Doran GenderLaborMarket 2019

Gender in the Labor Market: The Role of Equal Opportunity and Family-Friendly
Policies
Author(s): Elizabeth L. Doran, Ann P. Bartel and Jane Waldfogel
Source: RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences , December 2019,
Vol. 5, No. 5, Improving Employment and Earnings in Twenty-First Century Labor
Markets (December 2019), pp. 168-197
Published by: Russell Sage Foundation
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/10.7758/rsf.2019.5.5.09
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Gender in the Labor Market:
The Role of Equal Opportunity
and Family-Friendly Policies
Eliz a be t h L. Dor a n, A n n P. Ba rt el, a n d Ja n e Wa ldfogel
Although the gender wage gap in the United States has narrowed, women’s career trajectories diverge from
men’s after the birth of children, suggesting a potential role for family-friendly policies. We provide new evi-
dence on employer provision of these policies. Using the American Time Use Survey, we find that women are
less likely than men to have access to any employer-provided paid leave and this differential is entirely ex-
plained by part-time status. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, we find that young
women are more likely to have access to specifically designated paid parental leave, even in part-time jobs.
Both data sets show insignificant gender differentials in access to employer-subsidized childcare and access
to scheduling flexibility. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications.
Keywords: gender, equal opportunity, family-friendly policies
Fifty-five years after the passage of the Equal uling flexibility, could play a potentially conse-
Pay Act, gender differences in the labor market quential role.
remain. The gender gap in pay has narrowed We fill an important gap in the literature by
but not closed, and female participation rates considering whether access to employer-
seem to have plateaued. Indeed, the United provided paid leave, childcare, and work sched-
States now lags behind many other advanced uling flexibility shows gender differentials. We
industrial countries on measures of gender focus on employer-provided benefits for two
equality in the workplace. In particular, sub- main reasons: first, in the United States, em-
stantial gender gaps in labor-force participa- ployers are the major source of these types of
tion and wages exist, especially for mothers. benefits; and, second, relatively little informa-
The larger gender gaps faced by mothers sug- tion exists in the literature on gender differ-
gest that family-friendly employer policies, ences in access to such benefits. We also dis-
such as paid leave, childcare, and work sched- cuss current public policy provisions and the
Elizabeth L. Doran is a doctoral candidate at Columbia University School of Social Work. Ann P. Bartel is Mer-
rill Lynch Professor of Workforce Transformation at Columbia Business School. Jane Waldfogel is Compton
Foundation Centennial Professor for the Prevention of Children’s and Youth Problems at Columbia University
School of Social Work.
© 2019 Russell Sage Foundation. Doran, Elizabeth L., Ann P. Bartel, and Jane Waldfogel. 2019. “Gender in the
Labor Market: The Role of Equal Opportunity and Family-Friendly Policies.” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation
Journal of the Social Sciences 5(5): 168–97. DOI: 10.7758/RSF.2019.5.5.09. Direct correspondence to: Elizabeth
L. Doran at eld2159@columbia.edu, 1255 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 10027.
Open Access Policy: RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences is an open access journal.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported Li-
cense.

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gender in the l a bor m a rket 169
role that new or expanded public policies might be partly attributable to the affirmative action
play. policies that came about after EEO: reviewing
Using two nationally representative data the literature, Harry Holzer and David Neu-
sets, we find that women are less likely than mark (2000, 2006) present descriptive evidence
men to have access to employer-provided paid suggesting that firms using affirmative action
leave—including paid parental leave, paid sick practices have more women apply and be hired
leave, and other types of paid leave—and this for open positions.
differential is entirely explained by the fact that In addition, the gender wage gap steadily de-
women are more likely to work part time. Young creased in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
women are found to be more likely than young tury. Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn (2017)
men to have access to specifically designated show that, although female wages have dramat-
paid parental leave even in part-time jobs. ically increased since the 1960s, they have not
Women and men are equally unlikely to have reached parity with men’s, as progress largely
access to childcare and scheduling flexibility. stagnated since 2000. Their decomposition
We find substantial heterogeneity by educa- analysis finds that both individual- and firm-
tional level: although women at all levels of ed- level characteristics account for gender wage
ucation are more likely to have access to spe- differences. In 2010, occupation and industry
cifically designated paid parental leave than accounted for the majority of the explained
similar men, highly educated women are less gender wage gap; the worker’s race, experience,
likely to have access to employer-provided and region also contributed. The authors con-
childcare or scheduling flexibility than compa- clude that it is plausible that EEO policies were
rable men. These results have important impli- responsible for the decline in the gap, but the
cations for policymakers. evidence does not definitively indicate a causal
effect.
R ec e n t Tr e n d s a n d D e v e lo p m e n t s One important factor in the narrowing of
U.S. equal employment opportunity (EEO) pol- the gender wage gap is the new life cycle of
icies were established with the Equal Pay Act of women’s employment. The average age at first
1963 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act birth has increased with recent cohorts, result-
(EEOC 1997). The Equal Pay Act prohibits un- ing in decreases in labor-force participation
equal pay on the basis of sex for equal work. later in the life cycle as women leave the labor
Title VII makes it illegal for employers to dis- force to care for children, a trend that Claudia
criminate against employees or job applicants Goldin and Joshua Mitchell call the “sagging
on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, race, middle” (2017). This midlife retreat from work
religion, age, nationality, disability, and other has two important implications. First, as the
characteristics. age of first birth has shifted later, employment
Since the 1960s, when EEO became law, the has increased for younger women (Goldin and
participation rate of women in the labor market Mitchell 2017). Younger women and men expe-
increased steadily, until peaking in 2000 at 60.7 rience greater parity in the labor market prior
percent (Goldin 2014; Black, Schanzenbach, to childbirth, indicating that EEO policies have
and Breitwieser 2017). Labor-force participation the desired effect before women have children
particularly increased among women under age but are potentially less effective once workers
thirty-five (Goldin and Mitchell 2017). This may become parents.1 Second, because women are
1. More young men participate in the labor force than young women, however (Loprest, Spaulding, and Night-
ingale 2019). Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence Katz (2010) find that recent male and female
MBA graduates from the University of Chicago begin their careers with almost identical earnings. Five years
after graduation, men earn 30 log points more than women; ten to sixteen years after graduation, this gap in-
creases to nearly 60 log points. One of the primary reasons for this divergence is that women experience more
career interruptions. Goldin and Katz (2016) show that this pattern is not inevitable. They explore the narrowing
gender gap among pharmacists, finding that technological and retail changes have increased substitutability
among pharmacists, which, in turn, reduced the wage penalty for part-time work and the gender wage gap.
r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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17 0 improv ing employ men t a nd ear nings
giving birth later, they have greater attachment der wage gap widens as cohorts age (Goldin
to the labor force, take less leave time after 2014; Chung et al. 2017).
birth, and reenter the workforce faster (Dey The motherhood wage penalty varies greatly
2014; Goldin and Mitchell 2017). Yet, although across subgroups. Mothers in low-skill and low-
women in their twenties and thirties are out of wage jobs bear the bulk of the wage penalty
the labor force for fewer years and work more (Blau and Winkler 2017; Budig and Hodges
steadily throughout their lives (Blau and Win- 2014; Budig 2014). Nonmarried mothers and
kler 2017; Goldin and Mitchell 2017), they do African American mothers also face a greater
not experience parity in labor-force participa- wage gap than married, white, or Hispanic
tion or wages later in life (Black, Schanzenbach, mothers do (Pal and Waldfogel 2016).
and Breitwieser 2017; Chung et al. 2017). It is difficult to determine whether the rela-
This new life cycle of women’s employment tionship between motherhood and lower wages
and the narrowing of the gap in labor-force paris causal or results from the selection of women
ticipation are linked to a closing of the educa- with lower wages into motherhood. The timing
tion gap (Dey 2014; Goldin 2014; Blau and Kahn of the emergence of a prominent gender wage
2017). The average woman today has more edu- gap—after age thirty-five, when many workers
cation than the average man, and more women are married and begin to have children—indi-
hold advanced degrees (Blau and Kahn 2017). cates a plausible causal story (Budig 2014).
This increase has ushered in greater labor-force Blau and Kahn (2017) posit several reasons to
participation and experience (Goldin 2014). expect the motherhood wage penalty to be
Heterogeneity is substantial in labor-force causal. First, without paid parental leave,
participation rates among subgroups of women may be more likely to leave their em-
women, particularly mothers. For men and ployers upon the birth of a child; they may exit
women without children, labor-force participa- the labor force or join an employer with more
tion has nearly reached parity; but for mothers family-friendly policies. Second, if firms expect
and fathers, a wide gap still exists (Weeden, women to leave after childbirth, they may re-
Cha, and Bucca 2016). This gap is exacerbated frain from hiring or investing in women. Fi-
by gender differences in labor-force exits after nally, having children may change worker be-
the birth of a child. In the year following child- havior in ways difficult to measure, such as
birth, women’s likelihood of employment de- decreased productivity or work scheduling re-
creases by 30 to 40 percent (Kuziemko et al. strictions. It is likely, therefore, that the moth-
2018). Women also stay out of the labor force erhood penalty occurs due to issues that arise
for longer than men; this differential is narrow- after childbirth (Goldin 2014; Blau and Kahn
ing, though, because women are taking shorter 2017), indicating that EEO policies are not
leaves (Dey 2014). enough to close the gap.
Progress on narrowing the gender gap in pay In summary, although EEO policies have
has also been uneven, particularly for workers likely played a role in narrowing gender gaps,
with children. The motherhood wage penalty, progress in recent years has stalled. Men and
whereby having children is linked to lower women may begin their careers on similar
wages for women, is well documented in survey ground, but their trajectories diverge after chil-
data (Waldfogel 1997; Budig and England 2001; dren are born. This may be due in large part to
Pal and Waldfogel 2016; Blau and Kahn 2017) the fact that the time demands associated with
and in experiments (Correll, Benard, and Paik having children are largely borne by women,
2007). Recent estimates indicate that, on aver- which can decrease labor-force participation
age, childless women earn 87 percent of the and wages (Blau and Kahn 2017).
wages of similar childless men, and that moth-
ers earn 75 percent of the wages of similar fa- Family-Friendly Policies
thers (Chung et al. 2017). The motherhood wage Relative to EEO policies, on which the United
penalty may explain wage divergence across the States has been a leader, in the domain of
life cycle: although men and women begin their family-friendly policies it lags behind its peers.
careers with roughly equivalent wages, the gen- Although EEO policies have likely helped nar-

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gender in the l a bor m a rket 17 1
row overall gender wage and employment gaps, exist—particularly one favoring men—it would
these policies do not address gaps for women suggest that equalizing access to employer pol-
with children, which are now the major drivers icies may play a role in reducing gaps. If one
of overall gender gaps. Family-friendly poli- does not exist, it would suggest that low levels
cies—which would help women maintain of access to these benefits across the workforce
labor-force attachment after having children— may be hindering progress toward closing the
are needed to continue the foundation set by gender gap, and that public policies should fo-
EEO policies. cus on raising the overall level of access to these
Evidence from peer countries indicates that benefits for all workers.
family-friendly policies may help reduce gender
gaps. Blau and Kahn (2013) find that though the Paid Family Leave
gender gap in labor-force participation in the The United States is the only industrialized
United States fell from 19.4 percentage points country that does not provide paid and job-
in 1990 to 14.1 percentage points in 2010, it fell protected leave for new parents. Qualified em-
much more substantially—on average, from ployees may take up to twelve weeks of job-
26.9 percentage points to 13.0 percentage protected leave under the Family and Medical
points—in twenty-one other countries over the Leave Act (FMLA), though only approximately
same period. Applying average family-friendly 60 percent of workers are eligible (Klerman,
policies in other countries to the United States, Daley, and Pozniak 2012). Paid family leave
they estimate that family-friendly policies (PFL) has garnered increased attention in re-
would have increased U.S. women’s labor-force cent years, as California, New Jersey, Rhode
participation rate from 75.2 percent to 82 per- Island, and, most recently, New York, have im-
cent during this period. Further, although other plemented these policies; Washington, D.C.,
nations have experienced similar economic Massachusetts, Connecticut, Oregon, and
and technological challenges, they have not ex- Washington state will be implementing these
perienced the stalled female labor-force par- policies in the coming years. These policies
ticipation of the United States (Black, Schan- augment long-standing temporary disability
zenbach, and Breitwieser 2017). Taken together, insurance (TDI) programs through which
this evidence suggests that strengthening mothers in five states (California, Hawaii, New
family-friendly policies may help close gender Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island) can take
gaps for mothers that EEO policies have not yet some paid leave during pregnancy and after
touched. Michelle Budig, Joya Misra, and Irene childbirth. The effects of PFL are theoretically
Boeckmann (2015), using data from twenty-t wo unclear, given that they depend on how moth-
nations, find that the most effective policies to ers and employers react to leave availability and
keep mothers in the labor force after childbirth leave-taking (Rossin-Slater 2017). On the one
are midlength leaves and childcare, and that hand, women who would have exited the labor
both policies reduce the motherhood wage pen- market in the absence of paid leave may be in-
alty.2 duced to return to work after childbirth, lead-
Given the potentially important role that ing to increased participation; on the other
family-friendly policies might play in reducing hand, women who would have continued work-
the gender gaps in workforce participation and ing without leave likely would take more leave,
earnings in the United States, we focus on three but with no effect on participation. Further, em-
key family-friendly policies: paid family leave, ployers may discriminate against hiring or pro-
childcare, and work scheduling flexibility. Our moting women of childbearing age if they do
analysis explores whether men and women not believe they can manage the short-term
have differential access to these policies be- cost of temporary employee replacement, but
cause this information is important to policy may also reward employees who remain with
decisions. If a gender difference in access does them after the child’s birth.
2. Such policies may not fully eliminate gaps if gendered roles and attitudes persist (Kleven, Landais, and
Søgaard 2018).

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California’s PFL is the most extensively stud- attachment to the labor market and wages (Us-
ied U.S. program because it dates back the fur- dansky and Wolf 2008; Ha and Miller 2015;
thest, to 2004. Research generally finds positive Chaudry et al. 2017). International evidence in-
outcomes for children and parents (Milkman dicates that greater spending on childcare is
and Appelbaum 2013; Bartel et al. 2014; Stearns associated with increased female employment
2015; Bedard and Rossin-Slater 2016; Boushey and decreased gender wage gaps (Olivetti and
2016; Rossin-Slater 2017). Specifically, with re- Petrongolo 2017). Recent evidence from Wash-
gard to labor-market outcomes, the evidence ington, D.C., shows that providing free pre-
from California suggests that PFL increases the school for three- and four-year-olds increases
likelihood that mothers return to work in the maternal labor-force participation by 10 per-
nine to twelve months following a birth by 18 centage points (Malik 2018). Affordability is
percentage points, increases weeks and hours particularly crucial. Considerable evidence in-
worked by mothers when children are one and dicates that childcare costs affect women’s
two years old (Baum and Ruhm 2016), and in- wages and labor-force participation, especially
creases weekly work hours for mothers of chil- for low-income families (Herbst 2010; Ahn 2012;
dren under the age of three by 10 to 17 percent Ha and Miller 2015). In 2011, families who used
(Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel 2013). One childcare spent an average of 7 percent of in-
potential mechanism is that PFL may keep come on care; low-income families spent 30
women in the workforce who otherwise would percent or more (Laughlin 2013). Yet current
have dropped out after having a child (Rossin- U.S. spending on childcare is low relative to
Slater 2017). PFL is therefore a promising strat- other high-income countries. The federal gov-
egy to boost the sagging U.S. labor-force par- ernment spends approximately 2 percent of
ticipation for midcareer women, potentially gross domestic product (GDP) on children, and
decreasing the gender gaps in labor-force par- less than 0.2 percent of GDP on programs only
ticipation and wages. for young children, such as childcare subsidies
and Head Start (Chaudry et al. 2017). In con-
Childcare trast, the average Organization for Economic
Childcare is a critical component of family- Cooperation and Development country spends
friendly policy, especially for mothers of young 0.8 percent of GDP on programs only for young
children. Relative to parental leave, childcare children, with the United Kingdom spending
may be particularly relevant in reducing gender 0.5 percent, France spending 0.8 percent, and
gaps because it allows mothers to continue in Sweden and Norway each spending nearly 2
employment without taking time off or reduc- percent (OECD 2017).
ing work hours, and because it affects a longer Because public provision is limited,
portion of their working life (Olivetti and employer-provided childcare could potentially
Petrongolo 2017). However, childcare is largely be a promising solution. Although employer-
seen as a private responsibility in the United supported childcare would have direct costs, it
States (Craig and Mullan 2010; Chaudry et al. could also promote worker productivity and
2017). Subsidies are available for low-income commitment (Hipp, Morrissey, and Warner
families, but only about 15 percent of eligible 2017) and reduce absences and interruptions
families receive such assistance (Chaudry et al. (Usdansky and Wolf 2008). Yet most American
2017). Tax credits are available to low- and employers do not provide any support for child-
middle-income families but are not widely used care: the National Compensation Survey in
due to cumbersome program rules (Chaudry et dicates that only 11 percent of workers have
al. 2017). Publicly funded childcare centers, pre- access to employer-provided childcare, a pro-
schools, and pre-kindergartens serve only a portion that has held roughly constant for the
small share of preschool age children. past two decades (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
Access to high-quality and affordable child- tics 2017). Little is known about whether women
care has the potential to improve a variety of are less likely to have access to this benefit than
parent and child outcomes, including parental their male peers.

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Work Scheduling But the specific types of flexibility measured

Finally, policies that affect work hours and vary considerably, and little evidence exists as
schedules, such as the right to request part- to gender differences in access to flexible work
time or flexible hours and advance work sched- arrangements.
ules, can help women stay in the labor force
after having children by providing an avenue Ac c e s s to Fa m i ly- Fr i e n d ly
by which to reconcile responsibilities to an em- Benefits
ployer and the family. These policies may be We first describe the data and methods used to
beneficial to women across the income distri- examine gender differentials in access to
bution. For salaried workers, scheduling flexi- family-friendly benefits. Next, we present pri-
bility policies are associated both with an in- mary regression results for gender differences
crease in female labor-force participation after in access to paid leave, employer-provided
childbirth (Herr and Wolfram 2012) and an in- childcare, and scheduling flexibility. Finally, we
crease in female wages (Weeden 2005). These show differences in access to family-friendly
policies may be particularly beneficial for benefits by educational attainment, as educa-
women in low-wage jobs because they tend to tion is typically related to the types of firms and
have the least flexibility and may be penalized jobs into which workers sort.
by being assigned fewer hours if they request it
(Goldin 2014; Boushey 2016). Data and Methods
Although less research has been undertaken We use national survey data from two data sets
to date on these policies than on other types of to provide new evidence on access to employer-
family-friendly policies, recent studies have provided paid leave, childcare, and work
brought work scheduling practices to the fore- scheduling flexibility in the United States and
front of public attention and have identified consider whether gender differentials in such
three primary types of unpredictable schedul- access are evident. The first data set, the Amer-
ing: lack of advance notice, last-minute sched- ican Time Use Survey (ATUS) 2011 Leave Mod-
uling changes, and changes in weekly work ule, is a nationally representative sample of
schedules (Henly and Lambert 2014). Recent the working-age population age fifteen to
results from the first randomized controlled eighty-five years. Critical for our purposes, the
trial of an intervention targeting unpredictable Leave Module contains detailed measures of
scheduling are promising (Williams et al. 2018). whether respondents receive paid leave from
The intervention, conducted at Gap stores in their employer, including whether they are
San Francisco and Chicago from November able to take paid leave for vacation, errands or
2015 to August 2016, addressed unpredictable personal reasons, own illness or medical care,
work scheduling by requiring stores to provide a family member’s illness or medical care,
two-weeks advance notice of schedules, end the childcare, eldercare, or the birth or adoption
use of just-in-time scheduling, allow swapping of a child. Although the ATUS provides im
of shifts among employees through an app, important details about whether and how work-
prove consistency of schedules from week to ers can use paid leave, it does not measure
week, and guarantee some workers a minimum whether workers have access to paid parental
number of hours per week, among other prac- leave specifically set aside for new mothers
tices. Results show that these practices in- and fathers.
creased median sales by 7 percent, increased We therefore turn to the National Longitu-
worker productivity by 5 percent, and were gen- dinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), which has
erally welcomed both by employees and man- measures of paid leave specifically to be used
agers. by new parents. The NLSY97 is a nationally rep-
National surveys suggest that 6 percent of resentative sample of persons who were ages
the workforce has flexibility in location of work twelve to sixteen in 1997; we use data from 2011,
and 49 percent has flexibility in hours or days 2013, and 2015, when the respondents are ages
worked (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). twenty-six to thirty-six. Thus, the NLSY97 not

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174 improv ing employ men t a nd ear nings
only provides measures not captured in the system), sector (government, private nonprofit,
ATUS, but also provides a large sample of work- or private for-profit), and union status. We also
ing adults in prime childbearing years. We also include controls for geographic area (state fixed
use the NLSY97 to examine access to employer- effects in the ATUS; region fixed effects in the
provided or subsidized childcare; the ATUS NLSY97). As the NLSY97 includes observations
does not measure childcare benefits. from multiple years, we include year fixed ef-
Finally, we return to the ATUS to study ac- fects in these models.
cess to work scheduling flexibility. The Leave We estimate three sets of models. The first
Module asks respondents whether they can includes only controls for individual character-
vary their work schedules in lieu of using leave istics (plus the relevant geographic fixed effects
time. Respondents indicate whether they can and, in the NLSY97, year effects). The second
vary work scheduling by the day of the week, adds potentially endogenous controls for em-
hours worked in a day, or work location. This ployer characteristics, and the third adds a con-
measure captures flexibility that workers may trol for part-time status, which is also poten-
use when they would otherwise have to use tially endogenous. We estimate the following
paid or unpaid leave, but does not capture equations:
whether they have access to more regular flex-
ibility. We therefore use the NLSY97 to examine yis = α + β1 femaleis + β2 Xis + β3 Ss + εis (1)
whether workers report a regularly accessible
flexible work schedule. Last, we use the ATUS yis = α + β1 femaleis + β2 Xis + β3 Ss + β4 Zis + εis (2)
to study working from home, which is another
method for achieving flexibility. To do so, we yis = α + β1 femaleis + β2 Xis + β3 Ss + β4 Zis
examine the number of minutes that respon- + β5 Wis + εis (3)
dents report working while at home in a given
day. yirt = α + β1 femaleirt + β2 Xirt + β3 Rr + β4 Tt + εirt (4)
For ease of interpretation, ordinary least
squares (OLS) linear probability models are es- yirt = α + β1 femaleirt + β2 Xirt + β3 Rr + β4 Tt
timated to predict access to family-friendly pol-  + β5 Zirt + εirt (5)
icies. (Results from probit models are similar.)
We restrict our analysis of the ATUS sample to yirt = α + β1 femaleirt + β2 Xirt + β3 Rr + β4 Tt
prime-age workers ages twenty-five to fifty-four;  + β5 Zirt + β6 Wirt + εirt (6)
as noted earlier, the NLSY97 sample contains
only respondents ages twenty-six to thirty-six. Equations (1), (2), and (3) measure gender
Our primary variable of interest is gender. differences in access to paid leave and schedul-
We also include a set of individual and em- ing flexibility as well as minutes spent working
ployer control variables. Individual covariates from home in a given day, in the ATUS. Equa-
include race and ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, tions (4), (5), and (6) measure gender differ-
black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, or other non- ences in access to paid parental leave, employer-
Hispanic), age, age-squared, education (high provided or subsidized childcare, and regular
school degree or less, some college, or college scheduling flexibility in the NLSY97. In equa-
degree or more), relationship status (married, tions (1), (2), and (3), y is access to a family-
cohabiting, or single), household composition friendly policy for worker i living in state s, fe-
(no children, youngest child ages zero to five, male is a dichotomous indicator set to one
or youngest child ages six to seventeen), and (zero) for female (male) workers, X is a vector
citizenship status (native-born citizen, foreign- of individual covariates, S is a vector of state
born citizen, or foreign-born noncitizen). Em- indicator variables, Z is a vector of employer
ployer covariates include industry (thirteen covariates, and W is an indicator variable for
dummies using the 2007 Census Industry Clas- part-time status. In equations (4), (5), and (6), y
sification system), occupation (six dummies us- is access to a family-friendly policy for worker
ing the 2010 Census Occupation Classification i living in region r in year t, female is a dichoto-

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mous indicator set to one (zero) for female example, a mother with young children may
(male) workers, X is a vector of individual co- prefer a job in which she can work part-time,
variates, R and T are vectors of region and year though this may mean she does not have ac-
indicator variables, Z is a vector of employer cess to paid time off.
covariates, and W is an indicator variable for Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence consistent
part-time status. with this type of sorting. Results in table 2 show
that women, especially those with children, are
Primary Results significantly more likely to work part time than
Table 1 presents unadjusted means for access men. Table 3 considers whether part-time jobs
to family-friendly policies by gender in the provide fewer family-friendly benefits than full-
ATUS and NLSY97. Although the majority of re- time jobs. With the exception of scheduling
spondents of both genders report access to flexibility for the NLSY97 sample, all the part-
some type of paid leave, a significantly smaller time and full-time differentials in family-
share of female respondents (4.3 percentage friendly policies are significant. Taken together,
points fewer than men) have paid leave (panel tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that women are
A). Results from the ATUS show no significant more likely to engage in part-time work and, in
gender differentials in access to paid leave for so doing, they forgo access to family-friendly
infant bonding. Results from the NLSY97 (panel benefits. With regard to wages, we find no sig-
B), however, reveal that significantly more nificant hourly wage differential for part-time
women have access to paid parental leave. versus full-time workers in the NLSY97; as ex-
Turning to employer-provided or subsidized pected, the difference in annual hours worked
childcare, results from the NLSY97 indicate is significant.
that fewer than one in ten workers receive this The results in tables 2 and 3 suggest that
benefit with no gender differential in access part-time status may explain why table 1 shows
(panel B). Finally, ATUS results in panel A show gender differentials in access to some family-
no significant gender difference in access to friendly benefits. To more fully explore whether
scheduling flexibility in lieu of using leave, and part-time status alone, or other control vari-
no significant gender difference in daily min- ables, explain the gender differentials, we next
utes spent working from home. However, return to the OLS regression results. Table 4 re-
sults for the NLSY97 measure of regular access ports results using ATUS data, panel A showing
to scheduling flexibility (panel B) indicate a sig- results for access to any paid leave by prime-
nificantly greater share of women have access age workers, panel B showing access to sched-
to this benefit. uling flexibility in lieu of leave, and panel C
The gender differences observed in table 1 showing time spent working from home on a
could be explained by a sorting model in which given day.3 When specified only with individual
workers sort into firms based on characteris- controls and state fixed effects (column 1), and
tics such as wages, family-friendly policies, when adding employer controls (column 2),
and the availability of part-time hours. Male women are around 5 percentage points less
and female workers may value these character- likely to have access to any paid leave than
istics differently, both because of personal men. Column 3 adds a control for part-time
preferences and because of the constraints status, which essentially brings the gender dif-
they face, such as requiring time for caregiv- ferential to zero. This result indicates that,
ing. Women with children, or women who an- while women have less access to paid leave,
ticipate having children, may be more likely to this differential is driven by part-time workers,
sort into firms that accommodate their prefer- who are 37.7 percentage points less likely to
ences and constraints, even if doing so re- have access to paid leave than full-time work-
quires a trade-off of pay and other benefits. For ers (see table A1).
3. We also estimated all ATUS models with a sample mirroring the ages of the NLSY97 sample. Results for this
younger sample (not shown but available on request) are similar in magnitude, direction, and significance.

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Table 1. Unadjusted Gender Differentials in Access to Family-Friendly Policies
Male Female Differential
Panel A. Family-friendly benefits, ATUS

Any paid leave 0.713 0.671 –0.043*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Vacation 0.710 0.659 –0.050*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
Personal 0.628 0.576 –0.051*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.025)
Own illness 0.694 0.651 –0.042*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Other’s illness 0.590 0.534 –0.039
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024)
Elder care 0.353 0.341 –0.011
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022)
Childcare 0.384 0.374 –0.009
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022)
Infant bonding 0.523 0.540 0.017
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023)
Any flexibility 0.552 0.570 0.018
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022)
Hourly flexibility 0.512 0.508 0.029
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021)
Day of week flexibility 0.372 0.401 –0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022)
Location flexibility 0.264 0.250 –0.013
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019)
Daily minutes working from home 18.257 19.866 1.609
(1.605) (1.860) (2.456)
Panel B. Family-friendly benefits, NLSY97

Paid parental leave 0.325 0.410 0.085***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Employer-provided childcare 0.081 0.087 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Scheduling flexibility 0.393 0.437 0.045***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ATUS Leave Module and NLSY97 (BLS 2011, 2011–2015).
Note: ATUS sample is restricted to prime working age, twenty-five to fifty-four years old. NLSY97
sample is twenty-six to thirty-six years old. Percentages and differences are weighted using individual
weights. Differentials may be slightly different than the amount obtained by subtracting the female
column from the male column due to rounding. In panel A, male n = 1,827 for leave, female n = 1,934
for leave; male n = 1,840 for flexibility, female n = 1,945 for flexibility. In panel B, male n = 6,781, female
n = 6,658.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

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Table 2. Gender Differences in the Share of Part-Time Workers
Male Female
Regression Regression
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Panel A. All workers, ATUS

Part time 0.143 0.138 0.286*** 0.241***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 1,827 1,827 1,934 1,934
Panel B. Workers with children, ATUS

Part time 0.150 0.137 0.331*** 0.269***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,184 1,184
Panel C. Workers without children, ATUS

Part time 0.137 0.137 0.252*** 0.222***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Observations 749 749 750 750
Panel D. All workers, NLSY97

Part time 0.168 0.143 0.313*** 0.262***
(0.004) (0.005) (0 .005) (0.006)
Observations 6,781 6,781 6,658 6,658
Panel E. Workers with children, NLSY97

Part time 0.118 0.107 0.342*** 0.282***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 3,462 3,462 4,571 4,571
Panel F. Workers without children, NLSY97

Part time 0.213 0.173 0.263*** 0.233***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 3,319 3,319 2,087 2,087
Note: Regression-adjusted means control for individual characteristics and firm characteristics
(industry, sector, and occupation). In the ATUS, regression-adjusted means also control for state fixed
effects; in the NLSY97, regression-adjusted means also control for region and year fixed effects.
Individual controls include race, age, age-squared, relationship status, education, household composi-
tion, and citizenship status. Employer controls include industry, occupation, sector, and union coverage.
Industry controls use the 2007 Census Industry Classification system to categorize workers into:
agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining, quarrying, and oil; construction; manufacturing; wholesale and
retail; information; financial activities; professional and business services; education and health
services; leisure and hospitality; other services; and public administration. Occupation controls use the
2010 Census Occupation Classification system to categorize workers into: management, professional,
and related; services; sales and office; farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and maintenance;
and production, transportation, and material moving. Sector controls include government, private
for-profit, and private nonprofit. All models are weighted using individual weights. Significance stars
indicate difference between male and female results.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

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Table 3. Family-Friendly Benefits and Hourly Wages for Part-Time and Full-Time Workers
Part-Time Workers Full-Time Workers
Regression Regression
Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
Panel A. Family-friendly
benefits, ATUS
Any paid leave 0.223 0.346 0.700*** 0.708***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009)
Any scheduling flexibility 0.647 0.650 0.514*** 0.547***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.009) (0.010)
Minutes working from home 13.534 18.769 20.478* 18.265
(2.401) (3.072) (1.406) (1.512)
Panel B. Family-friendly
benefits, NLSY97
Paid parental leave 0.129 0.158 0.422*** 0.414***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Employer-provided childcare 0.032 0.042 0.096*** 0.094***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Regular scheduling flexibility 0.426 0.423 0.412 0.411
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Panel C. Hourly wage, NLSY97

Hourly wage 23.54 20.81 26.37 21.48
(1.18) (3.15) (4.10) (1.29)
Panel D. Annual hours

worked, NLSY97
Annual hours worked 1,127.017 1,293.153 2,094.322*** 2,159.485***
(13.929) (17.448) (7.638) (7.631)
Note: Regression-adjusted means control for individual characteristics and firm characteristics
(industry, sector, and occupation). In the ATUS, regression-adjusted means also control for state fixed
effects; in the NLSY97, regression-adjusted means also control for region and year fixed effects. See
note to table 2 for information on individual and employer controls. All models are weighted using
individual weights. In panel A, paid leave n = 3761, scheduling flexibility n = 3,785. For all models in
panels B, C, and D, n = 14,060. Significance stars indicate difference between part-time and full-time
results.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 5 uses the ATUS to study gender dif- sonal time, their own illness, or someone else’s
ferentials by allowed type of paid leave use.4 illness. Once we account for part-time status
Results from specifications 1 and 2 (panels A (panel C), these differences are no longer sig-
and B) indicate that women are significantly nificant. Nor do we see significant gender dif-
less likely (5 to 7 percentage points) to have ac- ferences in being able to use paid leave for
cess to leave that can be used for vacation, per- infant bonding. To explicitly examine paid pa-
4. Because of missing data, our sample varies according to the outcome measure used. When conducting the
same analysis with a consistent sample (n = 2,403), our results are similar in magnitude, direction, and signifi-
cance.

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Table 4. Primary Regression Results from ATUS 2011
1 2 3
Panel A. Access to any leave

Female –0.056** –0.050* –0.006
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Panel B. Access to scheduling

flexibility in lieu of leave
Female 0.005 –0.014 –0.025
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Panel C. Minutes spent working

from home on a given day
Female 2.030 0.416 0.399
(3.632) (3.705) (4.524)
Employer controls No Yes Yes

Part-time worker control No No Yes
Source: Authors’ calculations using ATUS Leave Module (BLS 2011).

Note: Coefficients for individual controls, sector, and part time are presented in table A1 for panel A
and table A4 for panel B. All models include state fixed effects and individual controls. See note to
table 2 for information on individual and employer controls. All models are weighted using individual
weights. For all models in panel A, n = 3,761. For all models in panels B and C, n = 3,785.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 5. Access to Paid Leave by Allowed Paid Leave Use Type from ATUS 2011
3 4 5 6 7
1 2 Own Other’s Elder Child- Infant
Vacation Personal Illness Illness Care care Bonding
Panel A. Specification 1,
individual controls only
Female –0.066** –0.073** –0.060** –0.058* –0.024 –0.025 –0.007
(0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Panel B. Specification 2, individual

controls and employer controls
Female –0.056* –0.062* –0.057** –0.055* –0.023 –0.027 –0.019
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Panel C. Specification 3, individual

controls, employer controls, and
part-time status control
Female –0.009 –0.017 –0.010 –0.007 0.002 –0.002 0.019
(0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 3,673 2,909 3,538 3,117 3,505 3,526 3,521

Note: All models include state fixed effects. See note to table 2 for information on individual and employer
controls. All models are weighted using individual weights.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

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Table 6. Primary Regression Results from NLSY97
1 2 3
Panel A. Access to paid

parental leave
Female 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.075***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Panel B. Access to employer-

provided or subsidized childcare
Female 0.0001 –0.016** –0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Panel C. Access to regular

scheduling flexibility
Female 0.036*** –0.002 –0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Employer controls No Yes Yes

Part-time worker control No No Yes
Source: Authors’ calculations using NLSY97 (BLS 2011–2015).

Note: All models include region fixed effects, year fixed effects, and individual controls. Coefficients for
individual controls, sector, and part-time worker are presented in table A2 for panel A, table A3 for
panel B, and table A6 for panel C. See note to table 2 for information on individual and employer
controls. All models are weighted using individual weights. For all models, n = 14,060.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
rental leave more closely, we turn to the pri- flexibility in lieu of taking leave are studied us-
mary regression results for the NLSY97, as ing both data sets. Using the ATUS, results in
shown in panel A of table 6 (full results shown panel B of table 4 indicate no significant gender
in table A2). Across all three specifications, differences in access to any flexibility in lieu of
these results indicate that, among workers of leave nor in access to particular types of flexibil-
prime childbearing age, women are up to 7.5 ity (for full estimates of table 2, panel B, see
percentage points more likely to have access to table A4; for estimates by type of leave, see table
paid parental leave than similar men even A5). Using the NLSY97, estimates in panel C of
when we control for part-time status. table 6 examine gender differentials in regular
Using the NLSY97, access to employer- access to scheduling flexibility (for full esti-
provided childcare for workers of prime child- mates, see table A6). Although results from
bearing age is studied in panel B of table 6. Re- specification 1 suggest that women are 3.6 per-
sults from specification 1 show no significant centage points more likely to have access to
gender differential. Results from specification such flexibility than men with similar personal
2 indicate that women are significantly less characteristics, results from specifications 2
likely (1.6 percentage points) to have access to and 3 indicate no significant gender differen-
childcare than similar men. In specification 3, tial. Taken together, these results show no gen-
as in table 4, the addition of a control for part- der difference in access to scheduling flexibil-
time status yields an insignificant gender dif- ity, whether it is in lieu of leave or is more
ference: part-time workers are 4 to 5 percentage regularly available. Finally, using the ATUS in
points less likely to have access to employer- panel C of table 4, we find no significant gender
provided childcare than full-time workers (see differences in minutes spent working from
table A3). home on a given day, suggesting that women
Gender differentials in access to scheduling are not disproportionately likely to work from

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Table 7. Education-Stratified Regression Results, ATUS and NLSY97
1 2 3
High School Some College
or Less College or More
Panel A. Access to any leave, ATUS

Female –0.066 0.120** –0.038
(0.038) (0.046) (0.026)
Observations 1,194 861 1,917
Panel B. Access to scheduling flexibility in

lieu of leave, ATUS
Female 0.068 0.001 –0.094**
(0.045) (0.050) (0.029)
Observations 1,194 861 1,917
Panel C. Access to paid parental

leave, NLSY97
Female 0.064*** 0.080*** 0.086**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.031)
Observations 8,383 4,406 1,271
Panel D. Access to employer-subsidized or

provided childcare, NLSY97
Female –0.006 –0.011 –0.050*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.020)
Panel E. Access to regular scheduling

flexibility, NLSY97
Female 0.022 –0.027 –0.073*
(0.014) (0.018) (0.030)
Note: All models include geographic fixed effects, individual controls, employer controls, and part-time
status controls. See note to table 2 for information on individual and employer controls. All models are
weighted using individual weights.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
home instead of using other forms of schedul- gressions (shown in table 7) include state fixed
ing flexibility. effects, individual controls, employer controls
and part-time status. In no case are women sig-
Education-Stratified Results nificantly less likely to have access to any leave
Educational attainment influences the types of than their male counterparts, and in the
firms and jobs into which workers sort. In sup- NLSY97 women in all education groups are sig-
plemental models, we therefore examined re- nificantly more likely to have access to paid pa-
sults stratified by level of education (high rental leave. When considering childcare, the
school degree or less, some college but no de- most highly educated women are 5 percentage
gree, and a college degree or more). These re- points less likely to have access to employer-

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provided or subsidized childcare than compa- ployees take leave. In addition, universal provi-
rable men. Finally, our results indicate that sion mitigates the potential for worker selec-
women with a college degree or more are less tion into jobs with family-friendly benefits and
likely to have access to regular flexibility than employer discrimination against these workers,
similar men, though women with less educa- although discrimination could still occur if em-
tion do not appear to face these differentials. ployers face other costs and believe that par-
ticular groups of workers will be more likely to
P o li cy Im p li c at i o n s use the benefits.
Our analysis shows that though women have With these considerations in mind, we turn
less access to any employer-provided paid leave to a discussion of whether and how family-
than men, this is entirely explained by part- friendly policies might be expanded to address
time status. It seems that women are sorting the shortfalls in coverage that we found.
into part-time jobs to have more time for care-
giving and, in so doing, are forgoing income Access to Paid Family Leave
and access to paid time off. However, we also We find that young women are significantly
found that young women, even those in part- more likely to have access to paid parental leave
time jobs, are more likely than men to have ac- than comparable men. Yet overall levels of ac-
cess to specifically designated paid parental cess to paid parental leave are low, estimates
leave. Furthermore, we found insignificant gen- indicating that slightly less than half (NLSY97)
der differentials in access to employer-provided to slightly more than half (ATUS) of all workers
or subsidized childcare and access to schedul- have access to this benefit. Although public
ing flexibility. Thus, the problem with access to support is strong for mandating employers to
family-friendly policies is not gender differ- provide paid family leave (Horowitz et al. 2017),
ences but overall low levels of access to such we do not believe it is the appropriate mecha-
policies for both women and men. nism by which to provide paid family leave be-
Public policy could expand coverage by two cause it would likely be costly for employers
primary mechanisms. One is to mandate that and result in discrimination against women of
employers provide such coverage. Employer childbearing age.5 In regard to public provision,
mandates are ill suited to many types of family- several states have paid family leave policies
friendly policies because they can lead to dis- that are in effect (California, New Jersey, New
crimination against workers with children (Gr- York, and Rhode Island) or soon to be imple-
uber 1994), particularly women, and can impose mented (Massachusetts, Washington, Connect-
high costs on employers, particularly small icut, Oregon, and Washington, D.C.). Although
businesses (Mathur et al. 2017). Employer man- these policies vary widely in terms of length of
dates, however, may be the only alternative leave, wage replacement rate, and eligibility re-
when the policies involve workplace practices quirements, they are generally funded through
such as scheduling. increased payroll taxes either solely on employ-
The second mechanism—to provide such ees or on both employees and employers (Na-
coverage through public provision—is more ap- tional Partnership for Women & Families 2018).
propriate than employer mandates in situa- For example, California’s program, which is
tions with both high costs and the potential for funded by employee payroll taxes, costs the av-
discrimination. Family-friendly policies often erage worker $2 per month in additional payroll
can be funded through a small payroll tax on taxes (Milkman and Appelbaum 2013).
all workers or employers, thereby distributing Although the costs to workers are low, the
the cost of coverage across workers rather than costs to employers are potentially greater.
burdening the specific employers whose em- Firms in California argued that the indirect
5. A related option would be an employer incentive, such as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which offers a
12.5 to 25 percent tax credit incentive for employers to provide paid family leave to lower-income workers, but
the incentive does not offset the cost of providing this benefit and may not see a high take-up rate among em-
ployers who did not previously offer paid family leave (Mathur et al. 2017).

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costs of the law, such as paying current workers may be the most feasible way to increase access.
overtime or hiring and training temporary Although some states and cities have enacted
workers to complete the work of the employee universal pre-kindergarten programs, these
on leave, would be detrimental, although post- programs typically provide only one (or two)
law surveys found that a majority of employers years of care and currently serve less than a
indicated they were either unaffected or posi- third of four-year-old children. Expanding
tively affected by the law (Milkman and Appel- childcare subsidies for low-income families
baum 2013). Some employers even report being while streamlining the application and renewal
helped by the law, in that the policy has re- process and lengthening eligibility periods
placed the costs of providing employees with could greatly benefit households at the bottom
paid family leave. Employer surveys in Rhode of the income distribution. Other measures,
Island, New Jersey, and New York also indicate such as expanded tax credits or more public
widespread support, with roughly two-thirds of funding through sliding-scale fees, will be
employers supporting the law in their state and needed to reach middle-income families who
an additional 10 to 15 percent having neutral also face high costs but typically receive little
views (Bartel et al. 2017). On the federal level, employer or public support.
several congressional representatives from These public policies have little potential to
both parties have proposed paid family leave impose costs on employers because they are
policies (for a discussion of these proposals, generally funded through taxes on earners; em-
see Mathur et al. 2017). ployers even may benefit from a reduction in
work absences and interruptions. Moreover, as
Access to Childcare mentioned, childcare access is believed to be
Employer mandates are probably ill suited to particularly beneficial in reducing gender gaps
expand access to childcare. Not only would the because it allows women to avoid work inter-
cost of such a benefit be burdensome for em- ruptions or reductions in work hours; pro-
ployers, it could also result in discrimination grams to support young children and their fam-
against workers with children. Evidence indi- ilies may also be beneficial in reducing racial
cates that employers discriminate against inequality in the workforce (see Rodgers 2019).
mothers: mothers who opt out of employment
to care for children are seen as less committed, Access to Work Scheduling Flexibility
less capable, and less deserving of employment Employer mandates are the most appropriate
(Weisshaar 2018) and receive fewer callbacks for mechanism by which to promote scheduling
interviews (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; flexibility because scheduling involves work-
Weisshaar 2018).6 A childcare mandate might place practices that cannot be provided by pub-
exacerbate such discrimination or create addi- lic services. Policies to promote scheduling flex-
tional discrimination to the extent that women ibility must address the different issues that
would be seen as more costly to employ. hourly workers and salaried workers face. For
Also, as a practical matter, the share of em- hourly workers, scheduling flexibility means
ployers offering this benefit is extremely low protections against unpredictable schedules.
(only about one in ten). Thus, rather than man- This can be accomplished by equipping the
dating employers to dramatically increase worker with input into both the number of
childcare provision, which would be costly to hours per week and the time of day the hours
employers and may result in gender discrimi- are worked. For salaried workers, scheduling
nation, expanding public childcare programs flexibility often means providing the worker
6. Family-friendly policies may also lead to employer discrimination: if firms believe women will require a change
in hours or decrease productivity after childbirth, they may not hire or invest in women (Blau and Kahn 2013;
Thomas 2018). Mallika Thomas (2018) exploits variation from the introduction of the FMLA to examine the effect
of increased access to job-protected leave on firm behavior. She finds that since the enactment of FMLA, women
under the age of forty are 5 percent more likely to stay employed but 8 percent less likely to be promoted, rela-
tive to women hired before FMLA.

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
with the ability to adjust when (and potentially flexibility in work arrangements. On the federal
where) their work is done, as well as the right level, congressional representatives from both
to request part-time or flexible work. However, parties have proposed policies focused both on
scheduling flexibility policies also are associ- scheduling flexibility and on scheduling control
ated with both hiring and wage penalties (1 Million for Worker Flexibility, n.d.).
against women (Goldin 2014) and thus should
be joined with equal pay and benefit policies to C o n c lu s i o n
insure gender equality in the labor market. EEO policies, in combination with other factors
Employers may worry that an inability to such as changing gender norms and roles, have
change workers’ schedules at the last-minute contributed to substantial progress toward
will harm their bottom lines, as many employ- closing gender gaps in the workplace. However,
ers—particularly in retail and service—have after the birth of children, women’s career tra-
long relied on just-in-time scheduling to match jectories diverge significantly from men’s. In
the number of employees to in-store traffic. Ex- this article, we considered whether family-
perimental evidence indicates that this concern friendly policies are a potentially promising so-
does not bear out: employers who give workers lution to promoting workplace gender equality
more scheduling control see an increase in among parents. Using data from the American
sales far greater than the additional cost asso- Time Use Survey and the NLSY97, we provide
ciated with giving workers greater scheduling new evidence on employer provision of these
control, and workers who control their sched- policies, finding that the gender differential in
ules are significantly more productive on the access to paid leave through employers is en-
job (Williams et al. 2018). Scheduling flexibility tirely explained by the greater likelihood of
holds other potential benefits for employers. women being in part-time jobs. To accommo-
First, flexibility may boost retention, which date caregiving responsibilities, women sort
could lower recruiting and training costs. On into part-time jobs and thereby forgo income
average, replacing a worker costs an employer and various types of paid leave. Offsetting this
about 20 percent of the worker’s salary (about is the fact that young women are more likely to
16 percent for workers earning less than $30,000 have access to paid parental leave. Gender dif-
per year) (Boushey 2016). ferentials in access to childcare through an em-
Several cities, including Emeryville, San ployer or access to scheduling flexibility are not
Francisco, Seattle, and New York, as well as the significant.
states of New York and Oregon, have enacted Nonetheless, access to such policies re-
scheduling control policies focused on low- mains rather low in the United States. Public
wage workers (Williams et al. 2018). Although policies—such as a federal provision for paid
provisions vary, they generally mandate employ- family leave, expanded public or subsidized
ers to adhere to a minimum amount of advance childcare, and employer mandates for schedul-
scheduling notice and to pay workers for any ing control and flexibility—could play an im-
last-minute changes to schedules (Williams et portant role in helping all families, particularly
al. 2018). Further, all workers, both hourly and those who are low income, navigate the tension
salaried, in the cities of Berkeley, San Francisco, between work and home and have the potential
and New York, and in the states of New Hamp- to continue progress made by EEO toward a
shire and Vermont, have the right to request more gender-equitable workforce.

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Table A1. Access to Any Paid Leave: Regression Results, ATUS 2011
1 2 3
Female –0.056** –0.050* –0.006

(0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Race (ref = white)

Black –0.011 0.002 –0.012
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Hispanic –0.057 –0.035 –0.044
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
Other –0.005 –0.008 –0.001
(0.052) (0.049) (0.045)
Age 0.005 0.005 –0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Age2 –0.000 –0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relationship (ref = married)

Cohabiting –0.017 0.010 –0.008
(0.046) (0.045) (0.044)
Single –0.020 –0.014 –0.017
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Education (ref = college or more)

High school or less –0.170*** –0.052 –0.040
(0.024) (0.028) (0.025)
Some college –0.089*** –0.011 –0.012
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
Household composition (ref = no children)

Youngest child age six to seventeen –0.010 –0.020 –0.005
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Youngest child age five or younger 0.006 0.005 0.020
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
Citizenship (ref = native-born citizen)

Foreign-born citizen –0.051 –0.033 –0.041
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
Foreign-born noncitizen –0.246*** –0.209*** –0.203***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
Union coverage –0.040 –0.027
(0.068) (0.057)
Sector (ref = private for-profit)

Government 0.090* 0.084*
(0.037) (0.035)
Private nonprofit –0.002 0.001
(0.044) (0.043)
Part-time worker –0.377***
(0.031)
Constant 0.659** 0.632* 0.692**

(0.251) (0.268) (0.257)

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Table A1. (continued)
1 2 3
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes

Industry controls No Yes Yes
Occupation controls No Yes Yes
R2 0.096 0.177 0.240

Note: Industry controls use the 2007 Census Industry Classification system to categorize workers into:
agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining, quarrying, and oil; construction; manufacturing; wholesale
and retail; information; financial activities; professional and business services; education and health
and production, transportation, and material moving. All models are weighted using individual weights.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Table A2. Access to Paid Parental Leave, NLSY97
Primary Job Any Job
1 2 3 4 5 6
Female 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.051*** 0.077***

(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Race (ref = white)

Black 0.039*** 0.027* 0.028** 0.042*** 0.029* 0.029*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Hispanic 0.054*** 0.027* 0.027* 0.057*** 0.030* 0.030*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Other 0.009 0.026 0.032 0.026 0.046 0.051
(0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042)
Age 0.099* 0.060 0.032 0.057 0.027 0.006
(0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
Age2 –0.002* –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.000 –0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Cohabiting –0.061*** –0.040*** –0.031** –0.070*** –0.051*** –0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Single –0.068*** –0.044*** –0.042*** –0.082*** –0.060*** –0.058***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Education (ref = college

or more)
High school or less –0.147*** –0.068*** –0.060*** –0.154*** –0.075*** –0.067***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Some college 0.031 0.007 0.009 0.027 0.004 0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Household composition
(ref = no children)
Youngest child age six to –0.038** –0.029* –0.037** –0.047*** –0.036** –0.042**
seventeen (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Youngest child age five or –0.014 –0.003 –0.002 –0.021 –0.009 –0.006
younger (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Citizenship (ref = native-

born citizen)
Foreign-born citizen 0.077** 0.043 0.029 0.061* 0.032 0.022
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Foreign-born noncitizen –0.068* –0.060 –0.049 –0.078* –0.067* –0.057
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Union coverage 0.085*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.061***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Primary Job Any Job
1 2 3 4 5 6
Sector (ref = private

for-profit)
Government –0.003 0.005 –0.003 –0.01
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Private nonprofit 0.059** 0.067** 0.076*** 0.073***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Part-time worker –0.256*** –0.218***
(0.009) (0.010)
Constant 0.322*** –0.507 –0.079 0.343*** –0.071 0.709

(0.006) (0.754) (0.736) (0.006) (0.816) (0.811)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Occupation controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060
R2 0.008 0.113 0.153 0.009 0.117 0.144

Note: Region fixed-effects use census region categories: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Industry controls
use the 2007 Census Industry Classification system to categorize workers into: agriculture, forestry, and fishing;
mining, quarrying, and oil; construction; manufacturing; wholesale and retail; information; financial activities;
professional and business services; education and health services; leisure and hospitality; other services; and
public administration. Occupation controls use the 2010 Census Occupation Classification system to categorize
workers into: management, professional, and related; services; sales and office; farming, fishing, and forestry;
construction and maintenance; and production, transportation, and material moving. All models are weighted
using individual weights.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Table A3. Access to Employer-Provided or Subsidized Childcare, NLSY97
Primary Job Any Job
1 2 3 4 5 6
Female 0.0001 –0.016** –0.010 0.004 –0.014* –0.009

(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Race (ref = white)

Black 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Hispanic 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.014* 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Other –0.014 –0.015 –0.014 –0.012 –0.013 –0.012
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Age –0.005 –0.016 –0.022 –0.016 –0.022 –0.026
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)

Cohabiting –0.012 –0.007 –0.005 –0.013 –0.008 –0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Single –0.019** –0.014* –0.013 –0.021** –0.016* –0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)

or more)
High school or less –0.034*** –0.008 –0.006 –0.036*** –0.007 –0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Some college –0.003 –0.007 –0.007 –0.004 –0.009 –0.010
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
(ref = no children)
Youngest child age six to –0.010 –0.006 –0.008 –0.007 –0.003 –0.004
seventeen (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Youngest child age five or 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.009
younger (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)

born citizen)
Foreign-born citizen 0.028 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.014 0.012
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Foreign-born noncitizen –0.034* –0.035* –0.033* –0.039** –0.042** –0.040**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Union coverage 0.001 –0.002 –0.003 –0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Primary Job Any Job
1 2 3 4 5 6

for-profit)
Government 0.015 0.016 –0.018 –0.020
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Private nonprofit 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.028* 0.027*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Part-time worker –0.052*** –0.043***
(0.005) (0.006)
Constant 0.142 0.249 0.337 0.310 0.268 0.421

(0.464) (0.461) (0.460) (0.495) (0.518) (0.517)
Occupation controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060
R2 0.007 0.029 0.034 0.008 0.035 0.038

Note: Region fixed effects use census region categories: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Industry controls
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Table A4. Access to Any Scheduling Flexibility in Lieu of Leave, ATUS 2011
1 2 3
Female 0.005 –0.014 –0.025

(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Race (ref = white)

Black –0.031 –0.009 –0.006
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Hispanic –0.037 –0.033 –0.031
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Other 0.074 0.084 0.082
(0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
Age 0.001 –0.003 –0.001
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Age2 –0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

Cohabiting 0.004 –0.013 –0.008
(0.049) (0.045) (0.045)
Single 0.021 0.014 0.014
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Education (ref = college or more)

High school or less –0.155*** –0.112*** –0.115***
(0.026) (0.030) (0.030)
Some college –0.075** –0.073* –0.073*
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Household composition (ref = no children)

Youngest child age six to seventeen 0.027 0.018 0.014
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Youngest child age five and younger 0.044 0.031 0.027
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Citizenship (ref = native-born citizen)

Foreign-born citizen –0.145** –0.167*** –0.164***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
Foreign-born noncitizen –0.113** –0.097* –0.098*
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Union coverage –0.209** –0.211**
(0.076) (0.073)
Sector (ref = private for-profit)

Government 0.201*** 0.199***
(0.041) (0.041)
Private nonprofit 0.214*** 0.211***
(0.053) (0.053)
Part-time worker 0.095**
(0.031)
Constant 0.630* 0.444 0.430

(0.274) (0.294) (0.294)

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
1 2 3
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes

Industry controls No Yes Yes
Occupation controls No Yes Yes
R2 0.063 0.113 0.116

Note: Industry controls use the 2007 Census Industry Classification system to categorize workers into:
agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining, quarrying, and oil; construction; manufacturing; wholesale
and retail; information; financial activities; professional and business services; education and health
and production, transportation, and material moving. All models are weighted using individual weights.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table A5. Access to Scheduling Flexibility by Allowed Use Type, ATUS 2011
1 2 3
Hour of day Day of week Location
Panel A. Specification 1,
individual controls only
Female –0.021 0.020 –0.027
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019)
Panel B. Specification 2, individual

controls and employer controls
Female –0.032 –0.002 –0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021)
Panel C. Specification 3, individual

controls, employer controls, and
part-time status control
Female –0.038 –0.002 –0.018
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022)

Note: All models include state fixed effects. See note to table 2 for information on individual and
employer controls. All models are weighted using individual weights.

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Table A6. Access to Regular Scheduling Flexibility, NLSY97
Primary Job Any Job
1 2 3 1 2 3
Female 0.036*** –0.002 –0.003 0.047*** 0.004 0.001

(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Race (ref = white)
Black –0.024* –0.004 –0.004 –0.025* –0.001 –0.001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Hispanic –0.022 –0.031* –0.031* –0.025* –0.030* –0.030*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Other –0.015 –0.005 –0.005 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Age –0.020 –0.022 –0.021 –0.016 –0.023 –0.021
(0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053)
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cohabiting –0.040*** –0.038** –0.038*** –0.040*** –0.044*** –0.044***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Single –0.050*** –0.048*** –0.048*** –0.049*** –0.050*** –0.050***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
or more)
High school or less –0.101*** –0.067*** –0.067*** –0.113*** –0.072*** –0.073***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Some college –0.028 0.005 0.005 –0.036* –0.007 –0.007
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
(ref = no children)
Youngest child age six to –0.028* –0.012 –0.011 –0.028* –0.010 –0.010
seventeen (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Youngest child age five and –0.044*** –0.029** –0.029** –0.050*** –0.031** –0.031**
younger (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
born citizen)
Foreign-born citizen 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.002 –0.002 –0.001
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Foreign-born noncitizen –0.069 –0.066 –0.067 –0.063 –0.054 –0.055
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Union coverage –0.066*** –0.065*** –0.061*** –0.060***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
for-profit)
Government 0.100*** 0.100*** –0.108*** –0.108***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Private nonprofit 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.080*** 0.080***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
Primary Job Any Job
1 2 3 1 2 3
Part-time worker 0.012 0.023

(0.012) (0.013)
Constant 0.767 0.860 0.839 0.726 0.850 0.769

(0.816) (0.797) (0.797) (0.836) (0.872) (0.872)
Occupation controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060 14,060
R2 0.021 0.069 0.069 0.024 0.083 0.084

Note: Region fixed effects use census region categories: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Industry controls
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

103.208.95.130 on Wed, 07 Feb 2024 10:01:30 +00:00
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Doran GenderLaborMarket 2019

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Gender in the Labor Market: The Role of Equal Opportunity and Family-Friendly

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/10.7758/rsf.2019.5.5.09

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Keywords: gender, equal opportunity, family-­friendly policies

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r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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Work Scheduling But the specific types of flexibility measured

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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Table 1. Unadjusted Gender Differentials in Access to Family-Friendly Policies

Male Female Differential

Panel A. Family-friendly benefits, ATUS

Panel B. Family-friendly benefits, NLSY97

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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Table 2. Gender Differences in the Share of Part-Time Workers

Panel A. All workers, ATUS

Observations 1,827 1,827 1,934 1,934

Panel B. Workers with children, ATUS

Observations 1,078 1,078 1,184 1,184

Panel C. Workers without children, ATUS

Observations 749 749 750 750

Panel D. All workers, NLSY97

Observations 6,781 6,781 6,658 6,658

Panel E. Workers with children, NLSY97

Observations 3,462 3,462 4,571 4,571

Panel F. Workers without children, NLSY97

Observations 3,319 3,319 2,087 2,087

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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Part-Time Workers Full-Time Workers

Panel C. Hourly wage, NLSY97

Panel D. Annual hours

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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Table 4. Primary Regression Results from ATUS 2011

Panel A. Access to any leave

Panel B. Access to scheduling

Panel C. Minutes spent working

Employer controls No Yes Yes

Source: Authors’ calculations using ATUS Leave Module (BLS 2011).

Panel B. Specification 2, individual

Panel C. Specification 3, individual

Observations 3,673 2,909 3,538 3,117 3,505 3,526 3,521

Source: Authors’ calculations using ATUS Leave Module (BLS 2011).

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

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Table 6. Primary Regression Results from NLSY97

Panel A. Access to paid

Panel B. Access to employer-

Panel C. Access to regular

Employer controls No Yes Yes

Source: Authors’ calculations using NLSY97 (BLS 2011–2015).

Keywords: gender, equal opportunity, family-friendly policies

Female 0.065* 0.045* 0.075* 0.073* 0.051* 0.077*

Constant 0.322* –0.507 –0.079 0.343* –0.071 0.709