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ABSTRACT
This research delves into the intricate dynamics of minority shareholder oppression within the
Indian corporate landscape, specifically exploring the impact of majority rule on the rights and
interests of minority stakeholders. The study investigates historical legal frameworks, recent
legislative changes, and judicial precedents to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
challenges faced by minority shareholders. By focusing on the interplay between majority
dominance and minority rights, the research aims to contribute valuable insights to corporate
governance practices in India.
The Companies Act of 2013 in India has a crucial function in overseeing corporate matters,
placing emphasis on openness, and guaranteeing the efficient functioning of economic entities.
This act is a clear demonstration of India's dedication to creating a strong and responsible
corporate sector, which is essential for economic advancement in the constantly evolving global
business landscape. Chapter XVI of this legislative framework specifically deals with issues of
corporate oppression and mismanagement. It includes Sections 241 to 245, which provide
remedies for such claims. Curiously, this significant section fails to offer explicit definitions or
elucidate the exact parameters of "oppression" and "mismanagement." The absence of this
important element has resulted in complex legal deliberations, court explanations, and scholarly
arguments, requiring a comprehensive examination of these ideas. The aim of this study is to
clarify the intricate aspects related to the understandings of oppression and mismanagement in
relation to the Companies Act of 2013. In order to achieve this, we will undertake a
comprehensive exploration of intricate legal principles, significant court decisions, and
scholarly perspectives. We seek to examine how the Indian legal system and legal scholars have
dealt with these uncertainties and, as a result, the practical consequences of such unclear
concepts within the corporate environment.
INTRODUCTION
The Indian corporate sector has witnessed significant transformations, yet concerns persist
regarding the protection of minority shareholder rights. Majority rule dynamics often raise
questions about the equitable treatment of minority stakeholders. 1 This research endeavors to
scrutinize the dynamics of minority shareholder oppression in the context of Indian corporations,
emphasizing the role of majority rule in shaping the corporate governance landscape.
The individuals who possess the largest proportion of shares are regarded as the majority
shareholders in a firm. The word "minority shareholder" is not explicitly defined in the Company
Law. However, it is commonly accepted that individuals who possess a smaller portion of shares
are referred to as minority shareholders.
Minority shareholders are individuals who possess a quantity of shares that does not grant them
power over the organisation. Typically, the governance of a firm operates on the principle of
majority rule. In each company, the directors are elected representatives and so have the
authority to oversee the firm's operations. The members exercise the rights that are not granted to
the directors during their general meeting. This choice is typically determined based on the
principle of majority. The concept of majority rule refers to the authority of the majority
shareholders to govern the firm and oversee its operations. Consequently, the majority exercises
its influence in the overall assembly.
The rights of minority shareholders in any firm are inherently limited, and they have frequently
experienced violations of their rights. The notion that the will of the majority should triumph and
have authority over the minority is referred to as the principle of majority rule.One This is
commonly referred to as the Foss v. Harbottle Rule. Foss v Harbottle is a prominent English
legal precedent in the field of corporation law. Therefore, harms that are purportedly inflicted
solely on the corporation and not on its members should be addressed through corporate
measures rather than individual member intervention. This principle is referred to as the
appropriate plaintiff rule, which is relevant in this situation due to the company being recognised
as a distinct legal entity.
Consequently, only the company itself has the authority to seek recourse in the event of any
harm inflicted upon it, rather than individual shareholders. India also adhered to this guideline as
it is taken from common law. However, there were a few exceptions to this rule, but they did not
serve as effective means of addressing the issue. Currently, the rule has been weakened to
1
Davies, P. (2020) ‘Majority and minority shareholders’, Introduction to Company Law, pp. 119–174.
doi:10.1093/oso/9780198854913.003.0005.
accommodate the evolving requirements and provide safeguard to the minority shareholders as
well.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the historical and legal foundations influencing the treatment of minority
shareholders in Indian corporate law?
2. How do recent legislative changes address the concerns of minority shareholders in the
Indian corporate environment?
3. What judicial precedents have shaped the interpretation and application of majority rule
dynamics in cases of minority shareholder oppression?
4. To what extent do corporate governance practices contribute to or mitigate minority
shareholder oppression in India?
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
1. To assess the historical evolution of minority shareholder rights within the Indian
corporate legal framework.
2. To analyze recent legislative amendments and their impact on safeguarding the interests
of minority shareholders.
3. To examine landmark judicial decisions highlighting the interplay between majority rule
and minority rights.
4. To evaluate the effectiveness of existing corporate governance mechanisms in addressing
minority shareholder concerns.
HYPOTHESIS
Low enforcement of laws I the reason for oppression of minority shareholders in India.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This research adopts a theoretical framework grounded in agency theory, stakeholder theory, and
legal pluralism. Agency theory helps explain the principal-agent relationship between majority
shareholders, who act as agents, and minority shareholders, who are principals. Stakeholder
theory underscores the importance of equitable treatment of all stakeholders in corporate
governance. Legal pluralism is considered to understand the multiple legal sources that influence
the rights and obligations of minority shareholders in India.
This theoretical framework guides the exploration of majority rule dynamics and their impact on
minority shareholders, providing a comprehensive lens for analyzing the complexities inherent in
the Indian corporate landscape.
Section 399 of the Companies Act of 1956 grants individuals the privilege to approach the
Company Law Board in instances of oppression and/or mismanagement as outlined in Sections
2
Balancing the scales: Empowering minority shareholders in India’s insolvency landscape (no date) The
Economic Times. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/legal/balancing-the-scales-
empowering-minority-shareholders-in-indias-insolvency-landscape/articleshow/104059565.cms?from=mdr
(Accessed: 28 January 2024).
397 and 398. The numerical criterion has been specified as either a ten percent stake, one
hundred members, or one-fifth of the total members, depending on the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the authority to exempt this was bestowed with the Central Government.
In the case of Sri Ramdas Motor Transport Ltd. v. Tadi Adhinarayana Reddy and Ors., the Court
has clarified that according to section 397 of the Companies Act 1956, any member of a
company can file an application with the Company Law Board if they believe that the company's
affairs are being conducted in a way that is harmful to public interest or unfairly oppressive to
any member or members. The purpose of this application is to seek an order under section 397 of
the Companies Act. Nevertheless, minority activism does not deprive the majority shareholders
of their democratic rights.
This principle was also confirmed in the case of Shanti Prasad Jain v. Kalinga Tubes Ltd. A
conflict erupted between two factions of wealthy entrepreneurs vying for control over a certain
corporation. The appellant, who serves as the chairman of the firm, claimed that the company's
activities were conducted in a manner that was unjust and detrimental to him and his group of
members. The appellant argued that the allocation of new shares to external parties was intended
to undermine the interests of the current shareholders and constitutes oppressive behaviour. The
Supreme Court determined that the High Court's decision to dismiss the case under Section 397
was correct, as the simple act of assignment does not amount to oppression. The court
emphasised that the presence of factual evidence is necessary to substantiate any allegations of
severe mismanagement or oppression.
By delineating provisions based on the shareholding percentage and categorizing companies with
and without share capital, the Act sought to establish a nuanced approach to safeguarding
minority rights. However, challenges persisted as the numerical thresholds set in Section 399 of
companies act became a point of contention. The requirement of 10% shareholding or 100
shareholders (whichever is less) for companies with share capital, and 1/5th of the total number
of members for those without, posed hurdles for minority shareholders seeking legal recourse.3
3
Minority Interest, https://www.mca.gov.in/content/mca/global/en/data-and-reports/reports/other-reports/report-
company-law/minority-interest.html (last visited Jan 31, 2024).
Judicial Precedents and Evolving Jurisprudence
The judicial landscape played a crucial role in shaping the discourse around majority rule
dynamics. While the Foss v. Harbottle rule initially posed challenges by limiting minority
actions, judicial interpretations have evolved over time. Early decisions, such as those in
Bhajekar v. Shinkar and Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. Nageshwara Rao,
leaned towards a strict adherence to majority rule, emphasizing the right of the company to ratify
even irregular acts.
Some cases, like Sri Ramdas Motor Transport Ltd. v. Tadi Adhinarayana Reddy and Others,
changed the way things were thought about. The court recognised that Section 397 of the
Companies Act 1956 lets any member ask for help from the Company Law Board when
someone is being unfair. In a break from strict majority rule, this change showed a growing
concern for the rights of minorities.
In the cases of Probir Kumar Misra v. Ramani Ramaswamy and Ors 5. and Namtech Consultants
Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Termometrics India Pvt. Ltd.6, the Madras High Court and the Karnataka High
Court respectively, have issued orders for the acquisition of shares by one of the conflicting
groups of shareholders. This was done by determining the value of the shares through an
impartial expert evaluator and through a competitive bidding process. The courts did not
consider whether the shareholders were in the majority or minority.
This landmark decision makes us think about the flaws that are built into the system and the
possibility of other ways to settle disagreements when there are foreign parties involved. It
4
Needle Industries (India) v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1298.
5
Probir Kumar Misra v. Ramani Ramaswamy and Ors., MANU/TN/2194/2009 (High Court of Madras).
6
Namtech Consultants Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Termometrics India Pvt. Ltd., ILR 2008 Kar 1187 (High Court of
Karnataka).
shows that Indian company law can be changed to fit different situations and that minority rights
are respected even when the majority is not Indian.
But the number limits set in Section 399 made things more difficult. It became a problem that
companies with share capital had to have 10% of the shares or 100 owners, whichever was less.
For companies without share capital, they only had to have 1/5th of the total number of
members. These limits were meant to stop pointless lawsuits, but they made it harder for small
owners to get legal help.
LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW
Section 241 allows any member of a company to approach the Tribunal if they suspect that the
company's activities negatively affect public interest, the interests of the company or its
members, or if there has been a substantial change in its management likely to have adverse
consequences.7
Once a petition is filed under Section 241, the Tribunal possesses the authority to take various
actions to resolve matters in dispute. These actions may include regulating the future conduct of
the company, facilitating the purchase of shares, reducing share capital, imposing constraints on
7
Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, § 241.
share transfers, revising agreements, dismissing directors, recovering gains, and determining
appropriate costs.8
This section outlines the consequences when the Tribunal terminates, sets aside, or modifies
agreements mentioned in Section 242. It explicitly states that these actions do not give rise to any
claims against the company and prohibits directors or managers affected by such actions from
assuming similar roles without the Tribunal's consent for a specified period.9
Section 244 elucidates who possesses the right to file an application under Section 241. For
companies with share capital, this includes a minimum of one hundred members or one-tenth of
the total members, or members holding one-tenth of the issued share capital. In companies
without share capital, the threshold is not less than one-fifth of the total members.10
Section 245 empowers members or depositors who perceive prejudicial conduct in a company's
management to file applications on behalf of these groups. The applications may seek diverse
orders, including restraining the company from unlawful acts, voiding resolutions, claiming
damages, and more.11
This section ensures that specific provisions (Sections 337 to 341) are applied with necessary
modifications to proceedings under Sections 241 and 245, ensuring a consistent legal framework
for these proceedings.12
The Halsbury's Laws of England, further clarifies that oppression should involve a continuing
course of oppressive conduct, specifically directed at the petitioner in their capacity as a member.
It necessitates an element of lack of probity or fair dealing concerning the petitioner's proprietary
rights as a shareholder. In essence, it should not merely entail inefficient or careless conduct. 15
In the Needle Industries case, it was clarified that technically legal and correct conduct may still
justify relief under the just and equitable jurisdiction. Conversely, conduct involving illegality or
contravention of the Act may not be sufficient for relief. It is crucial to establish a pattern of
continued oppression rather than isolated acts to warrant legal intervention.
Tata Consultancy Services Limited v. Cyrus Investments Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. is a case that shows
how tricky the word "mismanagement" can be. The main problem in this case was that Mr.
Cyrus Mistry was kicked off of several Tata Group directorships by the Board of Directors and at
shareholder meetings.
In the realm of corporate law, the judicial interpretation of the terms "oppression" and
"mismanagement" in India is a nuanced and evolving process.
Power Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Maheshwar Hydel the Company Power Corporation
Ltd. talks about the short-term effects of abuse and bad management. The words "have been"
and "are being conducted” are used in Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013. To "have been"
something means to do something in the past that is still happening now. On the other hand, "are
being conducted" means that something is still happening.
16
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investments (P) Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 272.
17
Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P.Gaekwad, (2005) 11 SCC 314 (Supreme Court of India).
RECENT TRENDS IN MINORITY SHAREHOLDER
In the intricate tapestry of corporate governance, minority shareholder activism has evolved into
a formidable force, reshaping traditional power dynamics and emphasizing, fairness,
transparency, and equitable treatment within companies. Recent years have witnessed notable
trends in this domain, signifying a transformative phase in corporate governance and
highlighting the growing assertiveness of minority shareholders.
One of the prominent trends characterizing minority shareholder activism is the heightened
emphasis on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) issues. Beyond mere financial
considerations, shareholders are leveraging their positions to advocate for sustainable and
responsible business practices. This trend mirrors the global shift towards ethical and socially
responsible investing. Minority shareholders are increasingly demanding greater transparency on
companies' ESG performance, urging adherence to environmental standards, and advocating for
initiatives that reflect social responsibility. This signifies a broader acknowledgment that
corporate success is intricately tied to ethical conduct and positive societal impact. 18
Proxy contests have emerged as a more prevalent tool in the arsenal of minority shareholder
activists. In these contests, shareholders solicit votes from their counterparts to replace
incumbent board members or influence specific corporate decisions. Minority shareholders
strategically employ proxy contests to challenge board decisions, demand changes in corporate
strategies, or advocate for board diversity. The increasing prevalence of proxy contests
underscores the assertiveness of minority shareholders in influencing corporate governance.19
Beyond conventional forms of activism, litigation has become a noteworthy trend in minority
shareholder activism. Shareholders are increasingly turning to legal avenues to challenge
corporate decisions, allege governance lapses, or seek redress for perceived injustices. The
judiciary plays a pivotal role in defining the boundaries of minority shareholder activism, and
landmark legal cases are shaping the legal framework that governs shareholder rights.
18
Manupatra, Casting Light on the Shadows of Corporate Governance: Unravelling Oppression and
Mismanagement in India’s Companies Act of 2013, https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details?
id=undefined&ifile=undefined (last visited Jan 31, 2024).
19
Girard-Guerraud, C., Goodman, J. and Louche, C. (2022) ‘Transformations in shareholder activism: Past,
present, and future’, Recent Trends in Financial Engineering, pp. 133–164.
doi:10.1142/9789811260483_0007.
Historically, shareholder activism was hindered by collective action problems, as investors opted
to withdraw their assets rather than take action. Nevertheless, regulatory modifications are
compelling more involvement of shareholders (see to Section IV). Indian regulated mutual funds
are currently obligated by SEBI to participate in voting on resolutions pertaining to their
portfolio firms and submit voting reports on a quarterly and annual basis. The Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority of India released its Stewardship Code in March 2017,
which outlines guidelines for insurance companies' involvement in publicly traded stocks.
Historically, the prevalence of promoters posed challenges for investors in their efforts to enforce
modifications at the board level. Nevertheless, this image is undergoing transformation. In May
2018, investors successfully ousted a director of Fortis Healthcare due to issues raised by
investors regarding the board's evaluation of certain bids for the firm. In 2019, the board of CG
Power and Industrial Solutions ousted its promoter from the position of chair, however this did
not entail the revocation of a directorship. This action was taken in response to charges of
specific irregularities. In March 2022, Invesco achieved a significant legal victory that affirmed
its authority to request an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) in order to reformulate the
board of Zed. Ultimately, Invesco retracted the requisition, nevertheless, the judgement paves the
way for future such actions. In a correlated ruling, as previously stated, the Bombay High Court
declined to endorse a petition seeking to prohibit Yes Bank (a creditor that imposed a share
pledge) from exercising its voting rights to oust the chairman of Dish TV, a company previously
under the control of the same promoters as those of Zed. In Dish TV's Extraordinary General
Meeting (EGM) on 24 June 2022, the proposal to retain the current managing director was
declined, with 78.95 percent of shareholders voting against it. Additionally, shareholders also
rejected the election of some other directors. These cases, along with the promoter opposition,
are significant advancements in the context of shareholder activism in India.
Moreover, there is a growing awareness among minority shareholders about the broader
implications of their activism. Beyond immediate financial gains, activists are considering the
long-term sustainability of companies, incorporating ESG considerations into their demands.
This signals a shift towards a more holistic view of corporate governance, where social and
environmental responsibility are integral components.20
The changing landscape of minority shareholder activism is not devoid of challenges. The legal
and regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions remain diverse, posing hurdles for shareholders
engaging in cross-border activism. The balance between short-term gains and long-term
sustainability is another delicate aspect, as activists navigate the fine line between immediate
financial returns and the broader interests of all stakeholders.
While legislative and judicial developments have brought about positive changes, challenges
persist. The numerical thresholds in the Companies Act of 2013, though intended to prevent
frivolous suits, pose practical difficulties. Recent high-profile conflicts, such as the Tata and
Cyrus Mistry dispute, have highlighted the limitations of these thresholds, calling for a nuanced
evaluation of their applicability. The introduction of class action suits under the new Act is a
positive step towards collective redressal. However, the mechanism's underutilization raises
questions about awareness and the need for further advocacy to encourage affected parties to
leverage this provision.
20
Islam, A.U. (2020) ‘Do shareholder activism effect corporate governance and related party transactions:
Evidences from India?’, Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, 13(2), pp. 165–189.
doi:10.1177/0974686220966810.
SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
Regulatory Framework
India's rules and regulations helps in understanding how important independent directors are for
good corporate governance and protecting small owners. The Companies Act of 2013 requires
that certain types of businesses have independent directors on their boards. This is done to make
sure that decisions are made in an impartial and fair way. It is assumed that these boards will
balance out the power of the leader, protecting the interests of small owners from being harmed.
21
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) also made the SEBI (Listing Obligations and
Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, which states what independent directors need to do
and how they should do it. In its guidelines, SEBI stresses how important it is to have
independent directors who promote openness, boost the board's reputation, and keep an eye out
for any actions that could hurt small owners. 22
Independent directors play a crucial role in preventing related-party transactions that might
disproportionately benefit majority shareholders at the expense of minority interests. Through
their oversight on audit committees and their involvement in strategic decision-making, they act
as a check against any attempts to subvert fairness in transactions or corporate actions.23
21
The independent director: Has it been indianised enough? - manupatra. Available at:
http://docs.manupatra.in/newsline/articles/Upload/51D72E8E-0E3D-436C-8816-07816F8789EC.pdf
(Accessed: 28 January 2024).
22
The role of independent directors in corporate governance a critical study. Available at:
http://gnanaganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/60/1/Hepitha%20Priscilla.P.pdf (Accessed:
28 January 2024).
23
Batth, C.V. (2016) ‘Role of independent directors in the changing business scenario in India’, International
Journal of scientific research and management [Preprint]. doi:10.18535/ijsrm/v4i2.02.
Challenges Faced by Independent Directors
While the role of independent directors is pivotal, they face numerous challenges in discharging
their duties effectively. One major challenge is the risk of being co-opted or influenced by the
dominant majority shareholders or the management. The very independence that empowers them
to protect minority interests can become compromised if they succumb to external pressures.
Additionally, the lack of clarity in defining the exact scope of the duties and powers of
independent directors poses a challenge. Ambiguities in legal provisions can make it difficult for
independent directors to navigate complex corporate scenarios and identify instances of minority
shareholder oppression effectively.24
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the analysis of minority shareholder oppression in the Indian corporate landscape
reveals a complex interplay of historical, legislative, and judicial factors. The evolution from the
Companies Act of 1956 to the transformative changes in the Companies Act of 2013 signifies a
24
Role of independent directors - KPMG. Available at:
https://www.in.kpmg.com/SecureData/aci/Files/RoleofIndependentDirectorsIssuesandChallenges.pdf
(Accessed: 28 January 2024).
25
(No date a) Role of independent director in corporate governance – reference to India. Available at:
http://www.virtusinterpress.org/IMG/pdf/10-22495_cbv9i1art5.pdf (Accessed: 28 January 2024).
significant stride in recognizing and safeguarding minority rights. Judicial precedents, notably
cases like Sri Ramdas Motor Transport Ltd. v. Tadi Adhinarayana Reddy and the innovative
approach in Needle Industries (India) v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd.,
underscore the adaptability of Indian corporate law. Challenges persist in implementing
numerical thresholds and underutilizing class action suits, evident in conflicts like the Tata and
Cyrus Mistry dispute. The examination of related party transactions emphasizes the intersection
of regulatory frameworks and shareholder activism, urging strengthened oversight and enhanced
disclosures. Ongoing efforts by regulatory bodies, companies, and activist shareholders are
essential in shaping a corporate landscape prioritizing equity, transparency, and stakeholder
interests.
The Companies Act of 1956 included some safeguards aimed at safeguarding the interests of
minority shareholders against the dominance of dominant shareholders. This marked the initial
action by the legislature to acknowledge the rights of minority shareholders in India. According
to the Companies Act of 1956, minority shareholders were marginalised within the firm as a
result of the dominance exerted by the majority. The Companies Act of 2013 has implemented
several important measures to protect the rights of minority shareholders in a firm, regardless of
whether there is oppression or mismanagement that affects their rights. Furthermore, it may be
determined that the primary objective of the legislation is to protect the rights and benefits of the
minority shareholders. However, the difficulty is in ensuring the implementation of these rights.
Effective implementation of minority shareholders' rights ensures proper governance by
prioritising the involvement of minority shareholders in corporate management. One significant
drawback of the Companies Act of 2013 is the numerical threshold specified in Section 244 of
the Act. Although it is acknowledged that there should be filters in place to prevent the filing of
frivolous lawsuits and to avoid wasting the Court's time, it is challenging to fulfil the specified
minimum requirement. This was revealed following the recent controversy between Tata and
Cyrus Mistry, where the Mistry group's request was first dismissed due to their failure to meet
the required numerical criteria. While the NCLT has been granted the authority to waive certain
provisions, there is a lack of clarity regarding the circumstances under which the NCLT can
exercise this power and the specific criteria that must be met. In general, implementing filters for
direct actions, such as those brought by shareholders in their own names to assert their rights
(rather than those of the company), contradicts the principles of corporate law and ultimately
weakens the position of minority stakeholders.