DAY 4 III.

NEGLIGENCE

E. DEFENSES
E. DEFENSES
3. Assumption of Risk (ARTICLE 1174)
Assumption of Risk (ARTICLE 1174)
Afialda v. Hisole
Transporto v. Mijares
● See AQUINO, TORTS AND DAMAGES 242 (2001). Civil Code
Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. CA
Co v. CA Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
4. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
Picart v. Smith risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
Ong v. Metropolitan Water District
PLDT v. CA
Raynera v. Hiceta What is meant when there is an assumption of risk?
Phoenix Construction v. IAC
● “One who knows, appreciates and deliberately exposes himself to a danger
5. Prescription (ARTICLE 1146) assumes the risk thereof. One cannot deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal
Kramer v. CA injury, especially when preventive measures are at hand, and then hold the author
Spouses Santos v. Pizardo of the danger for the ensuing injury.”
De Guzman v. Toyota Cubao ● It means that danger is apparent, YET the persons ignored this obvious danger and
6. Force Majeure / Fortuitous Event (ARTICLE 1174) assumed the risk of being harmed/damaged/incur loss
Gotesco Investment Corp. v. Chatto
Servando v. Phil. Steam With this defense, the defendant basically alleges that it cannot be held liable for damage
Yobido v. CA since the plaintiff himself/herself assumed the risk of such damage.
7. Diligence (ARTICLE 2180, last paragraph)
Ong v. Metropolitan Water District EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA:
Dulay v. CA 1. Emergency is found to exist;
Go v. IAC 2. Life or property of another is in peril; or
8. Mistake & Waiver (ARTICLES 6 and 1170) 3. He seeks to rescue his endangered property
Gatchalian v. Delim
Theis v. CA Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio
YHT Realty v. CA Hisole. In March 1947, without any fault from Afialda or any force
Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply v. CA majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his death.
Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. CA Afialda’s sister, Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that under the
9. Emergency or sudden peril doctrine Civil Code, “The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. C&A Construction, Inc.
Afialda v. Hisole should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in
See Mckee case case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of
Gan v. CA the person who may have suffered it.”

F. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE Was Hisole liable for the death caused by the animal he owns? -
● Gula v. Dianala NO, Afialda being injured by the animal under those circumstances,
● San Ildefonso Lines v. CA
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
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 assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
The law uses the term “possessor and user of the animal”. Afialda was
the caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the
carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user
of the carabao and therefore he is the one who had custody and
control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from
causing damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a
stranger. Obviously, it was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent
the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself.
And being injured by the animal under those circumstances was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed
and for which he must take the consequences
Transporto worked in Sugar Planter’s Association, while Mijares
worked in Sugar Central. Both of them have their offices inside the
Analysis Department of La Carlota Sugar Central. One day Transporto
was called to the office of Lim (chief of the department) because there
was a big firecracker on Lim's table. When Transporto observed the
firecracker, he said that it was fake. Lim and Mijares though, insisted
that it was real. Then Transporto commented how he used to explode
bigger-sized firecrackers and that if you held it tightly you wouldn’t get
hurt. His co-workers laughed, so Transporto challenged them that he
would ignite the firecracker for P100. Only Mijares took up the bet, but
for P20 which Transporto agreed. They went outside the office to light
the firecracker. Before Transporto lit the fuse, Mijares asked how he
could be sure that Transporto won’t throw the firecracker at him.
Transporto then suggested that the firecracker be tied to his hand,
Transporto v. which they did (on his right palm). Transporto simulated lighting the
Mijares1 fuse with his cigarette then suddenly thrusted it to Mijares yelling
“BOOM!” so Mijares pushed the firecracker and ran. Transporto
laughed and called him a coward. Mijares dared him to light the fuse
for real, which Transporto did. After the firecracker exploded, he said
“you lost” then started walking back to the lab. Pilado (the only other
person who went outside) then told Transporto that his hand was
bleeding, so the latter went to the hospital where he was confined for
4 days and incurred hospital fees. However, his monthly salary was
only P150, and ever since the incident he was fired from work. When
Transporto was finally discharged, he asked Mijares for monetary help
and they agreed that Mijares would pay P1,000, but gave P500 only.
When Transporto demanded the other P500, Mijares refused. Hence,
he filed a case for damages.
What was the proximate cause of Transporto’s injury? - His own
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See AQUINO, TORTS AND DAMAGES 242 (2001).
voluntary act of lighting a firecracker and clenching it between his
hand.
Based on the facts, it was clear that Transporto played a part in
incurring his injury. Moreover, if Transporto didn’t want to take the risk
after the fuse was ignited, he could have easily pulled out the fuse
with his left hand or he could have smothered it by smashing it on the
ground. The SC called this a “volenti non fit injuria” (no wrong is
done to him who consents). When a person, knowing and
appreciating the danger and the risk, elects voluntarily to encounter
them, he can no more maintain an action founded upon the statute
than he can in cases to which the statute has no application.
One who voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from a known
danger is barred from a recovery.
Extra Notes:
This case should be governed by the DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON
FIT INJURIA (no wrong is done to him who consents). That to which a
person assents is not esteemed, in law, an injury. When a person,
knowing and appreciating the danger and the risk, elects voluntarily to
encounter them, he can no more maintain an action founded upon the
statute than he can in cases to which the statute has no application.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK – One who knows, appreciates and
deliberately exposes himself to a danger assumes the risk thereof.
One cannot deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal injury,
especially when preventive measures are at hand, and then hold the
author of the danger for the ensuing injury.
Typhoon "Gening" in Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain.
Isabel Lao Juan (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters Emporium,
to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in
waist-deep flood, Nana Belen was accompanied by Aida and Lina, her
employees. Suddenly, Nana Belen screamed and quickly sank into
the water. Aida and Linda attempted to help, but were afraid
because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving
Ilocos Norte Electric in snake-like fashion in the water. Antonio, the son-in-law, upon
Company v. CA hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law, passed by the City Hall
to request the police to ask INELCO to cut off the electric current. The
body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. Engr.
Juan, of National Power Corporation, noticed certain fluctuations in
their electric meter that indicated such abnormalities as grounded or
short-circuited lines. He set out of the NPC compound to inspect and
saw grounded and disconnected lines where some electric lines were
hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO
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office, he could not see any INELCO lineman. Engr. Juan attempted
to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile. A case for
damages was filed against INELCO. One of the defenses set-up by
INELCO was that Nana Belen assumed the risk in wading through
waist deep flood, thus INELCO was not liable.
Was the deceased’s act of wading in waist deep waters constitute
an assumption of risk that would absolve INELCO from liability? -
NO, it was the negligence of the INELCO in not providing quickly
repairing or at least deactivating the power lines which was the
proximate cause of the death of the Belen.
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God
for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim’s death. It was through
the intervention of INELCO’s negligence that death took place.
Although INELCO presented witnesses such as its electrical engineer,
chief lineman, and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence
and to negate the charge of negligence, the witnesses testified in a
general way about their duties and the measures which defendant
usually adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. Thus, the finding of
the TC was based on what INELCO's employees were supposed to do,
not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question,
and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about by
the typhoon. In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in
Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29,
extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might
imperil life or limb. The negligence of INELCO having been shown, it
may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's
death was solely due to a fortuitous event.
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by INELCO
finds no application in the case at bar. A person is excused from the
force of the rule when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he
must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist
or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to
rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand
as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with
an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal
incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without
regard to INELCO's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise. Hence, heirs of Nana Belen, may not be barred from
recovering damages for the death caused by INELCO's negligence.
Extra Notes:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA:
1. Emergency is found to exist;
2. Life or property of another is in peril; or
3. He seeks to rescue his endangered property
In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of
electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable
incident that might imperil life or limb. The measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to
the danger; this duty extends to every place where persons have a
right to be. When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is
liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent
conduct or omission
Co brought his Nissan pick-up truck to Broadway Motor Sales (BMS)
for repairs. They agreed that the car would be ready by July 21, but
BMS failed to release the pickup on said date because the battery was
weak and has not been replaced. The parties then agreed to
reschedule the date of release to July 24. When Co went to BMS on
July 24 to get his pick-up, BMS informed him that it was carnapped
earlier that day when one of BMS’ employees took it out on a test
drive. Co sued BMS for damages. The lower court ruled that BMS was
guilty of delay in the performance of its obligation and held BMS liable
to Co for the value of the lost vehicle. The CA reversed, reasoning that
the vehicle was lost due to a fortuitous event.
Whether the repair shop can be held liable for the loss of a
customer’s vehicle while the same is in its custody for repair or
other job services? - YES; Pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the
Co v. CA New Civil Code, liability attaches even if the loss was due to a
fortuitous event if “the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk.
Pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the New Civil Code, liability
attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event if “the nature of
the obligation requires the assumption of risk.” Carnapping is a
normal business risk for those engaged in the repair of motor
vehicles. For just as the owner is exposed to that risk so is the repair
shop since the car was entrusted to it.
Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The
fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s
rightful possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically
give rise to a fortuitous event.
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Carnapping does not foreclose the possibility of fault or negligence on
the part of BMS. Even assuming arguendo that carnapping was duly
established as a fortuitous event, still private respondent cannot
escape liability. Article 1165 of the New Civil Code makes an obligor
who is guilty of delay responsible even for a fortuitous event until he
has effected the delivery.

NOTES:
● N.B. The Court should have stopped in providing for the
basis of liability under Arts. 1174, 1262, and 1165 par. 3 which
says: “If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the
same thing to two or more persons who do not have the
same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous
event until he has effected the delivery”
● The court’s view of assumption of risk in this case doesn’t
make sense. A mere test-drive of a vehicle doesn’t mean that
a person consents to the risk of theft, even if it’s done by
those who repair motor vehicles. It would be tantamount to
saying that those engaged in any service/industry assumes
the risk of crimes to be inflicted upon them.

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Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is a defense invoked by the defendant in a situation
where both plaintiff and defendant were negligent. The doctrine states that:
● “Doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or the negligence of a 3rd person which is imputed to his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.”
Atty. Go: In trying to apply the doctrine of last clear chance the following must concur in order
to invoke the defense successfully: BALO
1. BOTH defendant and plaintiff must be negligent
2. Their negligent act or omission must not be contemporaneous; there must be an
appreciable amount of time.
3. Plaintiff had the last opportunity to avoid the accident caused but failed to do so.
LASTLY, the doctrine of last clear chance CANNOT apply when a person is required to act
instantaneously, and the peril cannot be avoided with all the means at hand.
the other lane, Picart moved the horse closer to the railing, reasoning
that he had no sufficient time to move to the right direction. Smith
continued driving towards Picart and when he had gotten quite
near, he quickly swerved to the other lane. The horse was so
frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. The horse’s limb
was broken and Picart was thrown off, leading to several injuries that
required medical attention.
W/N Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done? - YES
Although Picart was negligent in the first place for being in the wrong
lane, the SC held that where both parties are negligent, the person
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.
Here, the negligence of Smith succeeded that of Picart because it is
clear that the former had the final opportunity to avoid the accident,
but he did not do so.

Can the defense of last clear chance be invoked if one is required to act instantaneously?
● No. For the doctrine of last clear chance to apply, there must be an appreciable
interval between the negligent acts in order for the plaintiff to be afforded with the
last fair chance to prevent the injury.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The act or omission amounting to want of Where both parties are guilty of negligence,
ordinary care on the part of the person but the negligent act of one succeeds that
injured which, concurring with the of the other by an appreciable interval of
defendant’s negligence, is the proximate time, the one who has the last reasonable
cause of the injury. opportunity to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
Doctrine APPLIED - Smith Jr. had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident caused but failed to do so
Picart v. Smith
(repeat case) Picart was riding on his horse on the Carlatan Bridge when Smith,
riding in his car, approached the bridge. Smith blew his horn thrice to
give warning, as Picart was on Smith’s lane. BUT, instead of moving to
Recap:
Although Picart was negligent in the first place for being in the wrong
lane, the SC held that where both parties are negligent, the person
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.
NOTES
● It is important to note the temporal aspect of the negligence
of the parties in this case.
● The negligence of both parties is sufficiently established.
Picart’s pony was traversing the bridge IN THE WRONG
LANE, it should have been traveling at the left side of the
bridge and not the right. While Smith Jr.’s negligence was
that he was driving faster than the speed limit and did not
slow down as he was approaching the bridge even after
seeing Picart.
● However while both Smith Jr. and Picart were negligent, their
negligent acts did not happen at the same time.
Doctrine NOT applied - 1st element missing - MWD not negligent.
Ong v. Metropolitan
Water District Dominador (14y/o) and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to the
(repeat case) pool. Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker
room to drink coke. Some boys who were in the pool area informed

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that somebody was swimming underwater for quite a long time.
Abaño immediately jumped to retrieve the apparently lifeless body of
Dominador from the bottom. Abaño immediately applied manual
artificial respiration. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the
clinic. An autopsy was performed and found that the death was due to
asphyxia by submersion in water.
W/N the death of Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of MWD and/or its employee? - NO
The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of
a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimant notwithstanding his negligence; “A person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person
which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident."
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big pool and it
being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation
of MWD’s rules, and i that the lifeguard responded to the call for help
as soon as his attention was called, and immediately after retrieving
the body, all efforts at MWD’s disposal were used to bring him back to
life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine
now invoked by Ong to impute liability to MWD. The last clear chance
doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence
of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
NOTES:
● Sps. Ong is mistaken in the application of the doctrine of last
clear chance in this case. The Sps. are contending that the
MWD was liable because they had the last clear chance in
preventing the death of their child.
● However, in applying the elements mentioned earlier in this
section, the argument stands no chance. MWD has not been
found to be negligent in managing the swimming pools. Thus
the 1st element is lacking which on its own destroys
invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance.
● Also the invocation of the doctrine is erroneous. The
question is not ONLY WHETHER the negligent person failed
to prevent damage/injury, BUT ALSO HAD the person have
the opportunity to prevent such damage/injury.
Doctrine APPLIED - Antonio had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident caused but failed to do so
Sps. Esteban were residents of Lacson Street [Take note, they were
residents of the area. AKA, everyday sila dumadaan sa area] While
they were driving one night along that street, which at that time was
raining, their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open
trench, excavated by PLDT for their conduit system. As a result they
were injured and the windshield of the jeep was shattered. They
instituted an action for damages against PLDT claiming that PLDT did
not put up signs to warn people of the manhole. PLDT, for its defense,
claims that the spouses were the ones who were negligent.
Who is liable, PLDT or the Sps. Esteban? - SPS. ESTEBAN
The accident which befell the Spouses Esteban was due to the lack of
diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The perils of the
road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by Sps.
Esteban. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent
Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of
his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
PLDT v. CA (repeat negligence on the part of PLDT. The presence of warning signs could
case) not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of
excavations on the site. [LET ME STRESS THIS:] It was NOT THE LACK
OF KNOWLEDGE OF THESE EXCAVATIONS which caused the jeep of
respondents to fall into the excavation but the UNEXPLAINED
SUDDEN SWERVING of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one
should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence
he imputes to petitioner PLDT.
TAKE NOTE: They were residents of the street. They knew of the
excavation ongoing. They were stupid for falling into the hole which
they knew of. Also, they were swerving from their driving lane. Their
own negligence was the proximate cause of their injury.
NOTES:
● This case does not explicitly apply the doctrine of last clear
chance however, the ruling is important for the purposes of
discussing the last element of the doctrine of last clear
chance. The court ruled in this case that: “The above findings
clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not
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 only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes
to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of
its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.The perils of the road were known to,
hence appreciated and assumed by, Spousess Esteban. By
exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio Esteban
could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act,
even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of PLDT.”
● The doctrine found no application to the case, such
ratiocination by the court was merely hypothetical as PLDT
has been adjudged to not have been guilty of negligence
Doctrine APPLIED - Raynera had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident caused but failed to do so
Culpable Act or Omission: Raynera while riding his motorcycle,
crashed onto the left rear portion of the trailer of a truck with 2 metal
sheets, which was without tail lights.
● Orpilla – truck driver, Hiceta - truck owner
Damage: Raynera sustained head injuries and died.
Causal Relation: (Testimony of tricycle driver who avoided the
accident and traffic investigation officer)
Rayner had control of the situation as he was traveling behind the
truck. His motorcycle had headlights and was traversing in the service
road with a speed limit less than a highway. He had the last clear
Raynera v. Hiceta chance. Despite the absence of the tail light and license plate, the
truck was still visible.
– ● The ruling must not be taken to mean that every vehicular
Reynaldo Raynera got into an accident on March 23, 1989, at about
2am. Raynera was on his way home riding a motorcycle traveling on
the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The
Isuzu truck was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 km/hr. The truck
was loaded with 2 metal sheets extended on both sides, 2 feet on the
left and 3 on the right. There were two 2 red lights, about 35 watts
each, on both sides of the metal plates. The asphalt road was not well
lighted. At some point on the road, Raynera crashed his motorcycle
into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail
lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and was
rushed to the hospital. He was pronounced dead on arrival. His widow
and children filed an action for damages against Orpilla, the driver of
the truck, and Hiceta, the owner of the truck. The RTC ruled in favor of
Raynera, but this decision was reversed by the CA, which absolved
Hiceta and Orpilla of liability, by applying the doctrine of last clear
chance.
Does the CA’s application of the doctrine of last clear chance
correct in this case? - YES. The proximate cause was Raynera failing
to stop, he had control of his motorcycle while traversing the
service road. He had the last opportunity to stop accident.
The SC upheld the CA in applying the doctrine of last clear chance.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck
was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed; It
used the service road, instead of the highway, because of its cargo.
The testimony of a tricycle driver (who was able to avoid the accident
although he himself almost bumped the truck) and admission by a
traffic investigation officer (regarding the visibility of the red lights on
both sides of the steel plates) clearly showed that that the direct cause
of the accident was the negligence of the victim.
Traveling behind the truck, Raynera had the responsibility of
avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of
the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable
him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service
road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the
highway. The responsibility to avoid the collision with the front
vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no
other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one
who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had
the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
NOTES:
collision where a rear vehicle has bumped the front vehicle,
liability shall be with the rear vehicle. What is important to pin
down is the proximate cause of the accident, and this is
circumstantial.
Doctrine NOT applied - the order of negligent acts is not the only
factor to be considered; check also the gravity of risk created
Phoenix Culpable Act or Omission: After drinking cocktails, Dionisio drove
Construction v. IAC where his headlights suddenly failed and failed to see the dump truck
(repeat case) (owned by Phoenix, parked by Carbonel) parked askew sticking out
into the street with no headlight causing a collision.
Damage: Dionisio suffered physical injuries.
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Causal Relation: Dionisio was negligent because he drove fast and he
extinguished his headlights (reduced to 20%). Carbonel’s negligence
was the proximate cause as he parked the dump truck that way.
The last clear chance doctrine does not apply because Carbonel must
respond to foreseeable consequences of his act. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character or gravity of the risks created
by such act or omission to the rest of the community. Order of
negligent acts not only factor.
– injury. Based on Phoenix, the order of negligent acts is not
Dionisio was on his way home and had taken “a shot or two” of liquor
from a cocktail party. He alleged that his HEADLIGHTS HAD FAILED so
he switched it on “BRIGHT” and saw an improperly parked (not parallel
to the street curb) DUMP TRUCK on the street. He smashed into the
dump truck. As a result, he suffered some physical injuries,
permanent facial scars, a nervous breakdown and loss of two gold
bridge dentures. Dionisio filed an action for damages against
Carbonel (truck driver) and Phoenix (employer), claiming that the
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligence of Carbonel in
parking his truck. Phoenix countered that Dionisio was recklessly
driving at the time of the accident while under the influence of liquor.
W/N Dionisio had the last clear chance to avoid the danger - NO
Who is liable? - PHOENIX AND CARBONEL
Phoenix asks us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. Although Dionisio was negligent as he was driving fast and
worse, he extinguished his headlights, the legal and proximate cause
of the accident was still the negligent manner in which the dump truck
was parked - in other words, the negligence of Carbonel. Moreover,
the last clear chance doctrine did not fall upon Dionisio because
Carbonel must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his
own negligent act or omission.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to
do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common
law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the
task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence —
the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of
the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in
chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of
terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." Of more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each
party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act
or omission for the rest of the community.
NOTES:
● It is not necessarily true that the person whose negligent act
occurred the latest had the last clear chance to prevent the
the only factor to be considered.
● *N.B.: At first, it is peculiar why the Court in Phoenix did not
apply the doctrine of last clear chance in this case.
Theoretically all elements are satisfied as in this case.
○ Both Carbonel and Dionisio were negligent;
Carbonel for parking incorrectly; Dionisio for
speeding, inebriated, with no headlights.
○ Carbonel’s negligent act of parking the dump truck
did not occur at the same time with Dionisio driving
inebriated at an excessive speed with no headlights
at night.
○ Dionisio could have avoided the accident had he
turned on his headlights.
● However, the court ruled that such a case merits only a
reduction of claim from plaintiff.
● Function of the doctrine: Serves to mitigate the harshness of
the doctrine of contributory negligence. The doctrine of last
clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff
who had also been negligent provided that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to
do so. There is no general concept of last clear chance that
can be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as
a general rule in negligence cases in our civil law jurisdiction.
Under Article 2179, CC, the task of the court is to determine
whose negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. This
task is not simply an exercise in chronology or physics; the
relative location in the continuum of time of the parties’
negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant factors
that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission
and the character and gravity of the risk created by such
act or omission for the community.
8
Prescription (ARTICLE 1146)
Civil Code
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
To review: prescription starts to run from the time a cause of action accrues:
● Civil Procedure under Rule 2 Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court defines cause of action as:
“A cause of action is an act or omission which violates a right of another”.
A cause of action accrues when:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right;
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.
The last element of course is where a quasi-delict is committed. That is the start of the period
of reckoning prescription.
Important to distinguish in prescription is what the claim for damage is based on.
● Culpa Contractual - Actions based on culpa contractual shall prescribe in 10 years
according to Art. 1144
● Culpa Aquiliana - 4 years (Art. 1146)
● Culpa Criminal (civil liability ex delicto) - 10 years however, prescription period is
suspended during the pendency of the criminal action
Culpable Act or Omission: April 8, 1976 - F/B Marjolea a fishing boat
owned by Kramer from Marinduque to Manila, figured in a collision
with an inter- island vessel M/V Asia Philippines of Trans-Asia Shipping
Lines
Spouses Santos v.
Kramer v. CA
Damage: F/B Marjolea sank. Captains of both vessels then filed their
maritime protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the PCG
Causal Relation: 1981 - Board of Marine Inquiry of PCG concluded that
the loss was due to the negligence of the employees of M/V Asia
Philippines.
The findings of the Board also served as the basis of the Decision of
the Commandant of the PCG dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second
mate of M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his
profession as a marine officer. On May 30, 1985 (9? Years later),
petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages in the RTC of Pasay
City. Trans-Asia filed a Motion seeking dismissal of Complaint on
the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for
damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four
years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their
Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action
accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place,
and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was
instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.
Whether action as prescribed? Yes, reckoning for prescription in
quasi-delicts starts from the day the cause of action accrues which
is there is a violation of the right of the plaintiff; which
coincidentally is when the quasi-delict is committed.
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive
period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. It is clear
that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element of
a CoA occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an
act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time
when the cause of action arises.
In this case, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from
the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry,
that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other
party before he can file an action for damages.
Culpable Act or Omission: Collision of a Viron Transit Bus, driven by
Sibayan, and another bus.
Damage: Death of van driver and 3 passengers and physical injuries
Pizardo
of 5 passengers
Causal Relation: Sibayan was found guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide; but a separate civil action was reserved. After
the judgment of the criminal trial, Sps. Santos filed for damages
9
 against Sibayan, Viron Transit, and its President. Viron Transit moved
to dismiss due to prescription.
● NOTE: Sps. Santos made a reservation to file a separate civil
action, therefore the court did not give any pronouncement
on the civil liability.
Sps. Santos opposed the motion to dismiss contending that the right
to file a separate action in this case prescribes in 10 years reckoned
from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has
already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on
quasi delict prescribe 4 years from the accrual of the cause of action.
W/N action has prescribed? NO, the damages claimed are not based
on quasi-delict. It is based on crime.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are
consistent with Sps. Santos’ claim that the action was brought to
recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are
allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit,
such does not necessarily mean that they were pursuing a cause of
action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing
of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has
the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi delict
under the Civil Code.
Complaint here was not based on quasi-delict but on the final
judgment of conviction (10 years). Although there are allegations of
negligence, it does not mean it is quasi-delict.
The prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a
bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime ex
delicto, especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
Carlos De Guzman bought a white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS double cab
motor vehicle, 1996 model (car) from Toyota Cubao. Two days later,
the car was delivered to him. Less than a year later, despite the car
being used only for 12,000 km, its engine developed a crack as it was
De Guzman v. Toyota being driven along Marcos Highway during a heavy rain. De Guzman
Cubao commented that the car didn’t even pass through the flood, and that
the car was advertised as being capable of being driven on flooded
areas or rugged terrain. Since there’s no reason as to why the engine
would crack, De Guzman concluded that it was because the engine
itself or the car was defective upon purchase, and so he demanded
Toyota to replace his engine based on implied warranty. Toyota
however refused stating that it was not covered by the warranty.
Culpable Act or Omission: De Guzman argued that the engine was
defective as the car has only been used for 12000km and it was
advertised as being capable of being driven on flooded areas or
rugged terrain.
Damage: The engine of De Guzman’s car developed a crack during a
heavy rain.
Causal Relation: De Guzman demanded the replacement of his
engine based on implied warranty. The Civil Code provides that the
vendor shall be responsible for warranty against hidden effects and
shall prescribe after six months from delivery.
Has the action of De Guzman prescribed? - YES, his action is based
not on quasi-delicts but on implied warranties based on the Law of
Sale.
The Civil Code provides that a vendor shall be responsible for
warranty against the hidden defects. Moreover, such action arising
from the hidden defect prescribes after six months from the delivery
of the thing sold. However, in this case, De Guzman filed his
complaint for damages more than 19 months after receiving the car.
De Guzman also argued that the sale of the car should be under Art.
169 of R.A. 7394 (consumer products used for personal, family, or
agricultural purposes) which means that the prescription period is 2
years. However, even assuming that the sale falls under R.A. 7394, Art.
68 would govern and not Art. 169. Art. 68 states that the prescription
period for implied warranties is 1 year. Hence, it has also prescribed.
NOTES:
● In this case, the complaint was filed 19 months after receiving
the car. De Guzman argued it was under Art. 169 of RA 7394
(consumer products used for personal, family or agricultural
purposes) with a prescription of 2 years.
● Art. 68 would govern which states that the prescription for
implied warranties is 1 year.
Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty against the
hidden defects which the thing sold may have… xxx
Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten
articles (such as defects in warranty, see Art. 1561) shall be barred
after six months from the delivery of the thing sold.
10
Force Majeure / Fortuitous Event (ARTICLE 1174)
Civil Code
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
In order for the defendant to successfully invoke fortuitous event the following elements
must concur:
1. Cause is independent of the will of the debtor;
2. The event is unforeseeable or unavoidable;
3. Occurrence renders it absolutely impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner; impossibility must be absolute not partial, otherwise not force
majeure; and
4. Debtor is free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Gloria Chatto and her daughter Lina went to see a movie at a theater
owned by Gotesco. They bought balcony tickets. Hardly ten minutes
after entering the theater, the ceiling of the theater's balcony
collapsed. Gloria and her daughter suffered injuries and filed a
complaint for damages against Gotesco. Gotesco claims that the
collapse was due to force majeure.
Culpable Act or Omission: Ten minutes after entering the theater,
owned by Gotesco, the ceiling of the theater’s balcony collapse
Damage: Gloria and her daughter suffered injuries
Gotesco Investment
Corp. v. Chatto
Whether there was force majeure? NO, thus the implied warranty
that the place of amusement or entertainment is safe of the owner
subsists and imputes liability.
Collapse of the ceiling was due to constructional defects
● Witness of Gotesco, Mr. Ong, was unable to explain the
collapse (not an engineer but an architect) and no adequate
inspection of premises were done prior to said collapse.
○ Ong could have easily discovered the cause of the
collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To
Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not
explain the cause or reason is that either he did not
actually conduct the investigation or that he is
incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect
who had not even passed the government's
examination.
○ The ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the
collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be
equated, as an act, of God.
● Implied warranty from owner to keep the premises safe
○ Exception: not liable for unknown defects which
could not be discovered by ordinary means.
Assuming for the sake of argument, collapse was due to force
majeure, Gotesco was still liable for negligence. Trial court found it
was due to construction defects as the accident happened 4 years
after construction. No adequate inspection prior to collapse.
The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly
warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are
safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being
subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not
contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
reasonable means. Gotesco’s failure to ensure that the theater was
structurally sound was their negligence.
Servando and Uy Bico engaged in the services of Philippine Steam,
where the latter would carry the goods of Servando (colored paper,
toys, general merchandise) and Uy Bico (cavans of rice) from Manila to
Negros Occidental.
Culpable Act or Omission: Philippine Steam was able to deliver the
goods to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs in Negros
Occidental. The cargoes were discharged to be in complete and good
order. However, at 2PM of the same date, the warehouse caught fire
of unknown origin, which led to the absolute loss of the goods.
Servando v. Phil.
Steam,
Damage: The goods were lost due to a fire. Servando and Uy Bico
claim for damages from Philippine Steam.
Was Phil. Steam liable for the cargoes that were burned in the
warehouse? - NO, it was a fortuitous event that caused the loss of
the cargo.
The fire was a fortuitous event which could not have been foreseen.
Under Art. 1174, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and
proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for
11
 non-performance.
The burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event
which happened independently of the will of Philippine Steam. It could
not have foreseen the event. Philippine Steam also would not have
exercised control as it was under the warehouse of BOC.
Characteristics of Fortuitous event (Caso fortuito)
1. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or
of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must
be independent of the human will;
2. it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes
the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid;
3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
4. the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Causal Relation:
Whether the tire blowing out is a fortuitous event? NO, the
supposed tire-blow out was not independent of human will.
There must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause
of injury or loss. It is settled that an accident caused by defects in the
automobile or through negligence of a driver is not a fortuitous event.
A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force
majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still prove
that it was NOT negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from
an accident (ex. Extraordinary diligence in the care of the carrier like
daily routine checkup on parts). They were not able to rebut the
testimony that the bus was running fast and the jeepney overloaded.
- Explosion of a new tire is not a fortuitous event because it
has human factors – There must be an entire exclusion of
human agency
- Fact tire was new did not imply it was entirely free of defect

Tito and Leny Tumboy, along with their children, boarded a Yobido
Liner bus in Surigao del Sur bound for Davao City.

Culpable Act or Omission: While they were riding, the left front tire of
the Yobido Liner bus (owned by Tumboy), exploded, causing the bus
to fall into a ravine around 3ft from the road and strike a tree.

Damage: As a result, Tito died and the passengers suffered physical

injuries

Leny and her children filed a complaint for breach of contract of

carriage & damages against Alberta and Yobido, owner and driver of
the bus, respectively. Leny claimed that the driver failed to exercise
Yobido v. CA diligence since aside from the road being winding and rough, the
driver was also driving fast and when she told him to slow down, he
just stared at her through the mirror. Alberta and Yobido justified that
this falls under a caso fortuito since the tire of the bus was newly
bought, that the driver was driving slow since the road was zigzag,
and that the drivers that they hire undergo tests and submit the
necessary documents.

Lower Court dismissed the complaint since tire blow-out is a caso

fortuito - an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of
Alberta and Yobido. CA reversed saying that the explosion of the tire
is not in itself a fortuitous event, since the fact that the cause of the
blow out was unknown (either defect in tire itself, zigzag road, faulty
mounting, etc.) does not relieve the carrier of liability.

12
Diligence (ARTICLE 2180, last paragraph)
Civil Code
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
the diligence of a good father is a rather obscure basis for diligence. In order for one to
determine the required diligence in any given case it is necessary to look at the
circumstances of the person, place and time.
Of course there are required standards of diligence under the Civil Code. Common carriers
and their employees are required to exercise “extraordinary diligence”
The basis of the standard of diligence in a case is important; because the liability imposed in
Art. 2176 is also imposed vicariously onto the following people under Art. 2180 should they
fail to observe the diligence of a good father of the family in keeping level of diligence
required of those primarily liable.
Culpable Act or Omission:
Dominador’s parents argued that MWD had the last opportunity to
save Dominador. Dominador drowned in the big pool.
Damage: Dominador died of drowning.
Causal Relation:
It was not known how Dominador made it to the big pool and he went
there without a companion, in violation of the rules.
Dominador and his 2 brothers went swimming in one of MWD’s
Ong v. Metropolitan
Water District
swimming pool. They were swimming in the small pools. Dominador
Dulay v. CA
told his brothers that he was just going to the locker to drink coke, and
when he said that, his brothers went to the big pool. A boy told Abano,
the lifeguard, that someone drowned. Abaño immediately responded
and dove in the pool and other employees of MWD, such as the nurse,
sanitary inspector, etc. came to assist, but Dominador still died. Sps
Ong filed a case against Metropolitan. Lower court dismissed.
W/N the death of Dominador can be attributed to the negligence of
MWD and/or its employees. NO. Employees immediately responded
and did all they could to bring Dominador back to life
The responsibility (vicarious liability) shall cease when the persons
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. In this case, several important facts show that
MWD exercised the diligence of a good father of a family or the level
of diligence required in managing their swimming pool facilities to wit
these are:
1. Care and supervision of the pools and users are entrusted to
a recreational section: a Chief, a nurse, and 6 lifeguards who
took a life-saving course in Red Cross.
2. For the safety of patrons, MWD’s pools have the following:
ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, saving kit, medicine kit, and a
resuscitator; the bottom of the pools is painted with black
colors so as to insure clear visibility; they also have a sanitary
inspector in charge of a clinic;
3. they also have on display, rules and regulations governing
the use of the pools. One of the rules is that swimming alone
or without any attendant is prohibited.
4. MWD’s doesn’t have a physician, but it has a nurse and a
sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate
the oxygen resuscitator; they also have security guards.
It could not have been said that the management and it’s employees
were negligent of their ordinary diligence in managing and keeping
the safety of the resort. They have exhausted every avenue to save
the boy’s life to no avail.
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred in a carnival in Alabang Village. As a result, Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
Maria Dulay, widow of the Atty. Dulay, filed an action for damages
against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
and/or Superguard Security Corp., alleged employers of Torzuela,
using as basis Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, Dulay
argues that under Article 33 of the Civil Code, Torzuela’s act of
shooting is actionable. Superguard alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code, cannot lie since the civil liability applies only to quasi-offenses
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Safeguard also filed a
motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
Torzuela is not one of its employees. An information for homicide was
also filed against Torzuela. Judge Regino of the RTC granted the
motions of Safeguard and Superguard.
13
 (1) WoN Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, covers not only acts
of negligence but also acts which are voluntary and intentional –
YES, because a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also
charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. Since Article 2176
covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional
and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court
to dismiss Dulay’s complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to Safeguard and
Superguard.
(2) WoN Article 33 of the Civil Code in relation to Torzuela’s act of
shooting is actionable – YES,
because the term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not
only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide. Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Jazmin then filed a complaint against Go and the bank before the CFI
for moral and exemplary with attorney’s fees.
The issue is whether Go and CBTC are liable for damages. YES
Causal Relation:
Go, the branch manager was negligent because he did not exercise
diligence expected of him as a bank officer - if he did, he would have
noticed the glaring disparity between payee’s name and addresses on
the treasury checks and the name and address of the depositor
appearing in the bank’s records. The situation would have been
different if the alteration was only the amounts as it would be
unnoticeable. But the error in the name and address of the payee was
very patent and should not have escaped the trained eyes of bank
officers
Solidbank (CBTC) is responsible as well, as provided by Art. 2180.
CBTC is responsible for the acts of its employees. The burden of proof
lies upon the bank and it cannot disclaim liability in view of its failure to
prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage and that it
was not negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Floverto Jazmin is an American citizen and a retired pensioner DOCTRINE: In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable
residing in MARAVILLA ST., Pangasinan. He receives annuity checks for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of
from the U.S Government for disability and for retirement. the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
Culpable Act or Omission: foreseen by the defendant.
In 1975, Jazmin made a bank account with Solidbank (now CBTC) by
depositing 2 US Treasury Checks, payable to the order of Floverto
Jasmin of MARANILLA ST. In his info sheet, he said he was a Fil
Citizen, and left blank his telephone no., residence certificate/alien
certificate of registration/passport, bank and trade performance and
as to who introduced him to the bank. Three weeks after, Solidbank
Go v. IAC sent the check for clearance to the drawee bank, and it allowed
depositor to withdraw the amounts in the checks. However, it was later
found by Go, branch manager, that the amounts were altered ($1810
and $913.4 -> $13.4).

Damage: Because of this, Jazmin was required to appear before the

Philippine Constabulary in Benguet for investigation regarding the
complaint of Go against him for estafa by passing altered dollar
checks (inconvenience, humiliation, embarrassment).

Investigators found that the person named “Floverto Jazmin” who

made the deposit and withdrawal with Solidbank was an impostor.

14
Mistake & Waiver (ARTICLES 6 and 1170) 3.
4.
Civil Code
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. (4a)
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages. (1101)
Why is mistake considered a valid defense that would not consider the party in question
to be negligent? In cases involving mistakes of fact, there is total absence of information /
misconception / difference in interpretation that would not make the party negligent.
● Does the same defense apply in cases of mistake of law? No. Ignorantia legis non
excusat.
What is meant by “mistake” in this section? - Mistake of fact NOT Mistake of Law
● Mistake of Fact - error in the appreciation of the facts as to the obligation
● Mistake of Law - error in the understanding of the law.
Gatchalian v. Delim
Why is mistake of fact a material factor and a defense for the defendant?
● A: Atty Go - Mistake of fact is a defense because there can be no negligence if
there is “mistake” as to the subject matter of a particular act or event. Negligence is
predicated on the omission of care/diligence required in a particular event which is
based on the circumstance of the person, time, and place.
● A mistake of fact in the subject matter of an obligation means that the diligence truly
required by the obligation WAS NOT correctly identified by the defendant. Thus the
net effect is that the diligence required in a given case CANNOT be complied with
because it was not identified correctly
3D Quiz #2 – What are the requisites of a valid waiver?
1. It is not contrary to law, public customs, public policy, morals, or prejudicial to a third
person with a vested right;
2. It is couched in clear and unequivocal terms; and
3. There is intent on the party to waive his/her right.
Liable for damages in the performance of obligation, if guilty of: (1170)
1. Fraud
2. Negligence
Delay
Those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof
Culpable Act or Omission: Gatchalian boarded Delim’s minibus as a
paying passenger (driven by someone else). They heard a snapping
sound and the mini-bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of
the road, went off road, turned turtle, and fell into a ditch.
Damage: Gatchalian and the other passengers got injured.
Causal Relation:
In the hospital, Delim’s wife paid for their hospitalization and made the
injured passengers sign a waiver stating, “That they are no longer
interested to file a complaint against the driver and owner of the
minibus because it was an accident and the driver and owner have
gone to the extent of helping them to be treated.”
Gatchalian filed a case before the CFI for damages but the CFI said
she validly waived her cause of action in signing the letter. CA denied
the claim for damages but said the waiver was not valid.
Whether it was a valid waiver?
No, because the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot
be regarded as a waiver cast in “clear and unequivocal” terms.
Gatchalian also said that while reading it, she experienced dizziness
but seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign
the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint
Affidavit in its entirety.
Waiver, to be valid and effective, must:
● be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right
● not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof
do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
right vested in such person.
● not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs.
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an
injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to
render that standard unenforceable. Such a purported waiver is
offensive to public policy.
15
 Private respondent Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of
three adjacent parcels of land. Adjacent to parcel no. 3 is a vacant lot
named parcel no. 4. A 3-storey house was constructed by Calsons on
parcel 3. However, there was a mistake in a survey wherein in the
certificate of titles, Parcel no. 3 was erroneously indicated as Parcel 1,
while Parcel 1 and 2 as Parcel 4 (which is not owned by Calsons).
Culpable Act or Omission: Calsons, in good faith, made a mistake by
selling Parcel 4 to Theis, thinking it is Parcel 1 and 2, based on the
survey.
Damage: Theis wanted to build a house in said lot in Parcel No. 4 but
there was already a lot constructed.
Causal Relation:
To remedy the mistake, Theis was offered the actual parcel 1 and 2 but
this was refused. Thus, Calsons filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of property.
W/N there was a mistake which annulls the contract of sale? - YES
It is equally true that when one sells or buys a real property, he either
Theis v. CA sells or buys the property as he sees it, in its actual setting and by its
physical metes and bounds, and not be the mere lot number assigned
to the same property in the certificate of title or in any document.
Precautions were observed by the parties in the case at bar as there is
no question at all that the sale in question was consummated through
brokers of the sale who, brought Theis to the vicinity.
Clearly, therefore, there was honest mistake on the part of Calsons
in the sale of Parcel No. 4 to Theis, which Calsons tried to remedy by
offering instead another Parcel instead or reimbursement of the
purchase price in double amount,
Art. 1331 of the New Civil Code provides for the situations whereby
mistake may invalidate consent. The concept of error in this article
must include both ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with
respect to a thing, and mistake properly speaking, which is a wrong
conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence of some
circumstance, fact, or event, which in reality does not exist.
In this case, there is lack of full and correct knowledge and a wrong
conception of the thing. The mistake invalidated the consent.
- Mistake of law does not invalidate consent (Ignorantia legis
non excusat)
Every time McLoughlin would stay at Tropicana Hotel he would rent a
safety deposit box. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez
and Payam had custody of the keys for Tropicana’s safety deposit
boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use
of two keys, one of which is given to the guest, and the other remains
with the hotel management. When a registered guest wished to open
his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the
management who then would assign one of its employees to
accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box
with the two keys. McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his
safety deposit box – one envelope containing $10k US Dollars, and
another envelope containing AU$10k Australian Dollars, letters, credit
cards, bankbooks and a checkbook.
Damage: McLoughlin experienced two incidents of missing money
and jewelry.
Culpable Act or Omission: Eventually, McLoughlin confronted Lainez
and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with
YHT Realty v. CA the key assigned to him. McLoughlin confronted Tan who admitted
that she had stolen McLoughlin’s key and was able to open the safety
deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez
Causal Relation: Lopez refused to accept responsibility on behalf of
the hotel relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box
entitled “Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box” which
disclaims any liability of the hotel for things put inside the box. (waiver)
W/N the waiver is valid? No.
Art. 2003 of the CC provides that the hotel-keeper cannot free himself
from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable
for articles brought by the guest (contrary to law). A Hotel business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are
bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to
their persons and belongings. The law does not allow such duty to
the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-
called “undertakings” that ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
Valenzuela Hardwood entered into an agreement with the Seven
Valenzuela Brothers Shipping Corporation (Seven Brothers) whereby the latter
Hardwood and undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the
Industrial Supply v. former’s lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon,
CA
Isabela for shipment to Manila.
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 The contract between the parties had a stipulation which says
“owners (ship owner) shall not be responsible for loss, split,
short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo.”
Subsequently, the said vessel sank resulting in the loss of
Valenzuela Hardwood’s insured logs. Valenzuela Hardwood likewise
filed a formal claim with Seven Brothers for the value of the lost logs
but the latter denied the claim.
W/N the stipulation holding the cargo owner not liable in case of
any damages is valid – YES because it’s a contract of private
carriage.
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that
responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the
shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused
even by the negligence of the ship captain.
Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does
not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the
Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a
private carrier.
The public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations
in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers.
The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from
Anglo-American law. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier
undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person
only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation
exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is
not against public policy, and is deemed valid.
Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on
common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not
acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the charter
party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence
of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing
common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public
at large is not involved, as in this case of a ship totally chartered for
the use of a single party
Sabena Belgian Paula San Agustin was a passenger of Sabena Belgian World Airlines
World Airlines v. CA originating from Casablanca to Brussels, Belgium on her way back to
Manila. She checked in her luggage which contained her valuables
(clothes, jewelry, shoes, bag) amounting to $4,265. She stayed
overnight in Brussels but her luggage was left on board.
She arrived at Manila and immediately submitted her bag tag to
claim her luggage but it was missing. She was instructed to report
that her luggage was missing and she complied with this.
Subsequently, she was informed by the Airline company that her
luggage was found and that such would be shipped to Manila.
However, she was informed that the luggage was lost for the second
time.
San Agustin demanded from the defendant money the value of the
luggage and its contents or its exchanged value.
On the other hand, Airline company alleges that the loss of her
luggage was due to the negligence of San Agustin, as her flight from
Brussels to Manila had not yet been confirmed. It also alleges that San
Agustin as a seasoned international traveller should have been
familiar with the procedure that items of value should be hand carried
or if checked in, it should be declared.
W/N the airline is liable for the lost luggage? - YES
Fault or negligence consists in the omission of that diligence which is
demanded by the nature of an obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place. When the
source of an obligation is derived from a contract, the mere breach or
non-fulfillment of the prestation gives rise to the presumption of fault
on the part of the obligor. This rule is not different in the case of
common carriers in the carriage of goods which, indeed, are bound to
observe not just the due diligence of a good father of a family but that
of “extraordinary” care in the vigilance over the goods.
The airline cannot invoke the tort doctrine of proximate cause
because the private respondent’s luggage was lost while it was in the
custody of the petitioner. The “loss of said baggage not only once
but twice,” said the appellate court, “underscores the wanton
negligence and lack of care” on the part of the carrier. The above
findings foreclose whatever rights petitioner might have had to the
possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers
under the Warsaw Convention.
Extra: The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier
availment of the provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the
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damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his
part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct, or if the damage is
(similarly) caused . . . by any agent of the carrier acting within the
scope of his employment.

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Emergency or sudden peril doctrine
“Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger is not guilty of negligence even if fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the the emergency he finds
himself in is brought by his own negligence” (Gan v. CA)
The emergency rule or sudden peril doctrine can be broken down into elements namely:
1. Defendant found himself in a place of danger.
2. Defendant had no time to consider the best means to avoid such danger.
3. And was not negligent
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE EMERGENCY RULE
with the Napocor barge but managed to avoid it and instead hit the
deflector wall causing almost 500,000 in damage. Petitioner refused
to pay and thus a civil case was filed against Delsan by C&A. TC Ruled
emergency rule applied, CA found captain negligent.
W/N the TC correctly applied the Emergency Rule? - No
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule,
one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is
not applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt.
Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.

Reasonable course of action under an No appreciable interval of time.

appreciable interval of time. EXTRA ( CAN SKIP )

Two antecedent negligent acts (for Erds: One should not be guilty of negligence.
Can still apply even when there is only one
negligent act) Cannot be held liable for negligence but
can be liable under Art. 365 of the RPC
Merely shifts the burden to prove proximate (Example: Reckless Imprudence resulting to
cause. Homicide)
3E Quiz # 2 – What is the emergency or sudden peril doctrine?
According to Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a person who suddenly finds
himself/herself in a place of danger and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if fails
to adopt what may appear, subsequently and upon reflection, to have been a better method.
National Housing Authority contracted with C&A to build a deflector
wall for the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo. Project was
finished in 1994.
Delsan Transport On October 20, 1994, 12MN, Captain Jusep of Delsan lines owned
Lines, Inc. v. C&A ship M/V Delsan express received information that there was a
Construction, Inc. typhoon coming in from Japan.
At 8.35AM M/V Delsan Express attempted to get into North Harbor but
could not. 10.00AM M/V Delsan Express dropped anchor off of Vitas 4
miles away from Napocor barge. M/V Delsan Express nearly collided
W/N Captain Jusep is negligent? - YES
W/N under Art. 2180 Delsan liable for the quasi-delict? - YES
Captain Jusep is negligent by waiting for 8.35AM before bringing the
ship to North Harbor Petitioners are vicariously liable under 2180
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code states that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Captain Jusep received the report
12MN and waited for more than 8 hours to move the ship, he
likewise ignored the weather report and in all angles failed to take
action to prevent the damage.
Under Art. 2180 whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage
or injury to another there arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise due diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Petitioner failed to present evidence that showed it formulated
guidelines/rules for the proper performance of functions of employees
and any monitoring system.
Not necessary to state petitioner is negligent in selecting or
supervising employees as negligence is presumed by operation of
law. Allegations of negligence of the employee and existence of
employer-employee relationship in complaint are enough to make out

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 a case of quasi-delict under 2180.
A truck driven by Galang, owned by Tayag and Manalo had a head on
collision with the Ford Escort of the Mckees causing the passengers of
the Ford death and injuries. The cause of this is the Ford escort
switched to the opposite lane to avoid hitting two boys who were
unsure to cross hitting the truck. McKee filed cases against Tayag and
Manalo and a criminal case against Galang. Galang was found guilty
but Tayag and Manalo weren’t liable. On appeal, they were found
liable.
Whether Tayag and Manalo were liable? Yes, the acts of the driver
were the proximate cause due to last clear chance.
Emergency Rule: one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger
and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
maybe adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of
negligence. In this case, Jose Koh adopted the best means possible.
Even assuming that he was negligent, it was not the proximate
cause. Although the entry of the car to the lane resulted in the
collision. The proximate cause was Galang did not heed the
emergency signals given to slow down to give the car an opportunity
to go back its lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
See Mckee case
right which was the precautionary measure, it went full speed (48kph,
(copy paste from old
doc) max speed 30kph). It only stopped 10 meters away when the signals
were from hundreds of meters away. Civil Code provides that a person
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
Gan v. CA
was violating any traffic regulation. Doctrine of Last clear chance
applies.
Notes:
N.B. The doctrine of last clear chance does not really find application
in this case. As the case mentions that: “Last clear chance is a
doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if
it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the
last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof.”
The case is bereft of any record stating that Koh was negligent. Thus
doctrine of last clear chance does not apply the court even said so in
the decision: “The doctrine applies only in a situation where the
plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm
and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff”
The Court just took pains to say hypothetically “even” if it could be
said that Koh was also negligent then the doctrine of last clear
chance applies.
Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota Crown Sedan along North Bay
Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While driving, two vehicles, a truck and a
jeepney, are parked at the right side of the road. While driving, there
was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction and another one
who overtakes the first vehicle.
To avoid a head-on collision, the Gan served to the right and as a
consequence:
● The front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man
pedestrian (Isidoro Casino) ~ DOA to Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital
● Casino was pinned against the rear of the parked jeepney
and the jeepney moved forward hitting the truck
○ Sedan was damaged on its front
○ The jeep suffered damages
○ The truck sustained scratches
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. On appeal,
the conviction was modified to Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
Petitioner now appeals to the said ruling
W/N Gan is criminally liable for the accident? - NO
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence."
The CA, in its decision, said that Gan should have stepped on the
brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction. And that
she should not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right
but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she
would not bump into the pedestrian.
The SC held that the appellate court is asking too much from a mere
mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her
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best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous
situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle.
● The danger confronting Gan was real and imminent,
threatening her very existence
● She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough
time to head the very powerful instinct of self-preservation

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F. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
As mentioned in the previous sections; civil liability arising from a crime shall not only impose
criminal liability but civil liability as well.
In Criminal Negligence cases, civil liability may be recovered by the plaintiff from the
accused/defendant in two ways:
1. Filing of Criminal Action without express reservation in filing a separate civil case
based on a cause of action other than criminal liability - Civil liability imposed here
is a civil liability ex delicto.
2. Filing a civil action for damages before prosecution presents evidence, or filing
because of express reservation - Civil Liability imposed here may be based on
other causes of action from Art. 1172. (Contract, Quasi-delict etc.)
What’s the difference between Dianala and San Ildefonso Lines? Why was one allowed to file
a separate civil case while the latter it was prohibited?
● Simple. The case in Dianala, the civil action was filed AFTER the Criminal case
ceased. The Court acquitted the accused already. In San Ildefonso, the filing of the
civil case was contemporaneous an ongoing Criminal proceeding. The reservation
was needed in order for the civil case to proceed independently from a
simultaneous criminal case
Esperanza was run over by a cargo truck driven by Pedro and owned
by Ponciano in Bago City, Negros Occidental. Initially, Ismael Gula,
Esperanza’s husband, filed a criminal case against Pedro for
homicide thru reckless imprudence, in which Ismael participated
through a private prosecutor and made no reservation to file a
separate civil action. The court acquitted Pedro on the ground of
reasonable doubt, holding that prosecution failed to prove the
negligence of Pedro. Eventually, Gula et al. filed a civil case for culpa
aquiliana against both Pedro and Ponciano in the CFI. Pedro et al.
alleged that the civil liability has been waived and that Ismael’s second
Gula v. Dianala action was barred by res judicata.
W/N the Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages
on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action as against
the Rejon, the owner? YES, Petitioners opted to file a separate civil
case of culpa aquilana which is different from the cause of action in
the criminal case.
SC held that (a) the injured party may bring separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act whether or not the offender is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, so long as the
injured party does not recover twice on the same cause act or
omission and (b) the extinction of civil liability where the court finds
that the facts from which the same may arise do not exist refers only
to civil liability ex delicto. Here, it was clear that Ismael filed the
second case on the ground of culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code
and, thus, it was unnecessary for him to file a reservation to file a
separate civil action because as Article 31 of the Civil Code finds full
application. Last but not least, res judicata cannot apply as regards
Ponciano not only because he was not a co-accused in the earlier
criminal case, but also because the second case claimed his liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and under the RPC.
DOCTRINE: A separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to
recover damages on both scores. He would be entitled to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
A bus of San Ildefonso bumped a Toyota Lite Ace driven by Jao. This
resulted to the total wreck of the vehicle and injuries of the
passengers. A criminal Case filed with RTC for reckless imprudence.
Insurance Corp. paid Jao under a car insurance policy. Now a
subrogee of her rights. Filed with RTC a civil case seeking to recover
sums above mentioned. Bus Co. wanted the civil case to be
suspended due to the pendency of the criminal suit and the Insurance
Co/Jao’s failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a
separate damage suit in said criminal action. RTC denied this saying
that in cases of tort, which can proceed independently of the civil
action need not be reserved.
If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based
San Ildefonso Lines on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no
v. CA reservation was made in the said criminal case? NO.
Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these
independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a
continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal
action. It is only in those cases where the offended party has not
previously filed a civil action or has not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action that his civil action is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. Without such reservation, the civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously
waived or instituted. Requiring previous reservation also covers
quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
22
The Yakult Phils. Case, which ruled that “Although the separate civil
action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted BEFORE THE
PROSECUTION PRESENTED EVIDENCE in the criminal action, and
the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the
actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance
with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made
by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence,”
does not apply in this case.

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