Mali’s referendum can’t guarantee a democratic transition

The junta’s constitutional amendments could let it consolidate power over

an unstable nation.

The ruling junta in Mali is holding a constitutional referendum as part of a

transition back toward civilian rule, but experts and political opponents say the
true aim is consolidating its power in the increasingly violent and unstable Sahel
region, which runs through Mali and several other countries.

–GAP 1– F

The vote has been delayed several times, most recently in February of this year,
citing logistical reasons. Presidential elections are to be held in February 2024,
though it’s unclear whether the junta will adhere to that timeframe.

–GAP 2– B

“The fear I have for Mali is that we might see, effectively, the restoration of
military power which is kind of like going back to the ‘70s and ‘80s, which are
commonly referred to in the African politics literature as the ‘Dark Decades,’”
said Daniel Eizenga, a research fellow at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
“That was a really terrible time, but [the current situation] looks kind of like a
prelude to reexperiencing that,” he told Vox in an interview.

–GAP 3– A

However, the international community has pushed for the referendum as part of
Mali’s path back to civilian governance; regardless of the flaws in the process, it’s
a necessary step in the transition, Leonardo Villalón, a professor of political
science and African studies at the University of Florida, told Vox. “This
referendum is going to be limited and flawed, in the sense that the vote is going
to be very difficult to hold in some areas,” he said. “There’s precedent for that,
and there’s precedent for widespread acceptance of that,” particularly given the
security challenges that Mali faces and its fragile electoral apparatus.

“I’m assuming [the referendum is] going to pass, and the government will make
sure it passes,” Villalón told Vox.

The junta promised stability, but violence has only accelerated in Mali

Goïta’s leadership is actually the result of a second coup he staged in May 2021,
seizing power from the transitional president and prime minister. Goïta had
previously taken power from Mali’s last elected civilian, President Ibrahim
Boubacar Keïta — commonly referred to as IBK — over allegations of corruption
and worsening security and economic conditions.

–GAP 4– E

“[IBK’s] government was not particularly effective on the security front,” Eizenga
told Vox. “The situation has gotten much worse, and it’s gotten worse faster
since the junta came to power, and I think they bear a lot of responsibility for
that, particularly the violence against civilians. But the situation was trending
badly before they came to power, too.”

–GAP 5– C
Though the efficacy of both forces in containing the violence has been dubious
at best, the calls for their removal have more to do with the junta’s efforts to
whip up populist, nationalist, and anti-colonial sentiment than they do with the
military’s own efforts to stabilize areas where insurgent groups are in control.

–GAP 6– G

That is primarily due to the Moura massacre in Mali’s southern-central Mopti

region. As Vox’s Jen Kirby wrote in a March report on the Wagner mercenary
group:

“In January, a group of independent United Nations experts called for an

investigation into reported abuses in Mali, including a potential mass execution
in Moura. Malian troops and Russian mercenaries — who are fighting an
insurgency — were accused of murdering hundreds of people last March, many
of them likely civilians with no apparent ties to insurgent groups.”

The junta has defended its actions in Moura, decrying a recent United Nations
report on the event and claiming that it was protecting civilians in the area from
Islamist violence. But, Eizenga said via email, “part of the logic seems to be to
alienate international forces like those comprising [the UN peacekeeping forces],
so as to limit scrutiny of the military’s operations particularly with Wagner
support.”

Missing paragraphs (there is one extra).

A.
Security forces have already voted, and civilians are set to vote Sunday, June 18
— a simple “yes” or “no” in response to whether they approve of the changes the
junta has proposed to the 1992 Malian constitution, created by civilian leadership
after the overthrow of dictator Moussa Traoré in 1991. Opposition to the changes
includes a contingent of influential imams who oppose the idea of Mali as a
secular country, as well as political parties and civil society groups that reject
mechanisms for the junta to consolidate power under the guise of the
democratic process.

B.

Some of the proposed constitutional amendments give more power to the

president, rather than the parliament — hence the political opposition. Though
it’s unclear whether the current leader, Col. Assimi Goïta, will stand in any future
election, certainly an ally or proxy for the junta will. That could effectively
legitimize the junta’s control and perpetuate the current violence and instability.

C.

United Nations peacekeeping forces and French military forces had been in Mali
since 2013, in an effort to help the government combat extremist forces.
However, the junta effectively forced French troops out in 2022 and on Friday
demanded that UN peacekeepers leave the country “without delay.”

D.

Despite its failures to stamp out Islamic extremism and the alleged atrocities it’s
committed, the junta does have supporters, Villalón said. “They have support
and they have a lot of ambivalence — maybe people who aren’t sure about them,
but they’re also really dissatisfied with the old guard, the old parties that ruled
Mali for so long.”

E.

Though the coup sparked an international outcry, thousands of Malians who had
protested IBK’s poor handling of the country’s crises supported the military
forces as they took the capital Bamako. Islamist terrorist groups and separatist
groups flush with weapons and insurgents after Libya’s collapse in 2011 have
wreaked havoc across the Sahel region, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and
Niger.

F.
The junta, which came to power in an August 2020 coup, has promised to
stabilize the country, where violent insurgent Islamist groups compete with it
and each other for control. Instead, violence on the part of the Islamists and the
junta — backed by the Russian mercenary Wagner group — has increased
exponentially, with civilians bearing the brunt of the horror.

G.

Indeed, under the present government, the security situation has rapidly
deteriorated, Eizenga told Vox. According to data from the Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Africa Center for Strategic
Studies shared in an email, in 2022 there were 996 violent events involving
Islamist groups, which resulted in 3,635 fatalities. As Eizenga told Vox, that
makes violence in 2022 “by far the worst on record.” Furthermore, “based on the
available data through the first quarter of 2023, we anticipate roughly a doubling
of violence since the junta took power.”