PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

ALFREDOPANGILINAN y TRINIDAD

Facts:

Two charges of rape of his own daughter was filed against the accused. On May 5, 1997, appellant,
who was arrested and detained with no bail recommended, filed a petition for bail, but denied. On
June 9, 1999, the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned, scheduled
his arraignment. On June 17, 1999, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty to the charges against him. Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it adduced during
the hearing for the petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence the trial court
admitted, the trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision. On September 9, 1999, the trial
court convicted appellant of two counts of rape and imposed on him the capital punishment for
each count. On November 16, 2005, the CA affirmed the death penalties imposed by the trial court
but modified the amounts of damages awarded. On January 27, 2006, the CA elevated the records of
the case to the SC for automatic review.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC had no jurisdiction because he was not properly arraigned.

Whether or not the appellant’s rights were prejudice by the fact that there was late arraignment.

Ruling:

a. No. Appellant assails his conviction because he was not

ISABELO A. BRAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013 FACTS: A letter
complaint was filed before the PACPO, Ombudsman, alleging that the ASEAN Summit
street lighting projects were overpriced. Braza, being the president of FABMIK, was one of
the respondents. The OMB-Visayas filed before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec.
3(g) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be placed in double
jeopardy should he be arraigned a new under the second information because his previous
arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if he was regularly arraigned, double
jeopardy would still not set in because the second information charged an offense
different from, and which did not include or was necessarily included in, the original
offense charged. Braza was effectively discharged from the first Information upon the filing
of the second Information but said discharge was without prejudice to his prosecution for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it proper that a
new preliminary investigation be conducted under the new charge. ISSUE: Whether or not
double jeopardy has already set in basis of Braza "not guilty" plea in the first Information
and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the second Information. RULING: NO.
The Sandiganbayan's Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions for
Braza's arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the Information would be
amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected against double
jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended information without
losing his right to question the same. The relinquishment of his right to invoke double
jeopardy had been convincingly laid out. Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent.
Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
 consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to
conveniently avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information. There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for the
same offense.

ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGOG.R. No. 226679FACTS:

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr.

(Estipona)

is charge with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165

(Possession of Dangerous Drugs).

The said accused, not being lawfully authorizedto possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and
without the corresponding license or prescription unlawfully and feloniously have, in his
possession and under his control and custody,one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystallinesubstance, which when examined were
found to be positive for MethamphetamineHydrocloride

(Shabu),

a dangerous drug.

Estipona filed a

Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,

prayingto withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section
12,Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-
timeoffender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates:a)

the intent of the law

b)
the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court

; andc)the

principle of separation of powers

The prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A.
No.9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it
wouldallow plea bargaining. Nonetheless, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the
accused toenter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in
paragraph 3, Section2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23
of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, it is left without any choice but to reject the
proposal of the accused."

Respondent Judge issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It opined that:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining,encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."

The accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, ineffect,
suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining
as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

(However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with
possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez,
(2010).

The ruling of the SupremeCourt in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent
application of Republic Act No. 9165 inorder to serve an intent for the enactment of the law,
that is, to rehabilitate the offender.)

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.ISSUE:I.Whether
section 23 of republic act no. 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.II.Whether the respondent judge,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction when he
refused to declare section 23 of R.A. 9165 as unconstitutional.
III.Whether section 23 of republic act no. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the
said law, is unconstitutional for being violative of the constitutional right to equal
protectionof the law.HELD:I.

Yes. The Supreme Court held under section 5 (5), article VIII of the 1987 constitutionexplicitly
provides that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedureis now their
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislativedepartments.

It should be stressed that this power was granted by the Constitutions for the Courtto enhance its
independence

for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence andintegrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor aschampions of justice."Thus,
Section 13, Article VIII of 1935 Constitution which provides that the Congress shall havethe
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure,and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." However under the
1987 Constitutionsuch power took away from Congress

In fine, such power is no longer shared by the SupremeCourt with Congress, more so with the
Executive. The 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the
concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying inone body the Court's
rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a“stronger and more
independent judiciary." Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority torepeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.

The court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rulesof
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The otherbranches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectivelyrepeal, alter
or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed fromthis perspective, the court has rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress,
in theexercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court

(Rules),

to wit:1

Fabian v. Desierto

-Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in anadministrative disciplinary case
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the

Rules

instead of appeal by
certiorari

under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.2.

Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.

- TheCooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of
the

Rules.

3.

RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees;

Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. JudgeCabato-Cortes;

In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees;

and

Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al

Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment
of legalfees imposed by Rule 141 of the

Rules.

4.

Carpio-Morales

v.

Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)

- The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme
Court from issuing temporaryrestraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin an investigation conducted by theOmbudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes
Rule 58 of the

Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the

Rules,
the Court asserted its discretion toamend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's
authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of
the safeguards of their institutional independence.II.

No.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the SupremeCourt
that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions.Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of
R.A. No. 9165unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration might
have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial stationIII.The court
did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to
theconstitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future
discussion bythe Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
Pending deliberationon whether or not to adopt the statutory provision

in toto

or a qualified version thereof, the courtdeem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against
plea bargaining on drug cases untiland unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issuedfor the purpose.WHEREFORE, the petition for

certiorari

and prohibition is GRANTED.

Section 23 of Republic Act No.9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-
making authority of the SupremeCourt under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.Additional discussion on Plea Bargaining

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights,

i.e.,

the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. Indetermining whether a rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the

judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law

andfor justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away avested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classifiedas a substantive matter; but

if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule dealsmerely with procedure.

It is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases inall courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing
criminal charges byagreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
"important," "essential," "highlydesirable," and "legitimate" component of the
 administration of justice.In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval. There isgive-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining. Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,

the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right

. Instead,it

operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process forenforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
andredress for a disregard or infraction of them.

In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious
andsobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocentuntil the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to bail(except those charged with offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua

when evidence of guilt is strong),

to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness

againsthimself.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying
himrather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go
to trial. Under the present

Rules,

the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on theconsent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guiltyto a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for
this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, which

may

allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. Theword

may

denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to makesuch
plea.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the
trial court'sexercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. " If the
accused moved to plead guiltyto a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow sucha plea only when the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crimecharged. The only basis on which
the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change inthe former plea of not
guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soonas the
prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the
trial courtto assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances
upon which the accusedmade his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and
of the public will be served. The rulingon the motion must disclose the strength or weakness
of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any findingon the weight of the evidence on hand, the
judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea isimproper and irregular.

Daan vs. SandiganbayanFacts:

Daan and Kuizon were charged of 3 counts of malversation of public funds and falsificationof public
document by a public officer or employee and entered a plea of not guilty to thecases filed
against them.

Thereafter, they offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and offered to substitute thesame with
a plea of guilt provided that the mitigating circumstances of confession of plea ofguilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if suchproposal is
not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of notguilty to the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with aplea of guilty,
but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a privateindividual. On the
other hand, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty tothe malversation
cases with a plea of guilty to the lesser crime of failure ofan accountable officer to render
accounts.

The Sandiganbayan denied their Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendationof the
Prosecution on the ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify itsapproval.
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner’s Motion

for Reconsideration.Hence, this case filed by Daan.

Issue:

WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition forPlea
Bargain?

Held:

Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the acc

used’s request to Plea Bargain.

Section 2, Rule 116 authorizes Plea bar

gaining which provides that: “

At arraignment, the accused,

with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court toplead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged

. Afterarraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offenseafter withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is

necessary.”

Here, the Records show that there was a

favorable recommendation by the Office of the SpecialProsecutor to approve petitioner's motion to

plea bargain

. Moreover, the

lesser offense ofFalsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Accounts by an

Accountable Officer arenecessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of PublicFunds.

Specifically, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty tothe
lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear
thatpetitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll ofthe Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of
Malversation of PublicFunds, while the informations contain allegations which make out a
case for Malversation againstpetitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion,
theoretically, petitioner may still be heldliable for Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to renderaccount was in violation of a law
or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting withinthe prescribed
period.Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case
likewiseconstitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.
RULE 119

G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR. v. ERWIN YERRO,ERICO
YERRO AND RITCHIE YERRO

FACTS:

A criminal complaint for estafa filed by petitioner against respondents ErwinYerro, Erico Yerro, and
Ritchie Yerro (respondents) before the RTC.In the course of the proceedings, the counsel on record,
private prosecutor Atty. Norberto Luna, Jr. (Atty. Luna), manifested that there was an on-going
settlement between petitioner and respondents, and that they would file the necessary
motionrelative thereto.Although a Compromise Agreement was reached between petitioner
andrespondents relative to the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution failed to furnishthe RTC a
copy of the same and file the necessary motion as manifested. As aresult, the RTC, in an Order
dated September 18, 2001 (September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order), dismissed the case for failure of
the prosecution to comply withthe court’s directive, as well as to take any further step to
prosecute the case, inview of the accused’s constitutional right to speedy trial. On June 15, 2004,
or more than 2 years from the issuance of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order, petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, claiming that he learned of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order
only on June 7, 2004, and that he believed in good faith that the case was merely archived in
accordancewith the terms of the Compromise Agreement. RTC denied petitioner’s motions,holding
that the dismissal, which was grounded on failure to prosecute, had long become final and
executory and thus can no longer be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. CA affirmed the
denial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was provisional dismissal of the case.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Yes. The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissalwithout prejudice to the
reinstatement thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule117 of the Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 8.
Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent
of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. Under the afore-cited provision, a case is provisionally dismissed if the
following requisites concur:(a) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the
accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for its provisional dismissal;(b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case;(c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing
the case provisionally; and(d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of
provisional dismissal of the case. In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met.
While it may appear that the respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the
Compromise Agreement, the prosecution neither presented the same for the court’s approval nor
filed the required motion to that effect such that no order was in fact issued granting the
provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, petitioner’s assertion that the respondents are estopped
from invoking their right to speedy trial is without basis.

Estrada v. People, G.R. No. 162371. August25, 2005

FACTS:

An Information charging Mary Helen Estrada withestafa was filed with the RTC of Las Piñas
City.Estrada signed an undertaking that in case of herfailure to appear during the trial despite due
notice,her absence would constitute as an express waiver ofher right to be present during trial and
promulgation of judgment and the lower court would then proceedwith the hearing in absentia.
When the schedule forhearing and presentation for evidence came, counselfor petitioner failed to
appear. Estrada jumped bailand was considered to have waived her right topresent evidence. The
RTC thus rendered judgmentbased only on prosecution evidence: JunimarBermundo (complainant)
applied for employment inJapan with Estrada and paid P68,700.00 for it.Estrada then told Junimar to
proceed to the JapaneseEmbassy to claim the plane tickets, however, helearned that nothing was
filed with the Embassy.Junimar decided to abandon his plan of going toJapan and just get the money
from Estrada which she failed to return despite receipt of a demand letter.She was convicted of
Estafa by means of false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations by theRTC. The CA denied her
Petition for Certiorari, thus Estrada filed the present petition for review oncertiorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court denied Estrada of her constitutional right to be heard and to be
assisted by counsel

RULING:

NO. At the outset, the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail while trial was pending should be
emphasized. In fact, it appears that from the beginning, the address she furnished the trial court was
incorrect. From such facts alone, petitioner’s arguments regarding the validity of the proceedings
and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of her constitutional right to due
process are doomed to fail. The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable.”

The Court likewise upholds the validity of the promulgation in absentia of the RTC judgment and the
RTCs Order dated April 5, 2000, denying due course to petitioners notice of appeal for being filed
beyond the reglementary period. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
Rule applicable in this case since promulgation was held before the effectivity of The Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, provides:

The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of
thecourt in which it was rendered. However, if theconviction is for a light offense, the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of his counsel orrepresentative. When the judge is absent or
outsideof the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. If the
accused isconfined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the executive judgeof the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or
detention upon request of thecourt that rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have authority toaccept the notice of appeal and to approve the bailbond pending
appeal. The proper clerk of court shallgive notice to the accused personally or through hisbondsman
or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. In casethe
accused fails to appear thereat the promulgationshall consist in the recording of the judgment in
thecriminal docket and a copy thereof shall be servedupon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is
forconviction and the accuseds failure to appear waswithout justifiable cause, the court shall further
orderthe arrest of the accused, who may appeal withinfifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
to him orhis counsel. Clearly, promulgation of judgment in absentia isallowed under the Rules. In
Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that such promulgation is validprovided the following
essential elements are present:(a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminaldocket; and (b) that
a copy thereof be served uponthe accused or counsel. In the present case, therecords bear out the
fact that copies of the decisionwere sent by registered mail to the given addressesof petitioner and
her counsel, Atty. Herenio Martinez,and there is no question that the judgment wasindeed recorded
in the criminal docket of the court.From the foregoing, petitioner is deemed notified ofthe decision
upon its recording in the criminal docketon September 3, 1997 and she only had fifteen (15)days
therefrom within which to file an appeal.Evidently, the notice of appeal filed only on April 5,2000
was filed out of time

h.

Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr. v. Leila De Lima GR No. 197291 Date: April 3, 2013

DOCTRINE: The admission as a state witness under RA 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said
witness cannotsubsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses
to testify. The immunity for thestate witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court.

FACTS:

Relying on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, the panel of prosecutors charged 196
individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. Dalandag was thereafter
admitted into the witness protection program of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Datu Andal
Ampatuan Jr. is then mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay and one of the principal suspects in
the massacre, wrote to Secretary Leila De Lima requesting the inclusion of Dalandag in the
information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. Secretary De Lima denied Ampatuan Jr.’s request,
prompting Ampatuan Jr. to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC, seeking to compel Secretary
De Lima to charge Dalandag as another accused.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not the Secretary of Justice can be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag
as a co-accused in the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission as state witness.

RULING

No. Dalandag’s exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the panel of prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an
accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, which requires that “the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear
to be responsible for the offense involved,” albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some
exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state
witness. While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily but
with due regard to the proper administration of justice. Anent the requisite that there must be an
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to
rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is
obvious the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that
matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state
witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence in his possession and
whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct
or corroborative evidence, which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one, an the like. On the other
hand, there is no requirement under RA 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as
one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program.
The admission as a state witness under RA 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and the said witness
cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to
testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such
witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to
him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial
court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said
accused from the information.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued
on June 27,2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.