Hardt, 2017

European Security
ISSN: 0966-2839 (Print) 1746-1545 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20
How NATO remembers: explaining institutional

memory in NATO crisis management
Heidi Hardt
To cite this article: Heidi Hardt (2016): How NATO remembers: explaining institutional memory
in NATO crisis management, European Security, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2016.1263944
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2016.1263944
Published online: 14 Dec 2016.
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EUROPEAN SECURITY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2016.1263944
How NATO remembers: explaining institutional memory in

NATO crisis management
Heidi Hardt
Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This article introduces an argument for how institutional memory of Received 12 August 2016
crisis management operations develops in North Atlantic Treaty Accepted 20 November 2016
Organization (NATO). Scholars of European security and of
KEYWORDS
international organisations have examined organisational learning, Institutional memory; NATO;
but have yet to explain its precondition: institutional memory. In a organisational learning; crisis
context of increasing turnover due to defence budget cuts, it management; peace
remains unclear how shared knowledge of strategic errors is operations; international
acquired. This article finds that the NATO secretariat facilitates organisations
practitioners’ use of informal processes for contributing to
institutional memory in response to the constraints of existing
formal learning processes. These formal processes, including a
lessons learned centre and a lessons learned database,
inadvertently disincentivise practitioners from contributing such
knowledge as using them can incur reputational costs. Drawing
on NATO documentation and interviews with 27 NATO elite
practitioners, the paper provides evidence that practitioners
instead share knowledge through three informal processes:
interpersonal communications, private documentation and crisis
simulations.
A regional organisation’s (RO) ability to develop institutional memory in the realm of crisis
management can have significant consequences for those individuals engaged in the
theatre of operations (LaPalombara 2003, p. 145, Bossong 2013, p. 95).1 The repetition
of a strategic error can cost lives. In planning an operation in Libya in 2011, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) practitioners recalled the strategic lessons from the organis-
ation’s bombing of Serbian television headquarters (HQ) that resulted in 16 civilian
deaths in an operation in Kosovo a little more than a decade earlier. Yet across the
diverse body of the literature on organisational learning, scholars have treated institutional
memory as a necessary precondition for learning – without problematising the develop-
ment of memory (Haas 1990, p. 74, Levy 1994, Scott 2004, Lebow 2006, Lipshitz et al.
2006, p. 15, Benner and Rotmann 2008, Campbell 2008, Howard 2008, Lipson 2010,
Bossong 2013). This article addresses the question: how does NATO develop institutional
memory of strategic errors in crisis management?
CONTACT Heidi Hardt hhardt@uci.edu Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of
California, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 H. HARDT
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, European ROs have faced a significant
problem in developing institutional memory due to a decrease in practitioners’ opportu-
nities to share knowledge within their respective organisations. States and ROs alike have
adjusted their policies with respect to turnover in response to budget decreases. As states
decreased their defence budgets (SIPRI 2016), they lowered their financial contributions to
ROs engaged in crisis management operations. With respect to NATO, the recent US pre-
sidential election suggests that more cuts to the organisation’s budget may be imminent.
While campaigning, the now US president-elect Donald Trump said, “When we’re paying
and nobody else is really paying, a couple of other countries are but nobody else is really
paying, you feel like the jerk” (Tomkiw 2016).
Three changes related to turnover in ROs have limited practitioners’ ability to share
knowledge of strategic errors. First, increases in gaps between postings have meant
that there is less of a chance that a practitioner departing an RO will be able to share
knowledge with his or her successor. A given position may not be filled for months –
making it difficult for the practitioner to communicate with the successor. Second,
shorter job contracts mean that the memory of any given practitioner is shorter. At
NATO, secretariat staff now rotate out every three years – with some possibility of a
three-year extension.2 High turnover can diminish the quality of organisations’ retained
knowledge (Carley 1992, p. 41) as practitioners have less experience. Third, hiring
freezes for staff, such as at NATO (Dijkstra 2015, p. 134), mean that a departing practitioner
may simply not have a successor with whom to share his or her knowledge. Such growing
uncertainty surrounding practitioners’ means of sharing knowledge motivates this article’s
research question of how institutional memory does develop in such a context.
In this article, I argue that NATO practitioners socially construct institutional memory
through the use of three informal processes: interpersonal communications, private docu-
mentation and crisis simulations. Secretariat practitioners act as norm entrepreneurs who
act to socialise incoming secretariat practitioners and other NATO practitioners into using
these informal processes. Practitioners are receptive to such a norm because NATO’s exist-
ing formal learning processes disincentivise them from recording strategic lessons.
Employing these formal processes inadvertently incurs reputational risks. This argument
explains the development of institutional memory in NATO’s decision-making and plan-
ning of crisis management operations.
In terms of case selection, NATO represents a least likely case among European ROs that
engage in crisis management (Eckstein 1975, p. 119). An argument about practitioners’
reliance on informal processes should be least able to explain behaviour in organisations
with a highly centralised (Stone 2013, p. 126) and highly institutionalised crisis manage-
ment capacity (Wallander 2000, p. 728). Of all ROs, NATO remains the only organisation
with a joint military command. Moreover, existing scholarship on NATO has not yet exam-
ined institutional memory.3
The broader universe of cases from which I selected NATO included all European ROs
engaged in crisis management. This universe comprised NATO, the EU and the Organiz-
ation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Findings from a study of the least
likely case of NATO should have implications for these other ROs. All three European
ROs have analogous decision-making processes (e.g. pursuing consensus), share many
of the same member states, share democratic values, face similar budgetary constraints
and host practitioners who face similar political constraints on reporting errors. In fact,
EUROPEAN SECURITY 3
the EU modelled its crisis management capacities after NATO (Hofmann 2011, pp. 127–
128, Rynning 2012, pp. 53–54, Graeger 2016, p. 161). With NATO as the least likely case,
we should be more likely to exhibit similar behaviour with respect to institutional
memory across the other ROs.
Evidence includes official NATO documentation and semi-structured elite interviews
with 27 high-level civilian and military NATO practitioners engaged in crisis management
decision-making and planning. These elite practitioners included ambassadors, leaders in
NATO’s secretariat, leaders in NATO’s lessons learned office as well as others (see Table A1
in the appendix for the full list). I aimed at conducting interviews that permitted an exam-
ination of the organisation at the strategic level of decision-making and planning.
I conducted almost all of the interviews at NATO HQ in Brussels, Belgium. I selected
NATO HQ because the site provided the most access to those particular elites involved
in strategic decision-making and planning at NATO. Interviews with individuals in different
NATO institutions (e.g. Allied Command Operations) or with troops in the field may have
yielded somewhat different conclusions about how knowledge is shared in the planning
and logistical processes. However, this unique sample of NATO elite practitioners – relative
to potential samples at other NATO institutions – provides a reliable basis for this paper’s
argument because elite practitioners at NATO HQ have the most significant influence on
NATO’s entire decision-making and planning processes. Of all NATO sites, the HQ hosts
NATO’s highest level political body – the North Atlantic Council (NAC), as well as the Mili-
tary Committee, the International Staff and the International Military Staff. These insti-
tutions play the most active role in the process. As a result, NATO HQ remains the
nexus for decision-making and planning of NATO crisis management operations.
I received no funding and no privileged access from NATO to conduct this study. Also,
I have never been employed by NATO.
This article contributes to European security scholarship and international organisation
scholarship an original argument about how institutional memory develops in crisis man-
agement. It challenges an underlying assertion in the relevant literature that formal learn-
ing processes are sufficient for capturing institutional memory. In doing so, this research
advances scholars’ understanding of the relationship between formal and informal pro-
cesses. The article also presents new empirical data about how practitioners in the
world’s most deployed military organisation identify and share lessons. Additionally, the
article generates new hypotheses for testing in future research on this under-explored
subject.
After discussing the subject of institutional memory in crisis management, this article
presents an argument about the facilitating role of secretariat practitioners as norm entre-
preneurs for informal processes and about the constraints imposed by formal learning pro-
cesses. After considering possible competing explanations, I then present evidence from
documentation and interviews, discuss policy implications and conclude with a summary
of findings and directions for future research.
Institutional memory in crisis management

Institutional memory matters for European organisations engaged in crisis management
operations because institutional memory affects an organisation’s ability to both
prevent the repetition of errors and increase operation effectiveness. Scholars of European
4 H. HARDT
security organisations (Hampton 1996, Bossong 2013), international organisations (Haas

1990, Campbell 2008, Benner et al. 2011), social psychology (Berman 2012) and manage-
ment studies (Argyris 2003, Argote 2011) have identified the sharing of knowledge as a
necessary step for organisations to learn. Repeating errors can be deadly for those imple-
menting the operations and those in host countries. When organisations do develop insti-
tutional memory, operation effectiveness likely increases. Research in international
organisation (Campbell 2008, Howard 2008, Benner et al. 2011) and management
studies (Akgün et al. 2012, p. 434) have found that organisational learning increases organ-
isational performance.
In this study, I define institutional memory as externally expressed shared knowledge
among organisation practitioners about outcomes of past crisis management operations.
Constructivist scholars in International Relations have emphasised this collective nature of
knowledge (Haas 1990, p. 74, Lebow 2006, p. 3). Thus, institutional memory develops
through the sharing of knowledge across time and space. According to organisational
learning scholars, knowledge refers to the content residing within an organisation (East-
erby-Smith and Lyles 2005a, p. 3). Knowledge sharing from one practitioner to another
can occur through different means, including conversations through interpersonal
relations (e.g. ties) (Van Wijk et al. 2005), communications during meetings and events,
uploading and downloading data to/from databases, emails, written memos and official
publications.
My definition of institutional memory also accounts for the historical dimension in that
shared knowledge is updated over time in response to changed perceptions about past
decisions and plans.4 How practitioners perceive decision outcomes affects their willing-
ness to support such decisions in ongoing operations. Exploring institutional memory
also builds on recent scholarship aimed at explaining how security organisations
operate beyond their institutional design (Héritier 2001, Juncos and Reynolds 2007,
Jenson and Mérand 2010, Pouliot 2010, Cross 2011, Hardt 2014).
Institutional memory can develop in multiple arenas of crisis management (Noll and
Rietjens 2015). In state capitals, national militaries can develop their own formal processes
to capture knowledge from the field. Norway’s military looked to the formal NATO Lessons
Learned Process to strengthen its own capacity in this respect (Eggereide et al. 2010). In
the theatre of operations, troops use formal learning processes provided by ROs to
share knowledge (Andersson and Eriksson 2015). For example, NATO used such processes
to adjust its guidelines on medical support to shorten response times in the field (NATO
2009). In this article, I specifically investigate the development of institutional memory
in the arena of decision-making and planning of crisis management operations.
Practitioners’ knowledge about past crisis management operations can be good, bad or
ugly. This article focuses on the ugly – the strategic errors that most severely and nega-
tively affect the outcome of an operation. I define a strategic error as an “action that unin-
tentionally deviates from a plan or accepted standard of performance and fails to achieve
its desired goal, for which the failure was potentially preventable” (MacPhail and Edmond-
son 2011).
I focus on knowledge of strategic errors because little is understood about this particu-
lar form of institutional memory and because such errors are the most damaging for crisis
management operations. First, scholars have written extensively about how organisations
go public with their best practices (Brown and Duguid 1991, Orlikowski 2002, p. 249,
EUROPEAN SECURITY 5
Howard 2008). Showcasing success increases the organisation’s prestige, perceived legiti-
macy and prospects for future funding. In contrast, strategic errors put these in jeopardy.
Scholars have also previously studied tactical errors in security organisations (Peen Rodt
and Wolff 2012, Moerbe 2013, Ostlund 2009).
Second, strategic errors – as opposed to tactical errors – have more significant and
long-lasting consequences. They can shift the outcome of a crisis management operation
in an irreversible way. Such errors also tend to be more politically sensitive given that they
arise out of HQ – rather than in the field. In contrast, tactical errors can be more easily cor-
rected. These errors may involve problems related to military hardware, weaponry, logis-
tics, medical support, specific technologies and interoperability issues. Tactical errors are
also easier to separate from the individuals and states committing them.
Developing institutional memory through informal processes

I argue that secretariat practitioners act as norm entrepreneurs to socialise other RO prac-
titioners into using informal processes for the development of institutional memory. Prac-
titioners from across the organisation socially construct and diffuse shared knowledge
about the outcomes of the organisation’s crisis management operations – in response
to the constraints of formal processes. The social context of repeated interactions
among practitioners affects how they assign meaning to and update their shared knowl-
edge. These informal processes involve what Checkel calls “mutually constitutive and non-
instrumental bases of social interaction” (Checkel 2005, p. 556). Simultaneously, formal
learning processes disincentivise the recording of strategic lessons, as discussed further
below. This argument builds on two bodies of literature in social constructivist research.
The first one has explored norm diffusion in international contexts (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, Acharya 2004, Wayne Sandholtz 2007). The second one has explored the
influence of social interaction on learning in international institutions (Bandura 1977, Floc-
khart 2004, Checkel 2005, Flockhart 2006).
I characterise processes as “formal” if they are codified – either in an organisation’s
charter or in a standard operating procedure (Wiseman 2015, p. 320). I characterise pro-
cesses as “informal” if they are uncodified and therefore “invisible” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
2009) but have become normalised (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, pp. 721–722).5
My argument agrees with scholarly work that conceptualises knowledge as socially con-
structed. International Relations scholars Haas and subsequently Lebow described the collec-
tion of knowledge as a “social construction” (Haas 1990, p. 167, Lebow 2006, p. 3). Individuals
shape one another’s memories as shared knowledge of past experiences is continually con-
tested and redefined (Lebow 2008, p. 480). Organisational sociologists and organisation
behaviour scholars similarly view the meaning of knowledge as arising from encounters
among individuals (Follett 1949, Scott 2000, p. 13, Akgun et al. 2003, pp. 842–843). As
explored below, this argument accounts for structure and agency by emphasising the inter-
active impact of organisations’ formal processes and the role of practitioners as agents.
By design: formal learning processes in NATO crisis management

Whereas socialisation pressures encourage practitioners to embrace informal processes,
existing formal learning processes inadvertently deter practitioners from using them to
6 H. HARDT
share strategic knowledge. Formal processes can incur reputational risks if practitioners
name names in formal documents without being able to stay anonymous in doing so.
As a result, practitioners look for alternative means of knowledge sharing. Before further
discussing the constraints of NATO’s formal processes, I briefly describe the origins and
nature of these processes, their function and who is meant to be using them based on
their institutional design.
The formal learning processes at NATO comprise practitioners’ use of a lessons learned
office called the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (NATO 2016), the “NATO
Lessons Learned Process” and practitioners’ use of an online lessons learned database
called the NATO Lessons Learned Portal (NLLP). These formal processes bound how prac-
titioners choose to share knowledge of strategic errors.
Following a 1999 final report from NATO’s military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
NATO (2016) created the JALLC through the expansion of its maritime joint analysis team
to include activities by air and on land. The JALLC officially opened in 2002 in Lisbon, Por-
tugal. Portugal was one of the member states that had volunteered to host the new centre.
As JALLC’s analysis activities expanded, the JALLC also took on the role of managing the
NLLP in 2010.
The JALLC has three primary roles: to conduct and produce JALLC analyses (also known
to practitioners as JALLC reports), to aide in the development of official NATO lesson
learned papers and to manage the NLLP. To begin the process of identifying a lesson,
any individual practitioner within NATO can share what is referred to as an “observation”
via the NLLP. According to the NATO Lessons Learned Process described on the JALLC
website, the observation is documented in the database. An action body (i.e. a NATO insti-
tution) can choose to task the JALLC with doing an analysis (i.e. report) of this particular
observation. This can then result in a “lesson identified” to be circulated depending on
the requests of the institution that tasked the analysis (see diagram shown in NATO 2016).
The JALLC is, therefore, responsible for “performing Joint Analysis of operations, train-
ing, exercises and experiments based on joint analysis requirements generated by both
NATO strategic commands” (NATO 2016). The centre operates under the command of
the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) – one of NATO’s two strategic commands.
Although the JALLC is located in Portugal, the HQ of ACT is located in Norfolk, Virginia,
in the USA.
With the JALLC responsible for analyses (i.e. reports) and the NLLP, who are the prac-
titioners who are meant to be contributing observations? In other words, who is required
to share knowledge via the NATO Lessons Learned Process? According to standard oper-
ating procedures, practitioners are in fact obligated to share lessons. Formal NATO docu-
mentation indicates that “all” practitioners should contribute knowledge of “all” types of
lessons (strategic, operational and tactical).6 However, to the best of my knowledge,
there are no disciplinary or other consequences for choosing not to use the formal process.
Constraints of formal learning processes

Such formal learning processes can nevertheless inhibit the development of some types of
institutional memory in crisis management. In particular, the design of NATO’s Lessons
Learned Process limits practitioners’ ability to share their knowledge of strategic errors.
First, JALLC staff conduct such analyses only in response to “taskings” by NATO institutions.
EUROPEAN SECURITY 7
The JALLC does not independently initiate analyses. Once an analysis is complete, which
takes anywhere from a few months to a year, the institution that requested the analysis
can approve some, all or none of the analysis. That same institution then determines
with whom the analysis should be shared. In brief, although the JALLC has the mission
of conducting analyses, the creation of such analyses depends on practitioners to be
aware of this role, to request analyses of operations and to choose to widely share
those analyses.
Second, the creation and sharing of official lessons learned papers depend on the NAC
to acknowledge a need for such official papers and to put this on the NAC’s weekly agenda
along with other important issues. The NAC comprises member states’ permanent repre-
sentatives and is NATO’s highest decision-making body. By design, the JALLC is “able to
assist in the management and dissemination of Lessons Learned NATO-wide” (2016)
but only upon formal request by the NAC. The NAC can choose to request (or not
request) the creation of an official NATO lesson after the completion of a NATO crisis man-
agement operation. Once the lesson is produced, then the NAC must reach consensus to
endorse (or not endorse) the lesson. The NAC finally determines who can and who cannot
receive access to the lesson based on the classification provided to that lesson.
Third, NATO practitioners can share their own lessons with the NLLP. According to the
formal NATO Lessons Learned Process, in the first stage:
an individual within NATO makes an observation: “a comment based on something someone
has heard, seen or noticed that has been identified and documented as an issue for improve-
ment or a potential best practice”. (NATO 2016)
Contributing to the NLLP, however, requires practitioners to already be relatively

informed. Yet using the NLLP requires a) an awareness that it exists, b) training for how
to use it and c) a willingness to go on the record. The JALLC does conduct a twice-a-
year training course for military personnel assigned by member states (NATO 2016).
However, there are thousands of people who work across NATO’s institutions, which
means the JALLC’s capacity for outreach is limited.
As a result, NATO’s formal learning processes may ironically deter practitioners from
using them to identify strategic errors. NATO designed the JALLC for the purpose of cap-
turing important knowledge, and yet NATO’s formal processes constrain practitioners’ abil-
ities to share knowledge of strategic errors. By definition, formal learning processes should
aide learning – not disrupt it.
Previously, scholars of international institutions have argued that institutions’ formal
processes structure political behaviour. Social constructivist theorist Wendt writes that
the structures in which agents are embedded “are inseparable from the reasons and
self-understandings that agents bring to their actions” (Wendt 1987, p. 359). Rational
choice institutionalists have emphasised how institutions structure the strategies that pol-
itical actors employ to achieve outcomes (Shepsle 2008). Historical institutionalists have
emphasised how institutions structure political interactions, therein viewing institutions
as patterned relations (Hall 1986, Steinmo et al. 1992, p. 13).
Emphasising the constraints of structure and the critical role of secretariat practitioners
as agents, my constructivist argument about institutional memory agrees with historical
institutionalists in that institutions do shape both political actors’ strategies and their
objectives (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, p. 9). An RO’s formal learning processes are a critical
8 H. HARDT
part of the institution of the RO. These formal processes have more of an impact on behav-
iour than rational choice scholars would expect. Formal learning processes remind prac-
titioners of their own temporary status in the RO. Rotations occur frequently. This
affects practitioners’ determination to share knowledge when they can so as to avoid
the repetition of strategic errors.
As aforementioned, NATO practitioners may choose not engage with existing formal
learning lessons for two reasons, indicated in order of importance: risk to their repu-
tation and prerequisite training. First, by participating in formal learning processes, an
elite practitioner can risk his or her reputation – if not his or her career. By naming
names of individuals, implicating a particular NATO institution or member state, the
practitioner cannot avoid placing blame if he/she is to report openly and honestly.
Yet these processes do not provide practitioners with anonymity. Practitioners may
face a legitimate risk of retribution by their supervisors and/or state capitals for report-
ing errors at the strategic level.
Second, practitioners’ training into a new position – whether it be an incoming ambas-
sador or an incoming high-level secretariat staff – does not typically include training in
lessons learned processes. In military organisations, information sharing occurs on a
“need-to-know” basis. Sharing knowledge with one’s successor or one’s colleagues is
not built into the job description (Schilling and Kluge 2009, p. 343).
Secretariat practitioners as norm entrepreneurs

Practitioners as agents in institutional memory development
In ROs, practitioners act as agents who willingly choose to contribute their individual
knowledge of strategic errors to the RO. These practitioners have important instrumental
reasons for contributing their individual knowledge. In particular, practitioners have an
interest in ensuring that strategic errors are not repeated. A strategic error’s negative
impact on the organisation can indirectly affect a practitioner’s ability to continue deciding
and planning future operations. Irrespective of who or what causes the error, a less effec-
tive crisis management operation can harm an organisation’s reputation. The survival of an
international organisation in turn affects whether its practitioners can keep their jobs
(Johnson 2014, p. 29). An elite practitioner’s position in the RO remains dependent on
the political and financial support that member states continue providing.
Elite practitioners in an RO’s HQ are central to an argument about institutional memory
because of the influence that they hold within ROs. They shape the practices that occur in
contexts of international cooperation (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, Pouliot and Cornut
2015) and influence the distribution of the RO’s resources. Their decisions determine the
mandates that shape crisis management operations. Practitioners’ context-specific experi-
ences allow for them to process more complex information (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013,
p. 369). At NATO, many practitioners have served in the armed forces and/or diplomatic
missions.
Informal processes allow practitioners to privately update their knowledge accordingly
(Berman 2012, p. 220). Implicit conceptual models shape individuals’ perceptions of what
should and should not be considered a strategic error (Allison and Zelikow 1999, p. 3). Yet
in security organisations, time is limited (Hardt 2014) and stress is high (Axelrod 1994).
EUROPEAN SECURITY 9
Practitioners in high-pressure environments ultimately seek means for sharing knowledge

that minimise costs and maximise returns.
The secretariat and the memory-protection norm

An RO’s secretariat plays the critical role by providing practitioners precisely those means
to share knowledge of strategic errors. Secretariat practitioners act as norm entrepreneurs
by promoting the informal processes that all RO practitioners use for circulating knowl-
edge of strategic errors. These practitioners diffuse what I refer to as a “memory-protection
norm”. This norm refers to RO practitioners’ behaving on the shared understanding that
the secretariat is responsible for the protection of the RO’s institutional memory. Construc-
tivist scholars define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given
identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 891). Management scholars have argued that
internalising norms can in fact “be a more effective means of achieving coordination
and integration than external control systems relying on explicit rules and regulations”
(Racelis 2011, p. 32).
Secretariat practitioners (i.e. agents) are able to take such action because of member
states’ (i.e. principals) lack of oversight over existing formal learning processes (Miller
2005, Hawkins et al. 2006). An absence of accountability increases the ability of agents
to overreach their authority (da Conceição-Heldt 2013, p. 22, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014,
p. 270). Trusting the lengthier experience of secretariat practitioners (Hardt 2016), states
engage in informal delegation of the task of institutional memory development to the sec-
retariat with minimal certainty about the quality of the memory (Arndt and Gould 2006).
Simultaneously, secretariat practitioners push back against the control of states (Johnson
2014).
The first stage of the norm life cycle begins with secretariat practitioners acting as norm
entrepreneurs to “convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms”
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 895). Secretariat practitioners serve as the “early catalysts
who create the initial momentum” behind norm adoption by other NATO practitioners
(Hamilton 2008, p. 80). In acknowledging the agency of secretariat practitioners, I build
on the existing constructivist literature arguing that IO actions occur above and beyond
the national interests of states (Grigorescu 2002, Park 2005, p. 118, Chwieroth 2013).
Chwieroth observed that secretariat practitioners provide an “important socializing experi-
ence” in informal governance (Chwieroth 2013, p. 271) and Dijkstra noted that the NATO
International Staff (IS), in particular, have successfully established an atmosphere of trust
among practitioners (Dijkstra 2015, p. 131).
As new staff rotate in NATO, secretariat practitioners use socialisation to diffuse the
memory-protection norm among other types of NATO practitioners (e.g. ambassadors,
military representatives and military staff) (Checkel 2001, Flockhart 2006). Secretariat prac-
titioners promote the norm that they and other RO practitioners should engage in informal
processes of sharing knowledge of strategic errors. These norm-adoption and repeated
norm-promotion occur through social influence (Flockhart 2006, p. 97). In this way, sec-
retariat practitioners persuade7 secretariat and non-secretariat practitioners until the
norm cascades to the rest of the population (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 902).8 In
the final stage of the norm life cycle, these NATO practitioners – secretariat and non-sec-
retariat – become what Finnemore and Sikkink refer to as norm followers (Finnemore and
10 H. HARDT
Sikkink 1998, p. 902). The practitioners accept that the secretariat should take the lead in
managing informal processes of knowledge sharing.
Europeanist Bossong (2013) argues that “more formal processes for knowledge gener-
ation, capture and transmissions are critical in the EU context as information can be lost
over various levels” (p. 97). Yet, unlike formal processes, the invisibility of informal pro-
cesses aides in the accuracy of memory because practitioners can name names and
discuss politically sensitive circumstances with less self-censorship. An individual can
share sensitive knowledge through informal, in-person handovers and private documen-
tation. Interpersonal networks have been shown to be a more “effective and expeditious
channels for information” in crisis management (Horn et al. 2006, p. 119).
In contrast, formal lessons learned processes are more likely to reflect sanitised and
self-censored knowledge. In their study of lessons learned processes in Europe, Andersson
and Eriksson (2015, p. 8) write:
Every step in the described LLPs is coupled with major challenges, for example collection of
observations has to deal with bias and accuracy issues, analysis and validation needs to deal
with concealed cause and effect relationships, transferal and sharing of lessons is dependent
on the ability to articulate and distribute the knowledge, storing lessons is dependent on the
externalisability, and successful implementation can be difficult to verify.
Ultimately, informal processes allow practitioners to flexibly adjust strategic lessons

without the need for vetting or seeking consensus. Bossong’s (2013) research demon-
strated the importance of flexibility in learning in EU crisis management (p. 98). Addition-
ally, practitioners are likely unaware of the real costs of the informal process of passing on
knowledge in this manner. For example, informal processes run a risk of misinterpretation.
Alternative explanations
Before examining evidence, I consider two potential alternative explanations from related
literature since existing scholarship has yet to problematise institutional memory. These
explanations provide competing rationales for how ROs develop institutional memory
of strategic errors in crisis management. In a context of increasing turnover and gaps
between postings, what are alternative possibilities for how RO practitioners manage to
share their knowledge of strategic errors?
A first alternative explanation would be that the RO’s member states develop insti-
tutional memory within their respective state apparatuses. This would mean that, at
NATO, sharing of knowledge of strategic errors would occur only among individuals
within the silos of 28 member states.
According to this state silo explanation, states withhold knowledge from one another.
According to neo-realists, neo-liberalists and regime theorists, states rationally use IOs to
pursue their interests (Keohane 1984, Moravcsik 1993, Abbott and Snidal 1998, pp. 5–6).
Acknowledging wrongdoing to other states would rarely be in a state’s interest. Revealing
information about an error in decision-making could limit a state’s ability to bargain in
future negotiations. States instead prefer to maintain their reputations as strong and
capable. However, states do have an interest in identifying their own foreign policy
lessons (Levy 1994, Harnisch 2011). Any relevant knowledge exchange would occur
among the practitioners in states’ defence ministries, foreign ministries and national
EUROPEAN SECURITY 11
delegations to the RO. If this explanation is correct, we would need to observe the necess-
ary condition that member states collect knowledge in silos. If incorrect, we would need to
find evidence of states sharing such knowledge with other states or with RO practitioners.
Recent scholarship found that international intelligence cooperation has increased in both
quality and quantity (Aldrich 2009, p. 27). If member states are more willing to share intel-
ligence, they may be more willing to share lessons from operations. More importantly,
several states have already publicly shared their national lessons from NATO operations.9
This provides preliminary evidence against the state-centred explanation, but evidence
from within ROs is needed.
A second alternative explanation would be that ROs develop institutional memory
through the organisation repositories designed to capture lessons. In other words,
sharing of knowledge of strategic errors occurs as RO practitioners share their own
lessons with the organisation’s repository. I use the term repository to refer to a physical
structure outside of one’s mind. Examples of repositories include paper and digital
archives and online learning databases within lessons learned offices (e.g. UN Department
of Peacekeeping Policy and Best Practice Service).
International organisation scholars Benner and Rotmann argued that learning infrastruc-
ture, such as lessons learned offices, is critical for international organisations to learn from
their military operations (Benner and Rotmann 2008, p. 44).10 Haas also conceptualised
shared knowledge as “structured” (Haas 1990, p. 73). Organisational theory scholarship
(Cyert and March 1963, p. 38) and management scholarship have long argued that structures
(Bannon and Kuutti 2005, p. 192) provide “storage” for knowledge (Akgun et al. 2003, p. 847,
Table 1) in organisations. If this alternative explanation concerning the role of repositories is
correct, we should observe evidence that formal lessons learned office capturing strategic
lessons. At NATO, the repository would be the aforementioned JALLC. If the explanation
is incorrect, we should observe little to no use of this office for these purposes.
Methodology
Elite interviews with leading NATO practitioners provided support for my argument about
practitioners’ reliance on informal processes, but did not provide support for alternative
explanations. Practitioners reported predominantly using informal processes in their
establishment of shared knowledge about past outcomes. Informal processes included
interpersonal communications, private documentation and critical conversations during
crisis simulations.
I used elite interviews to most closely approximate practitioners’ behaviour (Easterby-
Smith and Lyles 2005b, p. 789) that could not be otherwise observed. I sampled prac-
titioners who were directly involved in decision-making and planning at HQ and who
were coordinating with those in capitals and in the field.11 This study received approval
from the university's Institutional Review Board for conducting interviews at NATO.
I recruited leading NATO practitioners to participate in the study by emailing national
delegations to request interviews with ambassador-level permanent representatives.
From these interviews, I applied snowball sampling to interview military representatives,
senior IS practitioners, an Assistant Secretary General and ambassadors from partner
states. I also interviewed the two leading practitioners of JALLC via contact information
on the JALLC website (see Table A1 in the appendix).
12 H. HARDT
For interviews, I applied a semi-structured interview format to ask questions about how
practitioners identify and share knowledge of strategic errors at NATO. Doing so provided
practitioners with the latitude to explain in their own words how they understood insti-
tutional memory. Aberbach and Rockman note that elite practitioners are more likely to
push back against particular questions and phrasing as they do not like being put in the
“straight jacket of close-ended questions” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, p. 674). By consist-
ently asking all practitioners the same questions, I was able to prevent the subject of con-
versation from drifting off-track. Responses could, therefore, be more easily compared
and analysed than if the interview had been unstructured (Aberbach and Rockman 2002,
p. 674). A list of the interview questions can be found in Table A2 in the appendix.
Following interviews, I examined both the mechanisms that practitioners identified and
the case of the Libya operation that practitioners discussed. I then carried out qualitative
content analysis to code as formal or informal those knowledge-sharing mechanisms that
practitioners identified. Coding rules were based on the definitions of formal and informal
processes provided at the beginning of this article. I coded a mechanism as a formal
process if it was codified in a NATO treaty, charter, summit declaration or a standard oper-
ating procedure (e.g. a handbook, guidelines or tasking) published and provided by NATO
or a NATO member state. I coded a mechanism as an informal process if the mechanism
was not codified in such a way but was considered routine (Feldman 2000).
Evidence of informal processes of memory construction

Shared knowledge
Interviews reflected evidence of shared knowledge about strategic errors in past oper-
ations. In the case of the 2011 NATO operation in Libya, 22 out of 27 practitioners indicated
that the most significant strategic lesson from the operation was a failure to prioritise the
limitation of civilian casualties. Between April and October 2011, the NATO operation
resulted in at least 100 civilian deaths (Holden 2012). Three IS practitioners identified
the need to improve coordination with local actors and speed up communication with
media and NGOs regarding inquiries. Two permanent representatives referenced conver-
sations with the Red Cross about civilian casualties when asked about the Libya operation.
In references to the need to limit casualties in future operations, an IS practitioner noted
that procedural changes were adopted following the NATO air campaign in Kosovo in
1999. These included the adoption of guided ammunition such as laser-guided bombs
or GPS-guided bombs. “We made huge progress if you compare Allied Force in terms of
collateral damage, and civilian casualties … because they realized that they drew
lessons and they were able to change the procedures.”12 High-level civilian and military
practitioners and permanent representatives shared an understanding that NATO’s
failure to minimise civilian casualties was a strategic error.
Through the use of informal processes, practitioners indicated that the IS – rather than
states or the JALLC – drove the construction of institutional memory in NATO crisis man-
agement. Of those surveyed, 24 out of 27 practitioners identified the IS as being respon-
sible for identifying strategic lessons. Moreover, almost all practitioners interviewed (91%)
described informal processes as the means by which memory develops in the organis-
ation. The daily frequency with which IS practitioners privately document lessons
further evidences this commitment.
According to NATO’s formal standard operating procedures, “each commander is

responsible for capturing his or her own lessons” with respect to specific operational learn-
ing.13 This applies to divisions across the organisation. The former commander of NATO’s
lessons learned office clarified that everyone within NATO is formally responsible for learn-
ing their own lessons: “NATO-wide, people believe that JALLC is there to do our learning
for us … No. We are facilitators.” However, the JALLC commander and chief of staff agreed
that, in practice, the organisation’s institutional memory falls in the hands of both the IS
and JALLC civilian staff. The latter collect operational lessons with strategic implications
and produce recommendations based on their analyses.
The limitations of formal learning processes

In decision-making and planning of NATO’s operations, who then use existing formal
learning processes? Misinformation among leading NATO practitioners existed over
what were the formal learning procedures and which institutions and individuals played
which part. Senior JALLC practitioners noted that it was the NAC’s responsibility to
request knowledge of strategic errors. One JALLC practitioner explained, “We cannot
force nations to contribute with anything and we shouldn’t. It is completely up to these
nations, and, fortunately, those nations who have something to contribute often will …
even if it is not necessarily all roses.”14 JALLC practitioners indicated that most requests
for JALLC analyses came instead from NATO’s ACT. Whereas JALLC practitioners pointed
to the NAC, NAC representatives said the opposite: the responsibility was on JALLC staff
to supply the NAC with strategic lessons.
Since none of the practitioners interviewed in this sample said that they them-
selves had shared lessons via the NLLP, there remains some uncertainty about who
does and does not share strategic lessons with the NLLP. The fact that none of the
individuals in this sample said that they did suggests that, at a minimum, the NLLP
is under-utilised, if not unknown to many elite practitioners. The former JALLC com-
mander indicated that commanders in the field were the ones who were ultimately
responsible for sharing lessons through this process, even though everyone is
meant to use it.
At the HQ, ambassadors and military representatives and their staff within NATO HQ did
on occasion receive JALLC analyses; however, none expressed an understanding that they,
too, were meant to share their own lessons via the NLLP. Given practitioners’ limited
awareness of the formal NATO Lessons Learned Process, this set of interviews raised
further questions for future scholarship about whether or not practitioners at NATO HQ
read the JALLC analyses. Practitioners consistently emphasised that they lacked time to
reflect on such types of documents. These two pieces of evidence provided further evi-
dence that practitioners at NATO HQ were not using formal learning processes for
sharing knowledge of strategic errors.
The turn to informal processes

Instead, NATO practitioners at NATO HQ expressed a reliance on informal processes for
sharing knowledge about strategic lessons. The following quote by a NATO ambassador
is representative:
14 H. HARDT
There is no formal lessons learned process … It is really sort of an exchange of views among
those people who are directly involved who have been discussing this and who have perhaps
have the stronger interests in the issue than others.15
In their responses to the question of how knowledge is collected at HQ, practitioners

identified a total of five processes. A single practitioner identified from one to three pro-
cesses. Table 1 shows all 66 processes that practitioners identified, in interviews, as in use
at the time of data collection. Of these, 91% of those processes were informal.
Together, the interviews indicate that a) practitioners were predominantly using infor-
mal processes and b) were not using formal processes for identifying and sharing knowl-
edge of strategic lessons. To emphasise the connection between the two types of
processes, practitioners turned to such informal processes in response to the reputational
risks that formal processes incurred.
Prior to the creation of JALLC, it is likely that practitioners were already using some
informal processes (i.e. socialisation) to share knowledge of strategic errors. However,
the establishment of the centre sent a strong signal to practitioners that the organisation
needed to prioritise knowledge retention. Such enhanced awareness about learning likely
motivated practitioners to actively seek out means for passing on their knowledge across
time and space. Yet, rather than using these formal processes as would be expected, NATO
practitioners instead sought out alternative means for sharing strategic knowledge. They
sought processes whereby they could share without penalty for honesty. In this way, the
creation of the JALLC did serve to strengthen NATO’s institutional memory of strategic
errors – just not in the way that it was intended to do.
Practitioners acknowledged how strategic lessons were politically sensitive and, as a
result, they had to relegate discussion of such lessons to informal communications. One
practitioner said, “at the NATO level, I think there are some self-reflection always among
the ambassadors at the NAC, in terms of the decision-making process”,16 but described
the process of actually sharing lessons as informal given the political nature of the
lessons. The following sections explain the three informal processes that practitioners
described when asked how strategic lessons are identified and shared at NATO.
Interpersonal communications from staff to states

The IS used verbal interpersonal communications as one informal means of sharing knowl-
edge about past strategic errors in crisis management. Socialisation among NATO prac-
titioners perpetuated the norm that the IS remains responsible for the organisation’s
institutional memory. Staff practitioners described this as an unwritten duty and commu-
nicated the expectation to incoming staff. Acting on the task, IS practitioners privately
placed phone calls to delegations to ensure different member states shared
Table 1. Processes of sharing knowledge of strategic errors.

Process Formal Informal
Verbal knowledge sharing by IS practitioners 23
Written knowledge sharing by IS practitioners 24
Knowledge sharing through IS-led CMX 13
Formal NATO Lessons Learned Process (e.g. JALLC) 6
Total references to processes 6 60
understandings about relevant past outcomes. Similarly, permanent and deputy perma-
nent representatives sought out advice from senior IS practitioners about the outcomes
of past crisis management operations that had relevance for current ones.
In interviews, both secretariat practitioners and member state practitioners expressed
trust in the secretariat to recognise an event or situation as worthy of remembering for
current and future operations. One IS Operations Division practitioner explained, “The
role we have to play is to translate for the critical decision-makers and those who really
prepare the decisions, to translate the needs, requirements, concerns, requests to the mili-
tary chain.”17 This involved observing implications of past policies, isolating lessons and
“introducing certain ideas to influence future decision-making”.18 A permanent represen-
tative described learning at the organisation as a “collective process” among staff and
state practitioners.19
IS practitioners reported using their own personal experience in crisis management
planning to share knowledge – all in the context of a high time-pressure environment.
They described having little time or resources to consider outside assessments of past
operations (e.g. academic, consultant or think-tank studies). One practitioner said,
It is basically all very very personal. There is no structure in terms of mindset or of formal train-
ing. It is a question about individuals, it is individuals who matter – much more than one would
think from the outside.20
Assistant Secretary General Jamie Shea remarked, “As someone who is involved in
policy planning, my job consists of not trying to understand the past but predicting the
future. And believe me, predicting the future is much easier than trying to understand
the past.”21 In explaining their role in institutional memory, staff emphasised that, in
such an environment, they had to rely on their own historical experience in NATO crisis
management. “You don’t need to read or write the reports. You use personal experience
all the time,” said one staff.22 The staff member cited two decades of experience in crisis
management operations, including time as a commander in Sarajevo and as a member of
the NATO International Military Staff. Another practitioner from the Operations Division
described applying previous experience with the NATO operation in Kosovo when drafting
the four-page NAC Initiative Directive outlining strategic guidance for the NATO operation
in Libya. The staff remarked, “Old guys like me, we generally bring the question up. How
was this particular aspect of the operation with in such an operation in the past?”
The unique co-location of all national delegations, partner delegations and the sec-
retariat in one physical building at NATO HQ further facilitated a high degree of interper-
sonal communications among practitioners. As one permanent representative explained,
“we all use the same cafeteria, we use the same restrooms like a family, and that is the
secret of this organisation, contrary to so many others”.23 Practitioners found that
having all delegations under one roof was an advantage for passing on lessons.24
As evidence of the mutual constitution of shared knowledge, IS recalled instances of
their own updating of knowledge about past crisis management operations through con-
versations in NATO HQ. They observed drawing on not only the knowledge gained from
their own experiences – with particular references to lessons from Kosovo and Afghanistan
– but also those of other practitioners. Staff practitioners explained how observations or
complaints made by leaders from the host countries of NATO operations could change
their shared knowledge by updating staff’s interpretation of the operation. Permanent
16 H. HARDT
representatives cited insights that became available from other delegations through infor-
mal conversations over coffee. Three members of the IS also cited international civil
society (specifically, the International Red Cross) as influencing their interpretations. One
permanent representative remarked that the reliance on informal processes of knowledge
sharing was “an institutional culture thing” as NATO is “an organization that is still a little
behind when it comes to assessments and lessons learned. Performance assessment fra-
meworks are something that they don’t understand.”25 Importantly, these interpersonal
dialogues occurred privately among delegations and the IS in lieu of engaging in formal
learning processes.
The continued use of interpersonal communications to perpetuate sharing of knowl-
edge at NATO was somewhat constrained by the organisation’s formal process of short-
ening job contracts and increasing turnover. An IS expressed this impact:
In an ideal situation, you have delegations who rotate, but you have the International Staff
who are long-term people who ensure the corporate memory. But the tendencies now … is
to push the rotation of staff. … We have seen more and more rotation, and therefore, less
and less institutional memory. I think we’ve encountered more and more problems dealing
with issues that nobody remembers anymore how to solve.26
Private documentation
At NATO HQ, secretariat practitioners also collected knowledge through the creation and
circulation of private written documentation. This documentation includes food-for-
thought papers, memos and unofficial lessons learned papers, among others – none of
which have been mandated or approved by NATO’s leading political decision-making
body. To support the presence of such documents, 63% of practitioners independently
cited seeing internal drafts of unendorsed lessons learned papers. There is no formal
rule or procedure requiring that such a document be drafted after the completion of an
operation. Instead, secretariat practitioners began circulating these as what they called
“standard business”27 – despite the absence of a standard operating procedure mandating
it. IS practitioners in the Operations Division consulted with NAC permanent representa-
tives and circulated drafts of private documents regarding lessons from the previous oper-
ation, but these documents rarely would become endorsed lessons learned papers.
A member of the IS explained that once they had circulated the recommendation, “our
job was done. … We cannot keep monitoring every recommendation that we come up
with because then the staff could not do anything else.”28
Drafts rarely succeeded in becoming formally endorsed by the NAC according to the
Lessons Learned Process due to political sensitivities (NATO 2016). As a result, there is
no single lessons learned document on each of NATO’s largest operations (e.g. Afghani-
stan and Kosovo). In 2012, the NAC did approve a formal lessons learned paper on the
Libya operation six months after the end of the operation, and the document was
shared electronically to those practitioners at NATO HQ with classified level clearance.
On early drafts, staff in the Operations Division met with national delegations, partner
states and representatives of non-governmental organisations, including the Red Cross.
According to IS practitioners and permanent representatives, the lessons learned paper
identified changes that could be made to minimise civilian casualties for future air power
operations. This included strengthening channels of communication with local
populations and increased local ownership.29 The lessons learned paper also called for
NATO’s stronger partnership with the Arab League and for NATO to “intensify its relation-
ship with ROs because of the need for their support”.30 The paper also emphasised the
need to rebalance burden sharing, including calling for more oil tankers and Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance. In total, the paper listed 15 recommendations. The
concern over asymmetric burden sharing is decades old as in and out of NATO, scholars
and policy-makers have called for Europeans to contribute more to capabilities. Yet the
Libya operation acutely highlighted this concern with Europeans’ reliance on the USA
for precision-guided munitions, “which made up virtually all of the 7,700 bombs
dropped or fired on Libya” (Schmitt 2012, p. 2). NATO practitioners and ambassadors
noted that the operation might not have happened if it were not for the contributions
of US assets.
It is important to note that the leaked version of the endorsed NATO lessons learned
paper on Libya did not explicitly address civilian casualties, despite the wide attention
to the subject in elite interviews (Schmitt 2012, p. 4). This illustrates how the process of
knowledge collection is politicised even in informal processes.
In NATO-agreed documents, you cannot name nations when it comes to shortcomings. You
can make generic comments such as, “Only 12 allies participated,” but you’re also not
going to say, “Next time around, countries X and Y better be on board.31
IS practitioners, therefore, play the role of both initiators and mediators, conducting infor-
mal consultations and collecting a wide range of conflicting viewpoints within HQ on
what should be recorded and what should not. Although the majority of these docu-
ments never become NAC-approved, they nonetheless serve to shape and share
shared knowledge about completed operations through the informal diffusion of
knowledge.
The IS practitioners also informally collected knowledge in the form of informal docu-
mentation to update the formal NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) document. IS prac-
titioners interviewed identified this formal document as a reflection of the collective
knowledge that they had accumulated through months of informal discussions with
members of national delegations. Tasked by the NAC in 2010, the IS designed the docu-
ment to provide a template for crisis response. Specifically, it was meant to be an “over-
arching system for crisis management against which all Article 5 and crisis response
planning should be designed” (NATO 2012, p. 5). It indicates that planning should occur
through a “dialogue” between the military and civilian branches of NATO. The NCRS
manual begins chronologically with preventive options and moves through six phases
of crisis response, with great detail given for each phase regarding who should provide
which action, documents and assessments. Partners that participate in operations have
full access to the NCRS manual and are expected to apply it in cooperation with allied
member states.32
Ultimately, IS practitioners updated the NCRS based on knowledge privately col-
lected from practitioners across NATO HQ; but, critically, the NCRS lacked input
from NATO’s lessons learned office – the JALLC.33 The NCRS remains widely shared
electronically with all nations and personnel involved in planning operations at
NATO HQ having copies of the document. However, many NATO practitioners indi-
cated that they often skipped steps in the sequence.34 Two military practitioners
18 H. HARDT
acknowledged a need to cut corners. One noted that, “you have to compress time.
Most of the time, our responses to crises occur faster than we can imagine before-
hand.”35 This is reiterated in a NATO (2012) website description of the crisis manage-
ment process, which states that “the illustrative phases are not rigid, may be of
different length and may overlap as required by the crisis situation”. IS practitioners
argued that the document was seldom used by state delegations and that, in some
cases, permanent representatives had refused to read it despite repeated requests
by the IS.36 Permanent representatives confirmed that it was infrequently used in
their planning of operations. One permanent representative said that it was used by
that representatives’ delegation to help identify needs and contribute to the plan in
the Libya operation.37 Although less influential than unofficial lessons learned
papers, the informal process of negotiating recommended updates also contributed
to the shared knowledge of the past.
Simulation through crisis exercises

The NATO secretariat practitioners also facilitated the sharing of knowledge of strategic
errors through a third informal process: the use of crisis simulations to informally
discuss outcomes of past NATO interventions. Practitioners leveraged these relatively
more formal contexts as an opportunity for informality. In doing so, they facilitated critical
discussions about the past.
Of those interviewed, about half of the subjects identified social interactions during
their participation in the Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) as a means by which insti-
tutional memory develops in NATO. Triangulation of interviews confirmed that the IS over-
sees what became an annual tradition. It is “designed to test the NAC procedures at the
strategic political-military level” and “involves civilian and military staffs in Allied capitals,
at NATO Headquarters and in both Operations and Transformation Strategic Commands”
(NATO 2015). At HQ, NATO practitioners devote a week to role-playing their responses to a
fictitious crisis in a fictitious country.
What is important to note is that the CMX was not designed for knowledge sharing
about past strategic errors. Instead, practitioners in the IS created the CMX for the
purpose of permitting practitioners role-play the decision-making process involved in
an actual crisis response. Yet, the format of the event allowed for practitioners to have con-
versations in which they identified lessons about past crisis management operations.
Specifically, it brought practitioners from across different NATO institutions and countries
into a social setting. This created opportunities for individuals to reflect organically among
one another on the past. The fact that practitioners used the CMX to share knowledge of
past strategic errors – without the corresponding institutional design to do so – suggests
that the process should be categorised as informal.
In their conversations at the CMX, practitioners made analogies to the Kosovo operation
and to the Afghanistan operation and talked through what the applicable strategic lessons
were. An IS practitioner explained,
The CMX is supposed to be based on lessons learned from previous operations … while they
shouldn’t be based on completely abstract fantasies. Theoretically, CMX should also expose us
to situations that produce lessons from the exercises, which then can be applied to actual
operations. All this is supported by the (NATO) Crisis Response Manual.38
The IS identified best practices and lessons from “putting people together and trying to
identify how they can all work together”.39 Practitioners encounter communication and
coordination problems that they would face in a real crisis, leading to late night meetings
and occasional shouting matches.40 A deputy permanent representative reiterated that
practitioners try to “learn lessons on how we communicate with each other”.41
The informality of conversations surrounding the CMX did not make the lessons them-
selves immune from politics. “We meet with the people that we would need to meet in a
real crisis. We look at the details of the process, including consulting SHAPE,” said a per-
manent representative, “but when you point to a specific operation, people point to the
lessons that they want to hear”.42 Practitioners also shared knowledge by expanding exist-
ing professional networks across NATO institutions in an informal setting. Through partici-
pation in the CMX, “you learn who you need to approach to work on a subject and then
you have a brainstorming session … and you just build the memory”,43 said an IS member.
This provided practitioners with pre-existing interpersonal relationships that increased
trust for future cooperation. In practice, this led to enhanced interoperability,44 increased
awareness of NATO procedures and psychologically prepared practitioners for the time-
pressure of actual crisis scenarios.
Several issues limited the ability for the IS to collect knowledge from the exercise. First,
some permanent representatives and military representatives preferred to use it as a train-
ing exercise for their subordinates rather than participating themselves.45 Second, scen-
arios do not often match the types of crises that NATO is confronting at the time. A
permanent representative commented that this “confused the daylight out of all of us”,
and an IS practitioner noted that “the exercise reality and the real reality are not the
same”.46 Third, partner states could participate in the CMX but then not contribute to
post-CMX evaluations. “It becomes a little like sticking one’s head in the sand,” one
partner state ambassador remarked.47 Such evaluations, like formal lessons learned
papers, also take years to be approved by the NAC and shared accordingly. Ultimately,
the process of simulating a hypothetical crisis allowed for practitioners to socially construct
and interpret the erroneous outcomes of past crises.
Lack of support for alternative explanations

Evidence from elite interviews did not support either a state silo explanation or an organ-
isation repository explanation. With respect to the idea that states are primarily respon-
sible for institutional memory, almost 90% of NATO practitioners interviewed instead
placed this responsibility in the hands of the IS. Of these practitioners, four indicated
that particularly the Operations Division of the IS played the key role.
The three practitioners who did not cite the IS simply answered that they believed that no
one collects knowledge at HQ. A NATO permanent representative summarised that, “infor-
mally, there is a lessons learned process” and the IS act as the “collective memory”.48 An IS
practitioner explained that “people who have worked on the issues are luckily around
because their institutional memory allows for quick inputs”.49 The practitioner continued
to say that, “with operational lessons, there is a paper trail, it’s not the same for political
and strategic lessons”. Consequently, “capturing lessons happens much more in the sec-
retariat than the NAC”, said a permanent representative.50 The IS collect these through con-
sultation because nations prefer not to acknowledge that strategic errors occur. Another IS
20 H. HARDT
official summarised that, “I do not think that we have an institutionalised structured way of
learning political lessons from operations” and cited that “nations are not necessarily eager
to have a collective pool of lessons learned that they agree on”, given their “political resist-
ance against any formal process of learning lessons”.51
Interview evidence also did not indicate that memory is siloed only in NATO’s most
powerful states (i.e. the USA, the UK and France). A military representative from one of
these states said that, “nations do collect their own lessons”,52 but these do not automati-
cally become a part of the collective memory at NATO. For example, the USA conducts its
own individual assessments with the Pentagon and State Department following NATO
operations. Ultimately, all permanent representatives from these states identified the IS
rather than their respective capitals as the primary source of collective knowledge at
the organisation.53
Second, evidence in this study provided no support for an organisation repository
explanation for sharing knowledge of past strategic errors. All but six practitioners were
unfamiliar with the formal NATO Lessons Learned Process and the NLLP. For example,
practitioners stated that they were “not familiar with JALLC reports” and that they did
not know how the process with JALLC worked – even though the NATO Lessons
Learned Process requires all individuals to participate in such processes.
In response to the question of how institutional memory develops, only 22% of prac-
titioners could acknowledge the existence of a formal learning process at the organisation.
Of those six practitioners who did identify it, only two were able to correctly identify the
steps involved in the process. They were the commander and chief of staff of JALLC.
Elite interviews also indicated that formal JALLC analyses often excluded input from
leading practitioners in NATO’s leading strategic decision-making body – the NAC. A geo-
graphic disconnect likely contributed to this limited input. The NAC is located in NATO HQ
in Brussels, whereas the JALLC is located in Lisbon, Portugal. JALLC leaders lamented a lack
of communication with NATO HQ. At the same time, practitioners in other NATO insti-
tutions did not uniformly receive training on the formal lessons learned process.
As noted above, the majority of permanent representatives to the NAC were unfamiliar
with the formal process, JALLC documents, NLLP and what their own assigned role was in
the broader NATO Lessons Learned Process. An IS practitioner explained that “there is no
doctrine” for learning at political and strategic lessons.54 Responses of all six practitioners
who mentioned the formal process suggest that they did not believe that they personally
were part of an organisation-wide formal learning process. These practitioners referred to
others as “they” – be it commanders or the JALLC – with respect to who was involved in
the formal process. One NATO ambassador said:
At the NAC level, without formalizing or necessarily formalizing lessons learned process that,
we of course we have the memory of what happened, and of how operations went. So I can
mention that for many other colleagues that were here during the Libya operations, some-
thing that is in the collected memory. Also, informally there is kind of a lessons learned to
process.55
Similarly, another NATO ambassador said:
I think then maybe, there’s political resistance against any formal process of learning lessons,
and institutionalizing such process, because every operation, every mission is in many ways
politically sensitive.
As further evidence of the knowledge gap concerning NATO’s formal learning infra-
structure, only six practitioners independently mentioned the JALLC in interviews. Of
these six, three remarked that the JALLC only collects tactical lessons. A deputy permanent
representative said, “They [JALLC officials] are not really in the driver’s seat.”56 Another IS
official said:
None of the JALLCs’ taskings do we ever see, even though sometimes they pertain directly to
things that we are doing. And then suddenly we see a paper that the JALLC has written on our
relations with operational partners and international organizations!
Additionally, many practitioners simply lacked information about the JALLC’s potential.
Most (78%) did not mention the institution at all. Of the six who did, two of them asked me
to explain what it was and another had never seen any JALLC documents. As indicated
above, the demand-driven institutional design of the JALLC was such that the production
and dissemination of both NATO formal lessons and analyses depended on NATO prac-
titioners to task the JALLC with the identification of lessons on specific past crisis manage-
ment operations. This lack of familiarity with the JALLC and the NLLP provides further
explanation for why some practitioners were not using formal processes to capture stra-
tegic lessons.
Policy implications
Given that practitioners rarely use NATO’s formal learning processes for developing insti-
tutional memory from strategic errors, NATO needs to reconsider its existing learning infra-
structure and adopt means for supporting existing informal processes.
To support existing formal processes, NATO could add lessons learning training to exist-
ing security training that is required for all practitioners (including state, secretariat, volun-
tary national contributions, etc.) who enter and use NATO facilities. This would increase
awareness of formal processes across all levels. (Dissolving the JALLC altogether could
be cost-effective, but would jeopardise the sharing of tactical lessons.) Second, the organ-
isation could anonymise practitioners as they share observations with the NLLP. This could
incentivise practitioners to share knowledge without concern for reputational conse-
quences by supervisors or colleagues. Third, NATO could require all its civilian and military
staff – and strongly encourage ambassadors, military representatives and staff in national
delegations – to leave behind an exit document for one’s successor.57 The exit document
could be secured such that only the outgoing and incoming individuals would have
access, so as to provide anonymity.
To bolster existing informal processes, first, NATO could make efforts to physically
relocate the JALLC out of the suburbs of Lisbon and into Brussels. This would also
increase opportunities for JALLC practitioners and IS practitioners to communicate.
The risk of this option would be to the independence of the JALLC. Therefore, measures
would need to be taken to minimise uninvited influence of NATO personnel on JALLC
content. Second, job contracts for IS could be extended to 5-year contracts rather
than 3-year contracts. This would extend the amount of time that practitioners have
to socialise, diffuse norms surrounding informal processes and contribute relevant
knowledge at the strategic level to influence decision-making and planning of
operations.
22 H. HARDT
Conclusion
In the conduct of crisis management operations, many European ROs face a growing
threat that has received little public attention. That is, those practitioners involved in
the decision-making and planning of operations have fewer opportunities to pass on
their knowledge within the RO. Following budget cuts at the state level and the organis-
ation level, practitioners have shorter job contracts and gaps between postings. With less
time to accumulate and share knowledge, this article sought to explain how European ROs
do develop institutional memory of their strategic errors. Understanding the development
of memory matters because identifying past missteps can prevent them in the future. In
the context of crisis management, preventing errors can mean saving lives.
Drawing on social constructivist scholarship, I argued that individuals working in an
RO’s secretariat act as norm entrepreneurs by encouraging RO practitioners to use infor-
mal processes for sharing knowledge of strategic errors. Interviews with NATO prac-
titioners indicated that members of the IS (NATO’s secretariat) facilitated the use of
three such processes: interpersonal communications, private documentation and conver-
sations during crisis simulations.
Practitioners prefer to participate in these informal processes because an RO’s formal
learning processes inadvertently deter practitioners from using them for sharing knowl-
edge of strategic errors. At NATO, for example, existing learning infrastructure lacked
the anonymity needed for practitioners to be willing to record errors. Using NATO’s
lessons learned database (i.e. the NLLP) could incur high reputational risks. Many prac-
titioners were unaware or largely misinformed about the formal processes themselves.
Interviews indicated that NATO’s formal learning processes fail to capture strategic-level
lessons. We can no longer assume that the presence of formal learning infrastructures
ensures their use for these purposes.
In addition to exploring memory-making in NATO, this article expands scholars’ under-
standing of the relationship between informal and formal processes. The study demon-
strated that, in crisis management, an RO’s secretariat can respond to shortcomings in
existing formal processes by expanding its role to create and sustain informal processes.
This suggests a new way in which the secretariat – a non-state actor – influences policy-
making within European ROs. Scholars have also largely “underestimated” informal pro-
cesses in international organisations (Wiseman 2015, p. 319) such as NATO. Yet emerging
attention to the subject of informal governance speaks to the need to further theorise and
investigate the interplay between informal and formal processes (Stone 2013).
This article also opens new venues for empirical research on the subject of institutional
memory. Additional studies can explore the development of institutional memory in other
European organisations such as the EU and the OSCE. Whereas this study focused on stra-
tegic errors, future scholarship may examine the processes behind institutional memory of
other types of errors in European ROs. For example, how do different member states share
tactical knowledge from NATO operations with their respective militaries? As noted earlier,
future research may prove that learning repositories in ROs are particularly effective at cap-
turing tactical errors. Preliminary findings from this study suggest this may be the case.
The research in this article also presents opportunities for further study of knowledge
across ROs. For example, there is ample space in the literature for exploring how different
ROs share knowledge with one another in crisis management. One can also test
hypotheses about whether knowledge about specific types of crisis management oper-
ations is more likely to be passed on relative to other types. Further research can help
to deepen our understanding of how knowledge is shared in the context of crisis manage-
ment operations and build on the largely unexplored subject of institutional memory in RO
crisis management. For ROs, acknowledging and understanding strategic errors represent
the critical first step towards reform.
Notes
1. Subsequent research on institutional memory in NATO appears in the author’s forthcoming
book, Lessons in Failure: Institutional Memory in International Organization Crisis Manage-
ment (Oxford University Press).
2. Following a policy of tenured staff contracts, former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen reduced contracts for members of the International Staff to three years in
length with the possibility of a second three-year term, and these have continued under
the current secretary-general.
3. This body of scholarship has focused on reforms (Dijkstra 2015), strategy , relations with Russia
and operations (Rynning 2012, Auerswald and Saideman 2014, Engelbrekt et al. 2014, Saide-
man 2016). Recent work by Noll and Rietjens (2015) does examine learning in civil–military
cooperation, but does not examine institutional memory at the strategic level.
4. This definition of institutional memory makes no normative assumptions about whether the
individuals involved in the sharing of knowledge do or do not ultimately learn (Levy 1994,
p. 292) since this would imply improvement in their behaviour (Knopf 2003, p. 191).
5. This argument shares the aim of the international practices research agenda to understand
the inner-workings of international institutions (Pouliot and Cornut 2015, p. 5); however, I
do not adopt the agenda here due to differences in epistemology. A recent review of the prac-
tices scholarship noted that the studies involve an interpretivist approach (Pouliot and Cornut
2015, p. 6) to reflexively study practices (see also Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014).
6. The NATO Lessons Learned Process states that to initiate the learning process, an individual
within NATO makes an observation: “a comment based on something someone has heard,
seen or noticed that has been identified and documented as an issue for improvement or a
potential best practice”. For success, “everyone within an organization needs to be involved
in learning lessons” (NATO 2016).
7. Persuasion is “the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become
norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 914).
8. By population, I refer to NATO practitioners that engage in the decision-making and planning
of the organisation’s crisis management operations.
9. See official reports by the US and Canadian governments, respectively, as examples: http://
usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141231_art013.pdf,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_12-16.pdf , http://publications.
gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf.
10. States may also be more likely to delegate a task such as identifying and sharing knowledge of
errors to an RO lessons learned office when there are many member states (Pollack 2003,
Hawkins et al. 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2014, p. 313).
11. Due to constraints, this sample did not include individuals working in capitals or those indi-
viduals working in the theatre of operations.
12. NATO, International Staff in Operations Division, interview by the author.
13. JALLC, Commander and Chief of Staff, phone interview by the author.
14. JALLC, Official, phone interview by the author.
15. NATO, Permanent Representative, interview by the author.
16. NATO, Deputy Permanent Representative, interview by the author.
17. Interview with International Staff in Operations #4, 11 June 2013.
24 H. HARDT

20. NATO, Permanent Representative, interview with the author.
21. NATO, Jamie Shea (2013) “1949: NATO’s anxious birth (Jamie Shea’s history class)”, Lecture
Webcast. 1:07, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggdYQPXDG8Y.
24. This ability to converse in a central cafeteria may change depending on the design of NATO’s
new building. The organisation will begin the process of moving in the summer of 2017.
26. NATO, High-level International Staff, interview by the author.
28. NATO, International Staff in Economics and Security, interview by the author.
35. NATO, Military Officials in a National Delegation, interview by the author.
39. NATO, International Staff in Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, interview by the author.
40. NATO, International Staff in Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, interview by the
author.
43. NATO, International Staff in Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, interview by the
author.
45. NATO, Two Permanent Representatives, interview by the author.
47. NATO, Ambassador to a Partner State, interview by the author.
52. NATO, Military Representative, interview by the author.
53. As noted in the introduction, interviews with representatives in all 28 member states in state
capitals may have yielded different findings.
57. To the best of my knowledge, most NATO institutions do not require such a document.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the ISA 2014 Annual Convention and the 2014 ISAC-
ISSS joint annual conference. I thank the conference participants Margaret Karns, as well as Stephen
Saideman, Stephanie Hofmann, Stéfanie von Hlatky and Robert Keohane for their feedback and sug-
gestions. I thank Ralph Angeles and David Blackburn for transcribing interviews.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Heidi Hardt is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, and a
recent Fulbright scholar at the Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University
Institute. She is the author of Time to react: the efficiency of international organizations in crisis
response (Oxford University Press, 2014). Her research and publications focus on how international
organisations engage in crisis management.
ORCID
Heidi Hardt http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5014-4975
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Appendix
Table A1. Interviews with NATO elite practitioners.
Interview Date Institution Location
1 11 June 2013 IS Brussels
2 11 June 2013 Military Committee Brussels
4 11 June 2013 NAC Brussels
7 12 June 2013 NATO Partner Brussels
8 12 June 2013 NATO Partner Brussels
19 14 June 2013 NATO Parliament Brussels
24 17 June 2013 JALLC Lisbona
25 17 June 2013 JALLC Lisbona
26 19 June 2013 NATO Partner Brusselsa
27 24 June 2013 NATO Partner Brusselsa
a
These interviews were conducted by phone.
Table A2. Interview questions.

Which individuals or institutions within NATO are formally and informally responsible for identifying and/or recording
strategic lessons?
Which individuals or institutions within NATO are formally and informally responsible for sharing strategic lessons?
How are these strategic lessons shared? By what mechanisms?
How do you share knowledge of crisis management operations?
What were the strategic lessons from the Libya operation? Was any knowledge applied from previous or ongoing
operations?

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How NATO remembers: explaining institutional memory in

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Institutional memory in crisis management

security organisations (Hampton 1996, Bossong 2013), international organisations (Haas

Developing institutional memory through informal processes

By design: formal learning processes in NATO crisis management

Constraints of formal learning processes

Contributing to the NLLP, however, requires practitioners to already be relatively

Secretariat practitioners as norm entrepreneurs

Practitioners in high-pressure environments ultimately seek means for sharing knowledge

The secretariat and the memory-protection norm

Ultimately, informal processes allow practitioners to flexibly adjust strategic lessons

Evidence of informal processes of memory construction

According to NATO’s formal standard operating procedures, “each commander is

The limitations of formal learning processes

The turn to informal processes

In their responses to the question of how knowledge is collected at HQ, practitioners

Interpersonal communications from staff to states

Table 1. Processes of sharing knowledge of strategic errors.

Simulation through crisis exercises

Lack of support for alternative explanations

Similarly, another NATO ambassador said:

18. NATO, International Staff in Operations Division, interview by the author.

Table A2. Interview questions.

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