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AFM 1

THE INFORMATION GN IN

THIS DOCUMENT
IS NOT TO BE COMMUNICATED EITHER DECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO ANY PERSON
NOT
NIGERIAN AIR FORCE
BASIC AIR POWER
DOCTRINE

FIFTH EDITION
November 2021
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AFM 1
RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGES CHANGED BY
Serial Date Rank and Name Signature Date

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

RECORD OF CHANGES ......................................................................................................................................iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................iv
FOREWORD ......................................................................................................................................................vi
PREFACE ...........................................................................................................................................................ix
CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................................................ 1
OVERVIEW OF DOCTRINE ................................................................................................................................. 1
BASIC TENETS OF NAF DOCTRINE................................................................................................................. 5
TYPES AND LEVELS OF DOCTRINE ................................................................................................................. 6
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE ...................................................................................................................... 9
CHAPTER 2 ...................................................................................................................................................... 14
NATURE OF CONFLICT AND WARFARE ........................................................................................................... 14
DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................... 14
SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT .......................................................................... 15
TYPES OF CONFLICTS .................................................................................................................................. 16
THE NATURE OF WAR ................................................................................................................................. 19
LEVELS OF WARFARE .................................................................................................................................. 20
PRINCIPLES OF WAR ................................................................................................................................... 22
STYLES OF WARFARE .................................................................................................................................. 26
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ................................................................................................................... 27
CHAPTER 3 ...................................................................................................................................................... 30
THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE AND NATIONAL DEFENCE ..................................................................................... 30
INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER ........................................................................................................ 30
DEFENCE POLICY OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................................... 31
ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE ...................................................................... 32
CHAPTER 4 ...................................................................................................................................................... 34
AIR POWER ..................................................................................................................................................... 34
DEFINITION ................................................................................................................................................. 34
CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER .............................................................................................................. 34
AIR POWER AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR ................................................................................................ 42
APPLICATIONS OF AIR POWER.................................................................................................................... 43
EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS .................................................................................................................... 48
TRENDS IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER.......................................................................................... 49

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AIR-MINDEDNESS ....................................................................................................................................... 51
CHAPTER 5 ...................................................................................................................................................... 52
FUNDAMENTAL ROLES AND KEY ENABLERS OF AIR POWER ......................................................................... 52
ROLE 1: CONTROL OF THE AIR .................................................................................................................... 53
ROLE 2: ATTACK....................................................................................................................................... 57
ROLE 3: AIR MOBILITY ............................................................................................................................. 63
ROLE 4: INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE ................................................................ 67
ENABLING ROLE 1: FORCE PROTECTION ................................................................................................... 69
ENABLING ROLE 2: FORCE SUSTAINMENT................................................................................................ 73
CHAPTER 6 ...................................................................................................................................................... 76
AIR POWER DEFINITIONS AND TERMS ........................................................................................................... 76
DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................... 76
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................. 94

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FOREWORD

The role of air power, when appropriately

applied, in bringing a conflict to a quick, decisive
and favourable conclusion has been universally
and firmly established. The nature of
contemporary conflicts, characterized by the
involvement of non-state actors, irregular warfare
and diffuse battlespaces, coupled with the
proliferation of dual-use resources in information
technology and unmanned aircraft systems
necessitates an innovative employment of air
power.

This in turn requires a thorough

understanding of the tenets of air power; its strengths as well as weaknesses.
This NAF Basic Air Power Doctrine AFM 1, which is in its fifth edition, is the
NAF’s capstone doctrine promulgated for the sole purpose of expounding and
promoting the understanding of the application and employment of air power in
addressing current and emerging threats to our national security.

Its understanding, and assimilation, is essential for developing and

promoting air mindedness amongst all personnel. Hence, I encourage all
personnel, irrespective of their specialty, to study it, believe in it and practice
the enduring principles stated therein

IO AMAO
Air Marshal
November 2021 Chief of the Air Staff

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This publication draws doctrinal materials extensively from publications from

the United States Air Force, Royal Air Force, the Royal Canadian Air Force,
the Royal Australian Air Force, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

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PREFACE

1. The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was established primarily to provide the
nation with the air power needed to defend the territorial integrity of Nigeria
and meet her international commitments. The primary objective of the Air
Force is to win battles by air – to gain and maintain control of the theatre of
operation and/or to take actions immediately and directly against an enemy’s
war fighting capacity. As a critical element of the interdependent land-naval-
air force synergy, air power can be the decisive force in warfare. All
components of NAF air resources must therefore constantly be in a position
to operate and apply air power for most efficient and effective results.

2. The three most essential instruments that enable best practices in the
application of air power by the NAF are its professional and specialist
trainings, equipment of the Force, and Air Force doctrines. This Basic Air
Power Doctrine (BAPD) which is the foundational doctrine is the link between
Nigeria’s national security framework and the methods of application of air
power resources by the NAF. It presents an overview of the fundamentals of
air power and nature of conflicts.

3. As at the time of this review, doctrinal manuals on 14 air power

subjects to guide the conduct of operations by the NAF have been published,
while work is on-going on a few more. The doctrines that have been
published are:

a. NAF Operations and Planning Doctrine (AFM 1 – OP).

b. NAF Command and Control Doctrine (AFM 1 – CC).
c. NAF Targeting Operations Doctrine (AFM 1 – TO).

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d. NAF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Doctrine (AFM

1 – ISR).
e. NAF Irregular Warfare Doctrine (AFM 1 – IW).
f. NAF Counter Air Operations Doctrine (AFM 1 – CA).
g. NAF Counter Land Operations Doctrine (AFM 1 – CL).
h. NAF Counter Sea Operations Doctrine (AFM 1 – CS).
i. NAF Air Mobility Doctrine (AFM 1 – AM).
j. NAF Force Sustainment Doctrine (AFM 1 - FS).
k. NAF Force Protection Doctrine (AFM 1 – FP).
l. NAF Legal Support for Air Ops Doctrine (AFM 1 – LSAO).
m. NAF Medical Support Doctrine (AFM 1 – MS).
n. NAF Unmanned Aircraft Systems Employment Doctrine (AFM 1-
UAS).

All airmen as well as stakeholders in the employment of air power are

enjoined to take full advantage of these publications in the task of fulfilling
national security obligations.

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CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW OF DOCTRINE

“At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central

beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is
of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by
experience, which lays the pattern for the utilization of men,
equipment and tactics. It is the building material for strategy
and is fundamental to sound judgement”.

- General Curtis Lemay

At the very heart of

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Doctrine can be viewed as the basis for institutional teaching;

fundamental philosophy of an organisation’s internal ways of doing
business. Since our business is primarily war, military doctrine translates to
advanced teaching of the fundamental beliefs on the subject of war; from
its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. In its simplest form,
military doctrine can be defined as the “fundamental principles by which
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national
objectives”

1.2. Accordingly, military doctrine must do more than merely record what
happened in the past. It must reflect a vision of a future, in order to shape
the manner in which we organize, train, equip and sustain forces and
ultimately fight. It prepares us for future uncertainties and combined with our
basic shared core values, provides a common set of understanding upon
which those who practise the art of war base their decisions. Our doctrine
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does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations but

establishes general guidance that requires judgement in application.
Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.

1.3. Specifically, this doctrine, espouses the beliefs and principles,

which adequately describe and guide the proper use of air power in military
action. It offers a conceptual framework for the best way to prepare and
employ air assets including its organization, training, equipment and
logistics.

1.4. The development of air power doctrine (Figure 1.1) is a process

derived from the accumulation of knowledge, which is gained primarily from
the study and analysis of experiences - actual combat operations as well as
tests, exercises or manoeuvres. In other words, what has usually worked
best. In those less frequent instances where experience is lacking or difficult
to acquire (theatre nuclear operations, for example), doctrine may be
developed through analysis or postulated actions. It is also influenced by
advancement in technology. Yet they enable commanders at all levels to
work in synergy for the attainment of the overall objective along a
suggested course of action. However, doctrine when rigidly interpreted
runs the risk of becoming dogmatic. According to JFC Fuller, “adherence
to dogma has destroyed more armies and cost more battles than
anything in war”. This notwithstanding, doctrine should never be static.

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Fig 1.1: Air Power Doctrine Development.

1.5. It should be noted that doctrine should be relevant for the past,
present and future (Fig 1.2) in the following ways:

a. The Timeless Intellectual Nature. The timeless intellectual

nature implies the enduring tenets, lessons from history and
experiences embodied in the principles of war.

b. The Practical and Dynamic Nature. The practical and

dynamic nature takes those timeless elements, interprets and applies
them in the light of current circumstances.

c. The Predictive Nature. The predictive nature takes

cognizance of the current elements, the trends in operations,
technology and potential for future warfare in order to apply them to
force development. The absence of a particular capability from our
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air force does not invalidate the doctrinal relevance of that role; it
simply means that we could fit in when the capability is inducted.

Fig 1.2: Nature of Air Power Doctrine.

In this aspect, doctrine enables a subordinate to act in accordance with his

commander’s recommended course of action and support the larger
scheme of operations even when he is unable to communicate with his
superiors.

1.6. Because of the complexity of modern warfare, there is a significant

degree of interdependence between the Services. Combat operations in any
one environment - air, land or sea - may facilitate and provide direct support
to operations in the other environments. While major operations may
invariably be joint or combined, the contribution of the single-Service is the
foundation on which those operations will depend. The development of
specialist single-Service way of fighting through an appropriate doctrine
remains a pre-requisite to the conduct of joint operations in the Nigerian
Armed Forces.

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1.7. An understanding of the relationship of basic doctrine to defence

strategy and the force structuring process is crucial. The key distinction is
that while doctrine should be a factor in the development of the national
defence strategy and force structure, it needs not necessarily be an
overriding determinant. Defence strategy can and do change and different
countries have different strategies. Only by possessing a deep knowledge
of the full range of capabilities their particular form of combat power can
generate, can military professionals properly advise senior commanders
and government. The key to that knowledge is strategic doctrine.

BASIC TENETS OF NAF DOCTRINE

1.8. The NAF primary mission is the defence of the Nation by air; hence,
our air power is designed to ensure the protection of Nigeria’s territorial
integrity, vital economic assets and other critical interests. Consequently,
evolution and formulation of doctrinal guideline for the employment of NAF
assets are rooted in the Service’s operational history while keeping in
view the experiences of others. NAF experiences span the Nigerian Civil
War, ECOMOG operations, border conflicts with the Republics of Chad and
Cameroon. Others include Exercise SEA DOG, TAKUTE EKPE, OLOGUN
META as well as Operations PULO SHIELD, ZAMAN LAFIYA, LAFIYA
DOLE, HADIN KAI and other counter insurgency and counter terrorism
operations. It is based on all the foregoing that the NAF doctrine of air
operations is predicated on 3 fundamental beliefs:

a. The NAF can best be employed in accordance with the

principles of Unity of Command, Centralisation of Control and
Decentralisation of Execution.

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b. The best employment of the NAF is in the offensive.

c. Control of the air is essential to the successful conduct of

combat operations.

TYPES AND LEVELS OF DOCTRINE

1.9. There are 3 types of doctrines:

a. Service Doctrines. Service doctrines describe Service

competencies and guide the application of air power resources.

b. Joint Doctrine. Joint doctrine describes the best way to

integrate and employ air resources with surface forces in military
actions.

c. Multinational Doctrine. Multinational doctrine describes the

best way to integrate and employ our air force with the forces of our
allies in combined operations. See Fig 1.3.

Fig 1.3: The Dimensions of Military Doctrine

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1.10. The Service doctrines cover the full spectrum of conflict and place
the utility of air power at 3 different levels and depth of details. These are
the strategic, operational and tactical doctrine. (Fig 1.4)

a. Strategic Doctrine. Doctrine at the military-strategic level of

war, also referred to as the capstone doctrine, is at the pinnacle of the
Service doctrine hierarchy. For the NAF, this is the Basic Air Power
Doctrine (BAPD) already introduced. It is the fundamental philosophy
for the employment of Nigeria’s air power, establishing the basic
framework and foundation in pursuit of National objectives. In
general, the NAF BAPD contains:

(1). The fundamental beliefs of the NAF.

(2). A set of endorsed principles for the guidance of NAF

commanders contemplating the use of air power or directing the
employment of air assets in operations.

(3). The basis for joint and multinational doctrines.

(4). The basis for operational and tactical level air power
doctrines.

There are 2 significant characteristics of basic doctrine. The first is

the almost timeless nature of basic doctrine. It seldom changes
because it deals with basic concepts rather than contemporary
techniques. The second characteristic, which is really the basis of
the first, is that it is relatively insensitive to political philosophy or
technological change.

b. Operational Doctrine. Operational doctrine applies the

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principles of basic doctrine to military actions by describing the use of

forces in the context of force capabilities, mission types and
operational environments. Operational doctrine describes the
organization necessary for the effective use of assets. It also
anticipates the changes and influences that might affect future
operations. Advances in technology might be one of those influences.
It provides the focus for developing the missions and tasks that must
be executed through tactical doctrine. It is expressed through
organizational arrangement and campaign planning.

c. Tactical Doctrine. Tactical doctrine applies strategic and

operational doctrines to military actions by describing the proper use
of specific weapons system and other types of system to achieve
detailed objectives. Tactical doctrine deals with the execution of
roles and tasks and can be found in the units’ Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs).

Fig 1.4: Levels of Doctrine

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1.11. Inter-relationship of the 3 Levels of Air Power Doctrine. The 3

levels of air power doctrine are neither mutually exclusive nor rigidly
limited to precise boundaries. The example a t T a b l e 1 . 1 helps to
illustrate their inter-relationship.

Table 1.1: Inter-relationship between the 3 Levels of Doctrine

DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

1.12. The Doctrine Loop. A doctrine is formulated on the basis of inputs.

The output would then provide the framework within which viable military
capability can be developed. These capabilities would require validation
through peace-time exercises or war experiences so that the feedback could
be employed to further refine the doctrine. The doctrinal loop is pictorially
depicted below. (Fig 1.5).

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Fig 1.5: T he Doctrine Loop

1.13. Factors Affecting Doctrine Development. There are a number of

factors that influence development of doctrine. While some derive from
higher national policy, others derive from feedback gotten in the process
of operationalizing doctrine. These factors, depending on their interaction
with doctrine, could either be input factors or output factors. The input
factors are national interest and national military objective, perceived threat,
politics/policies and experience. Others are theories and lessons of war,
current combat and training results. Output factors include education,
organization, force structure, training requirements and plans. These factors
are discussed below:

a. The National Interest and National Military Objective. The

military is an instrument of state power. The use of the military will,
therefore, be guided by the national interests and military objectives.
The resources available for defence and the national strategic aim in
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event of conflict will also influence such objectives.

b. The Perceived Threat. Operational doctrine depends on

a clear and concise assessment of the threat posed by a potential
adversary. However, threat is dynamic and a change in the intent
and/or capability of the adversary could negate the relevance of
doctrine and could well demand a rapid reassessment and change
in the doctrine.

c. Politics/Policies. The wishes of the Government are

paramount in a democratic setting where the Armed Forces are subject
to civil control. Changes to political structures, security policies, foreign
policies and defence policy of a government will have an influence
on doctrine.

d. Experience. As illustrated previously, the lessons from

history are fundamental ingredients in the formulation of doctrine.

e. Theory and Lessons of War. The writings of strategists

and theorists continue to influence doctrine. For example, study of the
writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini remain useful in any
study of conflict. Specifically, with regards to air power, the writings of
Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell and Warden explain the historical
formulation of air power doctrine. This does not mean that one
theory fits all scenarios. History shows that every conflict will be
different and hence offers different lessons for the future.

f. Current Combat. Lessons learnt from actual combat are

important for doctrine development. However, forces do not
necessarily have to be in combat for important lessons to be obtained.
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Analysis of the outcomes from combat involving other countries who

employ equipment and doctrine similar to one’s own could produce
important lessons. Obviously, lessons drawn from combat in which
one’s own forces are involved may be more relevant but may be
learned at a greater cost.

g. Training Results. The results of training exercises can be

used to validate and refine doctrine at all levels. There should always
be lessons learnt from training, whether in the classroom or during
field exercises, that would form an input for formulation of future
doctrine.

h. Education. Study of previous conflicts and the utilization

of air power produce better commanders in conflict and war. All
persons involved with the command, planning and execution of air
operations should continue this personal preparation. Once doctrine
has been formulated, it will have a continuous effect and impact on
the routine operations of all forces.

i. Organization and Force Structure. Organization of the

NAF must be a clear reflection of national military objectives and
how those objectives will be achieved. Force structure is best defined
as the “combat-capable part of a military organization, which describes
how military personnel, and their weapons and equipment, are
organised for the operations, missions and tasks expected from them
by the particular doctrine of the Service or demanded by the
environment of the conflict.” 1 This is based on government defence

1Moran, Michael, Modern Military Force Structures, October 26, 2006, Council on Foreign
Relations
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policy, capability analysis, capability options, acquisition options and

national resource capacity.

j. Training Requirements. Training must be an accurate

reflection of doctrine. Training requirements should therefore derive
directly from doctrine.

L-39 ZA, NAF Basic Trainer Aircraft

k. Plans. Plans are the most specific output of doctrine.

Doctrine informs and influences strategy, hence plans should reflect
current doctrine. However, plans may have to change in response to
the dynamism of context and scenario. At the core of the doctrinal
system is the formation of strategy. To ensure that all elements of
the process are focused on formulating realistic and coherent
strategy, there should be a validation system through feedback.
Accordingly, feedback from changed plans is necessary for doctrine
development.

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CHAPTER 2

NATURE OF CONFLICT AND WARFARE

DEFINITIONS

2.1. Appreciating the nature of conflicts and warfare requires a clear

understanding of the concepts of peace, conflict and war. These are
defined as follows:

a. Peace. Peace is a condition that exists in relations between

groups, classes or states when there is the absence of violence (direct
or indirect) or the threat of violence.

b. Conflict. Conflict, on the other hand is a situation in which

violence is either manifested or peace is threatened. It is a struggle
or clash between contending parties set to impose their will. Although
conflict can take many forms, it is broadly in 2 main categories:

(1) Interest-Based Conflict. A conflict arising from

disputes over trade or resources are interest based; for
example, a dispute related to territory. Such conflicts are
usually amenable to resolution through negotiation. The
resolution of the Nigerian/ Cameroon dispute over the ownership
of the Bakassi Peninsular is an example (The Green Tree
Agreement).

(2) Value-Based Conflict. A conflict arising, for

example, from a dispute related to religious or ethnic antipathy
can be considered value based. Such conflicts tend to be deep-

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rooted and hence generally less amenable to conciliation.

Diplomatic or political attempts at reconciliation are quickly
exhausted; one or both parties are then likely to resort to the
use of force. The Boko Haram insurgency is an example.

c. War. War can be described as the extreme form of

armed conflict, occurring between countries or between different
groups in a country.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

2.2. Conflicts take a wide range of form, constituting a spectrum which

reflects the magnitude of violence involved. The intensity of fighting is
another means by which conflicts can be described. However, description
denoting the level of military deployment can be misleading. Thus, a useful
guide is to assess the intensity by the rate of consumption of men and
materiel. In this way, the measure of intensity can be related to the battle
or campaign, as opposed to the other yardsticks, which may lead to false
deduction about the type of campaign being fought.

2.3. The extent of military involvement will depend on which condition

exists at the time and the level of support necessary. For example, in
peacetime, the military may be needed for disaster relief during absolute
peace, and peace support operations during fragile peace. Similarly, the
military could be used for conflict resolution in conditions of minor conflict
and combat operations in conditions of extreme/armed conflict. Fig 2.1
illustrates a typical range of military operations and conflict continuum. A
broader view of conflict, war and Military Operations Other Than War will
make for better understanding of air power application during these
conflicts.
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Fig. 2.1 The Range of Military Operations and Conflict Continuum

TYPES OF CONFLICTS

2.4. Conflict defies simple categorization. Dividing lines are often blurred,
categories are not exclusive and individual conflicts may spread across
boundaries. Thus, each crisis or conflict needs to be addressed in terms of
its specific circumstances. Conflicts range from general wars to limited
conflicts, regional conflicts, civil war, insurgency and terrorism.

2.5. General War. General war is conflict between major powers in

which their vital interests, perhaps even survival, are at stake. All the
resources of the opposing nations are likely to be harnessed to the war
effort and the conflict is likely to have few restrictions; indeed, it may
become less restricted as it continues. General war might be limited to the

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use of conventional forces initially but could escalate at any time to the
use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In the current strategic
environment, few nations have the capacity to initiate such a war and it
seems likely that there could be a significant period of warning before one
could occur. The last general war was World War II.

2.6. Limited Conflict. During the Cold War, the classification “limited
war” was used to describe international conflict short of general war in
which there would be no recourse to the use of nuclear weapons. In
practice, virtually all conflicts are limited in some way and armed forces
will almost invariably be subjected to constraints, the objectives to be
achieved and the means by which they may be pursued. An example is
the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

2.7. Regional Conflict. The term regional conflict describes a limited

conflict arising out of regional issues. The conflict may be contained within
the region, but the political and economic effects could go beyond the
region as is the case with Libya. There could be involvement from non-
belligerents supplying military equipment, advisers or volunteers. There
might be military intervention under the authority of the United Nations or
regional organizations like it was with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and
Liberia.

2.8. Civil War. Civil war is conducted largely within the boundaries
of a state in which a significant part of the population is associated with
opposing sides. Typically, the outcome would be to determine the
government of a state, regional autonomy or secession. One or both sides
may have external help. Civil war experiences of Nigeria, Angola and that of
Sudan are good examples.
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2.9. Insurgency. Insurgency d e s c r i b e s the actions of a minority

group within a state (or in some instances a majority group which lacks
power) intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of
subversion, propaganda and military pressure. The intent is to persuade
or intimidate a large percentage of the populace to accept such change.
Again, each side may have help from outside. There is no clear distinction
between civil war and insurgency. Indeed, a civil war may pass through a
phase of insurgency. Insurgent forces tend to avoid conventional
engagement with larger forces while seeking the active support of the
population at large. The Boko Haram in NE Nigeria is a typical example.

2.10. Terrorism. Terrorism may be defined as premeditated violence

perpetrated by groups or individuals and usually intended to influence an
audience wider than that of its immediate victims. In one form, terrorism
may be an element of insurgency. In another, it may be employed for
objectives short of the overthrow of the state. It may also be used by one
state against another. Examples include the Boko Haram and ISWAP.

2.11. Hybrid Warfare. The conflict environment continues to be

dynamic. Many contemporary conflicts tend to take place in a hybrid
environment. This is an environment in which high-technology and
conventional capabilities are mixed with irregular tactics. Hybrid Warfare is
basically “a way of synchronizing the range of possible means toward
achieving a desired end, while minimizing the risks associated with direct
military confrontation2.” The ‘means’ here can include deniable military
action, local proxy militias, economic pressure, disinformation, the

2Stephen M. Dayspring, Towards a Theory of Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Conduct of War During
Peace, file:///Users/apple/Downloads/790442.pdf.
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exploitation of social division, etc. against the whole of society of a target

nation to undermine its functioning, unity, or will, in order to achieve national
(or group) objectives 3. Hybrid Warfare can therefore be defined as “the
synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific
vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve
synergistic effects4.”

THE NATURE OF WAR

2.12. Three enduring truths describe the fundamental nature of war: a

political dimension, a human dimension, the existence of uncertainty and the
contest of wills. These truths are described below.

2.13. War as an Instrument of National Policy. War is an Instrument of

National Policy. Victory in war is not measured by casualties inflicted,
battles won or lost, or territory occupied, but by whether or not political
objectives were achieved. Thus, political objectives (one’s own and those of
the adversary) determine both the military objectives and the amount of
effort it requires. Military objectives and operations must support political
objectives and must be coordinated and orchestrated with non-military
instruments of power.

2.14. War is a Complex and Chaotic Human Endeavour. Uncertainty

and unpredictability, when combined with danger, physical stress and

3 Sean Monaghan, Countering Hybrid Warfare: So what for the Future Joint Force?,
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-
2_Monaghan.pdf?ver=2019-09-17-231051-890.
4 Dr. Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, ed, Multinational Capability Development

Campaign: Countering Hybrid Warfare project,s

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human fallibility produce friction, which that makes apparently simple

operations unexpectedly, and sometimes very difficult. This phenomenon
referred to as the ‘fog of war’ can be mitigated through sound doctrine,
leadership, organisation, core personal values, technologies and training.

2.15. War is a Clash of Opposing Wills. An adversary can be highly

unpredictable. War is not waged against an inanimate or static object, but
against a living calculating adversary. Victory results from creating
advantages against thinking adversaries bent on creating their own
advantages. This produces a dynamic interplay of action and reaction in
which the adversary often acts or reacts unexpectedly. While physical
factors are crucial in war; the national will and the leadership are also critical
components of war. The will to prosecute or the will to resist can be
decisive elements.

LEVELS OF WARFARE

2.16. War takes place simultaneously at 3 correlated levels, each with

differing ends, means, characteristics and requirements. These are
strategic, operational and tactical.

a. Strategic Level. The strategic level of war refers to the overall

direction of the war effort and the overarching political objective of
the conflict. It is further broken down ‘Grand Strategic’ and ‘Military
Strategic’ levels.

(1). Grand Strategic Level. Grand Strategic Level refers

to the political dimension of the conflict at the macro level, both
domestically and internationally, and mobilisation of national
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military and non-military resources to support the war effort.

The political dimension relates both to the desired political end-
state, and to domestic considerations enabling the conduct of
hostilities.

(2). Military Strategic Level. The term ‘military strategic’

refers to the military planning and direction of the conflict at the
macro level, that is, setting the desired military end-state and
the broad military approach to achieving that end-state.

b. Operational Level. The Operational level o f w a r is the

level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, directed,
conducted and sustained in order to accomplish military strategic
objectives. The operational level of war is the responsibility of the
Joint Commander (Chief of Joint Operations, DHQ) and the Joint Task
Force Commander (JTFC) once deployed. The operational level of
war is the link between the strategic and tactical levels of war.

c. Tactical Level. The tactical level is the level at which

engagements are planned, u n i t s d i r e c t l y deployed for combat,
and battles are fought. The objectives are unambiguous; like taking a
specific hill with a company, sinking an adversary’s ship and engaging
in air - air combat with an adversary aircraft.

2.17. While this categorisation of armed conflict according to the different

levels at which it is conducted is a useful analytical and control device, in
practice the distinctions may be somewhat blurred. For example:

a. A particular battle may be so critical to a campaign, and the

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campaign so critical to the war aim, that the battle may involve a
merging of the different levels of conflict, reflecting the strategic
implications of even tactical-level engagements.

b. The impact of pervasive media attention may turn a tactical

action into a strategic outcome.

Fig 2.2: Levels of Warfare

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

2.18. The principles of war are maxims about waging war and apply to all
levels of war. In some cases, they overlap and, on first examination, may
appear contradictory. They are not absolute nor is there a standardized list
of principles between nations. Indeed, nations change their principles from
time to time. Unlike the laws of natural science where observance of
certain condition produces a predictable result; or the rules of a game, the
breach of which entails a definite fixed penalty, the Principles of War
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simply represent a series of factors, that successful commanders

considered necessary in the past. Disregarding them involves risk and may
lead to failure. In line with universal maxims, the NAF Principles of War are:

a. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.

b. Offensive Action.
c. Concentration of Force.
d. Economy of Effort.
e. Security.
f. Surprise.
g. Flexibility.
h. Maintenance of Morale.
i. Sustainability.
j. Cooperation.

2.19. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. In the conduct of war

and all military operations, it is essential to select a single, attainable, and
clearly defined aim. Every plan of action at every level for the exploitation of
air power must be tested by the extent to which it contributes to the
achievement of the military aim at the next higher level of command. For
instance, in conducting the Nigerian Civil War, the Federal Government’s
aim was to “Keep Nigeria one”. It follows therefore that:

a. The military objectives must be directed to achieving the

political aim and the intended strategic end- state.

b. Commanders at all levels must know exactly what they are

required to achieve and must make it quite clear to their appropriate
subordinates. They should not waste effort on courses of action
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which do not (directly or indirectly) contribute to the attainment of

their aim.

c. Air tasks, roles and missions must be consistent and coherent

with the overall strategy and campaign plan. This system is known
as strategy-to-tasks.

2.20. Offensive Action. Offensive action confers the initiative, gives

freedom of action, and compels the enemy to be reactive rather than
proactive. It would be virtually impossible to achieve a military aim without
going on the offensive. Although defensive action may be inevitable,
success eventually depends on the offensive use of available forces.

2.21. Concentration of Force. To achieve success in war, it is essential

to concentrate superior force against the adversary at a decisive time and
place. Concentration of sufficient forces to achieve the decisive or most
important task at the time is the cardinal principle in the employment of air
power in war and conflict. Concentration does not mean that forces must be
massed in one place, but rather that they should be deployed in such a way
that an adversary’s threat could be countered, or a decisive blow could be
delivered. This principle may entail the employment of all available forces.

2.22. Economy of Effort. The corollary to concentration of force is

economy of effort. Economy of effort implies that the correct air power
weapon systems need to be matched to the task in what is termed ‘matching
strategy-to-task’. It also implies that forces allocated to task need to be
carefully balanced. Applying air power in ‘penny packets’ cannot have a
significant impact on the issues at hand.

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2.23. Security. Security protects vulnerabilities and vital interests –

denying the enemy the freedom to take the offensive while preserving own
freedom.

2.24. Surprise. The attainment of surprise can achieve result out of

proportion to the effort expended. In air operations, when other factors are
unfavourable to friendly forces, surprise might be essential to achieve
mission success. Air power can achieve surprise strategically,
operationally, tactically or by exploiting new technologies, material or
techniques. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment,
deception, originality, audacity and speed. All these apply to the exploitation
of air power at all levels of military activity.

2.25. Flexibility. Flexibility is one of the prime advantages of air power.

Although the aim might not alter, a commander might be required to
exercise flexibility by modifying plans to meet changing circumstances, take
advantage of fleeting opportunities or shift the main effort of the joint
campaign or air operations. Flexibility demands trust, good training,
organization, discipline, staff work and rapid decision-making when time is
of the essence. To be flexible requires sustainability and a degree of
mobility, which ensures that deployment can take place both rapidly and
economically so that the weight of effort can be altered as required.

2.26. Maintenance of Morale. Success in all forms of war depends

more on morale than on material conditions. Morale is a mental state but
is very sensitive to material conditions. It is based on a clear
understanding of the aim, on training and on discipline and is immediately
responsive to effective leadership. It is adversely affected by inferior or
inefficient equipment and depends to a large degree on sound
administration. Outstanding leadership closely followed by success in battle
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are the main factors that will sustain high morale when all other factors are
against it.

2.27. Sustainability. Sustainability encompasses all aspects of the

physical, moral and spiritual maintenance of a force. Sustainability is more
than logistics; it encompasses all equipment, personnel and industrial
support. As a principle of war, sustainability involves force generation,
deployment, operations, recovery to home base, recuperation and training.
Sustainability is also the ability of a force to maintain the necessary fighting
power, in this case combat air power, for the time needed to achieve military
objectives. The physical and moral sustenance of personnel, the
maintenance and repair of equipment and aircraft, the provision of combat
supplies and expendable commodities and the treatment, evacuation and
replacement of casualties are all aspects of sustainability. Disregarding any
aspect of sustainability could diminish combat power and hence jeopardise
mission success.

2.28. Cooperation. Cooperation entails the coordination of all activities

to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. It is the means
by which concentration of force and economy of effort can be achieved.
Joint action is best achieved by the goodwill and desire to operate at all
levels not only within any one Service but also among national Services and
allied forces. Only by full cooperation among Services can the right balance
of forces be achieved and plans effectively implemented.

STYLES OF WARFARE

2.29. There are 2 distinct styles of warfare recognized by the NAF: attrition
and manoeuvre.

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2.30. Attrition Warfare. Attrition warfare seeks victory through the

cumulative destruction of the adversary’s human and material assets by
superior firepower and technology. The attritionist gauges progress in
quantitative term; battle damage assessment, body count etc. He seeks
battle under any condition, pitting strength against strength to exert the
greatest toll on his adversary. Results are generally proportional to efforts;
greater expenditure yields greater results i.e. greater success demands the
willingness and ability to withstand attrition. Numerical superiority is
necessary for success, thus warfare by attrition is costly.

2.31. Manoeuvre Warfare. Warfare by manoeuvre stems from a desire to

circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage. The
objective is not really to destroy physically, but to shatter the adversary’s
cohesion, organization, command and control, and psychological balance.
Successful manoeuvre depends on the ability to identify and exploit
adversary weaknesses. The approach aims to apply strength against
identified vulnerabilities to achieve surprise, shock and opportunities for
exploitation. Shattering an adversary’s overall cohesion and will to fight,
rather than his materiel is paramount. Accordingly, at the operational level,
the key pursuits of the manoeuvrist approach are:

a. Shape the theatre of operations.

b. Attack the adversary’s cohesion.

c. Protect the cohesion of own force.

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

2.32. The other contemporary type of military operation is Peace Support

Operations (PSO). PSOs are designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a
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long-term political settlement. PSOs are multi-functional operations

conducted impartially in support of an appropriate legal authority involving
military forces, the police, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. Such
operations come under UN charter or regional bodies like AU and
ECOWAS. These include peace keeping, peace enforcement, conflict
prevention, peace-making, peace building and humanitarian operations.

2.33. Peace Keeping. Clearly defined, peace keeping (PK)

operations involve deployment of forces to monitor or implement a peace
or ceasefire agreement. Such operations are generally undertaken under
Chapter VI of UN Charter or regional authorization with the consent of all
the major parties to a conflict. Peace keeping is usually initiated when
there is diplomatic impasse and other mediatory actions fail to resolve a
crisis.

2.34. Peace Enforcement. Peace enforcement (PE) operations are

coercive in nature and undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
when the consent of any of the major parties to the conflict is uncertain.
They are designed to maintain and re-establish peace or enforce the
terms specified in the mandate.

2.35. Conflict Prevention. Conflict prevention activities are

normally conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from
diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to
prevent disputes from escalating into armed-conflicts or spreading. Conflict
prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings,
inspections and monitoring.

2.36 Peace Building. Peace building (PB) covers actions, which

support political, economic, social and military measures and structures

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aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress

the causes of the conflicts. This includes mechanisms to identify and
support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of
confidence and wellbeing and support economic reconstruction.

2.37. Peace Making. Peace making covers the diplomatic activities

conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a
cease fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of
offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressure, isolation and
sanctions.

2.38. Humanitarian Operations. Humanitarian operations are conducted

to relieve human suffering; military humanitarian activities may accompany
or be in support of humanitarian operations conducted by specialized
civilian organizations.

2.39. Strategic Interphase of PSO. Because of the political nature of

PSO and the effects of real time media reporting, strategic considerations
often impact directly to the tactical level. The NAF doctrine in PSO shall
view military activities in a wider multi-functional context, focusing on the
strategic and operational levels. The framework of operations and
principles, together with planning considerations and techniques shall be
based on the political military interface.

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CHAPTER 3

THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

3.1. At the Grand Strategic level, the Federal Government of Nigeria

exercises its instruments of national power to achieve policy goals. The
instruments include:

a. Diplomacy. Diplomacy is the art and science of

maintaining peaceful relationships between nations, groups, or
individuals. Often, diplomacy refers to representatives of different
groups discussing such issues as conflict, trade, the environment,
technology, or maintaining security. 5 It is usually the first instrument
applied to resolve conflicts before recourse to other means.
Diplomacy is often relevant in times of war and could involve
negotiating through a third party. However, the graduated use of
economic or military power often supports diplomatic negotiations.

b. Economy. Trade, investment and aid are economic

instruments that can be used to assert national influence.

c. The Military. The threat or the use of military instrument can

be used to advance national interest.

d. Information. Information is recognized as an instrument of

power not mainly on its own but as part of the aforementioned

5 https:/www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopidia/diplomacy.
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instruments of power. It includes strategic communication, the media

and the entertainment industry amongst others.

DEFENCE POLICY OBJECTIVES

3.2. The o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e of national defence is the protection of

Nigeria’s interests under the ambit of the Constitution. However, economic
realities and overall military capabilities determine the extent to which the
nation’s strategic interests may be defended. The degree of protection that
can be provided is therefore l a r g e l y determined by our foreign policy
objectives. To this end, Nigeria’s Defence Policy objectives are as follows:

a. Protection of Nigeria’s sovereignty, citizens, values, culture,

interests, resources and territory against external threats.

b. Provision of defence as well as strategic advice and information

to government.

c. Promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians.

d. Responses to requests for aid to civil authority.

e. Participation in disaster management and humanitarian relief

operations both at home and abroad.

f. Assistance to government agencies and levels of government

in achieving national goals.

g. Protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside.

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h. Ensuring security and stability in the West African sub-region

through collective security.

i. Participation in bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations.

j. Contribution to international peace and security.

ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE

3.3. The NAF was officially established by a statutory Act of Parliament in

April 1964 to serve four main purposes, namely:

a. To achieve a full complement of the military defence system of

the Federal Republic of Nigeria both in the air and on the ground.

b. To ensure a fast and versatile mobility of the Armed Forces.

c. To provide close support for the ground-based and sea borne

forces in all phases of operations and to ensure the territorial integrity
of a united Nigeria.

d. To give the country the deserved prestige that is invaluable in

international matters.

3.4 In 1994, the Federal Government through the Armed Forces

Amendment Decree 105 added the following roles:

a. Enforcing and assisting in coordinating the enforcement of

international law conventions, practices and customs ascribed or

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accede to by Nigeria relating to aerial or space activities in the Nigerian

air space.

b. Coordinating and enforcing of national and international air laws

acceded or ascribed to by Nigeria.

c. Delineating, demarcating and enforcing all aerial surveys and

security zones of the Nigerian air space.

3.5. In summary, the primary responsibility of the NAF is the defence of

the nation and the protection of vital national economic interests by air.
Accordingly, the NAF shall be employed either singly or jointly with other
Services. Its mission is “to ensure the integrity of the airspace by
gaining and maintaining control of the air while retaining a credible
capacity to fulfil other airpower tasks demanded by national defence
and security imperatives.”

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CHAPTER 4

AIR POWER

“In any modern operation, you can never, never underrate the
use of air power. You either have it or you don’t go into the
operation.”

- Gen Victor Malu

COAS, Oct 2000

DEFINITION

4.1. The key to understanding air power is recognising its ability to create
influence, through both hard and soft power. A variety of military options can
be used to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events.
Although air power can be used independently, it primarily seeks to create
effects and exert an influence through domains, including space and
cyberspace. Air power can thus be defined as “the use of air capabilities
to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events”.

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR POWER

4.2. In comparison to land or sea, the air is a unique fighting

environment. Hence, it presents quite different characteristics in terms of
strengths and limitations to air power as distinct from land and sea powers.
That, in turn means that air power has diverse applications, and demands
specific skills and expertise. Consequently, it generates different types of
ethos amongst its practitioners.

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4.3. The Strengths of Air Power. Air power has the unique ability
to exploit the third dimension above the surface of the earth where the
effects of environmental forces are reduced. As a result, air vehicles are far
faster and have greater reach than naval ships or land vehicles. Thus,
height, speed and reach must be considered as the primary strength of air
power. These primary strengths in turn, act together synergistically to
produce additional strengths, which are ubiquity, flexibility, responsiveness
and concentration.

a. Height. The ability of aircraft to operate at various heights

gives them the ability to observe and dominate activities on the
surface and below the sea. It allows direct fire to be used against all of
the adversary forces, whether or not they are in the front line. It also
permits manoeuvre in 3 rather than just 2 dimensions which is an
important factor in survivability. Height or altitude gives a different
physical perspective. Altitude allows you to see further around the
curvature of the earth giving the sensor of airborne ISTAR assets
range advantage. This also increases the survivability of these High
Value Assets (HVAs) by enabling them to operate from stand-off
positions away from adversary ground and air threats. The ultimate
height advantage for perspective is that of ability to operate from outer
space.

b. Speed. The speed of aircraft allows rapid projection of

military power. Greater speed allows mission to be completed in
shorter times and a larger number of tasks to be completed within a
given period. The absence of obstructions and low resistance to
objects moving through the air, when combined with aerodynamic
design and high-powered engines, enable aircraft to fly at high
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speeds. In terms of strategy, speed facilitates surprise and saves

time. At the tactical level, high speed reduces exposure of aircraft to
hostile fire and thus can increase their survivability in battle.

c. Reach. Reach is the ability to project force or achieve effects

over distance. Aircraft can project military power over great distances
in any direction unimpeded by surface features such as mountain
barriers or water expanses. However, reach may also be limited by
political necessities such as diplomatic clearance to fly through the
airspace of other states.

d. Ubiquity. The attribute of ubiquity, defined as “being

everywhere, (or seeming to be everywhere) simultaneously” describes
air power’s potential to cover the whole battle space whether for
ISTAR, strike or mobility roles. There is an inherent perception of
ubiquity when a relatively small number of high endurance platforms
operate and persist for long periods over multiple areas of interest.
This is distinctively advantageous when adversaries use asymmetric
and dispersed techniques to avoid detection and engagement.
Against a well-resourced and sophisticated air defence system,
achieving ubiquity requires air superiority, and or the use of low
observable (stealth) aircraft and stand-off weapons which enhance
survivability.

e. Flexibility. Aircraft can perform a wide variety of

actions, produce a wide range of effects and be adapted with
comparative ease to meet changing circumstances and situations.
For example, a multi role aircraft can be used for reconnaissance, air-
to-surface attack and air defence. It can, therefore, carry out more
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than one role during a single mission and be re-tasked in the air if
necessary.

f. Responsiveness. Speed and reach make air power

uniquely responsive. It can be used to counter or pose simultaneous
threats across a wider geographical area than is possible with surface
systems. Air power can be deployed rapidly into distant theatres
to provide visible and timely support for an ally ( e.g. NAF’s
intervention in ECOMOG operations) or to act as a deterrent to
aggression. For closer threats, it can be used to project military
power rapidly, direct from its peace time bases. The responsiveness
of air power is as important in crises management as it is in conflict.

g. Concentration. Speed, reach and flexibility allow air power to

concentrate military force in any of its many forms; in time and space.
The psychological and physical effects of such capability are often
crucial to achieving operational success.

4.4. Limitations. The inherent limitations of air power are

impermanence, limited payload and fragility. Like the strength of air power,
these are relative rather than absolute and need to be understood in that
context.

a. Impermanence. Aircraft cannot stay airborne indefinitely.

Although air-to-air refuelling (AAR) can greatly extend the range and
endurance of aircraft, no means have yet been found to re-arm, re-
crew or service an aircraft in flight. To that extent, air power is an
impermanent form of military force. The effect it creates also tends to
be transient, and to sustain those effects, operations have to be
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repeated. In certain circumstances, the impermanence of air power

can be an advantage.

b. Limited Payloads. The payloads that can be carried by

aircraft are far more limited than those that can be carried by ships
or by land vehicles. Thus, aircraft are most cost effective when they
are used for tasks which give high value pay- offs. This applies
equally to combat and combat support tasks such as, air
transportation. While relatively small payloads are a disadvantage,
they can in part be compensated for by the high sortie rate realizable
due to aircraft speed and by the lethality and precision of modern
air-to-surface munitions. Moreover, a small payload deployed quickly
may be of far more value in stabilizing a critical situation than a larger
one deployed later. It is important to note that payload limitations are
common to all systems, which exploit the third dimension.

c. Fragility. The need for aerial vehicles to be as light as practicable in

order to overcome the restrictive physical forces of gravity and drag means
they often carry little or no amour protection. Hence, relatively low levels of
battle damage can have catastrophic effects; a fact that tends to limit the
extent aircraft can be exposed to adversary fire. However, it is important to
distinguish between fragility and vulnerability. While aircraft are less robust
than land vehicles or ships, this shortcoming is largely compensated for by
the ability of aircraft to exploit speed and height, which increases the
adversary’s targeting difficulties.

4.5. Other Considerations. In addition to the strengths and

limitations discussed above, air power also possesses certain other
important characteristics, which significantly affect its contribution to
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defence and security. These are:

a. High Cost. Military aircraft are high-tech equipment and

as such are expensive. Similarly, aircrew training can also be
expensive. However, the advantages derived from air power
capabilities outweigh these costs. Furthermore, the increase capability
that high-tech equipment often provides over low-tech systems
typically permit a reduction in the numbers of platforms required. A
modern, highly capable multi-role aircraft will cost much more than a
less capable aircraft. For certain tasks, a highly capable aircraft is
essential, but for others a far less costly solution may suffice.
Similarly, training costs are closely related to the complexity of the
aircraft that the aircrew are required to fly. In any case, cost must be
balanced against cost effectiveness.

b. Dependence on Bases. All forms of modern military power

depend on base support. Armies in the field need depots to support
them and navies need harbour facilities. However, air power seems
to be more dependent on its bases than either land or sea power.
Helicopters and some fixed-wing aircraft can take-off and land
vertically, but most aircraft need runways. Additionally, all aircraft
need a high level of support if they are to operate at their maximum
sortie rate. If this base support is vulnerable to attack, then base
dependency can be a potential weakness. However, if the bases are
difficult to find or neutralise, then the converse applies. In these
circumstances, the unique ability of air forces to fight directly from
their peacetime bases enormously simplifies logistics and expedites
the delivery of ordnance from the factory or depot onto the
adversary.
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c. Sensitivity to Weather and Illumination. Air power is

sometimes perceived as being far more sensitive to weather and state
of illumination than other forms of military force. Bad weather can
certainly create difficulties with take-offs and landings, navigations and
target acquisition. But the operations of other types of forces are
equally affected by weather and day/night conditions. In very high sea
states, ships cannot fight and sometimes cannot even leave harbour.
Similarly, mud caused by torrential rain can bog down armies, while
intense heat can be a major handicap to carrying out large-scale land
force operations. Fortunately, in recent years, the impact of weather
and visibility on air power operations has changed markedly. With the
rapid advancement in technology, many combat aircraft are now able
to operate in all weather and illumination conditions. Indeed, the
concealment offered by darkness and bad weather is increasingly
turning into an advantage for air power, as more advanced all-
weather navigation and targeting aids are developed and deployed.

d. Sensitivity to Technology. Air power tends to be more

sensitive to technological changes than sea power or land power.
Since air power is a product of technology, technological advances
would inevitably affect air power development. Experience has shown
that even relatively small technological innovations can have a major
impact on air power effectiveness. While new generations of mobile
SAMs could threaten the offensive capabilities of air power, unfolding
breakthroughs in power-plant and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are
redefining aircraft capability. Equally, aircraft survivability could be
enhanced enormously by developments in low observables (stealth)
technology. The nature of the balance will always depend on the
overall direction and rate of technological development. Fig 4.1 is a
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diagrammatic summary of the characteristics of air power.

Fig. 4.1. Characteristics of Air Power

4.6. Principles for Air Power Application. Unified a ct i o n i s e sse nti al

for the effective use of air power. To achieve its greatest effects, air power
must be concentrated at a decisive point in time and space. The inherent
attributes of speed, reach and flexibility, which allow air power to be
exploited on diverse and multiple tasks simultaneously can lead to its
fragmentation and subsequent dissipation of effort if incorrectly employed.
Therefore, to achieve the strength of unified action, and to ensure that the
capabilities of air power are used as the overall situation demands, the key
principles of unity of command, centralised planning, decentralised
execution, and strategy-to-task must be applied.

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AIR POWER AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

4.7. Two principles of war with the most important effects on the
employment of air power are concentration of force and surprise.
Concentrated force increases destructive capacity and surprise reduces
own losses. This provides the justification for the conclusion that air power
is best suited for offensive action. It is more expedient to achieve a
favourable ratio of losses by seizing the initiative with attack than by
reacting in defence. Hence, the NAF doctrine of ‘Active Defence, Forward
Engagement’. The concept of active defence requires the maintenance of
a credible defence posture that would act as deterrence to potential
enemies and if deterrence fails, bring any conflict to a conclusion favourable
to Nigeria. To achieve this, the NAF must maintain superior intelligence
and a well-integrated air defence system that will blunt, degrade and
overcome any intruding air threat. Forward Engagement is the ability to
project force beyond national boundaries in support of Nigeria’s security
interests. This means having ready and capable forces that are deployable
at short notice, as well as maintaining a tactically offensive stance to seize
the initiative from the adversary early in the conflict. This would give own
surface forces freedom of action to operate with minimal interference from
adversary’s air action.

4.8. The flexibility to concentrate force when and where it is required

against any element of an adversary’s capability are fundamental to the
employment of air power. The flexibility and responsiveness of air power
enables the full spectrum of sustained air operations to be conducted at a
tempo which directly attacks an adversaries’ decision cycle. Compromising
the inherent flexibility erodes effectiveness and undermines responsiveness.

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APPLICATIONS OF AIR POWER

4.9. The distinct and specific characteristics of air power lead in turn to
distinct and specific applications. Air power’s speed of reaction is
responsive to political needs; it commits and risks the minimum number of
personnel; it can deliver enormous punch from which it is almost
impossible to hide and can do so with a precision that both opens up new
coercive possibilities and minimizes casualties.

4.10. Wartime Applications of Air Power. If crises management

measures fail and crises degenerate into war, air power can make a
decisive contribution to prosecuting operations successfully. The unique
ability of air power to concentrate combat power when and where needed
has become the dominant feature of modern wars. Air power offers
decision makers a wide range of options. These include:

a. Observation. Air power’s unique capability to exploit the

third dimension allows it to make a major contribution in monitoring
adversary activities and deployments and thus discovering his
intentions. Reconnaissance provides the basis for planning,
targeting and successful execution of military operations.

b. Destruction. Air power’s most obvious wartime application

is to destroy. The ability to concentrate firepower with a high degree
of accuracy over extended ranges gives it enormous potential
destructive power. This was evident in the Gulf War of 1991, where
air power destroyed nearly half the Iraqi armour and artillery before
the start of the Allied land offensive. At sea, the destructive potential
of air power became evident as early as 1942, when 5 Japanese
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aircraft carriers were sunk as a result of air attacks during the battles
of Coral Sea and Midway.

c. Denial. Air power can be used to deny an adversary the

ability to employ his air, surface and maritime forces effectively. It
denies the adversary the freedom to wage war as intended. The
most prominent example of an air-to-air denial battle was the Battle
of Britain (WWII), where air power was the only practicable means
open to Britain of denying Germans the opportunity to launch an
invasion of England.

d. Dislocation. The capacity of air power to inflict dislocation

is a key quality. Even if an aircraft fails to destroy its target, the
impact on morale of a near miss or of collateral damage may still
cause the adversary major mental, moral and physical dislocation.
Dislocation causes delay and confusion, and it breaks up unit
cohesion. It also makes the adversary far more vulnerable to follow-up
attacks by all types of forces. For example, in June 1944, the
German Panzer Lehr Division was subjected to continuous allied air
interdiction attacks during its deployment from Le Mans to contain the
Allied D- Day landings. The attrition sustained by Panzer Lehr during
this journey was significant (about 10 per cent or 220 vehicles), but
more importantly, unit cohesion was lost, and the division arrived on
the battlefield in uncoordinated and ineffective units.

e. Diversion. Air power can be used to divert adversary

forces in order to delay or destroy them. At a strategic level, diversion
can be achieved by concentrating attacks against sensitive adversary
targets, compelling him to divert forces and resources from offensive
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to defensive duties. For example, the Allied Strategic Bombing

offensive in WW II forced the Germans to divert 25-30 per cent of
their artillery production for anti-aircraft artillery. At the tactical level,
air power can achieve diversion by selectively attacking choke points
such as bridges. This can either delay the arrival of adversary surface
forces or channel their movement into areas where they can be more
easily contained or destroyed.

f. Delay. Delay is a wartime effect of air power resulting from

the effects of dislocation, destruction or diversion. In defensive
situations, imposing delays on the adversary allows friendly forces to
regroup and strengthen defences. In offensive situations, it allows
friendly forces to prevent the adversary’s escape.

g. Demoralisation. One of the important effects that air power can

create is demoralization. Air attacks have always had a particularly
sapping effect on morale, irrespective of the damage inflicted. In
Operation SANDSTORM, the losses suffered (reported at 50 per cent)
by rebel forces laying siege on the hydro- power town of Bumbuna
from an ECOMOG air strike completely dissuaded the rebels from
furthering their plans.

4.11. Applications of Air Power in Crisis Situations. In times of

increasing tension, the unique ability of air power to be deployed rapidly
and to project power over long distances, unimpeded by surface features,
makes it a useful instrument of national power. Air power has a variety of
important crisis management applications. These are:

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a. Deterrence. The proven ability to exact rapid retribution,

strike deep into hostile territory and deny a potential aggressor the
assurance that his homeland can be safe from attack, by air power
deployed against it, is by any measure a strong and explicit
deterrence. With timely warning and rapid deployment of a credible
force, air power
has the capability
of defusing a
crisis before it
really develops.
OPS SEA DOG
of 1985 is a good
example.
NAF JF-17, a multirole fighter

b. Political Signalling. Air power can be used to send clear

political signals. These can help reduce uncertainty and reduce the
possibility of miscalculation by the adversary. Air power can do this
through a number of measures like an overt increase in alert states
or by operational deployment of air power assets such as the
deployment of A-Jets to Cote d’Ivoire in response to the coup
of 2002. Deployment of surveillance assets to monitor adversary
activity would send clear signals that he is being watched and when
backed by offensive air power assets would make the adversary
rethink his course of action.

c. Punitive Air Strikes. In crisis situations, air power can be

used for punitive air strikes short of full-fledged war. One obvious
application of these punishment operations is as a response to
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attacks by state sponsored guerrillas or terrorists. Such operations

are reactive rather than proactive and depend on the element of
surprise for their success. A typical example was the reported strike
by the US on Libya during OPERATION ELDORADO CANYON and
the Israeli strikes against HAMAS in response to rockets fired into its
territories. Possible adversary reaction leading to an escalation of
conflict and adverse international opinion are factors to be considered
before such operations are conducted. In many such situations, air
power will often be the only instrument which has the requisite speed,
reach and striking power to deter aggression.

d. Supporting Friendly Foreign Governments. A crisis

management application of air power is to provide timely moral and
physical support for friendly governments, thus strengthening their
resolve in times of tension. An example was the deployment of a
Nigerian Air Force detachment to Mali in 2013.

e. Evacuation of Nationals from Crisis Zones. Air power

can be used to mount evacuation operations in crisis situations. The
evacuation of Nigerian nationals from Malabo in the 80s and from
Central African Republic in 2014 with NAF aircraft is an example of
the use of air power in conducting speedy evacuation.

4.13. Peacetime Applications. Air power has a variety of important crisis

management applications even in peacetime. These roles include:

a. Preserving Peace. Although the Air Force exists for the

purpose of war, the preparation for this role indirectly confers on it a
major peacetime role, that of deterrence. A well-balanced air force
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with a credible operational capability to exact rapid retribution

constitutes an effective deterrence. The air force can also be used
to help avert threats to peace by exploiting the third dimension for
surveillance purposes. A potential antagonist could thus be assured
that any threatening moves will be detected and the intent discerned.

b. Disaster Relief. When disaster strikes in the form of floods or

earthquakes, speedy response is vital. With its speed, air power
helps to play a key part in alleviating suffering. NAF transport aircraft
and helicopters have delivered food, medicine and other supplies in
numerous disaster relief operations. When done abroad, it helps to
promote international relations.

c. Emergency Rescue Operations. Air power has often been

called upon, and will continue to be called, to carry out rescue
operations of people in distress. A classic example was the dramatic
helicopter rescue of
people from the roof
of the burning
Nigerian External
Telecommunication
(NET) building in
Lagos in January NAF Super Puma

1983.

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

4.11. Effects-based operations are operations undertaken with the primary

consideration being the intended effects of the employment of the force

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rather than the actions taken by the force. In other words, operations should
be driven by desired ends (end states and objectives) and be defined by the
effects required to attain these ends and not just by what available forces or
capabilities can do, or by what the Air Force “customarily” does with a given
set of forces. Effects-based operations focus primarily upon behaviour and
not just physical changes while negating unnecessary attrition, destruction
and occupation. NAF air power managers and campaign planners must
resist the tendency to start the planning process with available resources
and capabilities in formulating a range of possible actions. This erroneous
approach provides no guidance on how operations support the overarching
campaign or national objectives. Consequently, the strategy-to-task planning
process is a method by which planning starts with the desired end-state,
followed by the subordinate objectives needed to bring it about, the effects
and underlying links needed to accomplish those objectives, and the actions
and resources needed to create those effects. This approach is to be
adopted in planning the employment of all NAF air power.

TRENDS IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER

4.12. The employment of air power in the immediate to the foreseeable

future is expected to be influenced by 3 important developments. These
developments are the increasing influence of non-state actors all over the
world, the rapid exploitation of space and cyber space and the increasing
proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as well as other products
of artificial intelligence.

4.13. Expanding Role in Counter-Asymmetric Warfare. Future wars

will continue to be more asymmetric in nature with the expanding influences
of non-state actors and their predilection for asymmetric warfare. Thus, the

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employment of air power will continue to shift emphasis from coercive to

stealth and high-precision strategies. The limitations and boundaries
imposed by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) must always be kept in mind
while developing these strategies.

4.14. Expanding Role of Space and Cyber-Space. The import and

impact of space in the conduct of military operations is expanding rapidly.
The rate of expansion has led some proponents to argue that space has
indeed become the fourth medium in which the military operates in the
protection of national security interests and has led to call for the
establishment of separate Space Force in some countries. Political and
legal factors imposed by the Treaty on the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space (Outer Space Treaty, in 1967) often provide limits on the use of
the medium. The debates on the dichotomy between militarization and
weaponization of space as they relate to the interpretation of the legal
requirements set out in the treaty need to be monitored with keen interest.
Nonetheless, the dual use (civil/commercial and military) capabilities of
space systems and the excellent force multiplier effects that space and
cyber-space currently provide and is expected to continue to provide must
be leveraged to the fullest. Space provides the unmatched fundamental
benefits of global perspective and persistence. This makes it indispensable
for earth observation, navigation and global communications. Efforts should
be made by the NAF to exploit these capabilities as provided by
civil/commercial space to enhance its operations while positioning the
Service to take advantage of any opportunities that military space may
provide in the future as the need and exigencies of the nation and the
Service may demand.

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4.15. Proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The enhanced

safety, enhanced presence, low cost, precision and low radar signature
characteristics of unmanned aircraft systems have made them a system of
choice for both state and non-state actors. The use of UAS is expected to
increase in future conflicts as miniaturization and low costs continue to
make them more portable and affordable. Therefore, detection of and
counter measures against unmanned aircraft should be a major concern of
the NAF in addition to the development of UAS employment capabilities.

AIR-MINDEDNESS

4.16. Air-mindedness is defined as the sum of an individual’s depth of

knowledge and understanding of the characteristics and employment of
airpower. It is the mindset expected of all members of the NAF that is based
on a comprehensive understanding of air power and its unitary application in
the context of their individual expertise. Hence, the concept of air-
mindedness applies to all personnel in the Nigerian Air Force and their
understanding of the employment of air power across the range of military
operations. It suggests that, in any situation, a firmly rooted air-minded
airman will ensure that the potential contribution and value of air power is
properly articulated and put forward or applied. It must be reiterated that air-
mindedness is not consigned to personnel of only one particular air force
specialty, nor is it restricted to a certain rank or organizational level. Air-
mindedness does not just happen. It is cultivated and nurtured through a
combination of experience, education, training and culture.

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CHAPTER 5

FUNDAMENTAL ROLES AND KEY ENABLERS OF AIR POWER

5.1. The employment of air power can be classified into 4 fundamental

roles. These are:

a. Control of the Air.

b. Attack.

c. Air Mobility.

d. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

Its successful exploitation, however, depends on 2 key enabling functions

- Force Protection and Force Sustainment. Please see Fig. 5.1 for a
taxonomy of the air power roles.

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ROLE 1: CONTROL OF THE AIR

5.2 Control of the Air is defined as the freedom, bound by time, to use a
volume of airspace for one’s own purposes while, if necessary,
denying its use to an opponent. It creates the enabling environment for
own forces to conduct operations in the air, land and maritime domains
without effective interference from adversary’s air power and air defence
capabilities. It provides freedom from attack, freedom to attack and
freedom of manoeuvre, and is achieved through the destruction,
degradation or disruption of an adversary’s air power and air defences.
Control of the air may not guarantee success in a joint campaign, but failure
to achieve adequate control of the air in situations where a credible
adversary air threat exists will constrain or jeopardise the conduct of air, land
or maritime activities.

5.3 Absolute control of the air may not be achievable at all times. In
many circumstances, achieving a degree of control of the air at the required
location and for the necessary duration may just be sufficient. Control of the
air can be described in one of the following 3 degrees:

a. Favourable Air Situation. A favourable air situation is one in

which the extent of air effort applied by the air forces of an adversary is
insufficient to prejudice the success of friendly land, sea or air
operations.

b. Air Superiority. Air Superiority is defined as that degree of

dominance in the air battle of one force over another, which permits
the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and

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air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by

the opposing force.

c. Air Supremacy. Air Supremacy is defined as that degree of air

superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective
interference.

5.4. When control of the air is not achieved, one of the following 2
conditions describes the air situation:

a. Air Parity. Air parity exists when control of the air is

being contested and no force has been able to obtain an air power
advantage and/or air defence dominance over another.

b. Unfavourable Air Situation. An unfavourable air situation

exists when operations are expected to encounter prohibitive
interference from adversary’s air power and/or air defence capabilities.

5.5. It is futile and maybe unrealistic, to assume total command of the air; a
situation where there is no opposition from the adversary. During the War in
Iraq, several US Apache helicopters were downed by the adversary despite
the assumed total command of the air achieved by coalition forces. Also, in
NE Nigeria, Boko Haram terrorists incapacitated some NAF aircraft
despite NAF air supremacy. This is so because there is always a
present and constant danger even from small arms fire.

5.6. Achieving Control of the Air: Counter-Air Operations. In

order to achieve ‘Control of the Air’, air forces conduct Counter Air
Operations. This is achieved through the destruction, degradation or
disruption of an enemy’s air capability. Counter-air operations may include

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the actions of any component and involve the use of land or ship-based
assets to counter threats including manned or unmanned aircraft, surface-to-
air systems, ballistic and cruise missiles and maritime or land forces.
Counter-air operations are subdivided into offensive and defensive
counter-air missions. (See Fig. 5.2).

Fig. 5.2. Components of Control of the Air

a. Offensive Counter-Air Operations. Offensive Counter- Air

(OCA) operations, sometimes referred to as pre-emptive attack, are
operations mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit an opponent’s air power
as close to its source as possible. Such operations may be pre-
planned or immediate and are conducted across enemy territory at the
initiative of friendly forces. Pre-planned operations depend on
continuous and accurate intelligence, while immediate operations
are conducted against unexpected mobile and time-sensitive
targets, where there may be only a small window available for attack.
OCA includes surface attack operations, air-to-air missions, the
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and Electronic Warfare
(EW).
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b. Defensive Counter-Air Operations. Defensive Counter-Air

(DCA) operations are those measures designed to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile air action. DCA operations are synonymous
with Air Defence (AD). They consist of active and passive operations
to detect, identify, intercept and destroy or negate enemy air and
missile forces attempting to penetrate friendly battlespace, or reduction
of the effectiveness of such attacks, should they escape destruction.
Air Defence could be active or passive.

(1) Active Air Defence. Active AD involves any direct

defensive action taken to destroy, nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of enemy air (manned and unmanned) and missile
attack. Integration of layered AD systems will allow for a
defence in depth with the potential for for multiple engagements
that increase the probability for success These actions are
closely integrated to form essential DCA capabilities, but may
involve different defensive weapon systems (including aircraft) or
tactics, techniques and procedures

The F-7NI, a NAF Air Defence Fighter

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(2) Passive Air Defence. Passive AD refers to all other

defensive measures taken to minimize the effects of opponent’s
offensive air action through the individual or collective protection
of friendly forces and critical assets. Elements of passive AD
include early warning, camouflage, concealment and deception,
hardening, dispersion, reconstitution, and low-observable or
stealth technologies.

ROLE 2: ATTACK

5.7. Attack (strike) involves employment of lethal or non-lethal and kinetic

or non-kinetic means to create the desired physical and/or cognitive effect on
the adversary. It has particular value for the use of air power as a broader
deterrent or coercive instrument. The attack capability allows the application
of a range of strategies, such as a diplomatic warning or show of force
through to the actual use of force. Attack can therefore be used to deter or
coerce the adversary, degrade, neutralize or destroy an adversary’s war-
making capabilities, or disrupt or deny courses of action. Attack missions are
proactive and offensive in nature and may be used to take the initiative, gain
surprise and minimize opposition to friendly operations. Like all air power
roles, attack can achieve synergistic effects when employed in combination
with other roles.

5.8. Precision attack weapons provide commanders with the ability to apply
decisive military force with discrimination while minimizing collateral damage
and unnecessary loss of human life. However, technical malfunctions or
targeting errors can still result in collateral damage that may have undesired
political, diplomatic and military repercussions.

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5.9. Although the term Strategic Attack is still prevalent in the air power
parlance, attack from the air can no longer be simply classified into tactical
or strategic categories. Air power spans the spectrum of conflict in range,
reach and effect. Additionally, attack is not solely kinetic, because air power
can also provide a very effective lever against an opponent’s cognitive
domain. Hence, attack from the air may be broken down into deep attack;
counter land, counter sea, and information operations. (Fig. 5.3).

Fig. 5.3: Components of Attack

5.10. Deep Attack. Deep Attack describes attacks conducted against

targets often (but not always) deep in enemy territory and of significant, often
strategic, importance. Deep attack is used to disrupt or destroy centres of
gravity or other vital target sets such as leadership, command elements, war
production resources, fielded forces or key supporting infrastructure. It
seeks to disrupt an enemy’s strategy, ability or will to wage war, or to carry
out aggressive activity. It is the outcome required that defines deep attack,
not the specific weapon system, delivery platform or type of target attacked.

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5.11. Counter Land Operations. Counter land operations aim to gain and
maintain a desired degree of control of the land battlespace by targeting
fielded enemy ground forces and the infrastructure directly supporting them,
or by using the psychological effects of air power to attack the enemy’s will.
The overall campaign strategy and the specific circumstances of the conflict
will determine how counter-land operations are conducted. The synergy of
air forces and surface forces, operating as an integrated joint force, can
often be overwhelming in cases where the activities of a single component
alone would not be decisive – this is the preferred method of employment.
Counter land operations fall mainly into two mission types:

a. Air Interdiction. AI is action to destroy, disrupt, divert or

delay the enemy’s surface potential before it can be used effectively
against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives. For
example, during the Gulf War, coalition air attacks halted and
destroyed an Iraqi column of tanks en-route the Saudi Arabian town of
Khafji. The destruction of these forces halted the Iraqi Army’s
offensive and reduced its overall will to fight. AI is carried out at such
distance from
friendly forces that
detailed integration
of each air mission
with the fire and
movement of
friendly forces is The Alpha-Jet: Ready for an Interdiction Mission

not required.

b. Close Air Support. CAS is action by fixed and rotary wing

aircraft against hostile targets requiring detailed integration with the fire
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and movement of friendly forces for targeting guidance and to avoid

fratricide. CAS provides ground or amphibious forces with firepower in
offensive and defensive operations, by day and night, to destroy,
suppress, neutralise, disrupt, fix or delay enemy forces in close
proximity to friendly ground forces.

NAF Alpha- Jet and Mi-24V ac: V e r s a t i l e in Close Air Support

5.12. Counter Sea Operations. Counter sea attack missions extend the
application of air power into the high seas or the littoral and its adjacent
waters, and extend the attack range and capability of surface and sub-
surface elements. Air attack provides a significant capability in the maritime
environment. Land or ship-based assets may be used to support sea control
operations as an integral part of the maritime campaign, in particular acting
as a force multiplier and adding reach to surface and sub-surface attack
capabilities. Like other forms of air power, maritime aviation has the capacity
to shape outcomes at every level of warfare, from tactical air support of
maritime operations to the strategic effect delivered by the imposition of a
blockade. The different specialist counter sea roles are detailed below.

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The NAF ATR-42 ac on Maritime Patrol

a. Anti-Surface Warfare. Anti-surface warfare (ASUW) operations

are conducted to destroy or neutralise enemy naval surface forces.

b. Anti-Submarine Warfare. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

operations are conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the
effective use of submarines.

c. Aerial Mining. Aerial mining operations are conducted to

support the control of vital sea areas, by inflicting damage on an
enemy’s vessels or submarines to hinder operations and impede the
flow of traffic through a given area.

5.13. Information Operations. Air attack is primarily associated with the

ability to deliver lethal weapons, but an adversary can also be influenced by
non-kinetic means. Air-delivered information activities use non-lethal effects
to influence the behaviour, will and understanding of an adversary, aiming to
affect perceptions and shape behaviours and attitudes. Although information
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activities consist of multiple elements, key areas of focus for air power are
electronic warfare and psychological operations. Information Operations
include:

a. Electronic Warfare. Electronic warfare (EW) seeks control of

the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, both to enable friendly-force
operations, and to deny an enemy the same degree of freedom.

b. Influence Operations. Influence operations affect

behaviours, protect operations, communicate intent and project
accurate information across the cognitive domain. The desired
outcome is a change in behaviour or an enemy’s decision-making
process. An example of strategic influence operations is the
deployment of NAF Alpha Jets to Senegal in Jan 2017, as part of an
ECOMOG detachment. Their low-level flights over Yahya Jammeh's
Presidential Palace in The Gambia compelled him to accept the
election results and relinquish power. On the other hand, the use of
NAF ATR 42 ac for leaflet dropping to influence the behaviour of the
BH and the Mi-171 helicopter for message broadcast to diffuse civil
unrest are examples of tactical influence operations.

c. Computer Network Operations. Computer network operations

(CNO) integrate the planning and employment of military capabilities to
achieve desired effects across the digital battlespace. They are
conducted in the information domain, consisting of hardware, software,
data and human components.

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ROLE 3: AIR MOBILITY

5.14. Air mobility is the ability and process of movement of personnel

(forces) and materiel by air. It provides the capability and encompasses
those operations for rapidly deploying, sustaining and redeploying
personnel, materiel or forces to, from or within a theatre by air. Air
mobility enables the conduct of other operations and has utility across the
full spectrum of conflict. It is often the transportation of choice when
speed, reach as well as obstacle and surface threat avoidance are required.
In some cases, air mobility can be the only means to create the
desired effect. Air mobility is thus a key element in force projection.

5.15. Operations under the air mobility role (Fig. 5.4) are classified into the
following air power functions as follows:

a. Airlift.
b. Airborne Operations.
c. Aeromedical Evacuation.
d. Air-to-Air Refuelling.

Fig. 5.4. Components of Air Mobility

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5.16. Airlift. Airlift operations are operations that involve the movement
by air of personnel and material both within and between theatres of
operations. Employing either fixed or rotary wing aircraft for airlift presents
peculiar requirements. Rotary wing platforms, for instance, are best suited
for tactical transport.

a. Fixed Wing. Fixed w i n g t r a n s p o r t aircraft are used for

both strategic and tactical movements. They are able to move a
relatively large number of men and materiel quickly and over long
distances. For instance, during Op LIBERTY, between May and
Decembers 1990, NAF C-130 airlifted 6,272 troops and 560 metric
tons of cargo from Nigeria to the theatre of operations. This volume of
airlift across the West African sub-region in the first few months of the
ECOMOG operations reaffirms the importance of airlift in the rapid
deployment and sustenance of military forces. It is the only tool that
can deliver considerable combat strength over long distances within
hours. Air
movement
planners should
however be
weary of the
limitation of
dependence on
airfields by fixed
wing aircraft in
The NAF C-130H for airlift
tactical
operations.

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b. Rotary Wing. Helicopters, as part of the air transport assets,

are capable of conducting a variety of support missions in-theatre.
During Ops LIBERTY, NAF Super Puma helicopters airlifted some
2000 troops and 10,000 metric tons of cargo in the period October
1990 - March 1991. Super Puma helicopters were a l s o used
extensively for tactical movement of troops and logistic in-theatre
during OP LAFIYA DOLE. However, mission planners must note that
helicopters can be adversely affected by weather and for the most part
require local air superiority to guarantee successful operations.

NAF Support Helicopter in Tactical Movement of Troops in-theatre

5.17. Airborne Operations. Airborne operations are the use of specialist

aircraft to transport land forces and their equipment directly to, or close to,
their objective and subsequently sustain, or extract them, when required. It
can be used to seize ground or installations that are vital to the adversaries.
This may be achieved by parachute insertion, tactical air-land operations or
rappelling/fast rope. Airborne operations should not be confused with

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tactical airlift operations. Airborne operations may contribute to all levels

of conflict within the joint campaign plan. They pose high risk, but the
potential gains make them a valuable element of air power capability. The
potential for use of an air borne force at any time at the opponent’s forward
or rear areas creates a continuing uncertainty for the adversary commander.

NAF G-222 Dropping Paratroopers

5.18. Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical evacuation is “the

movement of patients under medical supervision to and between
medical treatment facilities by air transportation”. AME provides time-
sensitive in-flight care of patients or casualties to and between levels of care
using predominantly mobility air forces aircraft or contracted aircraft (civilian
air ambulance) with medical aircrew trained specifically for this mission. AME
forces can operate as far forward as aircraft are able to conduct air

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operations, across the full range of military operations, and in all operating
environments.

5.19. Air-to-Air Refuelling. An air-to-air refuelling (AAR) mission is an air

activity conducted to refuel one aircraft from another in flight. A key enabler
of force projection, AAR can augment a number of other air power missions
by enhancing the range, endurance and payload of the receiver aircraft. AAR
is a force multiplier that can significantly enhance the overall effectiveness
and flexibility of air operations. It can be conducted for strategic or tactical
operations.

ROLE 4: INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

5.20. Surveillance and reconnaissance are the means by which air and
space power provide intelligence and situational awareness, whether for
operational level commanders taking a theatre-wide perspective using
space-based assets, or individual soldiers exploiting live video feeds from
manned or unmanned aircraft. The high vantage point afforded by air and
space allows an almost unhindered view ‘over the hill’ and across the
electromagnetic spectrum, providing intelligence at all levels of command.
Although a robust capability is required to direct, collect, process and
disseminate information, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) links several battlespace functions including targeting to allow a
combat force to employ its sensors and manage the information gathered to
best effect. ISR exploits the collection of information from all domains in
which it operates and is therefore domain neutral.

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a. Intelligence. Intelligence is the product resulting from the

collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and
interpretation of available information. Good intelligence provides
accurate, relevant, timely and predictive analysis to support
operations.

b. Surveillance. Surveillance is the continuing and systematic

observation of air, space, surface or subsurface areas, places,
persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other
means. Airborne (and space) surveillance assets exploit elevation to
detect opponents’ activities at a range and behind obstacles.

c. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance complements

surveillance by using visual observation, or other detection methods,
to obtain specific information about the activities and resources of an
enemy or potential enemy. It may also secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographical or geographic characteristics of a
particular area.

5.21. Application of ISR. ISR also enables the other fundamental air
power roles. It combines both physical and cognitive activities and relies
on the successful integration of technology with human processes. It is
viewed as a continuous activity throughout the spectrum of peace and
conflict, with ISR operations during peacetime building the foundations for
decision superiority during conflict. In military operations, it is synchronized
with, and contributes to, the joint campaign. In this context, ISR is not only
critical to operations in the air domain but also to operations in the other
domains. The ubiquity and demand for ISR encourages smaller air forces,

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such as the NAF, to consider all aircraft types as potential data and
information collectors. As the context of domestic and expeditionary
operations expands, NAF ISR enterprise will have to possess the
appropriate level of interoperability for combined operations.

Some NAF ISR Assets

ENABLING ROLE 1: FORCE PROTECTION

5.22. Force Protection (FP) derives from the war principle of ‘security’. It
is a broad concept embracing a range of measures to ensure the physical
integrity and morale of the
fighting force. Specifically, it
encompasses all means taken
to protect the capability of a
force from operational,
environmental, and occupational threats. Air-minded force protection is a
critical requirement for the successful delivery of all forms of expeditionary
military power, to counter threats and hazards, enable freedom of action
and enhance operational effectiveness. Aircraft are scarce, expensive
and fragile. Additionally, operating bases are potentially vulnerable if located
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in a hostile environment. Accordingly, air-minded FP capability is required to

mitigate the strategic consequences of the loss of air freedom of
manoeuvre, or of a key air platform. An early-entry FP capability is
necessary at the outset of a campaign to shape the environment and
facilitate the arrival of critical air assets

5.23. The responsibility for balancing the protection of the defended location
and force elements against the requirement to continue air operations must
be vested in the air commander, who is in the best position to adjudicate
between these potentially competing demands. FP depends on effective
risk management, based on a detailed assessment of the threat and
hazards drawn from accurate, timely, all-source intelligence, fused and
analysed organically. This information is used to prioritise the allocation of
resources. Resource limitations, constraints imposed by the nature of joint
or combined operations and the operating environment will force threats
and hazards to be reviewed as part of routine. Where specific FP measures
are constrained by host community sensitivities, imagination and negotiation
may be required to achieve the desired outcome. To assure FP, air forces
should have the capability for the following:

a. Air Base Protection.

b. Personnel Recovery.
c. Defensive Cyber Operations.
d. Defensive Information Operations.
e. Electronic Protection Measures (EPM).

5.24. Air Base Protection. In the NAF, the concept of base defence
takes into consideration all passive and active measures taken to protect,
mitigate and recuperate from the effects of a threat, attack or hazard.

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5.23. Personnel Recovery Operations.Personnel recovery missions are

the aggregation of military, civil and political efforts to rescue, release or
recover personnel from permissive, uncertain or hostile environments,
whether they are captured, missing or isolated. Military personnel
recovery activities include Search and Rescue as well as recovery
operations:

a. Search and Rescue. Search and rescue (SAR) entails the

recovery of isolated personnel in permissive environments. It could
involve deployment of military or civil SAR assets.

b. Recovery Operations. Recovery operations (RO) cover

all actions aimed at recovering isolated personnel during and after
combat. They are conducted in threat environments and comprise
the following:

(1) Combat Recovery.

(2) Combat S e a r c h a n d R e s c u e .

(3) Special Recovery Operations

NAF Mi35 on CSAR Mission

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5.26. Cyber D e f e n c e . Defence o f o w n networks and s y s t e m s i s

essential to protect against opponent’s Info Ops and to maintain the integrity
of own information capabilities and infrastructure. Computer Network
Defence (CND) must provide protection against the adversary’s computer
network attack (CNA) and CND incorporates hardware and software
approaches alongside people-based processes.

5.27. Defensive Information Operations. These are actions taken to

protect friendly decision-makers including the maintenance of access to
the effective use of information, information-based processes, C2 systems
and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict and to protect alliance information
critical to achieving specific objectives.

5.28. Electronic Protection Measures. Electronic Protection

Measures (EPM) involves active and passive measures taken to ensure the
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite an opponent’s use of
electronic warfare techniques. Electronic warfare is increasingly important
to the success of all types of military operations. Specialist manned aircraft
and unmanned air vehicles for EW support may be critical factors in
support of air operations within the joint campaign. Such aircraft and
systems designed to counter sophisticated SAM and AAG systems are
invariably in short supply, requiring priorities to be set as part of the
apportionment process. Moreover, there is a close interconnection between
EW and the associated task of the suppression of adversary air defences.
Comprehensive provisions for FP are contained in the NAF Force
Protection Doctrine (AFM 1 – FP).

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ENABLING ROLE 2: FORCE SUSTAINMENT

5.29. Sustainment is defined as the ability of a force to maintain the

necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its
objective. In its broadest sense sustainment encompasses all activities
necessary for the employment of air power other than its execution. Every
air operation must of necessity commence and end with provisions for
sustainment as it is concerned with sustenance of a force during every
stage of a campaign or operation; from force generation, through
deployment and operations in theatre, to recovery and recuperation.
Hence, force sustainment is a key enabler of air power application.

5.30. Sustainment and Logistics. Sustainment and logistics are often

used interchangeably, but there is a distinction. Logistics is the broader of
the 2 concepts as it encompasses all actions required to obtain, move and
maintain forces. This includes the acquisition and positioning of resources
as well as the delivery of those resources. Force sustainment, on the
other hand, is the activity which actually provides services and supplies to
the combat force. Since many force sustainment activities are conducted
within the tactical level of logistics, the 2 terms are commonly used
interchangeably by the operating forces.

5.31. Components of Sustainment. The main components of

sustainment are personnel, materiel, infrastructure and services. (See Fig.
5.5).

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Fig. 5.5. Components of Sustainment.

A Personnel. As a component of sustainment, ‘Personnel’

implies the provision and management of trained manpower (including
reserves) in sufficient numbers to man the force equipment.
Management of personnel (feeding, water, shelter and morale) is key
to their performance. A well-motivated group of personnel produce
great achievements.

b. Materiel. Materiel is all equipment, stores, packaging and

supplies used by the fighting force. It includes the resources used in
support of aircraft and associated equipment as well as the equipment
that facilitates the provision of combat support. It comprises special
purpose vehicles, communications and information management
systems, security equipment, warehousing equipment, weapons and
medical equipment. It also includes computers, radar, maps, tentage
and other items necessary to sustain operations. Consumable items
such as POL; ammunition; rations; and building materials are all part
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of the materiel component.

c. Infrastructure. Infrastructure includes fixed and permanent

installations, fabrications and facilities, including plants, buildings,
works, real property and natural/cultural environments. Infrastructure
challenges in sustainment are generally more difficult for short-term
operations in remote, austere environments. Due to fixed-wing
aircraft’s dependence on runways and other support facilities, there is
always the need to provide a certain amount of infrastructure to allow
air operations proceed. In this case, temporary installations become
preferable if well found bases are not available. This has the added
benefit of minimizing, when feasible, the force sustainment footprint.

d. Services. Sustainment services are provided in the 3

supporting elements: operations support, aircraft and weapon system
maintenance and mission support. This aspect brings the other 3
components of sustainment together at the right place and time. It is
reasonably straight forward to identify the services required to sustain
an air operation in pursuit of its objectives. It is more difficult, however,
to identify the best ways to deliver those services when the operational
situation and tempo are constantly changing and there is a likelihood of
hostile acts.

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CHAPTER 6

AIR POWER DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

6.1. All terms and definitions are drawn from British Defence Doctrine,
the United States Joint Doctrine, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
and other sources as indicated. Those marked NTP are under consideration
in the NATO terminology programme.

DEFINITIONS

6.2. Agency. A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are
broadly consistent with those of the campaign.

6.3. Active Air Defence. Direct defensive action taken to nullify or

reduce the effectiveness of hostile aircraft or missile attack against friendly
forces and vital assets. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft,
air defence weapons, weapons not used primarily in air defence role and
electronic warfare.

6.4. Aim (Military) A single unambiguous military purpose that must be

established before a plan can be developed at any level of command for a
military operation.

6.5. Air Borne Early Warning. Air surveillance and control; provided by
airborne early warning aircraft equipped with search and height finding radar
and communications equipment for controlling weapon systems.

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6.6. Air Defence. All defence measures designed to destroy attacking

adversary aircraft and missiles to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of
such attacks.

6.7. Air Defence Operations Area. An area and the air space above it
within which procedures are established to minimize mutual interference
between air defence and other operations; it may include designation code
of one or more of the following: air defence action area, air defence area, air
defence identification zone, and or firepower umbrella (Joint Pub 1-02).

6.8. Airhead. A designated area in a hostile or threatened territory

which when seized and held ensures the continuous air landing of troops
and material and provides the manoeuvre space necessary for projected
operations. Normally it is an area seized in the assault phases of an
airborne operation.

6.9. Airspace Control Au thorit y. The commander designated to

assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control
system in the airspace control area.

6.10. Airspace Control in The Combat Zone. A process used to

increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient and flexible
use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to prevent fratricide,
enhance air defence operations, and permit greater flexibility operations.
Air space control does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to
approve, disapprove or deny combat operations. Also called combat
airspace control. (Joint Pub 1-02).

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6.11. Air Interdiction An air operation conducted to destroy, neutralize or

delay the adversary’s military potential before it can be brought to bear
effectively against friendly forces, at such a distance from friendly forces
that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of
friendly forces is not required.

6.12. Airlift. Strategic or inter–theatre airlift is the carriage of

passengers and cargos between theatres of operation. Tactical or intra
theatre airlift is the carriage of passengers and cargo within a theatre of
operation.

6.13. Air Operations for Strategic Effect. Air operations for strategic
effect are aimed to destroy or disrupt the defined strategic centre of gravity
of an opponent. The effect sought by air power could be destructive, non-
destructive or a combination of both, against target sets, which undermine
the opponent’s ability, will and means to continue his aggression. Air
operations for strategic effect are not limited to bombing or solely the
domain of attack aircraft. All combat aircraft and associated weapon
systems are capable of action for strategic effect.

6.14. Air Power. The ability to project military power or influence through
the control and exploitation of air, space and cyber space to achieve
strategic, operational and tactical objectives.

6.15. Air Superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one
force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former
and its related land, sea, air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

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6.16. Air Supremacy. That degree of air superiority where in the opposing
air force is incapable of effective interference.

6.17 Allocation (Air). The translation of the air apportionment decision into
total number of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task.

6.18. Allotment. Allotment is the temporary change of assignment of air

forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in
the commander having operational command. The process of allotment is
used to provide the balance of forces needed to achieve the objectives
stipulated by that command.

6.19. Apportionment (Air). The determination and assignment of the total

expected air efforts by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted
to the various air operations or geographic area for a given period of time.

6.20. Area Air Defence Commander. Within a unified command,

subordinate unified command, or joint task force the commander assigns
overall responsibility for air defence to a single commander. Normally, this
is the component commander with the preponderance of air defence
capability and the command, control and communication’s capability to
plan and execute integrated air defence operations. Representations from
the other components involved are provided, as appropriate to the area air
defence commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC.

6.21. Area of Responsibility. The geographical area assigned by the

military strategic authority within which the operational level commander has
authority to plan and conduct the campaign and controls all joint actions
supporting his mission.
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6.22. Attrition. The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by

loss of personnel and material.

6.23. Attrition Warfare. A style of warfare characterized by the

application of substantial combat power that reduces an adversary’s ability
to fight through loss of personnel and equipment. Essentially, it aims at the
physical destruction of the adversary.

6.24. Battle Damage Assessment. The timely and accurate estimate

of damage resulting from the application of military force lethal or non–lethal
against a predetermined objective.

6.25. Battle Space. All aspects of air, surface, sub-surface, land, space
and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of operations.

6.26. Battle Space Dominance. The degree of control over dimensions of

the battle space that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the
adversary freedom of action. It permits power projection and force
sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential mission.

6.27. Campaign. A set of related joint military operations in a

given area(s) designed to achieve particular objectives.

6.28. Centre of Gravity. Characteristics, capabilities or locality(ies) from

which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derive its
freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

6.29. Close Air Support. Air action on hostile targets that are in close
proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air
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mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

6.30. Collateral Damage. Damage to personnel and property adjacent

to, but not forming part of an authorized target.

6.31. Combat Air Patrol. An aircraft patrol provided over an objective

area over the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone or over
an air defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile
aircraft before they reach their target.

6.32. Combat Power. The total means of destruction and/or

disruptive force which a military unit/force can apply against the opponent at
a given time.

6.33. Combined Operations. Military operations in which elements of

two or more allied nations participate.

6.34. Combined Joint Task Force. A multinational multi-service task

force. The CJTF headquarters concept provides for deployable multinational
multi-service headquarters of variable sizes.

6.35. Command. Command is the authority vested in an individual

for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.

6.36. Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. A formal analysis of the

situation, mission, adversary and own courses of action conducted in
preparation for forming a commander’s intentions and concept of operations.

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6.37. Commander’s Intent. A concise expression of the purpose of

a campaign or operation, the desired results and how operations will progress
towards achieving the desired end-state. At the tactical level, the
commander’s intent should be focused on the effect that he wishes to
achieve on the adversary.

6.38. Commonality. A state achieved when groups of individuals,

organization or nations use common doctrines, procedures or equipment.

6.39. Compatibility. The capability of 2 or more items or components of

equipment or material to exist or function in the same or environment
without mutual interference.

6.40. Components. Component are forces of one or more services

grouped into functional force elements (i.e. Maritime, land, air, logistics
and special forces) or exceptionally by service or geographical area
organized under one or more component commander’s subordinate to the
operations level commander.

6.41. Concept of Operations. A clear and concise statement of the line

of action chosen by commander in order to accomplish his mission.

6.42. Control. Authority which may be less than full command exercised
by a commander over part of the activities of subordinates or other
organizations.

6.43. Co-ordinating Authority. The authority granted to a commander

or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or
activities involving forces of 2 or more services or involving 2 or more
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forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation

between the agencies involved or their representatives but does not have
the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the
agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by
discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he
should refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

6.44. Counter Air. A function that integrates and exploits the

mutually beneficial effects of offensive and defensive operations by fixed
and rotary winged aircraft, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft
guns, artillery, and electronic warfare to destroy or neutralize adversary
aircraft and missile forces and their infrastructure both before and after
launch.

6.45. Culminating Point. An operation reaches its culminating point

when the operation can just be maintained but not developed to any
greater advantage.

6.46. Deception. Those measures designed to mislead an adversary

by manipulation, distortion or falsification.

6.47. Decisive Condition. An event, the successful outcome of which is a

precondition for unlocking the adversary’s centre of gravity.

6.48. Defensive Counter-Air. Operations to detect, identify, intercept,

and destroy adversary air and missile forces attempting to attack or
penetrate the friendly air environment. Defensive counter-air encompasses
both active and passive measures and is normally conducted near or over
friendly territory and generally reacts to the initiative of adversary forces.
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6.49. Direct Air Operations. Direct air operations are intended to

bring the flexibility and the precision of air power to bear where and when it
is needed. Direct air mission may include denial, disruption and mobility
operations in direct contact with opposing forces. Such operations require
close coordination and, possibly, control from other elements, be the land,
sea, or air.

6.50. Directive. A military communication in which policy is

established or a specific action is ordered.

6.51. Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military

forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but
requires judgement in application.

6.52. Electronic Warfare. Any military action involving the use of

electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack the adversary. Also called EW. The 3-major
subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack,
electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

a. Electronic Attack. Electronic attack is that division or

electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed
energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or
equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying
adversary combat capability. EA includes:

(1) Actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary’s

effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum such as jamming
and electromagnetic deception.
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(2) Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic

or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism
(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams or radiation
weapons).

b. Electronic Protection. Electronic protection is that

division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect
personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or
adversary employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize
or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP.

c. Electronic Warfare Support. That division of electronic

warfare involving actions tasked by or under direct control of an
operational commander to search for, intercept, identify and locate
sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic
energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus,
electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate
decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical
actions such as threat avoidance, targeting and homing. Also called
ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals
intelligence (SIGINT), which includes both communications
intelligence (COMINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT).

6.53. End-State. The state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the

end of a campaign either by the adversary air forces is insufficient to
prejudice the success of friendly land, sea or air operation. (NTP)

6.54. Favourable Air Situation. An air situation in which the extent of air
effort applied by the adversary air forces is insufficient to prejudice the
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success of friendly land, sea or air operation.

6.55. Force Protection. Process which aims to conserve the fighting

potential of the deployed force by countering the wider threat to all its
elements from an adversary, natural and human hazards and fratricide.

6.56. Fratricide. The accidental destruction of own, allied or friendly

forces. A result of what is colloquially known as a “blue on blue
engagement”.

6.57. Full Command. The military authority and responsibility of a

superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of
military operations and administration and remains a national responsibility
which cannot be delegated. No multinational commander will therefore have
full command over forces assigned him by other nations.

6.58. Host Nation Support. Civil and military assistance rendered

in peace, crisis and war by host nation to allied forces and organizations
which are located on or in transit through the host nation territory.

6.59. Indirect Air Operations. Operations aimed at depriving the

adversary of the military power he needs to occupy territory or exploit sea
space by neutralizing, delaying or destroying surface forces. Indirect air
operations enable a commander to take advantage of both friendly
strengths and adversary weakness whilst preserving his own freedom
action.

6.60. Interchangeability. A condition, which exists when 2 or more

items possess such functional and physical characteristics as to be
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equivalent in performance and durability, and are capable of being

exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves or
adjoining items, except for adjustment and without selection for fit and
performance.

6.61. Interoperability. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide

services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to
use the service so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively
together.

6.62. Joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations etc. in

which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

6.63. Joint Force Air Component Commander. The joint force air
component commander derives his authority from the joint force
commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign
missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders redirect and
organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall
mission. The joint force commander normally designates a joint force air
component commander. The joint force air component commander’s
responsibilities are designed by the joint force commander (normally these
includes, but are not limited to planning, coordination, allocation and
tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment
decision. Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority and in
coordination with other service component commanders and other assigned
or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander
recommends to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to
various mission or geographic areas. Also called JFACC.

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6.64. Joint Task Force Commander. The operational commander

of a nominated joint force.

6.65. Lines of Operation. Lines of Operation link decisive conditions in

the air space on the path of the centre of gravity.

6.66. Main Effort. A concentration of forces or means, in a particular

area where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.

6.67. Manoeuvre Warfare. Manoeuvre warfare is a war fighting philosophy

that seeks to defeat the adversary by shattering his morale and physical
cohesion; his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole, rather than
by destroying him physically through incremental attrition.

6.68. Manoeuvres. A term describing an approach that employs the

principles of manoeuvre warfare.

6.69. Mission Command. A style of command that seeks to convey

understanding to subordinates about the intentions of the higher
commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out
missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.

6.70. Multinational Operations. Operation in which elements of 2 or

more nations participate and which are normally based on a coalition.

6.71. No Fly Zone. Zone of air space established by international states

(or conceivably unilateral as a military or total exclusion zone) in which
special types of aircraft are prohibited.

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6.72. Offensive Counter Air. Operations mounted to destroy, disrupt

or confine adversary air power as close to its base as practicable. Also,
OCA.

6.73. Operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic tactical

service training or administrative military mission, the process of carrying on
combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres
needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

6.74. Operational Art. The skilful employment of military forces to attain

strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct
of campaigns and major operations.

6.75. Operational Command. The authority granted to a commander to

assign missions or task to subordinate commanders to deploy units, to
reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and or tactical control
as may be deemed necessary it does not include responsibility for
administration or logistics. Also, OPCOM.

6.76. Operational Control. Transferable command authority that may be

exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of
combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be
delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over
subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and
forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

6.77. Operational Level of War. The level of war at which campaigns

and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to
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accomplish strategic objective within areas of responsibility.

6.78. Operational Pause. A pause in operations while retaining the

initiative in other ways.

6.79. Order. A communication written or oral or by signal which

conveys instruction from a superior to a subordinate.

6.80. Passive Air Defence. All measures other than active air defence
taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air action. These measures
include deception, dispersion and the use of protective construction.

6.81. Peace Support Operations. Multi-functional operations involving

military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies, they are designed
to achieve humanitarian goals or long-term political settlement and are
conducted impartially in support of an appropriate mandate. These include
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peace-making,
peace building and humanitarian operations.

6.82. Phase. A phase is a discrete and identifiable activity along a

military line of operation in time and/or space that allows for the
reorganization and redirection of force part of the superior commander’s
plan.

6.83. Principles of War. The principles of war are guides to action

and fundamental tenets forming the basis for appreciating a situation and
planning but their relevance, applicability and relative importance change
with circumstances.

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6.84. Recognized Air Picture. The fullest achievable agreed level of

identification and tracking of all airborne contacts in the area of interest.

6.85. Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain by visual

observation or other detection methods, information about the activities
and resources of an adversary or potential adversary or to secure data
about meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics of a
particular area.

6.86. Sequence. The arrangement of activities within a campaign in the

order most likely to achieve the elimination of the adversary’s entire centre
of gravity.

6.87. Simultaneity. Element of campaign and operational design that

seeks to disrupt the decision-making process of the adversary commander
by confronting him with a number of problems simultaneously.

6.88. Supported Commander. A commander having primary

responsibility from all aspects of a task assigned by higher authority.

6.89. Supporting Commander. A commander who furnishes forces,

equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander or who
develops a supporting plan.

6.90. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. The purpose of SEAD

mission is to neutralize, destroy or degrade enemy surface-to-air defence
systems, which could include parts of an integral air defence system, radars
and early warning systems.

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6.91. Surveillance. The systematic observation of the aerospace surface

and sub-surface area, places, persons, or things by visual, aerial, electronic,
photographic or other means.

6.92. Sustainment. The ability of a force to maintain the necessary

level of combat power for duration required to achieve its objectives.

6.93. Synchronization. The focusing of resources and activities to

produce maximum combat power at the decisive time.

6.94. Tactical Command. The authority designed to a commander to

assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the
mission assigned by their higher authority. Also, TACOM.

6.95. Tasking. Tasking is the process of translating the allocation into

orders, and passing those orders to the units involved. Each order normally
contains sufficient detailed instruction to enable the executing agency to
accomplish the mission successfully.

6.96. Theatre of Operation. A geographical area defined by the military

strategic authority which includes and surrounds the area delegated to the
operational commander within which he will conduct operations.

6.97. Weapon Engagement Zone. In air defence, aerospace defined

dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats
normally rests with a particular weapon system.

6.98. Weapon Free. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a

status whereby weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively
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recognized as friendly.

6.99. Weapons Hold. In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a

status whereby weapons system may only be fired in self-defence or in
response to a formal order.

6.100. Weapons Tight. In air defence a weapon control order

imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired only at targets
recognized as hostile.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC Area Air Defence Commander

AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling
AU African Union
C2 Command and Control
CAS Close Air Support
CJO Chief Joint Operations
C-IN-C Commander in Chief
CND Computer Network Defence
CNE Computer Network Exploitation
CNO Computer Network Operations
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSCF Coordinator of Support Command Functions
DCA Defensive Counter Air
ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Cooperation of West African States
FP Force Protection
HVA High Value Asset
HVAA High Value Airborne Asset
ICRC International Committee for the Red Cross
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
Reconnaissance
IW Information Warfare
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

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JFC Joint Force Commander

JOA Joint Operations Area
J-SEAD Joint Suppression of Adversary Air Defences
J-STARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTF Joint Task Force
JTFC Joint Task Force Commander
NAF Nigerian Air Force
OPS Operations
OPCON Operational Control
Ops Sup Operations Support
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
PB Peace Building
PE Peace Enforcement
PJHQ Permanent Joint HQ
PK Peace Keeping
POW/PW Prisoner of War
PSO Peace Support Operations
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
RAF Royal Air Force
ROE Rules of Engagement
S/A POD Sea/Air Port of Disembarkation
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SEAD Suppression of Adversary Air Defences
SF Special Forces
SH Support Helicopter
SHORAD Shortage-Range Air Defence
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SOF Special Operations Forces

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SOLE Special Operation Liaison Elements

TASMO Tactical Air Support Maritime Operations
TACON Tactical Control
TACS Theatre Air Control Systems
TBM Theatre Ballistic Missile
TBMS Tactical Battle Management System
TM Theatre Missile
TMD Theatre Missile Defence
TST Time-Sensitive Target
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces
USAF United States Air Force
WCO Weapon Control Order
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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