The Russian-Ukrainian Relationship: Independence and Integration

A requirement for Modern and Contemporary Europe (HST105)

Cabornay, Franklin

Doyongan, Charisse Aleli

Lerios, Janine Beatriz

Macalisang, Rodulfo

Tuyor, Nova

January 2021
Introductory Clause

Ukraine has been an independent state since 1991, and is one of the largest

successors, by population, by territory and economy to the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (Soviet Union). The discussion of Ukraine independence in 1991 and the

dissolution of the USSR in the same year can be connected in the present issues of

Ukraine. This paper assumes the possible outcomes of why such crises exist and how

powerful countries got involved in these problems to the point where sanctions were

imposed. And what improvements and actions the European Union does to make

conflict doesn’t get out of hand.

Historically, Russians consider Ukrainians as their cultural heritage because

before the dissolution of USSR in, most of the Ukraine’s sovereignty was part and

incorporated over time in USSR’s.[1] Afterwards, this led to Ukrainian crisis as they

joined the European Union for political and economic purposes and for the future of

Ukrainian people, Russia's aggression in eastern part of Ukraine is alarming for the

union. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis doesn’t only revolve around its country and people.

In most part, Ukraine issues has become a signal case, with the conflict there leading to

reactions throughout the countries, this lead to the neighboring countries to improve

their state security and revised their foreign policy as Russia’s become deliberate in

conducting policies and practices in Ukraine.[2] However, the EU response impose

nations security on Russian border and also the United states become involved and

put sanctions on Russia’s invasion in Ukraine. The Ukraine desires to open its free

market to the EU and at the same time make strong alliance with the United States

companies in order for the country to develop and boost their economic stability were
block by Russia as they consider it as huge threat to their economy and state

sovereignty.[3] Since then, relations between Russia and the United States begun to

flunk out with the on-going Ukraine crisis the EU has also step up and put sanctions on

Ukraine-Russia border. However, in March 2014 an invasion erupted in Crimea, North

of the Black Sea in Eastern Europe by the Russian Federation that led to the

annexation of the place. President of Russia Vladimir Putin is having an opportunistic

appearance by showing that he is not afraid of the sanctions that were put by the United

States. Hence, it turns out as a strategic political dominance that Russian might easily

penetrate the borders of Ukraine. It make sense because Putin actions towards Ukraine

can be considered a strategic political move as he can achieve the goals by maintaining

constant conflicts, keeping Ukraine off-balance economically, ensuring that it remains

unattractive to the west making it more like this country should not make appearance

and undesirable so that the west cannot use the country in economic purposes and

taunting their powers in the face of EU response.[4] Putin’s political aggression by

showing military power make sense because it shows that he wants Ukraine to be part

of Russia and that European Union cannot do a thing about it.

Furthermore, with the Ukraine crisis throes into violent conflicts, its effects can

literally resound across the globe. The crisis is known for a power struggle between

people in Ukraine. One of the factions wants to align with the European Union and the

other is pro-Russian that resulted in Ukrainian people becoming confused, making them

divided in their own country. To make things clearer this issue can be rooted to crisis

identity. All on-going protests in Ukraine the people know exactly why they are raging in

anger. Perhaps this can be explained as Ukraine has a very long history of colonial
mentality and a short history for national independence. The country has been part of

totalitarian regimes of Stalin which is a big part because most of the eastern part of

Ukraine is using the Russian language because the geographical location of Ukraine

lies between Europe in the west and Russia in the east. It has been said that Ukraine

has been pulled between both sides for a very long time as Russian spent over a

century trying to make it embrace Russian culture. Theoretically, the most controversial

thing about Ukraine is that most people in the south of the country speak Russian,

sharing their cultural heritage with Russia. On the other hand the people in

western-north of the country speak native Ukrainian, seeing their country as more

European. Ukraine’s history between Europe and Russia lifted culturally and politically,

creating an identity crisis for the people. We can call it a divided nation due to the

geographical location and even political factors being pulled for self-interest in which

Union is better. Thus, the Russian aggression in Ukraine can also be seen by a divided

nation. Putin can see that half of the Ukrainian is pro Russia and this can be an

underhand for him in which there’s a higher chance that the next president will also be

pro Russia.

The positive purpose of the Maidan protests that began in Ukraine in 2013 calling

for integration with the more prosperous West and an end to systemic corruption by the

government. It quickly provided Putin with an opening for foreign agitation to escalate

indigenous chaos in pursuit of his objectives of greater regional and global control.

Putin’s annexation of Crimea and incursion into eastern and south eastern Ukraine

caught the West off guard, placing off a scramble to construct a response from the

United States, the European Union, and a North Atlantic alliance inclined to retrench
after more than a decade at war in Afghanistan.[5] The subsequent reaction of the

West, which is diplomatic condemnation, economic sanctions, nonlethal military aid, and

the strengthening of military powers along the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), has drawn indignation and derision from Russia, which has

cranked up its propaganda and other messaging tactics to suppress or at least confuse

former opponents at home and abroad. The Russian military has stepped up its

"exercises" near the border with Ukraine. NATO has been monitoring the frontier and in

the contested regions with repeated surges of Russian equipment and personnel.

Western sanctions, intensified by a sudden collapse in oil and gas prices worldwide in

the autumn of 2014, have affected Russia's economy hard but have not changed Putin's

strategy. The propaganda and repression techniques of the regime blurred every effect

that approved Russia's financial power brokers and the Russian public.[6]

In Ukraine, the elections of October 2014 strengthened the pro-European,

pro-reform movements in Ukraine. Parliament turned its attention to the urgent need for

corruption reduction and reform, Economy of the country to enforce its Partnership

Agreement with the European Union and to collect the requisite foreign financial help to

survive the economic crisis. The elected reformers, including the Maidan civic activists,

had a base to work on: The Reanimation Package of Reforms was drawn up by more

than two hundred academics, civil society organizers, and human rights defenders

earlier in 2014, proposing concrete steps to combat corruption, make procurement more

accountable, and revise taxes and the judiciary. They will now carry out those changes,

entrenched in parliament and dedicated to making good on the movement's objectives.

They are helped by the Ukrainian people's increased awareness about their monitoring

activities and the effects of failure.[7]

In this situation, with Russia's incursions combined with indigenous stresses, the

Ukrainian government bowed to the pressure from public and western governments to

enact serious governance and financial reform. Ukraine has adhered to its scheme to

allow the currency to float, and to gradually raise heating and home power prices to

cover the cost of production and distribution. It now embarks on vital institutions and

mechanisms of change, such as pensions, banks, the judiciary and public services,

which will assess the government's popularity and the Ukraine trajectory. In the medium

term, the attempts to reform continue to challenge the administration and the parliament

as if they were in particular, the elites and oligarchs of the country waffle on how much

they are able to concede and revolt against the pain of higher expenses. A pivotal test is

the reform of Ukraine's state gas monopoly, Naftogaz, a bastion of repression and

inefficiency. In this scenario, the issue of national identity still continues to loom large

for Ukraine, as it is for many post-Soviet nations. As a rallying point, Russian

aggression has served for national Ukrainian unity. But the lack of leaders' commitment

to creating, improving and sharpening a national identity that can be accepted by most

Ukrainians leaves people floating in a dangerous state of ambiguity and internal

tensions. With a steady infusion of divisive propaganda, Russia will capitalize on the

uncertainty.

The tension in Ukraine is partly driven by the willingness and ability of the United

States and European powers, such as Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom,

to support Ukraine and motivate Russia to end its violence. In this situation, worldwide
monetary resources for Ukraine are still conditioned on rapid reforms, straining the

society’s capacity to take on a battle and a financial crisis. On the army front, the

situation has the US turning in growing degrees of schooling and different navy help and

NATO persevering to amplify cooperation with Ukraine on protection reform. But

American and European leaders nevertheless demur on more potent measures in

opposition to Russia over its Ukraine intervention with inside the hopes of keeping

Russian assist on this primary issue.[8]

The Historical Background of the Issue

The French Revolution has been a turning point in the current history of Europe,

which began in 1789 and ended with the climb of Napoleon Bonaparte in the late 1790s.

During this time, French people updated the political scene of their country, evacuating

century-old doctrines such as the simple government and the medieval system. This

move emerged from broad dissatisfaction with the French administration and King Louis

XVI's financial deterioration, who encountered him and his wife Marie Antoinette on the

guillotine. While the French Revolution was striving for all its goals and often worsened

into a violent slaughter, it played a vital role in shaping modern nations by providing the

world with a power characteristic of the individual will.

Ukraine has long played an imperative, however in some cases neglected, part

within the world wide security arrangement. Nowadays, the nation shows up to be on

the front lines of a re-established great-power competition that numerous analysts say

will dominate worldwide relations within the future time.[9] Spurred by numerous

components, Russia’s animosity in Ukraine has activated the most noteworthy security
emergency in Europe since the Cold War. Whereas the United States and its partners

have taken critical reformatory activities against Russia, they have made small progress

in making a difference to re-establish Ukraine’s regional keenness. The momentous

1789, French Revolution, was phenomenal. It made Russia a noteworthy ideological

on-screen character in Europe for the first time, working from more than just

self-interested geopolitical calculation. Within the past, Russia had been known for its

grasp of edified absolutism, but moreover for its relative pragmatism—Catherine II and

her forerunners had been upbeat to back anti-royal groups in other nations when it

suited their needs. Presently Russia was wandering overseas within the benefit of a

philosophy. Such a principal change did not happen since the ruler willed it, however

most accounts of Russia’s reaction to the Revolution tell a story centered on the inside

legislative issues of the domain.[10] The impact of politics on history is evident. However,

the inverse relationship too holds history and the pictures of the past frequently

influence behavior of politicians. This is typically well outlined by the effect of the French

Revolution upon Russian political and intellectual history.

From 1920 to 1991, Ukraine was a crucial supporter of the economy of the Soviet

Union, one of the Soviet states. For over 1,000 years of unsettling history, the two

adjacent nations have been interlaced. Ukraine is currently a pivotal travel destination

through the rest of Europe, one of Russia's largest natural gas markets and home to an

estimated 7.5 million ethnic Russians — usually residing in eastern Ukraine and

southern Crimean locations. After the fall of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian

kingdoms at the end of the First World War, Kiev was the first independent nation in

1917.[11] That autonomy was short-lived. The modern nation was attacked by Poland,
and battled over by powers faithful to the despot and Moscow's new Bolshevik

government, which took control in Russia's 1918 revolution. After the long battle

towards independence, in 1991, more than 90 percent of Ukrainians voted to announce

autonomy from the disintegrating Soviet Union. But Russia proceeded to interfere within

the country's issues. In Ukraine's 2004 presidential race, the Kremlin supported

pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. Enormous extortion in that decision started

the Orange Revolution, which kept Yanukovych from control. The disappointment of

ensuing pioneers was driven to Yanukovych's making a comeback in 2010. But after he

canceled an exchange bargain with the European Union, he was driven from office once

more in the final month by pro-Western demonstrators. In spite of the world's shock,

Russian President Vladimir Putin is improbable to let Ukraine leave his country's circle,

emphasizing that Russia without Ukraine could be a nation; Russia with Ukraine is

definitely an empire.

Ukraine’s policy towards Russia since freedom in 1991 has been characterized

by a bind: how to protect its statehood within the setting of its overwhelming financial

reliance on Russia, which was an expectation on Ukraine’s interest in Russian-led

integration ventures.[12] Within the most detailed study to date of the developing

worldwide political economy of the previous Soviet Union, Economic Interdependence in

Ukrainian-Russian Relations analyses the unmanageable financial predicaments

confronting Russia's neighbors, and appears how financial interdependence has gotten

to be the key hub for the pursuit of control legislative issues within the region. Ukraine's

journey for total political independence from Russia is in pressure with the profound

financial interdependency between the two nations, and Ukraine's pioneers have found
that interest in three key goals--sovereignty, success, and security--often strife with one

another. Whereas the years since autonomy have seen Ukraine solidify its sway,

thriving remains tricky and there remains no long-term procedure for keeping up

Ukraine's political economy.

Ukraine was a foundation of the Soviet Union, the archival of the United States

amid the Cold War. Behind Russia, it was the second–most crowded and capable of the

fifteen Soviet republics, domestic too much of the union’s agrarian generation, defense

businesses, and military, counting the Black Sea Fleet and a few of the atomic weapons

stores. Ukraine was so imperative to the union that its choice to disjoin ties in 1991

demonstrated frustrations for the ailing superpower. In its about three decades of

autonomy, Ukraine has looked to produce its own way as a paramount state whereas

looking to adjust more closely with Western institutions, counting the European Union

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Be that as it may, Kyiv has battled to

adjust its remote relations and to bridge profound inner divisions. Ukraine has been a

battleground in 2014 when Russia attacked Crimea and started equipping and abetting

separatists within the Donbas locale within the country’s southeast. Russia’s seizure of

Crimea was the first time since World War II that a European state annexed the domain

of another. A few fourteen thousand individuals have passed on within the strife, the

bloodiest in Europe since the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Russia has profound social,

financial, and political bonds with Ukraine, and in numerous ways Ukraine is central to

Russia’s character and vision for itself within the world. Russia and Ukraine have solid

familial bonds that date back centuries. Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital is now and then alluded

to as “the mother of Russian cities,” on standard in terms of social impact with Moscow
and St. Petersburg. It was in Kyiv within the eighth and ninth centuries that Christianity

was brought from Byzantium to the Slavic people groups.[13] It was Christianity that

served as the grapple for Kievan Rus, the early Slavic state from which cutting edge

Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians draw their ancestry. Among Russia’s best

concerns is the welfare of the roughly eight million ethnic Russians living in Ukraine,

agreeing to a 2001 census, generally within the south and east. Moscow claimed an

obligation to secure these individuals as affection for its activities in Ukraine. After the

collapse of the USSR, numerous Russian politicians saw the separation with Ukraine as

a botch of history and a risk to Russia’s standing as an incredible control. Losing a

lasting hold on Ukraine, and letting it drop into the Western circle, was seen by many as

a major blow to Russia’s worldwide distinction. Russia is Ukraine’s biggest trading

accomplice, in spite of the fact that this interface has shriveled in later years. Earlier to

its intrusion of Crimea, Russia had trusted to drag Ukraine into its single showcase, the

Eurasian Economic Union, which nowadays incorporates Armenia, Belarus,

Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.[14] Much of the Ukraine's gas was also supplied by Russia

until the Crimean attack, after which imports dropped, which finally stopped in 2016. But

Russia still relies on the pipelines of Ukraine to pump their gas to consumers in central

and eastern Europe, paying billions of dollars annually for travel costs to Kiev.. Russia

was about to complete Nord Stream 2, a gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea in early

2020 that some warned Ukraine might lose fundamental profits. Russia is under

contract for a few more years to transport gas through Ukraine. Western scholars

oppose this idea to some degree on the motivations behind Russia’s animosity in

Ukraine. A few emphasize NATO’s post–Cold War extension, which Russia saw with
expanding alert. In 2004, NATO included seven individuals, its fifth development and

biggest one to date, counting the previous Soviet Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania. Four years afterward, when NATO expressed its expectation to bring Ukraine

and Georgia into the overlay at a few points within the future, Russia made clear that a

red line had been crossed. Within the weeks leading up to NATO’s 2008 summit,

President Vladimir Putin cautioned U.S. ambassadors that steps to bring Ukraine into

the union would be an unfriendly act toward Russia. Months afterward, Russia went to

war with Georgia, apparently exhibiting Putin’s eagerness to utilize constraints to secure

Russia’s interface. Other specialists debate the declaration that Russia’s fear of NATO

was its essential thought process, countering that the NATO extension address had to a

great extent broken down after 2008 as Western governments lost interest and Russia

expanded its impact in Ukraine. Or maybe, they say, the greatest figure behind Russia’s

mediation was Putin’s fear of losing control at home, especially after notable

anti-government dissents emitted in Russia in late 2011. Putin claimed U.S. on-screen

characters were sowing this distress and from there on started casting the United States

as a chief rival to rally his political base. It was by looking through this Cold War redox

focal point that he chose to intercede in Ukraine.

Twenty years later, as Russian forces seized Crimea, re-establishing and

fortifying Ukraine’s sway re-emerged as a top U.S. and EU remote policy need. The

United States remains committed to the rebuilding of Ukraine’s regional integrity and

sway. It does not recognize Russia’s claims to Crimea, and it pushes Russia and

Ukraine to resolve the Donbas struggle through the Minsk agreements. Marked in 2014

and 2015 and brokered by France and Germany, these agreements call for a cease-fire,
a withdrawal of overwhelming weapons, Ukrainian control over its border with Russia,

and neighborhood races and an extraordinary political status for certain zones of the

locale.

Operative Clause and Solutions

EU capacity limiting factors: its reluctance to consider Ukraine as a membership

candidate, miscalculation of Ukrainian leaders in Russia and ignoring rising nationalism

and xenophobia. These three items have limited the EU's ability to respond to the crisis

between Russia and Ukraine by ignoring Russian support for separatist movements in

past years and Georgia’s invasion and acknowledgement of the two separatist enclaves'

independence. The EU did not know that Russia treated it as its "zone of privileged

interests," as well as the EU (not just NATO).

First of all, the EU has never sponsored Ukrainian membership that restricts its

ability in Ukraine to influence domestic reforms. The EU cannot place on its prospective

members the same high standard of conditionality as it could in the critical area of the

rule of law and corruption. The EU's miscalculation on Ukrainian leaders was the

second restriction. The EU and U.S policymakers firmly tried to believe that the

leadership of Ukraine was committed to European integration, and these feelings

overshadowed skeptical suspicions about the leaders of Ukraine. Brussels thought that

it was the only show in the city and that there was no competition with alternative

integration projects. Thirdly, the EU is a union of 28 democratic nations where decision

making is more complex and takes longer to reach and take policies, and Russia is

dominating an oppressive political structure dominated by one common leader. A

difficult framework and cumbersome processes for addressing decision-making and

strategies through the High Commissioner for Enlargement, European External

Committal, have limited the EU's response to the Ukraine-Russia crisis through Action

Service; Extension Director-General; EU Council; and the ambassadors, governments

and parliamentarians of the Member States.[15] Moreover, in 2012 after Putin had

reappointed Russia's President on a platform of nationalism, conservative ideals and

anti-western xenophobia, the EU "slumbered" into Russia-Ukraine crisis, as it

overlooked major domestic changes in Russia. The EU could not appreciate that a

revisionist Russia would be more prepared to turn its control into its "privileged interest

zone." Ukraine is more strategically important to Putin and Russian nationalists than it is

to the EU.

The EU's closed-door approach to Ukraine has been consistent and never

offered membership. President Jean-Claude Juncker of the European Commission said,

"Ukraine will certainly not, and will not, become a member of the EU in the next 20-25

years".[16] This is a symptom of enlargement fatigue, an unwillingness to confront

Russian objections and in some quarters and inability to consider Ukraine as belonging

to the European club. Growing Euroscepticism and Ukraine’s failure to combat

corruption and implement reforms decreases the pressure upon the EU to give a

membership perspective. Ukraine and Turkey are large countries on Europe's borders

and are not generally considered 'European' by the 28 EU members with their

civilizations, religions and national identities. In addition, there was a clear assumption

that one of the countries that did not join the EU without the other is expected to have

an organic relationship between Russia and Ukraine, even though Russia never
decided to join the organization. Consequently, the EU still viewed CIS members as

Eurasian rather than European.[17]

In connection to the EU’s perspective towards the relationship, thus won't be

easy to settle the dispute. Russia was blocking a request from Ukraine to invite UN

peacekeepers to the Donbas. The Ukraine and USA rejected Russia's own proposal for

peacekeepers on the basic issue of where they would be stationed. Repeated truce

attempts did not last longer than a day. Ukrainian and American peacekeepers are

aiming at a Russia-Ukrainian internationally recognized frontier, while Russia is

recommending that the cessation of fire be focused. So Putin's proposal was similar to

earlier Yeltsin's proposals when CIS (read Russian) peacekeepers froze conflicts which

Russian proxies won in the TDN, SO and Abkhazia ceasefire. Maybe we should decide

how to handle the conflict rather than how to settle the conflict. There are two

explanations why the dispute is unlikely to be resolved. Firstly, different parties are still

far away from their interpretation of dispute origins and appropriate solutions. While

many in the West understand that its annexation to Crimea is highly impossible and

willing to agree that it would be far more difficult to recognize it officially and legitimize it.

For Ukraine's government, this is even more real. If the region is to be removed from

Ukraine, it would be important for a full settlement of this dispute to find a means to

legitimize Russia's annexation and it seems like there are not many Westerners, nor in

Ukraine, who are nearly appropriate, partly because it could set a hazardous precedent.

Secondly, it is not straightforward to reverse the losses in different ties, even though the

desire was to (and that it is questionable).[18] Of course, several other reforms have

shown attempts at progress in ties on both sides, but what is striking is how these
efforts seem to be founded or swamped by more negative developments. Western

assistance to Russia was valid, but much less than hoped, and as much resentment as

gratitude. The Ukrainian nuclear weapons abandonment agreement may have helped to

ensure that deeper tensions with Russia and the US had not yet been resolved, but also

at a time when the weak points of Ukrainian security protections had left many resentful,

while the US and Russia were angry at Ukraine negotiating weapons. The 1997

agreement on friendship, as opposed to many Russian elites, was equally unfriendly.

The signing of the agreement, which was largely motivated by NATO's plan to sign an

agreement with Ukraine, had little effect on relations between Ukraine and Russia.

The paper argued that the EU's policies with respect to Ukraine were limited in

three respects. Firstly, the EU cannot control the process of Ukraine's reform

exceedingly, since it provides only "enlargement-lite" without membership. The EU

power would be allowed if Ukraine had been granted a membership perspective which

would give Brussels the opportunity to press Kiev to implement institutional changes,

tackle corruption and reduce oligarchs' power and influence.[19] The three factors

helped to force the EU's action in Ukraine to avoid Euromaidan slide into the violence

and to respond to Russia's attack in Crimea and Donbas in the future. These three

factors helped the European Union take measures to strengthen and negotiate at the

early stage of Euromaidan, but Yanukovych has neglected these appeals. When the EU

intervened more actively in February 2014 to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the

political crisis, the public mood after the killing of unarmed protestors was seriously

misjudged, when it agreed to the presidency of Yanukovych until the end of the year.

Initially poorly prepared and taken by surprise to deal with political uncertainty, the
roundtable agreement created an impression that the EU was trying to advance

Yanukovych and was like the EU's cautious approach to the Arab Spring where it was

committed to sustainability and stability and preferred to deal with governments rather

than revolutionaries.[20]

The Ukraine dispute is not only resisted by the causes which are still in effect.

While the cost of death and economics, Russia and Ukraine will help the post-Minsk

Continue to mount indefinitely in dispute. This will help extend the fight placed in place.

The cost to continue the war seems relatively low compared to otherwise at the

concession expense necessary to end the concession. It depends a great deal on

Russia if that remains true ambitions that are hard to quantify. If the Russian aim was to

take over Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine, Ukraine would be weakened and send

to the West a post, then the situation is enviable having to freeze the dispute in order to

achieve its aims. From early November 2015 Russia concentrated on Russia before the

Kerch Strait incident not about shifting facts on the field, but about getting to the West

but embracing them and accepting them. The emphasis seemed primarily to weaken

the West resolve and seem effective to retain sanctions. Evolution renewed use of force

in the Kerch Strait and the Sea Azov questioned whether the policy of Russia was

simply to protect the existing state.[21]

The study of underlying causes shown here makes us pessimistic about whether

the dispute between Ukraine and Russia can be resolved or the wider Russian-West

dispute sometime in the near future. You found that the two conflicts are now one and

each one makes the other more challenging to find a solution. However, the deeper

issue remains that all of the underlying causes of the conflict explored within this paper
still exist, and now they have been compounded by the conflict itself. If the underlies

and the dynamics make it difficult to achieve, there is also a compromise on what the

potential routes are to an end. And what policies could this lead to? As in any war, one

side on the battlefield will end, one side surrendering because the costs are too high or

some compromise. In practice there is sometimes no simple distinction between

"victory" and compromise. Those who feel too much was given up to compromise call it

a "capitulation," while those who worry about losing might call it a victory. As we pointed

out, this view is based heavily on what is considered to be the current alternative state.

The intense, fundamental conflicts underlying this paper have highlighted the

Ukraine-Russia dispute. The end of the Cold War brought to an end the violent

ideological struggle between western democracy and communism and ended the sharp

divide of Europe between territories. With 14 new states and the creation of a political

opening in Moscow, the fall of the Soviet Union went further. But the break-up of the

Soviet Union left Russia profoundly unhappy with the existing state, freeing Ukraine and

questioning Russia's status as a great power. By 2014, Russia continued its desire to

regulate Ukraine, but any sense of need to obey the laws of Europe had decreased.

Russia was both angered and its interests were threatened, but Viktor Yanukovych's

overthrow provided also an excuse to take advantage of at least something he had long

asserted in Ukraine. This ultimate conclusion is that the causes of the dispute have

been profound and continuous. That is why it will be resolved hard. A new set of

security agreements in Europe will hopefully help to end the war. The dispute will last,

with Ukraine caught up in the middle, until Russia recognizes the vision for the West for

Europe, or the West embraces Russia.

[1] “Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy,” accessed January 4, 2021,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45008.pdf.

[2] “The Ukraine-Russia Conflict: Signals and Scenarios for the Broader Region,” accessed
January 4, 2021,
https://www.academia.edu/33561804/The_Ukraine_Russia_Conflict_Signals_and_Scenarios_fo
r_the_Broader_Region.

[3] Max Fisher, “Everything You Need to Know about the Ukraine Crisis,” September 3, 2014,
https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know.

[4] “The Ukraine-Russia Conflict,” United States Institute of Peace, December 30, 2016,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/03/ukraine-russia-conflict.

[5] “The 'Euromaidan', Democracy, and Political Values in Ukraine,” accessed January 4, 2021,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321503071_The_'Euromaidan'_Democracy_and_Politi
cal_Values_in_Ukraine.

[6] F. Stephen Larrabee et al., “How Are European Countries Vulnerable to Russia?” RAND
Corporation, January 18, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1305.html.

[7] Marek Dabrowski, Marta Domínguez-Jiménez, and Georg Zachmann, “Six Years after
Ukraine's Euromaidan: Reforms and Challenges Ahead,” Bruegel, accessed January 4, 2021,
https://www.bruegel.org/2020/06/six-years-after-ukraines-euromaidan-reforms-and-challenges-a
head/.

[8] “Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy,” accessed January 4, 2021,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45008.pdf.

[9]
John Morrison, “Pereyaslav and after: the Russian-Ukrainian Relationship,” October 1, 1993,
https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/69/4/677/2406623.

[10]
John Morrison, “Pereyaslav and after: the Russian-Ukrainian Relationship,” October 1, 1993,
https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/69/4/677/2406623.

[11]
Theunis Bates, “Ukraine's Fraught Relationship with Russia: A Brief History,” The Week - All
you need to know about everything that matters (The Week, March 8, 2014),
https://theweek.com/articles/449691/ukraines-fraught-relationship-russia-brief-history.

[12]
Theunis Bates, “Ukraine's Fraught Relationship with Russia: A Brief History,” The Week - All
you need to know about everything that matters (The Week, March 8, 2014),
https://theweek.com/articles/449691/ukraines-fraught-relationship-russia-brief-history.
[13]
Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations, accessed January 4, 2021,
https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3006-economic-interdependence-in-ukr.aspx.

[14]
Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations, accessed January 4, 2021,
https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3006-economic-interdependence-in-ukr.aspx.

[15] R. Dragneva-Lewers and K. Wolczuk, “Ukraine Between the EU and Russia: The Integration
Challenge: R. Dragneva-Lewers: Palgrave Macmillan,” R. Dragneva-Lewers | Palgrave
Macmillan (Palgrave Macmillan UK), accessed January 4, 2021,
https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137516251.

[16] Rfe/rl, “Juncker Says Ukraine Not Likely To Join EU, NATO For 20-25 Years,”
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Juncker Says Ukraine Not Likely To Join EU, NATO For 20-25
Years, March 4, 2016),
https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/27588682.ht
ml.

[17] Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia,” August 24, 2016,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12447.

[18] Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri and About The Author(s) Taras Kuzio is a Non-Resident
Fellow at the Centre for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Study and Professor, “Causes and Potential Solutions to the Ukraine and Russia
Conflict,” June 27, 2020,
https://www.e-ir.info/2020/06/27/causes-and-potential-solutions-to-the-ukraine-and-russia-conflic
t/.

[19] “The Disastrous EU Summit on the European Partnership,” Atlantic Council, August 29,
2019,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-disastrous-eu-summit-on-the-european-pa
rtnership/.

[20] R. Dragneva-Lewers and K. Wolczuk, “Ukraine Between the EU and Russia: The Integration
Challenge: R. Dragneva-Lewers: Palgrave Macmillan,” R. Dragneva-Lewers | Palgrave
Macmillan (Palgrave Macmillan UK), accessed January 4, 2021,
https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137516251.

[21] Paul D'Anieri, “Conclusion: Ukraine, Russia, and the West ‒ from Cold War to Cold War
(Chapter 8) - Ukraine and Russia,” Cambridge Core (Cambridge University Press), accessed
January 4, 2021,
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ukraine-and-russia/conclusion-ukraine-russia-and-the-we
st-from-cold-war-to-cold-war/19BCA2B98D3D9264721D8F06A9266DA8.
 Bibliography

Bates, Theunis. “Ukraine's Fraught Relationship with Russia: A Brief History.” The Week -
All you need to know about everything that matters. The Week, March 8, 2014.
https://theweek.com/articles/449691/ukraines-fraught-relationship-russia-brief-history.

Dabrowski, Marek, Marta Domínguez-Jiménez, and Georg Zachmann. “Six Years after
Ukraine's Euromaidan: Reforms and Challenges Ahead.” Bruegel. Accessed January 4,
2021.
https://www.bruegel.org/2020/06/six-years-after-ukraines-euromaidan-reforms-and-challen
ges-ahead/.

D'Anieri, Paul. “Conclusion: Ukraine, Russia, and the West ‒ from Cold War to Cold War
(Chapter 8) - Ukraine and Russia.” Accessed December 28, 2020.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ukraine-and-russia/conclusion-ukraine-russia-and-t
he-west-from-cold-war-to-cold-war/19BCA2B98D3D9264721D8F06A9266DA8.

“The Disastrous EU Summit on the European Partnership.” Atlantic Council, August 29,
2019.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-disastrous-eu-summit-on-the-europe
an-partnership/.

Dragneva-Lewers, R., and K. Wolczuk. “Ukraine Between the EU and Russia: The
Integration Challenge: R. Dragneva-Lewers: Palgrave Macmillan.” R. Dragneva-Lewers |
Palgrave Macmillan. Palgrave Macmillan UK. Accessed January 4, 2021.
https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137516251.

D’Anieri, Taras Kuzio and Paul, and About The Author(s) Taras Kuzio is a Non-Resident
Fellow at the Centre for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Study and Professor. “Causes and Potential Solutions to the Ukraine and
Russia Conflict,” June 27, 2020.
https://www.e-ir.info/2020/06/27/causes-and-potential-solutions-to-the-ukraine-and-russia-
conflict/.

Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Accessed January 4, 2021.

https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3006-economic-interdependence-in-ukr.aspx.

“The 'Euromaidan', Democracy, and Political Values in Ukraine.” Accessed January 4,

2021.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321503071_The_'Euromaidan'_Democracy_and
_Political_Values_in_Ukraine.

Fisher, Max. “Everything You Need to Know about the Ukraine Crisis,” September 3, 2014.
https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know.
Kuzio, Taras. “Ukraine between a Constrained EU and Assertive Russia,” August 24,
2016. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.12447.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Nathan Chandler, Keith Crane,
and Thomas S. Szayna. “How Are European Countries Vulnerable to Russia?” RAND
Corporation, January 18, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1305.html.

Morrison, John. “Pereyaslav and after: the Russian-Ukrainian Relationship,” October 1,

1993. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/69/4/677/2406623.

Rfe/rl. “Juncker Says Ukraine Not Likely To Join EU, NATO For 20-25 Years.”
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Juncker Says Ukraine Not Likely To Join EU, NATO For
20-25 Years, March 4, 2016.
https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25-years/275886
82.html.

“The Ukraine-Russia Conflict.” United States Institute of Peace, December 30, 2016.
https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/03/ukraine-russia-conflict.

“The Ukraine-Russia Conflict: Signals and Scenarios for the Broader Region.” Accessed
January 4, 2021.
https://www.academia.edu/33561804/The_Ukraine_Russia_Conflict_Signals_and_Scenari
os_for_the_Broader_Region.

“Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy.” Accessed January 4, 2021.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45008.pdf.