(An assignment towards fulfilment of Mid- Term Assessment in the subject of Political

Science and International Relations)

“ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN CURTAILING CIVIL HARM – CASE STUDY OF

YEMEN”

SUBMITTED BY: UJJWAL AGRAWAL (2076)

VANSHIKA MEENA (2078)

Semester V - B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) 2021-2026

SUBMITTED TO: DR. MANISHA MIRDHA MA’AM

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND

SOCIAL SCIENCES, NLU JODHPUR

DATE OF SUBMISSION: 22-07-2023

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JODHPUR

SUMMER SESSION

(JULY- NOV 2023)

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We take this opportunity to express our profound gratitude and respect to our guide and
teacher, Dr. Manisha Mirdha Ma’am, who is a renowned authority in India in subjects of
Political Science, International Relations and Clinical and Therapeutical Psychology, for her
constant guidance, monitoring and encouragement throughout the course of this project topic.
The blessing, help and guidance given by her due to her multidisciplinary experience,
knowledge and skills has made all the difference in this project work.

We also take this opportunity to express a deep sense of gratitude to IT and Library
Department. Their cordial support, valuable information and guidance, successfully helped us
in completing this task through various stages. We are obliged to staff members of National
Law University, Jodhpur, for the valuable information provided by them in their respective
fields. We are grateful for their cooperation during the period of this assignment.

Lastly, we thank almighty, our parents and friends for their constant encouragement without
which the completion of this project would not be possible.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................4

II. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................4

A. PURPOSE/OBJECTIVES:..............................................................................................5

B. REVIEW OF LITERATURE:..........................................................................................5

C. STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS:...................................................................................7

D. METHODOLOGY:.........................................................................................................7

III. TIMELINE OF UN PEACE EFFORTS IN YEMEN.............................................................8

A. THE AFTERMATH OF ARAB SPRING..........................................................................8

B. THE UN RESOLUTIONS 2140, 2201 AND 2201..........................................................9

C. THE DEATH OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALEH...........................................................12

IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE UN PEACE EFFORTS IN YEMEN...............................................15

A. THE SAUDI-IRANIAN PROXY WAR IN YEMEN.........................................................15

i. Iran’s winning card in Yemen..............................................................................18

ii. Saudi Arabia’s Geopolitical Concerns.................................................................18

B. UN PASSIVITY TOWARDS SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY..............................................21

C. THE RESTRAINTS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PRINCIPLE..................22

V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE...................................................................24

VI. SUGGESTIONS AND THE ROAD AHEAD........................................................................25

VII. RESULT........................................................................................................................26

VIII. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................27
 I. ABSTRACT

Despite ongoing efforts by the UN and the international community to

establish a peace agreement in Yemen since the inception of the chaos in 2011,
the nation continues to experience a humanitarian crisis that the UN labels as
the worst in the world as a result of the ongoing hostility between the Houthi
opposition forces and the Yemeni government, which is supported by Saudi
Arabia and Iran. Yemen's civil conflict does not appear to be getting narrower.
It severely ravaged the country's infrastructure and resulted in the deaths of
thousands of Yemenis, including both soldiers and civilians. Since the UN has
frequently sidestepped important problems in Yemen's civil conflict, opponents
have claimed that it is subservient to state interests. All armed parties have
allegedly committed atrocities that potentially qualify as war crimes,
according to a number of reports by international human rights organizations.
Although these reports haven't had much of a bearing on the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) or other major UN bodies, the UN may leverage its
position as an intermediary to draw focus on the long-term costs in terms of
both people and money, as well as the fact that a destabilized nation is a haven
for extremist organizations. A well-planned strategy that strikes a balance
between the need for security, transitional justice, and the establishment of
an accountable, democratic administration is necessary to put an end to the
conflict in Yemen and stabilize the nation. Despite the fact that this is an
uphill battle, the initial task is to persuade the Saudi-led coalition that doing
so is in the best interests of all.

Key words- Yemen; United Nations; Civil Harm; Saudi Arabia; Iran; Houthis; Conflict in
Yemen, United Nations Security Council

II. INTRODUCTION

Yemen has emerged as one of the regions where Iranian interests appear to conflict with
those of the Saudis borders the Saudi Kingdom, and occupies a large portion of the Arabian
Peninsula's southwest, however it is also one of the most destitute regions of the world.
Yemen became a crucial frontline in their struggle for domination away from their regional
battlegrounds in Syria and Iraq.1 In actuality, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are situated in a
region that is experiencing a power vacuum and lacks a superpower to step into it. To protect
their interests from ongoing threats from one another, they each want to increase their level of
authority.2

This articles attempts to answer the questions: How far will UN members go to bring about
peace in Yemen? What initiatives have been made so far? Why has it been so difficult to
adopt the necessary political measures that may end the violence in Yemen?

The aim is to highlight the UN's short-term remedies to the internal issues driving the Yemeni
crisis and their disregard for more effective solutions to the regional conflict, particularly the
Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen, which is fueling the turmoil there.

A. PURPOSE/OBJECTIVES:

The aim of the research was to attempt to comprehend and analyze the UN's initiatives to
bring about stability and peace in Yemen as well as the actions performed thus far to end the
current war. The important events of the Yemeni crisis will be highlighted in a timeline, and
concurrently, the UN Security Council resolutions will be highlighted. In addition, it will
demonstrate how the geostrategic competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a major
factor in the conflict in Yemen and how the UN has ignored it in resolving the issue. This
article will also discuss and analyze the limitations that prevent the UN from delivering
conclusive resolutions.

B. REVIEW OF LITERATURE:

1. M. Sharp, Jeremy. (2018). Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.

Congressional Research Service, 7-50.

This report provides detailed information on Yemen's current turmoil. In 2014, the Northern
Yemeni-based Ansar Allah Houthi organisation, often known as the Houthis in this report,
took control of the nation's capital, Sanaa, also commonly spelt Sanaa, and moved southward
from the city to Aden on the Arabian Sea in early 2015. After Yemeni President Abdu
Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who had fled to Saudi Arabia, reached out for international
assistance in March 2015, Saudi Arabia and a hastily assembled international coalition

1
Heffron, D. (2015). How the Iran Deal will re-shape the balance of power in the Middle East. London: Centre
for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, 1-17.
2
United Nations in Yemen. (2017). UN Strategic Framework for Yemen (2017-2019).
https://yemen.un.org/en/11647-un-strategic-framework-yemen-2017-2019
known as the Saudi-led coalition unveiled a military operation aimed at reestablishing Hadis
rule and evicting Houthi fighters from the capital and other major cities.

2. Genser, Jared. (2018). The United Nations Security Council’s Implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect: A Review of Past Interventions and Recommendations for
Improvement. Chicago Journal of International Law, 18(2), 449-482.

This Article analyzes eleven country-specific case studies, which demonstrate that the
presence of certain conditions enable the U.N. Security Council to successfully implement its
R2P mandate. Further, when the identified conditions are absent, implementation is generally
unsuccessful. Given these conditions, this Article identifies recommendations for
strengthening international institutions so that implementation of R2P by the Security
Council in the coming decades will successfully save civilian populations from mass atrocity
crimes

3. Roland, Popp. (2015). War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi Intervention. CSS
Analyses in Security Policy. ETH Zurich, 2-4..

This article laid out a detailed analysis on how Yemen is often the subject of global attention:
internal power struggles have continued in the aftermath of autocratic ruler Ali Abdullah
Saleh's demise during the Arab Spring and the start of a national dialogue. Saudi Arabia has
responded militarily to the Houthi rebels' takeover of power.

4. Kronenfeld, Sami and Guzansky, Yoel. (2014).Yemen: A Mirror to the Future of the
Arab Spring. Military and Strategic Affairs. The International Institute for National
Security Studies, 6(3), 79-99..

This article gives detailed account of how the breakdown of Saleh's delicate political balance
has pushed Yemen to the brink of disaster, with competing elites, ethnic revolts, separatists,
external intervention, and fundamentalist terrorist activity pressing to divide the nation whilst
impeding the new regime's efforts to create a new political order and stability. Yemen's
destiny is now unknown, but the events and processes that are taking place there may give us
with insights into prospective situations in other Middle Eastern countries in the post-Arab
Spring age.
 C. STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS:

The hypothesis of this research is that Yemen can't start the task of rebuilding and
recuperating until there is a clear route towards ending the conflict and reaching an agreement
on a political horizon. As a result, the international community's short-term goal must be
reaching a binary deal involving the Houthis and the government. However, that critical
precondition cannot be met until and until the Houthis understand the necessity of
participating in the process.

D. METHODOLOGY:

The method of research adopted was a combination of doctrinal and empirical research,
where reliance was placed on secondary sources such as research articles, governmental and
non-governmental reports and books about the history of conflict in Yemen and also for
analyzing the role the multiple UNSC Resolutions played in restoring peace in the nation.
The authors have relied on theories related to international law and international relations and
applied the same to check the functionality and the reasons behind Yemen’s internal turmoil
and instability and the role of surrounding powers in the struggle for peace. The authors have
also analysed whether a comprehensively planned peace treaty would assist UN in handling
the growing demand of peace and stability in the country.
 III. TIMELINE OF UN PEACE EFFORTS IN YEMEN

A. THE AFTERMATH OF ARAB SPRING

The Northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and Saudi Arabia maintained cordial ties
following the twin revolutions in Northern and Southern Yemen as well as the Islamic
revolution in Iran because of their shared rivalry to Iran.3 At the same time, due to their
shared hostility to Western colonialism and the authority of the Gulf monarchs, Tehran (Iran
) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), a communist nation that
replaced British control in the south, became closer. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was
generally open to maintaining relationships with any state that may serve his own interests
and who played regional powers off against one another in order to reinforce his own
position, developed relations with Yemen after the union. Salisbury claims that the Arab
Spring wave, which overthrew Saleh's 33-year administration in 2011, marked the start of the
real Yemeni Crisis. In fact, Saleh was coerced by the US and Saudi Arabia to sign a
document delegating power to Vice President Abed Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.4

The key opposition leaders in Yemen and supporters of Saleh's General People's Congress
party agreed to the peace transition process in May 2011. But Saleh refused to accept being
overthrown in this way and continued to battle his opposition. The UN Secretary-General
condemned the violence committed by the Yemeni security forces against their own citizens
in a statement from September 2011 and urged the government to safeguard its unarmed
population and respect international law.5

The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue using his good offices in
accordance with Resolution 2014 and called for the implementation of a political settlement
based on the GCC initiative for the peaceful transfer of political power in Yemen on October
21, 2011, when the UN issued its first resolution on the matter.6

3
M. Sharp, Jeremy. (2018). Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service. 7-50.
www.crs.gov. R43960
4
Salisbury, Peter. (2015). Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1-15.
5
Genser, Jared. (2018). The United Nations Security Council’s Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect:
A Review of Past Interventions and Recommendations for Improvement. Chicago Journal of International Law,
18(2), 449-482.
6
UN Security Council. (), Security Council resolution 2014 (2011) [on the situation in Yemen], 21 October
2011, S/ RES/2014(2011), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ec4e9742.html [accessed 19 February
2019].
So, in November 2011, Saleh signed the GCC plan, ceding control to his deputy Mansour
Hadi, who then called the National Dialogue Conference (this was later failed) and
started drafting the constitution. The country's divided political environment proved difficult
for the newly appointed president to unify, and he failed to stand up to the Houthi
terrorists who have been conducting a lengthy insurgency in the north for years.7

(Houthi Expansion from 2012- 2015)

B. THE UN RESOLUTIONS 2140, 2201 AND 2201

On February 26, 2014, the UN passed Resolution 2140 to support the implementation of
the outcomes of the National Dialogue, insist on the necessity of implementing political
7
Salisbury, Peter. (2015). Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1-15.
transition, and to establish a sanctions regime under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. This was two years after the first resolution and as a result of the ongoing Houthi
rebellion against Hadi's government.8

Early in 2015, the Houthis movement succeeded in becoming a powerful militia group and
extending its influence to Yemen's capital. After forcing Mansour Hadi, the interim
president, to submit his resignation, the movement seized control of Sana'a.9

In the months that followed, the Houthis proclaimed themselves to be the ruling party,
disbanded the legislature, and constituted an interim Revolutionary Committee under the
direction of Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. President Hadi had to flee to Aden, where he
proclaimed himself the sole legitimate president and enlisted the support of his devoted
government officials and military personnel.10

The Security Council expressed serious concern over reports of the use of child soldiers on
February 15, 2015, and condemned the unilateral actions taken by the Houthis to dissolve the
Yemeni parliament and seize control of the government institutions. They also urged all
parties to continue the political transition mandated by Resolution 2201. 11 Additionally, in
accordance with Resolution 2204, the UN on February 24th extended the Sanctions Panel of
Experts' mission until March 2016.12

President Hadi, who had fled to Saudi Arabia, pleaded for international intervention as the
Houthi troops pushed from the capital all the way to Aden. On March 27, 2015, Saudi
Arabia formed a global coalition and began conducting military operations with the aim
of restoring Hadi's administration and eliminating the Houthi forces from the capital
and other significant cities in Yemen.13

The council enacted Resolution 2216 in April 2015, demanding the Yemeni parties to fully
execute Resolution 2201, asking for a political settlement to the conflict that is peaceful, and
requesting the Houthis to withdraw their forces from areas they have taken control of and
8
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) [on the Middle East], 26 February 2014, S/
RES/2140 (2014), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/530ef1fe4.html [accessed 19 February 2019].
9
Salisbury, Peter. (2015).
10
Roland, Popp. (2015). War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi Intervention. CSS Analyses in Security Policy.
ETH Zurich, 2-4.
11
UN Security Council (2015). Security Council resolution 2201 (2015) [on the situation in Yemen], 15
February 2015, S/RES/2201. available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/54eb58a84.html [accessed 19
February 2019].
12
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2204 (2015) [on the situation in Yemen], 24 February 2015,
S/RES/2204 (2015), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/550aaf834.html [accessed 19 February 2019]
13
Roland, Popp. (2015). War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi Intervention. CSS Analyses in Security Policy.
ETH Zurich, 2-4.
hand over all of their weapons. Additionally, it striked an arms embargo on a number of
persons and asked once more that the Secretary-General step up his efforts to act as a
mediator to allow the political process to resume.14

The UNSC voted Resolution 2266 on February 24, 2016, to prolong the asset freeze and
travel restriction imposed by Resolution 2140 and to assist in easing the crisis in Yemen.15

An asset freeze, travel restriction, and arms embargo against individuals and entities
designated by the Committee imposed in accordance with resolution 2140 (2014) were
reaffirmed and extended until 26 February 2018 by Resolution 2342, which was published a
year later on 23 February 2017.16

14
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) [on cessation of violence in Yemen and the
reinforcement of sanctions imposed by resolution 2104 (2014)], 14 April 2015, S/RES/2216 (2015), available
at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/553deebc4.html [accessed 19 February 2019]
15
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2266 (2016) [on the situation in Yemen], 24 February 2016,
S/RES/2266 (2016), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/56d549164.html [accessed 19 February 2019].
16
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) [on the situation in the Middle East], 23
February 2017, S/RES/2342 (2017), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/58b40d9c4.html [accessed 19
February 2019].
 C. THE DEATH OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALEH

The relationship between Saleh and the Houthis broke down in December 2017, which
resulted in the former president's death and gave the Saudi coalition the opportunity to move
forward with military achievements. Despite many UN attempts to implement a peace
accord, the Houthi forces continue to hold control in the northern region of Yemen. The
war between the two sides seemed to be never-ending.17

Additionally, the UN made an effort to denounce Iran's support for the Houthi movement in
Yemen, concluding in January 2018 that Iran had violated UNSCR 2216 by failing to prevent
the transfer of Iranian-made short-range ballistic missiles to Houthi forces. However, on
February 26, 2018, Russia stepped in to support its ally Iran and vetoed the draft resolution
for the U.N. Security Council that would have voiced alarm about Iran's violation of the
global arms embargo.18 In order to continue the travel restriction and insist on the asset freeze
and arms embargo against individuals who pose a threat to the stability of Yemen, the
Security Council passed Resolution 2402.19

In an attempt to end the Houthi threat, a multinational coalition of armed forces led by Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) launched Operation Golden Victory in June
2018 with the goal of regaining the Red Sea port city of Hodeida. They also continued to
conduct airstrikes against Yemeni territory.

The conflict over territory in light of broader dispute between the two groups

As the different regional groups within Yemen seek to control territory, having the upper
hand in the Hodeida in crucial in rebalancing power in the conflict. The main landlocked
northern Houthi-controlled territories have access to the Red Sea through Hodeida port,
which is the nation's second-largest port after Aden. Controlling this port is essential for
supplying Sanaa, the capital of Yemen under Houthi control. Furthermore, the port is
located north of the Bab al Mandab Strait, one of the world's major shipping lanes. The
Houthis tax imports, regulate food distribution and fuel exiting the port, and exploit this port
as an income source, which is maybe the most significant.20

17
18
M. Sharp, Jeremy. (2018). Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, 7,
5700. www.crs.gov. R43960.
19
UN Security Council Report. UN documents for Yemen : Security Council Resolutions, available at : http://
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2402.
pdf. [ accessed February 2019]
20
M. Sharp, Jeremy. (2018). Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, 7,
5700. www.crs.gov. R43960.
Martin Griffiths, the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen, convened a
consultative meeting with a group of independent Yemeni leaders on November 4, 2018, to
talk about the country's present condition and to restart the political process. This conference,
which was held in Amman, was the follow-up to the first of the kind that brought
independent Yemeni leaders and the Special Envoy to the negotiating table in August 2018 in
Wilton Park, London.21

UK’s part in attempting to negotiating peace

As a consequence of the UK effort, both the Yemeni government and the Houthis have
consented to begin negotiations in Sweden. In fact, after being discussed by the five
permanent members, the UK circulated a UN resolution to the 10 elected Security Council
members. The drafted resolution called for an immediate cessation of hostilities in the
vicinity of the port of Hodeida, an end to all missile and UAV assaults against neighboring
nations and marine areas, and a halt to all attacks on inhabited civilian areas across Yemen. It
gave the warring parties two weeks to eliminate their blockade against humanitarian
aid.22

However, Saudi Arabia, together with their partner the United Arab Emirates, tried to
persuade the UN Security Council members not to adopt a resolution calling for an end to
hostilities since it had struggled for months to reclaim the important port from the
Houthi rebels.23

Despite opposition, Martin Griffiths continued the talks between the two opposing groups
and emphasized the significance of the Hodeida Agreement's complete execution. The
Houthis demanded that Hodeida be designated as a neutral area. Khaled al-Yamani, the
foreign minister of Yemen, and the leader of the Hadi administration delegation both rejected
this notion. Peacekeeping, any kind of permanent UN presence, or neutralization were all
rejected. The latter believed that it was a question of sovereignty to subordinate the city to the
police forces of the internal ministry. However, because the port serves as the entry gateway
for the majority of Yemen's commercial commodities and aid supplies, his government

21
UN Department of Political Affairs, The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General For Yemen
(2018). Martin Griffiths Convenes a Consultative Meeting With Independent Yemeni Figures. https://osesgy.
unmissions.org/martin-griffiths-convenes-consultative-meeting-independent-yemeni-figures
22
The StraitsTime. (2018). UN draft resolution calls for Yemen truce, two weeks to unblock aid. https://www.
straitstimes.com/world/europe/un-draft-resolution-calls-for-yemen-truce-two-weeks-to-unblock-aid
23
Borger, Julian. (2018). Yemen ceasefire resolution blocked at UN after Saudi and UAE ‘blackmail’. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/29/un-yemen-ceasefire-resolution-blocked-saudiuae-
blackmail.
consented to the placement of UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM)
observers there.24

On December 21, 2018, Resolution 2451 approved the Stockholm Agreement, which
required all parties to adhere to the Hodeida ceasefire in full. The resolution gave the
Secretary-General permission to establish and send out an advance monitoring team for the
initial 30 days of the Stockholm Agreement's implementation. 25 As a result, on January 16,
2019, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2452, which constituted a Political Mission to
support the Hodeida Agreement in Yemen.26

According to Griffiths, the parties are aware that there is no military option and should
place their highest focus on finding a diplomatic settlement. To him, formal discussions in
Yemen and ongoing Track II activities are complimentary. Griffiths emphasizes the
importance of working on Yemeni peace-building in addition to official diplomatic efforts, or
Track I, to end the war.27

Other actions including the reopening of Sanaa airport and prisoner swaps have been
considered in addition to the UN agreement on a ceasefire in Hodeida. The supervising
committee for carrying out the prisoner swap deal finished up its meetings in Amman on
January 17, 2019. The committee, which comprised members of Ansar Allah, the Office of
the Special Envoy, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Government of
Yemen, addressed the actions that needed to be taken in order to continue moving towards
meeting the terms of the agreement. It is important to note that the prisoner exchange was the
first agreement between the two sides since the start of the Yemeni conflict. As an outcome,
the execution of this agreement is regarded as the beginning of the two parties' ability to trust
one another.28
24
France 24. (2018). Yemen’s Saudi-backed government rejects UN troops in Hodeida. France 24 Report,
https://www.france24.com/en/20181210-yemen-saudi-backed-government-rejects-un-troopshodeida-houthis-
khashoggi.
25
UN Security Council. (2018). Security Council resolution 2451 (2018) [on the situation in the Middle East.
S/RES/2451. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27- 4E9C-8CD3
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2451.pdf
26
UN Security Council. (2019) Security Council resolution 2452 (2019) [on the situation in the Middle East], 16
January 2019, S/RES/2452. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2452.pdf.
27
Office of the Special Envoy of the SGFY, News. (2018). Martin Griffiths: Track II efforts complement official
negotiations, and lay the foundation for peace building in Yemen. https://reliefweb. int/report/yemen/martin-
griffiths-track-ii-efforts-complement-official-negotiations-and-lay-foundation.
28
Office of the Special Envoy of the SGFY News. (2019). The supervisory follow up committee on
implementing the prisoner exchange agreement concluded its meeting in Amman. https://osesgy.
unmissions.org/supervisory-follow-committee-implementing-prisoner-exchange-agreement-concludes-
itsmeetings-amman
Exceptionally, the Hodeida governorate ceasefire has been generally respected by both sides,
and hostilities have greatly lessened since then. However, there is still some violence present.
However this seeming calm shows how committed both sides are to seeing their
commitments through. The Special Envoy expressed optimism for a fresh round of
negotiations in order to move past humanitarian concerns and start addressing the crucial
components of a political end to the conflict. 29 In general, many people—including UN
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres—viewed the Sweden peace negotiations as a
breakthrough that might serve as a starting point for peace and an end to the humanitarian
crisis in Yemen.30

IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE UN PEACE EFFORTS IN YEMEN

A. THE SAUDI-IRANIAN PROXY WAR IN YEMEN

There are several facets to the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the quest for regional
influence and dominance. Since the Iranian revolution, this conflict has continued, and both
sides have been adding to a lengthy list of old grievances with each setback and victory. As
each of them backed opposite parties in the Arab Spring domino effect, the relationship
between Saudi Arabia and Iran deteriorated. 31The sensitivity of Saudi Arabia to Iran led to
uprisings in neighboring nations, including Yemen, where Iran supported the Houthis' 2011
uprising against Ali Abdallah Saleh. Saudi Arabia saw it necessary to suppress any attempts
to expand the revolution close to its southern frontiers. In order to lead an inter-Arab
alignment against the alleged Iranian threat in Yemen, Saudi Arabia first discarded its
previously observed lack of engagement in world affairs. 32 Yemen was not Iran's primary
security concern, but the country saw Yemen's turmoil as a chance to exert more influence on
Saudi Arabia.33

29
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. Report. (2019). Briefing of the Special Envoy
for Yemen to the Security Council. https://osesgy.unmissions.org/briefing-special-envoy-yemen-securitycounci.
30
United Nations Secretary-General. (2018). Secretary-General’s remarks at closing of the Intra-Yemeni
Consultations. Rimbo, Sweden. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-12-13/ secretary-generals-
remarks-closing-of-the-intra-yemeni-consultations-delivered
31
Beauchamp, Zack. (2015). Iran and Saudi Arabia’s cold war is making the Middle East even more dangerous,
Vox World, http://www.vox.com/2015/3/30/8314513/saudi-arabia-iran.
32
Jahner, Ariel. (2012). Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf, International
Affairs Review, 20(3),37-48.
33
Friedman, George. (2015). The Middle Eastern Balance of Power Matures. Stratford Review.
In Yemen, tensions between the two competitors continued to rise as it was uncertain whose
hands the region's leadership would fall into given the power vacuum that the revolts had
formed.34

In order to answer the question, how can the UN effectively end war in Yemen? It is
necessary to address the question, what are the main geostrategic interests of Iran and Saudi
Arabia in Yemen that keep fueling the conflict?

i. Iran’s Winning Card In Yemen

Reardon contends that despite the lack of clarity around Iran's involvement in the series of
these incidents and its support for the Houthi uprisings, the unanticipated shift in the situation
on the ground was certainly to Iran's advantage. Actually, Yemen is a country in which Iran
has a long-term strategic interest. Yemen, a poorly managed, turbulent nation bordering
Saudi Arabia's southern border and situated on the southwest tip of the Gulf peninsula, is
connected to historic smuggling routes used by those attempting to enter the country
clandestinely. Furthermore, Tehran may use Yemen's 35% Shiites as a favorable base of
operations in its conflict with Saudi Arabia. According to Reardon, Iran will try to exert
pressure on Saudi Arabia on areas involving Iraq and Syria by using the Houthi card, as well
as escalate its efforts to destabilize the Kingdom from its southern border.35

According to Kronenfeld et al., Saleh's administration is where Iran's participation in Yemen

first began. This influence has continued ever since. They believe that whereas in the past this
participation had been believed to be a minor occurrence involving the shipment of weapons
to insurgents in Yemen, it is now being considered an important diplomatic problem that is
growing as the government at large becomes weaker. Since 2012, the U.S. security forces
have been working in conjunction with the Yemeni government to stop Iranian weapon
shipments to Yemen. In July 2012, Yemen’s Interior Ministry revealed the discovery of an
Iranian spy group based in Sana’a and arrested an officer from the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards on suspicion of having been its leader.

Additionally, after being apprehended by the Yemeni Coast Guard and the US Navy in a
joint operation in January 2013 and charged of conducting business with Iran and smuggling
weapons, crew members of a ship carrying armaments from Iran were handed down
34
Katzman, Kenneth. (2015). Iran’s Foreign Policy, Congressional Research Service. 8-10.
35
Reardon, Martin. (2015). Saudi Arabia, Iran and the ‘Great Game’ in Yemen. Opinion/ Iran, Al-Jazeera.
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-great-game-ye201492984846324440.html
sentences by a Yemeni court. Iran may demonstrate its regional strength as well as the extent
of its military influence by participating in Yemen. In comparison to the amount of weapons
already entering Yemen, particularly from the north, Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis—
which include assault rifles, explosives, anti-tank weapons, and large sums of money—are
insignificant. However, they do give Tehran the opportunity to influence Yemen and
challenge Saudi Arabia's hegemony in the Arabian Peninsula. Iran is not only assisting the
Houthis, but it also strives to strengthen its influence over other Yemeni groups, such as the
southern separatist movement. According to the Yemeni administration, Iran even tried to
undermine the National Dialogue Conference, which was intended to establish a national
consensus and resolve Yemen's political crisis. In 2013, the Iranian ambassador of Sana’a
met with the head of the political branch of the Houthi movement several times to persuade
the Houthis to withdraw from the conference.36

Saudi Arabia's interests in Yemen are extremely high also because of the porous 1,770 km
southern border it shares with Yemen. Iran was able to penetrate and manipulate Saudi
Arabia with ease. The Saudis have been supporting Yemen's central government militarily
and financially, as well as launching their own air strikes and ground operations against the
Houthis, for these reasons. The Saudis perceive a serious national security danger to the
region south of their border, especially given the lack of certainty surrounding Yemen's
future. Saudi Arabia cannot afford for Yemen to become unstable because doing so would
allow Iran to establish a firm presence on the peninsula.37

In actuality, an Iranian encirclement is possible if the Houthi succeed in building a pro-

Iranian Shiite state, as Friedman claims. Nevertheless, it is also important to take into account
that Saudi Arabia is conducting military operations in Yemen to cut off Iranian supplies while
additionally offering financial support.38

ii. Saudi Arabia’s Geopolitical Concerns

Saudi Arabia's geopolitical worries increased as the Houthis continued to seize control of
Yemen's coastline and the nearby maritime passageway that provides access to the Red Sea.

Heffron indicates that the ports situated along the strait are of tremendous strategic
importance to the Saudis since the strait of Bab al-Mandab is used to transport 4% of the

36
Reardon, Martin. (2015). Saudi Arabia, Iran and the ‘Great Game’ in Yemen. Opinion/ Iran, Al-Jazeera.
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-great-game-ye201492984846324440.html
37
Kronenfeld, Sami and Guzansky, Yoel. (2014). Yemen: A Mirror to the Future of the Arab Spring. Military
and Strategic Affairs, 6(3), 79-99.
38
Friedman, George. (2015).The Middle Eastern Balance of Power Matures, Stratford Review.
world's oil, much of it from Saudi Arabia. Although it is not as crucial as the waterway of
Hormuz, Saudi Arabia's access to the world's oil markets depends on the Bab al-Mandab
waterway.39

The Houthis' hold on Yemen's western coast means that Riyadh now has access to the Red
Sea, which means giving Iran to continue supplying its regional allies with weapons on a
regular basis, maintain a continuous presence near the Bab el-Mandeb Straits, and get access
to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.40

Bruno observes that the massive Saudi bombing campaign against Yemen was evidence that
Al-Saud would cease at nothing to safeguard control over the city that overlooked the Strait
of Bab el-Mandeb, one of the most significant waterways in terms of international politics. 41

Saudi Arabia focused all its efforts on isolating the Houthis politically, crippling them
economically, and now weakening them militarily because it perceived the Houthis as mainly
Iranian proxy. In reaction, the Houthis refused to accept Hadi, who had been elected as
president of Saudi Arabia. They conducted military drills along the Saudi border and will
probably take a more confrontational stance in the event that the Saudis use military
intervention against them. Although they are less dependent on Tehran than Hadi and his
supporters are on Riyadh, their greater self-sufficiency has compelled them to seek Iranian
financial and political backing due to the country's circumstances.42

While Saudi Arabia claims that its intervention in Yemen is necessary for national security, it
is obvious that the alliance's top priority is to establish a balance of power between the two
opposing sides in Yemen's ongoing conflict: the Shiite Houthi rebels, who have allied with
former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the Saudi-supported government forces.43

According to McInnis, Iranian rhetoric towards Saudi Arabia and the other GCC nations has
further heated up as the conflict in Yemen has progressed. The Islamic Republic must be

39
Heffron, Daniel. (2015). How the Iran Deal will re-shape the balance of power in the Middle East. London:
Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS), 1-17.
40
Kronenfeld, Sami and Guzansky, Yoel. (2014).Yemen: A Mirror to the Future of the Arab Spring. Military
and Strategic Affairs. The International Institute for National Security Studies, 6(3), 79-99.
41
Bruno, Alessandro. (2015). A New Balance of Power in the Middle East, Geopolitical Monitor. http://www.
geopoliticalmonitor.com/a-new-balance-of-power-in-the-middle-east/
42
Yemen at War. (2015). Crisis Group Middle East Briefing. Sanaa, Brussels
43
Dieter Bednarz, Reuter Christoph and Zand Bernhard. (2015). Proxy War in Yemen: Saudi Arabia and Iran
Vie for Regional Supremacy. DER SPIEGEL. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/saudi-arabia-and-
iranfighting-proxy-war-in-yemen-a-1027056.html.
ready for a new kind of battle with Riyadh since it has changed from being a regional rival to
a proxy danger, according to Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali, a top IRGC strategist. 44

B. UN PASSIVITY TOWARDS SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY

The UN is aware of Iran's and Saudi Arabia's support for and deployment of their allies in
Yemen and the significance of this role in determining the course of the conflict as it deals
with the Yemeni issue. However, the UN only allowed Yemeni counterparts to participate in
the Stockholm negotiations, excluding the two primary actors in the ongoing conflict. Martin
Griffiths stated that the war is strategic and that resolving the crisis in Yemen is of the utmost
importance for Yemenis as well as for everyone else with interests in the vicinity, which is
not surprising given that the red sea is where commerce routes and shipping lanes pass
through. The stability of Yemen is undoubtedly important to member states in the region and
beyond. Griffith believes that his objective is simply to include Yemenis at the negotiating
table, despite the fact that the UN must take these interests and concerns into account.
According to Griffith, outsiders shouldn't participate in decision-making. The latter
contradicts himself when he argues that regional governments contributed to the war in
Yemen but that they should not be included in decision-making.

Prior to the UK draft resolution, Jeremy Hunt, the foreign secretary of the UK, visited Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran on November 19 and urged all parties to
accelerate efforts to bring about an end to the Yemeni crisis. Hunt asked Tehran to push the
Houthis into negotiations. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign minister of Iran, responded by
saying that all Yemenis were ready to enter negotiations provided the Saudi-led coalition
gave them the opportunity to do so. This illustrates how the UN still treats the situation in
Yemen as a simple civil war despite the fact that it is clearly a struggle between proxies.

In November 2018, Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Geneva, called on all governments with influence and authority to put an end to the violence
in Yemen and expressed indignation at the escalation of hostilities. Bachelet urged the Houthi
forces, the Saudi-led Coalition, and all parties providing arms to the parties to the conflict to
immediately put an end to the suffering of Yemeni civilians, pointing out that violations by
one party to the conflict do not give carte blanche to the others to fight back at all costs.
Another UN representative stressed once more that the major reason for the suffering of the

44
Salisbury, Peter. (2015). Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London, 1-15.
Yemeni people was due to opposing forces igniting the civil war from both inside and outside
of Yemen. At this point, it is important to emphasize that the proxy conflict in Yemen will
continue unless this rivalry is addressed. In order for the UN to bring peace to Yemen, it must
first bring peace to Yemen between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

C. THE RESTRAINTS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PRINCIPLE

The UN Office for Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect claims that the
principle implies a political obligation to put an end to all forms of violence and persecution
in their worst forms. It attempts to close the gap between what states are required to do
pursuant to international humanitarian and human rights law and what populations actually
encounter when they are at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity. It encourages governments to understand their duties, hence promoting their
sovereignty. Additionally, it enables the UN system to work with governments to develop
capacity, provide early warning, and engage in other preventative and protective measures,
rather than only responding once the harm has already been done, in order to help states
prevent the listed crimes and violations and protect the impacted people.45

Additionally, the Security Council ended up failing of upholding the concept fully by
portraying the crisis in Yemen as just a civil war regardless the graveness of the mass crimes
committed against the Yemeni population while still pleading for resolutions. The P5 nations
engagement in the Saudi-led military operations blocked any additional steps taken to
implement Pillars II and III of the concepts Therefore the Security Council only urged for the
observance of international human rights and humanitarian laws. In actuality, the US and UK
support the Saudi-led coalition and many weapons deployed by coalition troops can be linked
back to them, despite the growing number of UN allegations of deadly strikes against
civilians in Yemen. Considering that two of the P5 are therefore backing the groups that are
committing these atrocities against civilians, it is not surprising that the Security Council has
only renewed sanctions since 2015 in order to carry out the Responsibility to Protect
programmes in Yemen.

45
United Nation Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect: Responsibility to Protect.
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html
 V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE

The United Nations' failure in Yemen has an assortment of reasons. The legitimate
government headed by President Hadi and the Houthis were the only parties to the conflict
recognized by Resolution 2216, while there are several other entities that were not included
within the framework of this resolution, and all components must be involved, and their
concerns addressed in order for these negotiations to succeed.

Second, none of the parties identified in Resolution 2216 is content with making any
compromises that may assist them find a point of agreement to come to a resolution.

In internationalized civil wars, such as the one occurring in Yemen, this war is not limited to
regional states, but there is an indirect participation of the permanent members of the United
Nations. As a result, these great powers unintentionally obstruct the effective implementation
of necessary decisions, preventing the United Nations from fulfilling its primary objective of
safeguarding international peace and security.

Despite the presence of several UN envoys in Syria and Libya, the UN's efforts in Yemen
have not culminated in overtly favorable outcomes, and this is because foreign actors have
intervened to help local actors in order to forward their own agendas. This failure can also be
explained by the UN's constrained resources and the Security Council's disagreements and
divisions, which prevented the UN from implementing its resolutions on the Yemeni crisis
into action.

VI. SUGGESTIONS AND THE ROAD AHEAD

First, UNSC 2216 only recognizes two parties to the conflict (the Huthis and Hadi's
internationally recognized government), whereas there are many other relevant political
entities across the nation, including tribal and other social groups, the General People's
Congress (likely to undergo major reforms and emerge as an important political entity after
Saleh's death), youth, civil society, women, southern separatists, and others. All Yemeni
forces must take part in negotiations and have their concerns taken into consideration for
there to be progress.

Second, as was already mentioned, none of the two parties now recognized by the
government is prepared to make compromises. Hadi's emphasis on the "three references" is a
strategy to sabotage any attempt at settlement while the Huthis are still in an advantageous
position.
Third, Saudi Arabia has excessive influence in this forum since the UK represents Yemen at
the UNSC and is particularly receptive to Saudi points of view. Despite mounting public
pressure, the UK has not put out any draft resolutions in the last year; Saudi Arabia is
concerned that a more impartial resolution may cast doubt on its involvement in Yemen.

Fourth, Hadi is unambiguously entirely committed to preventing any change that would most
certainly lead to the end of his presidency. His only remaining claim to power is that he is
identified as the "legitimate" president of Yemen in UNSC 2216. Since the UK represents
Yemen at the UNSC as the "pen holder" and is particularly receptive to Saudi viewpoints,
Saudi Arabia has a disproportionate amount of power in this body.

The UN is further restricted by its dealings with governments, which are the physical
manifestations of the states they represent. International recognition of the Hadi
administration in Yemen forbids it from utilizing actions that would contradict his position.
The UN has come under increasing pressure in the last few months of 2017 to adopt a new
UNSC resolution that is more balanced and takes into consideration the realities on the
ground. This will allow the UN to assist in putting an end to what its own humanitarian
coordinator has called "this absurd war that has only resulted in the destruction of the country
and the incommensurate suffering of its people, who are being punished as part of a futile
military campaign by both sides."

There are two prospects for a new strategy in the near future: the UK may provide ideas that
would allow for dialogue among all the forces on the ground as well as a freshly drafted
resolution to the Security Council that acknowledges the reality in Yemen. The soon-to-be-
completed Special Envoy's term of office presents the new UN Secretary General with an
opportunity to designate an experienced envoy with a track record of success in resolving
challenging issues. These two steps, taken together, would give millions of suffering
Yemenis some hope. Success would also aid in restoring the UN's severely tarnished
international reputation.

VII. RESULT

The result of the findings was in line with the hypothesis of the authors. Before defining an
agenda for peace that involves a much broader spectrum of stakeholders than the present UN
structure permits, the UN will need to identify new means to arbitrate not just between
Yemen's competing parties, but inside their ranks. In a future Yemen, the Saudis and Emiratis
will only get what they want. Getting the Saudi-led coalition to agree on a cohesive vision
and negotiation position, on the other hand, would effectively rebalance the battle and erase a
significant Houthi advantage: a split foe.

Restoring the equilibrium of power in negotiations with the Houthis isn't a pipe fantasy just
yet. A cohesive alliance would have a higher chance of extending ceasefires on favourable
conditions, potentially leading to Yemeni peace talks. This necessitates that main coalition
members first reach an agreement on Yemen's future, the roles of the country's numerous
governmental entities, and the allocation of earnings from the the nation's oil and gas
resources.

(Violence in Yemen During the UN-Mediated Truce: April-October 2022)

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Stockholm resolution was the UN's most notable accomplishment to date since it was
successful in bringing the opposing Yemeni factions to the negotiating table and in putting
the essential measures in place to end the violence, foster trust, and provide humanitarian
help to the Yemeni people. It is crucial to emphasize that these actions by themselves will not
bring to a lasting peace in Yemen. Political stability and an ongoing cease-fire are still non-
existent to the current day.

The dispute has to be reevaluated by the UN on both the national and regional levels. Locally,
there is no readily apparent powerful Yemeni rival to oppose Houthi control in northern
Yemen, which makes long-term prospects for a united Yemen vague and unachievable.
Therefore, the civil conflict won't be resolved anytime soon unless a firm political decision is
made that goes beyond simple sanctions and travel restrictions. If not a failing state, Yemen
has become a weak one. None of the rivals will consent to give up the leadership of this
nation to the other by sacrificing it. Given this, enhancing local governance and upholding
democracy throughout its institutions will probably reduce foreign interference while putting
all domestic parties in power. Stability and a strong grip on power in Yemen would also
mean that neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia would have to fear losing their allies and to feel
insecure about their borders.