Remedies

Introduction:
The victim of a tort may avail himself of two types of remedies, judicial or extra-judicial remedies.

A. EXTRA-JUDICIAL REMEDIES
Extra-judicial remedies are remedies obtained by ways of self-help or abatement of nuisance where the
aggrieved party need not resort to judicial proceedings in order to assert his right.

(a) Self-help
The principle is that when a mishap befalls a person or his property 当不幸事故降临一个人或其财
产时, he must act accordingly so as to minimise the extent of his loss or damage. The person exercising self-
help can use no more force than is necessary to achieve his objective. Self-help is a remedy which is always
available unless expressly excluded. It is however, generally not encouraged by the law as the plaintiff might
be too emotional and therefore not impartial in judging the extent of necessary steps that he ought to take. In
Supreme Court case of Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & Ors v Poh
Swee Siang, the learned Hashim Yeop Sani SCJ said that sec. 7 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 provides
that a person entitled to the possession of land may recover it in the manner prescribed by the law relating to
civil procedure. In the context of the provision of sec. 7 of the Act, the word “may” is permissive and
discretionary and it is not obligatory on the part of a person entitled to the possession of land to restore
exclusively or solely to a Court of law. In other words, sec. 7 of the Act does not exclude the common law
remedy of self-help. This is a remedy which is always available unless expressly excluded. The plaintiff
therefore, might act more than what is reasonably necessary in the circumstances and in doing so, he might
exceed his own rights despite his efforts towards self-help.

(b) Abatement of nuisance

An occupier of land or any other person by the authority of the occupier may abate or remove a
nuisance. Prior notice ought to be given to the offending party as to the proposed act of abatement, except
where there is a situation of emergency where either life or property is in grave danger, or, in order to reduce
the nuisance, one is not required to enter onto the land of the other party. In reducing the nuisance, the
plaintiff must exercise care so as not to cause unnecessary damage as a result of his own reaction. If there
are two methods of reducing the nuisance, the plaintiff should adopt the safer of the two methods.

Abatement 减 量 of a public nuisance is a statutory duty of the local authority under the Local
Government Act 197. In Section 73(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, a local authority has the power to prohibit,
remove, abate and prevent any nuisance occurring within its area. Section 82 of the Act provides the power
of the local authority to serve a notice on the person by whose act, default or sufferance if satisfied of the
existence of a nuisance.

In Lemmon v Webb, the appellant sold an area of land to the respondent who then cut off the
branches from the neighbouring trees which overhung his land. The branches were cut back to the property
boundary without first notifying the tree owner who is the appellant. The appellant sought damages and an
injunction against the respondent to restrain him from the cutting of further branches without his permission.
The court held that if he can get rid of the interference or encroachment without committing a trespass, he
may do so whenever he pleases, no notice or previous communication is required by law. Besides, in
Burton v Winters & Anor, the defendant's predecessor had built the garage and it encroached four and a
half inches onto the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff thus, built a wall on the defendant's land in front of the
garage. An injunction was granted against the plaintiff but she persisted. Another injunction was issued to
prevent her from trespassing and interfering with the defendant's land and property. She however, attempted
to build another wall, and damaged the garage. The court held that although there was a common law right
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of self-redress for trespass by encroachment, such a right was restricted to simple cases which did not
include urgent cases which required an immediate remedy. In this case, it was too late and inappropriate for
the plaintiff to exercise the right of seif-redress. The demolition of the garage wall was out of proportion to
the damage suffered by the plaintiff. (only allowed for straight forward issue)

B. JUDICIAL REMEDIES
A judicial remedy is one that is sought and obtained by the plaintiff through action in a court of law.
The judicial remedies that will be discussed in this chapter are damages injunction, and specific restitution
of property.

(a) Damages
This remedy comprises monetary compensation and is the main and most common form of remedy
sought by a plaintiff in a tort action. In order to successfully claim for damages, the plaintiff must prove two
things; firstly, that a tort has occurred; and secondly, that the plaintiff has suffered some damage. It must be
stressed that the requirement of proving damage is a general principle as there are torts which are actionable
per se that is; these torts are actionable without proof of damage such as intentional torts. Damages may still
be awarded by the court as recognition of the plaintiff's right. Where actual damage is suffered by the
plaintiff, the amount of damages will differ accordingly to reflect the loss incurred.

1. Damages recoverable only once

The general principle of damages recoverable only once is that there is only one cause of action for
each tort and damages must be recovered once for all and must be awarded in a single lump sum. In Fetter v
Beale, the plaintiff recovered damages from the defendant for assault and battery. Several years later, he
discovered his injuries were much more serious than he had at first thought and he brought a second action
against the defendant for additional damages. The court denied his second claim and stated that a person
may only claim for damages once for a single tort. Of course, if the defendant commits another tortious act
against the plaintiff, albeit the same kind of tort but at a later date, the plaintiff would have a separate cause
of action in respect of the second tort. Besides, in Henderson v Henderson, applying the doctrine of res
judicata, it was held that the parties must bring their whole case before the court so that all aspects of the
case may be considered before a final decision is made once and for all. The parties cannot return to court to
advance arguments or claims which they failed to put forward on the first occasion.
However, there are two exceptions to this general principle. Firstly, violation of two separate
rights. If the defendant's single wrongful act challenges two or more different rights of the plaintiff, or a
series of the defendant's wrongful acts challenges several rights of the plaintiff, the plaintiff may institute
separate actions in respect of each of his rights.
 In Brunsden v Humphrey, the plaintiff's taxi collided with the defendant's van due to the latter's
negligence. The plaintiff had received damages for the damage to his taxi but subsequently brought a
second claim for personal injuries sustained in the collision. The court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to bring the second claim as two of the plaintiff's rights had been infringed in the collision.
 (Criticized Brunsden’s case) In Talbot v Berkshire County Council, the Court of Appeal however
stated that the exception will only exist for the plaintiff to make a second claim, if there exists
'special circumstances' and these are, firstly, where the plaintiff was unaware of the existence of the
claim, or secondly, where there was an agreement between the parties that the action would be held
in abeyance, or thirdly, where the plaintiff had not brought his case on the ‘second’ issue in reliance
on a representation made by the defendant.
 In Wain v F Sherwood and Sons Transport Ltd, the plaintiff was involved in a road traffic
accident. He claimed damages for damage caused to his van but did not bring any claim for personal
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injury. This is due to the counsel failure to advise the plaintiff that if the pleadings were not amended
to include a claim for personal injury, such action might be barred in future. As a result, when the
plaintiff brought a second action in respect of his back injury, the Court of Appeal refused him
remedy. The fact that the claim for the back injury was not made was due to his counsel's negligence,
did not fall within 'special circumstances, as mentioned in Talbot's case.
 In Malaysia this 'literally interpretation' can be seen in the case of Malbai v Nawi. Here the plaintiff
and defendant were in a fight and X, after helping the defendant, beat the plaintiff up. The plaintiff,
who had successfully claimed from X, subsequently claimed from the defendant. The defendant
contended that the assault was a joint assault, and since the plaintiff had claimed from X, he could
not claim from the defendant. The court held that the attacks from X and the defendant were different
in nature, and the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was allowed.
The second exception is continuing injury. It occurs where the damage is continuous, such as a
continuing trespass to land and continuing nuisance. Trespass is actionable per se and gives rise to a fresh
cause of action from day to day. In the case of continuing nuisance, a fresh cause of action arises upon
materialisation of further or subsequent damage.
 In Darley Main Colliery v Mitchell, the defendant mined underneath the plaintiff's land. The
plaintiff's land subsequently caved in and the defendant paid damages accordingly. Fourteen years
later, the plaintiff's land caved in again. The House of Lords held that the plaintiff was entitled to
damages in the second cause of action. Damages however could only be recovered for any damage
up to the day of the trial. A plaintiff cannot claim for any prospective damage; however, probable the
future damage may be.
 In West Leigh Colliery Co Ltd v Tunnicliffe & Hampson Ltd, the court held that a plaintiff
cannot recover damages for any reduction in the value of his land based on damage that might occur
in the future.

2. Restitutio in integrum
The general rule of Restitutio in integrum is that damages are to be assessed on a compensatory
basis, which is to restore the plaintiff to his position prior to the commission of the tort. In Livingstone v
Rawyards Coal Co, it was held that restitutio in integrum is that sum of money which will put the party
who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in If he had not
sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation.
However, there are two limitations to the general principle namely mitigation of damage and final
damage caused by plaintiff’s impecuniosity. For mitigation of damage, even though the defendant is
generally fully liable for the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has a corresponding duty to
minimise his loss. The plaintiff will not be able to claim as damages, any loss that he has incurred due to
lack of reasonable steps on his part, what is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances in each case.
 In The Oropesa, there were storms out at sea and a collision happened between two ships, the
Oropesa (O) and the Manchester Regiment (M). M suffered bad damage. The captain of the ship
ordered 50 of his crew over to the O by lifeboat. One hour later, he boarded a lifeboat with 15
crewmembers, in order to seek advice, assistance and to enable help messages to be sent for M.
However, the heavy seas caused the lifeboat they were on to capsize and as a result, nine of the
crewmembers drowned. It was held that the deaths of the seaman were directly caused by the
negligence of O. There was no novus actus interveniens. The captain’s decision to leave the boat
naturally resulted from the emergency of the severe damage caused by O. Thus, there was no break
in the chain of causation by the captain.
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Next, the final damage caused by plaintiff’s impecuniosity. 由原告的不当行为造成的最终损害
If the plaintiff cannot minimise his loss due to his impecuniosity, the defendant will be held to be fully
liable, but where the damage itself is a product of the plaintiff's impecuniosity, then it becomes too remote.
In Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd v Canterbury City Council, the defendants had, in the course of building
operations, caused nuisance and damage to the plaintiff’s building. The dispute was very lengthy, the costs
of repair increased accordingly, and the parties now disputed the date at which damages fell to be assessed.
A judge in this case stated that in so far as the plaintiffs had in fact suffered more than the loss assessed on a
market basis, the excess flowed directly from their lack of means and not from the tortious act, or
alternatively it was too remote in law. In modern terms, he would have said that it was not foreseeable.

3. Claims for damage to property

Next, claims for damage to property. The general principle is that the defendant is liable for all the
damage or loss to the plaintiff’s property as a result of the defendant’s tort.
In cases where damage is caused to real property, restitutio in integrum is achieved by the
application of one or the other measures which are diminution in value assessment or cost of repair or
reinstatement. Diminution in value assessment refers to the value of the property reduced due to the
damages caused by the defendant. In other words, it is the sum of reduction in the value. One measure is to
take the capital value of the property in the undamaged state and to compare it with its value in a damaged
state. This is generally referred to as the 'diminution in value' assessment. The other is to take the cost of
repair or reinstatement. Generally, the 'diminution in value' assessment applies where the plaintiff intends
to sell the property and the 'reinstatement' assessment applies where he intends to occupy the premises. Both
of this measure will depends on the value of the property.

4. Claims for pure economic loss

The general principle is that pure economic loss is recoverable, subject to some requirements
includes, if the loss is caused by a negligent misstatement. If the loss is caused by the defendant's negligent
act, recovery is possible provided it is foreseeable.
In Steven Phoa Cheng Loon v Highland Properties Sdn, the plaintiff was the owner of blocks two
and three of an apartment. As a result of the collapse of block one, the apartments in blocks two and three
became worthless. The plaintiff then brought an action against the developer, the engineer others. The
engineer was held liable for negligence as he should reasonably foresee the danger of a landslide. Hence, he
should exercise reasonable care to either design and construct the foundation or ensure that slope reasonable
stable. Besides, he is also liable on nuisance as a professional qualification should reasonably foresee that
the omission for not take reasonable standard in supervising the pipe culvert and retaining wall will lead to
damage to the tower.

5. Joint and several tortfeasors

Where several tortfeasors commit a tort, they are deemed as joint tortfeasors and if the claim is made
against all at the same time, only a single award is permissible against all the tortfeasors.
For joint tortfeasors, they are deemed to have participated in some common enterprise. In
Jayakumar v Chen Kit Hong & Anor, it was held that where injury inflicted onto the plaintiff is
indivisible, any tortfeasor whose act has been proximate cause of the injury must compensate for the whole
of it. The defendant may subsequently in a separate action seek to recover any contribution from a joint
tortfeasor
For several tortfeasors, where independent acts of the defendants coincide to produce the final
damage to the plaintiff. Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ explained the common law position as follows in Malaysian
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National Insurance Sdn Bhd v Lim Tiok that if each of several persons, not acting in concert, commits a
tort against another person substantially, contemporaneously and causing the same or indivisible damage,
each tortfeasor is liable for the same damage.
A discharge from liability to one will be an effective discharge to all the other joint tortfeasors;
whereas this rule does not apply to several tortfeasors. In Malbai v Nawi, it was stated that where there are
two assaulters but one has been forgiven, then both parties are discharged from the assault. This principle is
not applicable if the assaults are separate. In the case of joint tortfeasors, what is important is the conspiracy
between both parties towards the final damage. Mere similarity of design on the part of the Independent
actors, causing independent damage, is not sufficient to make them joint tortfeasors.

TYPES OF DAMAGES
A) General and special damages
There are several types of damages and the first one is general and special damages. General
damages refer to damage or loss that the law presumes a person incurs as a consequence of a tort. The exact
amount is not or cannot be quantified at the time of the trial. An award for general damages includes,
damages for pain and suffering, and society’s prejudice as a result of a libel or slander. A claim for loss of
future earnings and loss of earning capacity come under general damages. General damages usually referred
to damages "at large", the sense that they are not capable of being assessed by reference to any mechanical,
arithmetical or objective formula. In Ong Ah Long v Drs Underwood, it was held that general damages are
simply compensation that will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural
and direct consequences of the wrongful act so far as money can compensate.
Special damages refer to damage or loss which the law does not presume to arise from the tort. The
plaintiff must give notice in his pleadings that he is claiming for special damages, with full details and
particulars. It must therefore be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. They are recoverable only where
they can be included in the proper measure of damages and are not too remote. For instance, medical and
hospital bills or the loss of earnings right up to the date of trial. Special damage also refers to damage that
the plaintiff needs to prove in torts that require proof of damage, examples being the torts of negligence,
nuisance, slander which are not actionable per se and strict liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.
Damages for Personal Injury
There are two types of claims that may be made for personal injury which are pecuniary loss and
non-pecuniary loss. Pecuniary losses refer to those losses suffered by the plaintiff that can be calculated
which includes the claim for loss of earnings or loss of future earnings, nursing bills and funeral expenses
while non- pecuniary losses refer to those losses suffered by the plaintiff that cannot be calculated. It
includes the claim for pain and suffering, loss of amenity or loss of enjoyment of right and loss of reputation
in defamation cases.
Cases for non-pecuniary loss
(pain and suffering & loss of amenities)
 In Mohd Arif Abdullah v Mohamed Mat Nor & Afiqah Wira Construction Sdn Bhd, it
involved in a personal injury claim in an accident. The plaintiff claimed for several damages in
his pain and suffering. The court awarded RM 110, 000 because he had one severe traumatic
head injury with intracranial Haemorrhage (RM 100,000), soft tissues injuries (RM 5,000) and
scars (5,000).
 In Thangavelu v Chia Kok Bin, an infant plaintiff, though in a state of coma for about eleven
months before he died, was not totally unconscious. The court found that there was an element of
pain and suffering and awarded RM 20,000 for pain and suffering and loss of amenities. In
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awarding damages for pain and suffering the court need to consider the mental suffering of the
plaintiff and his expectation of life that has been reduced by the injuries.
(Unconsciousness does not preclude a claim for loss of amenities, but only pain and suffering)
 In West v Shephard, the victim was knocked down as she crossed the road. She was seriously
injured and became permanently bedridden and in need of continuous nursing attention in
hospital. She could show some sign of recognition of relatives and of members of the nursing
staff, but her expectation of life was seven years from the accident. Lord Morris said that
unconsciousness is relevant to those damage which can only exist by being felt or thought or
experienced. It does not, however, eliminate the actuality of the deprivations of the ordinary
experiences and amenities of life which may be the inevitable result of some physical injury. The
victim was awarded damages for the loss of amenities of £17,500.
 In Wise v. Kaye, Veronica Wise, aged 20, was involved in a road accident. She went into coma
immediately and it was certain that she would never recover or become aware of her Situation.
Lord Justice Upjohn said that the plaintiff while living should not be prevented from so claiming
merely because she is wholly ignorant of the grave loss she has suffered. The injury and damage
has been suffered. Her ignorance of either is immaterial. The victim was awarded damages for
the loss of amenities of £15,000.

Laws: Civil Law Act 1956 (CLA)

Multiplicand
Section 28A of the CLA provides the damages in respect of personal injury where subsection (?)(?) states
that …
(1) In assessing damages recoverable in respect of personal injury which does not result in death, there shall
not be taken into account—
(a) any sum paid or payable in respect of the personal injury under any contract of assurance or
insurance, whether made before or after the coming into force of this Act;
(b) any pension or gratuity, which has been or will or may be paid as a result of the personal injury; or
charity cannot be deduct
(c) any sum which has been or will or may be paid under any written law relating to the payment of any
benefit or compensation whatsoever in respect of the personal injury such as SOCSO.
(2) In assessing damages under this section,
(a) no damages shall be recoverable in respect of any loss of expectation of life caused to the plaintiff by
the injury; （ if P 自杀的，不能 claim）

(b) if the plaintiff’s expectation of life has been reduced by the injury, the Court, in assessing damages
in respect of pain and suffering caused by the injury, shall take into account any suffering caused or
likely to be caused by awareness that his expectation of life has been so reduced;
(c) in awarding damages for loss of future earnings the Court shall take into account—
(i) that in the case of a plaintiff who has attained the age of sixty years or above at the time when he
was injured, no damages for such loss shall be awarded; and in any other case, damages for such loss
shall not be awarded unless it is proved or admitted that the plaintiff was receiving earnings by his
own labour or other gainful activity before he was injured; 只有 prove 因为伤导致他不能做工，才
可以 claim

(Not receiving earning during the injury)

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 In Dirkje v Mohd Noor, a Dutch national, was a qualified registered nurse. On 1 November 1983 she
took no pay leave for a period of two and a half years to enable her to go on a world tour. She arrived in
Malaysia on 21 October 1984, that is, 20 days after the 1984 Amendment Act had come into force. On
24 October 1984 while cycling towards Ipoh, she was knocked down by a bus. She suffered very severe
injuries. The Supreme Court: The words "before he was injured" in section 28A(2)(c)(i) meant "at the
time" he was injured. Since Dirkje was on no pay leave at the time she was injured, she was not entitled
to any award for loss of future earnings.
 In Tan Kim Chuan v Chandu Nair, the injured appellant was a 12-year-old schoolboy who was not
earning at the time he was injured. The court held that an injured person ought not to get damages in a
claim either for loss of future earnings or loss of earning capacity unless at the date of the accident he
was in fact receiving earnings.
(ii) only the amount relating to his earnings as aforesaid at the time when he was injured and the
Court shall not take into account any prospect of the earnings as aforesaid being increased at some
time in the future; 他受伤前拿多少钱就赔多少，就算他过不就应该加薪，也不能算

(Increase in Prospective earnings)

 In Marappan v Siti Rahmah, it involved a 33-year-old trainee teacher whose injuries in 1986 resulted
in complete paralysis in her four limbs. At the time of her injury she was receiving RM345 as a training
allowance. She would have completed her training and would have received a trained teacher's pay. In
the judgement, the prospect of her earnings being increased as a future trained teacher was ignored.
(iii) any diminution of any such amount as aforesaid by such sum as is proved or admitted to be the
living expenses of the plaintiff at the time when he was injured. 记得剪掉 living expenses

(Living expenses to be deducted)

 In Chang Chong Foo v Shivanathan, the plaintiff had given evidence that he was a daily rated worker
and that from his income he spent RM60 a month on petrol for his motor-cycle and RM5 per day for
meals at his place of work. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the claimant's petrol and meal
expenses should be deducted. as the disabled claimant would no longer incur those expenses and that the
expenses were directly connected to earning his living.
 (liberal approach) As to loss of earnings, the learned High Court judge, Richard Tallala J in Tey Chan &
Anor v South East Asia Insurance Bhd opined that the living expenses to be deducted under s. 28A(2)
(c) of the Civil Law Act 1956 are not the whole of the first plaintiff's expenses of living but the expenses
reasonably incurred by him in earning his living, such as the extra cost of having his meals and
refreshment while at work, which cost would not ordinarily have been incurred had he stayed at home.
Otherwise, it can lead to absurd and unjust consequences which could not be the intention of Parliament.
Multipliers
Moreover, Section 28A (2)(d)(?) of the CLA also provides the damages in respect of personal injury where
in assessing damages for loss of future earnings, the Court shall take into account that—
(i) in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years or below at the time when he was
injured, the number of years’ purchase shall be 16; and （30 或以下-16）

(ii) in the case of any other person who was of the age range extending between thirty-one years and
fifty-nine years at the time when he was injured, the number of years’ purchase shall be calculated by
using the figure 60, minus the age of the person at the time when he was injured and dividing the
remainder by the figure （31-59 之间- 拿 60 减他现在的岁数了除 2）

Calculation of damages
Formula: Multiplier x Multiplicand
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 Multiplier: Age between 31 to 59 = 60 - (age at the time injured) / 2
 Multiplier: Age 30 years and below = 16
 Multiplicand: Take into account Section 28A(1) and (2)

Example: -
Multiplicand:
- XXX is earning RM 1000 per month
Calculation: RM1000 x 12 (1 year) = RM12,000
- Monthly expenses are meal and petrol cost total of RM 2000 a month
Calculation: RM2000 x 12 = RM2400
RM12000 – RM2400 = RM9600 (Multiplicand)
Multiplier:
- Applicant aged 24, below 30 years old, use 16
Multiplicand x Multiplier
Calculation: RM9600 x 16 = RM153600
Damages: RM 153,600

Pre-Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2019 (no need to refer in problematic)

Prior to the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2019, Section 28A(2)(c)(i) provides that in awarding
damages for loss of future earnings the Court shall take into account that in the case of a plaintiff who has
attained the age of fifty-five years or above at the time when he was injured, no damages for such loss shall
be awarded; and in any other case, damages for such loss shall not be awarded unless it is proved or
admitted that the plaintiff was in good health but for the injury and was receiving earnings by his own labour
or other gainful activity before he was injured.
In Tan bin Hairuddin v Bayeh a/l Belalat, the plaintiff had attained the age of 59 years at the time
of his injury. It was held that he was not entitled to both pre-trial and post-trial loss of earnings, even though
he could prove such loss of earnings. In Osman Effendi v Mohd Noh, KN Segara J, after referring to the
requirement of good health in the new section, said that there was always a presumption that the plaintiff
was in good health before the injury and that the requirement of good health before the injury was fulfilled
when there was no challenge by the defendant either specifically in his pleadings or in his cross-examination
of the plaintiff. Besides, in Loh Hee Thuan v Mohd Zani bin Abdullah, although there was evidence
before the court that the injured plaintiff had a history of diabetes mellitus also an old infarct in the right
basal ganglia of the brain. The High Court find that the plaintiff was leading a normal life before the
accident. The various doctors' evidence showed that the plaintiff's diabetes was well under control. The fact
that he had led a normal life up to the time of the accident and had led evidence that he was "receiving
earnings by his own labour or other gainful activity before he was injured" is sufficient in my view to satisfy
the requirement of proof as stated in s. 28A(2)(c)(i) of the Act.
(Multipliers)
Moreover, Section 28A(2)(d) also provides that in assessing damages for loss of future earnings the
Court shall take into account that—
(i) in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years or below at the time when he was injured,
the number of years’ purchase shall be 16; and
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(ii) in the case of any other person who was of the age range extending between thirty-one years and
fifty-four years at the time when he was injured, the number of years’ purchase shall be calculated by
using the figure 55, minus the age of the person at the time when he was injured and dividing the
remainder by the figure 2.

However, after Civil Law (Amendment) Act 2019, (RFER ABOVE)

Hence, it shows that the maximum age for one to claim for damaged for personal injuries had been
extend from 55 years old to 60 years old. Besides, for multiplier, the calculation for one who aged
between 31 to 54 is 55 minus the age of the person at the time when he was injured and dividing the
remainder by 2. Currently, since the maximum aged had been extend to 60 years old, the calculation for
one who aged between 31 to 60 will be 60 minus the age of the person at the time when he was injured
and dividing the remainder by 2. However, it must be noted that the calculation for the person who was
of the age of 30 or below at the time when he was injured is remain the same which is time 16.

(Refer to RX’s note, remedies II)

Types of damages
B) Aggravated damages
C) Contemptuous damages
D) Nominal damages
E) Exemplary damages
Judicial Remedies (part II)
B. Injunction
C. Specific Restitution of Property
D. Extinction of Liability