BRYAN ALBERT SUERTE – 4B

USA COLLEGE OF LAW

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2

1. SPOUSES TAPAYAN VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS:

The parties herein are relatives by affinity. Respondent is the registered owner of a
parcel of land situated along Pingol Street, Ozamiz City, covered by OCT No. P-1223. Based on
the records, it appears that two (2) mortgages were constituted over this property the first in
favor of the PNB, and the second in favor of DBP.
The parties executed a Deed of Undertaking in reference to the DBP Mortgage. Wherein
the Respondent has no liability in so far as the aforesaid loan contracted by the Petitioners
concerned. That in the event the Petitioners could not pay the loan, the Respondent may pay
the said loan just to secure the property from being foreclosed, and the Petitioners shall
acknowledge the amount paid by the Respondent.
The DBP loan was not paid when it fell due.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision directing Petitioners to execute a
mortgage over the Carangan Property in favor of Respondent

SC RULING:

The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule
130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary. The Court’s
ruling in Lorenzana vs. Lelina is instructive:
The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the
instances mentioned in Section 3, Ru1e 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. Nevertheless,
evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a
document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered.
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at
the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the
party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence
may be made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time
they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if
by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been
challenged at the proper time. Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in any
case. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if
the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court
may not consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper
time.
2. ROGELIO DANTIS, petitioner vs. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR., respondent

FACTS:

Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-125918, with an area of 5,657 sq. m, located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired
ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased
facther, Emilio Dantis, in December 22, 1993; that he had been paying the realty taxes on the
said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a portion of his property without any
right at all; that demands were made upon Julio, Jr.
Julio, Jr. also claimed ownership over the 352 sq. m portion of lot where his house is
situated because the same was sold to his late father by the parent of Rogelio Dantis.

ISSUE:
W/N there was a perfected contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr.

SC RULING:
An affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness
stand. The sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its
averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit “3” must be excluded from
the Judicial Proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a
declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule
because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).
Exhibit “4”, on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere
photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the purported
undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree
of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best
proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary
evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5
which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the
offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original
or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on
part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent
loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence. In MCC Industrial
Sales Corportion vs. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that were the missing document is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only
collaterally involved.

3. RCBC BANKARD SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioner vs. MOISES ORACION, JR. AND EMILY L.
ORACION, respondents

FACTS:

Respondents Moises and Emily applied for and were granted by petitioner credit card
accommodations with the issuance of a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum on December 2,
2010. Respondents on various dates used the credit card in purchasing different products but
failed to pay petitioner the total amount of Php 117,157.98, inclusive of charges and penalties or
at least the minimum amount due under the credit card.
 ISSUE:

W/N an electronic document is to be regarded as an original thereof under the Best

Evidence Rule?

SC RULING:

Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic document is regarded as the

functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or
output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. 45 As defined,
"electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a
right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically; and it includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable
by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document.46 The term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data
message"47 and the latter refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.48

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
identify the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals:

[1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

[2] When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another
at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. 49

[3] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with
identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from
the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by
other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates
shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original.50

Apparently, "duplicate original copies" or "multiple original copies" wherein two or more copies
are executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1 and 3
above. If the copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be called a "print-out or
output" based on the definition of an electronic document, or a "counterpart" based on Section
2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

4. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PROOF OF OFFICIAL RECORD

A. CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF RECORDS OF CIVIL REGISTRY

YASUO IWASAN, petitioner vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN, respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as “single” and “has never
married before.” Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner
came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay
City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.

In July 2009, petitioner notice his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something
might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private
respondent confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away.
 Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered that
indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took
place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his
marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous
one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

W/N the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be
accorded evidentiary weight?

SC RULING:

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of
their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents
on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who
issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and
due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible,
they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since
neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

B. (IN CONTRAST) CERTIFICATION BY CENTRO NOT ADMISSIBLE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIIPPINES, petitioner vs. EMETERIA LUALHATI, respondent

FACTS:

On August 12, 2004, respondent Emeteria G. Lualhati filed with the RTC of Antipolo City
an application for original registration covering Lots 1 and 2 described under Plan Psu-162384,
situated in C-5 C-6 Pasong Palanas, Sitio Sapinit, San Juan, Antipolo, Rizal, consisting an area of
169,297 and 79,488 square meters, respectively. Respondent essentially maintains that she,
together with her deceased husband and their four children, have been in possession of the
subject lands in the concept of an owner since 1944.

In support of her application, respondent submitted the blueprint of the survey plan and
the tracing cloth plan surveyed at the instance of Andres Lualhati and approved by the Director
of Lands in October 1957, the certified true copy of the surveyor’s certificate, the technical
descriptions of Lots 1 and 2, Tax Declaration No. 26437 issued in the name of Andres Lualhati,
which states that the tax on the properties commenced in 1944, the real property tax register
evidencing payment of real property taxes on the subject properties from 1949 to 1958,
certifications from the DENR, and CENRO, that no public land application/land patent covering
the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title, and a letter
from the Provincial Engineer that the province has no projects which will be affected by the
registration.

ISSUE:

W/N the subject lands we’re alienable and disposable?

SC RULING:

CENRO certifications are not sufficient. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do
not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached
an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable. An application for original registration must be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or
PENRO certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, in order to establish
that the land is indeed alienable and disposable.21

Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence, that the land sought to
be registered has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The
records of this case merely bear certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City,
stating that no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are
the lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO certifications, however, do not even
make any pronouncement as to the alienable character of the lands in question for they merely
recognize the absence of any pending land patent application, administrative title, or
government project being conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly declare
that the subject lands form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
these certifications remain insufficient for purposes of granting respondent’s application for
registration. As constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Unfortunately for
respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the requirements for original
registration in order to show the alienable character of the lands subject herein.

C. PROOF OF RECORD OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OF A SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OR TRIBUNAL

MANUFACTURERS HANDOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners vs. RAFAEL
MA. GUERRERO, respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Handover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank with the RTC of Manila for brevity.
Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against
interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth USD 18,000.00 due
to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero
amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
 The bank filed an answer alleging inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is
governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual
damages. Subsequently, the bank filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking the
dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same ground alleged in its answer. The bank
contended that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages.

ISSUE:

W/N the affidavit which proves a foreign law as a fact, is “hearsay” and thereby cannot
serve as proof of the New York law relied upon by petitioners?

SC RULING:

There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where
material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The resolution of whether a foreign law
allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is
concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.8 Foreign laws are not a
matter of judicial notice.9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the
conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims
present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the
merits.

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority
or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy
or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer.

5. PROOF OF WRITINGS IN UNOFFICIAL LANGUAGE.

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, petitioners vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO,
respondents

FACTS:
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352.
The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear,
however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among
them and that the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs
of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.
On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias5 was executed by spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter’s wife,
Veronica Pico. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it described
as follows:
Fourth – A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not
measure it, the area is bounded on the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato
Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to Villasis. Constructed
on said land is a house of light materials – also a part of the dowry. Value …200.00.6
 It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by
OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the
owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are
Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of
the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a
private document as it was never notarized.
Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades8 although they
have different theories regarding its present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now
the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in
favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually
incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of
Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern
side. Respondents posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato
Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They are the ones who have been possessing said land
occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.

ISSUE:

W/N the original certificate of title is admissible despite of lack of translation thereof?

SC RULING:

The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial

language must be accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its
admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court,
where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.31 Where such
document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence
and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in
which the document is written is understood by all, and the document is admissible in evidence.

As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit

"A," that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment35 on respondents’ formal offer of documentary
evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among others, that "Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F
and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public
and official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party
would like it to prove."36 Said evidence was admitted by the RTC.37 Once admitted without
objection, even though not admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject
it.38 Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all
parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting
from the said evidence.39