Book Reviews 1059

Nissim Momigliano L, Robutti A, editors (1992). Shared experience: The psychoanalytic dialogue. London:
Karnac.
Widerberg B (1969). Adalen 31. Svensk Filmindustri.

Antonino Ferro
Via Cardano 77, I–27100 Pavia, Italy
E-mail: antonino.ferro3@tin.it

Pluralidad y Diálogo en Psicoanálisis

[Plurality and Dialogue in Psychoanalysis]
by Joan Coderch
Herder, Barcelona, 2006; 220 pp; e24.90

Both in his clinical practice and in his publications (La Interpretacin en Psicoanlisis
[Interpretation in Psychoanalysis] and Teora y Tcnica de la Psicoterapia Psicoanalti-
ca [Theory and Technique of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy], among others), Dr Joan
Coderch has shown a deep interest in unravelling the complexities of this ‘impossible
profession’ that is psychoanalysis. He always compares his own clinical experience
with the relevant literature without taking shelter in our predecessors’ authority.
Coderch seems to be especially concerned with specifying what is the true nature of
psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts, and which theories are best suited to sustain it.
It is surprising to find that Freud himself was still interested in this topic as late
as 1928. At that time he wrote to his disciple Oskar Pfister, ‘‘I want to protect anal-
ysis from physicians … and … from priests. I want to entrust it to a profession that
doesn’t yet exist, a profession of secular ministers of souls, who don’t have to be
physicians and must not be priests’’ (Freud, 1963, p. 126).
In a subsequent letter Freud clarifies that, when he envisions his psychoanalysts
of the future, he is thinking of a very distant future. Such a statement seems to
anticipate that the understanding of the true nature of psychoanalysts will demand
many years and great effort. I think that we have not truly acknowledged, as Bion
has done, that psychoanalytic practice is a new profession for mankind. This fact
generates such personal and social apprehension that we all feel reassured if we can
refer psychoanalysis to a discipline already known to us (medicine, for example).
The novelty of psychoanalysis probably underlies the first problem posited by
Coderch, namely, the current plurality of psychoanalytic theories – a ‘tower of
Babel’ that seems to threaten us with the confusion described in the myth. Coderch
appears tolerant toward this theoretical and practical diversity. He even tends to
see it as beneficial. Diversity, in his view, offers us the freedom to offset the danger
of its triggering inquisitorial responses such as, ‘‘This is not psychoanalysis’’, ‘‘So
and so is not a psychoanalyst’’, and so on.
I have some objections to such a benevolent attitude. First, as Coderch himself
admits, an old tenet established by Freud himself prescribes that we can call
psychoanalyst anyone who sufficiently believes in the psychic unconscious, the
transference, resistance, and infantile sexuality or the Oedipus complex.
In the past I have found the comparison between psychoanalysis and Darwinism
suggestive. Despite debates among current neo-Darwinians, Darwinism has held on
to the hard core of its thought – the idea of evolution, the common origin of the

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species and natural selection. The main difference with psychoanalysis is that
Darwinism does not involve a professional practice, and it is probably at this level
that the strongest disagreements among psychoanalysts occur. Once again, Bion
has expressed it very clearly:
The gap between what some regard as analysis and what I, as a Kleinian, regard as analysis
is very wide and widening. This is attributed to differences in theory. I do not believe that
what separates scientists is their difference in theory. I have not always felt ‘separated’ from
someone who differs from me in the theories he holds … Conversely, I have felt very far sep-
arated from some who, apparently, hold the same theories.
(Bion, 1970, p. 86)
I believe that over the course of his study Coderch has reached a decisive conclu-
sion – every interpretation produced by an analyst bears a manifest and an implicit
(pragmatic – communicative) content. Through the implicit content ‘analysts
convey their attitude and their way of relating to their analysands’. The manifest
content varies according to the analysts’ theoretical model. The implicit one, by
contrast, hinges on the setting and on the analysts’ stance regarding the analytic
process, and remains unchanged throughout it. Based on these presuppositions, the
author ends this first chapter stating that ‘‘if analysts work properly, they always
convey to their analysands their interest in listening to them and in understanding
them, as well as their wish not to thwart their analysands’ freedom and to help
them think and become responsible for their actions. This explains why all analy-
sands may be helped by their analysts despite differing interpretations’’. In this
phrase – ‘‘if analysts work properly’’ – Coderch is ‘forced’ to state that to provide a
clarifying element in our present-day ‘Babel’, we must determine the identity of the
analyst. What is implicit here is that if the pragmatic–communicative aspect of
interpretation shows that analysts are steering, leading, or subjugating their
patients, or making them into the analysts’ own image (into their disciples, for
instance), it means that analysts have not understood their role, regardless of the
appropriateness of their theories.
Even though the IPA itself has organized meetings on psychoanalytic identity in
the past, it seems that there have been no further attempts to discuss the topic, per-
haps out of fear of the inquisitorial persecution mentioned by Coderch. Nevertheless,
avoiding an honest discussion of this problem implies ignoring a question often
raised by Freud himself, not only in his letters to Pfister, but also in texts such as
The Question of Lay Analysis and many others that would take too long to mention.
Finally, even on this point we would be atypical, because in all other professions
the suitability of their members is openly discussed. Other professionals do not seek
shelter in an illusory attempt to belong to a collective that is free of these problems.
Moreover, permanent conflict within psychoanalytic associations belies such an illu-
sion. I wonder if what lies at the bottom of this conflict is the crucial problem of
the psychoanalytic identity of their members, which nobody wants to debate
candidly.
In the following chapters Coderch attempts to establish a connection with kin-
dred disciplines such as philosophy of language, philosophy of science, hermeneu-
tics, neuroscience and sociology. He thus breaks with a dreadful tendency among
psychoanalysts to withdraw into their own theories and methods, as though fearful
of contamination or of the distortion of their ideas.

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Thus in Chapter 3 the author tries to determine the scientific status of psycho-
analysis by means of current findings in philosophy of science. Once again we can
see how the author strives to establish the identity of this new activity and disci-
pline called psychoanalysis. I think that if any doubt remained that psychoanalysis
is indeed a ‘new and unknown activity for mankind’, it would be dispelled by the
fact that one hundred years after its birth we are still trying to discern its nature.
As we all know, the problem stems from the fact that both Freud and his follow-
ers have tried to determine whether this new discovery should be considered a natu-
ral or a humanistic science. The so-called ‘establishment’ or ‘institutional
psychoanalysis’ seems to have opted for the wish to belong to the group of the
‘hard’ natural sciences, which is, as Coderch states, the most prestigious club. Freud
and many of his disciples tried to achieve membership by developing a meta-
psychology – a theoretical creation that would gradually become the serious theory,
the basic theory of the new science.
Oddly enough, on this point as in many others Freud’s followers seem to have
been more Catholic than the Pope. Freud himself did not take his metapsycho-
logical postulates so seriously. We may recall here that he referred to instincts as
‘our mythology’, and to metapsychology as ‘our witch’. Furthermore, he considered
many of his theories as provisory scaffoldings that might be replaced at any time
by others better suited to explain the observed facts. Yet just like his famous theory
of the death drive, what had started as pressing speculation became for many of his
disciples a fundamental aspect of the theoretical edifice of psychoanalysis.
Coderch is right again when he introduces here the fundamental criticism of the
group of anti-metapsychologists led by George Klein. However, he does not quote
what in my view is this author’s most significant essay, Two Theories or One?
(Klein, 1973). The most important aspect of this article is that it shows both how
inadequately metapsychology explains psychoanalytic phenomena, and the serious
distortion created by transforming this set of ideas into the essential and only psy-
choanalytic theory. Clinical theory is thus denied its theoretical status, when it is
precisely this conceptualization that revolutionized psychology and the entire cul-
ture of the twentieth century as well.
Coderch seems confident that the debate will lean towards the hermeneutic pos-
tulates of psychoanalysis. He doubts, however, that we psychoanalysts are capable
of resigning our illusion of practising a ‘serious’ science, for we do not acknowl-
edge that this metapsychological aspiration renders our discipline the target of
malicious and groundless attacks by naturalists. We have defended ourselves from
such attacks by resorting to the well-worn argument of resistance aroused by
psychoanalysis. Yet we should admit that natural scientists do not usually attack
the validity of humanistic sciences such as history, sociology, anthropology, or
even psychology. These disciplines remain within their research realm without
claiming to belong in that of the natural sciences. In addition, it seems to be gen-
erally accepted that scientific criticism must be offered by one’s peers. Only physi-
cists have the authority to discuss physics theories, or biologists to discuss
biology theories, and so on. We should ask then why so many strangers spend
their time criticizing psychoanalysis with no grounds to do so. Maybe the main
reason is that we pretend to be what we are not. In fact, many of these attacks
are reminiscent of the pecks endured by roosters when they try to invade other
farmyards.

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The author’s research brings to light the fact that just as in 1928, when Freud
was writing to Pfister, in 2006 we have not yet deciphered the nature of our disci-
pline. Nonetheless, Coderch takes a big step forward towards establishing our iden-
tity when he points out that the use of empathy is an essential and specific aspect
of our work. This element is absent from natural scientific research and is present,
by contrast, in fields such as cultural anthropology. Cultural anthropologists need
to identify with their object so as to understand it and, like us, run the risk of not
being able to step outside such identification. (It is not rare to learn of anthro-
pologists forever trapped in the tribe they were studying.) Ethologists, sociologists,
archaeologists, historians, and linguists may need to use empathy to a certain
extent, which might be an indicator of our discipline’s membership group. Let us
mention here that none of these specialists is the object of impertinent assessments
by naturalists.
In this sense, it seems to me that Coderch himself shows some doubt regarding
the abandonment of the naturalist dream when he argues in favour of equating
causes and reasons. In the end, however, he opts for the usefulness of maintaining
the old differentiation established by Dilthey. I usually illustrate this problem with
the example of the Tajo river. During the entirety of its known life, the Tajo had
flowed through the Castilian plateau into the Atlantic Ocean in Portugal, until a
manmade project diverted part of its waters to the Mediterranean. It is obvious
that the river has no attachment, intention, or preference for one or the other sea,
and that it is moved only by causes such as geographical features and gravity.
Human reasons modified its final destination.
What is specific to mental life is precisely intentionality and desire, and hence
responsibility, guilt and, ultimately, freedom. The latter is inherent to human life
and, in fact, in the metapsychological endeavour there is an attempt to eliminate it
because philosophy of science used to consider teleology an anathema (there seems
to have been some change regarding this issue). Nevertheless, as George Klein
concludes:
Grasping intentionality and meaning will always constitute a special level of observation.
Psychoanalysts should never feel guilty regarding the goals of their enterprise. There is no
such thing for analysts as stimuli and responses, but rather encounters that bear meaning.
Their task is to decipher that meaning.
(Klein, 1970, p. 591)
At the end of his research Coderch concludes that ‘‘psychoanalysis is a science,
albeit not of a scientific–natural nature. It is a human science, because it is based
on observation and its interpretation, but it is conducted by means of a dialogue
between two human beings’’ (p. 134). This definition, with which I basically agree,
contains, however, a very important problem that requires more attention. Bion has
often remarked on it. I am referring to the fact that observation of psychoanalytic
phenomena does not take place through the sensory organs, as does observation in
other sciences. Anxiety, love, or envy cannot be touched, seen, or heard, for they
possess no sound or colour. Physicians may see, hear, and touch, but psycho-
analysts must perceive the objects of their research through non-sensory perception,
even though we may be confused by expressions as common as ‘‘I can clearly see
what you feel’’; or, like Marcellus’ in Hamlet, ‘‘Something is rotten in the state of
Denmark’’.

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I am certain that Coderch knows Bion’s ideas very well because I have seen them
mentioned elsewhere in his work. I believe, however, that it would have been appro-
priate to introduce them in this book, because they may be clearly linked to the
notion of empathy. Even though Bion believed that psychoanalytic phenomena are
perceived by intuition while Freud considered that they are perceived by conscious-
ness, I believe that there are other writings by Freud that are much more relevant
here. For instance, Totem and Taboo, where he states as follows:
For psycho-analysis has shown us that everyone possesses in his unconscious mental activity
an apparatus which enables him to interpret other people’s reactions, that is, to undo the dis-
tortions which other people have imposed on the expression of their feelings.
(Freud, 1913a, p. 160)
I think that this text strongly supports the specific relevance of empathy high-
lighted by Coderch, and also sheds some light on the problem posited by Bion.
Freud always sought contact and support among the scientific disciplines of his
time, and sometimes regretted finding neither. For instance, he often yearned for a
science such as ethology, which emerged shortly after his death and would have
served as the basis for his theory of the drives. Bowlby, Fonagy, and others have
drawn from the findings of this discipline later on. One wonders what Freud would
have done with current genetics in connection with his complementary series, with
present-day anthropology in relation to his ideas on totems and taboos, or with
current sociology and his views on civilization and its discontents … Psycho-
analysts who succeeded him, however, seem to have preferred to keep his work, as
Home has humorously pointed out, like the room of the dead husband – untouch-
able, bolted and barred by the negating widow.
Coderch, on the contrary, prefers to open it to let in the fresh air of philosophy
of language and philosophy of science. He also welcomes the ideas of neuroscience
on such a fundamental topic in our practice as memory, or its not less decisive
acknowledgment of a non-repressed unconscious. Finally, in his chapter devoted to
narcissism the author studies the sociology of our times. Present-day culture is
utterly dominated by a narcissism that negates dependency to the extreme of deny-
ing our reliance on our own planet Earth, which we are plundering and pillaging in
a manic, inconsiderate and suicidal way. Indeed, as Coderch stresses, it is the exac-
erbated narcissism of our society that transforms psychoanalysis itself into a most
unpopular science. The cause of its unpopularity lies in the fact that one of the
bases of its theory is precisely the essential need to re-establish the acknowledg-
ment, care and respect we owe to the objects upon which our lives depend. Interest-
ingly enough, on this point we come into conflict once again with the so-called
‘hard’ sciences, whose arrogant materialism makes them accomplices in the deterio-
ration of our society.
Bion mentions an exchange he once had with an atomic physicist for whom
Greek, Latin, poetry and literature were but trivial matters with which Oxford
University pitifully wasted its time. The British psychoanalyst deplores the fact that
scientists seem to be more interested in developing their intelligence and cunning to
make their discoveries than in attaining the wisdom to apply them. That is why
atomic physics and so many other scientific and technological marvels, such as the
Internet, are associated with the anxiety caused by their use by ignorant and evil
minds.

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1064 Book Reviews

Like the humanistic disciplines abused by Bion’s atomic physicist, psychoanalysis

can promote the development of the necessary wisdom to make appropriate use of
such dangerous knowledge. Yet I wonder if, immersed as we are in our society,
psychoanalysts are aware of this ability, or if we remain dazzled by the sparkling
triumphs of the hard sciences and disregard our own potential.
Coderch’s book devotes a chapter to psychoanalysis and psychotherapy that is
the most clarifying I have read on this topic. Instead of opposing them in a
more or less radical and sterile way, as authors usually do, he establishes a dia-
logue between these practices that is both enriching and consistent. I only have
one objection to make. Why does he define psychotherapy as applied psycho-
analysis? I have always been struck by the fact that psychoanalysts have not fol-
lowed Freud on this point, when they have been so orthodox on so many
others.
As is well known, Freud was eager to consider psychoanalysis as a completely
autonomous discipline that could be applied to very diverse matters such as medi-
cine, sociology, religion, history, or the arts – hence his Claims of Psychoanalysis to
the Interest of the Non-psychological Sciences (Freud, 1913b). Nonetheless, his fol-
lowers, showing a rare unanimity, only regard as psychoanalysis its medical applica-
tion, with three or four weekly sessions and so on. Everything else is applied
psychoanalysis, which is obviously second-class. Freud, by contrast, applied psycho-
analysis to everything, from the Wolf Man to Hamlet, Moses and religion, the
primitive tribe, or Gradiva. The assessment his disciples have made of these studies
has been so confusing that they have not hesitated to place in the highest level,
conversely, writings such as Little Hans and The Schreber Case. These should never
be included in the category of plain psychoanalysis, but rather in that of applied
psychoanalysis. Why haven’t psychoanalysts followed Freud’s judgement? Have they
chosen to do otherwise so that they could remain forever connected with a ‘respect-
able’ science such as medicine? Are we aware that this intimate connection was the
fate dreaded by Freud, since it reduces psychoanalysis to a small space in the treat-
ment section of the psychiatry manuals?
The book ends with a rigorous chapter, along the same lines as the rest of the
text, on The Plurality of Child Psychoanalysis, written by another outstanding Cata-
lan psychoanalyst, Joana Mara Tous.
One final conclusion: this is the type of research that present-day psychoanalysis
needs if it intends to survive into the twenty-first century. Every psychoanalyst who
reads it, therefore, decisively contributes to his or her own survival.
References
Bion W (1970). Attention and interpretation. London: Tavistock Publications. [(1974). Atención e interpretación.
Buenos Aires: Paidos.]
Freud S (1913a). Totem and taboo. SE 13:1–164.
Freud S (1913b). The claims of psycho-analysis to scientific interest. SE 13:165–92.
Freud S, Meng H, editors (1963). Psycho-analysis and faith: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister,
Mosbacher, translator. London: Hogarth.
Klein G (1970). ¿Dos teorı́as o una? Rev Argentina Psicoanál 27:553–94.

Juan Francisco Rodrı´guez

Avda. Brasil 4, 28020 Madrid, Spain
E-mail: galeria@ireneteubal.com.es

Int J Psychoanal (2008) 89 ª 2008 Institute of Psychoanalysis

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