UNIVERSIDADE LUSÍADA – PORTO

FACULDADE DE DIREITO
MESTRADO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

A RESPOSTA DA RÚSSIA À ASPIRAÇÃO DA GEÓRGIA À

SUA INTEGRAÇÃO NA EU
RUSSIA'S RESPONSE TO GEORGIA'S ASPIRATION TO JOIN THE EU

Ana Karseladze

Trabalho apresentado à unidade curricular

de História das Relações Internacionais
(Temas avançados) coordenada pelo Prof.
Doutor Joel Mata
 Porto – 2022

Abstract

Since perestroika, Georgia has been the most independent country from the former Soviet
Union. As 20% of Georgia is occupied by Russia, its occupations in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are seen as an existential threat, which drives Georgia's ongoing aspirations to
integrate into the EU, where Russia plays an obstructive role.
Keywords: Georgia, Europeanization, Russia, post-Soviet states.

Introduction

This article focuses on Georgia's journey from post-Soviet country to free market
democracy, which has been fraught with difficulties. It aims to discuss Georgia's example in
Russian foreign policy towards post-Soviet countries as they begin to turn their vector
towards the West and examines how the Russian factor has always been a resistance in
Georgia's Europeanization while reviewing Russian-Georgian relations over time.

Georgia's geopolitical location

In the geopolitical space of the world, Eurasia occupies a central place. In Eurasia, one of the
regions of exceptional strategic importance is the Caucasus, and in the Caucasus - Georgia,
as the junction between the modern sea, land and energy resource routes. The Caucasus
region has long aroused the interest of its neighbors. Positioned as the crossroads of two
continents, Europe and Asia, the region has great potential to connect different parts of the
world and global markets, but also seems to appeal to great powers in their efforts to
spread specific political agendas to new areas. Georgians (also known as Kartvels) are the
indigenous people of the Caucasus. Georgians have controlled the main passes of the
Caucasus and other Transcaucasian routes since time immemorial.
Georgia has also been an outpost of Christian culture and consciousness from the earliest
centuries to the present day. In fact, these two distinct functions define the regional
essence of the Georgian state. From a physical-geographical point of view, Georgia is
situated between the borders of Europe and Asia. Georgia's territory, which borders Russia
in the north, Azerbaijan in the east, and Armenia and Turkey in the south, sharing a
southeastern part of its border with Iran, makes it an appealing geopolitical-economic
region, especially as it is a country through which the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline passes from
the Caspian Sea to Europe. Georgia also has access to Black Sea ports.
Georgia has the following geopolitical characteristics: 1. a central location in the Caucasus
region; 2. a peripheral location towards European countries; and 3. a neighboring (border)
location with Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia 4. Its location on the sea connects
Georgia not only to the countries of the Black Sea coast, but also to world markets. Its
territory forms an axis of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor (TRACECA). It is also
the shortest transit line linking the countries of Eurasia. At the same time, Georgia can help
the function of the "Great Silk Road". Georgia is surrounded by Islamic religious nations due
to its religious-geographical location. The only land route to the Christian world is through
Russia, since its southern neighbor Armenia is isolated from the Christian world. At the same
time, the Black Sea connects Georgia to the Orthodox countries of Ukraine, Romania,
Bulgaria and Greece.

The Europeanization of Georgia

Since regaining its independence on April 9, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia passed a
resolution on the restoration of independence and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
December 1991, Georgia has entered the international arena independently, establishing
diplomatic, trade, economic and other relations with countries all over the world. One of
the most important directions of Georgia's political and economic development is its gradual
integration into European structures. Strengthening cooperation with the EU helps Georgia's
democratic institutions and security, as well as developing external trade relations with the
EU. It is crucial for Georgia to broaden the institutional frameworks of its relations with the
European Union. Most Georgians see the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern
Partnership as important factors for Georgia's integration into the EU. Relations between
the European Union (EU) and Georgia began in 1992, shortly after Georgia regained
sovereignty following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The EU was among the first to
help Georgia during the difficult first years of transition, which was crucial for the country's
development. In 1995, the European Commission (EC) established its Delegation to Georgia
in Tbilisi.
Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia from 1995 to 2003, proposed a "New Silk Road"
as a primordial East-West artery through Georgia and across a "peaceful Caucasus". Georgia
experienced political stabilization under Shevardnadze, which favored cooperation with the
EU. Georgia became a full member of the Council of Europe in 1999, and the following year
a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Georgia and the EU came into
force. However, it can be said that during Shevardnadze's tenure, Georgians' mentalities
were still (post-)Soviet, as Russian influence was still strong - first and foremost because it is
not easy to eradicate 70 years of Soviet rule, the transition is a long and complex process; at
the time, Shevardnadze himself, as a former USSR Foreign Minister, was very close to
Russia.

EU-Georgia relations after the "Rose Revolution"

Bilateral relations with the EU were further strengthened after the "Rose Revolution" of
2003, which brought to power a young, pro-Western government led by Mikheil Saakashvili,
who undertook an ambitious program of political and economic reforms, raising high
expectations in EU member states. President Saakashvili and his government have declared
that the country's main goal is to join the European Union and develop towards the West
since their first day in power. The new government has been successful not only in
modernizing the economy and establishing the role of the rule of law, but also in reforming
the civil service and fighting corruption. The inclusion of the South Caucasus in the European
Neighborhood Policy in June 2004 laid a new foundation for EU-Georgia relations (ENP). This
policy aimed to bring Georgia and 15 other EU countries closer together in terms of
legislation, economy, and politics. To stabilize the neighboring countries, the ENP provided
opportunities for economic integration, financial assistance, and political dialogue. Georgia
and the EU successfully concluded negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area (DCFTA) as part of their Association Agreement in July 2013, after 17 months and seven
rounds. The Association Agreement, together with the DCFTA, aimed to provide for
Georgia's close political and economic integration with the EU.

Contemporary relations between the EU and Georgia

The year 2017 will be remembered as a turning point in Georgia's European integration. The
visa-free regime between Georgia and the EU came into force on March 28. This historic
achievement strengthened economic, cultural and social ties between the EU and Georgia.
In addition, the EU's recognition of Georgia's success in implementing complex reforms,
developing democratic institutions, and economic sustainability is significant. The European
Union's External Action (2017) lists the following focal points of Georgia's Europeanization
process: the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
and its Eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership (EAP), the EU-Georgia Association
Agreement (including visa liberalization), and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has heightened the geopolitics of the Black Sea region. The EU
re-energized its eastward push to finally derail Russia's efforts to dominate its pro-Western
neighbors. The European Union (EU) has granted Georgia a "European perspective",
indicating that Georgia is on track for eventual integration into the bloc. However, this is not
what the majority of the population expected, to be granted the same candidate status as
Ukraine and Moldova.
Since Georgia is in an inferior position, it must fulfill a number of conditions before
becoming a full candidate. However, the EU's decision was not entirely unexpected. To this
must be added internal country problems, arrests, demonstrations and political class
divisions. The government was probably worried about sending Russia a hostile signal from
another country that had been promised NATO membership and had a history of opposing
Kremlin aggression. The EU's 12 recommendations for Georgia include "a commitment to
de-oligarchization", removing the excessive influence of vested interests in economic,
political and public life. Other areas include addressing political polarization in which both
the opposition and the ruling party are to blame.

The decisive historical encounter between Georgia and Russia

The relationship between Georgia and Russia is complex in nature. The states, with cultural
and religious ties, recently fought a short-lived but intense war, which sparked controversial
debates in both states about the future relationship between them. Beyond the human
dimension, the armed conflict of August 2008 has a historical and political context. Georgia
is a very old Christian nation that considers itself much older than Russia. Georgian national
identity can be traced back to the establishment of an autocephalous Georgian church in
the 4th century and the development of a Georgian alphabet in the 5th century. The
decisive historical encounter between the two nations took place during the reign of
Russian Empress Catherine II, when a treaty was signed in 1783 in the city of Georgievsk
between Russia and King Erekle II, who controlled what is now the eastern part of Georgia,
providing Russian protection against Persian attacks. This paved the way for greater Russian
domination, both in depth and in space, eventually leading to the complete integration of
Georgia into the Russian empire from 1881 to 1917. This period, for the most part,
coincided with a patriotically oriented Georgian intelligentsia, often critical of Russian
domination and Russification.

"Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic"

Today's Georgia considers the three-year existence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia
from 1918 to 1921, which was then swiftly and ruthlessly suppressed by Bolshevik forces, as
an important reference point for national liberation and the modern democratic state, as
well as its final emergence from the dissolution of the Soviet Union with the promulgation
of the Georgian Declaration of Independence on April 9, 1991. Georgia's independence
emerged from a serious crisis, and even the fall, of its powerful northern neighbor in both
cases. The killing of Georgian demonstrators by Soviet troops on April 9, 1989,
foreshadowed the country's independence in 1991. It came after a decade of armed
conflict, repression and mass terror that characterized the Stalinist era. In fact, there was
little to entice the newly independent Georgia to follow the patterns of the Russian and
Soviet eras, and much of Georgia's political class, as well as public opinion, took a sharp turn
towards the West.
The Soviet era did, however, leave a significant legacy: the division of Georgia into three
political-territorial entities, including the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the
autonomous "Oblast" (district) of South Ossetia. Of course, Georgia, with its capital Tbilisi,
remained within its internationally recognized borders, coinciding with the former
"Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic" as it stood on December 21, 1991. During the period of
transition to post-Soviet sovereignty, the country's first President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia,
used nationalism to alienate the two smaller political-territorial entities of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia from Georgia's independence project, proclaiming ethno-centrist slogans such
as "Georgia for Georgians". The fighting that eventually erupted between Georgian and
separatist forces, first in South Ossetia in 1991-92 and then in Abkhazia in 1992-94, resulted
in Georgia losing control of large portions of both territories. Russia supported the
insurgents, but it seems that the Russian political elite and power structures were divided
on the issue and only partially involved, and Moscow remained on bad terms with Tbilisi at
the same time.

The conflicts between Russia and Georgia

Russia's relations with Georgia were the tensest of any post-Soviet state. In addition to
fomenting separatism in South Ossetia since 1990, Russia militarily supported separatists in
Abkhazia (1992-93), which is also part of Georgian territory, in order to undermine Georgia's
independence and assert Russian control over the strategically important South Caucasus.
For years, Tbilisi has tried to deal with these separatist regimes, offering a negotiated
solution that included full autonomy within Georgia. In recent years, Moscow has granted
Russian citizenship to most of the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has moved
to establish close economic and bureaucratic ties with the two breakaway republics,
effectively annexing both territories. The use of Russian citizenship to create a "protected"
population residing in a neighboring state in order to undermine its sovereignty is a slippery
slope that is leading to a redrawing of the former Soviet borders in Russia's favor.
Tbilisi's approach to the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as its
deteriorating relationship with Russia, all escalated in the August 2008 war. Since 2006,
Georgia and Russia have been at odds over a Russian embargo on Georgian agricultural
products, deportations of Georgian citizens and, most importantly, Russian support for
Georgia's two breakaway regions. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in
February 2008, Russia lifted sanctions against Abkhazia and South Ossetia in March, and on
April 16 announced its decision to establish legal ties with the two regions. The armed
conflict between Russia and Georgia erupted in August 2008 on the territory of the
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia's planned military campaign lasted
five days before the parties agreed to a preliminary ceasefire on August 12. The European
Union (EU), led by France, brokered the ceasefire. After the agreement was signed, Russia
withdrew most of its troops from uncontested Georgian territory, while establishing buffer
zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia recognized the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia on 26 August 2008, incorporating them into what President Dmitry
Medvedev called Moscow's "zone of privileged interests", and has since deployed five
military bases on occupied Georgian territory.

Russia's arsenal of punitive measures against Georgia

Russia had already used its full arsenal of disciplinary and punitive measures against Georgia
during the 2000s. This included requiring a visa to travel, imposing trade restrictions and
engaging in military interventions. Russia's support for separatism, as well as its illegal
intervention across Georgia's borders, were just some of the numerous attempts to
destabilize Georgia and exert power over the country. Russia's interference and its attempt
to influence the country in Georgia were met with growing tensions from citizens towards
the authorities, especially after the change of power, which was one of the main reasons for
Russian concerns about losing influence, power and hegemony in the post-Soviet space.
The conflict between Russia and Georgia has been ongoing for a long time, and it can be
concluded that Georgia has started its path towards a closer relationship, if not full
membership, with/in the European Union to distance itself from Russian interference. It is
also important to note that a developing relationship with the West has not been proven as
a clear guarantee to prevent Russian interference and the use of its hegemony over its
neighboring countries, particularly Georgia. In order to fully utilize the power of the EU in
the process of decreasing Georgia's dependence on Russia, Georgia would have to persuade
everyone, including themselves, that the Russians do not belong inside the "gates" of the
European Union.
Russian pressure on Georgia to reverse its pro-Western course has increased significantly
since President Vladimir Putin took office. Relations with Russia turned sour after the 2003
revolution in Georgia, as the new government showed itself to be democratic and focused
on rebuilding the Georgian state, resolving secessionist conflicts and seeking NATO
membership. Moscow is annexing sovereign Georgian territory, undermining confidence-
building between Georgia and its secessionist minorities and increasing the risk of a military
outbreak. In addition, Moscow has tried to squeeze Georgia's economy by manipulating
energy supplies, instituting an embargo on wholesale trade and transportation, and
deporting ethnic Georgians from Russia. These measures obstruct Georgia's reform process,
despite the fact that Russia has so far failed to meet its objectives. In fact, Russia has
consistently supported armed secessionist movements against Georgia, helping them
secede in the early 1990s and supporting them militarily and politically ever since.
Russia has refused to remove unwanted military bases from Georgian territory for more
than a decade; has bombed Georgian territory on many occasions; has accused Georgia on
false charges of harboring terrorists against Russia; has used subversive measures, including
attacks on the Georgian head of state; has imposed a discriminatory visa regime on the
country; and has exerted economic pressure on Russia through Georgia's energy
dependence. Russia's foreign policy towards Georgia stands out in comparison with virtually
all other members of the former union of Soviet socialist republics (USSR). While Moscow
has increasingly sought to re-establish control over its former domains, nowhere has it been
more eager and willing to show its teeth than in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia's
interventionist policies have included the use and threat of violence, subversion, and what
amounts to a total annexation of Georgian territory. This Russian policy has had serious
consequences for Georgia's efforts to achieve political and economic development, as well
as stability and security.
Georgia, a small country with significant internal problems, has been unable to focus on
development due to constant pressure and manipulation by Moscow to change Georgia's
policies. With regard to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian policies have
directly damaged the integrity, unity and functioning of Georgian states, as well as
contributing to a deep political, economic and psychological malaise in Georgian society.

Russia's foreign policy towards post-Soviet countries

Given the legacy of Soviet control and the continuing political, cultural, and economic ties
between Russia and its CIS neighbors, Russia's leadership has not consistently considered its
relations with the CIS states as a branch of foreign policy. Moscow's invasion of Georgia,
despite pious declarations about the importance of international law and state sovereignty,
demonstrates a gap in Russian thinking about the CIS. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the
CIS has become a battleground for the great powers: Russia, the United States, Europe and,
increasingly, China. The struggle for influence in the former Soviet republics has often
surprised Moscow, which for a long time considered the whole region its exclusive preserve
but was too weak to enforce its claim to exclusivity for much of the 1990s.
The war in Georgia, which the Western powers have strongly condemned, appears to be a
turning point in Russia's relations with the CIS. After years on the defensive as outside
influence - primarily Western - spread throughout the former Soviet Union, Moscow
decided to strike a decisive blow that would weaken or topple the West's most important
outpost in the former Soviet Union and send a message to others that they would have no
choice but to come to some kind of accommodation with their former hegemon. Russia's
instrumental approach to the former Soviet Union has resulted in variations over time and
space. The European republics (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the three Baltic
states) served as a buffer zone between Russia and the EU and NATO's expanding Europe.
The Caucasus and Central Asia, on the other hand, have historically been significant for
Moscow as a zone of instability and insecurity along Russia's vulnerable southern border.
Russia retains hard power options in the CIS that it lacks elsewhere, as demonstrated by its
invasions of Georgia and Ukraine. While Russia's residual influence remains strong in many,
but not all, former Soviet states, there has been a persistent pattern of trading off such
interests to promote Russia's global influence.Russia maintains many levers of control in
what many Russians still refer to as the Near East, including the presence of Russian troops
in some neighboring countries (Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia and Armenia), the
encouragement of regional separatists in the context of so-called frozen conflicts, and the
control of oil and gas supplies in many CIS states. In general, Moscow remains interested in
maintaining its influence in the former Soviet Union, guaranteeing access to the seas
(particularly the Baltic and Black Seas) and transit rights for Russian gas and oil, and, to a
lesser extent, protecting the rights of Russian speakers who found themselves living outside
their home country after the collapse of the USSR.
Russia's position towards its neighbors, as well as its reunification strategy and ideology,
could be divided into three phases. The first phase lasted from the late 1990s to the early
2000s and was marked by a shift in Russian policy towards the CIS following Boris Yeltsin's
presidency. This period also saw an increase in cooperation with Russia's neighbors, as well
as the implementation of some initiatives to establish a formal organizational network in the
former USSR. (e.g. Unification of Russia and Belarus, The Eurasian Economic Community,
etc.) Due to a variety of internal economic and political problems that Russia and many of its
neighbors faced during this period, these organizations were destined to remain nominal or
make insignificant progress in their development. The second phase occupied the mid-2000s
and was strongly influenced by Russia's reaction to the "Color Revolutions" in Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In this phase, Russia made a decisive turn towards its neighbors,
demonstrating a desire to play a larger political role in the region, as well as fierce
competition with the US and the EU for economic and political influence in the former
Soviet republics.
The third phase, which lasted until the end of the 2000s, was marked by the systematization
of Russia's political and economic approach. The development of a long-term strategy based
on strengthening economic, military and political ties with the post-Soviet states that make
up the core of post-Soviet integration (Belarus and Kazakhstan) demonstrated Russia's most
prominent interest in regional integration since the collapse of the USSR.
If we continue this logic, as the fourth phase can be considered the current period, due to
the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia's future position and foreign policy towards the post-
Soviet countries depends very much on the outcome of the war. On August 12, 2008, Polish
President Lech Kaczynski appeared in Tbilisi alongside the leaders of Ukraine and the Baltic
States, delivering a defiant speech in which he famously summed up Russia's imperialist
ambitions as extending not only to Georgia, but also to other parts of Eastern Europe.
President Kaczyski warned 150,000 people gathered in front of the Georgian parliament that
Russia was trying to re-establish its dominance in the region. "Today Georgia, tomorrow
Ukraine, the day after tomorrow - the Baltic States and later, perhaps, the time will come for
my country, Poland," proclaimed the President.

Conclusion

Georgia is, without a doubt, very firmly on the path of further Europeanization and
distancing itself from the Russian sphere of influence. Russian policy has had serious
consequences for Georgia's efforts to achieve political and economic development, as well
as stability and security. Georgia, a small country with significant internal problems, has
been unable to focus on development due to constant pressure and manipulation by
Moscow to change Georgia's policies.

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