Nettle The State As A Conceptual Variable

Trustees of Princeton University
The State as a Conceptual Variable

Author(s): J. P. Nettl
Source: World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Jul., 1968), pp. 559-592
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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THE STATE AS A CONCEPTUAL
VARIABLE
ByJ.P. NETTL
T HE concept
of stateis notmuchin voguein thesocialsciences
rightnow. Yet it retainsa skeletal,ghostlyexistencelargely
because,forall the changesin emphasisand interestof research,the
thingexistsand no amountof conceptualrestructuring can dissolve
it. The presentarticledevelopsa conceptualapproachin which no
violenceis done to historicalor empiricalfact,but which offersa
means of integrating the conceptof stateinto the currentprimacy
of socialscienceconcernsand analyticalmethods.It is hoped thatthis
approachnot only will providea convenientconceptualization, but
willcontribute a
to attacking substantive
problemofsomeconsequence.
Sincetherelevantarea is potentiallyhuge,no morethana brushstroke
configuration can be attempted.
I
Whatsocialscientistshave doneis to providea framework of analysis
in which the state is one possibleconcretization of structures, one
politicaldimension,or even one systemof social bonds-but not the
onlyone.' Systemsanalysis,whethersociological(structure-functional-
ism),politicalscience-oriented(input-output),or evencybernetic (self-
steeringinformation and controlsystems),leaves open the empirical
definitionof goal-attaining,conversion,or regulatorystructuresof
which the traditionalstate-collectivityis in any case an important
part.The moretraditional approachesbased on power,coercion,force,
allocationof values,or such use of violencestilltendto
authoritative
clustermore closelyaround the central"state-area"of concerns,but
nowadayscertainly avoid too rigidan identificationof theirconcerns
withthestatetel quel.2 All thisis by now so well known and profes-
sionallyinternalized-perhaps excessivelyso-that thereis no need to
1For a sensitiveand suggestiveanalysisof the stateas a unibondedsystem,con-
withlanguageand territorial
trasted or neighborhood groupsall forming
a multibonded
nation,see PitirimA. Sorokin,Society,Culture,and Personality(New York i962),
I97-2II.
a
2 See, forinstance,recentdefinition
thatemergesin the contextof a generaldis-
cussionof social systemsand revolution:"The state is the institutionalization
of
authority. . . a specialformof power" (ChalmersJohnson, RevolutionaryChange
[Bostoni966], 30).

560 WORLD POLITICS
spelloutin fulldetailthisblurring of theedgesbetweenstateon the

onehandand politicsor society on theother.3
Two factorsmaybe briefly citedas contributing to thechange.One
is thatnowadays theproblem of sovereignty a
is,forsocialscientists,
dead duck.Morethanthirty yearsago, Frederick Watkinspushed
sovereigntytothemargin ofpoliticalscienceconcerns byinsistingthat
it be regardedas a "limiting concept"-anideal-typical situation
that
hadtobe qualified in all sortsofways.He qualified itwiththenotion
of autonomy, another limiting conceptthatappliedbothto thestate
itselfandtoall theassociations withinorbelowit,and as sucheroded
thevalueof sovereignty as a uniquepoliticalfactor.4 Sincethenwe
hearlittleofsovereignty exceptin thecontext ofhistorical andphilo-
sophical(and,ofcourse, legal) discussions.'
The otherfactor relatesto thegrowingempirical difficulty
of con-
tinuing tousetheconcept ofstatewithinthehistorical slotwithwhich
itsdevelopment hasbeenmostcloselyassociated-the If
nation-state.6
theentryof thethirdworldontothestageof modernsocioscientific
consciousnesshas had one immediate result(or shouldhavehad), it
is thesnapping of the linkbetween andnation.Whatwereawk-
state
wardexceptions before(Switzerland, theSovietUnion,empiresgen-
erally,andso on) havenowbecomealmosta ruleofnonnation-states.
Indeed,themanypleasforcentralgovernment actionto attainade-
quate"development" (thequotation markswill excuselack of speci-
fication, or evencommitment
definition, to theword)havetendedto
3The conceptof stateis, forinstance, one of thosethatTalcottParsonshas neither
specifically
"appropriated" nor tried to integrateinto his systemsanalysisin any
meaningfulway. In general,he simplyidentifies the statewith maximalcontrolof
resourcesand coercivemachinery-a sort of maximizationof coercivepower that
presumably is presentin everyorganization, butis maximizedin thepoliticalorganiza-
tion par excellence. See most recently"The PoliticalAspectof Social Structureand
Process,"in David Easton,ed., Varieties of Political Theory (EnglewoodCliffsi966),
83.
The conceptof statelends itselfonly with difficulty to any anaylsisof structural
differentiation-hence Parsons prefersto concentrateon generic problemsof the
"political"whichfacilitatesuch an approach.The essentially undifferentiatednature
of the stateconceptis furtherdiscussedbelow in SectionII.
4 FrederickMundell Watkins,The State as a Concept of Political Science (New
York and London I934).
5 See recentlyF. H. Hinsley,Sovereignty (London i965).
6 See the eruditebut whollyinconclusive discussionin Carl J. Friedrich,Man and
His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York i963), 547-66 and
passim. It is probablyan integralpart of the difference betweenthe epistemological
structuresof sociologicaland politicaltheorythatstateand nationare empiricaldimen-
sionsin the former, standingin no a priori relationship to each other,while for the
latterthey are closelyinterdependent, positivelycorrelated,and fundamentalcon-
ceptualgivens.

STATE AS CONCEPTUAL VARIABLE 561
pointup theneedforan adequatestatein nonnational circumstances.7

It is worthpointingout,however, thatin onesensethecontinued use
oftheword"state"in thecontext ofdeveloping countriesrepresentsa
formof conceptual underdevelopment withinthesocialsciences;far
fromspecificallyexempting suchcountries fromthetendency concep-
tuallyto dissolve
the"state"intomorefunctionallyspecific or limited
structuressuchas civilormilitary
bureaucracies
orpolitical the
parties,
literature
thatusestheconceptofstatedoesso in the"old-fashioned"
sensebecauseit has notyetgot aroundto applying thenew termi-
nology.'
II
Yet thesedevelopments or changesare neither purelya matterof
fashionnoran evolution fromlessgood to better, thoughtheymay
containelements of fashionas well as genericevolution.Conceptual
changesare bothideologically and geographically conditioned.The
erosionof theconceptof statecoincides in timewith,and is clearly
a functionalpartof,theshiftofthecenterofgravity ofsocialscience
totheUnitedStatesoverthelastthirty years,especially
theacceleration
in thisshiftin the lastfifteenyears.The relative"statelessness" of
American socialsciencecoincides
withtherelative of the
statelessness
UnitedStates,withthe long periodduringwhichthe egalitarian
andpluralisticsociety withsensitive
predicted fingertips
byTocqueville
wasbecoming overa vastcontinent.
institutionalized One has onlyto
readLipsetor Mitchellto see thatan Americansociopolitical self-
examination simply leavesno room for anyvalidnotion of But
state.9
thisonlyhighlights a problemthatis in factmucholder,thoughit
haslongremained dormant owingtoa lackofprofessionalization and
tothecomfortably dissensual
orindividualisticWeltanschauung ofthe
ThustheEnglishtradition
socialsciences. ofpolitical
andsocialtheory,
whichhasafterall madea substantial contributionoverthelastthree
7E.g., AlexanderEckstein,"Individualism and the Role of the State in Economic
Growth,"Economic Development and Cultural Change, vi (JanuaryI958), 8i-99;
Karl von Vorys,ed., "New Nations:The Problemof PoliticalDevelopment," Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, cccLviii (March i965), i-i69.
Amongeconomists writingon problemsof growthin poor lands today,references
bearingthisemphasisare legion.
8Two studiesthatdo use the new terminology also de-emphasizethe state: C.H.
Moore,Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-PartyGovernment(Berkeley
and Los Angeles i965); and particularly stronglymarked in this direction,Jean
Grossholtz,Politics in the Philippines (Boston i964).
9 Seymour M. Lipset,The First New Nation (New York i963); WilliamC. Mitchell,
The American Polity: A Social and Cultural Interpretation(New York i962).

562 WORLD POLITICS
centuries, got along verywell withoutany nativetheoryof the state

untilHarold Laski or perhapsMacdversomethirty or fortyyearsago-
exceptfor the marginalintrusionof continentalideas, whetheran-
archisticor neo-Hegelian.'0 The reasonis, of course,thatEnglandhas
been thestatelesssocietypar excellence."It is to a greatextentbecause
of these peculiaritiesthat,in the modernperiod also, the English
monarchy-onehardlydare speakof 'theEnglishstate'-has followed
a paththatdivergesfromtheEuropeannorm.""
This argumentsuggeststhatthe conceptof the stateis and ought
tobe treatedas a variablein socialscience,as a reflectionof thevarying
empiricalrealitywith which social scienceconcernsitself.Insofaras
social scienceaims at scientific reductionism and attemptsto separate
all epiphenomenal or occasionalfactorsfromexigencies, fundamentals,
and invariants, theconceptof stateis at risk.But ifit can be made into
an operatingvariablethatpointsup significant differencesand discon-
tinuitiesbetweensocieties,makingpossiblesystematically qualitative
or even quantitative distinctions, theremay be a case forbringingit
back in. Severalproblemshave howeverto be solvedfirst.
What is the state,forpurposesof rigorouscomparativeanalysis?
i. In thefirstplace,itis a collectivity
thatsummatesa setoffunctions
and structures in orderto generalizetheirapplicability. This definition
putsthe concept on a peer-dimension withnation,territory, or sover-
eigntyin law. The difficulty of relatingstate and sovereignty as a
primaryidentification is not so muchthattherelationship is, in socio-
politicalterms,inapplicableas thatit is insufficient, both in the sense
thatit is too narrowby leavingout spatialand social dimensionsand
thatit is too broad in thatit fails to "prepare"the conceptfor the
rightlevel at which it relatesto otherrelevantconcepts.The notion
of the sovereignstatefocusesexclusivelyon its superordinate status
vis-a-visinferiorassociations and thusobstructs thepossibilityofanalyz-
ing its relationship with othersummatingconceptssuch as nation,
society, or territory.'2
The generalizing, or depersonalizing,component
ofthedefinition can bestbe graspedbyappreciating thattheimportance
of thephrase"l'tbat, c'est moi" lies in the peculiarity and oddnessof
the identification, not in any commonplacequalityof the aphorism.
10H. J. Laski, The Statein Theoryand Practice(London 1935); R. M. Macdver,
The ModernState (London 1926). The beginnings in the conceptualprob-
of interest
lem in Englandmayperhapsbe attributed to H.C. Dowdell, The Word"State"(Lon-
don I923).
11Heinz Lubasz, The Developmentof the ModernState (New York and London
6.
i964), Introduction,
for politicalscienceof the sovereignty
12 For the difficulty emphasison the state,
see Watkins,42-84.

Ifthenotionofstateistobe atall meaningful, andnotmerely a ragbag

of
synonym government, itmust be divorcedfrom and even opposed to
personalpower-notin thelegalbutin thepoliticalsense.The point
abouttheNazi lawyer's famousstatement that"thesovereign is the
one who adjudicates or settlesany emergency situation" is not,as
somedemocratic commentators havepointedout,thatthestatement
oflaw,butthatit negatesanyusefulconceptofstateas
is destructive
ofpower.13
theinstitutionalization
Clearlythisdefinition is merely a genericone thatdoesnotlocate
either functions
particular orstructures appropriate tothestate.As will
becomemoreobviouslater,it is notproposed to attempt sucha loca-
tional precisely
definition because thisin fact is one of the variable
components. The overallconceptual identification of statewithlaw,
withbureaucracy, or withgovernment merely reimposes an artificial
(and toa largeextent self-defining) notionofstatebygrouping struc-
turesthatarebetterparticularized and thatare partof the statein
someempirical situations butnotin manyotherswheresomeor all
of thesestructures existand function withoutany valid notionor
phenomenon ofstateat all.In fact,as we shallsee,theymaysubstitute
forthestatein certaincasesaltogether.
2. In thesecondplace,and following fromthesummating aspect,
thestaterepresents a unitin thefieldof international relations.As
Hobbespointedoutthreehundredyearsago, there is a fundamental
differencebetween civilsociety withinthepurviewof anysovereign's
authority-the area(thoughnotthesituation) wewouldtodaydescribe
or a socialsystem-and
as a society theinternational arena,a stateof
nature withoftenrandom, unsystemic relations ofcollisionand collu-
sion.Herethestateis thebasic,irreducible unit,equivalent totheindi-
vidualpersonin a society. It is nowadays fashionable to referto "na-
inthisrolerather
tionalactors" thanstates,butthisis mainly toprovide
a tensilecontrastto international and supranational unitsthatanaly-
sis hopefullyseesemerging as partof a moreorderedinternational
system-an analyticalconvenience rather thana genuineerosion ofthe
state.14
In thisinternational
contexttheconceptofstate, tobeing
in addition
the almostexclusiveand acceptablelocus of
a unit,also generates
resource Whatever
mobilization. thestatemayormaynotbe internally
The statement
13 was made by Carl Schmitt,
in PolitischeTheologie(Leipzig I934),
ii.In generalsee Franz Neumann,The Democraticand theAuthoritarian State (New
York I957), 3-2I, 59-66.
14In addition,the phrase"nationalactor"exhibitsan overtoneof popularpartici-
pation-a piece of conceptualclothingverysuitableto a democraticage.

564 WORLD POLITICS
(whichis thesubjectofthisarticle),therehavein thepastbeenfew

challenges tobothitssovereignty anditsautonomy in "foreign affairs."
Theremaynowadaysbe growinglimitations-normative, collective-
integrative,pluralist-integrative-on thenotionally absolute sovereignty
and autonomy of statesin theinternational field, and these will be
brieflyreferred tobelow.15 Butwe arehereconcerned withtheinternal
or societalaspectof state,not theinternational one; foralmostall
intents and purposes thestateactsforthesociety internationally,and
internalmatters relatingto foreignaffairsare a stateprerogative
(includinginterpretation of sovereignty-limiting normsemanating
fromsupranational arrangements). In short, thestateis thegatekeeper
between intrasocietal and extrasocietalflowsof action.
Accordingly, we do notproposetofollowup herethisaspectofthe
definition of a state.One pointonlyis worthnotingbriefly. The fact
is thatthisinternational function is an invariant; countries witha
lowdegreeof"stateness" in theintrasocietalfieldhavetomakespecial
differentiated provisions accordingly (like the specialstatusof the
British ForeignOffice othergovernmental
vis-a-vis bureaucratic organ-
izations,theawkward dualityandconflict between interstateandinter-
partyrelations amongCommunist states,and finally theveryspecial
statusofforeign affairsin federalsocieties liketheUnitedStatesand
Switzerland, wheretheyareone oftheprimary raisonsd'etreforthe
claimforstateness on thepartofthefederal government). Thisdiffer-
encebetweenextrasocietal and intrasocietal problems of controland
actionis muchlessmarkedin countries witha strongstatetradition,
likeGermany orFrance.Hencewhatever variation we mayfindin the
degreeof stateness in theanalysisoffered here,and evenwherethe
notionofstateis veryweak,as in Britainand theUnitedStates,the
effective extrasocietal or international roleis not affected. Whatever
reasons theremaybe fortalking aboutBritish government rather than
theBritishstatedo not affect Britainas a state(or nationalactor)
viewedfromthepointofviewoftheinternational arena(or system).
ComingbacktoHobbes,however, theonehardlyinfluences theother;
theanalysis of stateas a conceptual variableintrasocietally is notin-
fluencedbyrecognition of thestateas an extrasocietal constant.
3. Third,thestaterepresents an autonomous collectivityas wellas a
summating concept ofhighsocietal generality.It is thusin a functional
sensea distinct sectoror arenaofsociety.16 Thisfactor ofautonomy is
15A recentarticlearguingfor the reinstatement of the conceptualsovereignty
of
relationsis Paul Y. Hammond,"The PoliticalOrder and the
statesin international
Burdenof ExternalRelations,"WorldPolitics,xix (April i967), 443-64,esp. 462-64.
16 For thenotionof arena,see TheodoreJ.Lowi's reviewarticle"American Business,

important in variousways.Foronething, itemphasizes whatis in fact
a limitation uponsovereignty; everyassociation tendstowardmaxi-
mization ofautonomy, andoncewe accepta pluralistic viewofsociety,
thegreater autonomy ofthestatevis-a-vis otherassociations or collec-
tivities
becomes an empirical question foreachindividual case (notto
speakof theinroadson external autonomy involvedin international
systems andpressures forpolitical Further,
unification)."7 theautonomy
of thestateis reflected by areasof exclusivity as
as well primacy in
all societiesthathavea well-internalized conceptof state.This may
leadtosharpdisjunctions ofa sectoralkind:between private andpublic
systems of education, betweenprivateand publicsectors of industry,
between road-andrail-building programs, or evenbetween competing
systems of telephone networks (as in Italy).Finally,the notionof
autonomy is relevantto theemphasis of structural or rolespecificity.
This simplymeansthata relatively autonomous statetendsto pro-
liferatespecificinstitutionsbothfortheadequatefulfilment of func-
tionaltasksof primacy withinsociety and forreplicating variousin-
ternalfunctional requirements withinits own autonomous sector-
suchas administrative courts,officesofcoordination, civilservice com-
missions, andso on.At therolelevel,theautonomy ofthestaterepre-
sentstheprimary role-identification
ofbeinga stateofficial; onlywithin
thisrole-set aresubsidiary and morespecific rolesevolvedin turn.
4. Fourth, thestateis essentially a sociocultural phenomenon. This
followsfromtheliberation of theconceptfromexclusive association
withparticular structures,and fromtheemphasis on autonomy. It is
alsostrongly suggested bytheempirical evidence. For instance, what
Friedrich hassomewhat pompously inflatedintoa generallaw-"Such
is thedialectic of thepoliticalthatthestateseeksand mustseekto
fosterthegrowth of a nation,indeedmustposititspotential coming
intobeing"-isin factapplicableonlyto Europe,and a limitedcon-
tinentalpartofEuropeat that.18 Whatconstitutes nationsis surely the
organized diffusionofcommon experience, andthismaybe structured
andamplified by a king,leader,church, party, army,or state-orall
of them.For us to nominate thestateas theprimary nation-builder
Public Policy,Case-Studies,
and PoliticalTheory,"World Politics,xvi (July i964),
677-7I5.
17 The uneasyconceptual relationshipbetweensovereigntyand autonomyis argued
at somelengthby Watkins.For a relevantmodel of politicalunification, see Amitai
Etzioni, "A Paradigmfor the Study of PoliticalUnification,"World Politics,xv
(Octoberi962), 44-74.
55i. In fact,Friedrich
18 Friedrich, has elsewhereoffered
quite a different
definition
and conceptualizationof the state;see belowfn. 23.

566 WORLD POLITICS
in anyempirical situation,therehas to be a subjective internalization

byparticipants as wellas theobjective existence of a generalized col-
ofa statebefore
lectivity thequotedstatement isvalid-unlessofcourse
we lapseintothedead-end residualdefinition ofyorewhichgaverise
to the originalsocialsciencedisinclination to keep the statein its
armory of conceptual tools.
Whatis beingarguedhereis thattheidentification of statewith
nation-indeed, themoregeneralrecognition of thestateas a signifi-
cantfactor in politicaland sociallife-depends notonlyon empirical
problems relating totheactivity andstructure ofa particular statebut
on theexistence of a culturaldisposition to allotrecognition to the
conceptual existence of a stateat all. This disposition can be isolated
in variousways.One is historical: Is therea historical traditionin any
particularsocietyfortheexistence, primacy, autonomy, andsovereignty
of a state?Another Do thepoliticalideasand theories
is intellectual:
ofthesociety pastor present incorporate a notionof state,and what
roledo theyassignto it? Yet anotherapproachis cultural:To what
extent haveindividuals generalized theconceptand cognition ofstate
in theirperceptionsandactions, andtowhatextent aresuchcognitions
salient?This lastis perhapsthemostimportant of the approaches,
sinceit appearsto be theonlyone thatmakespossibleanykindof
systematic ordering in whatmustotherwise seemto be a random
proliferationof quantitatively as well as qualitatively distinctphe-
nomenacaptured bytheall toogeneralnotionofstate.
III
atthisstagetospecify
It isdesirable andorderthesevariable
qualities
ofstatehood or "stateness"
somewhat further
in accordance
withthe
threefolddivisionoftraditions:
thehistorical,
theintellectual,
and the
cultural.
THE HISTORICAL TRADITION
Perhapsthemostremarkable factorin theconcretization of state-

hoodin thehistorical experience of variouscountries is theapparent
randomness ofsuchdevelopment-at leastas expressedin existingap-
to
proaches theanalysis of thestate. There is,forinstance,no ready
identificationof anydevelopment of a historical
statewithethnically
homogeneous, longunited,and centralized countries;
if therewere,
we wouldexpectto findEnglandwitha well-developed traditionof
state.If anything,theevidence pointstheotherway; oftenthemost
strongly articulated
development of statehoodhas takenplace in

countries thatweredividedlongafterFranceand Englandhad been

united.Here thestatehas comeintobeingeitherby extending its
impactfromone dominantgeographical component to the whole
eventual "nation-state" (as in the"takeover" ofthePrussian statecon-
ceptforthewholeofGermany afteri871), orithasbeena new,indeed
artificial,
creation following theunification ofrelatively "stateless"com-
ponents, as inItaly.It is therefore toidentify
difficult thecrystallization
ofstatehood in thiscontext as resulting
fromanyprecisely comparable
historicalevents.
Thereis considerable evidence thatthecommitment to statenesson
thepartof newlyunitedEuropeannationsor evenmulticommunal
societieslikeBelgiumwas in parttheresultof deliberate borrowing
fromenviedEuropeanleaders(and, of course,fromthe prevailing
andquite"internationally" Europeanliterature thatwillbe discussed
in thenextsection).No doubtthehistorical experience of France
sincetheseventeenth century was dominant in providing conscious or
unconscious modelsfor countriesthat underwenttheirnational-
integrativerevolution in thenineteenth century, so thatthestatecon-
ceptappearedas the mostappropriate one forthe achievement of
integrativeparity or equivalent nationalcohesionwithEurope'smost
centralized and self-conscious nation-state.19It is almostcertainly true
thatthefirst modern(or justpremodern) discussion ofthestateas an
entityand a conceptdatesbackto theItalyof Machiavelli. But the
realdevelopment ofthehistorical tradition tookplacein France;it is
theFrenchstate,and idea of state,thatprovidethebasicEuropean
model-eventhoughthe philosophical and intellectual tradition of
ideasaboutthestatereachedthefullness ofuniversality and precision
in Germanhandsfromthebeginning of thenineteenth century on-
ward.It is significantthatthewordl'JtatinFrenchshouldbe theonly
onenormally beginning witha capitalletter.
Yet thereare a numberof countries liketheUnitedStateswhose
historicalexperience mightsuggesta similarappropriation of "state-
hood"butwherethenotionhas nonetheless remained remarkable by
19For a discussionof the comparativeeffectsof this integrative revolution,see
S. M. Lipsetand SteinRokkan,"CleavageStructures, PartySystems,and VoterAlign-
ments:An Introduction,"in Lipsetand Rokkan,eds.,PartySystemsand VoterAlign-
ments(New York i968). The notionof modernity modelsand theconsequentstructur-
ing of leaderand followernationsin the Europeancontextis discussedby Reinhard
Bendix,in "Towards a Definitionof Modernity,"a, paper presentedat the Sixth
World Congressof Sociology,Evian, France, Septemberi966 (a preview of a
lengthy forthcomingbook on thissubject).See also J.P. Nettland RolandRobertson,
InternationalSystemsand theModernization of Societies:The Formationof National
Goals and Attitudes(London and New York i968).

568 WORLD POLITICS
itsabsence-orrather hasbeentransformed intoa verydifferent mean-

ing,as we shallsee.Probably no trulyfederalregimecan incorporate
anyadequatenotionofstate, sincebothfunctions andpowersinvolved
in thisconceptare-by almostany definition-coordinate withthe
regional units,andthenecessary overallsuperordination orsovereignty
doesnottherefore exist.Autonomy in turnbecomescapableofexpres-
siononlyin legalrather thansociocultural terms, distinguishing state
sectors fromone anotherratherthandistinguishing the statesector
fromall others, as in unitarysocieties witha highdegreeofstateness.
Accordingly itwouldappearthatthehistorical appropriation of state-
hoodis particularly relevant in societies thatmighthavehad an ob-
jectivepredisposition towarda federal structure(Germany and Italy),
butwherea centralformof government was in themainadopted.
Friedrich'sproposition citedearlieraboutstatesanticipating and even
predicating eventual nationsthusturnsout to be relevant to an im-
portantbut limitedset of empiricalcases; insteadof servingas a
constituent partofthebasicdefinition of thehistoric function of the
state,it drawsattention to an important component variablein the
Europeanexperience. This may,forinstance, help to explainthe
administrative and culturalimpoverishment of the individualstates
thecenter
vis-a'-vis in theWilhelmine Reich,as well as thesimulated
qualityof Germanfederalism undertheWeimarRepublic;withthe
institutionofa moreviableandvalidfederalstructure since1945,and
itsculturalinternalization in a highlynovelmanner, theappropriate-
nessof thehistorical Germannotionof thestateseemsto havebeen
lost.The relativeattrition of thetraditional salienceof the statein
Germany since 1945 may be due to just thisfactor.Thuswe findthe
institutionalizationand clustering of "stateattitudes"and theconcen-
trationofinterest in statephenomena increasinglyconcentrated on the
Linderrather thanthefederal government-even though littleattempt
hasbeenmadetoexplainandanalyzetheformer in traditional "state"
terms.We shallseebelowhowthisprocess ofsubstitution has affected
theintellectualattitudes to,andthefunction andstructures of,German
politics.20
20 For the transferof ideological as well as
processual primacy from the center to
the regions since I949 in Germany, see in general John Brown Mason, "Federalism-
The Bonn Model," in Arnold J.Zurcher, ed., Constitutionsand ConstitutionalTrends
Since World War II (New York I955) I34-54; Otto Kirchheimer,"The Political Scene
in West Germany," World Politics, ix (April I957) 433-45; A. J.Heidenheimer, "Fed-
eralism and the Party System-The Case of West Germany,"American Political Science
Review, LII (September I958), 809-30; Olle Nyman, Der westdeutscheFderalismus:
Studien zum Bonner Grundgesetz (Stockholm i960); Theodor Eschenburg, Staat und
Gesellschaftin Deutschland, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart I957).

Anotherapproachto the historical analysisof stateness and the
identification a
of conceptually salientstatedirectly concerns theprob-
lemof autonomy. As has alreadybeenpointedout,theexistence of
neutraland transformatory structures thatmerely processinputsinto
outputs and liveup to themodelpostulated bycertaintypesof social
sciencewouldrundirectly counterto thenecessary conceptual com-
ponentof autonomy. Havingno valueor normative components of
theirown,thetransformatory structures ofthetypepositedbyEaston
andAlmondcannotbe autonomous in anybutthemostlowlystruc-
tural-identificatorysense.This problem is quiteseparate fromthatof
sovereignty;a statemaybe sovereign as wellas autonomous orit may
merelybe autonomous. ThustheGermantradition hasalwaysempha-
sizedsovereignty, theautonomy ofthestatebeingin a sensededuced
fromitssovereign nature.In Italytheautonomy is,on theotherhand,
strongly marked, butthesovereignty is historically and empiricallyin
considerabledoubt.Whatever itsformalclaims,theItalianstatecan
be demonstrated as beingin effect no morethana sectorof activities
sharply differentiatedfromothersbuteffectively sovereign onlyin its
particularsphere. Yet a thirdalternative exists,namely, a situationin
whichthestructures we wouldnormally designate as appertainingto
thestateareby definition notautonomous, or are at leastmuchless
so thanother,nonstate ones.Thus in theUnitedStateswe have a
sharpdisjunction betweenthewell-maintained autonomy of certain
federalinstitutions suchas thefederalcourts, regulatory commissions,
and,finally, departments of thefederalgovernment; the legislative
branch, however, is distinguished by itslackof autonomy and by its
constitutionas a reflection of cross-pressures and interests-what has
beencalled"a government of separted institutions sharingpowers."21
Thissituation isparalleled by,though itisnotnecessarily a consequence
of,thewholeconcept oftheseparation ofpowers, between centerand
regionsas wellas amongthethreebranches ofgovernment. Hencein
theUnitedStatestherealboundaries of autonomy fallnotbetween
stateand otherinstitutions butwithinand betweenthecomplexof
institutions
thatelsewhere couldbe encapsulated withinthecollectivity
ofthestate.For present purposes thisinternalization of distinctareas
ofinstitutionalautonomy is thefundamental implication ofthesepara-
tionof powers.One recentauthor,comparing the development of
sovereigntyandgovernment inEuropeandtheUnitedStates, concludes
aphorismically that"Americaperpetuated a fusionoffunctions and a
21 RichardE. Neustadt,Presidential
Power: The Politicsof Leadership(New York
i960), 33.

570 WORLD POLITICS
divisionof power,whileEuropedevelopeda differentiationof func-

tionsand a centralization
of power."22
It wouldaccordingly seemas
thoughtheultimate identification
ofstatenessas a historical
tradition
restsempirically
as muchon thefactorofautonomy as on anyconcept
of sovereignty.
In addition,
theconceptual difference
between stateand government
is vitalhere.The reasonwhywe tendto speakofthefederalgovern-
mentratherthantheUnitedStatesin thisconnection (see below,
Section IV,Law Enforcement) isbecausethelegislative
branch hasbeen
effectivelyloppedofffromtheconceptofgovernment (theseparation
of "theHill" from"downtown" Washington), whereasan adequate
concept ofstatewouldhaveto includeit.The sameapplies,ofcourse,
to Britain;in fact,a largepartof thepointof theword"state"in
Europeis thatit is theonlyconcept thateffectivelyjoinsgovernment,
bureaucracy, andlegislature intoonecollectivity
and thusimparts real
valueto thedistinction between stateand government.
In a limitedhistorical
sense,theidentification
of statewithgovern-
mentin theworkof certain writersmightappearto makesenseon
thegrounds thatanyotherconception ofthestateis metaphysical and
therefore valuelessforconcrete historical
analysis.
But,as willbe seen
below,notonlyis theintellectual tradition
withitsmetaphysical com-
ponentimportant in itself,
butevenon a purelyempirical dimension
thefullidentification ofstatewithgovernment createsgreatproblems
in thecomparative ofWestern
analysis society.23
The problemof the
22
Samuel P. Huntington,"PoliticalModernization:Americavs. Europe," World
Politics,xviii (April i966), 393. The contrastbetweenfunctions and power,although
attractive,is inaccurate,since Huntingtonuses functionsin the Montesquieusense
of executive,legislative, and judicialonly-a definition thatmodernsystemsanalysis
no longerfindsmeaningful. Nonetheless, the contrastbetweenEurope and America
in thiscontextis strikingif takenalong the two dimensionsof sovereignty (power)
and autonomy(function).By dividingpower,institutional autonomyis createdauto-
matically.
23 Thus, forinstance, Friedrichwrites,"The subjectand methodof politicalscience
cannoteasilybe characterized. Its subjectis naturallythe 'state,'but we must not
read more into thisthanwhat is meantby the English 'government.' We are here
concernedwith the formsof rule (Herrschaft).Everymetaphysical attemptto ab-
solutizethe conceptof stateis in conflictwith this approach.. . . A metaphysical
absolute cannot be the object of criticalempiricalinvestigation"(Carl Joachim
Friedrich,Der Verfassungsstaatder Neuzeit [BerlinI953], Introduction, i). See the
similar characterization in Friedrich, Demokratie als Herrschafts-und Lebensform
(HeidelbergI959), I2. Here the problemis "solved"by attributing to the statethe
"steeringand leadingof the businessof the community. The stateis necessary,since
otherwiseno communitycan conductits businessadequately."Accordingto the
analysisput forwardin the presentarticle,however,the administration of societyis
preciselythe typeof universalization
applicableto the conceptof the Europeanstate;
government in Britainmakes far fewerclaims.Even the Parsonianformulation of
politicsas goal-attainment
is more modestthan any claim to "manage the business"
of society.

and itsrolehas alwayspresented

legislature
traditional difficulties
for
of theconceptof state.It is probably
theoperationalization no ex-
aggerationto saythatcountrieswithtraditions of stateness attempt,
moreor less adequately,to incorporate theirlegislatures withinit,
whilethosethatsettleforgovernment naturally excludeit. This is
clearwhenwe lookatthehistory oftheGermanlegislatures sincei87I
andtheextent towhichtheywerepressured toregardthemselves, and
in largepartdid regardthemselves,as a fundamental component of
thestate.The sameproblem has also existedin France,at leastuntil
I958-though it maybe arguedthatit stillremains partiallyunsolved
oftheFifthRepublic.
evenintheconstitution In Italy,too,theinclusive
incorporates
conceptof statealmostcertainly thelegislature. In Eng-
land,of course,theproblem hardlyarisesbecauseof thecurious, sig-
anduniquerole-change
nificant, involved inthetransposition ofelected
throughthe mediation
intomembersof a government
representatives
ofparty, ofwhichwe shallhavemoreto saylater.
Finallyin thisconnection, it is worthpointing outtheinfluence of
thehistoricaldevelopment ofa strongly notionofstateon
articulated
processesandstructuresofdissent. It isnocoincidence that"antisystem"
movements have moreeasilybeenable to developin societies with
stronglydeveloped states-even thoughthebasisofdissent hasbeenas
muchreligiousand socioeconomic as merelypolitical.Antisystem
oppositionsweremoststrongly markedin WeimarGermany, France,
andItaly,bothfromRightandLeft,and leasteffective or leaststruc-
in theUnitedStatesand Britain.24
turallyarticulated The notionof
stateaccordinglyappearstoprovide a convenient and polarizing means
complementary
ofdisidentification tothefrequently postulated Hegelian
notionof identificationwiththestatewhichwe shalldiscussin the
nextsection.Politicalmovements of dissentappearto focuson the
stateas theobjectof disaffection and are thusindirect evidencefor
thevariablenessof thedevelopment of statenessin differentsocieties.
The problemis well documented, notonlyby theactualhistory of
extreme right-andleft-wing parties, increasinglyfocusing on dissocia-
tionfromthestatewhiledemanding incorporationin (if not,indeed,
exclusive of) nation,butalsobythedifficulties
representation experi-
encedbyMarxhimself in tyingin theconceptof statewithhis class
concerns. The notionthat"themodernstatepoweris merelya com-
24This suggeststhe queryas to whetherNeil Smelser'sveryAmericanTheoryof
CollectiveBehavior(New York i963), with its carefullytended "levels" of action
levels of social analysis,would be meaningfulat all in a
replicatingthe different
societywith a strongstate,whose "politicization" of actionis structured
quite dif-
ferentlyand polarizesto extremesmuch more rapidly.

572 WORLD POLITICS
mitteewhichmanagesthecommonbusinessof thebourgeoisie" is
one of thehistorically
leastadequategeneralizations thatMarxever
made.Moreover, he amended itlater:"After every revolution marking
a progressive
phasein theclassstruggle,thepurely repressivecharacter
ofstatepowerstandsoutinboldrelief" already suggestsa shifttoward
therecognitionofgreaterstateautonomy, whileEngels'statement that
"thestatepresupposesthepublicpowerofcoercion separatedfromthe
aggregatebodyof itsmembers" soundsverymuchmorelikeWeber
thanMarx-oranymodern politicalscientist
in searchofa definition
ofuniqueness.25Moreover, Marxpartially lostinterestin theproblem
of thestatewhenhe movedintellectually as well as physicallyfrom
EuropetoEnglandandwhen,inwriting Das Kapital,he concentrated
on themuchmore"English"analysis of economic forcesand conse-
quentclassrelationsratherthanon theproblems of ideological con-
and
sciousness revolution in a state-dominated Europe.26 As is well
known,he evenwentso faras to excludeEnglandand theUnited
Statesfromanypostulated ofviolentoverthrow
necessity of thestate
precisely
becausetherewas no stateas suchto overthrow, becauseof
theessentially
transformatorynatureoftherelevant institutions.
When
Leninfacedthisproblemin I9I7 in Stateand Revolution,
he optedfor
the hard and destructive
path-simplybecausehe himselfwas faced
by a "hard" statewhose autonomouspower was far more real and
obstructive
thanthatof anyorganizedclass"committee" in accordance
withthetraditionalmodeofMarxistthinking.
THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION
Thereis no need to traceoutherethevariousintellectualand philo-

sophicalideas about the statein which Germanyhas played such a
leading part over the last I50 years.The extentof the intellectual
traditionof thestatein Germanthinkingcan well be summarizedby
highlighting theextremes of itsrange,itsintrusion
intoeventhemost
individualisticapproachto socialproblems-thatof psychoanalysis.
In
a discussionof WilhelmReich,who attemptedto build a politically
revolutionary systemof ideas out of Freudianmethodsand insights,
theultimatesubordination ofeventhispositionto a powerfultradition
has been well capturedin the generalaphorismthat "no German
everescapesHegel, [even] a GermanMarxistis suspectof sayingMarx
25 Karl Marx,The Paris
Commune(New York 1920), 70-7I; FriedrichEngels,The
Originof theFamily,PrivateProperty
and the State,firstpub. i884 (Chicago I902),
II5-i6.
26For an analysisof this shiftin orientation,
see particularly
Eugene Kamenka,
The EthicalFoundationsof Marxism(New York 7962), 38-47,57-59,62-69.

whenhe meansHegel."27 The importance ofHegelin thisconnection
is notonlythathe summarizesas wellas fathers
an intellectual
tradi-
tionofhighlyarticulate
and totalstateness,
in whichtheconceptof
stateis givensupreme butthathe transforms
saliency, thecoldnotion
of legal and political sovereignty into a "warm"-if not "hot"-
culturalconceptof self-identification and, indeed,affectfor the state.
WhatHegel did in an idealizedand philosophicalconcept,Freud later
perfected in muchmorepersonalterms.The basic power of the state
forhim restedon love-with hypnoticand eroticovertones. The state
becomesa transfer and extension, in termsof socialprogress, fromthe
relationship betweenchildrenand parentsin a familyto the relation-
ship of subjectsand statein society.In jumpingstraightfromHegel
to Freud,theobjecthereis merelyto short-circuit an enormousspan of
intellectualinfluences thatcannotreallybe traceddirectly backtoHegel
at all. The suffusion of Germanthinkingwith the conceptof state,
and thearticulation of the stateas the quintessential sociologicalphe-
nomenon of modernitythrough the writingsof historianslike
Treitschke and Meinecke,neednotbe spelledoutin detail;in referring
to Hegel, we are merelyencapsulatinga widespreadand dominant
intellectualtraditionwhich by no means adopts his particularphe-
nomenologyor dialecticalformof analysis.28
The difference as well as thelogicalconnectionbetweensovereignty
and statetakeson a veryspecialaspectin thiscontext.The intellectual
existenceof notionsof sovereignty, as well as theiridentification with
thefundamental orderofanypolity,is commonto thewholeEuropean
traditionand constitutes one of its historical-intellectual
peculiarities:
theidea accompaniedcloselyby the reality.The notionof state,how-
ever,does notfollowlogicallyor necessarily fromthe notionof sover-
eignty.While on the Europeancontinentthisidentification did take
place in thethinkingof philosophers of politicsand history, it did not
do so in Englandor theUnitedStates.In Englandtheintellectual tradi-
tionidentified sovereignty with a particularinstitution-Crown, then
Crownin Parliament-mediatedin moredemocratictimesby the in-
tervention of electionsat least once everyfiveyears.Thus while the
locus of legal sovereignty has remainedunchangedfor nearlythree
hundredyears,it has been politicallychallengedby the appearanceof
effectivelyinstitutionalizedpublicopinionthroughelectionsand,above
all,politicalparties.The need to pin down effective loci of sovereignty,
PhilipRieff,The Triumphof the Therapeutic(London i966), I53.
27
Some of thesethemesare highlightedin the variouscontributions
28
to Lubasz,
Developmentof the ModernState.

574 WORLD POLITICS
whichstillpreoccupies writers and students ofhistory and politicsin

England,is in itself of a
symptomatic stateless society.The saliencyof
sovereignty problems seemstopredicate a battery oflegalfictions and
a divorce between legalandpolitical structures in theeffectiveexercise
ofgovernment, all ofwhichareexorcised by the"collapse"of sover-
eignty intotheconcrete structuralformsof a statewheresuchexists.
In theUnitedStates theintellectual tradition ofcopingwithsovereignty
hasbeentodenyitsexistence altogether; in practiceonlylaw is sover-
eign,and probably the"function" of sovereignty can indeedbestbe
takenas beingfulfilled and institutionalized by the law. It is once
moreclearthatthisbranching-off of variousparticularizations of
sovereignty intodifferent structures or concepts, ofwhichthestateis
merely one,suggests a variableofgreater or lesserimportance in dif-
ferent societies.In a sensethehistorical development of statenessand
theintellectual concern withtheconcept ofstatedo notcoincide neatly.
Thereare societies withstrongly articulated intellectualtraditions
of
stateness buta feebleandineffective state-forexample, Italy.
It is herethattheidentification ofstateand nationas a historically
determined phenomenon, specifiedand limitedin time,becomes
relevant. The waveofnationalaspirations aftertheFirstWorldWar,
bywhichpreviously submerged peoplesin thelast"leftover" empires
ofEuropeattempted togainnational parity withtheadvancednation-
statesofFrance,Britain, and Germany, did notfollowtheFriedrich
rulein which states
existing bringforth effectivenations. Instead,these
newlyindependent nationssimplyadoptedtheconceptand practice
ofstatetostructure theirnewlywonindependence, whosemainclaim
forexistence restedon ethnicdiscontinuities made apparentby the
collapseoftheformer imperialpowerofRussiaandAustria-Hungary.
If anything, thestatewas empirically and conceptually moremean-
ingfulinthenonnational circumstances oftheoldRussianEmpireand
theAustro-Hungarian monarchy. The newde factoindependence of
thesuccessor stateswas concretized in termsof an autonomous and
self-sufficientgovernment. The importance ofthissubstantial addition
to thegenerality ofstates, and henceto thestreamof Europeanstate
traditions andexperiences, whichbeganwiththeBalkanwarsof 1912
andendedin i919, is tobe foundnotin anydevelopment ofthecon-
ceptofstateor thepractice of statehood, butmerely in thesynthetic
orartificial appropriation ofa goingconceptandpractice forpurposes
ofdotting thei's and crossing thet'sof a newlyrealizednationalin-
dependence. Far frombeinga development and extension ofan estab-
lishedEuropeanintellectual and historical tradition, the creationof

thesenewstates openedthefirst chapter in thedeclineoftheusefulness
of thestateconcept, to whichwe shallrevertin SectionV-the be-
ginningof theend.By thistimetheconceptof statewas becoming
inanimate and abstract, merelya collective noun summarizing the
effectivegovernment ofan independent nationand thecreation of an
international diplomatic persona.
We mustdistinguish here,however,betweeninanimateness and
depersonalization. The concept ofstatein thefullness oftheEuropean
intellectualandhistorical tradition had a lifeand character ofitsown
which,as we haveseen,wascapableofaffect as wellas effect-whereas
itsinanimate superimposition on a nationtendedto turnit intoa
formalabstraction, something technically necessary and no more.At
thesametime,however, the essenceof the conceptwas alwaysits
impersonal nature;thestatewasnevertobe whollyidentified withthe
individualsholding powerwithin it.Thisisperhaps themostimportant
ofall thedifferences between thosepolitical traditions
thatincorporate
thenotionof stateand thosethatdo not.Therehas alwaysbeena
strong element ofpersonal identificationwithgovernment in England;
thenotionof"thegovernment" is onlymeaningful by answering the
question,Whatorwhosegovernment?-whether thisbe themonarch
ora modern teamofparty-based ministers. In theEuropeantradition,
thedevelopment ofthenotionofstatebrokethepersonal identification
oftheoldernotionofsovereignty. The antipoliticalimpactofGerman
thinking in thecontext of statemeanta longperiodof dislikeand
fearforthenotionof a dominant politicalparty,letalonepartygov-
ernment, resting as thisdid on assumptions of partisanand electoral
victories.
ThewholeideaoftheGrandCoalition, whichhassurvived all
thepoliticalvicissitudes of thelasthundredyears,is in factnothing
buta negationof partyand partisanship in contradistinctionto the
unifying andall-incorporating concept ofthestate.29
We finda verysimilarnotionof depersonalization in Frenchand
Italiantraditions ofthestate,eventhough inthelatter casethestateis a
differentratherthana superior dimension of politicallife.Thus in
France, De Gaulle'sconstitution attempted toseparate theareaofstate
29The historyof thisview of partisanpoliticalpartiesin Germanyand elsewhere
in relationto the totality
of thestateis well documented in ErwinFaul, "Verfemung,
Duldungund Anerkennung des Parteiwesens in der Geschichtedes politischen Denk-
ens,"PolitischeVierteliahresschrift,
v, No. i (i964), 6o-8o.The cutting-off of ruling
groupsfromtheirpoliticalroots throughthe leftoverdemandsof antipoliticaluni-
versality,
coupledwith the declinein the meaningfulness of the traditionalGerman
conceptof statesince I945, helps to explainthe sense of loss and fearfulisolation
of therulingelitesin West Germany.For thissee Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaftund
Demokratiein Deutschland(Munich i965); and WolfgangZapf, Wandlungender
deutschen Elite:Ein Zirkulationsmodelldeutscher Ffihrungsgruppen i9i9-1961 (Munich
1965).

576 WORLD POLITICS
actionfromtheintrusive and divisivesystem of partiesby assigning

to eacha separateand clear-cutsphere of action.In bothFranceand
Italy,as wellas Germany, therealrefugeofdistinct and autonomous
statenormsand attitudes, as well as thegrowthof correspondingly
distinct hasbeenin thedevelopment
collectivities, ofthestatebureauc-
in theseareasthatthelatestgeneration
racy.It isprecisely ofEuropean
stateshas failedto makeanycontribution. The i9i8 successor states,
withthepossibleexceptions of Czechoslovakia and Poland,failedon
thewholetoproducea superordinate stateindependent offactionalor
partypolitics,andevenin thesetwocountries theintegrativeforceof
nationalwaysdominated overthatof state.Second,the tentatively
totalitariansystemsof Germany or Italyin a sensedowngraded the
concept evenmore;einyolk,einReich,
ofstate einFlihrer leftnoroom
forthestateinthishierarchy Theearlyemphasis
ofloyalties. onstate
in theNaziperiod wassoonquietly playeddown;Reichcametobe
viewed rather
astheterritorial thangovernmental complement toyolk,
whilethegovernmental aspectwasencapsulatedbyFfihrer. In spiteof
moreorthodox
Mussolini's offascism
articulation as a stateideology,
thefactheretooisthat,
contrary tothenowdeclining science
political
concept so
oftotalitarianism much in vogue ten or fifteenyears ago,
itmeansanything-has
totalitarianism-if strong connotations ofper-
sonalrather or stateleadership.30
thaninstitutionalized One of the
very thatreally
fewdictatorships didenhance thestrength ofthestate
as suchwasGetulio Vargas'EstadoNovoin Brazilbetween I930 and
I945.
The wholenotionof rationality through whichMax Weberhas

linked modernity statehood
andeffective makessenseonlyinthecon-
text Therationality
ofsuchdepersonalization.31 ofmodern bureaucracy
generated;
is internally insofaras itattains orcom-
a levelofbalance
promise between interests
conflicting in thetransformatorysenseof
American suchimpartiality
socialscience, fromandaddi-
is separate
tionalto theimportant phenomenon of autonomy whichwe have
already discussed. Weber
In thiscontext followsthetendencyofMarx
todissociatestatefromclassin thecourse ofthedevelopment ofhis
30 For Italy, see, inter alia, Giovanni Gentile, Che cosa e il
fascismo (Rome I925);
Dante L. Germino, The Italian Fascist Party in Power: A Study in Totalitarian Rule
(New York 1959). Some very illuminating comments on the institutionalDarwinism
and irrelevance of formal state structuresin Nazi Germany are made by David
Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany I933-I939,
(New York I966). For the vicissitudesof the concept of totalitarianismin American
political science, see Herbert J. Spiro, "Totalitarianism: Critique of a Concept," Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York i968).
31See Weber, Staatssoziologie (Berlin i956).

thinking.In a sense,theoperationalization
of Marx'sidea of revolution
by Lenin fromi9I7 onwardis an implicitrecognitionof the deper-
sonalizationof the state and the separationof the assault on, and
captureof, the state,on one hand, and the subsequentand separate
destruction rulingclasseson the other.
of the antagonistic
THE CULTURAL TRADITION
The culturaldimensionof stateness is largeand diffuse, and we can

do no moreherethanto pointup some of the main features. Perhaps
the mostobviousis the simplelinguisticarticulation of personalcon-
sciousnessof the statein variouseverydaysituations. The normallan-
guage of politics-and,indeed,the expressionof a citizen'scognitive
experience-utilizesthe word "state"in its identification and inter-
relationof variousobjects.It will readilybe obviousjust how variable
a phenomenonthisis when we rememberthata frontier is a Staats-
grenze in German,the confinedello stato in Italian,but merelya
frontier in English-speaking and othercountries.Similarly, the official
who exercisesjurisdictionat the frontieris immediatelyidentifiable
as a stateofficial in Germanyand Italy,Her Majesty'sServantin Eng-
land, and is without any particularidentification in many other
countries.
Indeed,probablythe only commonusage in Englishof the word
"state"is in connectionwith the conceptof welfarestate-a recent
phenomenonand one moreoverthat has slightlypejorativeor at
least ironicalovertones.It impliesa distinctrelaxationof individual
autonomyand decision-making, the acceptanceof prioritiesand de-
cisionson one'sown behalfby an outsidecollectivity ofwhichone feels
not a constituent but merelya recipientpart,by which the notionof
societyis partlycollapsedintothatof state.In any case,itsuse in Eng-
lish is in a distinctly and sectorallyeconomicsenseonly; it does not
replace the more deeply anchoredculturalstatelessness of English
politicsand societyas a whole.
The way to approachthis problemis simplyto inquire to what
extentnotionsof statehave becomeincorporated in the thinkingand
actionsof individualcitizensin different societies.In Italyand France,
the stateis instantlyrecognizableas an area of autonomousaction,
parallelto otherspheresof economy,religion,family,and so on. In
Germany, too,thereis someofthisautonomy, thoughas we have seen,
it is, as in France,strongly linkedto notionsof supremacyand super-
ordination.In England,it would be on the whole difficult to findan
agreeddefinitionat all, while in the United States,the word has a

578 WORLD POLITICS
precisebut totallydifferent meaningin contradistinction to its Euro-

pean meaning-namely,theresidualarea of regionalgovernment and
territory. Insofaras thereis any salientnotion of autonomyin the
area of centralgovernment, thereit is sometimescharacterized by the
term"UnitedStates":"GovernorresistsUnited intervention...."
States
It would notbe overtly difficultto quantifytherelativeculturalimpact
of notionsof stateon individualsby asking specificquestionscross-
nationally.In all probability we would findthatresponsesthatspecify
"state"in certaincountrieswould specifyquite different termsand
structures in others.This raisesa problemof functionalsubstitution
thatwe shall deal within SectionIV.32
There is of courseno need to relyonly on a positiveorientation
towardthestateas evidenceof a high degreeof stateness. The salient
negativeattitudes towardthestate,as in Italy,and thewhole antipathy
to e'tatisme in countrieslike Belgium,and formerly in France among
thebusinesscommunity, are bothevidenceof a high levelof stateness
in the individualcognitionwithinthesesocieties.As alreadypointed
out,thesaliencyofstateis positively correlatedwithtendenciesto well-
structured and
dissociation is thus a distinctfactorof both integration
and disintegration, whereassocietiesthat do not have a stronglyde-
velopedconceptof statehave to managetheirproblemsof integration
and controlin more informal,sociallyconsensualways. Where they
succeedin diffusing a high degreeof internalizednorms,the articula-
tionof dissentaccordingly findsit farharderto structure itselfeffec-
tively.Statenessas a socioculturalphenomenonaccordinglyoperates
as a variablein thecontextof formalor informalmechanismsof both
nonnativecontroland its complement, normativedissent.33
The natureofthestateconcept,as well as itsquantitative presencein
any society,can conceivably be conceptualizedin variouswaysby the
attemptto developspecifically culturalvariablesin a politicalcontext.
We have elsewherearguedforthe use of the variable"constitutional-
elitist."Though thisanalysisdoes not specifically deal with stateness
as such,it does focus on the formalizationand saliencyof distinct
politicalstructures, theirmeaningfulness and accuraterepresentation
of cleavagesand processes, on the one hand (a constitutional culture),
32 An example of a very preciseculturalinternalizationof the notion of state
is foundin Israel.Becauseof the interveningand unique conceptof country(aretz)
in commonusage, the state (medinat) becomesmerelythe active institutionalized
principleof autonomousauthority, while government(memshalah)is the temporary,
party-based incumbent.
that thisproblemis touchedupon, but nevermade explicit,in
33It is interesting
the culturalanalysisof Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
(PrincetonI963).

and,on theother, an informal,partly irrelevant setofpolitical institu-

tionsthatareexpendable in terms ofelitistdomination through means
otherthantheformal structure
political (elitistculture).To someex-
tentthisis a function oftheinstitutionalization and differentiation of
subsystems in society,as opposedto the relativecompression and
undifferentiatednessofthesocialsystem.34 It is clearthatin thepresent
contexta constitutionalcultureis linkedto thedevelopment andcrys-
tallization whilean elitistcultureis less likelyto have
of stateness,
developed and viablestatetradition.
a distinct
Reference maybe madein thisconnection to theUSSR,wherethe
Sovietstatehas playeda veryimportant rolein thedevelopment of
Sovietsociety. Butit,too,is notin themainstream of theEuropean
statetradition.ManyoftheSovietstate's apparent integrative functions
werealwaysin facthandledbytheparty-adistinct and autonomous
structurewhosesubordination to thestatehas beenstrongly resisted.
Insofaras thethreshold ofautonomy whichwe havespecified as neces-
saryforanyadequatedefinition of stateis metin theUSSR, it is in
thecontext of partyand notstateat all. Moreover, thephenomenon
of theSovietstatehas alwaysbeenacceptedas a strictly temporary,
eventhoughlong-term, concession to a hostileworldof other,non-
socialist
states.Finally,theimportant development of Sovietcitizen-
ship,as superordinate to and separatefromethniccommunities, has
notbeenachievedby thecreation of theSovietstateas such,but,as
in theAmerican case,bythecrystallization of a status, an additional
factorofidentification withina socialsystem. It is as irrevocablytied
to theSovietwayof lifeas American citizenship is to theAmerican
wayoflife-rather thantoidentification withthestatetoutcourt. Thus
theprocessofliberalization in thelastfifteen yearshas largelytaken
placeat theexpenseoftheSovietstate, whilein thePeoples'Democra-
ciesithas to thebenefit ofthestateat theexpenseoftheparty.
IV
orthesaliency
Ifstateness, ofthestate,in different
societies
is indeed
a quantitative a usefulwayofspecifying
variable, itsimportance is by
functional
analysis:Whatfunctions does thestateserve,and,in its
howarethosefunctions
absence, servedin othersocieties?
THE PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATION
In societies
witha tradition
ofstate,
theprovisionofcentral
adminis-
trationwill be carriedout by thestate.In Englandthereobviously
34See J.P. Nettl,PoliticalMobilization(New York i967), esp. chap. 3.

580 WORLD POLITICS
also existsa well-developed formof centraladministration, but it is

a muchmoreautonomously institutionalized
collectivity in its own
right.Itsautonomy is an attribute ofa casteratherthantheadminis-
trativeemanation ofthestate.Thisleadstoall kindsofimportant con-
sequences.Foronething, objectivecriteria
ofcompetence havedeveloped
onlyveryslowlyin Britain, becausetheproblemof function within
anylarger collectivity
likethestatehasnotbeenraised.Internal values
andnormshavenotcrystallized as partofanyphilosophy ofstateand
havenotbeenencapsulated withinanysuchlargerbodyofideasand
norms,buthavebeenallowedto developendogamously as it were.
Whereasthecountries witha highdegreeofstateness in Europehave
regardedcentraladministration as a sectoral,specific,even unique
problem andhavedeveloped techniques forthispurpose, sucha prob-
lem of autonomy or uniqueness has notarisenin theUnitedStates
orinBritain. In theUnitedStates, theproblem ofbureaucratic efficiency
andrationalization hasbeensharedbetween businessandgovernment;
thelatter hasborrowed morefromthepioneering workoftheformer
thanviceversa.It isperhaps significant
thattheflowering ofAmerican
writing on problems of administration beganand reacheditshighest
development withthetreatment ofthebusinesscorporation. In Britain,
theproblemofbureaucracy has beenlargelyignoredaltogether; the
self-sufficient
casteof theCivilServicehasbeencontent to regardad-
ministration as an unspecific and highlypragmatic formof problem-
solvingwhichhasneither required theimport oftechniques fromthe
outsidenorhadtobe related toanysectoral oruniqueareaofconcerns
calledstateadministration, as in Franceand Germany. Anycompara-
tivestudyofvaluesandattitudes ofwell-developed statebureaucracies
in Europe,on theonehand,and oftheadministration in theUnited
StatesandtheCivilService in England,on theother, wouldhighlight
thesedifferences.35
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereigntypresentsno problemin countrieswithwell-developed

traditions
of statesincetheone is identical
withtheother.We have
alreadyreferredto theconflict
betweenthedevelopment of'stateness
and a genuinelyfederalsystem.In England,sovereignty
is a problem
ofpeculiardifficulty-hence
theendlesslegal-political
debateas to its
residuallocus.The pointaboutthestatein thiscontextis thatit is
overtand obviates anylegalfictions.
35For some of thesedifferences,
see the discussionin F. MorsteinMarx, The Ad-
ministrative
State: An Introduction
to Bureaucracy(Chicago I957).

In empiricalterms,the existenceof a strongstatehas considerable

effect on thedevelopment of parties.It can be shownthatwherestates
exist,partiestendlargelyto be theinstitutionalization ofsocialcleavage
-and thisusuallymeans a multiparty system.Where no stateexists,
however,partiescarrya muchlargerfunctionalweight.They become
enginesof authority-legitimation (not now providedby the state);
wherethis is the case the structured articulationof interestsand/or
cleavagesin partytermsis inhibited.36 This suggeststhatin England
we mustlook to partiesas substituting forthe legitimacy functionof
the state.The argumentmightbe summarizedby statingthat the
weightof legitimacyof the statefalls on election-winning partiesin
thiscase,withtheresultant needofa closelystructured, well-disciplined,
and strongpartysystemto preventwhatwould otherwise be a vacuum.
A similarstrength is functionallyrequiredin single-party or hegemonic
partysystems liketheUSSR and thePeoples'Democracies, whichclaim
if
paritywith, notpriority over,thestate.Accordingly, thequantitative
variableofstateness has considerableinfluence on theformand strength
of parties.
It is important, however,to avoid any simpleidentification between
theexistenceof a state,on theone hand,and thedevelopment of effec-
tive and stablesovereignty on the other.In spite of the intellectual
problemofidentifying an adequatelocusofsovereign powerin societies
thatdo nothave a well-developed state,thereis no empiricalproblem
of sovereignty in mostof thesecountries. Though the development of
absolutemonarchy was defeatedin England,checkedand stalemated in
Sweden,and nevertook place in the United States,neitherEngland
nor Sweden has ever attemptedto institutionalize any divisionof
power,nor does government in eitherlack the resourcesof sovereign
power. It is historicallyinaccurateto identifythe developmentof
effectivegovernmental powerwithanytransfer ofundiminished power
fromsovereignrulerto state.It is equally unhistoricalto correlate
societieswith a high degreeof statenessas authoritarian-i.e., unable
to developanyadequatestructural meansforarticulating interests.
On
thecontrary, it can be arguedthatpreciselythe absenceof a statealso
prevents thepoliticalarticulationof socialcleavage,as theshorthistory
of newlyindependent countriesclearlyshows.Such articulation is one
possibleway of defininga parliamentary democracy. The veryabsence
of thestatehas oftenbeen largelyresponsible fortransforming parties
36For an extensionof thisargumentsee Nettl,chaps.5 and 6. See also Lipsetand
Rokkan.

582 WORLD POLITICS
of representation
intovehiclesof government
in societieslike England
and Sweden.37
SECTORAL AUTONOMY
Apartfromany connotations of sovereignty,we have seen thatthe

conceptof stateimpliesa distincttendencytowardsectoralautonomy.
This, too, is institutionalized in variousways. The rules of central
administration, the creationof differentiatedmeans of adjudicationin
mattersappertaining to the autonomousareas of the state(quite dis-
tinctfromany claimsof sovereignty forcentrallyadministered law),
even the divisionof economicactivitiesinto distinctstateand private
sectorsare all evidenceof a high degreeof stateness.I-tis perhapsbest
to highlighttheseproblemsby pointingout the mannerin which
theyare handledin societieslike Britainand the United Stateswhere
no stateas suchhas reallydeveloped.
Britainhas, as everyoneknows,resistedthe developmentof any
distinctadministrative law. The adjudicationof mattersappertaining
to thestateis subjectto the normalstatuteand common law. Insofar
as theactionofthecentraladministration is protected
fromsurveillance
by the normalcourts,it is the resultof emphasison the sovereign's
exemption fromthejurisdiction ofthecourtsratherthanof anysectoral
autonomyexpressedthroughspecialrules,procedures,and courts.In
addition,theremovalof jurisdiction fromthe courtsin manycasesof
government regulationis the resultof specificrefusalof judicial re-
courseby Act of Parliament.The growingtendencyto proliferate
administrative tribunalsof a quasi-legalkind is no exceptionto this
rule,sincesuch tribunalsoperatenot as judicialbodies specializingin
theapplicationof a distinctsectorof rulesappertainingto administra-
tion,but merelyas ad hoc "courts"dealing with a particularfunc-
tionalarea of problems,in which factsare argued but decisionsare
discretionary and notboundby anyfirmsetofrules.The "state"is not
in itselfa partyto suchproceedings, merelyitsindividualagentsacting
as independent personae.In otherwords,thesetribunalsare more ac-
curately organsofsocialinterest adjudicationand conflictmanagement
tackedon to the enforcement of government regulationsthan courts
applyinglegal rules.
Similarly,the underlyingassumptionsand attitudesabout many
proceduresin Britainshow clearlythe lack of sectoralautonomyas
far as the governmentis concerned.In Germany and Italy, the
autonomyof stateactivities has remainedremarkably untouchedeven
87 See Huntington,
4II, for the contraryidentification
of statelessnesswith de-
mocracy.

in thepostwar "modernization" of society-what is nowoftencalled,

in Erhard's phrase, "dieformierte Gesellschaft." It doesnotmatter for
thispurposewhether thestatesectoris largeor small;thepointis
thatit is autonomous. In France,thesuccessful extension of thespirit
ofplanification sinceI945 has drawna wholeseriesofindividuals and
institutional representatives fromindustry, thetradeunions,localgov-
ernment, and so on,intoad hoc stateadvisory bodies;in boththeir
function and theirroletheseactas emanations of thestateand have
thusbeenincorporated in whathas beena rapidlygrowingarea of
thestate'ssectoral concerns. In Britain, however-inspiteof thevery
largeextension of governmental initiative-the independence of the
advisory orconsultative bodieshasremained largely untouched. These
bodiesspeakforthemselves ortheirinterests; theyarenotstateorgani-
zations,and consequently the function-andaboveall the role-of
governmental agenciesin decision-making continueslargelyas a
negotiating andconflict-resolving rather thanan initiating andautono-
mousone.Thisneednotbe takenas evidencethatgovernment inter-
ventionis ultimately anylesseffective. Procedurally, the absenceof
genuinely autonomous areasof stateactivity makesforslownessin
decision-making anda tendency fora greatvariety ofcommissions and
inquiriestoprestructure a suitable climate ofopinion.Butthecohesive-
nessofsociety compensates forthelackof stateautonomy. Normsof
socialresponsibility are strongly implanted in thosewho are chosen
to guidethegovernment-indeed, onlysuitably socializedindividuals
areusuallychosento serveon commissions and committees, and even
wherethechoiceofrepresentatives is in thehandsof therepresented
body(tradeassociations, tradeunions,and such) therole-expectations
are clearlyspelledout in termsof potentialeffectiveness (viz., the
annualnegotiations betweenthe Ministry of Agriculture and the
Farmers' Unionoversubsidized farmprices).38
The sociointellectual consciousness of responsibility norms,strongly
markedin anyelitistsociety, largelycompensates forthe absenceof
anyaccepted areaofautonomous stateaction.Moreover, autonomy and
sovereignty inthisrespect appearas polaropposites; as we havealready
pointedout,thedeeplyanchoredacceptance of governmental sover-
eignty,together withthedeferential classstructure ofsociety, inhibits
as well as compensates forthe absenceof any conceptof stateau-
tonomy."9 Stateness maywellbe a qualitydeveloping in societieswith
88Forthesenegotiations,
see PeterSelf and H. Storing,The State and the Farmer
(London i962).
" For the dominantsocial model of the civil servicefor other institutionalized
suchas thebusinesscommunity,
interests see J. P. Nettl,"Consensusor Elite Domina-

584 WORLD POLITICS
a tradition
of politically
articulated whileconsensual
classdissensus,
do notin factrequireor developa state."Dividedsocieties
societies
cannotexistwithoutcentralized power;consensual societiescannot
existwithit."40
Thissuggeststhatthestatemay,in sociologicalterms,
be theintegrative of
phenomenon sociopolitical dissensus
typicalfora
certainperiodof historical
development-quite the contrary of the
morefrequent notionof thestateas theepitomeof
and traditional
nationalor societalconsensus.
LAW ENFORCEMENT
The wayin whichtradition in Britainand Americadiverges from

therestofEuropeis wellreflected in thestructureoflegaljurisdictions
and law enforcement. In Europe,the tradition of law is essentially
an emanation ofthestate-orrather, it becameincorporated intothe
statewhenthelatterinstitution "tookover"thesovereign powersof
individualrulers.Thus the law on the Continent has traditionally
beentheprofession of thestatepar excellence. To a greater or lesser
extent,judges,prosecutors, and othersconnected withtheadministra-
tionofjusticeregardthemselves as stateservants;thelaw theyenforce
is a distinct
and,on thewhole,narrowly definedas well as carefully
codified systemintimately connected withthejudicialfunction of the
state.The relationship is pointedup and idealizedby the German
concept ofRechtsstaat.Law as suchhaslittleautonomy ofitsown.
In Britainand America,on theotherhand,the law does have a
good deal of autonomy. Lawyersare a distinct caste,not primarily
connected withthestate(thoughin theUnitedStatesit is probably a
partofthereceived Europeantradition thattraining forand practice
of thelaw shouldalso providea strong, if now declining, recruiting
groundfortheprofession ofgovernment). Butthereis an important
distinctionbetweenEuropeandAmerica:in thelattercasethearticu-
lationofgovernment finds, as we shallsee,primarily legalexpression,
tion: The Case of Business,"PoliticalStudies,xiii (Februaryi965), 22-44. Precisely
thesesecondaryinfluences, togetherwith the ultimatethreatof legislativesovereignty
overriding all claimsof sectoralautonomy, are typicalof a no-statesocietylike Britain.
40 Huntington, 405. In general,much of the precedingargument is similarto that
so forcefully put forwardin Huntington'sarticle.But he treatsthe problemof
consensusand dissensusalong the dimensions of egalitarianversusreligiously,socially,
and sectorallydivided societies.In his view, England, too, qualifiesas a divided
societyrequiringthe impositionof sovereignauthority, while the United States is
the onlyinstanceof a consensualsociety.This is an unwarranted inversionof cause
and effect, a case can certainlybe made for regardingEngland
since sociologically
as vastlymore consensualthan the United States. The argumentin this present
articlesuggestsnot that statenessis a consequenceof dissensusbut that in many
of the earlyinstancesof strongstatesstateness inducesdissensus.The laterimposition
of a stateon dissensualsocietieshas eroded the developmentof the classicalform
of stateness-asin Italy,Belgium,and manyof the post-igi8successorstates.

and legal trainingis therefore professionally In Europethe

functional.
law is simplya vitalpartofthegovernmental profession;theuniversity
coursesin law are sharplydividedbetweengovernmental and com-
mercialcareeravenues,and the formerprovidea legal trainingonly
in a ratherspecialsense.Few cross-national professionshave less to
communicateto each otherthan Anglo-American lawyersand their
Europeancolleagues.Whatdistinguishes AmericanlawyersfromEuro-
pean lawyersis not only that the autonomyof the formeris much
morefirmly institutionalized
in a professional sense,but thatpossible
careeridentifications are not confinedto government, but include
businessand manyotheractivitiesas well. We may thus speak of a
socialpredominance of lawyersin theUnitedStateswhoseself-identity
is intentionally and stronglyprofessional, ratherthan of an identity
thatresultsfromassociationwiththe state.Wherein Europe thereis
a verystrongbreakbetweenwhatmightbe describedas "statelawyers"
(the administration of the law, thecentraladministration, and so on)
and privatelawyers, thisdifferenceis almostnonexistent,eithersocially
orprofessionally,in theUnitedStates.Bothin Englandand in America
privatepracticeleads to thebenchor to government service;in Europe
it does not.
There are of courseimportantdifferences betweenBritainand the
UnitedStates.In Britain,the law on the whole is an inward-looking
profession whoseprofessional autonomyhas been carefullypreserved
at the expenseof functionalintervention in the structureof modern
society;thelaw playsonlya limitedpartin politics,and lawyershave
ceasedtobe particularly prominent therein recenttimes.In theUnited
States,the law and its practitioners have perhapsbeen the mostim-
portantsinglefactormakingforpoliticaland social changeand have
timeand again provedto be the normalinstrument for bringingit
about.Insteadof demonstrating a narrowand self-sufficientinterpreta-
tion of existingrules,which Britishlaw shares with that of the
Continent, Americanlaw has tendedto followclosely,and frequently
to anticipate,major changesin public attitudesand has provideda
vehicleto which a whole proliferation of social thoughtand action
could be hitched.This is too well known to need elaborationhere.4
41 However, the social context of law-making (as opposed to law-interpretation)
is much more clearly accepted in most continental countries. The differencesmight
be schematized as follows:
CONSCIOUS IMPACT OF SOCIAL FACTORS ON LAW
EUROPE BRITAIN U.S.
Law-making(legislature High Low High
under advice)
Law-interpretation(courts) Low Low High

586 WORLD POLITICS
For present purposes it is sufficient

perhapsto suggest that,if we are
interested in thestructural substitutionof differentfunctions in dif-
ferent systems, we shouldperhaps regardthelaw in theUnitedStates
as a strongcandidate formanyofthefunctions ofthestatein European
societies.The UnitedStates-asopposedto thestates, theindividual,
and otherunitscompetingfor sectoralautonomy-articulates its
existence as a legalpersonaprimarily in termsof thearea of federal
law. None of thetransformatory modelsof thepoliticalsystem pro-
liferatedin recentyearsbysocialscientists in Americaappliesto the
law; it is noticeablethatpoliticsand law areheld firmly distinctin
American politicalanalysis, whiletheyare equallyfirmly mergedin
a conceptual sensein Europeand Britain.42 Insofaras stateness is
identifiablein termsof sectoralautonomy, it is withregardto the
law in the UnitedStates.Most important, perhaps,the Hegelian
perspective of incorporation and goal-settingtraditionallyidentified
withthestatein Europealsofallslargelyintothelegalarenain the
UnitedStates.WhereBritishinitiatives are essentially
politicaland
party-based, theirequivalent structural
location in theUnitedStatesis
primarily legal.The proposals maysometimes originatein thepolitical
spherebutneednot;theirultimate legitimation in anycase is legal.
Thustoa considerable extent we mayregardtheproblem offunctional
equivalence in thefollowing terms:continental Europe-state;Britain
-politicalparties;theUnitedStates-thelaw.
SOCIAL GOAL-ATTAINMENT AND REPRESENTATION
Finally,followingthe Parsonianidentificationof politicsas con-

cernedwithgoal-attainment forthesocialsystem,and thestateas the
primary formof thepoliticalsystem, we mustbriefly investigatethe
problem offunctionallocationin societies
withmoreorlessdeveloped
notionsofstate.Thisquestionis nottautological,
sinceit maywellbe
arguedthatevenin countries witha highlevelof stateness thestate
doesnotnecessarilyact as thestructuralquintessence
of thepolitical
42 The breakingup of a
receivedcontinental
Europeantraditionof law in an un-
suitableAmericanenvironment, to whichreferencehas alreadybeen made, can also
be shown in this context.Law is taughtseparately-evencontradictorily-in the
UnitedStatesby law schoolsin the autonomous, indigenoustraditionand by political
sciencedepartments in a vestigialformof the importedEuropean,mainlyGerman,
tradition-muchdislikedby the lawyers.An illuminating discussionof ideologically
conditioned approachesto the studyof law outsidelaw schoolsis GlendonSchubert,
"Ideologiesand Attitudes,Academicand Judicial," Journalof Politics,xxix (February
I967), 3-40; and "AcademicIdeology and the Study of Adjudication,"American
PoliticalScienceReview,LXI (March I967), i06-29. The divisionis into threetypes
of approach:conventional (law, history,
philosophy);traditional(economics,political
science,sociology);behavioral(psychology, anthropology).

system and therefore doesnotnecessarily fulfileithergoal-settingor

goal-attainment functions.The evidence of stateconservatism in Ger-
manyand Italyis verystrong;perhapsonlythelimitedarea of the
autonomous sectorstatein thesesocieties has facilitatedthedevelop-
mentof otherpoliticalstructures forgoal-setting.PostwarGerman
maybe saidtohaveattained
society itsdesiredgoalsofstability,pros-
perity,and politicalbalancemainlythroughthe shrinking of state
sinceI945; Adenauerand Erhard,like Guizot,reactedto
initiatives
theexcessivepreponderance ofthestatein thepreceding revolutionary
periodwitha deliberate de-emphasis of stateinitiatives-enrichissez-
vous!This,ofcourse, haslefttheconcept ofstateas suchunimpaired
butpartiallyincapable offinding concreteapplicationin termsofstruc-
turesorprocess. Recently, thisverydifferencebetweentheconceptual
overarching qualityofstateness and itslimitedapplication in practice
hasproduced a socioculturalgapandhasgivenrisetodisquiet(hence,
perhaps,theattempted GrandCoalitionas a mechanism ofreinforce-
ment).In Italy,similarly,thestatehasceasedtoprovide theinitiative
of
goal-attainment,butpoliticaltradition
hastended toinhibit thedevelop-
mentofpoliticalalternatives.43In France,however, thestatedoesap-
pearto haveadapteditself, notwithout a nearupheaval,to someof
thegoal-setting requirements of a modernsociety.
The wholeconceptof statemightwellproveto be temporally de-
termined; thetraditional Europeannotionof stateand itsstructural
applicationinpractice maynotbe adequateforthetasksofgoal-setting
and goal-attainment in a modern, fullyindustrialized society."This
mayparticularly be thecaseif theareaof autonomy tendsto remain
43For thissee theenviousdiscussion ofpossibleforeignmodels,particularly England,
in TempiModerni(publishedby CentroItalianodi Ricerchee Documentazione),VIII
(October-December i965), special issue on democracyand industrialization.
44It could be argued in this contextthat a distinction should be made between
the notionof an industrialsociety,which is perfectly capable of development under
the aegis of state-dominated social goal-attainment for nationalistic purposes,and a
consumer-oriented societywhere industrialization is primarilyrelatedto, and con-
cernedwith, the satisfaction of individualconsumptionwants. Both are formsof
industrialization, but the formeris capableof being dominatedby the state-indeed,
the Sovietmodelprovidesthe preeminent case of stateguidancefor industrialization
withoutdominantconsumerperspectives, and similarorientations can be deduced
fromthe industrializing philosophyof late nineteenth-century Japan,Germany,and
even Russia.But a mass consumption society-andparticularly its culturalstructur-
ing rightthroughsocietyto the workingclasses-maynot be a suitableor success-
ful contextfor a dominantstate.In societieswith such goals, the state may be
confinedto regulatingconflicting interestsand possiblyto the provisionof the com-
plementaryinfrastructure of education,road-building, nature conservation, public
utilities,and so on. It is in many ways easier for a nonstategovernment, as in
Englandand theUnitedStates,to intervene thanit is fora strongly articulatedstate-
especially if and whena shiftin socialgoals towarda redistribution of resourcestoward
thepoorerclassestakesplace.

588 WORLD POLITICS
frozenin size, if autonomydominatesthe effectiveapplicationof

sovereignty, and, above all, if it inhibitsthe developmentof adequate
politicalstructures for goal-attainment purposes.The historicalrela-
tionshipof the politicalsystemsin Europe with the statehas been
thatof representation in a narrowsense; theEuropeanstatehas lived
easilywithpoliticalpartiesonlyas long as thesewereprimarily repre-
sentativeofparticularinterests and did notattemptto questionor take
over the legitimacyand goal-attainment functionsof the stateitself.
Hence the developmentof two-party systemsfor authoritative goal-
attainment purposesmightcreateseriousdifficulties forthe traditional
state(GermanysinceI945). It is not,of course,arguedthatAmerican,
British,or evenSovietde-emphasis of theprimacyof thestate,or even
of the existenceof stateness, is in itselfnecessarilyconduciveto more
effectivegoal-attainment. It is ratherthatthe absenceof a potentially
inhibitingtraditionof statenessmay make the developmentof func-
tional political prerequisitesfor goal-attainment easier and more
flexible.
This analysistherefore suggeststhat the variabledevelopmentof
statenessin differentsocietiesis a crucialfactorin specifyingthenature
of thosesocieties'politics.One fruitful way of definingpolitics(and,
incidentally,of settlingone of themostdifficult definitionalproblems
in thewhole processof sociopoliticalanalysis)is to characterize it as
theone socialarea ofnormlessness-where theveryprocessof actionis
concernednot withimplementation of,or deviationfrom,established
normsbut with the businessof establishing normsin the firstplace.
Such a conceptionnecessarily postulatesa vacuum thatcontenders-
in the formof politicalpartiesor othergroups-attemptto fillwith
the normsthat theycompetitively offeras legitimatefor the whole
society.But if the area in questionis alreadyfilledwith a set of state
normsor evenstatemorality, thisnorm-creating functionof politicsis
necessarilyinhibited;all thatcan be leftis thearticulation of interests.
This is necessarilya lower"level" of politics.45
Withoutjudgingpreferentially betweenthesetwo formsof politics
45The cross-cutting problemof moralityin the articulationof values and norms
based on different demographic, economic,and structuralfactorsin societyis well
pointedup in the work of Maria Ossowska,the widow of StanislawOssowskiand
herselfa distinguishedphilosopher-sociologist. See particularlyPodstawa nauki
moralnosci[The basis of moral norms] (Warsaw 1946) and Sociologia moralnosci
[The sociologyof morals] (Warsaw i964).
In a sense,similarproblemsare raised by BernardCrick,In Defence of Politics
(London i962). Crick pleads for a normativeratherthan an interest-based politics,
and implicitin his definition
is theneed to contendforthe rightto supplyhigh-level
normative articulationthroughand in the politicalprocess.

atthispoint,it mustbe clearthatanyattempt to attainsocialgoals
through thedevelopment and legitimationof a setofpoliticalnorms
in a society raisesdoubtsas to thepossibilityof developing a viable
statein suchcircumstances. The veryinstability of governments in
developing countriessuggeststhatthecompetition fornormsis very
strong.A statecouldtherefore developonlyif a politically
supported
regimeremains in powerfora considerable timeand is ableto trans-
poseitsownnormsacrossthehighthreshold oftimeandinternaliza-
tionoflegitimacy intoa situationof stateness,
withinwhichinterests
can eventually be articulatedand institutionalizedby cleavagestruc-
tures.All thecurrent evidencefromthethirdworldis tothecontrary;
thepoliticalareaofnormlessness is largeand evident,and hencethe
of
possibility developing statesof theEuropeantypein today'snew
nationsseemsremote.
V
It is worthnotingthatthenotionofstatehasnot,in fact,takenroot
in today'sdeveloping countries.Insofaras a deliberatesearchforade-
quatepolitical modelsfromtheexperience ofdeveloped countries has
takenplace,it has led to theadoptionof,and emphasis on, parties.
Leavingasidethegeneralquestionof therelevance of theEuropean
politicalexperience fordeveloping countries,the evidencesuggests
thatwherea state-party dichotomy exists,
theemphasis is morestrongly
on party.46 Evenin theso-calledno-party states,runlargelyby the
military or at leastsubjectto ultimate militarycontrol,therehas been
littleattempt to manufacture a concept ofthedominant state.Rather,
theemphasishas beenon nation-whatmightbe described as the
national-constitutional structure.In this regard,Britishexperience
seemsto predominate overthatofEurope-perhaps partly becauseof
thepreponderance of theBritishcolonialexperience. Even thehigh
pointoftheFrenchrationalist tradition
amongFrench-speaking Afri-
canscanhardly be saidtohavepickedon thestateas thequintessential
formof thedesirable Europeanexperience; indeed,thewaveof left-
wingandFrench-inspired politicalthoughtin Africa,whichhas any-
how ebbedbeforethehardfactsof traditional socialstructure and
political instabilityin thedeveloping world,tendedvisibly to moveat
a levelof abstraction beyondthatof "mere"politicalinstitutions and
concerned itselfwiththephilosophical orientationsofFrenchthought
ratherthantheconcrete formof Frenchexperience.47 In short,the
46The evidenceforthisis surveyedin Nettl,Political Mobilization.
47For this,see Aimee LeSaire,Discours sur le colonialisme (Paris 1955); Gabriel
d'Arboussier,
L'Ajrique vers l'unite (Paris i96i). The journalPre'sence Africaine in

590 WORLD POLITICS
traditionandideasoftheEuropeanstatedo notfigure substantially in

theideas,programs, or concrete developments of today'sthirdworld.
Apartfromthequestionofdeliberate borrowing, whichhas played
quitean important partin thedevelopment ofsociopolitical ideasand
theirapplication in developing countries, thereare probablygood
reasonswhyno ideaofstateis likelyto developfromtheincreasingly
uniqueand particular politicalexperience of thesecountries. As they
developtheirown autonomous traditions in copingwiththeirpar-
ticularproblems, whichin turnare veryunlikethoseof historical
Europe,it seemsimprobable thatanyadequateconceptof statewill
appear.The Europeanexperience of stateness was essentially the
product ofa particularizationor narrowing of sovereignty into ethni-
callyhomogeneous orat leastethnically defined areas.The transforma-
tionofpostmedieval sovereigntyintostateness andnationality has,with
someexceptions suchas Austriaand Russia,generally resulted in an
overallshrinking ofsignificant and
territoriality in all cases in a nar-
rowingof potential references-the almostboundless Europeanhori-
zons availableto thosefewwho brokeout of the parochialism of
isolatedgeographical communities up totheendoftheeighteenth cen-
turygavewayto thespecificity of nationalreferences sharedby all.
The process canbe described as an implosion-with all theincreasing
intensityimpliedby thatword.Onlythe SovietUnionhas been a
deviantcase,in thatthe Sovietstateis essentially theproductof a
supranationalterritory,and Sovietcitizenship runscounterto ethnic
communalism. But,as has beenarguedabove,the Sovietstatedoes
nothavethefullconnotations of theEuropeantraditions, and many
of itsfunctionsarevestedin thesingleCommunist party.
Developing countries, ontheotherhand,havein common theexten-
sion of centralauthority acrossethnicboundariesand particular,
hitherto"sovereign" communities. The colonialexperience was notin
itself
productive of nationhood, except in a dissociative or antipathetic
senseofopposition toforeign domination. The realincorporation into
newunitsofthearbitrary areascarvedup bycolonialpowersfollowed
anddidnotprecedetheattainment ofindependence. The process here
was one of explosion, in whichtheconcentration of powerresulting
fromantipathy to colonialrule,structured successfully eitherthrough
politicalindependence partiesor disciplined military-political insur-
rectionary organizations,was thenappliedto the new "inherited"
the 1950's specializedin thiskind of topic.A generaldiscussionis found in Ruth

Schachter Morgenthau, WestAfrica(OxfordI964).
PoliticalPartiesin French-speaking

territory-thenationtrouve'e.48
The metaphor accuratelydirects
atten-
tionto theopposingnotionsof inwardconcentration and outward
extensionandhencescattering ofenergy. Obviously theoppositemove-
mentofenergy in thetwoexperiences is hardlylikelyto giveriseto
thesamephenomenon ofstate.
Thereremains onlytheoneconstant-the invariant development of
stateness
foreachnationalactorin theinternational field.New and
developing nationshavesoughtself-definition, integration,
and even
domestic viability
by emphasizing theirinternational roleand-they
hope-status. Butthishardlysuggests evidence ofthedevelopment of
theEuropeantypesofstateswe havebeendiscussing. If anything,
the
contraryis true:whiletheEuropeantradition is oneofstatenessboth
intrasocietally
andextrasocietallyandoftherelationship between these
twoaspects, thedevelopment ofa purelyor evenmainlyextrasocietal
formof state,whichconstitutes and defines itselfprimarilythrough
itsforeign relations,
is likelyto giveriseto something verydifferent
fromthe receivedEuropeantradition. For instance,personalismo
regimesat home,suchas Cuba or Egypt,aremediatedin interesting
waysby the intervention of statenessand its apparatus-including
regionalpactsor blocs,and UnitedNationsdelegations-in theinter-
nationalfield.
VI
The concept ofstate,thoughpresent in moreor lessmarginal form
in nearlyall sociopolitical
analysistoday,has notlentitselfreadilyto
adequateconceptualization in accordance withthe requirements of
modern theory or analysis.
Apartfromthefactthata hostof merely
definitionalproblems exist,attempts at universaldefinitionsuchas
Weber'sraisetheadditional problemthatvisiblythenotionof state
is lessevident in certainWestern traditions Insofaras
thanin others.
anyonehas beenawareof thisfact,it has usuallybeentreatedin a
footnote, or as a problemof semantics. As a rule,politicalscientists
and sociologists havetreatedthestatesimplyas thegeneralarea of
central government in contradistinction
to society.49
This articlehas suggested thatmoreor less statenessis a useful
variableforcomparing Westernsocietiesand thatthe absenceor
48 For thissee Nettl,PoliticalMobilization,
and PartII, "The Inheritance
Situation,"
in Nettland Robertson.
49 "Politicalsciencestartswith a stateand examineshow it affects society,while
politicalsociologystartswith a societyand examineshow it affectsthe state,i.e.,
theformalinstitutions and exerciseof power" (ReinhardBendix
for the distribution
and SeymourMartinLipset,"PoliticalSociology:An Essayand Bibliography," Current
Sociology,vI [ I957], 87).

592 WORLD POLITICS
presence of a well-developed conceptof staterelatesto and identifies

important empirical differencesin thesesocieties.
Firstthemeaningof
theconcept ofstateandofa highincidence ofstatenesswas discussed.
Then theinfluence of differencesat variousinstitutional,intellectual,
andcultural levelswasidentified fromcertain distinct
intellectualand
historicaltraditions in Europeand America.The consequences of
differentlevelsofstateness,as wellas thedifferentialincidence ofthe
constitutingcomponents ofstateness in varioussocieties,
werepointed
up. To highlight theproblem, a sketchfora functional comparison
between differentsocieties
withvariablelevelsofstateness was under-
taken,in whichthealternative structures formeetingfunctional ex-
igenciesinsocietiesoflowincidence ofstatenesswerediscussed.Finally
an attempt wasmadetoputthewholeconcept ofstatein itshistorical
settingand to examinebriefly thecontemporary and future relevance
ofthe concept to modern societiesand to developingcountries today.


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The State as a Conceptual Variable

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

spelloutin fulldetailthisblurring of theedgesbetweenstateon the

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

pointup theneedforan adequatestatein nonnational circumstances.7

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centuries, got along verywell withoutany nativetheoryof the state

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

Ifthenotionofstateistobe atall meaningful, andnotmerely a ragbag

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

(whichis thesubjectofthisarticle),therehavein thepastbeenfew

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

in anyempirical situation,therehas to be a subjective internalization

Perhapsthemostremarkable factorin theconcretization of state-

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countries thatweredividedlongafterFranceand Englandhad been

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itsabsence-orrather hasbeentransformed intoa verydifferent mean-

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

divisionof power,whileEuropedevelopeda differentiationof func-

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and itsrolehas alwayspresented

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

Thereis no need to traceoutherethevariousintellectualand philo-

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whichstillpreoccupies writers and students ofhistory and politicsin

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This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

actionfromtheintrusive and divisivesystem of partiesby assigning

The wholenotionof rationality through whichMax Weberhas

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

The culturaldimensionof stateness is largeand diffuse, and we can

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precisebut totallydifferent meaningin contradistinction to its Euro-

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and,on theother, an informal,partly irrelevant setofpolitical institu-

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

also existsa well-developed formof centraladministration, but it is

Sovereigntypresentsno problemin countrieswithwell-developed

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In empiricalterms,the existenceof a strongstatehas considerable

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Apartfromany connotations of sovereignty,we have seen thatthe

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in thepostwar "modernization" of society-what is nowoftencalled,

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The wayin whichtradition in Britainand Americadiverges from

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and legal trainingis therefore professionally In Europethe

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For present purposes it is sufficient

Finally,followingthe Parsonianidentificationof politicsas con-

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system and therefore doesnotnecessarily fulfileithergoal-settingor

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frozenin size, if autonomydominatesthe effectiveapplicationof

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM

This content downloaded from 14.139.125.180 on Sun, 24 Nov 2013 04:32:15 AM