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The Greatest Happiness Principle and Other Early German Anticipations of

Utilitarian Theory

Joachim Hruschka

Utilitas / Volume 3 / Issue 02 / November 1991, pp 165 - 177

DOI: 10.1017/S0953820800001096, Published online: 26 January 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0953820800001096

How to cite this article:

Joachim Hruschka (1991). The Greatest Happiness Principle and Other Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory. Utilitas,
3, pp 165-177 doi:10.1017/S0953820800001096

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 The Greatest Happiness Principle and
Other Early German Anticipations of
Utilitarian Theory*
JOACHIM HRUSCHKA
Universitdt Erlangen

Bentham was once thought to be the father of the principle which he

called 'the greatest happiness principle'. Now Hutcheson with his
'greatest happiness for the greatest numbers' is the generally accepted
source of this test of moral behaviour. It is not in Britain, however, but
in Germany that one finds its origin. A quarter of a century before
Hutcheson's An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue (1725), a German philosopher provided a formulation of the
principle on which Hutcheson relied.

I. REDDIE'S CLUE TO THE ORIGIN OF THE GREATEST

HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE
In his Inquiries elementary and historical in the Science of Law of 1840,
Bentham's adherent, the Glasgow advocate James Reddie, lists various
formulations of the greatest happiness principle predating Bentham's.1
Although his list does not include Hutcheson,2 it does mention a name3
which very rarely emerges in contemporary writings and which was
hardly remembered even in Reddie's time. It is that of Johann Groning,
a man born in the late 1660s, who published a number of books and
pamphlets on a multitude of subjects ranging from horticulture to
numismatics. Most of his work appeared during an approximately five-
year period starting shortly after the turn of the century.4 Apparently
Groning was an advocate at the Swedish high court situated in
* I am very grateful to Dr Sharon Byrd, Universitat Erlangen, Dr Knud Haakonssen,
A. N. U., and Prof. David F. Norton, McGill University, for their suggestions during my
preparation of this article, and to Mrs Elisabeth Short, Canberra, for her linguistic
corrections.
1
James Reddie, Inquiries elementary and historical in the Science of Law, London, 1840
pp. 68ff. Reddie expressly speaks of 'the greatest happiness principle', see, e.g. p. 12.
2
Hutcheson is mentioned, however, in other parts of Reddie's book, e.g. at p. 12 and
p. 40.
3
Reddie, p. 69.
4
A brief review of Groning's achievements in the history of natural law is to be found
in Adam Friedrich Glafey, Vollstdndige Geschichte des Rechts der Vernunfft, Leipzig,
1739 (repr. Aalen 1965), p. 16.
© Oxford University Press 1991 Utilitas Vol. 3, No. 2 November 1991
166 Joachim Hruschka
Wismar, which had jurisdiction over the Swedish territories in Ger-
many at the time. He probably is the author of a pamphlet, published in
1721,5 in which his achievements are listed, including his correspond-
ence with important personages of his time.6 On the whole one gets the
impression of a somewhat pretentious personality, at least from the
pamphlet last mentioned. The date of his death seems to be unknown.
It is Groning's Bibliotheca Juris Gentium Europaea of 1703 from
which Reddie quotes: 'Supremae autem rationis est id agere, ut boni
quantum plurimum potest, & in quam plurimis obtineatur, & tantum
diffundatur felicitas, quantum ratio rerum ferre potest/7
In order to give an impression of this dictum's possible effect on an
early eighteenth-century reader, I offer a translation as close to the
Latin original as possible: to act in accordance with supreme reason is
to act in such a manner that the greatest quantity of good available is
obtained for the greatest multitude possible and that as much felicity is
diffused as the reason of things can bear.
In praising the dictum Reddie states that it 'depicted exactly the
greatest happiness principle, involving the idea of number'. He fails to
mention that Groning did not compose but rather quoted the dictum.
Under contemporary standards of historical analysis this may be
surprising. None the less, an explanation can be given for the omission
since Groning himself is rather obscure on the dictum's origin. In the
section of his Bibliotheca Juris Gentium Europaea in which the dictum
appears, he is actually quoting various authors. The dictum itself is
contained in a book review, or rather the review of a pamphlet, which
Groning reprints in full.8 That review, 'Observationes de Principio
Juris', was published in 1700 in a journal, Monathlicher Auszug/Aus
allerhand neu-herausgegebenen/niltzlichen und artigen Bilchern? As
was then often the case, the review was published anonymously. As it
happens, the author of the review, although correctly citing the
pamphlet's title and year of publication, fails to mention its author,
clearly assuming that every reader was aware of his identity. The

5
Johan. de Groning, Musaeum Juris, et Solidioris Literaturae, Wismar and Leipzig,
1721.
6
Groning, Musaeum, p. 44 ff.
7
Johannes Groning, Bibliotheca Juris Gentium Europaea, Seu De Juris Naturae et
Gentium Principiis juxta doctrinam Europaeorum libri III, Hamburg, 1703, Lib. Ill, Cap.
XIII, §. XII (p. 352). The quotation is given from that source, since Reddie's repetition
contains a printing mistake which, strictly speaking, renders the proposition incompre-
hensible. Reddie also does not provide the full title of Groning's book and indicates an
incorrect year of publication, referring to it as lDe Juris Naturae et Gentium Principiis,
published in 1705'.
8
Groning, Bibliotheca, Lib. Ill, Cap. XIII (p. 346 ff.).
9
Monathlicher Auszug/Aus allerhand neu-herausgegebenen/nutzlichen und artigen
Bilchern, Hanover, 1700, p. 371 ff. The dictum in question in contained in Obs. XII at p.
378.
 Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory 167
omission had a peculiar effect on Groning. Obviously unfamiliar with
the pamphlet which the review criticizes, he thought that two anony-
mous authors were engaged in debate. Rather than simply admitting
his ignorance, he declared that he could not reveal their names,
expressly using the word 'revelare'. Since lack of knowledge is not the
only reason for not revealing a fact, one may get the impression,
intended or not, that Groning himself was the author of the review.10 In
fact, a marginal note by a possibly eighteenth-century hand in another
eighteenth-century reprint of the review, which is available in the
Erlangen University library,11 clearly attributes Groning with being
the author of the review. Thus, Reddie, perhaps himself baffled, had a
comprehensible reason for not pursuing his investigations. Groning
certainly had proved to be of no help.12
In fact, the pamphlet reviewed is a thesis, a dissertatio inaugurate,
De Principio Juris Naturalis Unico, Vero, et Adaequato. It indeed was
not published anonymously but under the full names of Heinrich
Cocceji, professor of law at the University of Frankfurt an der Oder,
and of his son Samuel Cocceji, twenty years old at the time.13 Heinrich
Cocceji had presided over the inaugural disputation, held in 1699, at
which Samuel Cocceji had defended the thesis. The thesis itself argues
that the will of God alone is the unique, true and adequate principle of
natural law. It had a certain impact on German natural law doctrine
until after the middle of the eighteenth century, particularly as it was
the starting point for the revival of the ancient distinction between the
principium essendi of natural law and its principium cognoscendi, or
between the principle constituting the moral obligation and the propo-
sition from which the contents of that obligation can be deduced.
Initial reactions to the thesis appeared promptly, due not only to its
own merits but also to the standing of Heinrich Cocceji, its assumed
author. At the time, the praeses, who presided over the disputation at
which a thesis was defended, was often its author. None the less, in the
case of the Coccejis, it was the son who expressly claimed authorship,
not only subsequently but also on the title page of the thesis.
One of the first reactions to the Cocceji thesis, if not the very first,

10
See Groning, Bibliotheca, Lib. Ill, Cap. XII, §. XIV (p. 345).
11
In the copy of the Cocceji reprint, mentioned in footnote 18 below, shelfmark 4°, Jur.
111/16, on p. 5.
12
The explanation given is valid for the time when Reddie first came across the dictum
in Groning's book. No explanation can be given for why Reddie did not discover the
proposition's true origin later although he obviously could have found it. See footnote 14
below.
13
In 'Discursus praeliminaris' to Bibliotheca which apparently was written and
printed later than the book itself, Groning expressly refers to Lib. Ill, Cap. XII, §. XIV of
Bibliotheca and he now says that the review is directed against Heinrich Cocceji's
doctrine. Groning also gives the title of the Cocceji thesis. See §. 12 on p. 10.
168 Joachim Hruschka
was that of the anonymous reviewer. As became known much later, its
author was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Therefore, the dictum quoted by
Groning and later by Reddie, although neither seems to have realized
the fact,14 is Leibniz's own.
The review itself consists of only a few pages of remarks in which
Leibniz focuses on the main tenet of the Cocceji family. His target is
the notion that the will of God is the first principle of natural law. He
provides a collection of arguments against that notion, including the
claim that the moral rules of equity and adequacy are as constantly
rooted in eternal ideas as the mathematical rules of equation and
proportion.15 None of these rules Leibniz suggests, is subject to divine
change. But Leibniz merely indicates what the principle of natural law
could be if it is not the will of God. The dictum given above is all that he
says in the review about that principle, and no reason or argument for
it is provided. In fact in the review, the dictum is an obiter dictum in the
strictest sense of the word.

II. HUTCHESON'S ADOPTION OF THE PRINCIPLE

Leibniz's article was widely read. During the following years, it was
cited in a number of books and articles,16 and, additionally, was
reprinted in full not only by Groning, but by Jakob Friedrich Ludovici,
a professor in Halle, in his Delineatio Historiae Juris Divini Naturalis
et Positiui Universalis of 170117 and by Leibniz's opponent, Samuel
Cocceji, as well, in 1702.18 The Cocceji reprint of the review was
accompanied by a commentary and a reprint of the Cocceji thesis.
None of these writers states that the famous Leibniz was the author of
the review. The first reference thereto appears to be in the second

14
Since Reddie, in his book, e.g. p. 19 and p. 31, refers to Leibniz's 'Observationes de
Principio Juris' in the Dutens-edition—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Opera Omnia IV,
Geneva, 1768 (repr. Hildesheim, Zurich, New York, 1989), pars tertia, continens opuscula
ad Jurisprudentiam pertinentia, p. 270ff.—itis hard to explain why he did not see that
the chapter in Groning's Bibliotheca which contains the dictum is nothing but a reprint
of Leibniz's article. Duncan Forbes's remark about Reddie's learning—see 'Natural Law
and the Scottish Enlightenment', The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment,
ed. R. H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner, Edinburgh, 1982, p. 202 at footnote 5-cannot
be accepted without qualifications therefore.
15
Obs. XIII: 'Uti propositionum & aequalitatum, ita & aequitatis & convenientiae
regulae aeternis rationibus constant.'
16
For instance in Johann Franz Buddeus, 'Historia Iuris Naturalis, aucta et ad hanc
aetatem usque continuata', Selecta Iuris Naturae et Gentium, Halle, 1704, §. XLVII (p. 65).
17
Jakob Friedrich Ludovici, Delineatio Historiae Juris Divini Naturalis et Positivi
Universalis, Halle, 1701, §. 89 ff. (p. 58ff.);Leibniz's dictum on p. 61.
18
Samuel Cocceji. Tractatus Juris Gentium de Principio Juris Naturalis Unico, Vero,
et Adaequato, pars prior et pars altera, Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, 1702, pars altera p. 5 ff.;
Leibniz's dictum on p. 32.
 Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory 169
edition of Ludovici's Delineatio, which was not published until 1714.19
Even then, Ludovici does not seem certain of Leibniz's authorship,
which, apparently, was not given unqualified recognition until more
than twenty years later.20 Moreover, although Groning, Ludovici and
Samuel Cocceji correctly quote the reviewer's suggestion of what the
principle of natural law could be, neither of them nor, seemingly, any
other author of the first decade of the eighteenth century gave it any
particular attention. Though generally available at the time, Leibniz's
dictum remained an obiter dictum par excellence.21
At this stage of the investigation Francis Hutcheson may come to
mind. I am referring, of course, to the pertinent passage in the Inquiry
into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, which appeared in
1725, or a quarter of a century after Leibniz's dictum was published.22
In fact, Hutcheson is very modest about his proposition. Although he
obviously gives it high regard, he does not pretend to have formulated
it himself. And when he writes 'that Action is best, which accomplishes
the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers', the very wording is
reminiscent of the Leibniz dictum. Indeed, it almost sounds as though it
were a translation. That Hutcheson's formula is adapted from the
works of another author is also suggested by the fact that the immedi-
ately preceding passage indubitably has its origin in another author's
work, namely in Carmichael's commentary on Pufendorf. It can hardly
be doubted that Leibniz's dictum was available in Britain in Hutche-
son's time, if not through other sources then at least through the
Cocceji reprint, for the Cocceji family was well known and respected in
British academic circles.
Beccaria's 'la massima felicita divisa nel maggior numero' in Dei

19
Jakob Friedrich Ludovici, Delineatio Historiae Juris Divini Naturalis et Positivi
Universalis, Editio II, priori multo auctior & emendatior, Halle, 1714, §. LXXXIX (p. 150);
Leibniz's dictum on p. 156.
20
See Carl Giinther Ludovici, Ausfuhrlicher Entwurff einer vollstdndigen Historie der
Leibnitzischen Philosophic zum Gebrauch Seiner Zuhorer herausgegeben, 2 vols., Leipzig,
1737 (repr. Hildesheim, 1966), vol. i, §. 421 (436 ff); and Johann Gottlieb Heineccius,
Elementa Iuris Naturae et Gentium, Editio II, Halle, 1742, Lib. I, §. X scholium (p. 8). The
first edition of Elementa was published in 1737.
21
Even in modern times Leibniz's dictum has been hardly noticed. Neither Hans
Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, 4th ed., Gottingen, 1962, p. 147ff.,nor
Hans-Peter Schneider, Justitia Universalis, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1967, p. 233 ff. and
p. 444, who expressly deal with the Leibniz-Cocceji dispute mention the dictum. The same
is true for Rene Seve, Leibniz et VEcole moderne du droit naturel, Paris, 1989, who deals
with Leibniz's utilitarianism, but does not mention the dictum. Huntingdon Cairns,
Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel, Baltimore, 1949, p. 314, mentions the dictum, but
does not concern himself with the historical relationship between Leibniz's thought and
that of Bentham; see p. 315.
22
Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,
London, 1725 (repr. Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson, Facsimile Editions Prepared
by Bernhard Fabian, vol. i, Hildesheim, 1971), 164.
170 Joachim Hruschka
delitti e delle pene of 176423 is also of interest. Beccaria expressly
considers this principle as the central idea of his book. It is stated at
the very beginning of the book and printed in italics. 'The laws',
Beccaria writes,24 should be 'dictated by a cool examiner of human
nature, who knew how to collect in one point, the actions of the
multitude, and had this only end in view, la massima felicita divisa nel
maggior numero'. In contemporary writings, Beccaria's formula is
usually regarded as having been taken solely from a French transla-
tion of Hutcheson's Inquiry.25 However, no conclusive proof supports
this assumption. I do not question the supposition that Beccaria, while
writing his Dei delitti e delle Pene, was familiar with Hutcheson's
Inquiry and, consequently, with Hutcheson's formulation of Leibniz's
principle. But I would like to suggest that Beccaria did not assume that
the principle was originally written by Hutcheson. Shortly after his
introduction of the principle and in obvious reference to it, Beccaria
writes: 'How great are the obligations due from mankind to that
philosopher, who from the obscurity of his closet, had the courage to
scatter amongst the multitude, the seeds of useful truths, so long
unfruitful!' This eulogy of an unnamed philosopher is far more intelli-
gible if interpreted as referring to an anonymous writer whose name
Beccaria never knew than to a writer of whose name he is supposedly
aware. It cannot be argued that Beccaria was reticent to mention
names, since shortly hereafter he expressly refers to Montesquieu.261
would like to suggest, therefore, that Beccaria, when writing his book
was not only familiar with Hutcheson's Inquiry but also with an
edition of Leibniz's review of the Cocceji thesis.
However, the way in which Beccaria acquired his knowledge of
Leibniz's principle is secondary. More interesting is the question of
why a possibly unknown writer's mere obiter dictum became so import-
ant that Hutcheson adopted it as his main tenet for judging the moral
quality of actions. Hutcheson's possible reasons can only be outlined
here. Leibniz's formula addresses a problem which had been perceived
since antiquity but had disturbed moral philosophers from the time of
Pufendorf 's particular attention to it. In his principal books on natural
law of 1672 and 1673, Pufendorf discusses several cases of extreme

23
Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle Pene a cura di Gianni Farncioni (Edizione
Nazionale delle Opere di Cesare Beccaria, diretta da Luigi Firpo, vol. i), Milan, 1984,
p. 23.
24
I have borrowed the translation of Beccaria from An Essay on Crimes and
PunishmentSy translated from the Italian; with a Commentary attributed to Mons. De
Voltaire, translated from the French, 3rd edn., London, 1770, p. 2ff.
25
See Robert Shackleton, 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number: the history
of Bentham's phrase', in Essays on Montesquieu and on the Enlightenment, ed. David
Gilson and Martin Smith, Oxford, 1988, p. 382 ff.
26
Beccaria, p. 25.
 Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory 171
necessity, one of them very similar to the famous case of Regina v.
Dudley and Stephens, decided by an English court towards the end of
the last century. In that case, the defendants had killed a fellow
member of their shipwrecked crew to survive on his flesh, after
spending several weeks in a lifeboat with no sign of rescue.27 Naturally,
the commentators on Pufendorf, such as Christian Thomasius, Gottlieb
Gerhard Titius and Jean Barbeyrac, discuss these cases as well. In 1703
Titius suggests that self-love may prevail over all other considerations
though he is not consistent in maintaining this idea.28 Three years later
Barbeyrac proposes a more sophisticated solution.29 In 1707 Carmi-
chael adopts Barbeyrac's view30 which reappears in his commentary on
Pufendorf of 1718.31 Translated into English Carmichael's statement is
as follows:
To determine what we ought to do in such cases for our own or other people's
welfare, it seems necessary to compute and compare three sets of factors: 1) the
gravity of evils which are to be feared, 2) the specific probability that one or the
other party will be threatened by these evils and 3) the number of persons
imperiled, on the condition, however, that dignity, being a person's utility for
many other people, can supplement number: If these things are equal everyone
is permitted to be his own next neighbour.

It is this statement that Hutcheson had in mind when he wrote in his

Inquiry 'that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from
[an] Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to
whom the Happiness shall extend: And here the Dignity, or moral
27
See Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium libri octo, 2nd edn., Frankfurt-
am-Main, 1684, Lib. II, Cap. VI (p. 308ff.),'De Jure et Favore Necessitates'. The case of
the seven British sailors in §. 3 (p. 312). The first edition was published in 1672. See also
Samuel Pufendorf, De Oflicio Hominis et Civis libri duo, Lund, 1673, Lib. I, Cap. V, §§. 18 ff.
(p. 59 ff.).
28
Samuelis L. B. de Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis juxta Legem Naturalem libri
duo. Observationibus antea separatim editis ... ac Supplementa ... locupletati, Autore
Gottlieb Gerhard Titio, Leipzig, 1709 (1st edn, 1703), Obs. 141-to Lib. I, Cap. V, §. 18-no.
8 ff. (p. 210 ff), and Obs. 142 ff.-to Lib. I, Cap. V, §. 19ff.(p. 211 ff.).
29
he Droit de la Nature et des Gens, Systeme General... Traduit du Latin de feu Mr. Le
Baron de Pufendorf, par Jean Barbeyrac. Avec des Notes du Tracteur... et une Preface,
Tome Premier et Tome Second, Amsterdam, 1706, note 5 on Liv. II, Chap. Ill, §. XV
(p. 179); note 3 on Liv. II, Chap. V, §. XIV (p. 246)—Seconde Edition, revue et augmentee
considerablement, Tome Premier et Tome Second, Amsterdam 1712, note 5 on Liv. II,
Chap. Ill, §. XV (p. 195 ff); note 4 on Liv. II, Chap. V, §. XIV (p. 269).
30
See Gershom Carmichael, Theses Philosophicae, Glasgow, 1707, §. XIII (p. 4).
31
Gershom Carmichael, Supplementa et Observationibus ad C. V. Sam. Puffendorfii
libros duos De Officio Hominis et Civis, Glasgow, 1718, Obs. 1 at Lib. I, Cap. V, §. IV (p. 75
ff.): 'Ut determinetur in talibus casibus, quid nostrae, quid aliorum saluti, debeamus;
Tria praecipue rationum genera videntur in computationem adhibenda, & quasi in se
invicem ducenda; Gravitas sc. Malorum quae utrinque timentur; specialis Probabilitas,
quae ab hac, vel ab ilia parte, ea minatur eventura; & Numerus personarum quae
utrinque periclitantur; ita tamen, ut Numerum supplere possit Dignitas, in Persona
multis utili: Caeteris vero prope modum paribus, unusquisque sibi proximus esse
permittitur.' Nearly the same words were used in Carmichael's Theses Philosophical
172 Joachim Hruschka
Importance of Persons, may compensate Numbers .. .\32 Hutcheson's
moral theory, both in its use of computation and in the factors included
in that computation, is nothing but an elaboration of CarmichaeFs
suggestion regarding the moral treatment of cases of extreme neces-
sity.33 Directly subsequent to this exploitation of Carmichael's remark,
Hutcheson employs Leibniz's dictum to provide the formula for com-
puting which of several actions is morally superior. It is quite under-
standable therefore, that the dictum had a certain appeal for Hutche-
son, particularly as Leibniz's comparison of the moral rules of equity
and adequacy with the mathematical rules of proportion and equation,
though hardly new at the time, also suggests the idea of computation.34

III. LEIBNIZ'S UTILITARIANISM

It is clear that Leibniz would not have coined a formula for the first
principle of natural law had he not given it consideration prior to his
review of the Cocceji thesis. Actually, in Mollat's Rechtsphiloso-
phisches aus Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften, published in the last
century, one finds a short paper written in Latin which, in its phrasing
and wording, is reminiscent of Leibniz's principle as suggested in the
review.35 It can be argued that Leibniz worked on this paper shortly
before or during the year 1700. At least, he must have had it in mind
while writing the review.
In that paper Leibniz argues that human happiness should be
diffused as widely as possible—'[id agitur, quantum potest,] ut felicitas
quam latissime diffundatur'—-that as many people as possible should be
made happy and content—'ut quam plurimi sint laeti'—that their
happiness should last as long as possible and that all things which
disturb their peace should be excluded. For this reason the number of
people to be made happy should be increased—'multitudo eorum, qui
felices reddi possunt, augeatur'-— to the extent they present no genuine
hindrance to each other, and, consequently, it is necessary not only to
maintain the human race but even to multiply it.36 The core of the

32
Hutcheson, p. 163.
33
From an historical point of view, utilitarianism, in particular act utilitarianism, is
to a certain extent dependent on the natural lawyers' discussions of these cases.
34
That Hutcheson adopted Leibniz's principle without any reference to his source is
not surprising. He did the same with the universalization principle which he took from
Johann Balthasar Wernher and Jean Barbeyrac. See my article 'Universalization and
Related Principles', forthcoming. See also David R. Raynor 'Hutcheson's Defence
Against a Charge of Plagiarism', Eighteenth-Century Ireland, ii (1987), 177.
35
Georg Mollat, Rechtsphilosophisches aus Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften, Leip-
zig, 1885, p. 3 ff.
36
Mollat, p. 4. The paragraph's exact wording is as follows: Torro summus est scopus
justitiam colentis, ut felicitas quam latissime diffundatur. Et cum felicitas sit status
 Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory 173
argument is the ancient notion ofcivitas Dei or respublica universi. As
God is author and king of the res publica universi, and, as He is
omnipotent and omniscient, most perfect in His volitions and actions
and in His governance of the world, He will never disregard the pains a
man takes on behalf of another and will always compensate for any
resulting detriments and disadvantages. Thus, the more a man sup-
ports another, the more he supports himself.37 The argument culmi-
nates in a definition of justice: 'The just is what is in the interests of the
public, and public welfare is the highest law.'—-'Iustum est, quod
publice interest, et salus publica suprema lex est.' And Leibnizfindsit
necessary to define the concept of publicum as well. 'Public is not only
a few, nor a particular people, but all individuals in the civitas Dei or
res publica universi.'38
In light of the clarity of Leibniz's paper, it would be superfluous to
discuss its utilitarian character. Moreover, the paper provides impres-
sive evidence that utilitarian tendencies existed in German moral
philosophy around 1700. It may even be argued that the utilitarian
nature of these tendencies was recognized by the first half of the
eighteenth century. The terminology needed for appropriately naming
them was available since Christian Thomasius, in his Institutiones
Jurisprudentiae Divinae of 1688,39 had introduced the distinction
between 'utilitas singulorum hominum' and 'utilitas totius humani
generis', or between the utility of individual men and the utility of
mankind as a whole. The two categories had often been confused by
earlier writers, even by those as prominent as Grotius and Pufendorf.
When trying to distinguish Leibniz and similar writers from writers of
different moral views, Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, in his Elementa
luris Naturae et Gentium of 1737, made use of this terminology. He
expressly employed the concept of 'utilitas humani generis' as a means
of making the distinction. He wrote:
The utility of mankind—utilitas humani generis—has been declared to be the
first principle of natural law by the celebrated Leibniz and by those who, in
accordance with Thomasius, commended the following proposition as funda-
mental, That all things are to be done which tend to make human life more
happy and more lasting, and that all things are to be avoided which tend to
render it unhappy, or to accelerate death/ 40

laetitiae durabilis, id agitur, quantum potest, ut quam plurimi sint laeti gaudiaque
eorum durare possint excludanturque, quae perturbent. Itaque curandum est, ut multi-
tudo eorum, qui felices reddi possunt, augeatur, quousque sibi mutuo non obstant, id est
propagationi et conservationi favendum est.'
37
Mollat, p. 3.
38
Mollat, p. 3: Tublicum... non paucorum, non certae gentis, sed omnium intelligitur,
qui sunt in civitate Dei e t . . . republica universi.'
39
Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1688, Lib. I, Cap. II, §. 96 (p. 77).
40
Heineccius, Lib. I, §. LXXVI scholium (p. 58): 'Utilitatem humani generis pro iuris
174 Joachim Hruschka
Since Heineccius frequently quotes from Leibniz's critical review of
the Cocceji thesis, expressly ascribing the review to Leibniz,41 it would
be hard to deny that the expression 'utilitas humani generis' refers to
Leibniz's principle as formulated in that review. The German philoso-
phers obviously could not be, and therefore were not, called 'utili-
tarians' before the time of Bentham and John Stuart Mill. None the
less, they were given by their contemporaries a title rather similar to
the one coined by the English philosophers much later. Indeed, they
appear to have been more than mere utilitarians avant la lettre.

IV. OTHER GERMAN WRITERS WITH UTILITARIAN

TENDENCIES
Leibniz was not the only German moral philosopher with utilitarian
tendencies. Heineccius, in the passage quoted above, refers not only to
Leibniz but also to a group of writers, namely all those who subscribed
to the principle of natural law as suggested in Thomasius's Funda-
menta Juris Naturae et Gentium of 1705.42 Heineccius seems to be
somewhat ambivalent concerning Thomasius himself. Actually Tho-
masius, in his early years, may have shown utilitarian tendencies,
since in his Institutiones of 1688 he maintains That the common utility
of mankind is the norm of any particular utility.'—Totius humani
generis utilitas communis norma est utilitatis peculiaris.'43 But in his
later work, which Heineccius in fact is citing, Thomasius tends to see
the happiness of individuals as inseparable from the happiness of
mankind as a whole. In other words, he seems to believe that 'philau-
tia'—literally: 'self-love'—or one person's quest for his own happiness
is completely reconcilable with 'amicitia'—-literally: 'friendship' —or
that person's search for other people's happiness. He expressly states
that 'philautia' and 'amicitia' are not contradictory but rather comple-
mentary.44 Consequently, 'utilitas singulorum hominum' and 'utilitas
totius humani generis' must be compatible, and the utility of mankind
need not, therefore, be the only end of morally appropriate action.

naturae principio habuerunt turn celeberrimus Leibnitius, turn omnes, qui cum laudatis-
simo Thomasio commendarunt propositionem fundamentalem: Facienda esse omnia,
quam vitam hominis reddant et maxime diuturnam, et felicissimam, et evitanda ea, quae
vitam reddant infelicem, et mortem accelerent. Thomas. Fund. iur. et gent. I, 6. 2V
41
In the passage cited in footnote 20 above.
42
Christian Thomasius, Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium ex sensu communi
deducta, editio quarta, Halle and Leipzig, 1718 (repr. Aalen, 1963), Lib. I, Cap. VI, §. XXI
(p. 172). The first edition was published in 1705.
43
Thomasius, Institutiones, Lib. I, Cap. II, §. 96 (p. 77).
44
Thomasius, Fundamenta, Lib. I, Cap. IV, §. XXXIX (p. 131); §. XLI and §.XLII (p. 132);
Lib. I, Cap. VI, §. 39 (p. 173).
 Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory 175
Thus Thomasius himself did not remain a utilitarian, if indeed he ever
was one.
The moral doctrine of Thomasius's Fundamenta obviously has its
shortcomings, for the utility of mankind and the utility of individuals
often appear to be diametrically opposed, and Thomasius himself does
not provide any solution for this opposition. This deficiency of his
doctrine must have been felt strongly by his contemporaries. Indeed,
people who worked with Thomasius were inclined to emphasize either
'philautia' or 'amicitia'. The latter inevitably became a kind of utili-
tarian. The most important author of this group was Andreas Riidiger.
From 1717 onwards,45 which was the later period of his moral writings,
Riidiger increasingly endorsed Thomasius's idea of 'amicitia', and it is
from this concept that his utilitarianism is derived. In the second
edition of his Philosophia Pragmatica of 172946 Riidiger wrote: 'Other
things being equal God loves a multitude of people more than any
single individual. Consequently, it is His will that common utility, or
the utility of the majority, is preferred to utility proper, or the utility of
the single individual.'—'Deus . . . caeteris paribus plures magis amat
quam unum, ergo Deus vult, ut utilitas communis, seu plurium praefer-
atur utilitate propriae, seu unius.' The argument is strikingly reminis-
cent of Leibniz, and, indeed, there may have been—albeit indirect-
connections between the two writers. At least there can be no doubt
that Riidiger was familiar with Leibniz's dictum from the Ludovici
reprint, since Ludovici and Riidiger worked at the same time in Halle
with Thomasius.
In 1726 a theologian at the University of Jena, Johann Georg Walch,
published a philosophical encyclopaedia, Philosophisches Lexicon,
which was widely read. Several editions were published, the fourth and
last of which appeared in 1775.47 There is reason to believe that several
articles in that encyclopaedia relating to moral philosophy, for ex-
ample, the article 'Eigenniitzig' (self-interested) and the article 'Gesetz
der Natur (natural law), or parts at least of these articles, were written
by Riidiger.48 In these articles the same arguments are employed as in
45
See Institutiones Eruditionis seu Philosophia Synthetica, Editio tertia, posterioribus
auctoris meditationibus accomodata, modisque concludendi aucta, Frankfurt-am-Main,
1717, p. 560 ff.
46
Andreas Riidiger, Philosophia Pragmatica, Editio altera, priore longe auctior et
correctior, Leipzig, 1729, §. 518 (p. 489).
47
Johann Georg Walch, Philosophisches Lexicon, Leipzig, 1726; Vierte Auflage in
zween Theilen, Leipzig, 1775 (repr. Hildesheim, 1968). The two articles mentioned in the
text are to be found in the 1st edition on p. 661/2 and p. 1251/2 if., in the 1st vol. of the 4th
edition on p. 921/2 and p. 1693/4 ff.
48
In his Institutiones Eruditionis of 1717, Riidiger already refers to the Philosophisches
Lexicon as a supplement to his own teachings (see Ad Lectorem, §.2). Therefore, it can be
argued that he was writing the pertinent articles of the Lexicon at the time. See also Max
Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufkldrung, Tubingen, 1945 (repr.
Hildesheim, 1964), p. 89.
176 Joachim Hruschka
Rudiger's own books: since God is interested in the happiness of all
men and since He loves every individual in the same way as any other
individual, it follows that He is interested in the happiness of many
men more than in the happiness of any single individual. The original
German expressions used are 'die Gliickseligkeit aller Menschen', 'die
Gliickseligkeit vieler' and 'die Gliickseligkeit einer einzelnen Person'.
Accordingly it follows that common utility is to be preferred to private
interests: 'Der gemeine Nutzen geht dem Privatinteresse vor.'49
Riidiger died in 1731. Although his principal thoughts on moral
philosophy, enshrined in Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon, were avail-
able throughout the eighteenth century his utilitarianism seemingly
had no followers in Germany.50 His opponent August Friedrich Miiller,
a former personal friend, won the battle. In the second edition of his
three-volume Einleitung in die philosophischen Wissenschaften of 1733
Miiller, in explicit contrast to Riidiger, supported Thomasius's 'philau-
tia\ In extensive arguments Miiller disputes Riidiger*s claim that the
utility of mankind is preferable to individual utility. The general
utility of mankind or public utility, the end of which is not the
happiness proper of any single agent and, therefore, not subordinate as
a means to the agent's own happiness—in the original this is a mixture
of German and Latin directed against Riidiger's Philosophia Pragma-
tica 'eine utilitas generis humani generalis vel publica, die nicht
propriam singulorum felicitatem zum Zwecke haben und folglich dieser
letzteren nicht zu subordinieren sein sollte'—such a utility of mankind
is self-contradictory.51
Miiller's Einleitung had a great impact on the development of moral
philosophy in the eighteenth century. As I have argued elsewhere,52 the
49
Walch, 1st edn., p. 1277/8, 4th edn., p. 1723/4 ff.
50
Another author with utilitarian tendencies was Johann Wilhelm von der Lith,
whose thesis De Primo Principio Legis Naturalis, Halle, 1699, was cited rather frequently
during the eighteenth century. Von der Lith, who apparently also had studied with
Thomasius, makes use of the ancient distinction between the good king and the tyrant. A
good king is a ruler who enacts laws for the benefit of his subjects, a tyrant is a ruler who
enacts them for his own benefit. God's government of the universe is compared by von der
Lith with a good king's rule over his kingdom, and the good king is described as one who
observes the happiness of all. From this it follows that the law of nature enacted by God
aims at the happiness of mankind—'finis legis naturalis est felicitas omnium hominum'—
and, consequently, the first principle of natural law is as follows: *AU acts which are
necessary for bringing about the happiness of mankind, are to be performed; and all acts
which are contrary to that happiness are to be omitted/—'Quicquid felicitas humani
generis necessario exigit, illud est faciendum; et quicquid eidem repugnat, omittendum.'
In his later life, von der Lith worked on theological rather than moral philosophical
problems.
51
August Friedrich Miiller, Einleitung in die philosophischen Wissenschaften, 2nd
edn., 3 vols., Leipzig, 1733, iii. 29.
52
'Die Person als ein Zweck an sich selbst—Zur Grundlegung von Recht und Ethik bei
August Friedrich Miiller (1733) und Immanuel Kant (1785), Juristenzeitung, xliv (1990),
Iff.
 Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory 111
book was particularly influential on Kant. Kant's anti-utilitarian
attitude which is apparent throughout his work presupposes prior
utilitarian tendencies in Germany. It is very likely that Kant acquired
this attitude from Miiller. It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude this
brief survey with a remark on a passage in Kant's Die Metaphysik der
Sitten published in 1797, or at the very end of the century, that began
with the publication of Leibniz's principle. The passage in question
deals with Kant's theory of punishment:
Judicial punishment (poena forensis) can never be used merely as a means to
further another good, either for the criminal himself or for civil society, but
instead must always be imposed on him only because he committed the offence;
for a human being can never be used merely as a means to another's ends and
can never be mixed with the objects of property law He first must be found
guilty before thought may be given to deriving any benefit for himself or for his
fellow citizens. . . . Woe to him who works his way through the tortuous
windings of the theory of happiness in order to discover some advantage
promised therein that would relieve him of the punishment or even of a degree
thereof.... If justice ceases, then it is no longer worth while for men to remain
alive on this earth. What then should one think of the suggestion to permit a
criminal who has committed a capital crime to remain alive, if, after consent-
ing to allow dangerous experiments to be made on him, he happily survives
such experiments and if doctors thereby obtain new information that benefits
the community? Any court of justice would repudiate such a suggestion with
scorn if it were made by a medical college, for justice ceases to be justice when
it sacrifices itself for a price.53
The example given in this passage is interesting. Kant argues that a
foreseeably profitable outcome of a dangerous experiment—profitable
that is for mankind—does not provide a sufficient reason for waiving
the death penalty to which the defendant is subject, since this penalty
is required by justice. Utilitarianism, at least act-utilitarianism, is
hereby rejected. But the emphatic language in 'woe to him who works
his way through the tortuous windings of the theory of happiness'—in
the original: 'wehe dem! welcher die Schlangenwindungen der Gliick-
seligkeitslehre durchkriecht'—is even more interesting. In this con-
text, the term 'Gliickseligkeitslehre' seems to refer to Riidiger, who was
the last German moral philosopher before Kant to argue for the utility
of mankind as the principle of natural law and who expressly used the
word 'Gliickseligkeit' to designate his theory. Thus, the utilitarian
approach, as one stage of eighteenth-century German moral theory
that preceded Kant's categorical imperative, is still reflected in the
work of one of the greatest opponents of utilitarianism.
53
Kant's gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Koniglich PreuBischen Akade-
mie der Wissenschaften, vol. vi, Berlin, 1914, 331 ff. The passage quoted is often taken as
evidence for Kant's so-called retributionism. For a more differentiated analysis based
not only on a few passages, but on all pertinent historical material available, see
B. Sharon Byrd, 'Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat'. Retribution in
its Execution', Law and Philosophy, viii (1989), 151 ff.