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Alexander E. Wendt
this article, I want to begin to clarify and contrast the nature of structural
analysis in each of these two traditions. My primary interest, however, is to
critique the conceptions of structural theory found in each of them, and to
use this critique to motivate the development of a new approach to structural
theorizing about international relations adapted from the work of "structura-
tion theorists" in sociology.2 This approach and the research agenda it im-
plies, in turn, require a foundation in realist philosophy of science (or
"scientific realism"3), arguably the "new orthodoxy" in the philosophy of
natural science, but as yet largely unacknowledged by political scientists.4
As structural theories of international relations, neorealism and world-
system theory differ, and thus might be compared, along a number of dimen-
sions: substantive claims, predictive power, scope, and parsimony, among
others. While these differences are important, they are, I think, strongly
conditioned by a more fundamental difference of ontology: neorealism em-
bodies an individualist ontology, while world-system theory embodies a
holistic one. A useful way to capture the nature and implications of this
difference is to evaluate the two theories in terms of their underlying as-
sumptions about the relationship of system structures to human agents.
Despite their commitment to "structural" rather than "agentic" theorizing,
like all structural theories they both presuppose some theory of what is being
2. The term "structuration theory" is sometimes narrowly identified with the work of An-
thony Giddens, who has articulated its basic problematic in his Central Problems in Social
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) and The Constitution of Society: Out-
line of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1984). In "On the Determi-
nation of Social Action in Space and Time," Society and Space 1 (March 1983), pp. 23-57,
however, Nigel Thrift uses the term more broadly as a generic label for a group of social
theories which share certain fundamental assumptions about the agent-structure relationship;
this group includes, but is not limited to, Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism
(Brighton, U.K.: Harvester Press, 1979), and Derek Layder, Structure, Interaction, and Social
Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). Since my purpose in this paper is less to
advance Giddens's ideas (indeed, I will rely more on Bhaskar than Giddens) than to demon-
strate the relevance of the overall problematic for international relations theory, I shall follow
Thrift's more inclusive use of the term.
3. Scientific realism (or simply "realism") is not related to political realism or neorealism in
international relations.
4. Whether or not scientific realism is the "new orthodoxy" in the philosophy of natural
science is undoubtedly a contentious issue among realists and empiricists, but it has in any case
made sufficient inroads that the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science, long an
important bastion of empiricism, held a year-long institute in 1985/86 which, among other
things, focused explicitly on that question. American political scientists generally seem to be
unaware of or uninterested in this debate and its potential implications for political science. To
my knowledge, the only discussions of scientific realism in international relations are British:
John Maclean, "Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of Change and the Study of International
Relations," in Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones, eds., Change in the Study of International
Relations: The Evaded Dimension (London: Frances Pinter, 1981), pp. 46-67, and Richard
Little, "The Systems Approach," in Steve Smith, ed., International Relations: British and
American Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 79-91.
Agent-structure problem 337
The agent-structure problem has its origins in two truisms about social life
which underlie most social scientific inquiry: 1) human beings and their
338 International Organization
planatory relationship between social actors or agents (in this case, states)6
and societal structures (in this case, the international system).
The agent-structure problem is really two interrelated problems, one on-
tological and the other epistemological. The first, and more fundamental,
issue concerns the nature of both agents and structures and, because they
are in some way mutually implicating, of their interrelationship. In other
words, what kind of entities are these (or, in the case of social structures, are
they entities at all?), and how are they interrelated? There are two basic
ways to approach this question: by making one unit of analysis ontologically
primitive, or by giving them equal and therefore irreducible ontological
status. Depending on which entity is made primitive, these approaches gen-
erate three possible answers to the ontological question, which I will call
individualism, structuralism, and structurationism. Neorealism and world-
system theory embody, respectively, the first two of these positions, both of
which ultimately reduce one unit of analysis to the other. Thus, neorealists
reduce the structure of the state system to the properties and interactions of
its constituent elements, states, while world-system theorists reduce state
(and class) agents to effects of the reproduction requirements of the capi-
talist world system. The structurationist approach, on the other hand, tries
to avoid what I shall argue are the negative consequences of individualism
and structuralism by giving agents and structures equal ontological status.
Far from being a mindless synthesis of the "best of both worlds," however,
the structuration project requires a very particular conceptualization of the
agent-structure relationship. This conceptualization forces us to rethink the
fundamental properties of (state) agents and system structures. In turn, it
permits us to use agents and structures to explain some of the key properties
of each as effects of the other, to see agents and structures as "co-
determined" or "mutually constituted" entities.
The manner in which a social theory addresses these ontological issues
conditions its approach to the epistemological aspect of the agent-structure
problem, the choice and integration of different types of explanations within
theories of social behavior. This problem actually raises two epistemological
issues. The first is the choice of the form of explanation corresponding
respectively to agents and structures. This choice depends largely on the
kinds of properties of agents and structures that have been deemed causally
6. Recent theoretical work has conceptualized the state both as an agent and as a structure;
see, for example, Roger Benjamin and Raymond Duvall, "The Capitalist State in Context," in
Roger Benjamin and Stephen Elkin, eds., The Democratic State (Lawrence, Kans.: University
of Kansas Press, 1985), pp. 19-57. For purposes of this paper, 1 assume with neorealists that the
state is an agent, a move which can be justified in part because the organizing principles of the
state system constitute states as individual choice-making units which are responsible for their
actions. My subsequent arguments about the way in which system structures constitute states
as agents should not, however, be seen as excluding a conception of the state as a structure of
political authority in which governmental agents are in turn embedded.
340 International Organization
a. Neorealism
On the surface, at least, neorealists have strong structural and anti-
reductionist commitments. In his discussion of the nature of systemic and
Agent-structure problem 341
10. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981);
Snidal, "The Game Theory of International Politics." Despite important differences between
the two versions over the conceptualization of choice situations in international relations, both
are based on an individualist definition of the structure of the international system as the
distribution of capabilities.
11. See Spiro Latsis, "Situational Determinism in Economics," British Journal for the Phi-
losophy of Science 23 (August 1972), pp. 207-45, and the reply by Fritz Machlup, "Situational
Determinism in Economics," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (September
1974), pp. 271-84.
12. Examples of such an approach in international relations might include Graham Allision,
Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) and John Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic
Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
13. This is probably the most persistently cited problem in the individualist program of
reducing all social scientific explanations to the properties of individuals or their interactions.
See, for example, Maurice Mandelbaum, "Societal Facts," British Journal of Sociology 6
(1955); Steven Lukes, "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered," British Journal of
Sociology 19 (June 1968), pp. 119-29; Harold Kincaid, "Reduction, Explanation, and Individ-
ualism," Philosophy of Science 53 (December 1986), pp. 492-513.
Agent-structure problem 343
b. World-system theory
World-system theory offers such an understanding of structure and thus, at
least with respect to its conceptualization of structure and structural analy-
sis, can be seen as a progressive problem shift over neorealism. In one
crucial respect, however, world-system theorists duplicate the neorealist
16. As far as I know, no neo-Marxist has used game-theoretic language to characterize
international economic relations between the advanced industrialized countries. But clearly,
because of their very different theoretical understanding of the state, neo-Marxist scholars are
much less likely than neorealists to see those relations in mercantilist, and therefore politically
fragile, terms; see, for example, Robin Murray, "The Internationalization of Capital and the
Nation-State," New Left Review 67 (May-June 1971), pp. 84-109, and John Willoughby, "The
Changing Role of Protection in the World Economy," Cambridge Journal of Economics 6 (June
1982), pp. 195-211. The issue in this article, of course, is not which view is actually correct, but
rather how to develop an approach to the agent-structure problem which ensures at least the
possibility of determining which is correct, that is, of developing a theory of states in interna-
tional economic structures.
Agent-structure problem 345
17. Douglas Maynard and Thomas Wilson, "On the Reification of Social Structure," in Scott
McNall and Gary Howe, eds., Current Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 1 (Greenwich,
Conn.: JAI Press, 1980), p. 287.
18. The structural Marxist approach to the agent-structure problem is discussed in Louis
Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970), pp. 180-81,
and in Steven Smith, Reading Althusser (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 192-200.
It should be noted, however, that despite the similarities between world-system theory and
structural Marxism with respect to their understandings of the agent-structure relationship, they
differ in important ways on other issues, such as the conceptualization of the capitalist mode of
production. See, for example, Gary Howe and Alan Sica, "Political Economy, Imperialism,
and the Problem of World-System Theory," in McNall and Howe, Current Perspectives in
Social Theory, pp. 235-86.
19. Smith, Reading Althusser, p. 177.
20. They disagree, however, about the exact meaning of this term, that is, about whether
totalities are "expressive" or "structured." On these differences, see Michael Burawoy, "Con-
temporary Currents in Marxist Theory," in Scott McNall, ed., Theoretical Perspectives in
Sociology (New York: St. Martins, 1979), pp. 16-39, and Harvey Kaye, "Totality: Its Applica-
tion to Historical and Social Analysis by Wallerstein and Genovese," Historical Reflections 6
(Winter 1979), pp. 405-19.
346 International Organization
23. This tendency is one of the most persistently cited criticisms of at least the early work in
world-system theory. See, for example, Robert Duplessis, "From Demesne to World-System:
A Critical Review of the Literature on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism," Radical
History Review 3 (Fall 1976), pp. 3-41, and Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System."
24. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Joan Sokolovsky, "Interstate Systems, World-Empires
and the Capitalist World-Economy: A Response to Thompson," International Studies Quar-
terly 27 (September 1983), pp. 357-67.
25. Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Socialist States in the Capitalist World-Economy," in his
Socialist States in the World-System (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 21-56.
26. Derek Layder, "Problems in Accounting for the Individual in Marxist-Rationalist Theo-
retical Discourse," British Journal of Sociology 30 (June 1979), p. 150.
348 International Organization
27. Emile Durkheim makes exactly this point in The Rules of Sociological Method (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1938), p. 90, when he says that "to show how a fact is useful is not to
explain how it originated or why it is what it is. The uses which it serves presuppose the specific
properties characterizing it, but do not create them. The need we have of things cannot give
them existence, nor can it confer their specific nature upon them. It is to causes of another sort
that they owe their existence."
28. See, for example, Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York: Academic Press,
1974), especially chap. 1.
29. Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marx-
ism," New Left Review 104 (July-August 1977), pp. 25-92.
30. See, for example, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff, "The Theory of Transitional
Conjunctures and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism," Review of Radical Political
Economics 11 (Fall 1979), pp. 3-22, and the response in the same issue by Herbert Gintis, "On
the Theory of Transitional Conjunctures," pp. 23-31.
31. See, for example, I. Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984), pp. 112-46.
Agent-structure problem 349
c. Summary
In this section, I have tried to identify important differences between the
neorealist and world-system understandings of "structural" explanation,
and to link these differences to their different social ontologies. I have also
attempted to show that, despite these differences, neorealism and world-
system theory share a common, underlying approach to the agent-structure
problem: they both attempt to make either agents or structures into primitive
units, which leaves each equally unable to explain the properties of those
units, and therefore to justify its theoretical and explanatory claims about
state action. The obvious implication of this argument is that neither state
agents nor the domestic and international system structures which constitute
them should be treated always as given or primitive units; theories of inter-
national relations should be capable of providing explanatory leverage on
both. This does not mean that a particular research endeavor cannot take
some things as primitive: scientific practice has to start somewhere. It does
mean, however, that what is primitive in one research endeavor must be at
least potentially problematic (or function as a "dependent variable") in
another—that scientists need theories of their primitive units. Notwith-
standing their apparent aspiration to be general theories of international
relations, the individualist and structuralist ontologies of neorealism and
world-system theory preclude the development of such theories. In contrast,
a structurationist approach to the agent-structure problem would permit us
to develop theoretical accounts of both state agents and system structures
without engaging in either ontological reductionism or reification.
32. State, Power, Socialism (London: Verso, 1978); see also Bob Jessop, Nicos Poulantzas:
Marxist Theory and Political Strategy (New York: St. Martins, 1985).
350 International Organization
a. Scientific realism
The philosophy of science community is currently in the midst of a wide-
ranging debate between empiricists and scientific realists about what might
be called the "theory of science."34 At issue in the debate are fundamental
questions of ontology, epistemology, and the rational justification of re-
search practices in both the natural and social sciences. Rather than attempt
to review the entire debate, I will concentrate on contrasting the "hard
33. This kind of dismissal is an old individualist move; see, for example, May Brodbeck's
juxtaposition of methodological individualism with "metaphysical" holism in her "Method-
ological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction," in O'Neill, Modes of Individualism and
Collectivism, pp. 289-90. More recently, "analytical Marxists" have resurrected this argument
to motivate a reconstruction of Marxist theory on "micro-foundations"; see Jon Elster, Making
Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-8. In this latter context, it
is perhaps worth noting that a number of social scientific realists have argued that Marxist
theory is best understood in realist, rather than empiricist, terms and therefore does not need to
be reconstructed on microfoundations to be "scientific"; see Russell Keat and John Urry,
Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 96-118, and James
Farr, "Marx's Laws," Political Studies 34 (June 1986), pp. 202-22.
34. The terms "empiricist" and "scientific realist" are the labels the participants in this
debate, most of whom are philosophers of natural science, use to describe themselves. Some of
the important contributions and overviews are Hilary Putnam, Mathematics, Matter, and
Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific
Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Richard Boyd, "On the Current Status of the Issue
of Scientific Realism," Erkenntnis 19 (May 1983), pp. 45-90; Jerrold Aronson, A Realist Philos-
ophy of Science (New York: St. Martins, 1984); Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1984); Wesley Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the
Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Paul Church-
land and Clifford Hooker, eds., Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985).
Agent-Siructure problem 351
core" empiricist and realist positions on two issues that are relevant to the
agent-structure problem and to structuration theory in particular: 1) the
legitimacy of ascribing ontological status to unobservable entities like
generative structures, and 2) the nature of causal claims and scientific expla-
nation. If the realist positions on these issues seem upon reading to be
unexceptionable, that is because they are: one of the principal arguments for
scientific realism is that it claims to make better sense than empiricism of the
actual research practices of natural and, to a lesser extent, social scientists.
In other words, realists assume that scientists, not philosophers, are the final
arbiters of what is "scientific." This contrasts with the empiricist position,
which is quite explicitly an artificial reconstruction of what scientists are or
should be doing. Indeed, it could be argued that neorealists and world-
system theorists are, at least in some respects, "closet" scientific realists.35
The explicit metatheoretical statements of both remain within an empiricist
discourse,36 however, and thus their research practice does not follow
through on the methodological implications of the scientific realist model.
This failure suggests an ironic twist on the old behavioral argument that the
social sciences are "immature" because they are not "scientific" enough: a
realist might argue that, far from being part of the solution, the empiricist
conception of natural science upon which mainstream social science is based
is part of the cause of its theoretical impoverishment.
The first axis of debate between empiricists and realists is the ontological
status of unobservables. Empiricists tend to "equate the real with the expe-
rientially knowable" in the sense that they are unwilling to say that entities
exist if we cannot, at least in principle, have direct sensory experience of
them. They argue that we should remain, at most, agnostic about the exis-
tence of unobservable entities like quarks, utilities, or generative structures,
and that we should instead interpret the theoretical terms describing such
entities, and the theories in which those terms are embedded, "instrumen-
tally" rather than "realistically."37 Theories and theoretical terms are useful
35. Neorealists might be seen as scientific realists to the extent that they believe that state
interests or utilities are real but unobservable mechanisms which generate state behavior, while
world-system theorists would be realists to the extent that they believe that the structure of the
world-system is a real but unobservable entity which generates agents.
36. The most explicit recent discussion of the philosophy of science underlying neorealism of
which I am aware is the symposium around Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's "Toward a Scientific
Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly 29
(June 1985), pp. 121-36. Bueno de Mesquita's emphasis on deductive analysis and logical proof,
rather than the identification of potentially unobservable causal mechanisms, as the foundation
of scientific explanation displays a clearly empiricist epistemological orientation. The explicit
statements on philosophy of science by at least the quantitative school of world-system theo-
rists show a similar reliance on empiricist arguments; see, for example, Christopher Chase-
Dunn, "The Kernel of the Capitalist World-Economy: Three Approaches," in Thompson, ed.,
Contending Approaches, pp. 55-78.
37. The best recent defense of instrumentalism and empiricism more generally is van Fraas-
sen, The Scientific Image.
352 International Organization
instruments for organizing and predicting experience, but there is too much
epistemic risk of positing false entities to justify an "abductive inference,"38
an inference that theoretical terms refer to real but unobservable entities and
processes. Empiricists, then, in effect subordinate ontology to epistemol-
ogy—what exists is a function of what can be known experientially.39 In
contrast to empiricists' rejection of abductive inference, scientific realists
argue that such inferences are, in principle, justified if the entity in question
can produce observable effects,40 or if its manipulation permits us to inter-
vene with effect in the observable world.41 Thus, the fact that we can use
theories about the (unobservable) internal structure of atoms to build nu-
clear weapons which can destroy cities is a good reason for the realist to
believe that such structures exist, as we understand them today. This thesis
is important to structuration theory because, in contrast to empiricism, talk
of unobservable and irreducible social structures can be scientifically legiti-
mate in this view. As long as they have observable effects or are manipulable
by human agents, we can, in principle, speak meaningfully about the "real-
ity" of unobservable social structures. "Generative structure," in other
words, is a (potentially) scientific rather than metaphysical concept.
Scientific realists commonly adduce two basic arguments in favor of ab-
ductive inference and, more generally, of the ontological status of unobserv-
ables.42 Proponents of the "indispensability argument" argue that a realist
construal of theoretical terms is necessary to make sense of the actual re-
search practices of natural and social scientists.43 Physicists would not posit
and build tests around quarks, and social scientists would not posit and build
tests around utilities or modes of production, if they thought that these
entities, despite being unobservable, were not real and causally efficacious.
Proponents of the "miracle argument," in turn, go one step further by
arguing that not only is scientific realism necessary to make scientific prac-
tices rationally intelligible, but it is also necessary to explain the instrumen-
38. Abduction is also known as "retroduction." Useful discussions of abduction are found in
Norwood Hanson, "Retroduction and the Logic of Scientific Discovery," in Leonard Krimer-
man, ed., The Nature and Scope of Social Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1969), pp. 73-83, and Boyd, "On the Current Status of Scientific Realism," especially pp. 72-
89. An unusually detailed and explicit illustration of abductive reasoning in the social sciences
(and thus supporting my earlier suggestion that some social scientists are practicing scientific
realists) is found in Elinor Ostrom's "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions," Public Choice
48 (no. 1, 1986), p. 19.
39. Aronson, A Realist Philosophy of Science, p. 261.
40. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 16.
41. Hacking, Representing and Intervening; Thomas Cook and Donald Campbell, "The
Causal Assumptions of Quasi-Experimental Practice," Synthese 68 (July 1986), especially pp.
169-72.
42. Alison Wylie, "Arguments for Scientific Realism: The Ascending Spiral," American
Philosophical Quarterly 23 (July 1986), pp. 287-97.
43. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 22. Geoffrey Hellman, "Realist Principles,"
Philosophy of Science 50 (June 1983), especially pp. 231-32.
Agent-structure problem 353
44. See, for example, Putnam, Matter, Mathematics, and Method; Boyd, "On the Current
Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism"; Richard Schlagel, "A Reasonable Reply to Hume's
Skepticism," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December 1984), pp. 359-74.
45. See Ernan McMullin, "Two Ideals of Explanation in Natural Science," in Peter French,
et al., eds., Causation and Causal Theories (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1984), pp. 205-20, and the three-way debate between Philip Kitcher, Bas van Fraassen, and
Wesley Salmon in "Approaches to Explanation," The Journal of Philosophy 82 (November
1985), pp. 632-54.
46. Rom Harre and Edward Madden, Causal Powers (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield,
1975); Salmon, Scientific Explanation; Schlagel, "Hume's Skepticism."
47. Hence behavioral social scientists' emphasis on quantitative analysis to discover law-like
regularities, rather than qualitative analysis and theory to identify causal mechanisms. On the
empiricist model, we cannot have science without (relatively) "constant" conjunctions. For a
useful more or less realist critique of this model of causation as it relates to social science, see
Daniel Hausman, "Are There Causal Relations among Dependent Variables?" Philosophy of
Science 50 (March 1983), pp. 58-81.
354 International Organization
48. Some realist accounts of causation, and particularly the account of Harre and Madden,
have been accused of implying an Aristotelian "essentialism"—the explanation of observable
phenomena in terms of occult and impenetrable "essences"; see, for example, David Miller,
"Back to Aristotle," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (February 1972), pp. 69-
78, and Fred Wilson, "Harre and Madden on Analyzing Dispositional Concepts," Philosophy
of Science 52 (December 1985), pp. 591-607. Other realists, however, emphasize that this
objection can be vitiated by explaining causal powers in terms of the physical properties and
social relations which underlie them; Schlagel, "Hume's Skepticism."
49. Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1982), p. 31.
50. Perhaps the most difficult problems in making this translation concern the role of human
motivations and self-understandings in social scientific explanations, and the ambiguity of the
notion of causal "mechanisms" in social life. For a sample of the recent debate among scientific
realists on the limits of naturalism in the social sciences, see Bhaskar, The Possibility of
Naturalism, and Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, especially the postscript.
Agent-structure problem 355
b. Structuration theory
Scientific realism provides a philosophical basis for a generative approach
to structural theorizing in the social sciences, and in so doing, it provides a
foundation for working out the implications of one of the intuitions about
social life with which I opened the discussion of the agent-structure prob-
lem: that the capacities and even existence of human agents are in some way
necessarily related to a social structural context—that they are inseparable
from human sociality. The implications of this insight, however, can be
worked out in at least two different ways—one reifies the social relations
that constitute agents, and one does not. I argued earlier that world-system
theory embodies a structuralist approach to the agent-structure problem that
is prone to reification and determinism. Structuration theory attempts to
preserve the generative and relational aspects of structuralism while taking
explicit conceptual and methodological steps to prevent the analytical sep-
aration of generative structures from the self-understandings and practices
of human agents to prevent structural reification.
It may be useful to preface the discussion with some comments on what
structuration theory, as a theory, is about. Structuration theory is an "ana-
lytical" rather than "substantive" theory, in the sense that it is about the
analysis rather than the substance of the social world.51 Structuration theory
says something about what kinds of entities there are in the social world and
how their relationship should be conceptualized, and as such it provides a
conceptual framework or meta-theory for thinking about real world social
systems, but it does not tell us what particular kinds of agents or what
particular kinds of structures to expect in any given concrete social system.
Structuration theory, then, does not compete directly with neorealism or
world-system theory, but instead with their individualist and structuralist
approaches to the agent-structure problem—that is, with their social on-
tologies. As a social ontology, however, structuration theory does have
51. Ira Cohen makes this particular distinction in "The Status of Structuration Theory: A
Reply to McLennan," Theory, Culture, and Society 3 (no. 1, 1986), pp. 123-34. Nigel Thrift
makes a similar point, arguing that structuration theory is more meta-theory than theory in
"Bear and Mouse or Bear and Tree? Anthony Giddens' Reconstitution of Social Theory,"
Sociology 19 (November 1985), pp. 609-23.
356 International Organization
52. Thrift, "On the Determination of Social Action in Space and Time," p. 30.
53. Adapted from ibid., pp. 28-32.
54. Ibid., p. 30.
55. This synthesis requires the development of mediating concepts that can link structure
and agency in concrete situations, and as such is probably the key source of disagreement
among structuration theorists. But whether this linkage is established through a "position-
practice system" (Bhaskar), a "habitus" (Bourdieu), or a "system-institution" nexus (Gid-
dens), they all serve the same theoretical function in concrete research, namely, binding agents
and structures into mutually implicating ontological and explanatory roles.
56. This point is more than a ritual admonition for social scientists to be sensitive to the
historical and geographical context of their subjects: substantive "social theories must be about
the time-space constitution of social structures right from the start." (Thrift, "On the Determi-
nation of Social Action," p. 31, italics in original.)
Agent-structure problem 357
The following discussion elaborates these points by first discussing the na-
ture of social structures, then of agents, and finally of their interrelationship.
My account relies primarily on Bhaskar's work, which of the five theorists
displays the most explicitly scientific realist orientation.57
Structuration theorists start out much like structuralists by defining
"structure" in generative terms as a set of internally related elements.58 The
elements of a social structure could be agents, practices, technologies, ter-
ritories—whatever can be seen as occupying a position within a social or-
ganization. The fact that these elements are internally related means that
they cannot be defined or even conceived independently of their position in
the structure. Thus, in contrast to the neorealist definition of international
system structures as consisting of externally related, preexisting, state
agents, a structurationist approach to the state system would see states in
relational terms as generated or constituted by internal relations of individu-
ation (sovereignty) and, perhaps, penetration (spheres of influence). In other
words, states are not even conceivable as states apart from their position in a
global structure of individuated and penetrated political authorities. The
nature and configuration of the internal relations that comprise a social
structure, in turn, define a set of possible transformations or combinations of
its elements. As a set of possible transformations, social structures are, by
definition, not reducible to the relationships between a structure's elements
that are observed in a given concrete context. Structures make a given
combination or instantiation of elements possible, but they are not ex-
hausted by whatever particular manifestation is actual.
Structuration theorists argue the scientific realist thesis that because so-
cial structures generate agents and their behavior (in the sense that they
make the latter possible), that because social structures have observable
effects, we can potentially claim that they are real entities despite being
possibly unobservable. This thesis raises the issue of when we can legiti-
mately claim that a social structure exists. The key weakness of abductive
inference is the danger of circular reasoning and self-confirmation; we assert
that a structure exists because it has the observed effects which we posited
for the structure in the first place. This weakness is, I think, at the heart of
57. In his Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1982), Giddens indicates (p. 14) that he also accepts a realist conception of science, but his
realism is generally less explicit and thus more attenuated than Bhaskar's. A more important
reason for relying on Bhaskar rather than Giddens, however, is the latter's weaker conception
of social structure as rules and resources rather than as a set of real but unobservable internal
relations, a conception which is arguably ultimately voluntarist in its implications; see for
example, Alex Callinicos, "Anthony Giddens: A Contemporary Critique," Theory and Society
14 (March 1985), pp. 133-66.
58. See, for example, Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, especially pp. 47-56; Peter
Manicas, "The Concept of Social Structure," Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 10
(July 1980), pp. 65-82; Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, p. 121; Andrew Sayer,
Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 80-87.
358 International Organization
think that their agent-structure framework presupposes at least an implicit distinction between
"subjective" and "real" interests. The best overview of the various conceptualizations of
"interest," and of the difficulties in explaining interests, is probably still William Connolly's
"Interests in Politics," in his book, The Terms of Political Discourse (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974), pp. 45-84.
66. For a discussion of the balance of power that is consistent in its substance, if not in its
philosophical rationale, with the interpretation I suggest, see Ashley, "The Poverty of Neoreal-
ism," pp. 276-79.
Agent-structure problem 361
The discussion of structuration theory so far has focused on its social ontol-
ogy, on its conceptualization of the nature and relationship of human or
organizational agents and social structures. While structuration theory does
not by itself generate claims or hypotheses about particular international
system structures or the causes of state action, the realist/structurationist
problematic does have both epistemological and theoretical implications for
the study of international relations. Thus, on the one hand, structuration the-
ory's social ontology strongly conditions its approach to the explanation of
state action. This idea is consistent with the effort of scientific realists to
reverse the subordination of ontology to epistemology, which is characteris-
tic of empiricism, and instead to make the form of scientific explanations
dependent on the nature and causal properties of entities. Beyond this gen-
eral concern with the form of explanations, however, structuration theory
also has implications for the content of substantive international relations
theories or, perhaps more precisely, for the nature and scope of the research
agendas which underlie those theories. In particular, structuration theory
suggests that, while neorealism and world-system theory provide important
insights into the structure and dynamics of international systems, they leave
important gaps in the theorization of the two basic building blocks of interna-
tional relations theory, states and international system structures.
a. Epistemological implications
Relatively little empirical research has been explicitly informed by struc-
turation theory, which might illustrate its implications for the explanation of
state action.69 In this article, I cannot develop an extended empirical illustra-
ion of my own; instead, I shall adapt materials from the few structuration
theorists70 and realist philosophers of social science who have tackled issues
of social scientific explanation in order to make two general epistemological
arguments: 1) that structural and agent-based analyses have distinct and
irreducible functions in the explanation of social action, but that 2) they are
both necessary elements of a complete explanation of social action. These
two arguments have important implications for our understanding of the
nature and limits of structural and what I shall call historical explanations, as
well as for their integration in "structural-historical" analysis.
Explanations are answers to certain kinds of questions. What counts as an
adequate explanation therefore depends on the object of the question, on
what is taken to be problematic.71 From a structurationist perspective, two
kinds of questions are particularly relevant to the explanation of social ac-
tion: "How is action X possible?" and "Why did X happen rather than Y?"
The domains of these two questions, and therefore the kinds of answers we
would expect, are different. "How-questions" are concerned with the do-
main of the possible, whereas "why-questions" are concerned with the
domain of the actual. To remain clear on the nature and limits of structural
explanation, an explicit epistemological and methodological distinction must
be maintained between the logic of these questions: "structural" analysis
explains the possible, while "historical" analysis explains the actual. His-
torical analysis focuses on what actually happened or will happen, and thus
takes as unproblematic the possibility that those events can happen. Actual
behavior, rather than the range of possible behaviors, is the explanandum.
While this historical analysis of conjunctural causes is an essential component
69. The most extensive use of an explicitly structurationist perspective in empirical research
is probably Allan Pred, Place, Practice, and Structure (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1986).
In his Explanation in Social History, however, Lloyd argues (p. 306) that the work of a number
of prestructuration theorists has a distinctly structurationist "structure," including, for ex-
ample, the works of Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1966), and Alain Touraine, The Self-Production of Society (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1977), and Abrams, Historical Sociology.
70. Sayer, Method in Social Science; Sylvan and Glassner, A Rationalist Methodology.
71. The implications of the epistemological distinctions between different kinds of questions
are brought out systematically in Alan Garfinkel, Forms of Explanation (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1981), especially pp. 21-48. Despite its explicitly anti-realist ontological
perspective, van Fraassen's The Scientific Image is also quite good on the logic or "pragmat-
ics" of different types of explanations.
Agent-structure problem 363
tions75 take the interests and causal powers of agents as given (or reconstruct
them without trying to explain them), and then attempt to explain particular
events by focusing on how those powers and interests are affected by the
incentives facing actors. Neorealism proceeds at this level; it stipulates the
structural context and the interests and causal powers of agents and then
attempts to answer the question "Why did state X do Y rather than Z?"
Beyond this, however, it is important to note that one of the intended or
unintended effects of state action is to produce or reproduce system struc-
tures; consequently, historical analysis is necessary to explain the emer-
gence and persistence of the structural conditions which constitute the
medium and conditions of possibility for state action. This recursive quality
of structural and historical explanations is the "unity" beneath their "diver-
sity," and thus it is the ultimate basis of their epistemological interdepen-
dence. It is nonetheless necessary to maintain the distinction between and
autonomy of each explanatory mode: each ultimately explains the properties
of the central objects of the other.
The respective explanatory limitations of structural and historical anal-
yses suggest, however, that a complete explanation of state action—that is,
one that explains both how that action was possible and why that possibility
was actualized in a particular form at a given moment—will have to combine
these methodologies into a "structural-historical" or "dialectical" analy-
sis.76 This combination will require abstract structural analysis to theorize
and explain the causal powers, practices, and interests of states, and con-
crete historical analysis to trace the causally significant sequence of choices
and interactions which lead to particular events (and to the reproduction of
social structures). Given the difficulty of doing structural and historical re-
search simultaneously, structural-historical analysis may require "brack-
eting" first one and then the other explanatory mode,77 that is, taking social
75. By my use of the term "historical" to describe this form of explanation, 1 do not mean to
suggest that this is the explanatory mode historians always use, or that the research practice of
historians is necessarily astructural or atheoretical. On the contrary, it seems to me that just as
good social science is historical, good history is structural and theoretical. I am only trying to
argue that "historical" and "structural" explanations are epistemologically distinct but interde-
pendent forms of inquiry, regardless of who uses them.
76. The term "structural-historical" is from Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Depen-
dency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp.
ix-xiv, while "dialectical" is from Sylvan and Glassner, A Rationalist Methodology, pp. 154-
59; both terms parallel the relationship between "abstract" and "concrete" research in Sayer's
Method in Social Science. Although he does not use either of these terms, Peter Manicas
provides a good illustration of the logic and implications of this form of inquiry in his critique of
Theda Skocpol's State and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979);
see his review in History and Theory 20 (no. 2, 1981), pp. 204-18.
77. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 80-81. This notion of "bracketing" is a
focal point of some of the major critiques of structuration theory; see, for example, Margaret
Archer, "Morphogenesis versus Structuration: On Combining Structure and Action," British
Journal of Sociology 33 (December 1982), pp. 455-83, and Nicky Gregson, "On Duality and
Dualism: The Case of Structuration Theory and Time Geography," Progress in Human Geog-
raphy 10 (June 1986), pp. 184-205.
Agent-structure problem 365
b. Theoretical implications
While this discussion of some epistemological implications of structura-
tion theory is admittedly very general, it is nonetheless relevant to the scope
and content of substantive international relations theories. A key implication
of the argument in Section 2 about the agent-structure relationship was that
theories of international relations must have foundations in theories of both
their principal units of analysis (state agents and system structures). Such
theories are more than simply convenient or desirable: they are necessary
to explain state action. This requirement follows directly both from the
scientific realist's conception of explanation as identifying causal mecha-
nisms, and from the ontological claims of structuration theory about the
relationship of agents and structures. If the properties of states and system
structures are both thought to be causally relevant to events in the interna-
tional system, and if those properties are somehow interrelated, then theo-
retical understandings of both those units are necessary to explain state
action. Waltz's suggestion that the theory of the state is not integral to the
task of developing systemic theories of international relations must therefore
be rejected. Structuration theory provides a conceptual and methodological
framework to overcome this separation, and as such it defines a research
agenda for theorizing about both state agents and the system structures in
which they are embedded. The core of this agenda is the use of structural
analysis to theorize the conditions of existence of state agents, and the use of
historical analysis to explain the genesis and reproduction of social struc-
tures. Although even preliminary remarks about the possible content of such
theories would require another article, I can indicate some of the directions
and bodies of research which might be relevant to such a research agenda.
"Theorizing the state" implies a research endeavor which seeks to de-
velop a theoretically and empirically grounded understanding of the causally
significant properties (such as powers, interests, practices) of the state as an
organizational agent or entity. Ideally such a theory would define exhaus-
tively the possible ways of acting of state agents, rather than generate deter-
366 International Organization
78. Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important?" Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972), pp.
159-79; Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy
Sciences 4 (December 1973), pp. 467-90.
79. This multiplicity of structures implies a rejection of what might be called structural
monism, that is, the view that there is only one set of underlying organizing principles, such as
those of the economy, that can be explicated in generative terms and therefore constitutive of
agents. This anti-monism is consistent with the critique of structural Marxism developed by
post-Althusserians like Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst in Mode of Production and Social Forma-
tion (London: MacMillan, 1977), and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1982). But their discourse-theoretic solution to the problem
of structural monism in many ways fundamentally opposes my suggestion that we build theories
of multiple social structures on the basis of scientific realism.
80. Prominent examples of neo-Marxist state theory include John Holloway and Sol Pic-
ciotto, eds., State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (London: Edward Arnold, 1978); Poulantzas,
State, Power, Socialism; and Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?
(London: New Left Books, 1978). Weberian critiques include Theda Skocpol, "Political Re-
sponse to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,"
Politics and Society 10 (no. 2, 1981), pp. 155-201, and Michael Mann, "The Autonomous
Power of the State," European Journal of Sociology 25 (no. 2, 1984), pp. 185-213.
Agent-structure problem 367
81. Examples of the "productionist" critique of world-system theory include Brenner, "The
Origins of Capitalist Development," and Howe and Sica, "Political Economy, Imperialism, and
the Problem of World-System Theory." The alternative conceptualization of the structure of
the capitalist world economy (in terms of a global mode of production) has been most fully
developed by the "internationalization of capital" school of Marxist political economy; see
Christian Palloix, "The Self-Expansion of Capital on a World Scale," Review of Radical Polit-
ical Economics 9 (Summer 1977), pp. 1-28.
82. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism; Nicos Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery
(New York: St. Martins, 1986); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism
(New York: Basic Books, 1986).
83. Bruce Andrews, "Social Rules and the State as a Social Actor," World Politics 27 (July
1975), pp. 521-40; Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in
Method," Millenium 12 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-75; Ruggie, "Continuity and Transforma-
tion"; Ashley, "The Poverty of Neo-Realism," and "Social Will and International Anarchy:
Beyond the Domestic Analogy in the Study of Global Collaboration," in Hayward Alker and
Ashley, Anarchy, Power, Community: Understanding International Cooperation (forthcom-
ing). Despite the potential usefulness of this research to the structurationist problematic, how-
ever, some of these scholars would probably reject association with that theory, especially
insofar as it is grounded in realist philosophy of science.
84. Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy," New Left Review 107
(January-February 1978), pp. 47-77; Harold Wolpe, ed., The Articulation of Modes of Produc-
tion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
368 International Organization
85. J.D. Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus
Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92.
86. Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: Wiley, 1976); Robert Axelrod,
The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); James March and Johan Olsen,
"The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Sci-
ence Review 78 (September 1984), pp. 734-48.
Agent-structure problem 369
Conclusion
87. Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975).
88. Roy Bhaskar, "Scientific Explanation and Human Emancipation," Radical Philosophy
26 (1980), pp. 16-26; Christopher Dandeker, "Theory and Practice in Sociology: The Critical
Imperatives of Realism," Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 13 (July 1983), pp. 195-210.