BRIEFING

International Agreements in Progress

Economic Partnership Agreement with

Kenya (East African Community)
OVERVIEW
On 18 December 2023, the EU and Kenya signed an economic partnership agreement (EPA).
The European Parliament has to give its consent for it to enter fully into force. The EU-Kenya
EPA will immediately provide duty-free, quota-free EU market access to all exports from
Kenya, combined with a partial and gradual opening of the Kenyan market to imports from
the EU. The text of the agreement includes binding provisions on trade and sustainable
development, and a transparent dispute resolution mechanism. All other East African
Community (EAC) countries – including South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Somalia, which accessed the EAC in 2016, 2022 and 2023 respectively – can join
the agreement if they so wish.
This agreement builds on negotiations for an EPA with the EAC partner states at the time –
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda – which were finalised in October 2014. The
EAC initially envisaged the EU-EAC EPA as a bloc-to-bloc agreement – i.e. the EPA could only
enter into force after having been ratified by all EAC partners. However, Kenya has been the
only EAC country to ratify the EU-EAC EPA in order not to lose free access to the EU market
(all other EAC partner states have the status of least developed countries, and as such enjoy
duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market). For a time, the EU-EAC EPA signing and
ratification process was stalled because of discussions on the agreement's consequences
for East African economies, but the EAC eventually agreed to Kenya entering negotiations
to implement a bilateral EPA with the EU.
Parliament is expected to vote on giving consent to the EPA at its February II plenary
session.
Fourth edition. To view earlier editions of this briefing, please see the EPRS blog.

Economic Partnership Agreement between Kenya, of the one part, and the European Union
and its Member States, of the other part (2023/0338(NLE))

Committee responsible: International Trade (INTA)

Rapporteur: Alessandra Mussolini (EPP, Italy)

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Author: Eric Pichon
Members' Research Service
PE 757.652 – February 2024 EN
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Introduction
According to the Lomé IV Convention (1990-2000), sub-Saharan African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries benefitted from a preferential tariff system for their trade with the Member States of the
European Communities and later the European Union. However, this system was in breach of the
'most-favoured-nation' principle under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
according to which preferential treatment granted to ACP countries should also be granted to other
countries with a similar level of development. This is the reason why the Cotonou Agreement,
signed in 2000, included a provision allowing the EU to negotiate different economic partnership
agreements (EPAs) with ACP sub-groups (Chapter 2, Part 3, Title II). According to this provision, the
aim of EPAs is to liberalise most trade in goods and services – with the exception of sensitive sectors
and products – in conformity with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules (Article XXIV, GATT). This
means that partner countries have to open their markets to each other’s products. However, this
reciprocity is accompanied by asymmetry: while EPAs require the EU to immediately open its
markets for most products, they provide for a gradual opening of ACP markets.
The East African Community (EAC) is one of the groupings to have negotiated an EPA with the EU.1
All EAC partner states at the time – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda – were part of
the negotiations, which concluded in October 2014. South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and Somalia, which are EAC partner states since 2016, 2022 and 2023 respectively,
were not involved in the negotiations but can join the EPA once it enters into force. EAC partner
states have long failed to adopt a common position on the EPA, thereby delaying plans for its
signing and ratification, and therefore it has yet to enter into force.
Figure 1 – East African Community partner states and EPAs with the EU

Data source: European Commission's DG Trade website, accessed 23 January 2023.

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 Economic Partnership Agreement with Kenya (East African Community)

Existing situation
The EAC is one of the most integrated regional economic communities of the African Union. Most
goods and services are traded duty-free between its partner states and with a common external
tariff with third countries (customs union); persons, goods, services and capital can circulate freely
(common market). The EAC plans to establish a monetary union by 2031 and has the ambition to
ultimately become a political federation.
While Kenya's economy relies mainly on agriculture and natural resources, the manufacturing,
energy and financial services sectors have all gained importance in recent years. Its trade balance is
in deficit, with imports exceeding exports. Key Kenyan exports include plant products (coffee, tea,
fruit and vegetables, cut flowers), oil and mineral fuels, and textiles. Imports include machinery,
transport equipment, chemicals and petroleum products. The government is implementing 'Vision
2030', a plan comprising a range of initiatives to stimulate economic growth and trade, including by
developing infrastructure, increasing the share of manufacturing and industry in the economy and
boosting the export of their products, facilitating trade and creating high quality jobs. While the
economy has grown stronger in 2023, challenges remain, among them a high public debt and
corruption.

Main trade data

EU Member States are together Figure 2 – EU trade in goods with Kenya and the East African
the EAC's 4th trade partner after Community (2022, € billion)
China, the United Arab Emirates
and India. The five EAC countries
that negotiated the EU-EAC EPA 2
account for 0.1 % of EU imports
from third countries and 0.2 % of
EU exports to third countries,
whilst the EU as a whole accounts
for 10.0 % of the EAC's imports and
14.0 % of its exports.
Kenya accounts for nearly half of
EU imports from the EAC and of EU
exports to the EAC (Figure 2). The
EU Member States together
account for 10 % of Kenya's
imports, mainly 'mineral and
chemical products, and
machinery. The EU is the primary
importer (16 %) of Kenya's
products, mainly agricultural and
horticultural products (fruit and
vegetables, cut flowers).
This pattern is similar for other EAC
countries. EAC manufactured
products are mainly exported Data source: European Commission, Trade statistics (EAC,
within Africa, mostly within the Kenya) accessed 20 December 2023.
EAC itself.

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Current trade schemes

In 2001, the WTO granted a temporary derogation (waiver) to the EU and the ACP countries to give
them time to negotiate EPAs before the preferential EU-ACP regime was discontinued. This waiver
expired in December 2007; since then, countries that have not yet ratified an EPA remain in one of
the EU's WTO-compatible trade arrangements. All EAC partners except Kenya have the status of least
developed countries (LDCs) and are therefore entitled, under a special arrangement under the EU
General Scheme of Preferences (GSP), to export 'everything but arms' (EBA) to the EU market without
facing duties or limitations to the amount (the principle of 'duty-free, quota-free'). Contrary to the
EPA conditions, which are negotiated between the parties, this trade scheme is subject to unilateral
changes by the EU. Kenya, not being an LDC country, does not have EBA status.

EU negotiation objectives
The overall aim of economic partnership agreements is 'to The European Commission's impact
foster smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states assessment of the EU-EAC EPA found
into the world economy', as set out in Article 36 of the that the agreement would increase
Cotonou Agreement. As EPAs are negotiated with regional EAC GDP 'on average by 0.3 %' and
blocs rather than individual countries, they are meant to would 'slightly reduce the poverty
foster regional integration, which is considered necessary headcount in EAC countries'. On
to better tackle development issues. Conversely, as the EAC average, EAC exports to the world
is already the most integrated African regional economic would increase by 1.1 % and imports
community, disagreements among the EAC partners by 0.9 %. The EU share in total EAC
imports would grow from 10.6 % to
regarding the EU-EAC EPA have resulted in a deadlock. The 12.6 %.
EAC already has a common external tariff (CET) that risks
being disrupted if not all EAC partners are part of the same
EPA. The EU considers the proposed EPA tariffs to be in line with the EAC CET, but not all partners
see it that way. In its June 2002 recommendation giving the Commission a mandate to negotiate
EPAs, the Council of the EU highlighted that the agreements should take into consideration ACP
states' 'political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable
development and contributing to poverty eradication'. EPAs therefore have to be coherent with EU
development policy: hence, the EU-EAC EPA has to protect some sectors, such as 'infant industry',
from competition, to avoid undermining the EAC's industrialisation strategy.
At the same time, the EU has its own trade objectives. For example, as access to raw materials at a
reasonable cost is crucial for the EU, it is wary of export taxes on such materials. Accordingly, the
EPA prohibits the imposition of new export duties and taxes, while allowing existing ones to
continue being imposed. 3 EU Member States also want to stay competitive with regard to other
developed economies; for this reason, EU negotiators have insisted that a 'most-favoured-nation'
clause be inserted in the EPA, so that, for example, the UK or the USA could not be granted more
favourable access to the EAC market.

Kenya's and EAC partner states' positions

Despite having reached an agreement on the EU-EAC EPA text, EAC countries have different
opinions about it. This explains why Rwanda and Kenya signed it in September 2016, why others
have not signed it, and why only Kenya has ratified it (see 'Signature and ratification process' below).
Kenya, the only country in the region not categorised as a least developed country,4 would have
been the most strongly affected if the EPA had not entered in force, as it would have faced export
duties estimated at US$100 million a year. This prompted Kenya to pursue the path of an EPA with
the EU. In addition, after the UK withdrew from the EU, Kenya quickly clinched an EPA with the UK,
as it accounted for more than a quarter of EU-28 imports from Kenya.

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 Economic Partnership Agreement with Kenya (East African Community)

Tanzania was the main opponent of the EU-EAC EPA, fearing that the envisaged ban on new export
duties on raw materials and the phasing-out of import tariffs over a period of only 25 years would
make it difficult for the country to develop a competitive processing industry. In July 2016, the
government announced it would not sign the EPA before a further assessment of the deal, taking
into account the consequences of the UK leaving the EU, is conducted. In February 2022, the
government continued to insist on 'engag[ing] the EU in technical discussions' on outstanding
issues, although such discussions had already taken place in 2017. According to Rwanda, which
signed the EU-EAC EPA along with Kenya, the agreement would have encouraged foreign direct
investment thanks to its transparent legal basis for trade, and its simplified rules of origin would
have eased EU access to Rwandan products. While rather favourable to the EU-EAC agreement,
Uganda chose to wait for all EAC countries to sign it in order to avoid being at odds with other EAC
partner states. Burundi became increasingly eager to sign the EU-EAC EPA after the EU lifted its
'sanctions' (restrictions under the Cotonou Agreement) against the country in February 2022.
The EU-Kenya EPA is open for membership to all other EAC partner states, but its impacts on the
EAC common market policy and customs union are not clear. The EAC customs union entails duty-
free trade between the EAC partner states and a common external tariff for products imported from
third countries. However, as the EU-Kenya EPA allows for the duty-free export of some EU products
to Kenya after a set period of time, some analysts warn that such products, after being imported
duty-free by Kenya, could be repackaged as if they had been produced in Kenya and exported duty-
free to another EAC country. This would result in a loss of income from the tariff, which would have
otherwise been charged on these products, had they been imported directly from the EU to an EAC
country that is not part of the EPA. 5

European Parliament's position

EPAs being international trade agreements, the European Parliament's consent is required before
the Council can adopt the EU-EAC EPA (Article 218 (6a) Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). The
Committee for International Trade (INTA), responsible for the dossier, has requested an opinion from
the Committee on Development (DEVE). The procedure file 2016/0038(NLE) for the EU-EAC EPA is
still officially considered in its 'preparatory phase', while the procedure file 2023/0338(NLE) for the
EU-Kenya EPA has been launched.
In its December 2023 opinion on the EU-Kenya EPA, DEVE called on INTA to recommend that
Parliament give its consent to the EPA's conclusion, highlighting that 'binding provisions on trade
and sustainable development (TSD), and a transparent dispute resolution mechanism' are an
improvement compared with the draft EU-EAC EPA. The rapporteur called for appropriate financial
support and monitoring mechanisms for effective implementation of the EPA. He regretted that 'no
role for parliaments is foreseen in the monitoring process of the EPA'.
In its resolutions on economic partnership agreements, Parliament has always insisted that they be
primarily aimed at sustainable development, poverty reduction and regional integration. Parliament
has also demanded that ACP national parliaments be involved in the preparation of EPAs. Yet again,
it has called on the Commission and partner countries to include development benchmarks and
safeguard mechanisms to monitor and counterbalance the opening of ACP markets to EU products.
In a resolution of 25 March 2009 on the EU-EAC EPA (then 'EC-EAC EPA'), Parliament pointed out that
the EPA's liberalisation schedules 'need to be assessed regularly and revised if they prove too
burdensome to implement', and reminded that 'trade commitments must be accompanied by an
increase in support for trade-related assistance', calling for the EAC partner states to be allocated an
'appropriate and equitable share' of the EU aid for trade. Parliament has also advocated reinforced
ownership of the EPA's monitoring and management by ACP states.

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Preparation of the agreement

Background of the EU-EAC process
To prepare the negotiations, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade
commissioned 'sustainable impact assessments' (SIAs) of the EPAs on key ACP economic sectors.6
One SIA report concerns more specifically the EAC: for the horticulture sector in southern and
eastern Africa, it finds that the absence of an EPA would not affect those LDC countries that would
retain their duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market. On the contrary, Kenya (the only EAC non-
LDC country) would experience several negative outcomes in the absence of an EPA: removing its
preferential market access would decrease its competitiveness on the cut flowers market, where its
main competitors still benefit from a duty-free regime, either because they are part of a free-trade
agreement with the EU (Colombia and Ecuador), or because they are LDCs (Ethiopia). This in turn
would result in a decrease in production and loss of employment.
According to the above SIA report, the EU-EAC EPA would have positive impacts for both LDC
countries and Kenya, except that the effects on the environment would be uncertain: the expected
increase in production would put pressure on the environment, unless codes of conduct are
implemented and respected. Even though the Commission has taken most of the sustainable
impact assessments' recommendations on board, the Parliament considers their impact on
negotiations to have been low, in particular because of the difficulty in collecting meaningful data
on ACP countries' trade.

Negotiation process and outcome

Background of EU-EAC negotiations
The WTO waiver expired on 31 December 2007; the same year, a framework EPA was concluded.
However, it did not address many of the outstanding issues and took 9 years to finalise. As is the
case with other EPAs, negotiators had to find a compromise not only between the EU and the
partner blocs, but also between the non-LDC and LDC members of each bloc. In the case of the EU-
EAC EPA, this divide was between Kenya and the rest of the EAC countries. EAC LDCs did not have
an immediate incentive to conclude the EPA, since even without the preferential ACP-EU trade
regime, they could still enjoy WTO-compliant duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for their
exports while applying taxes to imported products. On the other hand, Kenya risked losing its
preferential market access if an agreement were not reached before 1 October 2014 (see
'Preparation of the agreement' above). The EAC partner states agreed on the draft EU-EAC EPA at a
ministerial meeting in Arusha (Kenya) on 25 September 2014, and negotiations were finalised in
October 2014. The consolidated draft agreement was published in October 2015.

Signing and ratification process

Background of the EU-EAC process
In June 2016, following the submission of the Commission proposal, the Council of the EU
authorised the signing of the EPA by the Member States. On the EAC side, only Kenya and Rwanda
have signed the EPA. Kenya is the only country to have ratified it, in September 2016. According to
initial EAC rules, the EPA could only enter into force after it had been ratified by all EAC partners, as
the implementation of the agreement by only some of them would put the EAC customs union at
risk. Other EAC partners' reluctance to ratify the EPA has led to protracted discussions and stalled
the signing process (see 'Kenya's and EAC partner states' positions' above). EAC heads of state
decided in September 2016 to postpone the endorsement of the agreement by the EAC until
January 2017, to allow EAC countries to assess its impacts on the basis of statistical data. However,
this deadline was missed, since Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania failed to provide a consistent dataset.

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 Economic Partnership Agreement with Kenya (East African Community)

At their May 2017 summit, the heads of state acknowledged the stalemate in the signing of the
agreement and agreed that Kenya might be allowed to pursue the implementation of the trade deal
as from November 2017 if a compromise was not found with the EU at the EAC level.
Following discussions on EAC concerns between the then European Commission President,
Jean-Claude Juncker and the then EAC Chair and Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, in
September 2017, the EAC was expected to make a decision. However, the February 2018 EAC heads
of state summit postponed the decision again until a 'satisfactory clarification of concerns of some
partner states on the EPAs' had been achieved, with the tangible prospect of a new round of
negotiations on the terms of the agreement with the EU.
At their 21st ordinary summit in February 2021, EAC heads of state authorised 'EAC states who wish
to do so to commence engagements with the EU', without needing approval from all other EAC
partners ('principle of variable geometry'). This constituted a breach in the EAC's willingness to
implement the agreement as a bloc and practically meant that Kenya, which expressed the wish to
individually access the EPA, was authorised to move forward with its implementation.

Signing of the EU-Kenya EPA

Kenya and the EU launched a strategic dialogue marking 'the stepping up of EU-Kenya bilateral
relations' in June 2021 and agreed on 17 February 2022 to advance negotiations on a bilateral EPA.7
They concluded negotiations on 19 June 2023. On 28 September 2023, the Commission sent its
proposal for the signing and proposal for the conclusion of the EPA to the Council, which endorsed
the negotiated text on 12 December. The EU and Kenya officially signed the agreement on 18
December 2023 in Nairobi. The European Parliament must now give its consent to the EPA's
ratification and Kenya will proceed with its own ratification procedures. The agreement will then
enter fully into force.

The changes the agreement would bring

According to the European Commission's Directorate General for Trade, the EU-Kenya EPA consists
of 'the bilateral implementation of the EU-EAC EPA, with the addition of trade and sustainable
development provisions'.8

Elimination of most import and export tariffs

Duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market for all Kenyan products
Duty-free, quota-free access will be immediately applicable after ratification. This is mainly of
interest to Kenya, as other EAC countries, being 'least developed countries' (LDCs), have duty-free,
quota-free access for 'everything but arms' (EBA) anyway, without having to provide free access to
EU products in return. According to UNCTAD, no LDC country in the EAC was expected to shift away
from this status until at least 2024; 9 however, should a LDC do so and therefore lose access to the
'everything but arms' preferential trade scheme, it could join the economic partnership agreement
at any time to retain duty-free, quota-free access. The Commission nevertheless holds the opinion
that EPAs are favourable for LDCs too, as they define more flexible rules of origin and provide for
support towards improving the countries' infrastructure, standards and market monitoring.

Asymmetric opening of Kenya's market to EU products and services

Kenya will have to lower or lift taxes on EU imports, but this will be done progressively, to give it
time to adapt to EU competition. This liberalisation will be carried out over a period of 25 years after
the entry into force of the agreement. Goods of economic importance to Kenya will continue being
taxed, in order to protect them from competition.

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Placing limits on non-tariff barriers

Non-tariff barriers, such as country-specific standards, rules of origin, and sanitary and phytosanitary
conditions, are seen as restricting the free exchange of goods and services. The EPA will provide for
placing limits on these barriers, while the EU will support Kenya in meeting more demanding
requirements, thus improving its competitiveness.
Technical barriers to trade (TBT)
In compliance with WTO rules on technical barriers to trade, the EU and Kenya will commit to
harmonising their technical standards as much as possible, and to mutually recognising those that
are not common.
Rules of origin
As duty-free, quota-free conditions would immediately apply to Kenyan products imported into the
EU, it is important to determine whether a product is considered as originating from Kenya or not.
In the case of products processed with materials from third countries, rules of origin generally
require a sufficient level of processing in the exporting country. In order to favour industrial
development in Kenya, it has been decided that the rules of origin would be less strict (i.e. allowing
a possibly bigger proportion of foreign materials in the processed products) for Kenyan producers
than for EU producers.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are primarily aimed at protecting consumers by
guaranteeing the safety of food, animal or plant products. However, they have to be proportionate
to the risks, and should not be used as a means to restrict imports in favour of domestic products.
While sanitary and phytosanitary measures are framed by a WTO agreement, the latter allows
countries to set their own standards, be they higher or lower than international ones. The SPS
measures built into the EPA are a trade-off between market openness and health protection. The
EPA will mainly provide for a rapprochement of SPS measures, supported by capacity-building
actions and funding from the EU. The EU will still apply its own SPS rules for imports from Kenya.

Follow-up and monitoring

EPA institutions
An EPA Council, composed of Kenyan and EU ministers, as well as a Committee of Senior Officials,
will have the responsibility to decide on a number of issues, such as the application of duties, taxes
and safeguard measures, and dispute settlement. The Committee of Senior Officials will also be
entrusted with monitoring the impact of the EPA on the countries' economic welfare, and on
sustainable development.
An EPA Consultative Committee will enable social and economic partners and representatives of
the private sector, civil society and academia from the EU and Kenya to meet regularly and to advise
the Committee of Senior Officials on the implementation of the agreement, including on the
provisions on trade and sustainable development, after having received a request for consultation
or on its own initiative. Members of the EPA Consultative Committee will be recommended by the
Committee of Senior Officials and appointed by the EPA Council.
Trade defence
The EPA will provide for a trade defence mechanism: if imports increase too much and risk
disturbing the economy of a country, it is possible to reintroduce duties on the product concerned.
However, this could be done only for a limited period of time, not exceeding two years, and is to be
monitored by the Committee of senior officials.

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Dispute resolution
The EU-Kenya EPA includes a sophisticated dispute resolution mechanism aimed at promoting
amicable settlements and preventing the escalation of disputes. The mechanism provides for
successive steps ranging from mutually agreed solutions to mediation involving a neutral third party
and then to the establishment of an arbitration panel, whose ruling would be binding on parties.
Failure to comply with the arbitration may trigger the suspension of preferential market access.

Trade and sustainable development

Together with the dispute resolution mechanism, trade and sustainable development are a novelty
compared to the EU-EAC EPA. The trade and sustainable development clauses will be binding: it will
be possible to address them through a dedicated dispute resolution mechanism. These clauses will
commit to international standards and agreements on labour, gender equality, climate and the
environment. This includes the International Labour Organization declaration, the Beijing and
Beijing+5 declarations on women's rights, the Paris Agreement on climate change and the
Sustainable Development Goals. The EPA will also commit the parties to combat illegal wildlife
trade, illegal logging and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The EU will provide assistance
and capacity-building support to help Kenya comply with these obligations.

Completion and revision of the agreement

Rendez-vous clause
Most of the EPA text concerns trade in goods. Some key issues, such as trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, competition and transparency in public procurement, are still
outstanding and are to be addressed within five years of the agreement entering into force.
Most-favoured-nation clause
The most-favoured-nation clause will stipulate that if the EU or Kenya enters into a trade agreement
granting more favourable treatment to third countries, the same treatment becomes applicable to
trade between Kenya and the EU. This clause is asymmetric: it concerns any trade agreement the EU
concludes; for Kenya it will be limited to trade agreements with major trading economies'
accordingly, Kenya can agree more favourable terms for example with EAC partners or other ACP
countries. However, according to experts, the inclusion of this clause – an obligation under WTO
rules – might prevent Kenya from agreeing more favourable terms in trade agreements with the
United Kingdom or countries from the Global South, such as China or Brazil (both major trading
economies), as similar terms should also be granted to the EU.

Stakeholder views 10
East African civil society organisations (CSOs) have been critical of the EU-EAC EPA since the
beginning of the negotiations – just like most African CSOs as concerns the whole set of EPAs. After
the draft agreement was published, a network of East African CSOs called for EAC countries not to
ratify the EPA. In February 2022, East African CSOs again spoke out against the EPA, contending that
the agreement would be detrimental to the industrial development of EAC countries. They
furthermore bring up a number of arguments in support of their stance, for instance, that because
protectionist policies based on tariffs, subsidies and trade quotas have been used by Western
countries to develop their own industries in the past, they should not therefore be refused to
developing countries. Another such argument is that a constrained, even if progressive, removal of
tariffs would make it impossible for EAC countries to produce competitive manufactured goods.
Tariff removal and EU subsidies would make EU manufactured and agricultural products cheaper
than domestic ones, thus increasing EAC imports from the EU; that said, CSOs acknowledge that the
EPA provisions bar the EU from granting export subsidies. CSOs also believe that the EPA also risks
undermining EAC trade with African regions or southern partners, as it obliges 'the EAC to extend

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to the EU any more favourable treatment resulting from a preferential trade agreement with a major
trading economy/country'. Finally, CSOs also consider that including clauses on intellectual property
in the future could harm EAC countries – and goes beyond what is required by the WTO for least-
developed countries.
CSOs base their criticism on an assessment of the impact of the EPAs published in 2005 by the United
Nations' Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), but not officially endorsed by it. The study found
that the EPAs would result in a trade expansion that would favour the EU rather than the regional
partners, and in loss of revenue for all countries studied. However, this study also noted that the
expected decline in prices would be beneficial to consumers.11
In a 2018 joint statement on EPAs with African regions, the International Trade Union Confederation
(ITUC), ITUC-Africa and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) consider that EPAs fall short
on a number of expected commitments. Trade unions regret that EPAs do not include references to
labour rights, and that their impact on women workers has not been assessed. They point out that
the safeguard mechanisms against import surges due to tariff removal or reduction are difficult to
trigger. As a result, EPAs risk putting a strain on African agri-food and industrial production.
Furthermore, they voice concern that the rendez-vous clause on investment and services risks
exposing African states' public services to privatisation. Trade unions also criticise the EU for
threatening Kenya with a loss of its preferential market access unless it signs and ratifies the EPA.
EAC private-sector representatives in general favour the EPAs, while stating their wish that the EAC
customs union be preserved. As concerns agriculture, EAC small-scale farmers are the most worried
about competition from the EU: the EU has consented not to subsidise agricultural products
exported to the EAC, but this does not apply to the EU market, where subsidised EU products would
compete with imports from the EAC. Kenyan private sector organisations – especially the Kenya
Flower Council – were the most keen to secure an EPA with the EU, to avoid losing duty-free, quota-
free access to its market. After the EU-Kenya EPA was signed, the East African Business Council urged
other EAC countries to join it.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SUPPORTING ANALYSIS

Economic partnership agreements with the East African Community and Kenya, European Parliament,
Legislative Train Schedule, updated monthly.
Maurer A., Magis C. and Tammelleo J., Kenya and its role in intra-Africa regional trade: The prospects of
the EU-Kenya EPA, briefing requested by the INTA Committee, European Parliament, 24 July 2023.
Zamfir I., EU economic partnership agreements with ACP countries: Which way forward? European
Parliament, EPRS, November 2022.

OTHER SOURCES
Economic partnership agreement between the Republic of Kenya, Member of the East African
Community, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States of the other part, 'for the
bilateral implementation between the EU and Kenya of the EU-EAC Economic Partnership Agreement'
(accessed 3 January 2024).
Economic partnership agreement between the East African Community partner states, of the one part,
and the European Union and its Member States of the other part, consolidated text.
European Commission, EU-Kenya Economic Partnership Agreement, accessed 3 January 2024.
European Commission, Trade Policy: East African Community (EAC), accessed 3 January 2024.
European Commission, Overview of Economic Partnership Agreements, accessed 3 January 2024.

ENDNOTES
1
Negotiations with the EAC as a bloc began only in 2007; prior to this date Tanzania was involved in the SADC EPA
negotiations and Kenya in the eastern and southern Africa EPA ones.
2
EU statistics on trade in goods with EAC only include Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

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3
For a detailed insight on export taxes, see: M. Mendez Parra et al., Export Taxes and Other Restrictions on Raw Materials
and their Limitation through Free Trade Agreements: Impact on Developing Countries, Policy Department for External
Relations, European Parliament, April 2016.
4
While Tanzania and Kenya are both lower-middle-income countries (a World Bank classification), with the latter
having acquired this status in 2020, Tanzania has kept its LDC status (a UN classification that encompasses income,
human assets, and economic and social vulnerability).
5
'Notwithstanding the rules-of-origin provisions, transhipment can still occur'. (Richard Mshomba, in The Citizen
(Tanzania), 26 June 2023). See also: Bilateralizing the EU-EAC EPA: An Introductory Legal Analysis of the Kenya-UK
Economic Partnership Agreement, AfronomicsLaw, 26 February 2020.
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A more detailed description of the SIAs is given in: I. Zamfir, Economic Partnership Agreement with the Southern
African Development Community (SADC); EPRS, European Parliament, September 2017.
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In the meantime, Kenya signed a bilateral post-Brexit trade deal with the UK, reproducing sections of the EU-EAC EPA.
However, the impacts of a bilateral trade deal on the EAC customs union are not clear: ‘Consider a product for which
trade among EAC countries is duty-free. Assume that the same product imported by Kenya from the EU is not subject
to import duties because of the EU-Kenya EPA deal. However, this product, imported from the EU, would be charged
a tariff in any other EAC country. Trans-shipment happens if, for example, the EU exports that product to Kenya duty-
free and then the product is repackaged in Kenya and exported to Tanzania, as if it were produced in Kenya.
Notwithstanding the rules-of-origin provisions, trans-shipment can still occur. … Kenya will also find itself in situations
where it cannot satisfy countries in the EAC and the EU or UK at the same time, as the following case illustrates. Up
until 2022, the minimum tariff in the EAC for sensitive products had been 25 percent. However, that minimum was
raised to 35 percent in 2022. Raising the common external tariffs by the EAC created problems for Kenya with respect
to its EPA with the UK. The UK asked Kenya to respect the provisions of their EPA agreement and exempt its exports
to Kenya from the new tariff rates, thus creating tensions. These types of dilemmas will be common.' (R. Mshomba, in
The Citizen (Tanzania), 26 June 2023).
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The EU-EAC consolidated text of the agreement provides for trade in goods facilitation, customs, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, and sustainable development of agriculture and fisheries. On top of its 147 articles, the
document features more than 500 pages of annexes, which makes its content difficult for non-specialists to grasp.
Some issues had been awaiting resolution for years before the draft agreement was finally reached.
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Although Rwanda had a different view and expected to graduate from this status before 2024.
10
This section aims to provide a flavour of the debate and is not intended to be an exhaustive account of all of the
different views on the agreement. The next editions of this briefing will include reactions to the EU-Kenya EPA.
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In the case of EAC countries (in US$ million): net trade diversion for Burundi: -1.5; Kenya: -60.4; Rwanda: -3.0; Tanzani a
-25.0; Uganda: -9.0; revenue shortfall for Burundi: -7.6; Kenya: -107.2; Rwanda: -5.6; Tanzania -32.4; Uganda: -9.4;
consumer surplus: for Burundi: +1.8; Kenya: +30.6; Rwanda: +0.8; Tanzania +8.1; Uganda: -9.4. South Sudan, DR Congo
and Somalia are not included in the study.

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Fourth edition. The 'International Agreements in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the
process, from initial discussions through to ratification.

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