard had
in mind? Furthermore, the phrase in parentheses causes the
description to infer that a new procedure would be disal-
lowed. If some LSA planner had an innovative thought for a
new procedure, perhaps it would be worth approving as part
of the LSAP.
The task description for Task 302[3] states that the fol-
lowing consideration shall be applied to Support System Al-
ternatives:
Contractor logistic support (total, in part, or on an interim
basis) shall be considered in formulating alternative support
concepts.
Again the phrase in parentheses causes a problem. The
phrase is misworded since either total or in-part logistics
support can be obtained on an interim basis. A phrase that
correctly explains what is intended is: total support on an
interim basis or in-part support on an interim basis. Even
with this phrase clarified, it does not guide the task per-
former to consider all of the alternatives for contractor logis-
tics support. Continuous contractor support through the life
of the system must also be an alternative considered, partic-
ularly with COTS procurements and systems with a short
life (i.e., 10 years) in the fleet. Table 4 lists the four alterna-
tives that should be considered in satisfying this part of the
LSA task.
Table 4. Contractor Logistics Support Alternatives
Contractor Provides rn
In-part ILS (or some ILS) Interim
Total ILS Interim
In-part ILS (or some ILS) Through the end of life cycle
Total ILS Through the end of life cycle
144 Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993
GREEN
Table 5. Task Remark Reference, Table CF[4]
Code Data Element Title F o r m a t a b
EIAFDXA End Item Acronym Code 10 X L - 096 F
LSACONXB LSA Control Number (LCN) 18 X L - 199 F
ALTLCNXB Alternate LCN Code 2NF- 019 F
LCNTYPXB LCN Type 1AF- 203 F
TASKCDCA Task Code IXF- 427 F
TSKRRCCE Task Remark Ref. Code 2XF- 349 F
Table 5 (which is Table CF[4] for LSAR generation) is
provided for reference when reading the following dis-
crepant instructions. Paragraph 30.2.2.4[4] describes the
Data Element Code (CODE) as a nine-position code, left-
justified, used to identify the DED. First of all, the code is an
eight-position (or eight-character) one, and its utility is not
to identify the Data Element Definition (DED). The DED
clearly identifies itself in its own column across from the
data element title in every table; it is identified without hav-
ing to refer to the Data Element Code, or CODE. This same
paragraph also states that the last three positions of the code
[data element code (CODE)] are the table code. This state-
ment conflicts with the fact that the tables have two-position
(or two-character) codes through the entire standard.
The LSA military standards also contain inaccurate refer-
ences and outdated information. For example, Paragraph
5.1 [4] refers to DD Form 1949- 1, and indicates that it is pro-
vided as Figure 69; instead, this form is provided in the back
of the standard as Figure 7 1. A case of using outdated infor-
mation may be found in DED 217 of Appendix E[4]. This
DED provides examples of managing commands/agencies,
one of which is NavElex. NavElex, Naval Electronic Sys-
tems Command, was renamed SpaWar, Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command, back in 1985.
Using faulty military standards leads to shoddy products.
LSA analysts and engineers become dubious as to what is
expected when reading these inaccurate, .misleading, vague
LSA requirements descriptions. Analysts often times resort
to:
- Not addressing the requirement(s).
- Following the method of a previous LSA, whether right
or wrong.
- Deriving results from sheer guesswork.
- Incorporating fictitious information.
4: REVISE
RESOLUTION MILITARY
STANDARDS
[3,4]
At least one more revision to each military standard[3,4]
will be necessary to rid them of these technical deficiencies.
It is highly recommended that every user (DoD and their
contractors) of these standards forward beneficial comments
(recommendations, additions, deletions) for improving the
documents to the appropriate activity as described in the
Foreword[4]. With each user participating, technical infor-
mation from a wide knowledge base may be received to best
refine the requirements statements in all areas of expertise.
GREEN
CONCLUSION
In summary, the main areas to concentrate on for the bet-
terment of LSA programs in the future are:
- Start in Phase 0, CE/D
- Eliminate (by tailoring) all effortddata not required in
the acquisition.
- Eliminate redundancies; do not duplicate work.
- Contribute to improving the military standards.
With continuous contributions by all LSA planners and
performers in all DoD programs in these areas, as recom-
mended in this paper, efficiency in defense logistics pro-
grams will be promoted, and significant cost savings will be
recognized. Savings would be noticeable both in R&D (effi-
cient LSA producing only the essential resources) and O&S
(more cost-effective ILS as a result of efficient LSA).
The intent of this paper is to encourage participation and
trigger the innovative thoughts of the readers in the LSA im-
provement process. It is recommended that concepts for po-
tential LSA technological advancements (i.e., new Govern-
m e n t - o w n e d L S A R A D P s y s t e m ) be f o r w a r d e d t o
Government research agencies in the form of developmental
proposals for visibility and consideration.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to acknowledge the support of Darrell
W. Ference, a previous Naval Engineers Journal paper au-
thor. who encouraged the publication of this paper.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
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Logistic Supporr Analjsis, Mil-Std-l388-1A, Rev. A Notice
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DoD Requirements for a Logistic Support Analysis Record
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~~~~~
[lo] Ference, D. W., “Logistics Engineering at the Combat System
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[ 1I] DoD Requirements f o r a Logistic Support Analysis Record,
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[IS] Systems Engineering Management Guide, Defense Systems
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[16] Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division
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Naval Engineers Journal, May 1993 145