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Design of dams for mining industry

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 July 3–7, 2017 th Annual Meeting
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Prague, Czech Republic of International Commission on Large Dams

Design of dams for mining industry

Jiri Herzaa, John Phillipsb

Dams and Tailings, GHD, Perth, Australia

aJiri.Herza@ghd.com
bjohn.phillips@ghd.com

ABSTRACT
National and international guidelines use a consequence category framework for selection of design
parameters, loading conditions and surveillance requirements. Tailings dams are frequently assigned
high dam break consequence categories due to the potential for loss of life, significant impact on
environment and damage assets and infrastructure combined with the potential high damage to
reputation of the owner.

Mining companies often choose different approaches and accept comparatively higher risks in the
design of other mining infrastructure such as pits, waste dumps and process plants even though the
consequences and impact for the mine may be similar to those from a dam failure.

Recent, highly publicised failures of tailings dams shifted the focus of the mining companies and
regulators and have brought more stringent design requirements for tailings dams. Many global mining
companies are implementing internal design standards with the design requirements sometimes
exceeding the requirement of the national regulators or international guidelines.

This paper discusses the current engineering practice in tailings dam design in the context of other
mining infrastructure, examines the key principles in the selection of design loads and acceptable
margins of safety and suggests potential improvements for the design and operation of tailings dams.
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1. TAILINGS DAMS

1.1 Introduction
Tailings Storage Facilities (TSF) and other mining dams present one of the greatest risks in the mining
industry, as demonstrated by the catastrophic consequences of recent and historical tailings dam
failures which have been broadly publicised.

Bowker and Chambers (2015) show that the total number of reported failures of tailings dams has
been declining since the 1980’s however, the severity of these fewer failures has been increasing at
the same time (Figure 2.1).

Figure 1 Increasing severity of tailings dams failures (Bowker and Chambers, 2015)

The reduction in the total number of reported failures is believed to be the result of improved tailings
engineering practice and more stringent regulatory requirements. The increasing severity of the
failures is associated with the exponential growth of the tailings production rates and ever-greater
volumes of tailings and other mine waste being stored in ever-larger facilities.

On average, two significant incidents including failures of tailings dams occur worldwide every year,
although the exact number of these incidents cannot be determined due the different level of public
reporting in different countries (Rico et al, 2008).

A large number of legislation acts, practice notes, manuals and guidelines have been developed and
published for tailings dams (Anglo, 2005). Due to the long history of active mining industries in
Australia, Canada and South Africa, these three countries have arguably the most developed national
tailings and other tailings dam engineering practice. It is noted however, that China has the largest
number of tailings dams, estimated to be in excess of 12,000 (Wei et al, 2012).

Given the increasing consequences of the tailings dam failures, many large tailings dams are
classified with high consequence categories. Statutory authorities, recent guidelines, expert panels
and often the mining companies themselves call for stricter design requirements, tougher regulatory
environment and more severe design loading conditions to be applied.

1.2 History and development

Until the late 18th century, tailings consisted of mechanically separated but chemically unaltered
materials. The introduction of chemical leaching and flotation on the brink of the 20th century, allowed
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lower grade ores to be economically mined with the lower grades being compensated by greatly
increased production. The ongoing improvements in metallurgy and ore processing continue to drive
increased production rates (Bowker and Chambers, 2015).

Until the early 20th century, tailings were commonly discharged into nearby watercourses. The
increased impact of such deposition on the nearby communities and land users resulted in disputes in
Europe and North America. Legal actions against the miners put an end to the uncontrolled tailings
disposal in most of the western world by 1930 (Davies et al, 2002). However, disposal of large
volumes of untreated tailings into watercourses and seas continued in other parts of the world until
much later and, on a smaller scale, is still being used in some countries.

The first tailings impoundments were constructed in the USA in the early 20 th century using small
embankments, which were then raised inwards (upstream) by hydraulically filled dykes. The
liquefaction failure of Barahona tailings dam in Chile in 1928, which killed more than 50 people
provided the first evidence of the potentially fatal weakness of hydraulically filled dams (Villavicencio et
al, 2014).

A widespread introduction of mechanised earthmoving machinery during and after the Second World
War allowed tailings dams to be constructed economically using large quantities of compacted
earthfill. Despite the potential risks, the upstream construction method is still being used in some
countries, due to the comparatively low cost. In other countries, the upstream construction of tailings
dams has been banned. Alternative construction techniques for tailings dams are the downstream
construction method, which is similar to water dams construction, and the centreline raising which is
partly supported by the contained tailings.

Although the basic principles of shear resistance of soils were discovered in the early works of
Coulomb in the 18th century (Coulomb, 1773), tailings dams were generally constructed without
conventional engineering until the 1950’s, when the water dam engineering practices were adopted.

Failure of several tailings dams in Chile after a massive earthquake in 1965, attracted considerable
attention within and outside the mining community. This interest resulted in introduction of more
rigorous engineering principles and investigations of the liquefaction phenomenon began. By 1980’s
the basic principles of soils and structures behaviour was well understood and used for tailings dams.

A rapid development in the information technology since 1980’s has allowed for more sophisticated
design and modelling methods to be implemented. More precise and computerised soil testing
techniques also provide more representative inputs and liquefaction is continuously researched.
Despite these developments, catastrophic failures of tailings dams still occurs at regular intervals.

1.3 Unique features of tailings dams

Most of the modern design principles, guidelines and legislative acts related to tailings dams
originated from the regulatory framework of water dams. The recent Australian National Committee on
Large Dams (ANCOLD) Guidelines on Tailings Dams (ANCOLD, 2012) provides a good example of
such link between the water and tailings dams.

The current practices in dam design (both water and mining), the selection of loading conditions and
allowances such as freeboard are governed by the severity of the dam failure consequences. The
major differences between tailings dams and water dams are:

 Shorter operational life

 Changing operational conditions and on-going development
 Reliance on contained tailings (in centreline and upstream raised structures)
 Controlled site

1.4 Shorter operational life

Tailings dams have a life measured in years or tens of years, whilst the design life of a water dam is
typically over 100 years. Therefore, the cumulative probability of the same loading condition is much
lower at a tailings dam compared to a water dam.
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Due to their limited operational design life, many mine structures such as open cuts, waste dumps and
underground workings are considered as temporary only. The long term performance of these
structures is considered relevant to the mine closure. The temporary character of the mine structures
is projected in the perception of the acceptable risks, which contrasts with the consequence-based
design of water dams.

Many tailings dams do have their design lives extended well beyond the original design intent. A small
structure with a short design life becomes a large facility in operation for several decades. The
changes of the design life and intent, along with the associated uncertainties and risks are discussed
further in this paper.

1.5 Changing operational conditions and ongoing development

The management of tailings and other mine dams may change dramatically in a short period of time.
These changes may be caused by modifications to the mining technique and processing technology,
increase or reduction of mine throughput, variable ore nature, changing water requirements, market
conditions, value and demand for the product.

Many tailings dams are operated near active mine sites and the mining operations can directly impact
on the dam structure. Uncoordinated construction works near the tailings dam can pose the greatest
risk for the tailings dam. There have been cases of tailings dam failures directly triggered by unrelated
construction activities carried out by the dam owner.

Most tailings dams are often raised many times during their life and their design may be modified on
many occasions, often as a reaction to unexpected situation or an incident. The design of Mt Polley
tailings dam was modified 13 times before its failure in 2014 (Morgenstern et al, 2015). Similarly the
design of the Fundao tailings dam (Samarco mine) was also modified several times during its
operations before the failure in 2015 (Morgenstern et al., 2016).

The tailings dam may be raised beyond the original design intent and the increased loading can
extend well beyond the limits of the initial investigations and analyses. This may be overlooked as the
designers, operators and even the mine owners can change several times during the design dam life.
Insufficiently considered design changes, frequently made under the pressure to fulfil the needs of
ongoing production, is one of the key and unique hazards for tailings dams.

1.6 Reliance on the contained tailings

The tailings contained by the centreline or upstream raised tailings dams play an integral part in the
dam stability. The ever-changing conditions of the contained tailings significantly influences and
sometimes govern the structural integrity of the upstream and centreline raised tailings dam, as
demonstrated by numerous failures of such dams in the past including the Fundao dam in Brazil
(Morgenstern et al., 2016).

Many tailings are chemically modified, which makes them different from naturally occurring soils and
some methods and correlations of natural occurring soil mechanics may not be applicable. The tailings
also often contain hazardous chemicals, which increase the dam break consequences.

1.7 Controlled site

Often the people who would be directly exposed to floods from a tailings dam break may be limited to
those working at the mine voids, process plants, administration buildings and other mine
infrastructure.

A paper by Herza and Phillips (2016) compares the key design load conditions used for the design of
tailings dams, open pits, structures and waste dump in Australia and found that the design loads
differed by up to two magnitudes. The high design loads adopted for a dam are intended to prevent
damage and loss of life downstream, for example in a building which would collapse at much lower
design loads well before potential collapse of the dam.

Although adopting differential design criteria for tailings dams with potential impact limited a mine site
may be desirable, there is a general acceptance that when the impact of the failure exceeds beyond
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the mine boundaries, the dam must be designed, constructed and operated with respect to the
potential effects of failure on the general community, irrespective of the mine safety practices.

2. DAMS IN MINING CONTEXT

2.1 Common slopes in mining industry

The three most common slopes found on a mining site are:

 The open cut

 Waste dumps
 Embankments for tailings dams

However, the attention they receive and the design approach for each of these is quite different, and
reflects the importance assigned to them by the mining company. Some important differences, which
influence the attitude are shown in Table 1 for the importance of a slope failure to the company’s
future.

Table 1 Comparison of typical consequences of a slope failure

Pit slope Waste dump Tailings dam

Potential larger loss, in
Few staff in Staff unlikely to
Loss of life facilities downstream and
immediate vicinity be in area
also general public
Production loss Potentially large Minimal Modest to large
Direct financial cost Small Manageable Large to catastrophic
Environmental damage Small Small Potentially large
Company reputation Medium Small Potentially large
Direct cost of increased FoS
Very high Modest Small
compared to consequences
Years, until Short operation life,
Expected working life Years to decades
closure permanent after closure

It is not surprising that a lot of engineering effort goes into design of pit slopes with least effort to waste
dump slopes.

2.2 Open pits

In Australia, there are several generic guidelines such as the General Considerations in Open Pits
Mines Guideline provided by the Department of Mines and Petroleum in Western Australia (DMP,
1999), the Guidance Material for the Assessment of Geotechnical Risks in Open Pit Mines and
Quarries provided by the Victorian Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and
Resources or the Codes of Practice provided by the National Mines Safety Framework.

The Open Pit Mines Guidelines (DMP, 1999) allow for either a minimum recommended Factor of
Safety (FoS) or a Probability of Failure (PoF) depending on the consequence of failure and the degree
of uncertainty. These guidelines are shown in Table 2. A similar approach, based on the Probabilistic
Stability Analysis of Variable Rock Slopes (Priest and Brown, 1983), has been adopted for other
industry guidelines and codes of practice.
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Table 2 General Considerations in Open Pits Mines Guideline (DMP. 1999)

Wall Consequence Design Design Pit wall examples

Category of failure FoS PoF
Walls (not carrying major infrastructure)
1 Not Serious Not applicable where all potential failures can be
contained within containment structure #
Moderately Walls not carrying major infrastructure
2 1.2 10%
Serious
Walls carrying major mine infrastructure
3 Serious 1.5 1% (e.g. treatment plant, ROM pad, tailings
structure)
Permanent pit walls near public
4 Serious ## 2.0 0.3%
infrastructure and adjoining leases
# Potential failures have been defined as those modes of pit wall failure that have either a FOS of less than 1.2 or
a POF of greater than 10%.
## Where a mutually acceptable agreement to allow mining cannot be made between the mining company and
the "owner" of the adjoining structure or plot of land. Note that a higher standard of geotechnical data is required
for the design of category 3 and 4 slopes compared to category 1 and 2 slopes.
The Open Pit Guideline (DMP, 1999) and other mining guidelines and codes do not consider loss of
life as a measure of consequences because their safety management is governed by the OHS
practices (Herza and Phillips, 2016). These practices include the as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP) principle to determine the acceptable residual risks. Given that ALARP is a deterministic
approach, the OHS practices do not consider a quantitative risk assessment or suggest tolerable
levels of risks for workers. The minimum safety standards and policies are established by each mining
company but must meet several specific jurisdictional legislative requirements.

This different approach to risk means that the acceptable PoF values in a pit are at least an order of
magnitude greater than the equivalent PoF that would apply to a dam design. For example, where
earthquakes are considered in pit design, the design earthquake is frequently no more than a one in
one hundred Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP).

2.3 Waste dumps

The design of waste dumps does not to appear to be regulated in most countries, at least not whilst
still active dumps. The construction of waste dumps frequently follows in-house mining company OHS
guidelines and principles with a focus on minimum cost, constructability and safety of the operating
personnel.

The potential risks posed by the waste dumps are deemed acceptable as the waste dam slopes are
commonly considered as temporary structures only. A similar view is applied to various other batters
and cuts on mine sites. A thorough design and stability assessment is frequently only applied as part
of the mine closure. Closure requirements related to erosion control and aesthetics normally give
flatter slopes with ample factor of safety.

2.4 Design loads

The design loads are further defined by the “Design Working Life” with AS/NZS 1170 Table F2 giving
AEP figures for design lives of 5, 25, 50 and 100 years as shown in a condensed version in Table 3. In
practice many mines have a working life in the order of 25 years, or alternatively the processes,
market requirements or changing ore grades will require modifications to structures or buildings in that
time. Hence most structures are designed for a 25-year life at an importance level of 2 (defined as
“ordinary, medium consequence for loss of life).

The usual design standards are indicated in bold in Table 3. It can be seen that these differ
significantly from those usually adopted by dam designers.
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Table 3 Design loads for mining structures (Extract from AS/NZS 1170.0 Table F2)
Design Working life Importance Level Wind AEP Earthquake AEP

5 years 1 1/25 1/25

(if no risk to human life) 2 1/50 1/50
3 1/100 1/100
25 years 1 1/100 None
2 1/200 1/250
3 1/500 1/500
4 1/1000 1/1000
100 years or more 1 1/500 1/250
2 1/1000 1/1000
3 1/2500 1/2500
4 Risk analysis Risk analysis

Tailings dams are often considered to remain in place in perpetuity and in fact closure requirements
suggest a nominal life exceeding 1,000 years. If there were also 100 or more lives at risk the relevant
design loads would be Importance Level 4, >100 years as shown in italics on Table 3. This would
require an entirely different design approach.

However, a tailings dam has an active life for mining purposes for a period only slightly greater than
the life of the project. After that, it should be rehabilitated and closed, or modified for community use.
At closure the conditions including PAR can be quite different to those in its working life. A comparison
between current design requirements for a mining structure and a tailings dam is shown in Table 4.
The comparison is based on a design life of 25 years for a typical mining structure and a tailings dam
where the greatest risk to life is to persons associated with mining operations.

Table 4 Comparison of design requirements, Annual Exceedance Probability

Design Mine structure Tailings dam Tailings dam closure

requirement (expected life 25 (expected life (expected life >1,000 years)
years) undefined)
Flood 1/100 1/1,000 PMF
Wind 1/200 1/50 Not Applicable
Earthquake 1/250 1/10,000 MCE

The differences in design requirements during the operation life are substantial. Some differences are
understandable such as for wind loading where the waves attacking a dam needs a longer duration of
wind as compared with a gust loading on a structure. Similarly, floods are more likely to cause a
catastrophic dam failure than a structure failure. Closure is a special case with the dam then receiving
less attention from the owner and being potentially in the public domain in perpetuity.

The biggest difference is in earthquake loading. Whilst collapse of a single structure has limited loss of
life and financial impact as compared with a dam collapse, these relative differences should be
recognised in the assigning of a consequence category to the dam, or Importance Level to the
structure.

2.5 The role of Factor of Safety

The term Factor of Safety (FoS) is used to express the safety margin of slopes on embankment dams.
The minimum acceptable FoS for dam design were anecdotally determined in the USA in mid-20th
century by evaluation of the FoS of existing dams. It was found that the FoS of 1.5 providing sufficient
contingency and was generally acceptable. One of the first recommendations for the minimum FoS
were published in the USACE Design Manual (USACE, 1970) and these values, with minor
modifications, appear to behave adopted by many organisations including BRE (1990), Norwegian
Geotechnical Institute (1992), USBR (1987 and 2013) and others. The minimum required FoS provide
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the basis for the deterministic, fall-back of tailings dams, which is the prevailing design method used
up to the present time.

The purpose of FoS is to ensure reliability of the dam design and to account for uncertainties and
variability of the foundation and the dam components parameters, uncertainties of the design loads
and limitations of the analysis used. Smith (2003), Silva et al (2008) and others showed that the FoS is
strongly influenced by the uncertainties in the analysis and the input parameters and a higher FoS
does not necessary mean a lower probability of failure. Silva et al (2008) provided a guide for
estimation of the probability of failure of existing dams depending on the quality (Category) of
investigations, testing, design and construction as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Probability of Failure vs. Factor of Safety (Silva et al, 2008)

As can be seen in Figure 2, the same FoS of 1.5 may present an annual probability of failure between
1x10-1 and 1x10-6 depending on the project category.

The impact of uncertainties and reliability of input values was recognised many decades ago and
USACE (1970) recommended that these uncertainties be considered in selection of the appropriate
FoS. USACE (2003), which superseded the USACE 1970 manual , states that “Two of the most
important considerations that determine appropriate magnitudes for factor of safety are uncertainties
in the conditions being analysed, including shear strengths and consequences of failure or
unacceptable performance.”

Interestingly, the minimum required FoS published by USACE and other authorities these days do not
take into account the potential consequence of the dam failure or the uncertainties, but are solely
based on the loading conditions. The potential increase of the FoS to account for a higher
consequence or uncertainties is sometimes discussed in the text or additional notes. Fell et al. (2015)
provides a table of FoS adjustments allowing for some uncertainties, however the allowance for high
consequence category is not included.

Further increase in design loading conditions will unlikely reduce the rate and consequences of tailings
dam failures unless the uncertainties and limitations in the dam design, construction and operation are
recognised, reduced and allowed for. If the tailings dam design is based on the fall-back method, the
minimum FoS should be adjusted for the uncertainties and the potential consequences of failure. An
example of such adjustments, which may be applied to the typically acceptable FoS of 1.5 for steady
state loading conditions is shown in Table 5.
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Table 5 Modified minimum FoS

Level of uncertainties in data, Consequence category
assessment, loading conditions etc.
Low Significant High
Low 1.3 1.5 1.5
Medium 1.4 1.5 1.7
High 1.5 1.6 Note 1

Note 1: High consequence dams with high uncertainties in the input data, assessments and loading
conditions should not be designed until the level of uncertainties is reduced.

Different loading conditions would require different adjustments of the minimum FoS. Additional
research will be required to define the levels of uncertainties using objectively measured indicators,
which may be inspired by work by Silva et al (2008) on the risk assessment of existing dams.

A risk based design accounts for the system and parameters uncertainties and incorporate the
potential consequence of the dam failure. This approach divides the dam into components, evaluates
the likely failure modes of each component and the initiating events that might lead to. The
performance of each component under the selected loading is evaluated, taking the uncertainties into
account, to calculate the probability of the component failure. The total probability of the dam failure,
calculated from the dam components PoFs, is then combined with the potential consequences, to
derive the risk profile of the dam. The calculated risk can then be compared with the acceptable risk
level.

The risk-based approach may be time consuming and costly and it requires uncertainties and
reliability to be quantified in order to generate a meaningful outcome. For these reasons, the risk-
based design approach is rarely used for design of tailings dams and the fall back method is method is
mostly used in practice

3. CONCLUSIONS

The current engineering practice in tailings dam design is based on water dams design principles, in
which the selection of the appropriate magnitude of design loading is governed by the potential
consequences. The higher the consequence the higher the design loads used. The increasing
magnitude of design loads also significantly increases the level uncertainties in the stability analysis,
material characteristics, its performance and the design load parameters themselves. The unique
nature of tailings dams introduces additional uncertainties, which do not exist in water dams.

Although the importance of uncertainties was recognised long time ago, the minimum required FoS for
earthfill tailings dams are most commonly based on the loading conditions only. Therefore, the many
uncertainties associated with tailings dams may not be adequately reflected in the current tailings
regulatory and guidelines framework. The last two high profile failures of tailings (Mt Polley and
Samarco), triggered by unexpected behaviour of the foundation (Mt Polley TSF) and the tailings
(Fundao TSF), illustrate the importance of recognition of the uncertainties.

Unless the uncertainties and limitations in the dam design, construction and operation are recognised,
reduced and allowed for, the rate and consequences of tailings dam failures will unlikely decrease. If
the fall-back method is used for a tailings dam design, the minimum FoS should be adjusted for the
uncertainties and the potential consequences of failure.

Design of pit slopes is seen as having higher priority on mine sites and uses a risk based design
approach. The resulting higher levels of annual probability of failure are accepted by the mining
companies, reflecting the reliability of data, limited life and controlled access for those slopes and the
on-going monitoring. This risk-based approach could be extended to tailings dam stability in many
cases to quantify the overall risk profile of the tailing dam, which can then be evaluated against the
acceptable limits. Although it may be time consuming and costly, and it requires uncertainties and
reliability to be quantified in order to generate a meaningful outcome, the risk-based approach should
be the preferred design method for high consequence tailings dams.
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4. REFERENCES

ANCOLD (2012). Guidelines on Tailings Dams, Australian National Committee on Large Dams, May
2012.

Anglo (2005). Guidelines for the Operation of Tailings Disposal Facilities: International Perspective
and Explanatory Notes. Bulletin No S131/2005, Anglo American Technical Division, Johannesburg,
South Africa, 2005.AS/NZS 1170, Structural Design Actions, Australian Standards, 2002.

BRE (1999). An engineering guide to the safety of embankment dams in the United Kingdom. Building
Research Establishment, Garston, 1999.

Coulomb, C.A., 1773, In Memories de Mathematique et de Physique, Academie Royal des Sciences
par divers sans, 7, pp. 343-382.

Davies, M. P., Lighthall, P. C., Rice, S. and Martin, T.E., (2002). Keynote Address Tailings and Mine
Waste Practices SME, AGM Phoenix.

DMP (1999). General Considerations in Open Pits Mines Guideline, Department of Mines and
Petroleum of Western Australia, August 1999.

EER (2013). Guidance Material for the Assessment of Geotechnical Risks in Open Pit Mines and
Quarries, Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources, State Government
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Fell R., MacGregor P., Stapledon D. and Bell G., (2015). Geotechnical Engineering of Dams, A.A.
Balkema, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Herza, J., Phillips, J., (2015), Anomalies in design for mining dams, ANCOLD/NZSOLD 2016
Conference, Brisbane, October 2016.

Morgenstern, N. R., Vick, S. G. and Van Zyl, D., (2015). Report on Mount Polley Tailings Storage
Facility Breach, Report of Independent Expert Engineering Investigation and Review Panel to
Province of British Columbia, January 2015.

Morgenstern N., Vick S., Viotti C. and Watts B., (2016). Report on the Immediate Causes of the
Failure of the Fundão Dam. Fundão Tailings Dam Review Panel.

Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (1992). Rockfill dams, design and construction, Norwegian
Geotechnical Institute, Norwegian Institute of Technology, Oslo.

Rico, A., Salgueiro, A. Díez-Herrero, H. Pereira, (2008). Reported Tailings Dam Failures. A review of
the European incidents in the worldwide context, Journal of Hazardous Materials ,152, 846–852.

Silva F., Lambe T.W., Marr W.A., (2008). Probability and risk of slope failure. Journal of Geotechnical
and Geoenvironmental Engineering 134(12): 1691-1699

United States Department of the Interior (1987). Design of Small Dams, Bureau of Reclamation, Dam
Safety Office.

United States Society of Dams (2007). Strength of materials for embankment dam. A white paper,
Denver, 2007.

USACE (1970). Engineering and Design – Slope Stability, Doc No. EM 1110-2-1902, 1970.

USACE (2003). Engineering and Design – Slope Stability, Doc No. EM 1110-2-1902, 2003.

Villavicencio, Gabriel, Raul Espinace, Juan Palma, Fourie, A. and Valenzuela, P., (2014). Failures of
sand tailings dams in a highly seismic country, Can. Geotech. J. 51: 449–464.

Wei, Zuan, Yin, Guangszhi, Wang J.G, Ling, Wan, Guangzhi, Li, (2012). Design Construction and
Management of Tailings Storage Facilities For Surface Disposal In China: Case Studies of Failures,
Waste Management An Research Vol 31 p 106-112 Sage Publications October 11, 2012.

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