Tranquil Bites

ADDED TOPIC:
1. EXPEDITED -
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/footnotes-by-tranquil-g-s-salvador-iii
/314226232/expedited-rules-in-criminal-cases.html
2. DEATH OF A PARTY - DONE
/369156/death-of-a-party-in-a-civil-case.html
3. BODY WORN CAMERAS -
/361590/rules-on-body-worn-cameras-compressed.html
4. EXPROPRIATION - DONE
/358560/can-the-government-take-your-property.html
Can the government take your property?
Date: July 2, 2021

Link:
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/footnotes-by-tranquil-g-s-salvador-iii/358
560/can-the-government-take-your-property.html
Main Doctrine:
"The protection of property rights is necessary to preserve and enhance one’s
personal dignity that is comparable with the rights to life and liberty."
● The ability of the State to exercise its power to take private property for public
use upon payment of just compensation is known as “eminent domain.” The
legal procedure for its taking is specified as “expropriation.”
● The power of eminent domain affects a landowner’s right over his private
property, which is protected by the Constitution. The protection of property
rights is necessary to preserve and enhance one’s personal dignity that is
comparable with the rights to life and liberty. Therefore, such exercise of the
power must undergo painstaking scrutiny especially when it is exercised by a
local government with merely a delegated power (City of Manila v. Roces, et al.,
G.R. No. 221366, July 8, 2019).
● An action for expropriation is filed with the Regional Trial Court regardless of
the property’s value or nature, i.e., whether it is a real or personal property. The
reason is that expropriation “deals with the exercise by the government of its
authority and right to take property for public use” (Bardillon v. Barangay Masili,
G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003).
● The plaintiff or complainant in expropriation cases is the government, its
instrumentality or any local government unit, while the defendant is a person
who owns or claims to own, or occupies any part or any interest on the property
to be expropriated (Section 1, Rule 67, Rules of Civil Procedure).
● The action is commenced by filing a verified complaint. There is an assumption
that only real properties can be expropriated; however, personal properties
may also be subject to the same procedure.
○ The verified complaint must state the following: (a) the right and purpose
of expropriation; (b) describe the real or personal property to be
expropriated; and (c) the defendant/s in the action. If the title to the
property to be expropriated appears to be in the name Republic of the
Philippines but is occupied by private individuals, or if the title is obscure
or doubtful, such facts must be alleged in the complaint (Section 1, Rule
67, Rules of Civil Procedure).
● If the defendant-owner has no objection to his property being expropriated, he
may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect,
specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be
interested. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to receiving the notices of all
proceedings affecting the same. However, if a defendant has any objection to
the allegations in the complaint he shall serve his answer within the time stated
in the summons (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Civil Procedure).
● The government may withdraw or dismiss the complaint at any time before the
rendition of the order of expropriation (Section 4, Rule 67, Rules of Civil
Procedure).
● The fundamental basis for the expropriation of lands, under the power of
eminent domain, is public use. However, the very moment when it appears, at
any stage of the proceedings, that the expropriation is not for public use, the
action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the
action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some
public use. That is true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other
stage of the proceedings (Republic v. Heirs of Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, January
12, 2015 citing Manila Water District v. de los Angeles).
● Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a
corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement
resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed
by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation”
(National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro, G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008).
In one case decided by the Supreme Court, after the transmission lines were fully
constructed on portions of land by the National Power Corporation, it then
prohibited the planting or building of anything higher than three meters within
the area traversed by said lines (G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008).
● An important question is whether the government can take possession of the
property while the action for expropriation is pending. The answer is in the
affirmative. However, it is important to ascertain which between Republic Act
8974, otherwise known as “An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right of Way,
Site or Location for National Infrastructure Projects” or Rule 67 (Expropriation)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure will apply before the court issues a the writ of
possession.
○ Under Republic Act 8974, the government is required to make immediate
payment to the property owner upon filing of the complaint equivalent to
100% of the zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated. For
the issuance of the writ of possession under Rule 67, the government is
required to make an initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary equivalent to the assessed value of the property, for purposes
of taxation.
○ However, the initial deposit for the local government unit needed to take
immediate possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
action is at least 15% of the fair market value based on the current tax
declaration (Republic v. Holy Trinity Development, G.R. No. 172410, April
14, 2008). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly pronounced
that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation by mere
resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly
requires an ordinance and not a resolution (Beluso v. Municipality of
Panay, G.R. No. 153974, August 7, 2006).
○ Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, which is the first stage of
the expropriation procedure, the court shall proceed to the second stage
or the determination of just compensation. The court shall appoint not
more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the property sought
to be taken (Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Civil Procedure).
○ The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the
property not taken and deduct the consequential benefits derived by the
owner from the public use of the property taken. But in no case will
consequential benefits assessed exceed consequential damages assessed;
otherwise, the government will be able to take property without just
compensation (Section 6, Rule 67, Rules of Civil Procedure).
● Jurisprudence has defined just compensation in expropriation cases as:
○ [T]he full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true measure is not
the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to modify
the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample (Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation v.
Republic, G.R. No. 218628, September 6, 2017 citing NPC v. Court of
Appeals)
● Recently, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) sought the
assistance of the Supreme Court to “look into the possibility of considering
expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of right-of-way for priority Build,
Build, Build projects …as an urgent matter… [and to] issue policy and procedural
guidelines for efficient handling of expropriation cases” (Memorandum Circular
No. 08-2020). To address the impending volume of expropriation cases, the
Supreme Court designated eleven Regional Trial Courts in Imus City, Trece
Martirez City, Dasmarinas City, Tagaytay City, Caloocan City, and Manila as
Special Expropriation Courts for Public Roads (Memorandum Circular No.
08-2020).
● The Special Expropriation Courts shall devote at least one day a week to hear
expropriation cases. The filing of a motion for postponement shall not be allowed
except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure, or physical inability of the
witness to appear and testify. The expropriation cases shall be terminated within
180 days from the initial presentation of evidence, and judgment shall be
rendered within 90 days from submission for decision, pursuant to the 2019
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (OCA Circular 12-2021).
● While the government can take property for public use upon payment of just
compensation, it must not be exercised in an oppressive, capricious, or
whimsical manner. The State must always be mindful that property rights are
as much protected by the Constitution as life and liberty. When a property is
unjustly or illegally taken by the government, it is not only a title to the land
that is taken away, but also shelter, a source of livelihood, or enjoyment.
Can the government take your property?
Date: August 6, 2021

Link:
590/rules-on-body-worn-cameras-compressed.html
Main Doctrine:
● "These will help deter the excessive use of force by law enforcement officers in
the execution of arrest and search warrants."
● The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that “an arrest is made by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.” However, “no violence or
unnecessary force shall be used in making the arrest” (Section 2, Rule 113). The
restraint to be employed on the arrestee is only that which is necessary for his
detention.
● Implementing a search like an arrest is undertaken by law enforcement officers.
It can either be through an order of the court in writing, known as a search
warrant, or a warrantless search. There can also be instances when a person is
arrested and his body is searched as an incident thereof for dangerous weapons,
anything used in its commission, or to recover the fruits of the crime (Section 13,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
● The Supreme Court recently issued the "Rules on the Use of Body-Worn
Cameras in the Execution of Warrants" (A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC). The Rules shall
apply to all applications, issuances, and executions of arrest and search
warrants under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 2, Rule 1).
● A “body-worn camera” is an electronic camera system designated to law
enforcement units that may be worn during law enforcement activities for
creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, and processing
audio-visual recordings (Section 4, Rule 1, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● During the issuance of a warrant of arrest, upon the filing of criminal information
and finding of probable cause, the trial court must issue an arrest warrant with
an order requiring the use of at least one body-worn camera and one
alternative recording device, or a minimum of two devices (Section 1, Rule 2,
A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC). The same requirement must be reproduced in the search
warrant, if the judge finds probable cause for its issuance. (Section 3, Rule 3, A.M.
No. 21-06-08-SC).
● An applicant for a search warrant shall state in the application the availability or
unavailability of body-worn cameras to be used in the execution of the search
warrant. In case of their unavailability, the applicant may request for authority
to use alternative recording devices (Section 1, Rule 3, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● An “alternative recording device” is an electronic camera system that is not a
body-worn camera, which is capable of creating, generating, sending, receiving,
storing, displaying, and processing audio-visual recordings. It may be used as a
substitute for body-worn cameras in case of unavailability (Section 4, Rule 1,
A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● When making an arrest or search by virtue of a warrant, the officers wearing the
body-worn cameras or alternative recording devices shall, as early as
practicable, notify the person to be arrested or searched and the other subjects
of the recording that the execution of the warrant of arrest or search is being
recorded and that they are making an arrest or search pursuant to a warrant
issued by a court (Section 2, Rule 2; Section 4, Rule 3, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● However, a law enforcement officer who fails, without reasonable grounds, to
use bodyworn cameras or alternative recording devices during the arrest or
search; intentionally interferes with the ability of the device to capture the audio
and video recordings; or manipulates such recordings may be liable for contempt
of court. The violations shall be without prejudice to any administrative, civil, or
criminal liability. (Section 5, Rule 2; Section 7, Rule 3, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● If a body-worn camera is unavailable, at least two alternative recording devices
must be used. The officers having such cameras shall ensure that they are worn
in a conspicuous location and in a manner that maximizes their ability to
capture a recording of the arrest. Both the video and audio recording functions
of the cameras shall be activated as soon as the officers arrive at the place of
arrest or search (Section 3, Rule 2; Section 5, Rule 3, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● The cameras shall not be deactivated until the arrest has been fully concluded
and the arresting officers have delivered the person arrested to the nearest
police station or jail pursuant to Rule 113, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The same procedure shall be observed when a peace officer
effectuates a warrantless arrest (Section 3, Rule 2, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC). In
case of a search, the camera will not be deactivated until the search has been
concluded and the officers have returned to the police station (Section 5, Rule 3,
A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● All recordings from the body-worn cameras or alternative recording devices shall
be stored in an external media storage device and simultaneously deposited in
a sealed package with the issuing court. The report shall be accompanied by
affidavits of the officers whose body-worn cameras or alternative recording
devices were used to capture the recordings (Section 4, Rule 2; Section 6, Rule 3,
A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● In cases of warrantless arrests (Section 21, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, as amended) such as buy-bust operations or entrapment, the media
representative may be allowed to record the operation and the recording must
be turned over to and downloaded by the data custodian or his or her
representative within 24 hours from the time of the recording (Section 3, Rule
2; Section 1, Rule 4, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● When those devices are used during warrantless arrests by law enforcement
officers, the recordings and the affidavits of arrest shall be submitted to the
prosecutor conducting the inquest proceedings, and they shall form part of the
records of these proceedings (Section 4, Rule 2, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC). The
reason for the submission to the prosecutor is that there is no pending case in
court yet.
● Failure to observe the requirement of using body-worn cameras or alternative
recording devices shall not render the arrest unlawful or render the evidence
obtained inadmissible (Section 5, Rule 2, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC). However, a
similar failure to use the said devices during the execution of the search
warrant shall render the evidence obtained inadmissible. (Section 7, Rule 3,
A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● If a search is conducted or effected without the use of body-worn cameras or
alternative recording devices, in the absence of a reasonable grounds, a motion
to suppress evidence may be filed by the person searched. This remedy is
likewise available to persons searched as an incident to an arrest by virtue of a
warrant, when such an arrest was without the use of those devices (Section 8,
Rule 3, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● The data recorded by body-worn cameras and alternative recording devices are
not public record subject to disclosure, unless the recordings involve an incident
resulting in a loss of life or an assault made on law enforcement officers during
the arrest or search (Section 3, Rule 4, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● Should the arrest or search be complicated by any of the said incidents, the
recordings may be used in court even without the consent of the persons
identified (Section 6, Rule 4; A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● For recordings by law enforcement officers and persons witnessing the arrest
and search to be admitted as evidence, these must be presented during trial and
authenticated by the person who captured the recording. The recordings shall
not be deemed as substitutes for the presentation of witnesses. (Section 5 5and
8, Rule 4, A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● Consent of the person arrested or searched with the use of the recording
devices shall only be asked in the presence of counsel. If the person consents or
remains silent, the recordings may be used by and against him or her in a court
proceeding. If he or she declines, the recordings may not be used by or against
him or her. In the case of minors, consent shall be secured from his or her parent
or guardian (Section 6, Rule 4; A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
● With the issuance of the Body-Worn Camera Rules, it is expected that these will
help deter the excessive use of force by law enforcement officers in the execution
of arrest and search warrants, aid the courts in resolving conflicting eyewitness
accounts, and determine the conditions surrounding the resulting deaths in the
execution of the said warrants (A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC).
Death of a party in a civil case
Date: November 5, 2021

Link:
156/death-of-a-party-in-a-civil-case.html
Main Doctrine:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for.
● There is a possibility that a party may die while an action is pending in the trial or
appellate court.
● The Supreme Court, in the case of Cruz v. Cruz citing Bonilla v. Barcena, declared
that “[t]he question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which
survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental x x x” (G.R.
No. 173292, September 1, 2010).
● If the causes of action do not survive, the injury complained is to the person, with
the property and rights of property affected being incidental (G.R. No. 173292,
September 1, 2010).
○ Examples include: the death of a claimant for support, or death of a spouse
in an action for nullity or annulment of marriage.
● As explained in Bonilla: “x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides ‘that the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.’ From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the
absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law” (G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010 citing
Bonilla).
● In the case of Cruz v. Cruz, Memoracion Cruz claimed that during her union with
her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a
parcel of land located in Tondo Manila; that the said lot was registered in her
name; and that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said
property was transferred by Guido and the latter’s wife to their names in 1991 by
virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973 (G.R. No. 173292, September 1,
2010).
○ Memoracion claimed that the said deed was executed through fraud,
forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, and hence, was null and void.
After presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996.
Through a Manifestation, Memoracion’s counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri,
notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the fact of her death,
evidenced by a certificate thereof (G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).
○ For his part, Guido filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the
plaintiff’s reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive
a party’s death, pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and (2) allowing the case to continue would result in a legal
absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant, who is a
co-plaintiff in this case (G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).
○ The trial court ordered and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
the case without prejudice to the prosecution thereof in the proper estate
proceedings. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the RTC erred in
dismissing the case. The petition for the annulment of a deed of sale
involves property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of
petitioner Memoracion (G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).
● The period to inform or give notice to the court of the party’s death and the
legal representative/s is as important as determining whether the action
survives. Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
“it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his
legal representative or representatives”.
● The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. The court
shall forthwith order the said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice (Section 16,
Rule 3).
● In simpler words, the counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of
the fact of death of the party and give the name and address of the legal
representative/s. The court also has the duty to order the legal representative
to appear and be substituted or to take the place of the deceased party. Both
the counsel and court must comply with the requirements of the Rule.
● Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders the
proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm, because the court acquired
no jurisdiction over the legal representatives or the heirs on whom the trial and
the judgment would be binding (Brioso v. Mariano, G.R. No. 132765, January 31,
2003).
● As we explained in Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121510,
November 23, 1995):
○ “We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that
formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a
subsequent judgment, x x x… the general rule established not because the
rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal
representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because
non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right
to due process.”
○ In the case of de la Cruz v. Joaquin, the petitioners asserted that the RTC’s
Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. They claim that the
respondent died during the pendency of the case. There being no
substitution by the heirs, the trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over
the litigation – “the Rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process” (G.R. No. 162788, July 28,
2005).
○ Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or
belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a
promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is
not a sufficient reason to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party
must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process (G.R.
No. 162788, July 28, 2005).
○ Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves
voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in
defense of the deceased. In the case of Napere v. Barbarona, there is
really no violation of the right to due process; the proceedings cannot be
nullified because the petitioner, who was in fact a co-defendant of the
deceased, actively participated in the case (G.R. No. 160426, January 31,
2008).
○ The records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner
continued to represent them even after Juan’s death. Hence, through
counsel, the petitioner was able to adequately defend herself and the
deceased in the proceedings below. Due process simply demands an
opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied the
petitioner (G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008).
●
● However, not all cases of death of a party in civil case will fall under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
○ For example, if the action is for the recovery of money arising from a
contract, and the defendant dies before the final judgment, it shall not be
dismissed but shall be allowed to continue against the estate until the
entry of judgment. Since the action is for the recovery of money and the
deceased party is the defendant, Section 20 and not 16 of Rule 3 will
apply.
● The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence available in support of one’s defense. When due process is
not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and
protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot
affect the validity of a promulgated decision (G.R. No. 160426, January 31,
2008).
Impeaching a witness
DATE: June 3, 2022
233333/impeaching-a-witness.html
MAIN DOCTRINE:
“Courts do not accept a witness testimony perceived to be biased or prejudiced because it has
no factual basis”
● Courts do not accept a witness testimony perceived to be biased or prejudiced because
it has no factual and evidentiary basis. It is usually an opinion or judgment which is
unfounded. While religious or political beliefs may not be used as basis to disqualify a
witness from testifying, it may be used to discredit him or her by showing bias or
prejudice.
● Impeachment by inadequate perception. Since witnesses are expected to testify on
facts or events perceived, their perception may be tested during cross-examination for
accuracy.
● If a witness is asked in court to identify the offender, the cross-examiner may inquire
about his distance from the offender, his vantage point, his visual acuity or whether he
wears corrective lenses, and the lighting in the vicinity of the crime.
● A damaged witness after cross-examination may be rehabilitated by the proponent’s
counsel during redirect examination, or by presenting another witness to cure or
address the statements of the impeached witness.
● Redirect examination allows the witness to explain or supplement his or her answers
during cross-examination. (Section 7, Rule 132). Thereafter, the adverse party may
conduct a re-cross examination on matters stated by the witness in the redirect
examination (Section 8, Rule 132).
Expedited rules in criminal cases
Date: May 6, 2022

Link:
226232/expedited-rules-in-criminal-cases.html
Main Doctrine:
● “The accused continue to enjoy rights.”
● The Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts (Expedited Rules)
(A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC) included revisions on the Rule on Summary Procedure
(RSP) in criminal cases. The revisions “[took] into account the recent
developments in procedural and substantive law and jurisprudence, as well as
technological advancements”.
● An interesting innovation in the Expedited Rules is the discretion given to the
courts to determine whether the conduct of a videoconference hearing is
practicable and beneficial to the fair, speedy and efficient administration of
justice. The court may, on its own initiative or upon a motion, set the case for a
videoconference hearing at any stage of the proceedings (Rule II, Section 3,
Expedited Rules).
● Under the Expedited Rules, the Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial
Courts (First Level Courts) continue to have criminal jurisdiction over the
following cases: (a) violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; (b)
violations of the rental law; (c) violations of municipal and city ordinances; and
(d) violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. (Rule
I(B), Expedited Rules).
● However, the criminal jurisdiction of the First Level Courts was expanded to
cover offenses wherein the penalty of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year, or
where the fine does not to exceed P50,000, or both, regardless of other
imposable penalties. For offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, the RSP shall apply if the imposable fine does not exceed
P150,000.00 (Rule I(B)(5), Expedited Rules).
● If the criminal case is commenced by a complaint, the court may, after
examination of the complaint and the judicial affidavits and other evidence,
dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause. However, if commenced by
information, the court shall issue an order requiring the accused to submit a
judicial counter-affidavit with the accompanying judicial affidavits of witnesses
and other evidence (Rule III(B), Section 2, Expedited Rules).
EXPEDITED RULES SUMMARIZED

● The accused’s judicial counter-affidavit should be filed in court and served to the
private complainant and the public prosecutor within fifteen calendar days
from the receipt of the order. The judicial affidavit or judicial counter-affidavit
must be prepared earnestly by the parties because it shall take the place of
their direct testimonies (Rule III(B), Section 2, Expedited Rules).
● Upon receipt of the judicial counter-affidavit or once its period to submit has
elapsed, the court shall determine the existence of probable cause. If probable
cause exists, the court shall set the case for arraignment and pre-trial. However,
if no probable cause exists, the court shall order the dismissal of the case and the
immediate release of the detained accused (Rule III(B), Section 3, Expedited
Rules).
● On the other hand, the prosecution may, in lieu of judicial affidavits, submit: (a)
the complainant and the witnesses’ written sworn statements prepared by the
law enforcement agents, or (b) the affidavits filed by the contending parties
with the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation. The sworn
statements and affidavits shall be supplemented by additional direct
examination, if allowed by the court (Rule III(B), Section 2, Expedited Rules).
● Unlike in regular procedure, the court in criminal RSP cases shall not issue a
warrant of arrest against the accused, except for failure to appear despite notice
by the court. Release of the person arrested under the RSP shall either be on
bail, on the accused’s own recognizance or that of a responsible citizen of the
community (Rule III(B), Section 4, Expedited Rules). Recognizance is an
undertaking by an accused or responsible person that the former will appear in
court.
● If the warrant of arrest cannot be served because the accused’s whereabouts are
unknown, the court shall issue an order archiving the case. This order shall be
issued after a return or report is filed by the law enforcement agency showing its
failure to locate the accused, or after six months have elapsed from the issuance
of the warrant of arrest (Rule III(B), Section 4, Expedited Rules).
● The notice of arraignment and pre-trial shall require the attendance of the
private complainant, the accused, their respective counsels and witnesses, and
the law enforcement agents assigned to the case. Before the accused is
arraigned, the court shall inquire about the possibility of a plea bargain between
the parties (Rule III(B), Section 5, Expedited Rules).
● If the accused pleads guilty to the original charge or the lesser offense as a result
of a plea bargain offer, the court shall sentence the accused. If the accused
pleads not guilty, the court shall conduct the Pre-Trial Conference. Admissions
to be taken against the accused must be in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel either in the Pre-Trial Order or the Minutes of the Pre-Trial Conference
(Rule III(B), Section 5, Expedited Rules).
● At the trial, the direct examination of witnesses shall consist of the duly
subscribed written statements given to law enforcement agents, the affidavits
submitted before the investigating officer, or their judicial affidavits; subject to
cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations. The affidavit of the affiant who fails
to appear in court to testify shall not be considered as competent evidence for
the party presenting the affidavit (Rule III(B), Section 6, Expedited Rules).
● The prosecution and defense shall each have sixty (60) calendar days to
complete its evidence presentation. The prosecution will be required to present
evidence ahead of the defense. On the last day of each of their presentations of
evidence, the presenting party shall orally offer the evidence, and the other
party will be allowed to make oral comments. Thereafter, the court shall orally
resolve the offer of evidence (Rule III(B), Section 6, Expedited Rules).
● Postponements of hearings will be allowed only for acts of God, force majeure,
or the physical inability of the counsel or witness to appear. Any authorized
postponement shall not extend the period for presentation of a party’s evidence.
In effect, the party who sought the postponement shall only have the remaining
trial dates assigned to him or her to complete the presentation of evidence (Rule
III(B), Section 6, Expedited Rules).
● The court shall promulgate the judgment no later than thirty calendar days from
the court’s action on the last presenting party’s offer of evidence (Rule III(B),
Section 7, Expedited Rules). The accused, if convicted, may appeal by filing a
notice of appeal together with the proof of payment of filing fees with the First
Level Court that rendered the judgment or final order, within fifteen calendar
days from receipt thereof (Rule III(C), Section 1, Expedited Rules).
● Thereafter, the records will be elevated by the First Level Court to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for review. The judgment or final order by the RTC on the
appeal affirming the conviction shall be final, executory, and unappealable (Rule
III(C), Section 2, Expedited Rules). Henceforth, no further appeal can be made to
or entertained by the Court of Appeals.
● Essentially, there is only a one-step appeal for RSP cases: that is, from the First
Level Court to the RTC. However, if the RTC judgment or final order of conviction
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, then the accused may file a Petition for Certiorari to the Court of
Appeals – but not an appeal.
● The public should not be concerned about the unusual speed of the disposition of
criminal RSP cases, as the protection of the rights of the accused under the
Constitution are not sacrificed for swiftness. The accused’s right to be presumed
innocent, to be informed of the accusations against him, to be heard by the court,
and to meet in person the witnesses testifying against him remain to be
untouched and unimpaired.
Authenticating documents
DATE: June 10, 2022
235102/authenticating-documents.html
MAIN DOCTRINE:
“Our courts cannot render a fair judgment if the documents presented and identified are based
on fabricated facts”
● It is imperative that the documentary evidence marked, presented, and identified in
court is authentic. Otherwise, the truth will not be ascertained by our courts.
● There is a notion that an original document presented and identified by a witness is
automatically authentic or genuine. This is inaccurate since what may appear to be an
original document may have been falsified, forged, or tampered with.
● It is for this reason that every document presented, identified, and marked in court
must be authenticated.
● During the pre-trial, the parties are required to mark their respective evidence, examine
the copy and compare it to the original, and manifest in open court that the copy
presented is a faithful reproduction of the original (Section 2, Rule 18, Rules of Civil
Procedure).
● Even after this point, the documentary evidence is still not definitively authenticated.
The marking and comparison of documents are conducted only to ensure that all the
evidence is available and marked before the trial.
● However, there are instances in pre-trial when the parties may agree on the
genuineness and due execution of the documents (Section 2, Rule 18).
● There are also documents which are judicially admitted for their genuineness and due
execution, such as actionable documents (which are the bases of the claim) not
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party, and documents subject of and
attached to a Request for Admission (Section 7, Rule 8; Rule 26).
● Documents acknowledged before the notary public are authenticated by presenting
the notarized document with the “acknowledgement” in evidence.
● There is no necessity to present the notary public as a witness since the
acknowledgement is prima facie evidence of the execution of the document (Section
30, Rule 132).
● The notary public will only be presented if there are questions on the genuineness and
due execution of the document, such as tampering, insertion of information, or forgery
of signatures.
● In the absence of these issues, a party or witness to a notarized document can testify to
identify the document in court.
● Not all notarized documents are to be considered as public documents. Only those
which are duly acknowledged before the notary public are considered public
documents within the contemplation of the Rules.
● A “jurat” is a notarial act, but will not convert or make the document a public document
(Francisco, Evidence; citing Minutes of the Rules of Court Revision Committee).
● Public documents under treaties and convention which are in force between the
Philippines and the country of source are authenticated by a certificate or form
prescribed in the treaty or convention.
An example is the Apostille Convention, which took effect in the Philippines on May 14,
2019 after the Philippines acceded to it on September 12, 2018.
● Under this Convention, the tedious requirements of legalization in different

jurisdictions are disposed of. The internationally accepted certificate, otherwise known
as an “allonge,” satisfies the requirement of authentication.
● However, this applies only between and among the countries which signed or have
acceded to the convention. The certificate must contain: (a) an authentication of the
signature of the signatory; (b) the capacity in which the person signing is acting; and (c)
where appropriate, the identity of the seal or stamp it bears (Article 2, Apostille
Convention).
● The diplomatic officer or agent need not be presented as a witness in court, since the
presentation of the allonge will be sufficient to authenticate the document attached to
and referred therein. The person who applied for and processed the certificate or
allonge may be presented in court as a witness to identify it.
● In case the foreign country from which the document originates is not a party to the
Apostille Convention or other conventions, the secretary of the embassy or consular
officers of the Philippines in the foreign country, in which the record is kept, may
authenticate it by the seal of their office (Section 24, Rule 132).
● The certificate of the consular office may be identified in a Philippine court by a witness
who applied for and processed its authentication.
● The consular officers who signed the certificate and affixed the seal of the office are not
required to be presented as witnesses.
● After complying with the authentication of documents, these must then be formally
offered.
● According to the Rules, the Court shall not consider evidence which has not been
formally offered (Section 34, Rule 132). In simpler words, only documents formally
offered and admitted by the court can be considered in the rendition of judgment.
● The authentication of documents is indispensable in the orderly administration and
just disposition of cases.
Maintaining judicial stability
Date: JULY 8, 2022, 12:25 AM

242213/maintaining-judicial-stability.html
Main Doctrine:
“Forum shopping is when a party repeatedly avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, but which are all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and are all raising substantially the same issue either pending in, or already resolved
adversely by, some other court.”
● Parties who disagree with a judgment, order, or resolution made by the court
may file a motion for reconsideration in the same action or appeal the decision to
the next level court. They cannot question the judgment, order, or resolution by
commencing another action in a co-equal court.
● This is known as the doctrine of judicial stability, or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court: “[N]o court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction…” (Cabili v. Balindong, A.M. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011)
○ The rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction. It means that a court
shall have jurisdiction over its judgment, excluding all other coordinate
courts. This jurisdiction extends to the execution of the judgment and all
of its incidents, including ministerial acts of officers implementing the
judgment (A.M. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011).
● To allow the breaking down of the incidents of an execution is to split the
jurisdiction of courts. Splitting of jurisdiction is not allowed by our courts. In one
case, a court in Cebu City entertained a motion and issued an order involving the
Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Manila Golf) share in custodia legis, by virtue
of a writ of attachment issued by a co-equal court in Makati City (Yau v. Manila
Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 126731, July 11, 2002).
● In the case of Coronado v. Rojas, Judge Rojas was administratively sanctioned when
he enjoined a final and executory decision of the HLURB, a co-equal body.
● Similarly, the Court penalized two judges for issuing a TRO against the execution
of a demolition order issued by another co-equal court.
● The Court stressed that “when the respondents-judges acted on the application
for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were acting on matters
pertaining to a co-equal court” (Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera and Villarin cited in
Cabili v. Balindong).
● In another case, the Supreme Court declared that the Makati court cannot
entertain the habeas corpus case on account of a pending action in a Cavite court
designating the minor’s grandparents as his guardians ad litem.
● All these cases aim to illustrate that “the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction” (Panlilio v. Salonga citing 30-A Am Jur 605, G.R. No. 113087. June 27,
1994).
Example Case:
● Furthermore, in the case of Barroso v. Omelio, et al., a complaint for a sum of
money, damages and attorney’s fees was commenced by Edgar Barroso against
Dennis Li in Branch 16, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. The complaint
included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment which was granted
upon posting of a bond (G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015).
● In turn, defendant Dennis Li filed a counter-attachment bond issued by Travellers
Insurance & Surety Corporation (Travellers). Subsequently, there was a
compromise between the parties that was approved by the court and was the
basis of the judgment on compromise.
● Unfortunately, Defendant Dennis Li failed to pay the sums of money under the
judgment on compromise. Hence, complainant Barroso filed a Motion for
Execution in Branch 16 which issued a writ of execution against Dennis Li.
Because the writ of execution cannot be satisfied, Barroso then filed a motion for
execution upon Travellers’ counterbond.
● Instead of appearing before Branch 16, Travellers filed a separate case in
Branch 14, RTC Davao City, praying, among others, for: (a) the issuance of a
TRO and preliminary injunction against Sheriff Anggot and Barroso, to prevent
them from implementing the writ of execution; and that (b) Travellers’
counterbond be declared null and void.
● Applying Cabili v. Balindong, the Supreme Court said “[I]t is quite clear that, in this
case, the issuance of the subject writ of preliminary injunction was improper
and, thus, correctible by certiorari”. Herein, the respondent judge (Omelio)
does not have jurisdiction to hinder the enforcement of an order of a co-equal
court (G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015).
● A VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE JUDICIAL STABILITY IMPACTS ON FORUM
SHOPPING.
○ Forum shopping is when a party repeatedly avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, but which are
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and are all raising substantially the same issue
either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court (G.R.
No. 126731, July 11, 2002).
● In Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation, Yau, having intervened in the RTC Makati
City case to protect his interest in the Silverio (Manila Golf) share, should have
desisted from pursuing a similar remedy before RTC Cebu City since it will
pre-empt the authority of RTC Makati City to decide upon his intervention (G.R.
No. 126731, July 11, 2002). Here, Yau is evidently shopping for a forum to obtain
a favorable outcome.
● Determining whether a case pending in one court interferes with the
jurisdiction of a co-equal court goes back to the judge’s judicial competence.
Being in the frontlines of the judicial system, they are given the important task
of ascertaining which cases filed before them may initially prosper and be
heard in court.
Venue is jurisdictional
Date: July 15, 2022, 12:05 AM

243922/venue-is-jurisdictional.html
Main Doctrine:
“Any person who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commits, conspires, or plots to finance terrorism in the Philippines shall be tried in the
country.”
● Criminal action must be commenced in the place where the crime was
committed, or in any place where one of the essential ingredients or elements
thereof occurred (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure).
● This is unlike in civil cases, where it may be instituted in the place where the
property is located, if it is a real action, or where the parties reside, if it is a
personal action, at the option of the plaintiff (Rule 4, Civil Procedure).
○ For example, for homicide, the action must be commenced in the city or
municipality where the victim was stabbed to death; for carnapping, it
must be in the place where the motor vehicle was taken; and for the sale
of illegal drugs, it will be where the buy-bust operation and arrest took
place.
● There are two reasons for the rule: first, trial courts can only hear and try cases
involving crimes committed within their territorial jurisdiction. Second, it is
grounded on the fact that where the crime took place is where the witnesses and
other facilities for his defense are available (Tranquil Salvador III, Criminal
Procedure citing Union Bank v. People, G.R. No. 192565, 28 February 2012).
● However, there are “TRANSITORY OR CONTINUING OFFENSES”, which are
crimes where “some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to
their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another”
(Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, 17 November 2004) In such cases, the action can
be instituted where any of its essential ingredients, or elements, occurred.
○ For example, in violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the venue shall be in
any of the places where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or
dishonored (Rigor v. People).
● In a prosecution for estafa under Article 315(3) of the Revised Penal Code, the
venue shall be either in the place where the deceitful manipulations or false
pretenses of the accused were made, or where the damage was consummated;
as “deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa” (Tuzon v. Cruz, G.R. No.
L-27410, 28 August 1975).
● In kidnapping, the venue shall be wherever the victim is deprived of liberty, as
“deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another”
(People v. Grospe, G.R. 74053, 20 January 1988).
● To determine whether the court has jurisdiction over a criminal case, the
allegations in the criminal complaint or information are examined. However, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, if in the course of the
trial, evidence shows that the offense was committed elsewhere (Isip v. People,
G.R. No. 170298, 26 June 2007).
● While as a general rule, criminal actions can only be instituted within the
territorial borders of the place where the crime was committed, there are
crimes committed outside of the Philippines but can be prosecuted here.
○ An example is when a person outside of the Philippines, creates
counterfeit Philippine coins, currency, or securities (Article 2, Revised
Penal Code).
● Similarly, any person who, although PHYSICALLY OUTSIDE the territorial limits
of the Philippines, commits, conspires, or plots to finance terrorism in the
Philippines shall be tried in the country (Section 19, Republic Act 10168).
○ This is likewise seen in the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, where a Filipino
citizen or national outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines
who conspires to commit terrorism, incites to commit terrorism, recruits
people to a terrorist organization, or provides material support to
terrorists shall still be tried here (Section 49, Republic Act 11479).
● Any violation of the Cybercrime Prevention Act may be prosecuted in the
Philippines against any Filipino national regardless of the place of commission
(Section 21, Republic Act 10175).
● Hence, Filipinos abroad who impute a vice, crime or defect against a natural or
juridical person in the Philippines through any online or virtual platform such as
YouTube, Facebook, or Twitter can be prosecuted in the Philippines. They
cannot raise the defense that they are outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
● In the case of AAA v. BBB, the Supreme Court declared that the psychological and
mental anguish experienced by a woman constitutes a material element of the
offense of psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262. Hence,
psychological violence committed through marital infidelity is a transitory or
continuing crime.
● The Supreme Court explained that even if the extramarital affair causing the
mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, this does not place the
offender beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
● This ruling has addressed the suffering of Filipina spouses who have been victims
of philandering husbands who commit infidelities outside the Philippines (G.R. No.
212448, 11 January 2018).
SEARCH WARRANT
● It must be noted that the rule that venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases does
not extend to applications for search warrants, because strictly speaking there
are no criminal cases yet. In Pilipinas Shell, et al. v. Romars, the court characterized
a search warrant as “a special criminal process”, and concluded that
“proceeding for said applications are not [being] criminal in nature … the rule
that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto” (G.R. No. 189669, 16
February 2015).
● Knowing the place where the crime or any of its elements is committed is only
one aspect of jurisdiction that the prosecution should know before commencing
the action.
● The other aspect is the penalty of the offense. If the penalty of imprisonment
exceeds six years, then the case will be filed in the Regional Trial Court; however,
if it does not exceed six years regardless of the fine or accessory penalties, it will
be filed in the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court, subject to exceptions in law
(Republic Act 7691).
Replevin and its common law origins
Date: August 5, 2022, 12:15 am

249197/replevin-and-its-common-law-origins.html
Main Doctrine:
“In our jurisdiction, replevin may stand as a combination of the principal remedy with
a prayer for provisional relief, or for the recovery of a loan obligation with an
application for a writ of replevin on personal property used as security.”
● In the Middle Ages, replevin was used when a landlord distrained his tenant
because the latter disputed his liability to perform certain services.
● The tenant can recover possession of the chattels by giving security to the sheriff
for maintaining his contention in a court of law (A Concise History of the
Common Law).
● If the lord’s case is proved and judgment is rendered for the return of the
chattels, the possession shall be restored to the lord (A Concise History of the
Common Law).
● In other words, the chattels originally distrained by the lord and returned to the
tenant must be given back to the former to hold again as a distress (security).
● Replevin is both a principal remedy and a provisional relief. When replevin is

utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of personal
property that was wrongfully detained by another.
● When sought as a provisional relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the contested
property during the pendency of the action (Enriquez v. Mercantile Insurance Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018).
● In our jurisdiction, it may stand as a combination of the principal remedy with a
prayer for provisional relief, or for the recovery of a loan obligation with an
application for a writ of replevin on personal property used as security.
○ Examples of personal property that are the subject of the writ of replevin
are motor vehicles, financial and corporate records, or jewelries, among
others.
■ In the case of Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank, the
Complaint for the collection of the sum of P190,635.90 with an
application for a writ of replevin of a motor vehicle was filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City; however, the value
of the vehicle subject of the provisional relief exceeded the
jurisdiction of the court (G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 1999).
■ The Supreme Court said that although the value of the vehicle
seized pursuant to the writ of replevin may have exceeded the
jurisdiction of the MTC, that fact does not deprive the trial court of
its jurisdiction over the case.
● After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel
mortgage that had been used to secure the petitioner’s loan
(G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 1999).
Who is the defendant in an action for the recovery of possession of personal property?
● The person in possession of the property to be replevied is ordinarily the
proper and only necessary party defendant; the plaintiff is not required to join
as defendants other persons claiming a right on the property but are not in
possession thereof (G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018 citing BA Finance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals).
● As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for the delivery of the
property before the commencement of the action or at any time before an
answer is filed. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure for the
application of a writ of replevin (G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018).
● The party seeking the issuance of the writ must file the required affidavit and a
bond amounting to double the value of the property (G.R. No. 210950, August
15, 2018).
● The applicant or some other person who personally knows the facts must show:
○ that the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it; or is entitled to the possession thereof;
○ that the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the
cause of detention thereof;
○ that the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or
a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that
it is exempt from such a seizure or custody; and
○ the actual market value of the property (Section 2, Rule 60, Amended Rules
of Civil Procedure).
● Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the court, the court will
issue an order and a writ of seizure requiring the sheriff to take the property into
his or her custody.
● If there is no objection to the bond filed within five (5) days from the taking of the
property, the sheriff shall deliver it to the applicant (G.R. No. 210950, August 15,
2018).
● Hence, the contested property remains in the applicant’s custody until the court
determines, after a trial on the issues, who among the parties has the right of
possession (G.R. No. 210950, August 15, 2018).
● If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must
return it to the adverse party (Section 6, Rule 60).
● Personal property in custodia legis cannot be replevied. When property is
lawfully taken by virtue of a legal process, it is considered in the custody of the
law.
○ Therefore, when something is subject to the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, it is in
custodia legis (Superlines Transportation v. PNCC et. al, G.R. No. 169596,
March 28, 2007).
● In the case of Dagudag v. Paderanga, the crew of MV General Ricarte failed to
produce the certificate of origin and other pertinent transport documents
covering the forest products.
● Since nobody claimed the forest products, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) considered them abandoned and issued a seizure
receipt (A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008).
● Forest products lawfully seized by the DENR are already in custodia legis and
thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There being a violation of the Revised
Forestry Code, the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with the law
(A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008).
● In another case, the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate was
held administratively liable for issuing a writ of seizure ordering the sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate to take immediate possession of a 6 x 6
truck that was in custodia legis.
● The truck ordered by the judge to be seized was part of the exhibits formally
offered in evidence in a criminal case (Danao v. Ginete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1474,
January 21, 2003).
○ The writ of replevin, being a provisional remedy, is ancillary to the
principal action.
● The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results in the
restoration of the parties’ status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed at
all (Advent Capital v. Young, G.R. No. 183018, August 03, 2011).
○ Since Young possessed the subject car before the filing of the replevin
case, the same must be returned to him (G.R. No. 183018, August 03,
2011).
● A writ of replevin issued by any court in the Philippines may be served and
enforced anywhere in the country.
● There is no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressed or implied, that
provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit to the area of enforceability of a writ
of replevin (G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 1999).
Claims, defenses, and judgment on the pleadings

Link:
254767/claims-defenses-and-judgment-on-the-pleadings.html
Main Doctrine:
If the filing of the judgment on the pleadings is proper, the court can proceed to render
judgment without a trial after an Answer is filed by the defendant.
● An action is commenced by filing a complaint in court and paying the filing fees
assessed by the clerk of court. The complaint is the pleading that asserts the
complainant or plaintiff’s claims or causes of action (Rule 6, Section 3, 2019 Rules
● A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates or breaches the
rights of another (Rule 2, Section 2). Hence, the complainant comes to court to
seek redress for a wrong or to recover certain damages he or she may have
suffered by reason of the breach.
● The complaint usually contains allegations in support of the plaintiff’s claims and
the reliefs sought by him or her from the court.
● The person sued (the defendant), after proper service of summons and the
complaint, will have to file an Answer within 30 days from the receipt thereof
(Rule 11, Section 11).
● The Answer is a pleading that sets forth the defendant’s defenses. The defenses
may either be negative or affirmative. A negative defense is the specific denial
of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant to defeat the
latter’s cause or causes of action (Rule 6, Section 5).
● The negative defense must be categorical, supported by material facts and
evidence.”[W]hen defendant’s answer denies the allegations of the complaint
because the defendant ‘has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief’ and ‘specifically denies’ other allegations, … said denials are in fact mere
general denials amounting to admissions of the material allegations of the
complaint” (J. P. Juan and Sons v. Lianga Industries, G.R. No. L-25137, July 28,
1969).
● This is different from an affirmative defense, which contains an allegation of a
new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar the plaintiff’s
recovery. Affirmative defenses include fraud, statutes of limitations or
prescription, payment, illegality, and estoppel, among others (Rule 6, Section 5).
● In simpler words, an affirmative defense admits the material facts that lays down
the claim or cause of action but renders the plaintiff unable to recover, the reason
being that there exists legal defenses or factual circumstances that preclude
recovery on the part of the plaintiff, such as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
improper venue, or fraud.
● What is judgment on the pleadings? This occurs when an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading (Rule 34, Section 1).
● An answer fails to tender an issue if it fails to specifically deny the material
allegations consistent with Section 10, Rule 8 of the 2019 Rules of Civil
Procedure, resulting in the adverse party’s admission.
● If the filing of the judgment on the pleadings is proper, the court can proceed to
render judgment without a trial after an Answer is filed by the defendant.
● Under the 2019 Amendments of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may, in
its own initiative, render judgment on the pleadings without need of a motion
filed by the claimant. The same Rule retained the claimant’s prerogative to file
a motion.
● The shift in the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with judgment on the
pleadings was made more evident in the 2019 Amendments of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, when the trial courts were given the power, if the grounds are
present, to include “in the pre-trial order that the case be submitted for summary
judgment or judgment on the pleadings” (Rule 18, Section 10).
Habeas corpus: A prerogative writ

Date: September 2, 2022
Link:
256768/habeas-corpus-a-prerogative-writ.html
Main Doctrine:
Only when the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully deprived of his
liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
● The writ of habeas corpus is a writ that extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by
which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled
thereto (Rule 102, Section 1, Rules of Court).
○ The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held.
○ “[It] was devised … as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint” (In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by Edgardo E. Veluz, v. Luisa Villanueva, et
al., G.R. No. 169482, January 29, 2008).
○ The issuance of the writ contemplates two instances: (1) the deprivation
of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through
detention; and (2) the withholding of the custody of any person from the
one entitled to it (G.R. No. 169482, January 29, 2008).
○ The importance of habeas corpus as a fundamental right is reflected in the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
● When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted, the writ shall be
directed against the officer holding custody of the person or, in case the
restraint is caused by a person not an officer, the person responsible for said
detention; and he shall have to produce the body of the person restrained
before the court or judge designated in the writ.
● The officer shall also make a Return of the writ indicating the cause of the
restraint or detention, among others (Rule 102, Sections 8 and 10).
● A writ shall not be allowed if the person restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record.
● Furthermore, a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines,
or imprisoned under lawful judgment shall not be discharged by virtue of a writ
(Rule 102, Section 4).
● In passing over a petition for habeas corpus, the court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained and his liberty
restricted.
○ If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will
proceed only where such a restraint exists.
○ If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ
should be granted and the petitioner discharged, otherwise, the petition
will be refused (G.R. No. 169482, January 29, 2008).
● The writ of habeas corpus will not issue as a matter of course on the mere filing of
the petition.
● Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge
that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ.
● Only when the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully deprived of
his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted (G.R. No. 169482,
January 29, 2008).
Heart-to-heart talk with a priest

Link:
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/314258627/heart-to-heart-talk-with-a-priest.html
Main Doctrine:
The Philippine amendment (on the priest-penitent privilege) was expanded to cover
communications outside of a confessional character, but this does not mean that any
communication to a minister or priest is privileged. The party invoking the privilege
must first establish that the communication was confidential, the advice given was for
spiritual guidance, and that to do so is enjoined by the church to which the minister or
priest belongs.
● The 2019 Priest-Penitent privilege provision was expanded to cover “any

communication… made to or any advice given by him or her.”
● The privilege was originally limited to communications of a confessional
character, but, with the 2019 amendments, now includes the advice provided
by the minister or priest to the faithful, provided it is given in confidence and
confers spiritual guidance.
● Furthermore, the amendments now extend to people who are not ministers or
priests, but are “persons reasonably believed to be so” (Rule 130, Section 24 [d],
Rules on Evidence).
● This tolerance is not surprising since eight out of 10 Filipinos are Roman Catholic,
and utmost reverence is given to priests or ministers. Hence, it is very rare for
them to be subpoenaed for a testimony.
● The privilege is limited to the confessions of sins made for the purpose of
receiving spiritual advice or assistance.
○ Where the accused met the priest on a railroad train and, with no intent of
receiving his professional advice, assistance or consolation, told his story,
incriminating himself, it was held that there was no privilege under the
statute (Francisco, Evidence citing State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381).
○ Statements made by a church member, in the presence of his minister and
fellow members, whom he had assembled, are not privileged, since they
are not made to the minister in his professional character (Francisco,
Evidence citing Milburn v. Haworth, 47 Colo. 593).
○ Where a minister is consulted, not as such, but as a notary, or a friend and
interpreter, there can be no privilege (Francisco, Evidence citing 58 Am.
Jur. 297).
○ Hence, in a prosecution for the crime of bigamy it was held that the
statements of the accused made to a clergyman who was asked to
communicate them to the first wife to influence her to abandon the
prosecution for bigamy are not privileged (Francisco, Evidence citing
Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. II). The communication was not
of an ecclesiastical nature and was not intended to be confidential.
● In the case of Morales v. Portuando, Jose Antonio Rivera (Rivera) was murdered
in the Bronx while walking with Jennifer Rodriguez, her 11-year-old son, and
Cesar Montalvo (Montalvo) along a street near Kelly Park.
○ As the statute indicates, the privilege may be waived by the person who
made the confession (154 F. Supp. 2d 706 [S.D.N.Y. 2001]).
○ While Fornes’s statements to Father Towle may arguably qualify as
privileged communication, the statements were not rendered
inadmissible, for the following reasons, as quoted from the court records:
■ First, Father Towle has concluded that his conversation with
Fornes was not a “formal confession,” but that it was a
“heart-to-heart” talk. After much deliberation, he has concluded
that he was free, after Fornes died, to disclose the conversation.
The Archdiocese has agreed that Father Towle acted properly in
disclosing the conversation.
■ Second, even assuming Fornes’s statements were covered by the
privilege, he has waived it. Following his conversation with Father
Towle, Fornes disclosed at least portions of his conversation to
three different people—Maria Montalvo, Servino, and Cohen.
Moreover, Fornes spoke to Father Towle precisely about whether
he should reveal his involvement in the crime to exculpate Morales
and Montalvo (154 F. Supp. 2d 706 [S.D.N.Y. 2001]).
● The Philippine amendment was expanded to cover communications outside of
a confessional character, but this does not mean that any communication to a
minister or priest is privileged.
● The party invoking the privilege must first establish that the communication
was confidential, the advice given was for spiritual guidance, and that to do so
is enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs.
The Philippine perspective on the parent-child privilege

Link:
260412/the-philippine-perspective-on-the-parent-child-privilege.html
Main Doctrine:
Filial privilege refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like
other privileges.
● In the Philippines, the parent-child privilege is subsumed under parental and filial
privilege in Rule 130, Section 25. Under the said Rule, “[N]o person shall be
compelled to testify against his or her parents, other direct ascendants,
children or direct descendants…”
● However, an individual may be compelled to testify when the “testimony is
indispensable in a crime [committed] against that person or [committed] by one
parent against the other”. Regardless of whether the person is a victim or not,
the parental and filial privilege will not apply if the witness freely and voluntarily
testifies.
○ The reason for the rule is to preserve “family cohesion” and the lack of this
provision under former laws is believed as doing violence to the most
sacred sentiments between members of the same family (Evidence,
Francisco).
○ Disallowing a compelled testimony against a parent, descendant, or
ascendant prevents erosion of family relations.
● Filial privilege “refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or
waived like other privileges. (People v. Invencion, G.R. No. 131636, March 5,
2003).
● This privilege “is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil
Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil
Procedure [Evidence] chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants” (Lee v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 177861, July
13, 2010).
● The privilege cannot apply when a stepdaughter is being subpoenaed to testify
against her stepmother—because the rule applies only to “direct” ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has
no common ancestry by her stepmother; hence, Tiu can be compelled to testify
against Emma Lee (G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010).
Circumstances leading to a conviction

Link:
264408/circumstances-leading-to-a-conviction.html
Main Doctrine:
In criminal cases, circumstantial evidence, if sufficiently proven, can produce the
conviction of the accused.
● Circumstantial evidence relates to a series of facts, other than the fact in

controversy or in dispute, from which inferences may be derived.
● On the other hand, direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the
existence of the fact in issue, without any inference or presumption (Evidence,
Francisco citing 31 Corpus Juris Secundum 505).
● In criminal cases, circumstantial evidence, if sufficiently proven, can produce
the conviction of the accused.
● Only the presence of multiple circumstances will warrant a conviction
assuming that each of the facts (or circumstances) from which the inferences
are drawn is proven (see Section 4, Rule 133, 2019 Amended Rules on Evidence).
● “No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence
which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and…
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent…”(Evidence, Francisco
citing People v. Ludday, 61 Phil. 216).
● The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt
may all be established by circumstantial evidence.
● The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken
chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime (Bacerra v.
People, G.R. No. 204544, July 03, 2017).
● While there is no conviction in civil cases, liability may be determined by
considering “all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means… of knowing the facts…,” among others;
and all of these contribute to a preponderance of evidence (Section 4, Rule 133,
2019 Amended Rules on Evidence).
● In the case of Bacerra v. People, no one saw petitioner [Bacerra] actually set the
nipa hut on fire. Nevertheless, the prosecution has established multiple
circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety, support the
conclusion that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson (G.R.
No. 204544, July 03, 2017).
○ First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that the petitioner
stoned the private complainant’s house and threatened to burn him.
○ Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner
returned a few hours later and made his way to the private complainant’s
nipa hut (Bacerra v. People, G.R. No. 204544, July 03, 2017).
○ Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that the
petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire. The
private complainant testified that he saw the petitioner (Bacerra) walk to
and fro in front of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire.
○ Circumstantial evidence is like a “tapestry made up of strands which
create a pattern when interwoven.” Each strand cannot be plucked out and
scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture
(G.R. No. 204544, July 03, 2017).
● In another case, the SC affirmed the findings of the trial court that
“circumstantial evidence proven by the prosecution sufficiently established that
appellant committed the offense (robbery with homicide) charged.”
○ There should be a combination of evidence which, in the ordinary and
natural course of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to his
guilt (People v. Lignes, G.R. No. 229087, June 17, 2020).
● However, in the case of People v. Cadenas and Martije, the SC reversed the
conviction of Cadenas and Martije for rape with homicide which was based on
circumstantial evidence.
○ The trial court and Court of Appeals “rushed to the conclusion that the
presence of the appellants at the crime scene…as sufficient to incriminate
them to the commission of the crime charged” (G.R. No. 233199,
November 05, 2018).
○ The circumstance of being at the scene of the crime and leaving hastily
may raise speculations, as it had, in fact, inevitably made Cadenas and
Martije the prime suspects, but it is far too inadequate to support a
conviction.
○ The Court has consistently stressed that mere suspicions and
speculations can never be the bases of conviction in a criminal case
(People v. Cadenas, G.R. No. 233199, November 05, 2018).
○ The testimony of witness Escribano was highly suspicious, and it was
contrived to pin criminal culpability upon Cadenas and Martije.
○ No shred of evidence is on record that could show the existence of a
source of light then which may have provided Escribano with enough
illumination that enabled him to recognize who the two persons were
(G.R. No. 233199, November 05, 2018).
○ It is strange that Escribano should return to Castillo (live-in partner of the
victim) when natural instinct and reason would dictate that he should
have entered the house to see if anything bad happened to his friend’s
live-in partner or should have at least called for the victim’s name from
outside the house to check on her condition.
○ His reaction was unnatural and contrary to ordinary human experience
(G.R. No. 233199, November 05, 2018).
○ The Supreme Court finds it disturbing how Barangay Captain Gerald
Arquiza (Arquiza) was able to identify Cadenas and Martije as the sexual
ravishers and killers of AAA (the victim).
○ Nowhere in the prosecution’s evidence does it show that Castillo and/or
Escribano reported the incident and that they had identified the
perpetrators to Arquiza at any time after the discovery of the body of the
victim (G.R. No. 233199, November 05, 2018).
○ Finally, there is a paucity of evidence to show that the appellants (Cadenas
and Martije) have a motive to rape or kill the victim.
○ There was also no evidence that Cadenas and Martije carried a grudge or
had an axe to grind against the victim or her live-in partner, Castillo. In
fact, Cadenas declared that he did not find AAA attractive (G.R. No.
233199, November 05, 2018).
○ The Supreme Court underscored that a conviction must be based on the
strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.
○ It is paramount that the prosecution proves the guilt of the accused and
not the accused to prove his innocence.
○ The prosecution’s circumstantial evidence fails to prove indubitably the
appellants’ commission of the crime of rape with homicide (G.R. No.
233199, November 05, 2018).
Email as evidence
Date: October 7, 2022

Link:
266348/email-as-evidence.html
Main Doctrine:
The authenticity of the electronic document or email must be established by an
affidavit of the person having direct personal knowledge of the facts or knowledge
based on authentic records.
● On July 17, 2001, the Philippine Supreme Court approved the “Rules on
Electronic Evidence,” which took effect on August 1, 2001. The Rules stated that
it shall apply in all civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and
administrative cases (Rule 1, Section 2, A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
● The succeeding year, the coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence was
expanded to include criminal cases (A.M. 01-7-01 dated September 24, 2002).
● An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules
on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws (Rule 3,
Section 2, A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
● Electronic documents shall include “writing, document, record, instrument,
memorandum or any other form of writing (Rule 3, Section 1, A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
● An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
● When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time
with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as
the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic
re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques…
accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as
the equivalent of the original.” (Rule 4, Section 2, A.M. 01-7-01-SC)
○ Copies or duplicates of electronic documents shall not be admissible to
the same extent as the original if: (a) a genuine question is raised regarding
the authenticity of the original; or (b) in the current circumstances it
would be unjust or inequitable to admit a copy in lieu of the original (Rule
4, Section 2, A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
● The fact that an electronic document is in two or more copies, executed at or
about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart of its original
does not in itself prove its authenticity.
○ Separately, it will have to be authenticated by: (a) evidence that it has been
digitally signed; (b) appropriate security procedures as may be authorized
by the Supreme Court or by law; or (c) evidence showing its integrity and
reliability (Rule 5, Section 2, A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
● In the 2019 Amendments to the Rules on Evidence, the Supreme Court
fine-tuned the Rules on Evidence to capture the definition of an “original” and
“counterpart” under the Rules on Electronic Evidence:
○ (a) [I]f data is stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other
output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately, is an “original.”
○ (b) A “duplicate” is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the
original, or from the same matrix … by mechanical or electronic
re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent
techniques which accurately reproduce the original (Rule 130, Section 4,
2019 Rules on Evidence) .
● To be able to present, identify, mark, and authenticate an email, the proponent or
presenting party must understand the mechanics of an email.
○ The email would normally have lines for the recipient, sender, the other
recipients (copy furnished), the subject of the email, and the body of the
email.
○ The email address indicates the username and the hostname
(username@hostname), the latter of which includes providers such as
Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, official hostnames for government, companies, and
institutions, among others.
○ If an email printout is identified, marked, and authenticated by a
competent witness with no question raised regarding its integrity, then
the email printout may be admitted in evidence.
○ If there are issues about: (a) another person logging in to the sender’s
email and using it himself; (b) hacking or hijacking of another person’s
account through spyware, viruses, or other malicious software; or (c)
different recipients or parties to email communications receiving
different or altered messages, then further authentication may be
required by the judge.
○ In case the source of the email cannot be determined or if it was
forwarded from unknown or bogus senders, verification of the chain of
custody in handling the email may be resorted to by the judge.
● The authenticity of the electronic document or email must be established by an
affidavit of the person having direct personal knowledge of the facts or
knowledge based on authentic records. The affidavit must also affirmatively
show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.
(Rule 9, Section 1, A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
Quantum of proof in criminal cases

Link:
268442/quantum-of-proof-in-criminal-cases.html
Main Doctrine:
“How will the court determine the guilt of an accused in a criminal case? It will be
based on the collective evidence presented by the parties, such as testimonies of
witnesses, documentary, or object evidence”
● How will the court determine the guilt of an accused in a criminal case? It will be
based on the collective evidence presented by the parties, such as testimonies of
witnesses, documentary, or object evidence.
● Once authenticated, the judge will weigh the evidence and render a judgment.
● The accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt.
○ The quantum of proof is that degree of proof which excludes the
possibility of error and that produces absolute certainty (Rule 133,
Section 2, 2019 Rules on Evidence).
○ Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces
a conviction in an unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Section 2, 2019 Rules on
Evidence).
● The prosecution must rely “on the strength of its own evidence, and not
banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. (Macayan v. People, G.R.
175842, March 18, 2015).
● The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of
the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
● Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they [accused] must be
acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable” (G.R. 175842,
March 18, 2015).
● Every accused charged of a crime is presumed to be innocent unless the
contrary is proven.
○ This right is given to the accused because the state has “unlimited
command of means; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who
are regarded as public officers… with an attitude of tranquil majesty…”
(Evidence, Francisco citing Wharton’s Criminal Evidence [11th ed.], Sec.
1).
● The presumption of innocence can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
○ It is this presumption of innocence that lays such a burden upon the
prosecution. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden then an
accused must be acquitted (G.R. 175842, March 18, 2015).
○ “In discharging this burden, the prosecution’s duty is to prove each and
every element of the crime charged in the information, to warrant a
finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein. The prosecution must further prove the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense” (People v. Claro, G.R. No.
199894, April 5, 2017 citing Patula v. People).
○ “Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that
mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should
not sway judgment against him. It further means that the courts should
duly consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the process the
courts should persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with
guilt…” (G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017).
○ “It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty” (G.R. No.
199894, April 5, 2017).
● To guard against injustice, the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
● Since the State shall “take a person from the ordinary avocations of life, brand
him as a felon, and deprive him of his liberty…” there should be no doubt in the
guilt of the accused (Evidence, Francisco citing Binkley v. State, 34 Neb. 757, 52
N.W. Rep 708).
● The SC has repeatedly stated that “for evidence to be believed,… it must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
under the circumstances… [w]hatever is repugnant to these… lies outside of
judicial cognizance” (G.R. 175842, March 18, 2015).
● In the case of People v. Lumikid, the trial court concluded that Lumikid
committed the killing of Desiderio “Jessie” Camangan because of the testimony
of a lone eyewitness. Furthermore, it elucidated that the accused failed to
destroy the credibility of the lone witness (People v. Lumikid, G.R. No. 242695,
June 23, 2020).
○ In justifying its conclusion, the trial court said that “[h]er eyewitness
account… is credible compared to the unreliable alibi of the accused
[which] conveniently stat[es] that he was in a drinking session with his
three close friends… after the rain poured heavily,” precluding immediate
travel.
○ The trial court relied on the superiority of positive identification over alibi.
○ In reversing the conviction and acquitting Lumikid, the SC commented
on the statement of the trial court that “the accused has absolutely no
solid evidence to rely on for his acquittal”
○ The SC explained that the statement is contrary to the fundamental
precept of criminal law, which is to presume the innocence of the
accused until proven guilty.
○ The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and not for the accused to prove his innocence
○ The trial court brought it upon Lumikid to produce evidence to prove his
innocence rather than for the prosecution to do so.
○ Moreover, the prosecution has not completely ruled out the probability
that other persons may have committed the crime. (G.R. No. 242695, June
23, 2020).
● In another case, an accused Carlito Claro was acquitted by the SC when it
appreciated the accused’s defense of consensual sexual intercourse. It said that
“he (accused) and AAA (victim) were adults capable of consenting to the sexual
intercourse” (G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017).
○ The established circumstances supporting consensual intercourse
between the parties were: (a) agreeing to go on a lovers’ date; (b)
travelling together a long way from their meeting place on board the
jeepney; (c) alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal together; (d) walking
to and checking in together to the motel without the complainant
manifesting resistance; and (e) entering the designated room without
protest from her (G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017).
● A judge has a great responsibility to determine the true facts, appreciate
evidence, and weigh them collectively to dispense a fair and reasonable
judgment.
Death of an accused

Link:https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/footnotes-by-tranquil-g-s-salvador-iii
/314270860/death-of-an-accused.html
Main Doctrine:
A deceased defendant in an independent civil action, or those civil actions instituted
to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation such as the law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the deceased after proper substitution is complied with, as the case
may be.
● If an accused dies before judgment is rendered in a criminal case, the criminal

case will be dismissed and all the penalties that could have been imposed against
the accused will be totally extinguished.
● When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the crime shall be deemed instituted.
● The dismissal of the criminal case will also result in the extinction of the civil
liability arising from the offense, if the accused dies after arraignment (Rule 111,
Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure).
● If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
prejudice to any civil action that the offended party may file against the estate of
the deceased (Rule 111, Section 4, last paragraph, Rules on Criminal Procedure).
○ Arraignment is when the judge or clerk furnishes the accused with a copy
of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or
dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty.
○ The arraignment must be conducted before the court where the
complaint or information was filed (Rule 116, Section 1, Rules on Criminal
Procedure).
● The same procedure will apply if the respondent dies during the pendency of a
criminal complaint against him or her with the Office of the Prosecutor.
● However, an independent civil action to recover damages for such offenses as
defamation, fraud, physical injuries, refusal or failure of a member of the police
force to render aid or protection to any person, or any act or omission causing
damage to another either by fault or negligence are by their nature civil actions
(Articles 33, 34, and 2176, Civil Code).
● These civil actions may be filed by the offended party separate from the criminal
action.
● A deceased defendant in an independent civil action, or those civil actions
instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation such as
the law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts may be continued against
the estate or legal representative of the deceased after proper substitution is
complied with, as the case may be (Rule 111, Section 4, last paragraph, Rules on
Criminal Procedure).
● The heirs of the deceased (accused) may be named substitutes without the
appointment of an executor or administrator (Rule 111, Section 4 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure).
○ This provision is similar to Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
○ Comparing the two provisions, the most significant difference between
them is the provision in the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that the
counsel of the deceased party must inform the court of the death of his
client within thirty days from the fact thereof (Rule 3, Section 16).
○ In actual practice, if the legal representative of the deceased defendant
fails to inform the court of his desire to apply Rule 111, Section 4, then
Rule 3, Section 16 will apply; the reason being that those civil actions
based on other sources of obligation are in reality civil cases, similar to
independent civil actions, and are docketed in court as such.
● If an independent civil action or a civil action based on sources other than delict
have not yet been filed, the offended party (victim) may file it against the estate
or legal representative of the deceased accused, as may be warranted by law
and procedural rules (People v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166, July 5, 2017).
○ Accused Porferio Culas was convicted with statutory rape by the SC.
Before an entry of judgment could be issued, the SC received a letter from
the Bureau of Corrections informing the former that the accused Culas
had died on February 8, 2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death.
○ The SC reconsidered and set aside its Resolution dated July 18, 2014 and
entered a new one dismissing the criminal case against accused Culas.
○ Accused Culas’ death prior to his final conviction pending appeal renders
dismissible the criminal case against him (G.R. No. 211166, July 5, 2017).
○ Furthermore, Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.
Specifically, the “personal penalties; and… [the] pecuniary penalties… shall
be extinguished when the death of the offender occurs BEFORE final
judgment” (G.R. No. 211166, July 5, 2017).
● It is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a
violation of the penal law and to still be liable civilly based on contract or by
laws other than the criminal law. Such civil actions may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal action…
[but] the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission” (Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
○ As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes
her criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on
the offense (delict).
○ The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on the
constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which
can be overcome only by a finding of guilt — something that death
prevents the court from making” (Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210,
October 05, 2015).
○ In BP 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil actions.
○ Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is filed and
tried.
○ This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been
packed with BP 22 violations because creditors used the courts as
collectors (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015 citing Hyatt v. Asia
Dynamic Electrix Corp.).
○ As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities
arising from the issuance of a worthless check are deemed instituted in a
case for violation of BP 22; the death of Bernardo did not automatically
extinguish the action.
○ The independent civil liability based on contract… may still be enforced
against her [Bernardo’s] estate” (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
○ Death absolves the accused from any earthly responsibility arising from
the offense – a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify, much
less disregard. The intervention of death of the accused… is an injunction
by fate itself so that no criminal liability and… civil liability arising from the
offense should be imposed on him” (G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015).
Rescinding fraudulent transfers

Link:
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/314273098/rescinding-fraudulent-transfers.html
Main Doctrine:
● “The complaint for rescission must allege that successive measures have been
taken by the creditor before the action for rescission is instituted.”
● Can an aggrieved creditor immediately file an action for the rescission of a

contract?
○ The answer is in the negative. Such an action “…cannot be instituted
except when the party suffering damage has no other legal means [or
remedy] to obtain reparation for the same” (Anchor Savings Bank v. Furigay,
et al., G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013).
● The complaint for rescission must allege that successive measures have been
taken by the creditor before the action for rescission is instituted.
● These measures are for the creditor to have: (a) exhausted the properties of the
debtor through levy on attachment and execution; and (b) exercised all the
rights and actions of the debtor (against third parties), save those personal to
him (accion subrogatoria) (G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013).
● Only when these legal remedies are exhausted by the creditor can an action for
rescission be commenced.
● It is thus apparent that an action to rescind or an accion pauliana must be of last
resort, availed of only after all other legal remedies have been exhausted and
have proven futile (G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013).
● The plaintiff in an accion pauliana must show that: (a) he has credit prior to the
alienation, although demandable later; (b) the debtor has made a subsequent
contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; and (c) the creditor
has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim but would benefit by the
rescission of the conveyance to the third person (G.R. No. 191178, March 13,
2013).
● It is equally important that the act being impugned is fraudulent, and that the
third person who received the property conveyed, if by an onerous title, has
been an accomplice in the fraud.
● Accion pauliana presupposes that: 1) there is a judgment; 2) the trial court issued
a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment; and 3) the sheriff failed
to enforce and satisfy the judgment of the court (G.R. No. 191178, March 13,
2013).
● In the case of Anchor Savings Bank (ASB) v. Furigay, ASB filed, in 1999, a verified
complaint for a sum of money and damages with an application for replevin
against Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS), its president, Henry H. Furigay; his
wife, Gelinda C. Furigay; and a “John Doe” (G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013).
○ While the action was pending, spouses Furigay donated their registered
properties in Alaminos, Pangasinan to their three minor children.
○ Claiming that the donation of the properties was in fraud of creditors, ASB
filed an action for the rescission of the deed of donation against the
Furigay spouses and their children.
● The Supreme Court said that “[a] cursory reading of the allegations of [the]…
complaint would show that it failed to allege the ultimate facts constituting its
cause of action and the prerequisites that must be complied (with) before the
same may be instituted” (G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013).
● “ASB, without availing of the first and second remedies, that is, exhausting the
properties of CTS, Spouses Furigay, or their transmissible rights and actions,
simply undertook the third measure and filed an action for annulment of the
donation. This cannot be done” (G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013).
● An accion pauliana accrues only when the creditor discovers that he has no other
legal remedy for the satisfaction of his claim against the debtor.
● For as long as the creditor still has a remedy at law against the debtor, the
creditor will not have any cause of action against the debtor and a third person
for the rescission of their contract (G.R. No. 191178, March 13, 2013).
● In the case of Siguan v. Lim, et al., the question posed was “whether the deed of
donation executed by Rosa Lim [Lim] in favor of her children can be rescinded for
being in fraud of her alleged creditor [Siguan].”
● On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying several parcels of land and
purportedly executed by Lim on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. Hence, Siguan
filed an accion pauliana against Lim and her children to rescind the questioned
Deed of Donation (G.R. No. 134685. November 19, 1999).
● Siguan’s complaint alleged that sometime in July 1991, Lim, through a Deed of
Donation, fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad
faith and in fraud of creditors, including her; and that Lim conspired with her
children in antedating the questioned Deed of Donation to Siguan’s and other
creditors’ prejudice (G.R. No. 134685. November 19, 1999).
● The general rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time
of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved as one of the bases
of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract.
● Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud (G.R. No.
134685. November 19, 1999).
● Siguan cannot use the estafa case of Victoria Suarez since—although she’s a
creditor in another case—she is not a party to this accion pauliana.
● Article 1384 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “[R]escission shall be only
to the extent necessary to cover the damages caused“ (Article 1384 cited in G.R.
No. 134685. November 19, 1999).
● Under this Article, only the creditor who brought the action for rescission can
benefit from the rescission; those who are strangers to the action (like Suarez)
cannot benefit from its effects.
● The revocation applies only to the extent of the plaintiff creditor’s unsatisfied
credit; as for the excess, the alienation is maintained (G.R. No. 134685. November
19, 1999).
● The fact that the Deed of Donation in question was registered only on 2 July
1991, a year after the donation, is also not enough to overcome the presumption
of truth regarding the verity of the date in the deed in question, which is 10
August 1989.
● Siguan’s claim against Lim was constituted only in August 1990, a year after the
questioned alienation (G.R. No. 134685. November 19, 1999).
● Furthermore, Siguan failed to prove that she has exhausted all other legal
means to obtain the satisfaction of her claim and that the donor Lim did not
leave adequate properties which creditors might have recourse for in the
collection of their credits existing before the execution of the donation (G.R. No.
134685. November 19, 1999, see Article 1387, Civil Code).
● Hence, it is not enough for a complaint to allege that the questioned transfer is
in fraud of his or her rights, as the requisites of accion publiciana must be
present and proven by evidence.
● Failing to do so, the courts will be left with no recourse but to dismiss the action
for rescission.
Attachment as a provisional remedy

Link:
277350/attachment-as-a-provisional-remedy.html
Main Doctrine:
● “A preliminary attachment may be applied either ex parte (as part of the
complaint or initiatory pleading) or upon motion with notice and hearing in the
court where the action is pending”
● A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the court

where an action is pending.
● “[It]… allows the levy of a property which shall then be held by the sheriff… as
security for the satisfaction of the judgment that the court may render in favor of
the attaching party” (Tsuneishi Heavy Industries (Cebu), Inc. (Tsuneishi) v. MIS
Maritime Corporation, G.R. 193572, April 4, 2018).
● The intention is to “seize [the] property of an alleged debtor in advance of final
judgment and holds it subject to appropriation, thereby preventing the loss or
dissipation of the property through fraud or other means.
● This is also availed of to prevent the properties from “being removed beyond
the jurisdiction [of the court], or improperly disposed of or concealed” (G.R.
193572, April 4, 2018).
● A preliminary attachment may be applied either ex parte (as part of the
complaint or initiatory pleading) or upon motion with notice and hearing in the
court where the action is pending.
● An order of attachment shall be granted only when the applicant or a person who
personally knows the facts submits an affidavit and a bond corresponding to an
amount fixed by the court (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 57, Rules of Civil Procedure).
● The affidavit supporting the application for preliminary attachment must show
that: (a) a sufficient cause of action exists; (b) the case is one of those
mentioned in Section 1, Rule 57; (c) there is no other sufficient security for the
claim sought to be enforced by the action; and (d) the amount due to the
applicant, or the value of the property he is entitled to recover, is as much as
the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims (Section 3,
Rule 57).
● Essentially, the property levied on attachment is placed in the custody of the
court. However, the nature of the court’s custody would vary depending on the
property sought to be attached.
● A real property is placed in the custody of the court, by filing with the registry of
deeds a copy of the order, together with a description of the property attached,
and a notice that it is attached (Section 7(a), Rule 57).
● On the other hand, a personal property is placed in the court’s custody by “taking
and safely keeping it in his [sheriff’s] custody, after issuing the corresponding
receipt thereof” (Section 7(b), Rule 57). Stocks or shares are placed in the court’s
custody “by leaving with the president or managing agent [of the company], a
copy of the writ, and a notice [of attachment]” (Section 7 (c), Rule 57).
○ Custody over “debts and credits, including bank deposits, financial
interest, royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable
of manual delivery, [is transferred to the courts] by leaving with the
person owing such debts, or having in his possession or under his control,
such credits or other personal property, or with his agent, a copy of the
writ, and notice [of attachment]” (Section 7 (d), Rule 57).
● While the Supreme Court has “time and again held that the rules on the issuance
of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly against the applicants,” it must
be granted if the grounds for its issuance are present.
● Absent the grounds, the court issuing it will be acting in excess of its jurisdiction
(G.R. 193572, April 4, 2018).
● An examination of the grounds under Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, will reveal that except for one, all of the grounds require some
element of fraud.
○ For example, “an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or
damages… [can be made] against a party who is about to depart from the
Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors” (Section 1(a), Rule 57).
● There are also such grounds as: “[an] action for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted,” or “an action to recover the possession of
property unjustly or fraudulently taken… when the property…has been
concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the
applicant” (Section 1(b)(c), Rule 57).
● The significance of fraud as grounds for preliminary attachment is made even
more evident when “an action [is] against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought,
or in the performance thereof,” or “an action against a party who has removed or
disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors”
(Section 1(d)(e), Rule 57).
● Hence, “[w]hen fraud is invoked as a ground for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment… there must be evidence clearly showing the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud. Fraud cannot be presumed from a party’s
mere failure to comply with his or her obligation” (G.R. 193572, April 4, 2018).
● The Rules of Court require that in all averments of fraud, the circumstances
constituting them must be stated with particularity.
● “[F]raud is… anything calculated to deceive — including all acts and omission…
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed
— resulting in damage to or in undue advantage over another” (G.R. 193572,
April 4, 2018).
● In the case of Tsuneishi v. MIS Maritime Corporation, the record shows that
Tsuneishi released the vessel in September 2006 while MIS signed the
Agreement only in November 2006.
○ Hence, Tsuneishi’s release of the vessel even before MIS signed the
document was not the act which induced the former to turn over the
vessel to the latter (G.R. No. 193572, April 4, 2018).
○ The refusal of MIS to pay is rooted on its claim that its obligation should be
set off against Tsuneishi’s liability for the losses that the former incurred
for the unwarranted delay in the turn-over of the vessel.
○ “MIS insists that Tsuneishi is liable for the damage on the vessel… [which]
is not an act of fraud” (G.R. No. 193572, April 4, 2018).
○ According to the Supreme Court, “[e]ven assuming that MIS is wrong in
refusing to pay Tsuneishi, this is nevertheless not the fraud
contemplated in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
○ Civil law grants Tsuneishi various remedies in the event that the trial court
rules in its favor such as the payment of the obligation, damages and legal
interest.
● The issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is not one of those remedies”
(G.R. 193572, April 4, 2018).
○ In the case of Wee v. Tankiansee, “the affidavit merely states that
respondent [Tankiansee], an officer and director of Wincorp, connived
with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner [Wee] of
his money placements.”
○ There were no other factual averments detailing how Tankiansee
committed fraud or how he connived with the rest of the defendants to
commit it (G.R. 171124, February 13, 2008).
○ “In other words, petitioner [Wee] has not shown any specific act or deed
to support the allegation that respondent [Tankiansee] is guilty of fraud.
The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such
particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent [Tankiansee] was
committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ” (G.R.
171124, February 13, 2008).
● Absent the statements in the affidavit showing that the respondent (Tankiansee),
at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan not to pay or
that he committed the alleged fraud — the general allegation of him being an
officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other
defendants — is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment (G.R. 171124, February 13, 2008).
Judicial admissions

Link:
281527/judicial-admissions.html
Main Doctrine:
● “There are judicial admissions made during the trial, such as admissions in the
judicial affidavits of witnesses or those elicited while cross-examining them”
● A judicial admission is a formal statement, either by the party or by his or her

attorney, during a judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from a
field of controversy.
● It is a voluntary concession of a fact by a party or a party’s attorney during
judicial proceedings (Agbayani v. Lupa Realty, G.R. 201193, June 10, 2019).
● What is the value of a judicial admission in a court proceeding?
○ The act, declaration, or omission of a party with regard to a relevant fact
requires no proof.
○ “[I]t is used as a substitute for legal evidence at trial,” which means that
proof of genuineness and due execution of documents is not required (see
Rule 132, Sections 19 to 33, 2019 Rules on Evidence).
● A judicial admission is one made by the parties in the pleadings such as a
Complaint, Answer, or Reply.
● The failure of the defendant in an Answer to specifically deny under oath an
actionable document (basis of a plaintiff’s claim) amounts to a judicial admission.
● Facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions by the plaintiff and are
binding upon him.
● Facts alleged in the answer are deemed admissions of the defendant and are
binding upon him.
● Facts stipulated in an agreement (stipulation) of facts are deemed admissions of
both parties and are binding upon them (Francisco, Evidence).
● There are judicial admissions made during the trial, such as admissions in the
judicial affidavits of witnesses or those elicited while cross-examining them.
● The opportunities for eliciting judicial admissions extend to modes of discovery,
such as depositions pending action, perpetuations of testimony, or requests for
admissions.
● During pre-trial in civil cases, the parties are required to enumerate a summary
of admitted facts and facts for stipulation (to be admitted) in their pre-trial
briefs (Rule 18, Section 6, 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure).
○ Strictly speaking however, the latter is not a judicial admission until
admitted (or stipulated upon) by the parties.
○ “And well-settled is the rule that an admission, verbal or written, made by
a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof” (Republic v. Sarabia, et al., G.R. 157847 August 25, 2005).
● In criminal cases, “[A]ll agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be produced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused (Rule 118, Section
2, Rules on Criminal Procedure).
● A plea of guilty (or confession) to a lesser offense shall be approved by the court.
● “In order to constitute a judicial admission, the statement must be one of fact,
not [an] opinion [or matter of law]. [It]… must be contrary to an essential fact or
defense asserted by the person giving the testimony; it must be deliberate, clear
and unequivocal…” (G.R. 201193, June 10, 2019).
● “Judicial admissions are evidence against the party who made them, and are
considered conclusive and binding as to the party making the judicial
admission.
● A judicial admission bars the admitting party from disputing it…” (G.R. 201193,
June 10, 2019).
● “While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently
take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded…[t]o constitute
a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is
offered” (Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. 156052, February 13, 2008).
● Generally stated, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial is
conclusive against him unless the court in its reasonable discretion allows the
pleader to withdraw, explain or modify it if it appears to have been made by
improvidence or mistake, or that no such admission was made (Francisco,
Evidence citing Kanopka v. Kanopka, 31 C.J.S. 1171).
● Hence, no admission is made if it is “not in the sense in which the admission was
made to appear” or if “the admission was taken out of context” (Francisco,
Evidence citing the Minutes of the Revision Committee [1989]).
● In the 2019 Rules on Evidence, the phrase “that the imputed admission was not,
in fact, made” was incorporated into Rule 129, Section 4.
● In cases of failure to file an Answer leading to the defendant being declared in
default, “such a failure does not amount to an admission of the facts alleged in
the complaint” (Francisco, Evidence citing Lopez v. Medezona, 11 Phil. 209).
● However, allegations in the complaint being left uncontroverted may be
considered in rendering a judgment.
● Superseded or amended pleadings, on the other hand, disappear from the record
as judicial admissions.
● For these to be considered as extra-judicial (out-of-court) admissions, the said
pleadings should be offered formally in evidence.
● If not offered in evidence the admission contained therein will not be considered
(Francisco, Evidence citing Buenaventura v. Villar, 53 O.G. 3100).
● Judicial admissions of attorneys, being agents of their clients, apply to the latter.
● A party is bound by the admission contained on the pleading prepared by his
attorney, although he did not swear to or know of the statements therein, and
even though he had no actual knowledge of the existence of the pleading
(Francisco, Evidence citing 31 C.J.S. 1078).
● In the case of Agbayani v. Lupa Realty, “[T]he admission by Nonito’s counsel during
the pre-trial proceedings… that there was no sale between Tranquilino and
Nonito qualifies as a judicial admission because [it] is a deliberate, clear,
unequivocal statement… [made] during judicial proceedings in open court… (G.R.
No. 201193, June 10, 2019).
● “The admission by Nonito himself, on cross-examination by Tranquilino’s counsel,
that Tranquilino was in the United States at the time of the purported transaction
supports the statement of the counsel of Nonito that there was no sale
between Tranquilino and Nonito…” (G.R. 201193, June 10, 2019).
Uniqueness of an interpleader action
Date: December 2, 2023

Link:
283572/uniqueness-of-an-interpleader-action.html
Main Doctrine:
● “The action for interpleader protects the plaintiff from cases that may be
instituted against him by either or both of the disputing parties”
● The action for interpleader is a “remedy whereby a person who has… property
in his possession, or an obligation to render… without claiming any right…,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the… property or who
consider themselves entitled to demand compliance… be required to litigate
among themselves” (Alvarez v. The Commonwealth of the Philippines, G.R. L-45315,
February 25, 1938).
● The purpose of the action is to determine who is entitled to the property and
who can demand the performance of an obligation.
● “The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability” (G.R. L-45315,
February 25, 1938).
● In simpler words, the action for interpleader protects the plaintiff from cases
that may be instituted against him by either or both of the disputing parties.
● By filing an action for interpleader, the plaintiff seeks for the court to determine
the rights of the disputing parties, and not to enforce a right that was breached
or violated against them since, there is none.
● In one Supreme Court case, Lui Enterprises leased a parcel of land in Davao City
to Zuellig Pharma Corporation (Zuellig).
● During the lease, Zuellig was informed by the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom) that it is the new owner of the property and
subsequent rental payments should be made to the bank directly (Lui
Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma, et al., G.R. 193494, March 12, 2014).
● Zuellig informed Lui Enterprises of PBCom’s claim.
● However, Lui Enterprises insisted on its right to collect the rentals from Zuellig.
● Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and PBCom, Zuellig filed a
complaint for interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and
consigned the rental payments in court.
● Earlier, Lui Enterprises filed an action against PBCom for the nullification of the
deed of dation in payment with RTC Davao which it later claimed bars the filing of
the interpleader case.
● The subject of the nullification case were the properties used by Lui Enterprises
to pay its obligations to PBCom.
● The Supreme Court said the case to nullify the dation in payment was filed by Lui
Enterprises against PBCom, but that the interpleader case was filed by Zuellig
against Lui Enterprises and PBCom (G.R. 193494, March 12, 2014).
● Different plaintiffs and reliefs were sought in the two cases, thus, litis
pendentia (pendency of similar cases) is absent.
● In another case, Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. (Don Luis Realty), as lessor, executed
lease contracts with several tenants on its units in San Luis Building, Ermita,
Manila.
● The tenants were paying their rentals to Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General
Manager of Don Luis Realty (Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc., G.R. 136409,
March 14, 2008).
● After Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista, the tenants stopped paying
the rentals, claiming their refusal to pay was due to the internal squabble in Don
Luis Realty as to the person authorized to receive payments.
● Hence, Don Luis Realty instituted an action for ejectment against the tenants.
● While the main issue in the case is the propriety of the ejectment action
instituted by Don Luis Realty against the tenants, the Supreme Court said the
internal squabble did not justify the tenants’ failure to pay their rentals.
● They should have consigned their payments and commenced an action for
interpleader (G.R. 136409, March 14, 2008).
● In yet another case, an interpleader action was filed by Bliss Development
Corporation (BDC) against Edgar H. Arreza (Arreza) and Montano M. Diaz (Diaz)
in RTC Makati regarding the latter’s conflicting claims over a property.
● The judgment which later attained finality was in favor of Arreza (G.R. 133113,
August 30, 2001).
● As a result, Diaz had to deliver the property together with all of its improvements
to Arreza.
● Thereafter Diaz filed a complaint against BDC and Arreza in RTC Makati to hold
them liable for the reimbursement of his acquisition cost and improvements on
the property.
● The issue to be resolved was whether Diaz’s claims for reimbursement against
BDC and Arreza were barred by prior judgment (res judicata) in the interpleader
case.
● Diaz avers that an interpleader action is nothing more than the determination of
rights over the subject matter of the case while his reimbursement case involves
recovery of money and damages.
● The Supreme Court explained that “[T]he second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule
62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an
interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints
and responsive pleadings thereto, ‘as provided by these Rules’” (G.R. 133113,
August 30, 2001).
● The second paragraph of the same Section 5 “expressly authorize[s] the
additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a
complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.
● Hence, Diaz should have filed his claims against Arreza in the interpleader action”
(G.R. 133113, August 30, 2001).
● Having asserted in the interpleader action his alleged rights as a buyer in good
faith, Diaz should have crystallized his demand into specific claims for
reimbursement by Arreza. Diaz’s failure to set up his claim for reimbursement in
the interpleader action being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now
barred (G.R. 133113, August 30, 2001).
● The crux of Diaz’s reimbursement case is in the nature of an unpleaded
compulsory counterclaim.
● There being a prior final judgment in the interpleader case which acquired
jurisdiction over the same parties, the same subject property, and the same
cause of action, the subsequent reimbursement complaint should be dismissed
on the grounds of res judicata (Arreza v. Diaz, G.R. 133113, August 30, 2001).
Meeting court deadlines
Date: January 6, 2023

Link: https://manilastandard.net/opinion/314293600/meeting-court-deadlines.html
Main Doctrine:
● “Meeting court deadlines may appear to be a burden to some or an interruption
to joyous celebrations especially at this time of year, but it is a process that
litigants and court users must religiously observe“
● Unlike corporations and partnerships that conclude fiscal years and project
annual profits, the practice of law is continuous, uninterrupted, and unaffected
by holidays, national events, or natural calamities.
● The computation of the period prescribed by the Rules of Court before a
deadline expires is as follows: “[I]f the last day of the period… falls on a Saturday,
a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not
run until the next working day” (Section 1, Rule 22, 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure).
○ For example, if the deadline to file a pleading or motion is on December
25, 2022, which is a non-working holiday, the filing will be on the next
working day.
● The period to file an Answer is within 30 calendar days after the service of
summons to the defendant or person sued. If your deadline falls on a day after the
holiday, you will have to work through the holidays to meet your deadline.
● Only one extension of 30 days to file an Answer is allowed for meritorious
reasons (see Section 11, Rule 11).
● Before filing an Answer, “a party [defendant] may move for a definite statement
or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity [in the complaint] to enable him… to prepare [for]
his… responsive pleading” (Section 1, Rule 12).
● The defendant has 30 calendar days to file a Motion for a Bill of Particulars.
● After the motion is granted and the plaintiff serves the bill of particulars, or after
notice of the denial of the defendant’s motion, the latter may file his responsive
pleading within the remainder of the period he was originally entitled to which
shall not be less than five days in any event (see Section 5, Rule 12).
● If the plaintiff or complainant amends the complaint before an Answer is filed,
the defendant must file an Answer within 30 calendar days from service of the
amended complaint.
● However, if the amended complaint is filed after an Answer has been filed, the
defendant has 15 calendar days from notice to file another Answer (see Section 3,
Rule 11).
● A Reply, if allowed under Section 10, Rule 6 of the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure
(2019 Rules), may be filed within 15 calendar days from the service of the
Answer (Section 6, Rule 11).
● The plaintiff may file a Reply only if the defending party attaches an actionable
document (basis of the claim) to his answer (Section 10, Rule 6).
● A counterclaim or cross-claim (incorporated in the Answer) must be answered
within 20 calendar days from service of the same (Section 4, Rule 11).
● A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against the
opposing party, while a cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party
out of the transaction or occurrence subject of the action (Section 6, Rule 6).
● A third-party (fourth-party) complaint must be answered within 30 calendar
days after service of summons since it is governed by the same rule as the
Answer to a complaint (Section 5, Rule 11).
○ A third-party complaint is a claim of a defending party against a person
not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief (Section 11, Rule 6).
● Today, the Motion to Dismiss is only based on four grounds, including lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and statute of
limitations.
● As there is no express period in which to file a Motion to Dismiss under the 2019
Rules, it is to be filed within 30 calendar days from service of the summons and
complaint.
● The period to file an Answer will be interrupted by the filing of the Motion to
Dismiss and if it is denied, the defendant has only the remainder of the 30 days
to file the former (see Section 2, Rule 22).
● A Demurrer to Evidence, a litigious motion, can be filed by the defendant after
the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence and if he believes
that the plaintiff has no right to relief (see Section 1, Rule 33).
● It is at that stage of the proceedings wherein the plaintiff has filed his Formal
Offer of Evidence and the court has resolved the same.
● The Motion for Reconsideration of a Judgment or Motion for New Trial must be
filed within 15 calendar days or the period to file an appeal (see Section 1, Rule
37).
● While these motions are litigious, they will have to be resolved by the court
within 30 calendar days from the time these are submitted for resolution
(Section 4, Rule 37).
● An ordinary appeal may be taken within 15 days after notice to the appellant of
the judgment or final order appealed from.
● Where a record on appeal is required, as in special proceedings and multiple
appeals, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
30 days after notice of the judgment or final order (see Section 2, Rule 40 and
Section 3, Rule 41).
● Petitions for Review to the Court of Appeals “shall be filed and served within 15
days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner’s [appellant’s] motion for new trial or reconsideration… [U]pon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees… [and] before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of 15 days…” (Section 1, Rule 42).
● Petition for Review on Certiorari or Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
“shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial
or reconsideration… [T]he Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an
extension of 30 days only within which to file the petition” (Section 2, Rule 45).
● As for special civil actions for certiorari or Petitions for Certiorari, these “may be
filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court.
○ “If it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, [it is to be filed] in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area…” (Section 4, Rule 65).
○ The Petition for Certiorari “may also be filed [within the same period] in
the Court of Appeals or … the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is
in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction.
○ “If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable ONLY by the Court of Appeals” (Section 4, Rule 65).
Writings and signatures
Date: January 13, 2023

Link: https://manilastandard.net/opinion/314295625/writings-and-signatures.html
Main Doctrine:
The importance of accurate and truthful contentions in court is made even more
evident by the requirement of a verification of a party for certain pleadings.
● A signature is a writing or other mark that is placed upon an instrument for the
purpose of authenticating it and giving it legal effect (Barron’s Law Dictionary).
● The requirements of writing have over time extended to police evidence.
● Under the Philippine Constitution, “[A]ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall…be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel… of his own choice… [T]hese rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel” (Article III,
Section 12[1]).
● “Pleadings and other written submissions “must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him or her” (Section 3, Rule 7, 2019 Rules of Civil
Procedure), the reason being that the courts must be protected from misleading
and baseless allegations of the party or counsel.
● The signature of a lawyer constitutes a certificate that he or she has read the
pleading and document filed in court and served upon the other parties.
● The certificate attests that to the best of the lawyer’s knowledge, information
and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry that the pleading is not for an
improper purpose (Section 3, Rule 7).
● It also means that the lawyer does not intend to “harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;” and that the claims or
defenses made in the pleadings are supported by law or jurisprudence and not
frivolous arguments (Section 3, Rule 7).
● By signing the pleading or written submission, the lawyer certifies that the
“factual contentions [therein] have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified will likely have evidentiary support after availment of the modes of
discovery…” (Section 3, Rule 7).
● The importance of accurate and truthful contentions in court is made even
more evident by the requirement of a verification of a party for certain
pleadings.
● A pleading is verified by an affidavit of a party or by an affiant duly authorized
to sign the said verification (Section 4, Rule 7).
● The party attests that “the allegations [therein] are true and correct based on his
or her personal knowledge, or based on authentic documents.”
● The party also attests that the pleading is not filed for an improper purpose, is
supported by evidence, and is likely to have evidentiary support after reasonable
opportunity for discovery (Section 4, Rule 7).
● “A counsel’s signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a
mere means for identification. Through his or her signature, a party’s counsel
makes a positive declaration. In certifying… that he or she has read the
pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for
delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics” (A.C. NO.
10525, September 01, 2015).
● It was the counsel’s signature that gave legal effect and elevated its status to
that of a court document (Spouses Mariano, et al. v. Abrajano and Bayaua, A.C.
No. 12690, April 26, 2021).
● The Supreme Court has “demonstrated that what can otherwise be dismissed as
empty formalities are, in fact, necessary solemnities. They are not ends… but
crucial means to enhance the integrity, competence and credibility of the legal
profession. They are vital to the dispensation of justice” (A.C. NO. 10525,
September 01, 2015).
Peeking into wills and succession
Date: February 17, 2023

Link:
306022/peeking-into-wills-and-succession.html
Main Doctrine:
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
● Succession may be: (1) testamentary; (2) legal or intestate; or (3) mixed (Article
778).
● Testamentary succession is that which results from the designation of an heir,
made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law (Article 779).
● No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court (Article 838).
● There are two kinds of probate proceedings recognized by our law: (a) ante
mortem probate, or that which is had during the lifetime of the testator; and (b)
the probate after the death of the testator (Tolentino, Succession; see Article
838).
● “The probate of the will decides no other question than… the capacity of the
testator and compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for validity of wills. It does not determine… the validity or efficacy of
the provisions; these may be impugned… notwithstanding the authentication”
(Tolentino, Succession citing Montaño v. Suesa).
The estate of the deceased
Date: February 24, 2023

Link:
307956/the-estate-of-the-deceased.html
Main Doctrine:
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality.
● The law on succession is thus based partly on the law of family relations, and
partly on the law of property (Tolentino, Succession citing 5 Valverde 8).
● Disputes may arise in the determination of what constitutes the estate of the
deceased. For instance, if there is a question on the title of a property, it should
not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding; that question should
be ventilated in a separate action (Romero v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
188921, April 18, 2012).
● “As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality.
● “Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title” (Pacioles v. Ching, G.R. 127920, August 9, 2005).
● However, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership
“if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties’ consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties [is] not impaired” (G.R. 188921,
April 18, 2012; Aranas v. Mercado, et al., G.R. 156407, January 15, 2014).
● In the case of Romero v. Court of Appeals, et al., Leo and Amando claim their
brother Vittorio succeeded in fraudulently registering several properties to his
name through Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora, the latter being
the administrator of the estate of their deceased father (G.R. 188921, April 18,
2012).
○ Hence, Leo and Amando filed a complaint for annulment of sale against
Aurora and Vittorio.
○ The trial court in dismissing the case held that “the case could not be
adjudicated… without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the
intestate court (another pending action) as to the share of each of the
heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate” (G.R. 188921, April 18,
2012).
○ In the same decision dismissing the case, the trial court also declared that
even the claim of the mother, Aurora, that some of the properties being
claimed by the plaintiffs are paraphernal (properties exclusively owned by
the wife), is an issue which must be taken up and established in the
intestate proceedings (G.R. 188921, April 18, 2012).
○ “The Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether a
property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the
inventory of the estate rests with the probate court”… [T]his is… within
[its] jurisdiction which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent…” (G.R.
188921, April 18, 2012 citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals).
○ In simpler words, the case is not really one of title or ownership, but the
determination of which particular properties should be included in the
inventory of the estate, as “only the probate court can competently rule
on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate” (G.R.
188921, April 18, 2012).
● In Pacioles v. Ching, respondent Ching’s (mother of the deceased Miguelita)
purpose “was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties
should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted… to secure from
the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over
properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate” (G.R. 127920, August 9,
2005).
○ The Supreme Court said the Regional Trial Court, acting as an intestate
court, had overstepped its jurisdiction when it allowed the determination
of Respondent Ching’s claim.
○ The intended “day in court” or hearing is geared towards resolving the
propriety of the respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the
bulk of Miguelita’s estate (G.R. 127920. August 9, 2005).
○ “[I]t is well-settled… that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance… but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate[;] such [a] question cannot be determined in the course of an
intestate or probate proceedings.”
● In the case of Aranas v. Mercado, et al., the administrator, Teresita (second wife of
deceased Emigdio) submitted an inventory indicating that at the time of death,
Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal properties” worth
P6,675,435.25 consisting of cash, furniture and fixtures, pieces of jewelry, and
shares of stocks of Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson (G.R. 156407, January 15,
2014).
○ Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded
from the inventory, Thelma (daughter of Emigdio from his first marriage)
moved for the RTC to direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it.
○ The RTC granted Thelma’s motion.
○ The RTC ordered Teresita to re–do the inventory of properties which are
to constitute the estate of Emigdio and then to submit the revised
inventory within 60 days from notice thereof.
○ The Court also directed her to render an account of her administration of
the estate (G.R. 156407, January 15, 2014).
○ Can the RTC direct the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale
or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime?
○ The answer is in the affirmative.
○ “Upon [the issuance] of the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
■ Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three
months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory
and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of
the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance”
(G.R.156407, January 15, 2014).
○ Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that
no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from
the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another
person or entity.
○ Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is
vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be
included in the inventory (G.R. 156407, January 15, 2014).
● It is worth remembering that “[O]ftentimes death brings peace only to the person
who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate
remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds”
(G.R. 127920. August 9, 2005).
● These acrimonious disputes must be avoided to keep the peace among those who
were left behind.
Refreshing a witness’ memory
Date: March 10, 2023

Link:
312212/refreshing-a-witness-memory.html
Main Doctrine:
Where the witness is permitted to use a memorandum when on the witness stand, he
may be cross-examined as to the same and it may be inspected by the cross-examiner.
● Not all documents presented to a witness during trial has to be marked in

evidence.
● There are times a document is presented to the witness only to refresh his or
her memory since it might have grown hazy over time.
● The stimulus is the document that helps the witness recollect matters within his
personal knowledge.
● The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both witness
and his present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the
court (Evidence, Francisco citing People v. Zamora).
● However, “[i]f you allow him to consult notes, you partly lose the advantage of
that lively and quick examination which does not give bad faith time to think”
(Evidence, Francisco citing Betham, Rationale Judicial Evidence).
● “A witness may be permitted to read or consult a writing… [to] refresh… his
recollection and then testify as to the matters… which his memory has been
refreshed… [A]nd the fact that the witness did not recall the transaction until
[he]… [has been] refreshed… does not [mean] that his testimony is without
probative force” (Evidence, Francisco).
● “Where the witness’ memory is revived, and he… recollects the facts and
swears to them, the evidence is the testimony… and not the writing (or
record)… used to stimulate his memory.” If “the perusal of a memorandum
revives the memory of a witness, he should then testify… without the aid of the
writing (or record)” (Evidence, Francisco citing 98 C.J.S 85-87). This is known as
present recollection revived.
● In order for a document to be admissible as a record of the witness’ past
recollection, a proper foundation must be laid by showing that the witness once
knew the facts narrated in the memorandum, that he recollects the making of
the memorandum, and that it was truly made so that he can swear that it is
correct (Evidence, Francisco).
● A witness should not be allowed to see, consult, or refer to a memorandum for
the purpose of refreshing his memory unless it appears that it is necessary for
him to testify. It is proper to refuse to permit the use of the writing when the
witness has a clear, distinct and independent recollection of the facts (Evidence,
Francisco).
● Under the 2019 Rules on Evidence, reference by a witness to a memorandum is
allowed to refresh his memory respecting the fact that it was “written or
recorded by himself or herself, or under his or her direction, at the time when
the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact
was fresh in his or her memory and he or she knew that the same was correctly
written or recorded” (Section 16, Rule 132).
● Generally, where the present independent recollection of the witness is revived,
the use of the paper is proper regardless of whether or not it was made
contemporaneously with the event to which it relates, and the trial court does
not abuse its discretion by permitting the use of a memorandum made a
substantial time after the event (Evidence, Francisco citing 98 C.J.S. 97-98).
● “Where the witness is not testifying from his present independent recollection,
he may use a writing which he made; but it has been held that he may not testify
on the basis of a writing which was not made by him or under his direction”
(Evidence, Francisco citing 98 C.J.S 94-96).
● In simpler words, a witness may testify on the writing of another only from his
past recollection, if made under his direction.
● In the same 2019 amendment to the Rules on Evidence, “[A] witness may also
testify from such a writing or record, though he or she retains no recollection of
the particular facts, if he or she is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received
with caution” (Section 16, Rule 132).
● Where a witness has no independent recollection, but testifies merely from his
knowledge or belief in the accuracy of the paper, it is proper that the paper
should be put in evidence, or read to, or allowed to go before, the court as
auxiliary to the witness’ testimony or as statement adopted by him (Evidence,
Francisco). This is known as past recollection recorded.
● “The reason for this rule is that ‘…the oral testimony of the witness would amount
to nothing if standing alone, because, after the examination of the memorandum,
the witness concedes that his testimony is not a statement of what he then
recalls in relation to the subject-matter… but… what he now knows in relation to
the correctness of the memorandum…’” (Evidence, Francisco).
● “But if her present memory is less effective, it is sufficient if the witness testifies
that she knows the memorandum is correct because of a habit or practice to
record matters accurately or to check them for accuracy…it is even sufficient if
the individual testifies to recognizing her signature on the statement and
believes the statement is correct…” (Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410).
● The use of memoranda or documents is permissible to refresh the memory of a
witness as to the date of an occurrence, the age of an individual, his physical
condition at a certain time, the names and addresses of persons who witnessed
an accident, and the place where the witness was on a certain day (Evidence,
Francisco).
● It may also include physical measurements, the whereabouts of plaintiff at the
time of the filing of the suit, the contents of a lost contract, the figures of an
account, the articles sold to a certain person, or the articles on the taking of
which an action is based, or the birthplace of the witness (Evidence, Francisco).
● Where the witness is permitted to use a memorandum when on the witness
stand, he may be cross-examined as to the same and it may be inspected by the
cross-examiner, since in no other way can the accuracy and recollection of the
witness be ascertained.
● It is only by the inspection of the paper and such cross-examination that it can be
ascertained whether the memorandum does assist the memory or not (Evidence,
Francisco; see Section 16, Rule 132).
● Despite all these, “[t]he use of memorandum by a witness during his
examination to revive or refresh his recollection rests largely in the discretion
of the court [which must not be abused].”
● This is clearly inferred from the very wording of the rule which states: “A witness
may be allowed to refresh his [or her] memory” (Evidence, Francisco).
A mental retardee as witness

Link:
314437/a-mental-retardate-as-witness.html
Main Doctrine:
A mentally retarded person may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her
testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make
them known to the court.
● Under the Rules on Evidence, only “persons who can perceive, and, perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.”
● For purposes of testifying in court, the most important points of a witness’
perception are: (a) the appreciation of the events or circumstances as they occur;
and (b) his or her ability to testify on his or her perception.
● These qualifications and points of perception are easily applied to a witness who
is sane and in full control of his mental faculties.
● However, if a witness has difficulty perceiving or has a distorted perception of
events, circumstances, conditions, or behaviors, then the competency of the
witness may be put in question.
● It is also possible the witness accurately perceived the events or circumstances
but he or she may not be able to effectively communicate his perception in court.
● If there is a defect in the perception and recollection of the witness, he or she
may be excluded from testifying or the testimony given may be stricken off the
records.
● While “[t]he terms, ‘mental retardation’ or ‘intellectual disability,’ had been
classified under ‘deprived of reason’,… the terms, ‘deprived of reason’ and
‘demented,’ however, should be differentiated from the term, ‘mentally retarded’
or ‘intellectually disabled’” (People v. XXX, G.R. 243988, August 27, 2020).
● “An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or
demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses.
However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age” (G.R.
243988, August 27, 2020).
● “He or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual,
social, and practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers.
Because of such impairment, he or she does not meet the “socio-cultural
standards of personal independence and social responsibility” (G.R. 243988,
August 27, 2020).
● “Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is
as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a
chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. [However], [b]oth are considered
incapable of giving rational consent,… especially on matters involving
sexuality” (G.R. 243988, August 27, 2020).
● In the case of People v. XXX, the 23-year-old victim, AAA, reached only grade six
and was suffering from epilepsy and mild mental retardation.
○ She was raped on two separate occasions by the accused (XXX) because
he told her “[AAA] para gumaling ang epilepsy mo, may gagawin lang ako
sa iyo” (G.R. 242684, February 17, 2021).
○ GGG, sister of AAA, testified she noticed AAA’s belly and hips becoming
bigger.
○ Thus, GGG brought AAA to Dr. Lucila Gatchalian (Dr. Gatchalian) who
performed a pregnancy test using AAA’s urine sample, which yielded a
positive result.
○ GGG was shocked to discover AAA was actually pregnant (G.R. 242684,
February 17, 2021).
○ During trial, the credibility of the victim, AAA, was questioned.
○ The appellant argued “that AAA’s competence as a witness, by reason of
her mental retardation, is impaired.”
○ The Supreme Court declared the credibility and competence of AAA
cannot be disregarded merely by reason of her mental retardation (G.R.
242684, February 17, 2021).
● In the 2010 case of People v. Castillo, the Supreme Court upheld the credibility of
a person suffering from mental retardation:
○ “[Emphasis must be given to the fact] that the competence and
credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been
upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their
ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the
complainant’s accusations, it even lends greater credence to her
testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so
tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact
suffered such crime at the hands of the accused…” (cited in G.R. 242684,
February 17, 2021)
● In the case of People v. de la Paz, the victim, a 31-year-old woman with the
mental capacity of a child six years and six months old positively identified the
accused.
○ “That she had sexual intercourse with him was sufficiently established by
her testimony… though a mental retardate, was able to describe how she
was ravished by the appellant” (G.R. 177294, February 19, 2008).
○ “[H]aving the mental age level of a six-year-and-six-month-old normal
child would even bolster her credibility as a witness, considering that a
victim at such tender age would not publicly admit that she had been
criminally abused and ravished unless that was the truth.
○ “For no woman, especially one of tender age,… would concoct a story of
defloration,… if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished…” (G.R. 177294, February 19, 2008).
○ “Moreover, the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’
testimonies is, as has repeatedly been held by this Court, accorded great
respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on its part, it
having had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial
evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses“ (G.R. 177294,
February 19, 2008).
● In the case of People v. Rosales, a psychologist working with the National Bureau
of Investigation testified on the victim AAA’s mental condition.
○ She examined AAA, a 39-year-old victim of rape, and concluded in her
Neuro-Psychiatric Examination and Evaluation that AAA has been found
suffering from moderate mental retardation with a Mental Age of six
years and eight months and an IQ of 41 (G.R. 197537, July 24, 2013).
○ The Supreme Court observed “[t]he fact of AAA’s mental retardation did
not impair the credibility of her testimony. Mental retardation per se does
not affect credibility.
○ “A mentally retarded [person] may be a credible witness. The acceptance
of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the
manner she can make them known to the court” (G.R. 197537, July 24,
2013).
● In the case of People v. Alipio, the Supreme Court said “it is not fair to judge a
mentally-retarded person, one who does not have a good grasp of information
and who lacks the capacity to make a mental calculation of the events unfolding
before her eyes, according to what is natural or unnatural for normal persons”
(cited in G.R. 197537, July 24, 2013).
Ombudsman’s dismissal of a criminal complaint

Link:
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/314316348/ombudsmans-dismissal-of-a-criminal-c
omplaint.html
Main Doctrine:
● The Supreme Court declared that ‘[t]he determination of whether probable
cause exists is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman’
● The office of the Ombudsman is an investigative body tasked to “investigate on

its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient” (Tranquil G.S. Salvador III, Criminal
Procedure citing Section 13 (1), Article XI, 1987 Constitution).
● It has investigatory and disciplinary powers over “all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee… during his tenure of office”. Its investigatory and prosecutorial
powers are plenary and unqualified (Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Criminal Procedure
citing Section 16, Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Castro v. Deloria).
● Whether a dismissal of a criminal complaint by the Ombudsman is immutable.
● The Supreme Court “has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers” (De la Cruz v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. 256337, February 13, 2023).
○ “In line with the policy of non-interference, courts shall not interfere in
the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in determining probable cause.
The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to
great respect if there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion” (G.R.
256337, February 13, 2023).
○ “However, this Court (Supreme Court) may review the acts of the
Ombudsman if a party invoking Rule 65 (Petition of Certiorari) of the
Rules of Court substantiates, not merely alleges, that there was grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of the powers of the Ombudsman” (G.R.
256337, February 13, 2023).
● In the case of De la Cruz v. Office of the Ombudsman, “Dela Cruz was assigned to
conduct the inquest investigation of a Homicide case filed against the following
children in conflict with the law (CICL): AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, and EEE. The case
involved the death of the 14-year-old son of Lilia M. Abequiebel (Abequiebel)…”
(G.R. 256337, February 13, 2023).
● Dela Cruz dismissed the case against AAA, CCC, DDD, and EEE because their
guardians allegedly paid to Abequiebel their respective monetary obligations.
● In an Order dated November 27, 2019, the Ombudsman granted the Motion for
Reconsideration because there is “no single piece of evidence point[ing] to [Dela
Cruz’s] solicitation” (G.R. 256337, February 13, 2023).
● However, in an Ombudsman’s Order dated February 13, 2020, two months
thereafter, the July 26, 2018 Resolution was reinstated, finding probable cause
to indict Dela Cruz for three counts of violation of Sec. 7(d), in relation to Sec.
11 (a) of RA 6713.
● The Ombudsman relied on the statement of AAA’s guardian “that Dela Cruz
told him to leave the office upon payment of the settlement amount” (G.R.
256337, February 13, 2023).
○ “Dela Cruz claims that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion… in motu proprio reversing itself more than two months after it
issued its previous Order dismissing the criminal complaint against [him].”
● “Dela Cruz [also] claims that the Order dated November 27, 2019 must take
precedence over the subsequent Order dated February 13, 2020 as the former
had already reached [or lapsed to] finality by operation of law.”
● He invoked the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment (G.R.
256337, February 13, 2023).
● The Supreme Court declared “[t]he determination of whether probable cause
exists is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman.”
● “[T]his Court has held that the executive determination of probable cause is a
highly factual matter… We shall defer to the findings of the Ombudsman absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion…” (G.R. 256337, February 13, 2023)
● “… Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules, particularly refers to procedures in
administrative cases and provides when an administrative case shall be
considered final and executory or unappealable… It is thus apparent… that the
provision pertaining to the finality and execution of a decision of the
Ombudsman and the appropriate remedies available to aggrieved parties in
administrative charges do not apply to criminal cases” (G.R. 256337, February
13, 2023).
● “In order to apply the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment invoked by Dela Cruz, it is first necessary to determine if there is
indeed a final judgment.”
● In Imingan v. The Office of the Honorable Ombudsman, the Court emphasized the
results of preliminary investigations cannot be considered as valid and final
judgments (cited in G.R. 256337, February 13, 2023).
○ “[T]he [questioned] Orders pertain to the results of preliminary
investigations and, as such, cannot be considered as valid and final
judgment.”
○ Hence, the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment
cannot be applied to the De la Cruz case (G.R. 256337, February 13,
2023).
○ “[T]he Ombudsman may motu proprio conduct a reinvestigation as the
same is ‘consistent with its independence as protector of the people and
as prosecutor to ensure accountability of public officers, the Ombudsman
is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of
complainants’.” (G.R. 256337, February 13, 2023)
○ “[T]he Court upholds the policy of noninterference in the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers including its power to
motu proprio initiate a reinvestigation or reconsideration of a case
within its jurisdiction… as with all constitutionally mandated powers, [it]
must be wielded cautiously as to not frustrate the ends of justice.” (G.R.
256337, February 13, 2023)
Reasonable certainty of conviction
Date: April 14, 2023

Link:
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/314321215/reasonable-certainty-of-conviction.ht
ml
Main Doctrine:
● The prosecution office must continue to assist and coordinate with the relevant
Law Enforcement Agencies to build-up the case and ensure the successful
prosecution of the same
● Recently the Department of Justice issued Department Circular 20 dated March

31, 2023, directing all prosecutors of the National Prosecution Service to
conduct preliminary investigation for the sole purpose of determining
“whether a crime has been committed and whether there is a prima facie case
against respondent [suspected offender] and a reasonable certainty of [his or
her] conviction…”
● The role of the prosecutors as mandated by the Circular extends to the case
build-up stage where they may assist or cooperate with the complainants and/or
law enforcement agencies.
● It must be noted, however, that the Circular applies only to heinous crimes such
as, but not limited to, treason, piracy and qualified piracy, qualified bribery,
parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, robbery
with violence against and intimidation of persons, destructive arson, rape,
plunder, and carnapping (Section 3).
● It also applies to all violations of the (a) Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended; (b)
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended; (c) Anti-Terrorism Act of
2020; (d) Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012; and (e)
all crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (Section 3).
● Hence, the preliminary investigation required to be conducted before the filing
of a complaint or information in court under Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure will continue to apply for offenses “where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four years two months and one day without regard
to the fine.”
● As originally defined, a “preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial” (Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure).
○ Preliminary investigation is the determination of the existence of
probable cause by the executive department.
● With the issuance of Department Circular 20, there is now a difference
between the quantum of proof required for the preliminary investigation of
heinous crimes and offenses of the same category versus ordinary offenses.
● For the former, prima facie evidence and reasonable certainty of conviction is
required.
○ Prima facie evidence is “such status of evidence which on its own and if
left uncontroverted, is sufficient to establish all the elements of a crime.”
○ It is the duty of the prosecutor to determine based on available
documents, witnesses, or real evidence if prima facie evidence exists for
the filing of a complaint or information in court (Section 2).
● For ordinary offenses requiring preliminary investigation, the probable cause
under the Rules of Criminal Procedure will continue to apply as the measure or
quantum of proof. Otherwise stated, once the Office of the Prosecutor
determines the existence of probable cause, the criminal complaint or
information must be filed in court.
○ To achieve the objectives under the Circular, “all heads of prosecution
offices shall ensure that all prosecutors within their respective offices
shall… be available to assist, coordinate and cooperate with, and provide
sufficient legal guidance to law enforcement agencies (LEA) in all planned
operations,… from their inception until successful termination of the case”
(Section 4).
○ The “[p]rosecutors shall be available at any hour of the day or night, even
remotely via available telecommunications technology, for purposes of
consultation, cooperation and coordination on matters involving proper
collection and preservation of evidence, such as but not limited to
interviewing of witnesses, preparation of Judicial Affidavits, and vetting of
evidence” (Section 4).
○ “Criminal complaints received by prosecution offices from private
individuals, as well as formal referrals for investigation from LEAs
involving crimes covered [by the Circular]… shall, within 10 working days
from receipt, be evaluated to determine if they contain all the necessary
evidence to prove the essential elements of the crime and should be
docketed for preliminary investigation” (Section 5).
● “Should the evaluation disclose that the complaint or referral contains all the
necessary evidence to prove all the essential elements of the crime, the assisting
prosecutor who conducted the evaluation shall certify that there is a sufficient
ground to conduct preliminary investigation… [and] shall then be docketed for
the conduct of preliminary investigation…” (Section 5).
● “In all cases for preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor shall issue
a Certification as to the existence of prima facie case and of a reasonable
certainty of conviction… However, should the evaluation result in a finding that
the complaint is not supported by sufficient evidence, or that there are lacking
pieces of evidence, the complaint shall be referred back to the private
complainant or the referring LEA…” (Section 5).
● The referral endorsement must state the following: “(1) a report on the result
of the evaluation; (2) an advice about the lacking evidence; and (3) a directive
to secure and submit the said lacking evidence/s.”
● If the evidence remains to be insufficient or pieces of evidence cannot be located
within a reasonable period from its referral, the case shall be closed and
terminated without prejudice to refiling (see Section 5).
● For warrantless arrests (respondent is arrested while committing, about to
commit or has just committed the offense) requiring inquest proceedings, “the
docket/records section of the office shall immediately refer the complaint and
other required documents such as the investigation form, referral letter,
complaint-affidavits or arrest… to the assisting prosecutors [concerned]…”
(Section 6).
○ The assisting prosecutors shall immediately render assistance and
evaluate the records. “If the documents contain all the necessary evidence
to prove the essential elements of the crime, they shall certify that there is
sufficient ground to conduct inquest proceedings… [and] shall [be]
submitted to the head of office… for approval for inquest” (Section 6).
○ If an inquest prosecutor after evaluation of the complaint and the records
determines that not all the evidence necessary to prove the essential
elements of the crime are present, or the suspect/s are not taken into
custody within the period allowed by law, the assisting prosecutor shall
make a recommendation to the head of office for the conduct of regular
case build up and, if warranted, a preliminary investigation (see Section 6).
○ The prosecution office must continue to assist and coordinate with the
relevant LEA to build-up the case and ensure the successful prosecution
of the same. In all inquest proceedings covered by the Circular,
“prosecution offices must ensure that all important pieces of evidence are
submitted by the LEA to make sure that no suspect… lawfully arrested
without [a] warrant shall be released for further investigation” (Section 6).
○ The proper implementation of Department Circular 20 will deter the filing
of criminal cases in court which are: (a) poorly and hastily evaluated; (b)
lacking in evidence; and (c) intended to persecute rather than to
prosecute. Conversely, it may promote the use of plea bargaining or plea
of guilty to a lesser offense if the accused is convinced that he or she can
be convicted eventually.
Identification of the offender
Date: April 28, 2023

Link:
https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/314325491/identification-of-the-offende
r.html
Main Doctrine:
● The Supreme Court said “the testimonies from aggrieved parties should not
simplistically be equated to or treated as testimonies from detached parties…”
● “[T]he… identification of the author of a crime should be the primal concern of

criminal prosecution in any civilized legal system. Corollary to this is the
actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the
accused” (Concha, et al. v. People, G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018 citing People v.
Arapok).
● “All these must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt… and without
solace from the weakness of the defense. Thus, even if the defense of the accused
may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution
failed to discharge the onus on his identity and culpability” (G.R. 208114,
October 3, 2018).
● The identification of the offender can take place in-court or out-of-court.
● The former is subject to the exacting requirements of cross-examination while
the latter, being conducted in law enforcement establishments, is not bound by
the rules of a court proceeding.
● However, the Supreme Court “recognizes the ‘probative weight of an in-court
identification is largely dependent upon an out-of-court identification’.” Thus, it is
necessary to determine if the conduct of the latter is above suspicion.” (G.R.
208114, October 3, 2018).
● “Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification…, mug shots where photographs [of suspects] are shown to the
witness…, [or] thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group
of persons lined up…”(G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).
○ “Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity
of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned
out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements
of constitutional due process” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018 citing
People v. Teehankee).
○ In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects, the
Supreme Court has adopted the “totality of circumstances” test where the
following factors are considered:
■ “(1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018 citing People v.
Teehankee).
● In the case of Concha, et al. v. People, the victim of carnapping, Macutay, failed to
provide descriptions of his attackers when he reported the incident to the police.
○ He “did not describe them as to their height, skin color, clothes, or any
distinguishing mark that could have made them stand out” (G.R. 208114,
October 3, 2018).
○ Further, “Macutay was admittedly scared and confused, which reduced his
degree of attention. His disorientation was apparent when he gave his
watch, wallet, and even his t-shirt to his assailants as soon as he heard
‘holdup.’ He did not even wait for them to tell him what they needed from
him” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).
○ “[I]t was not shown how certain Macutay was in his identification of [the
accused]. Without any prior description, the basis of his identification is
questionable. It also remains uncertain whether the t-shirt that petitioner
Concha wore during the police show-up was the same t-shirt that
Macutay gave to his assailants…” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).
○ “Finally, the out-of-court identification was tainted with improper
suggestion… When Macutay, the sole witness, was invited by the police to
identify his assailants, his mind was already conditioned that he would
come face-to face with the persons who robbed him” (G.R. 208114,
October 3, 2018).
○ “Both verbal and non-verbal information might become inappropriate
cues or suggestions to a witness. In appraising the suggestiveness of
identification procedures, this Court has previously considered prior or
contemporaneous actions of law enforcers, prosecutors, media, or even
fellow witnesses” (People v. Nuñez, G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).
○ “The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the
degree of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the moment of
identification. What is most critical here is the initial identification made
by the witness during investigation and case build-up, not identification
during trial” (G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).
○ “A witness’ certainty is tested in court during cross-examination. In
several instances, this Court has considered a witness’ straight and candid
recollection of the incident, undiminished by the rigors of
cross-examination as an indicator of credibility” (G.R. 209342, October 4,
2017).
○ “Still, certainty on the witness stand is by no means conclusive. By the
time a witness takes the stand, he or she shall have likely made narrations
to investigators, to responding police or barangay officers, to the public
prosecutor, to any possible private prosecutors, to the families of the
victims, other sympathizers, and even to the media” (G.R. 209342,
October 4, 2017).
○ “The witness, then, may have established certainty, not because of a
foolproof cognitive perception and recollection of events but because of
consistent reinforcement borne by becoming an experienced narrator…
what is more crucial is certainty at the onset or on initial identification, not
in a relatively belated stage of criminal proceedings” (G.R. 209342,
October 4, 2017).
○ “‘It is by now a well-established fact that people are less accurate and
complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval
than after a short one.’… This Court has considered acceptable an
identification made two days after the commission of a crime, not so one
that had an interval of five and a half months” (G.R. 209342, October 4,
2017).
● In the case of People v. Nuñez, the prosecution witnesses were “not aided by the
sheer length of time that had lapsed from the criminal incident (robbery with
homicide) until the time they made their identifications. By the time Cruz made
the identification, seven years and eight months had lapsed… [a]s for Perez, eight
years and nine months had already lapsed” (G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).
○ The Supreme Court has always been mindful that “[t]he greatest care
should be taken in considering the identification of the accused,
especially when this identification is made by a sole witness and the
judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the
identification” (People v. Ansano, G.R. 232455, December 2, 2020).
○ “This stems from the recognition that testimonial evidence, unlike other
forensic evidence such as fingerprint and DNA testing which are real or
object evidence, are subject to human errors which may be intentional or
unintentional” (G.R. 232455, December 2, 2020).
○ “The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact… Human memory does
not record events like a video recorder. In the first place, human memory
is more selective than a video camera. The sensory environment contains
a vast amount of information, but the memory process perceives and
accurately records only a very small percentage of that information” (G.R.
232455, December 2, 2020 citing People v. Nuñez).
○ “[T]he act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting puzzle pieces
together, human memory can change in dramatic and unexpected ways
because of the passage of time or subsequent events, such as exposure to
“post event” information like conversations with other witnesses or media
reports” (G.R. 232455, December 2, 2020 citing People v. Nuñez).
○ “[M]emory can also be altered through the reconstruction process.
Questioning a witness about what he or she perceived and requiring the
witness to reconstruct the experience can cause the witness’ memory to
change by unconsciously blending the actual fragments of memory of the
event with information provided during the memory retrieval process”
(G.R. 232455, December 2, 2020 citing People v. Nuñez).
○ The Supreme Court said “the testimonies from aggrieved parties should
not simplistically be equated to or treated as testimonies from detached
parties…[they] should be handled with the realistic thought they come
from parties with material and emotional ties to the subject of the
litigation… [l]ike all other evidence, they must be independently
assessed” (G.R. 232455, December 2, 2020 citing People v. Nuñez).
Presenting rebuttal evidence
Date: May 12, 2023

Link:
329879/presenting-rebuttal-evidence.html
Main Doctrine:
● Rebuttal evidence is not utilized to change a legal strategy, rehabilitate a
witness, or to present newly discovered evidence
● Rebuttal evidence is often thought of as a form of cross-examination; however,

it is not.
● A rebuttal is given “to explain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given in
evidence by the adverse party.”
● It is “receivable only where new matter has been developed by the evidence of
one of the parties and is generally limited to a reply to new points” (Francisco,
Evidence).
○ To be clear, rebuttal evidence is presented after the defendant has
completed the presentation of evidence.
○ For example, after the defendant’s witnesses are presented and examined
in court and the defendant makes an offer of evidence, the plaintiff or
prosecution may then request for the presentation of rebuttal evidence to
meet the new points raised by the defendant.
○ Hence, the function of a rebuttal is “’to meet the new facts put in by the
opponent in his case in reply’ and is ‘necessary only because, on a plea in
denial, new subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or because, on
an affirmative plea, its substantive facts have been put forward, or
because, on any issue whatever, facts discrediting the proponent’s
witnesses have been offered’” (People v. Padero, G.R. 106274, September
28, 1993).
● The presentation of rebuttal evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court.
The court may allow or disallow the request for presentation of rebuttal
evidence. However, if the court grants the presentation of rebuttal evidence to
the plaintiff or prosecution, the defendant will be given a similar chance to
present sur-rebuttal evidence.
● Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the parties
should be allowed to introduce evidence in rebuttal.
● Judicial discretion, however, is not unlimited.
● It must be exercised reasonably, with the view of promoting the ends of justice,
one of which is to ascertain the truth. (People v. Hon. Felino Abalos, et al., G.R.
L-29039, November 28, 1969).
● The party cannot ignore the orders of the court when the latter is setting the
presentation of rebuttal evidence.
● Failure of a party to timely avail itself of the opportunity to present rebuttal
evidence will amount to the waiver of such right.
● Rebuttal evidence as a procedural tool is expressly provided in the 2017
Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.
● As paraphrased: If the court grants the motion to present rebuttal evidence, the
prosecution shall immediately proceed with its presentation after the accused
had rested his case (Number 13[e]).
● After the presentation of the prosecution’s last rebuttal witness, the accused
shall immediately present sur-rebuttal evidence, if there is any, and orally rest
the case in sur-rebuttal after the presentation of its last sur-rebuttal witness.
● Thereafter, the court shall submit the case for decision (Number 13[e]).
● Parties in civil cases may also be given the opportunity to present rebutting
evidence unless the court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice,
permits them to adduce evidence upon their original case.
● Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision (Section 5[f], Rule 30, 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure).
● In the case of People v. Padero, “the overwhelming import of the new facts
disclosed by the accused which have a damaging effect on the complainant’s
version (of rape) made it imperative for the prosecution to present rebuttal
evidence.
○ “Relegating the complainant to the background and presenting other
witnesses to rebut minor or trivial matters brought out… for the defense
engender serious doubts on the integrity of her story” (G.R. 106274,
September 28, 1993).
○ On rebuttal, the witnesses of the complainant denied the assertions of the
accused that there was no rape.
○ However, despite the opportunity for rebuttal, the complainant failed to
overturn the numerous circumstances shown by the accused’s witnesses
that there was no rape and the parties actually engaged in consensual
sexual intercourse (G.R. 106274, September 28, 1993).
○ “Where the defense tried to establish, not only that the accused did not
commit the acts alleged in the information, but, also, that another
person committed them, a new matter not covered directly by the
evidence for the prosecution, the testimony of the rebuttal witness
tending to show that the acts charged were indeed committed by the
accused… should not be stricken from the record…” (People v. Hon.
Felino Abalos, et al., G.R. L-29039, November 28, 1969).
○ There being new matters raised by the accused, “[t]he prosecution was
entitled, as a matter of strict legal right, to introduce positive evidence on
such new matter, instead of relying upon a mere inference from its
evidence in chief.”
○ However, “[i]n directing that the testimony of such rebuttal witness [to]
be stricken from the record… respondent Judge had committed a grave
abuse of discretion…” (G.R. L-29039, November 28, 1969).
● Rebuttal evidence is not utilized to change a legal strategy, rehabilitate a witness,
or to present newly discovered evidence.
● Its specific function is to reply to new matters raised by the other party in his or
her presentation of evidence.
Cross-examination on past criminal conviction
Date: May 19, 2023

Link:
332005/cross-examination-on-past-criminal-conviction.html
Main Doctrine:
● “Judges must be cautious in appreciating prior convictions since cases must be
tried without prejudice or bias and be based solely on the existence of the
crime”
● “The right to examine witnesses is an essential element in the conduct of a

trial… [T]he object of all examination of witnesses is to elicit facts to show the
truth, and it is not only the province of the judge, but it is also his duty to see
that facts within the knowledge of a witness are elicited…“ (Francisco, Evidence
citing 98 Corpus Juris Secundum 10).
● The witness is not obliged to respond to irrelevant or extraneous matters in a
litigation.
● However, “[a] witness is bound to answer his previous final conviction for an
offense. This simply means that a witness has a right to refuse to answer a
question about his having been merely charged with an offense…” (Francisco,
Evidence).
● “Cross-examination of defendant as to the facts peculiarly within his knowledge,
but which might be established by court record of his conviction in another cause
or court, does not violate the rule which requires that the best obtainable
evidence be produced” (Francisco, Evidence citing Territory v. Wright, 37 Hawaii
40).
● The Rule requiring the witness to answer the fact of his or her previous
conviction was reinforced in the 2019 amendments when it introduced a new
provision that laid down the standards by which a witness may be impeached
on a past conviction. It requires that “(a) the crime was punishable by a penalty
in excess of one year; or (b) the crime involved moral turpitude, regardless of
penalty” (see Section 12, Rule 132).
● Observers soon saw that the new law permitting defendants to testify, “no doubt
intended by the legislators to help assure fair trials, instead exposed
defendants to damaging cross-examination about past wrongdoings.”
○ Based on the analyses of the data collected, the authors concluded that “…
[t]he criminal record effect could be even stronger than we have found in
these analyses; the experimental work suggests that having a record for a
similar offense creates the most bias, and we had information only about
the offense of a defendant’s criminal record, not its type ….”
○ They further said that “[t]he enhanced conviction probability that prior
record evidence supplies in close cases may well contribute to erroneous
convictions …. [P]rosecutors making charging decisions and judges
considering the prejudicial effect of prior records should… account [for]
the dramatic effect that knowledge of criminal records can have in close
cases.”
● Judges must be cautious in appreciating prior convictions since cases must be
tried without prejudice or bias and be based solely on the existence of the crime.
However, past conduct and convictions may still be presented to show a
propensity to commit a crime or a tendency to lie.
Exclusion of witnesses
Date: May 26, 2023

Link:
334051/exclusion-of-witnesses.html
Main Doctrine:
● “A lawyer must be quick to move for the exclusion of witnesses not authorized
to be in court when another witness testifies”
● “The court has the power, in the trial of a case, to exclude witnesses from the
courtroom during the examination of other witnesses. This rule applies to trial
[in both] civil and criminal cases” (Francisco, Evidence).
● “The object of such order is obviously to elicit the truth by securing the testimony
not influenced by the statements of other witnesses or the suggestions of
counsel, as well as to prevent the collusion and concert of testimony among
witnesses” (Francisco, Evidence).
● The excluded witness is not prohibited from testifying but simply disallowed to
be present while other witnesses testify.
○ This is to prevent the excluded witness from listening to the testimonies of
others thereby avoiding testimonies based on another’s perception.
● Based on the original provision of the 1989 Rules on Evidence, “the judge may
exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he
may not hear the testimony of other witnesses” (Section 15, Rule 132).
● While maintaining the general intent of the original provision, the 2019
amendments to the Rules on Evidence supplied a list of those who cannot be
excluded in the courtroom, namely:
(a) a party who is a natural person;
(b) a duly designated representative of a juridical entity which is a party to the
case;
(c) a person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the party’s cause;
or (d) a person authorized by a statute to be present (Section 15, Rule 132).
● In addition, the amendments now expressly allow the judge to order the
exclusion of witnesses upon his or her initiative or on the motion of any party.
● The list of those not authorized to be excluded was taken from the United Stated
Federal Rules of Evidence (Section 615).
○ “Expert witnesses are excluded from the operations of the rule. In most
cases, their evidence is not based upon the conclusion which they form
from the testimony, but upon hypothetical questions or an assumed state
of facts…” (Francisco, Evidence).
○ “[H]ence, it is not necessary that they should listen to the testimony of
other witnesses. But if there is any reason to apprehend (believe) that
expert witnesses are… to be influenced by the testimony of other
witnesses, they should be treated in the same manner” (Francisco,
Evidence citing Jones on Evidence and Johnson v. State, 10 Tex. App 571).
○ “The rule does not apply to an agent of the party, when the presence of
such agent is necessary, as when the agent has gained such familiarity with
the facts that his presence is necessary for the proper management of the
action or defense” (Francisco, Evidence citing Ryan v. Couch, 66 Ala. 244).
○ The agent may also be treated as the equivalent of a representative of a
juridical entity which is a party to the case now allowed to be present in
court by reason of the amendments.
○ However, “corporate agents not necessary to conducting the case may be
excluded” (Francisco, Evidence citing St. Louis…Co. v. Cox, 221 S.W. 1043).
○ “Ordinarily, witnesses called to testify to another witness’ character for
truth and veracity are exempted from the rule” (Francisco, Evidence citing
14 Ency. of Evidence 596).
○ However, it is the author’s view that if a witness will testify on the
notoriety of another then the other witnesses on the same subject matter
will have to be excluded.
○ “In criminal cases, policemen, detectives, or other police officers, may in
the court’s discretion, be exempted from the rule, especially where it
appears that their presence is required in the courtroom either to guard
prisoners on trial or in assisting in the prosecution of the case” (Francisco,
Evidence citing 14 Ency. of Evidence 596).
○ A person who is not a witness but present in the courtroom may
afterwards be called to testify if counsel did not previously know that it
would be necessary to call him; but the court may decline to allow the
witness to testify if the testimony is merely cumulative and if there was no
reason given for the failure to call him on the witness stand (see Francisco,
Evidence citing 88 C.J.S. 174).
○ There is nothing in the Rule that prohibits the counsel of record to inquire
from the witnesses, inside the courtroom, to verify or validate the
statements of the adverse party’s witnesses.
○ The information can later be used to cross-examine other witnesses.
○ The prevailing rule is that a witness who violates the order of the court
“without the consent, connivance, or procurement of the party calling
him or of the counsel representing such party, [will] not [be]… rendered
incompetent to testify… [T]he party calling him cannot… be rightfully
deprived of the testimony of such witness” (Francisco, Evidence citing 53
Am. Jur. 48-49).
○ However, “a disobedient witness may be punished for contempt of court,
and his disobedience may be considered as affecting his credibility [if he
later testifies].” If it could not be foreseen that a disobedient witness
would be needed to testify, he or she may give rebutting testimony
(Francisco, Evidence citing 53 Am. Jur. 48-49).
● In the case of Design Sources International, Inc. and Kenneth Sy v. Lourdez Eristingcol,
the principal issue is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing assailed Orders disallowing petitioners from
presenting Stephen as their witness (G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014).
● The controversy arose from the objection of the respondent’s counsel to the
presentation of Stephen as the petitioners’ witness considering that Stephen was
already inside the courtroom during the presentation of witness (petitioner)
Kenneth (G.R. 193966, February 19, 2014).
● However, as aptly found by the Court of Appeals, the respondent failed to
substantiate her claim that there was a prior request for the exclusion of other
witnesses during the presentation of Kenneth. She did not even allege in her
Comment that there was any such request (G.R. 193966, February 19, 2014).
● “Excluding future witnesses… at the time another witness is testifying, or
ordering that these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily
to prevent them from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure
that the witnesses… [are not] influenced by the testimonies of the others.”
● “However, without any motion from the opposing party or order from the court,
there is nothing… that prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of other
witnesses… [N]othing in the records… would show that there was an order of
exclusion from the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondent’s counsel
to exclude other witnesses… prior to or even during the presentation of the
testimony of Kenneth.”
● Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the
parties, a court cannot simply allow or disallow the presentation of a witness
solely on the grounds that the latter heard the testimony of another witness.
● It is the responsibility of the respondent’s counsel to protect the interest of his
client during the presentation of other witnesses (G.R. 193966, February 19,
2014).
● Hence, a lawyer must be quick to move for the exclusion of witnesses not
authorized to be in court when another witness testifies.
● The lawyer’s inaction or delay in moving to exclude witnesses may be considered
a failure to protect the interest of his or her client.
Striking out an answer of a witness
Date: June 2, 2023

Link:
336311/striking-out-an-answer-of-a-witness.html
Main Doctrine:
● The motion to strike the answer must be made before the witness examination
is terminated or concluded.
● The court can only order the striking out of answers upon proper motion of the
concerned or affected party.
● The lawyer must be ready to interpose an objection to an incompetent,
irrelevant, or improper question.
● However, it may happen that a witness gives an answer to a question despite the
speed at which the lawyer objects to it. The remedy of the objecting lawyer is to
move to strike out the answer.
● Under the 2019 Rules on Evidence, the grounds on which striking out the answer
of a witness is permissible, are as follow: (a) when an answer is given before the
adverse party fully voices the objection; (b) when an answer is not responsive
to the question; (c) when an answer is given without a question being posed or
when it is beyond the limits set by the court; or (d) when the answer given is a
narration and not a response to a question (Section 39, Rule 132).
○ It may happen that incompetent evidence “is received conditionally on
the assurance of [the] counsel that he will supply [the] necessary
[evidentiary] foundation, [but] which [if] he fails to do, the court should
exclude the evidence on its own motion, or, the objecting party should
move to exclude it” (Francisco, Evidence citing 58 Am. Jur. 134-135).
○ “Where a witness answers a question before an objection can be
interposed, and the court thereafter sustains an objection to the question,
it has been held that the answer to the question cannot be considered as
evidence in the case even though no motion to strike the answer is made”
(Francisco, Evidence citing 88 C.J.S. 267-269).
○ “A motion to strike out evidence may be directed against a particular item
of evidence on the testimony of a particular witness or some part
thereof, or it may be for the purpose of having all the evidence stricken
out…it should specify the grounds upon which it is based… all other
grounds are thereby waived” (Francisco, Evidence citing 55 AM. JUR.
132).
○ “A party cannot insist that competent and relevant evidence be stricken
out for reasons going to its weight, sufficiency, or credibility… [neither can
he] move to strike it out because it proves unfavorable to him, even
though it is inadmissible” (Francisco, Evidence citing Mobile Light v.
Portiss and Fidelity & Casualty Co… v. Griner).
○ “The court may, on motion, strike out part of an answer where the
meaning of the part left is not changed thereby; but cannot strike out
qualifying words in the answer thereby changing it into a positive
statement, or strike out a part of an answer so as to leave it unintelligible”
(Francisco, Evidence citing 88 C.J.S. 287).
○ “Evidence may be stricken on motion, on the ground that it is wholly
incompetent, immaterial, or irrelevant, and prejudicial” (Francisco,
Evidence).
● An answer of a witness that has no relation to the fact in issue or irrelevant can
be stricken from the records upon proper motion.
● However, there are instances when irrelevant, immaterial, or prejudicial
questions are allowed to remain in the records subject to the discretion of the
court.
● While the grant or denial of the motion to strike is left to the court’s discretion,
“the right to have it stricken is not subject to the discretion of the court.”
○ “[W]here the incompetency or lack of qualification of a witness to testify
on a particular matter clearly appears, his testimony thereon should be
stricken. It is a sufficient ground for a motion to strike [if] want of
knowledge of a witness … appeared on cross-examination after the
court had [previously] ruled that the witness was competent” (Francisco,
Evidence citing 88 C.J.S. 269-273).
○ Where the “testimony on direct examination was based on hearsay, his
testimony is subject to a motion to strike and should be stricken. Likewise,
testimony should be stricken where it is apparent that the witness is not
testifying to anything within his own knowledge” (Francisco, Evidence
citing 88 C.J.S. 269-273).
○ “Where testimony apparently based on hearsay is not clear, the court may
temporarily overrule a motion to strike, and have further questions
asked; and, if the objection is not thereafter removed, it has been held
that a failure to strike is [an] error” (Francisco, Evidence citing 88 C.J.S.
269-273).
○ Where the subject matter of the evidence is privileged and the question
was answered by the witness, the answer may be the subject of a motion
to strike.
○ An answer to a question not based on facts but on speculation and
probability, or an answer which argues instead of responding may also be
stricken from the records.
○ If the answer is vague, unintelligible, or confusing, it may be stricken on
motion.
● “Testimony introduced without a proper foundation therefor, or on an
insufficient foundation, may be stricken,” such as presenting secondary evidence
of a destroyed document without proper foundation (see Francisco, Evidence
citing 88 C.J.S. 269-273).
● The testimony of a witness on a document not pre-marked during pre-trial may
be presented during trial if properly reserved pursuant to Rule 18 of the 2019
Rules of Civil Procedure.
● Hence, an answer pertaining to the reserved document is not a ground for a
motion to strike.
● “On the other hand,… evidence competent for any purpose, and relevant to any
issue, should not be stricken, and evidence which, although inadmissible at the
time it is admitted, subsequently becomes admissible need not be stricken”
● The timeliness of a motion to strike “may depend on the situation presented in a
given case, and it has been declared that there should be no strict rule. However,
inexcusable delay in moving to strike… is ground for denying the motion”
● “Ordinarily a motion to strike objectionable testimony must be made at the time
the testimony is given [when] the impropriety of the testimony is then
apparent. If the impropriety of the testimony is not apparent[,] it should be made
immediately after its impropriety becomes apparent, as where the ground for
the exclusion of the evidence appears for the first time on cross-examination”
● The motion to strike the answer must be made before the witness examination
is terminated or concluded.
● Thus, the motion can no longer be entertained when the examination of another
witness has commenced, when the party has rested its case, or when the case is
submitted for resolution.
● The court has to rule on the motion to strike an answer in a timely manner. The
ruling of the court if tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction may be questioned through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.
● Knowing how to move to strike an answer is important because it limits the
presentation of evidence to material and relevant matters, and will prevent the
court from rendering judgment based on muddled facts.
Identity of offenses leads to double jeopardy
Date: June 9, 2023

Link:
338380/identity-of-offenses-leads-to-double-jeopardy.html
Main Doctrine:
The protection of the Constitution against a person being put twice in jeopardy for the
‘same offense’ extends to an act that is punished both by law and ordinance.
● “The rule of ‘double jeopardy’ had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction… [i]t
meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense” (Melo v. People, G.R. L-3580, March 22, 1950).
○ “‘(T)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that
the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of
the criminal process.’ Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes
that a second trial would be unfair” (People v. Arcega, G.R. 237489,
August 27, 2020).
● The protection of the Constitution against a person being put twice in jeopardy
for the “same offense” extends to an act that is punished both by law and
ordinance. Hence, the “conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act” (see Section 21, Article III, 1987
Constitution).
○ “The phrase same offense… has always been construed to mean… that the
second offense… is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first
(criminal) information, [and] that the two offenses are identical. There is
identity [of] offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other” (Melo v.
People, G.R. L-3580, March 22, 1950).
○ “Under [the] Rules [of Court] there is identity between two offenses not
only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also
when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information” (Melo v. People,
G.R. L-3580, March 22, 1950 citing U.S. v. Lim Suco, 11 Phil. 484).
○ “In other words, one who has been charged with an offense cannot be
again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be
lesser or greater than the former… the Government cannot begin with the
highest, and then go down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for
every dereliction included therein…” (Melo v. People, G.R. L-3580, March
22, 1950).
○ However, “where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for
which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a
new and distinct offense…, the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.”
● In the case of Melo v. People, Conrado Melo was charged with frustrated
homicide for allegedly inflicting serious wounds upon Benjamin Obillo with the
use of a kitchen knife, requiring medical attention for more than 30 days.
○ On the morning of December 29, 1949, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged, and in the evening of the same day the victim Obillo
died from his wounds (G.R. L-3580, March 22, 1950).
○ “In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor
of an accused (defendant), the following requisites must [be present] in
the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charges; and (d)
the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent” (People
v. Obsania, G.R. L-24447, June 29, 1968).
● In the case of People v. Obsania, Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, raped the
complainant Erlinda Dollente, in the rice fields of Sitio Cawakalan, Barrio
Capulaan, Pangasinan. The accused Obsania pleaded not guilty upon arraignment
and moved for the dismissal of the case for the failure of the criminal information
to allege “lewd designs” (G.R. L-24447, June 29, 1968).
○ Despite the inclusion of the allegation “lewd designs” in the criminal
information, the accused claimed that it did not cure the jurisdictional
infirmity.
○ The trial court granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action,
causing the prosecution to file an appeal.
○ The question to be answered was whether the appeal of the Government
(through the prosecution) constitutes double jeopardy.
○ To answer this question, it must be determined whether the dismissal or
termination of the original case was with or without the express consent
of the defendant.
○ “[W]hen the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant,
the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense; because, [it]… constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege,… prevent[ing] the court from proceeding to the trial on [its]
merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him” (G.R.
L-24447, June 29, 1968).
○ “In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no double jeopardy… if the
indictment against him is revived by the fiscal” (G.R. L-24447, June 29,
1968).
● In the case of People v. Alejandro, the accused was charged with two counts of
rape of a 12-year old minor, AAA.
○ After the prosecution presented AAA as witness, accused manifested in
open court that he would no longer present any evidence for the defense
and submitted the case for decision (G.R. 223099, January 11, 2018).
○ The Regional Trial Court promulgated a decision acquitting the accused.
○ On the same day, the RTC recalled the decision upon motion of the
prosecution that there were Orders that were inadvertently placed in the
record of the case involving the same accused but with a different private
complainant-victim.
○ The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing “that a judgment
of acquittal is immediately final and executory and can neither be
withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place him in double
jeopardy.”
○ The motion was denied, and the accused was found guilty of two counts of
rape.
○ “What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered
based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed to
testify… allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case
involving the same accused-appellant” (G.R. 223099, January 11, 2018).
○ This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal that
had been promulgated is final, unappealable, and immediately executory.
○ “The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which
are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where
there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse
of discretion under exceptional circumstances.” The exceptions are not
present because the prosecution was able to present their case and their
witnesses.
● In the case of People v. Arcega, accused Domingo Arcega was charged and
convicted with attempted rape in the RTC of Iriga City.
○ The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the
judgment of the RTC, finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness only (G.R.
No. 237489, August 27, 2020).
○ The issue to be resolved was whether the Government may assail the
Court of Appeals’ decision modifying the RTC Judgment from attempted
rape to acts of lasciviousness.
○ The Supreme Court, citing People v. Balunsat, declared that “[w]e can no
longer review the ‘downgrading’ of the crime by the appellate court
without violating the right against double jeopardy, which proscribes an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of increasing the
penalty imposed upon the accused” (G.R. 237489, August 27, 2020).
○ “(T)he underlying idea,… is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent,
he may be found guilty” (G.R. 237489, August 27, 2020 citing People v.
Hon. Velasco).
Rule 103, Rule 109, or administrative correction
Date: June 16, 2023

Link:
340270/rule-103-rule-109or-administrative-correction.html
Main Doctrine:
The person wanting to change or cancel the entry must know the proper legal remedy
to avail (himself of) to avoid wasting his or her time and resources; this will also limit
the unnecessary filing of actions in courts.
● One of the most common legal problems encountered in the Philippines is an

error of entry in the birth certificate. The errors can occur in the first name,
middle name, surname, citizenship, sex of the person, birth month, birth year, or
in the name of a parent.
● Entries may also be canceled and corrected for: (a) marriage; (b) deaths; (c)
judgments of annulment of marriage; (e) judgments for nullity of marriage; (f)
legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgments of natural children; (i)
naturalization; (j) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; or (k) judicial
determination of filiation, among others (see Section 2, Rule 108, Rules of Court).
● The person wanting to change or cancel the entry must know the proper legal
remedy to avail (himself of) to avoid wasting his or her time and resources; this
will also limit the unnecessary filing of actions in courts.
● In 2001, Republic Act 9048 vested the civil registrar with primary jurisdiction
over the correction of certain clerical or typographical errors and changes of
first name.
● More than a decade later, “Republic Act 10172 expanded the coverage of the
summary administrative procedure provided under Republic Act 9048 to
include clerical corrections in the day and/or month in the date of birth, or in
the sex of the person, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry” (Santos v. Republic, et al., G.R.
250520, May 5, 2021).
● The Supreme Court, in the case of Bartolome v. Republic (G.R. 243288, August
28, 2019), summarized the rules:
○ (1) A person seeking 1) to change his or her first name, 2) to correct
clerical or typographical errors in the civil register, 3) to change/correct
the day and/or month of his or her date of birth, and/or 4) to
change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently clear that there was a
clerical or typographical error or mistake, must first file a verified petition
with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the
record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in accordance
with the administrative proceeding provided under R.A. 9048 in relation
to R.A. 10172.
○ (2) A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to change both
his or her first name and surname may file a petition for change of name
under Rule 103, provided that the jurisprudential grounds discussed in
Republic v. Hernandez are present.
○ (3) A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of entries in
the civil registry may file a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
under Rule 108… [R]ule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register” (G.R. 243288, August 28, 2019).
○ It must be underscored that a “person may only avail (himself) of the
appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 [in the entries
referred to as number 1 above] after the petition in the administrative
proceedings is filed and later denied” (G.R. 243288, August 28, 2019).
● Bartolome’s prayer that his middle name, ‘Cruz’ be entered, is a mere clerical
correction and must be undertaken through the administrative proceeding
provided under Republic Act 9048 (G.R. 243288, August 28, 2019).
● “In Labayo-Rowe, the Court defined clerical errors as ‘those harmless and
innocuous changes such as the correction of names clearly misspelled,
occupation of parents, errors that are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, errors made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or
writing’” (G.R. 243288, August 28, 2019).
○ “It can be readily seen that this jurisprudential definition was expressly
incorporated into R.A. 9048, which, as already discussed, expressly
removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court…
○ “[T]he Court categorically holds that typographical or clerical errors in a
person’s surname must likewise be corrected through the administrative
proceeding…”(G.R. 243288, August 28, 2019).
● Petitioner’s allegedly misspelled surname, ‘Bartholome’ may be readily
corrected by merely referring to the existing records of the civil registrar, such
as the surnames of petitioner’s parents and immediate family members, the
petition should have been filed under R.A. 9048 and not under Rule 103 of the
Rules”
● “In sum, … if the prayer to administratively change petitioner’s first name is
denied, the same may be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
● “If the prayers to administratively correct petitioner’s middle name and
surname are denied, the same may be brought under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court” (G.R. 243288, August 28, 2019).
● In the case of Santos v. Republic et al., Luigi Santos, son of Bong Revilla with
another woman, “prays that he be allowed to change his surname from ‘Santos’ to
‘Revilla’ to ‘avoid confusion, x x x to show [his] sincere and genuine desire to
associate himself to (sic) [Bong] Revilla[,] Jr. and to the Revillas, x x x to show that
he accepts and embraces his true identity, and to show his true and genuine love
to his biological father” (G.R. 250520, May 05, 2021).
○ The Supreme Court held “that petitioner correctly availed himself of the
remedy under Rule 103 to change his surname from “Santos” to “Revilla.”
○ Contrary to the findings of the CA, Rule 108 is inapplicable as petitioner
does not allege or identify any erroneous entry that requires substantial
rectification or cancellation” (G.R. 250520, May 05, 2021).
○ “In the instant case, it is apparent that petitioner does not seek to correct
any clerical or substantial error in his birth certificate or to effect any
changes in his status as an adopted child of Patrick Santos.
○ “As such, neither Rule 108 nor R.A. 9048 as amended applies… [t]hus, he
properly availed himself of… Rule 103 since he ‘seeks to alter the
designation by which he is known and called in the community’” (G.R.
250520, May 5, 2021).
○ While the legal procedure was correct, there is “no basis to allow
petitioner to change his (surname) to ‘Revilla’ simply because he is,
biologically, the son of Bong Revilla and wants to associate himself with
the Revilla family.
○ Besides, the “adoption [of Luigi Santos by Patrick Santos] severs all legal
ties between the adoptee and his or her biological parents” (G.R.
250520, May 5, 2021).
● It is evident “[t]he State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.
● A change of name is a privilege, not a right [and for this reason] [p]etitions for
change of name are controlled by statutes. (Silverio v. Republic cited in G.R.
243288, August 28, 2019).
Motion for Bill of Particulars
Date: June 23, 2023

Link:
342473/motion-for-bill-of-particulars.html
Main Doctrine:
If there is a defect in the criminal information or if the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the court shall order an amendment of the information instead of quashing
it.
● Pleadings in civil cases must contain “in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts, including the evidence on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense” (Section 1, Rule 8, 2019
Rules of Civil Procedure).
○ The purpose of this provision is to make the parties’ litigants aware of the
facts in controversy and the issues sought to be resolved by the courts.
● In criminal cases, “[a] complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed” (Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
○ The requirement of sufficiency of information goes back to the
constitutional right of the accused “to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him” (Section 14 [2], Article III, 1987 Constitution).
○ It is the duty of the State in indicting the accused to apprise him or her of
the crime allegedly committed, its elements, the manner of its
commission, and the jurisdiction of the court to hear, try, and decide the
case.
● There are instances, however, in both civil and criminal cases, when the
drafting of the complaint or information is defective or vague.
● In such a situation, before responding to a pleading or before the accused is
arraigned, a party may file a motion for a bill of particulars identifying the
defects in the subject pleading and the details desired. (see Section 1, Rule 12
and Section 9, Rule 116).
● To be clear, in civil cases, the Motion for Bill of Particulars points out the defects
and the details desired in a Complaint before the filing of an Answer, in an
Answer before the filing of a Reply, or in a Reply before the filing of a Rejoinder.
● This is in contrast to a Bill of Particulars that is submitted by a party whose
pleading is being complained about after the court orders the submission of the
details requested.
○ The “purpose of a bill of particulars [is] to amplify or limit a pleading,
specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and
pleaded in general terms, [and to] give information, not contained in the
pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature,
character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by
the pleader…”(Virata v. Sandiganbayan et al., G.R. 106527, April 6, 1993
citing Tan v. Sandiganbayan).
○ Put simply, its purpose it to “apprise the opposite party of the case which
he has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the
matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation
for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in
framing his answering pleading and preparing for trial” (G.R. 106527, April
6, 1993).
○ “It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material allegations
necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of action or
defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense
other than the one stated… [nor] to set forth the pleader’s theory of his
cause of action or a rule of evidence on which he intends to rely, or to
furnish evidential information…” (G.R. 106527, April 6, 1993).
● It must be noted that in the 2019 amendment to the Rules on Civil Procedure,
every pleading stating a party’s claims or defenses shall state the names of
witnesses, summary of the witnesses’ testimonies with their respective judicial
affidavits, and documentary and object evidence (Section 6, Rule 7).
● Hence, some say that today, a Motion for Bill of Particulars has been rendered
toothless.
● While this view may be partly true, judicial affidavits and evidence attached to
the pleadings may be vague, defective, or completely irrelevant.
● The Motion for Bill of Particulars, therefore, remains to be a potent procedural
tool to address vague, indefinite, uncertain or general allegations in pleadings,
thereby preventing surprises during trial.
● In contrast, the Motion for Bill of Particulars is submitted in criminal cases
before arraignment by the accused or before the reading of the criminal
information to him or her.
● “The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information
and the details desired” to allow the prosecution to remove any defects in the
information (Section 9, Rule 116).
○ “During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully know
the precise charge that confronts him and [is] made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him… thus [it] ensures that an accused [is] fully acquainted
with the nature of the crime imputed to him in the Information…” (Enrile v.
People et al. G.R. 213455, August 11, 2015).
○ “A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the
Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the accusations
made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and
prepare a defense… the Information must [also] provide some means of
ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact
one for which he was charged…” (Enrile v. People et al. G.R. 213455,
August 11, 2015).
○ “In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his
defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented,
enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the
court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the
charge” (Enrile v. People et al. G.R. 213455, August 11, 2015).
○ “If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be
quashed on the ground that it fails to charge an offense. Of course, an
Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and yet
insufficient [to] inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged
offenses” (Enrile v. People et al. G.R. 213455, August 11, 2015).
○ “In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to move for a bill
of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial…
[A] bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the
Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime
charged” (Enrile v. People et al. G.R. 213455, August 11, 2015).
○ “Its purpose is to enable an accused [to accomplish the following]: to
know the theory of the government’s case; to prepare his defense and to
avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of
another prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the
prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence” (Enrile v.
People et al. G.R. 213455, August 11, 2015).
● If there is a defect in the criminal information or if the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the court shall order an amendment of the information
instead of quashing it, as is stated under Rule 117 on the Motion to Quash.
● The Motion to Quash shall be granted only in the event that the prosecution
fails to make the amendment or cure the defect despite the amendment (see
Section 4, Rule 117).
● Hence, “the general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It is not the function of
the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution… [nor] to
include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people
intend to prove the elements of the offense charged…” (Enrile v. People et al.,
G.R. 213455, August 11, 2015)
Intervening in a court case
Date: June 30, 2023

Link:
344592/intervening-in-a-court-case.html
Main Doctrine:
“The court when faced with a motion for intervention ‘shall consider whether or not
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be [more] fully
protected in a separate proceeding’”
● “Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is

permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in
claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting
the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them”
(Garcia, et al., v. David, et al, G.R. 45454, April 12, 1939).
● “[It] is the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit
pending between others;… [a] person becomes a party [with leave of court] for
the protection of some right or interest alleged…” (Garcia, et al., v. David, et al,
G.R. 45454, April 12, 1939 citing 33 C. J. 477).
● The leave can be availed of by filing a motion attaching the
complaint-in-intervention or answer-in-intervention.
● “Fundamentally, therefore, intervention is never an independent action, but is
ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to
obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the… machinery of trial, but merely to afford
one not an original party… the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could
assert or protect such right or interest” (Garcia, et al., v. David, et al, G.R. 45454,
April 12, 1939).
● The three important elements are:
○ (1) That only a person having a legal interest in the subject matter of the
litigation or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against
both, may intervene;
○ (2) That a mere intruder or stranger may not be allowed to intervene; and
○ (3) hat a judge is given the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the motion for intervention (Garcia, et al., v. David, et al, G.R.
45454, April 12, 1939).
● “What qualifies a person to intervene is his or her possession of a legal interest
in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both; or when he or she is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an
officer thereof” (Republic v. Rubin, G.R. 213960, October 07, 2020).
● “[T]he Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate
character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material… more than
mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and
contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral” (G.R.
213960, October 07, 2020).
● The court when faced with a motion for intervention “shall consider whether or
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be
[more] fully protected in a separate proceeding” (Section 1, Rule 19, 2019 Rules
● The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before the rendition of
judgment by the trial court (Section 2, Rule 19).
● “After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore… [since]
intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an
existing litigation” (Ongco v. Dalisay, G.R. 190810, July 18, 2012).
● “It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the
trial court’s sound discretion. The trial court must not only determine if the
requisite legal interest is present, but also take into consideration the delay and
the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the intervention will cause”
(G.R. 190810, July 18, 2012).
● “Both requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal interest is not
more important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should
result. To help ensure that delay does not result from the granting of a motion to
intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only
before rendition of judgment by the trial court” (G.R. 190810, July 18, 2012).
● “There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court for the filing of a motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay would
result from many belated filings of motions for intervention after judgment has
already been rendered, because a reassessment of claims would have to be done”
(G.R. 190810, July 18, 2012).
● In the case of Ongco v. Dalisay, Valeriana Ungco Dalisay (Dalisay) applied for the
registration of a parcel of land by filing an Application for Land Registration
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan. At the hearings, no
oppositor aside from the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) came (G.R.
190810, July 18, 2012).
○ There being no oppositor, an Order of General Default was issued against
the whole world except the Republic.
○ Consequently, the court found Dalisay to have clearly shown a registrable
right over the subject property and ordered that a decree of registration
be issued by the Land Registration Authority once the Decision had
become final.
○ The Republic filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. While the case
was pending appeal, Lorenza C. Ongco (Ongco) filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene with an attached Answer-in-Intervention which sought the
dismissal of Dalisay’s Application for Land Registration on the grounds
that the subject property was not free from any adverse claim.
○ The Court of Appeals denied the intervention since it was filed after the
judgment was rendered in the trial court and when the appeal was
pending with it.
○ Moreover, Ongco is not an indispensable party since her interests are
inchoate and merely collateral, as she is only in the process of applying for
a free patent (G.R. 190810, July 18, 2012).
○ “Also, the action for land registration may proceed… without joining her.
This is because the issues to be threshed out in a land registration
proceeding — such as whether the subject land is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and whether the applicant… [has]
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said
land… — can be threshed out without joining petitioner” (G.R. 190810,
July 18, 2012).
○ “In any case, we note that petitioner (Ongco) is not left without any
remedy in case respondent (Dalisay) succeeds in getting a decree of
registration. The person may file, in the proper court, a petition for
reopening and reviewing the decree of registration (obtained by actual
fraud) within one year from the date of entry thereof (G.R. 190810, July
18, 2012 citing Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529).
● In the case of Looyuko, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Manila Regional Trial
Court issued a writ of execution in an action for judicial foreclosure.
○ Subsequently, the deputy sheriff sold in a public bidding the parcel of land
covered by TCT 1702 to FGU with a certificate of sale which was later
confirmed by the RTC (G.R. 102696, July 12, 2001).
○ The RTC issued an order for the cancellation of TCT 242 and for the
issuance of a new TCT in FGU’s name.
○ Before the new TCT could be issued, the Spouses Gutang filed a motion
for intervention and to set aside the judgment of the RTC, alleging that
they are the new registered owners of the property (G.R. 102696, July 12,
2001).
○ In an Order, the RTC allowed the motion for intervention, holding the
failure of FGU to implead the Spouses in the action for foreclosure
deprived the latter of due process. Later, Looyuko et al. filed a motion for
intervention, which the RTC granted (G.R. 102696, July 12, 2001).
○ The Supreme Court ruled that a motion for intervention should be made
“before or during a trial” or can be filed any time before the rendition of
judgment.
○ “[T]he motions for intervention were filed after judgment had already
been rendered… [and] when the case was already final and executory…
[this] can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final
judgment” (G.R. 102696, July 12, 2001).
Calendar of cases, extensions, and postponements
Date: July 7, 2023

Link:
347193/calendar-of-cases-extensions-and-postponements.html
Main Doctrine:
It is always best that cases be resolved based on its merits and not because of
procedural or technical errors
● The calendar of cases in courts are vital documents in the orderly administration
of justice.
● It is the “clerk of court, under the direct supervision of the judge, [who] shall
keep a calendar of cases for pre-trial, for trial, those whose trials were
adjourned or postponed, and those with motions to set for hearing” (Section 1,
Rule 20).
● Due to their importance, “[p]reference… is given to habeas corpus cases,
election cases, special civil actions, and those so required by law.”
○ A lawyer attending a hearing or trial may observe, outside of the
courtroom, the writing of the calendar of cases, which lists the cases to be
heard and tried in the morning or in the afternoon of that day.
○ Courts also have a calendar book that contains all the court settings for
the entire year and the succeeding year.
● If a court hearing or trial is not included in the calendar book, it will not be
included in the day calendar, unless the lawyer timely notices it and is able to
request for its inclusion.
● To limit the cancellation of hearings, the 2019 Amended Rules on Civil
Procedure introduced the concept of presumptive service (notice).
● There is presumptive notice if it appears in court records that the notice was
mailed at least 20 calendar days before the date of hearing, if the addressee is
within the judicial region, or at least 30 calendar days if the addressee is
outside of the judicial region (see Section 10, Rule 13).
● In civil cases, a “defendant may, for meritorious reasons, be granted an additional
period of not more than 30 calendar days to file an answer.
● A defendant is only allowed to file one motion for extension of time to file an
answer” (Section 11, Rule 11).
● “A motion for extension to file any pleading, other than an answer, is prohibited
and considered a mere scrap of paper” (Section 11, Rule 11).
● The prohibition on filing a motion for extension of time was reiterated in Section
12 (e), Rule 15.
● “The court, however, may allow any other pleading to be filed after the time fixed
by these Rules” (Section 11, Rule 11).
● While litigants may seek refuge under this provision to request for extensions on
other court filings and submissions, the author does not recommend it since its
approval or denial is purely left to the discretion of the court, and may be denied
outright.
● Extensions of time may be allowed in the Court of Appeals before the filing of a
Petition for Review or in the Supreme Court before the filing of a Petition for
Review on Certiorari (Appeal by Certiorari) (see Section 1, Rule 42; Section 4,
Rule 43; and Section 2, Rule 45).
● However, no such extensions are allowed for ordinary appeals such as a notice of
appeal or a record on appeal.
● It is worth noting that once the court records are elevated to the Court of
Appeals, an extension of time to file a brief may be allowed “for good and
sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration
of the time sought to be extended” (Section 12, Rule 44).
● There are no provisions for criminal cases at the trial court level on motions for
extension both in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the 2017 Revised
Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.
● This is because the major stages of a criminal proceeding such as arraignment
and plea, pre-trial, and trial have limited court filings.
● In case a party files a meritorious motion in a criminal case, the adverse party
shall file his or her comment within a non-extendible period of 10 days counted
from notice or receipt of the order to file the same (see III 2(c), 2017 Revised
Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases).
● Similar to appeals in civil cases, the period to file ordinary appeals in criminal
cases cannot be extended; however, the filing of briefs at the Court of Appeals
may be extended for “good and sufficient cause” (Section 5, Rule 124).
● Extensions of time may be allowed in Petitions for Review in criminal cases,
similar to Rule 42 as used in civil cases (Section 3, Rule 122).
● In civil cases, motions for postponement are not allowed, except if these are
based on acts of God, force majeure, or the physical inability of the witness to
appear and testify.
● “If the motion is granted based on such exceptions, the moving party shall be
warned that the presentation of its evidence must still be terminated on the
dates previously agreed upon (during pre-trial)” (Section 12(f), Rule 15).
● “A motion for postponement, whether written or oral shall… be accompanied by
the original official receipt from the office of the clerk of court evidencing
payment of the postponement fee… [which is] to be submitted either at the time
of the filing of said motion or not later than the next hearing date” (Section 12,
Rule 15).
● The original grounds of illness of a party or counsel to postpone a trial was
retained in the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure so long as “the presence of such
party or counsel at the trial is indispensable and that the character of his or her
illness is such as to render his or her non-attendance excusable” (Section 3, Rule
30).
● The same Rule on postponements apply to criminal cases as stated in III, 2(d) of
the 2017 Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.
○ Interestingly, the provisions in the 2019 Civil Procedure on postponement
were lifted verbatim from the said Guidelines and reiterated in the
Pre-Trial Rules in Section 7, Rule 18.
● These Rules on calendar of cases, extensions of time, and postponements must
be carefully observed by lawyers in order not to prejudice or harm the interest
of their clients.
● It is always best that cases be resolved based on its merits and not because of
procedural or technical errors.
Annulling a final and executory judgment
Date: July 14, 2023

Link:
349487/annulling-a-final-and-executory-judgment.html
Main Doctrine:
Lawyers are cautioned that certiorari is not a remedy for a lost appeal.
● A judgment attains finality after the expiration of the period to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal.
● It also becomes final and executory if there is no other legal remedy available to
the losing party after the judgment is rendered by the Supreme Court or if the
latter denies a motion for reconsideration.
○ “The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies must become final
and executory on some definite day fixed by law” (One Shipping
Corporation v. Penafiel, G.R. 192406, January 21, 2015).
● A judgment attaining finality therefore becomes immutable and unalterable.
○ “This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final
judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law” (G.R. 192406, January 21, 2015).
● “The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1)
the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments” (G.R. 192406, January
21, 2015).
● The exceptions are concerned only with corrections on the original judgment or
in declaring a judgment void.
● The legal remedies of an aggrieved party from a judgment that has attained
finality are: (1) a petition for relief from judgment; or (2) a petition for annulment
of judgment under Rule 38 and Rule 47, respectively, of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
● The petition for relief from judgment will be discussed by this author in a
different article. (Next article)
● The case of Macabingkil v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
provided for a third remedy which is “either a direct action, as certiorari, or by
collateral attack against the challenged judgment (which) is void upon its face,
or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals”
(cited in Arcelona, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. 102900, October 2, 1997).
● Lawyers are cautioned that certiorari is not a remedy for a lost appeal.
● An annulment of judgment is “a remedy in equity… [available] only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment… sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking [in] jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud”
(Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank & Trust Company, G.R. 159926,
January 20, 2014).
● “Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or
final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a
matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the
courts… [while]… [t]he latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the
service of summons or other process on the petitioner” (G.R. 159926, January
20, 2014).
● “A judgment or final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action is always void… [b]ut the defect of lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be waived by
the party concerned either expressly or impliedly” (G.R. 159926, January 20,
2014).
● “Fraud is extrinsic… where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent,
as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where
the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the
acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat…” (G.R. 159926, January 20, 2014).
● “The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having
his day in court. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief” (G.R. 159926, January 20, 2014).
● “In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory
judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity
can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law” (Diona v. Balangue, et al., G.R. 173559, January 7, 2013).
● “The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the
discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be
brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel” (G.R. 159926, January 20,
2014).
● The remedy of annulment of judgment “is available only when the petitioner can
no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner.
● This means the remedy, although seen as ‘a last remedy,’ is not an alternative to
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief” G.R. 159926,
January 20, 2014).
● In the case of Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank & Trust Company, the
counsels of the parties failed to attend a court hearing despite a previous
agreement to do so.
○ As a result, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case for failure to
prosecute, and the dismissal of which attained finality (G.R. 159926,
January 20, 2014).
○ Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired with the
RTC and learned that its counsel of record had not informed it about the
order of dismissal.
○ Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment to the Court of Appeals,
seeking the nullification of the order of dismissal.
○ “The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of the counsel of
record to keep track of the case, and [of] his failure to apprise Pinausukan
of the developments in the case… [was] not accept[ed] [by the CA] as
constituting extrinsic fraud because… what is involved is mistake and
gross negligence of Pinausukan’s own counsel” (G.R. 159926, January 20,
2014). Full text at www.manilastandard.net
● In the case of Tortal v. Taniguchi, the issue was whether or not Jerson E. Tortal
may assail a final and executory judgment nullifying his marriage with Chizuru
Taniguchi in an appeal of a case for annulling the levy and sale in the execution of
Taniguchi’s house and lot in favor of Sales, a creditor of Tortal (G.R. 212683,
November 12, 2018).
○ The petition to annul the levy and sale was initiated by Taniguchi after she
learned that Tortal and Sales entered into a compromise agreement in a
collection case between them.
○ The compromise agreement led to the levy of Taniguchi’s property which
was sold on public auction.
○ Tortal claims he failed to participate in the proceedings for the nullity of
his marriage with Taniguchi because summons was not served on him. In
the same case, the court declared the house and lot as Taniguchi’s
exclusive property.
○ The Supreme Court said “instead of directly assailing the… Decision,
which granted the nullity of his marriage in an action for annulment of
judgment, petitioner chose to tackle the issue in his appeal… which
nullified the levy and sale by auction of the house and lot to Sales. This is
clearly not the correct remedy” (G.R. 212683, November 12, 2018).
○ “Without a ruling from the Court of Appeals nullifying the… Decision,
which granted the nullity of petitioner (Tortal) and respondent’s
(Taniguchi) marriage and declar[ing] respondent as the exclusive owner of
the house and lot, this Decision remains valid and subsisting… [m]oreover,
it became final and executory”(G.R. 212683, November 12, 2018).
● In another case, “Sebastian’s petition for annulment of judgment before the CA
clearly alleged that, contrary to the claim of Spouses Cruz (Nelson and Cristina)
in LRC Case 421, the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT P-41566 was not really lost,
[but] was surrendered to her by Lamberto, Nelson’s father and attorney-in-fact,
and was in her possession all along” (Sebastian v. Spouses Cruz, et al., G.R.
220940, March 20, 2017).
○ “Should such allegation be proven following the conduct of further
proceedings, then there would be no other conclusion than that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case 421.
○ “As a consequence, the Decision dated March 27, 2014 of the RTC in the
said case would then be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction”
(G.R. 220940, March 20, 2017).
○ The remedy of annulment of judgment is available only in civil actions or
cases (Section 1, Rule 47, Rules of Civil Procedure).
○ The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being
questioned was rendered in a criminal case and when there is no law or
rule providing for this remedy (People v. Bitanga, G.R. 159222, June 26,
2007).
Petition for relief from judgment
Date: July 28, 2023

Link:
354150/petition-for-relief-from-judgment.html
Main Doctrine:
To avail oneself of the petition for relief, the grounds provided in Rule 38 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure must be present in the petition and must also be filed within the
required periods.
● A petition for relief from judgment is a legal remedy for a judgment that has
attained finality. Such a petition is one of the legal remedies available to an
aggrieved party to question a final and executory judgment.
● “A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy… allowed only in
exceptional cases. It is not available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for
new trial or appeal” (Madarang v. Spouses Morales G.R. 199283, June 9, 2014).
● It may not also be filed if the latter remedies were not availed of, or the period
to utilize them has expired due to the fault of the petitioner.
● “The petition is the proper remedy of a party seeking to set aside a judgment
rendered against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a
hearing, was prevented from taking an appeal, or a judgment or final order
entered because of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence” (Lasam v.
Philippine National Bank, et al., G.R. 207433, December 5, 2018).
● To avail oneself of the petition for relief, the grounds provided in Rule 38 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure must be present in the petition and must also be filed
within the required periods.
○ These grounds are fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
○ “To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the negligence
must be so gross ‘that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against.’ This is to prevent parties from reviv[ing] the right to
appeal [already] lost through inexcusable negligence”(G.R. 199283, June
9, 2014).
■ In the case of Madarang and Bartolome v. Spouses Morales,
“[p]etitioners argue that their former counsel’s failure to file a
notice of appeal within the reglementary period was ‘a mistake and
an excusable negligence due to [their former counsel’s] age.’ This
argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens… [and] asks this
court to assume that a person with advanced age is prone to
incompetence… [which] cannot be done” (G.R. 199283, June 9,
2014).
■ “Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11,
2010 (or beyond the deadline of July 9, 2010), the trial court
correctly denied the notice of appeal… There is… no showing that
the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary
diligence and prudence… [hence], petitioners are bound by their
counsel’s negligence”(G.R. 199283, June 9, 2014).
○ “Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief,
refers to extrinsic or collateral fraud which, in turn, has been defined as
fraud that prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly
presenting his case or defense and from having an adversarial trial of the
issue, as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his
client’s interest” (Santos v. Santos, G.R. 214593, July 17, 2019 citing
Lasala v. National Food Authority).
■ “[I]n cases of gross and palpable negligence of counsel and of
extrinsic fraud, the Court must step in and accord relief to a client
who suffered thereby. [F]or the extrinsic fraud to justify a petition
for relief from judgment, it must be fraud which the prevailing
party caused to prevent the losing party from being heard on his
action or defense… [the] fraud concerns not the judgment itself but
the manner in which it was obtained” (G.R. 214593, July 17, 2019).
■ “If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so
great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that
the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and
denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the
client another chance to present his case” (G.R. 214593, July 17,
2019 citing Apex Mining, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals).
○ In the case of Lasam v. Philippine National Bank, et al., “Lasam claimed she
only learned of the finality of the February 23, 2010 Order after she
consulted a different lawyer. She also averred that she was seriously
deprived of her right to present her case due to the gross negligence and
ignorance of her former counsel…” (G.R. 207433, December 05, 2018).
■ Lasam summarized the actions of her former lawyer as: (a) her
failure to appear on the February 23, 2010 hearing of the case; (b)
her failure to file the motion for reconsideration on time; and (c)
her use of the wrong remedy by filing a second motion for
reconsideration which led to the finality of the February 23, 2010
Order (G.R. 207433, December 05, 2018).
■ “The records reveal that Lasam’s knowledge of the… Order could
be traced to at least two periods: on February 23, 2010, when the
Court issued the subject Order and… Lasam was… in attendance;
and on July 23, 2010, the date… [of] the Verification and
Certification for the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA [as
signed by Lasam]”(G.R. 207433, December 05, 2018).
■ “[W]hile there was an attempt to argue the compliance with the
60-day period in the petition for relief, there was no effort to
show that the six-month period – which is equally relevant for a
petition for relief – was complied with. It may be that this was
consciously adopted to conceal the fact that the petition for relief
was also filed beyond the sixth month reglementary period” (G.R.
207433, December 05, 2018).
■ “As pointed out by the PNB, the RTC’s February 23, 2010 Order
was, in effect, entered on May 3, 2012, when this Court’s February
22, 2012 Resolution in G.R. No. 199846 was entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgments… [I]t is clear that Lasam failed to comply
with the 60-day period… when she filed her petition for relief on
January 22, 2013, or almost three years from the time she
acquired knowledge of the order sought to be set aside” (G.R.
207433, December 05, 2018).
■ “Likewise, she failed to comply with the six-month period
provided in the same Rule when she filed her petition for relief
more than eight months from the date of entry of the order
sought to be set aside… Since strict compliance with the relevant
periods was not observed, the RTC correctly dismissed Lasam’s
petition” (G.R. 207433, December 05, 2018).
● A petition for relief from judgment must be “filed within 60 days after
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or final order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence…”
(Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Civil Procedure).
○ “It should be noted that the 60-day period from knowledge of the
decision, and the 6-month period from entry of judgment, are both
unextendible and uninterruptible… A petition… filed beyond the
reglementary period [must be] dismissed outright… because [it]… is an
exception to the public policy of immutability of final judgments” (G.R.
199283, June 9, 2014).
○ For example, if the petitioner “learns” of the final and executory judgment
on July 15, 2023, he has 60 days from July 15, 2023 or until September
14, 2023 to file the petition for relief from judgment. However, the 60
days is within a bigger time period of six months from the entry of
judgment.
○ In case a petition for relief is denied by the trial court and such a denial is
questioned in the appellate court, the latter must “determine not only the
existence of any of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of the
petitioner’s cause of action or defense, as the case may be” (G.R. 214593,
July 17, 2019).
○ “If the appellate court finds that one of the grounds exists and, what is of
decisive importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of action or
defense, it will reverse the denial or dismissal, set aside the judgment in
the main case and remand the case to the lower court for a new trial in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38” (G.R. 214593, July 17, 2019).
Rendering a summary judgment

Link:
356599/rendering-a-summary-judgment.html
Main Doctrine:
The Supreme Court has declared that a partial summary judgment is an interlocutory
order and not a final judgment.
● “A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to

promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding
out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the
expense and loss of time involved in a trial” (Philippine Business Bank v. Felipe
Chua, G.R. 178899, November 15, 2010).
○ “[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its
nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party
tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate
evidence to prove it.
○ “This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sake
of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact
that their answers are not under oath anyway” (Calubaquib, et al. v.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. 170658, June 22, 2011).
○ “When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact
to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of
summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is
allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material
facts” (G.R. 178899, November 15, 2010).
● Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the claimant or defending party may apply
for summary judgment (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 35).
● The court may also include in the pre-trial order that the case be submitted for
summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to a material fact (Section 10,
Rule 18).
○ “In determining the genuineness of the issues… the court is obliged to
carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings,
but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in
the affidavits…
○ “[T]hus,… even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a
summary judgment is proper so long as ‘the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine’” (G.R. 170658, June 22, 2011).
● If the claiming party seeks to recover a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, or to
obtain a declaratory relief, he or she may move for summary judgment after an
answer has been filed and served.
● However, if it is the defendant or the party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought, the motion for
summary judgment may be filed by them at any time (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 35).
● The motion for summary judgment, being a litigious motion, is subject to the
comment of the adverse party within five days from receipt of the motion
(Section 3, Rule 35 in relation to Section 5, Rule 15).
● Any action of the court on the motion for summary judgment (whether to grant
or deny the same) is not subject to an appeal, certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus (Section 3, Rule 35).
● If the motion for summary judgment is denied the case will have to go to trial as
there are genuine issues to be resolved.
● However, granting of the motion means that the parties will have to wait for the
rendition of the summary judgment.
● In either case, the parties are not prohibited from filing a motion for
reconsideration (see Section 12, Rule 15).
● When the court eventually renders a summary judgment, the losing party may
file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.
● The errors of the trial court in rendering a summary judgment and the erroneous
appreciation of facts, evidence, and law may be raised in the motion for
reconsideration or appeal.
● It is significant to note that the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil
Procedure now require every pleading stating a party’s claim or defense to (a)
state the names of their respective witnesses; (b) provide a summary of the
witnesses’ intended testimonies together with their judicial affidavits; and (c)
attach the relevant documentary and object evidence (Section 6, Rule 7).
○ Considering that the testimonies of witnesses, as well as documentary
and object evidence are part of the court records, the trial court can, if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, motu proprio include in
the pre-trial order that the case is submitted for summary judgment.
○ The court may also consider the evidence pre-marked, identified, and
compared during pre-trial.
● The power of the trial court to render a summary judgment, on its own initiative,
was first introduced in the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
○ This was done in order to give the trial court the power to render
judgment without trial if it is apparent on the pleadings, documents and
evidence available to the court that it is a waste of time for the court and
the parties to proceed to trial.
● In the case of Ley Construction and Development Corporation, et al. v. Union
Bank of the Philippines, “[Petitioners] admitted their indebtedness . . . to
[respondent]. The only defense interposed by [them] was that [they], in a series of
conferences made in the office of [the respondent] Corporation, were granted
extensions of time within which to pay and/or settle said accountabilities” (G.R.
133801, June 27, 2000).
○ “However, [petitioners] failed to indicate and specify in their Answer to
the complaint who the officers were [through] whom [respondent]
granted extensions, if at all they were granted. [Petitioners] did not even
bother to submit any affidavits of [the] officers… to enable… the [trial
court] to ascertain whether or not the defense of [petitioners] was, at
least, plausible and not contrived or sham” (G.R. 133801, June 27, 2000).
○ “This is a proper subject of summary judgment.
● The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the
full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case.
○ The court may issue “an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just” (Section 4, Rule 35).
○ “This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment… [it was]
never intended to be considered a ‘final judgment,’ as it does not ‘[put] an
end to an action… [T]he Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as
a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the
trial only on the assailed facts… [or] those facts which are not in dispute’”
(G.R. 178899, November 15, 2010).
○ “After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the
partial summary judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to
be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment
is more akin to a record of pre-trial, an interlocutory order, rather than a
final judgment” (G.R. 178899, November 15, 2010).
○ “[A] partial summary judgment… does not put an end to the action at law
by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to
recover the remedy he sues for [and] cannot be considered a final
judgment.
○ “It remains to be an interlocutory judgment or order, instead of a final
judgment, and is not to be dealt with and resolved separately from the
other aspects of the case” (G.R. 205698, July 31, 2018).
● In the case of Philippine Business Bank v. Felipe Chua, “the partial summary
judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB against its
co-defendant, respondent Chua, based on the latter’s admission that he signed
promissory notes as a co-maker in favor of PBB” (G.R. 178899, November 15,
2010).
○ “Clearly, this partial summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the
main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas Tan’s complaint, i.e., the validity of the
secretary’s certificate which authorized John Dennis Chua to take out
loans, and execute promissory notes and mortgages [using CST’s
properties as collateral]…, as well as [its] validity… [which] remained
unresolved” (G.R. 178899, November 15, 2010).
○ “[T]he partial summary judgment is an interlocutory order which could not
become a final and executory judgment, notwithstanding respondent
Chua’s failure to file a certiorari petition to challenge the judgment.
○ “Accordingly, the RTC grievously erred when it issued the writ of
execution against respondent Chua” (G.R. 178899, November 15, 2010).
● In the case of Home Development Fund v. Sagun, plaintiffs Globe Asiatique and
Delfin Lee’s motion for summary judgment was granted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati.
○ The latter declared the plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance
but the exact amount of damages will have to be determined during the
trial proper (G.R. 205698, July 31, 2018).
○ The Supreme Court in the same case declared that a partial summary
judgment is an interlocutory order and not a final judgment.
○ Hence, the remedy available to HDF is a Petition for Certiorari and not an
appeal, for only a final judgment or order could be appealed (G.R. 205698,
July 31, 2018).
Recalling a witness on the stand

Link:
359125/recalling-a-witness-on-the-stand.html
Main Doctrine:
A witness cannot be examined after the conclusion of direct, cross, re-direct, and
re-cross examinations.
● Every witness presented by a party in court during the presentation of evidence

cannot be detained longer than the interest of justice requires (Section 3(2), Rule
132, Rules on Evidence).
● A witness cannot be examined after the conclusion of direct, cross, re-direct, and
re-cross examinations (Section 4, Rule 132).
● “After the examination of a witness by both sides…, the witness cannot be
recalled without leave of court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its
discretion, as the interests of justice may require” (Section 9, Rule 132).
● “The matter of recalling witnesses ordinarily rests in the discretion of the trial
court, and under the facts and circumstances of particular cases, such
discretion has been held not to be abused by permitting or refusing to permit
the recall of a witness” (Evidence, Francisco citing 98 C.J.S. 104-105).
● “[D]iscretion… is not properly invoked… by an applicant’s mere general statement
that there is a need to recall a witness ‘in the interest of justice,’ or ‘… to afford a
party full opportunity to present his case,’ or that… ‘there seems to be many
points and questions that should have been asked’ in the earlier interrogation”
(People v. Judge Rivera, G.R. 98376, August 16, 1991).
● “To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground for recall of
witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but
ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound
additional questions is essential before the Court’s discretion may rightfully be
exercised to grant or deny [the] recall” (G.R. 98376, August 16, 1991).
● “There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for
the recall [such as]… that particularly identified material points were not
covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital
documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or
that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner…” (G.R. 98376,
August 16, 1991).
● “In passing on a motion for leave to further [cross-examine witnesses], the trial
court must consider the probable probative force of the matter sought to be
developed in the light of evidence receive[d], and consider whether the new
evidence would probably produce a different result” (Evidence, Francisco citing
98 C.J.S. 123).
● “The party recalling the witness should not be obliged to make the witness his
own and thus be deprived of the right to impeach him” (Evidence, Francisco citing
State v. Rodriguez, 23 N.M. 156).
● “The recalling of a witness for the purpose of impeachment is a matter resting
in the discretion of the trial court…; a party cannot claim the privilege of
recalling a witness for… impeachment as a matter of right (Evidence, Francisco
citing 98 C.J.S. 383).
● “The court may limit the scope of the examination of a recalled witness, and the
examination must be limited to the matters concerning which leave to
re-examine the witness has been granted.
● “The scope and limits of the examination on recall are within the discretion of the
trial court” (Evidence, Francisco citing 98 C.J.S. 105).
● In the case of People v. Judge Rivera, et al., (G.R. 98376, August 16, 2011) the
Government, to establish the culpability of Wilfredo Sembrano, presented
Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath.
○ Lee testified on direct examination that Sembrano had run out of the VIP
room where the fire had started and refused to heed his call to stop.
○ “Lee took the witness stand again on April 26, 1987 during which he was
cross-examined by defense counsel, gave additional evidence on redirect
examination, was again questioned on re-cross examination by the same
defense counsel, and thereafter allowed to step down”
○ “The prosecution completed presentation of its evidence-in-chief in due
course. But before it could rest its case, and two months or so after
Benjamin Lee had completed his testimony, the defendant’s original
counsel, Benjamin Formoso, withdrew his appearance and was
substituted by another attorney, Eduardo S. Rodriguez”
○ “The latter then filed a motion on June 8, 1988 to recall Benjamin Lee for
further examination.
○ “The ground relied upon by Atty. Rodriguez was simply that after he had
reviewed the record of Benjamin Lee’s testimony, he [concluded] that
‘there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked
but were not propounded by the other defense counsel who conducted
(the cross examination)’”
○ The trial court granted the motion to recall Lee for further cross
examination.
○ Efforts were exerted to cause witness Benjamin Lee to again appear
before the court, but with no success, since he had terminated his
employment and moved elsewhere without indicating his new address.
○ Thereafter, the private prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion
drawing the trial court’s attention to the inability to procure the
re-appearance of witness Lee, and that he had been previously thoroughly
examined by the former defense counsel, and praying that further
examination of Benjamin Lee be dispensed with.
○ The trial court denied the motion to dispense with the recall of Benjamin
Lee and ordered the testimony of Benjamin Lee for the prosecution be
stricken off the record for lack of complete cross-examination, the reason
being that the witness could no longer be found, and “the failure of
counsel for the accused to further cross-examine the witness is not the
fault of the defense”
○ The trial court granted the motion to recall a witness on nothing more
than said movant’s general claim that certain questions had to be asked.
○ In doing so it acted without basis, exercised power whimsically or
capriciously, and gravely abused its discretion.
○ In the same manner, the trial court “acted whimsically, capriciously, and
oppressively, in other words, gravely abused its discretion, in ordering the
striking out of the entire testimony of Benjamin Lee after it appeared that
he could no longer be found and produced for further examination”
○ “In the first place, the Court acted unilaterally, without any motion to this
effect by the defense and thus without according the prosecution a prior
opportunity to show why the striking out should not be decreed.
○ “More importantly, the striking out was directed without any showing
[whatsoever] by the defense of the indispensability of further
cross-examination…”
○ “It should be stressed that Lee was subjected both to cross-examination
and recross-examination by former counsel of the accused Sembrano.
○ “Obviously, the latter was satisfied that there had been sufficient
cross-examination of the witness [and] [a]bsence of cross-examination
may not therefore be invoked as ground to strike out Lee’s testimony (as
being hearsay)” (G.R.98376, August 16, 1991).
● In the case of Castillo, et al. v. Sebullina and Torres, “the trial judge directed
counsel for the plaintiffs to recall the witnesses whose testimony had already
been taken at the former hearing; but this counsel declined to do [so], insisting
on their right to rely upon the transcript of the notes of the testimony already
taken” (G.R. 9181, September 29, 1915).
○ “The trial judge refused to admit or to consider the transcript of this
testimony unless these witnesses were recalled to the witness stand, and
again directed counsel for plaintiffs to recall their witnesses, stating he
desired himself to hear the witness testify, to note their demeanor and
conduct when testifying, and, if necessary, to cross-examine them” (G.R.
9181, September 29, 1915).
○ “No one can doubt the power of a trial judge in the course of a
proceeding pending before him to recall and reexamine a particular
witness, if he deems it advisable so to do for the development of the
truth as to the issues he is called upon to adjudicate; and of course upon
such reexamination he may repeat any or all of the questions asked in
the examination in chief” (G.R. 9181, September 29, 1915).
○ “If [a judge] may recall one witness… he may recall all who have testified in
the course of the trial, and the only limit upon his power…, other than the
general rules touching the competence and admissibility of evidence,
would seem to be the duty resting upon him not to subject the litigants or
the witnesses to useless or unnecessary inconvenience, expenses, or
delay” (G.R. 9181, September 29, 1915).
Submission of electronic copies of pleadings

Link:
361707/submission-of-electronic-copies-of-pleadings.html
Main Doctrine:
The party filing a pleading in a mode or manner other than electronically has the duty
to electronically transmit to the court PDF copies within 24 hours from the filing of
the paper copy.
● On January 1, 2013, the Supreme Court issued the Efficient Use of Paper Rule to
address “a need to cut the judicial system’s use [of] costly paper, save our forests,
avoid landslides, and to mitigate the worsening effects of climate change that the
world is experiencing.”
● On May 1, 2020, the Supreme Court introduced for the first time, in the 2019
Amended Rules of Civil Procedure, the electronic filing and service of pleadings
and court bound documents.
● It also allowed the court to “electronically serve orders and other documents to
all the parties in the case” (Section 18, Rule 13).
● On April 11, 2023, the Supreme Court approved the Guidelines for Submission of
Electronic Copies of Pleadings and Other Court Submissions Being Filed Before
the Lower Courts Pursuant to the Efficient Use of Paper Rule (Guidelines) in line
with the goal of the Supreme Court to digitally transform our courts, achieving a
technology-driven judiciary.
● “The Guidelines shall govern the electronic transmittal of copies in Portable
Document Format (PDF) of pleadings and other court submissions and their
additional accompanying documents, such as annexes and exhibits, if any, for
filing in all cases governed by the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure before all lower courts” (Section 1, A.M. 10-3-7-SC and 11-9-4-SC).
● The Guidelines shall apply to the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax
Appeals, and first and second-level courts and shall cover cases filed after the
effectivity of the Guidelines (Section 1).
● “By April 5, 2024, the primary manner of filing of all pleadings… covered by the
Guidelines… shall be through electronic transmittal…” (Section 11).
● “The PDF copies of pleadings and court submissions must be transmitted by
litigants and court users to the official e-mail address of the court where the
case is pending. A directory of the official e-mail addresses of the lower courts
is available at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/court-locator” (Section 2).
● “In instances when the primary manner of filing is through personal filing, by
registered mail, or by accredited courier, in accordance with Rule 13, Section
3(a), 3(b), or 3(c) of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the PDF copies must be transmitted within 24 hours from the filing of the paper
copy” (Section 2).
● The filer referred to in Rule 13, Section 3(a), 3(b), or 3(c) “shall execute a verified
declaration that the pleading or court submission and its accompanying
documents, if any, submitted electronically are complete and true copies of the
paper copies filed before the court” (Section 9).
● The party filing a pleading in a mode or manner other than electronically has the
duty to electronically transmit to the court PDF copies within 24 hours from the
filing of the paper copy. In this instance, the pleading is considered “filed on the
date and time of filing of the paper copy, and not the date and time of the
transmittal of the electronic copy” (Section 3[a]).
● “If the pleading, court submission, or any accompanying document has already
been filed personally, by registered mail, or by accredited courier, the PDF copy
to be transmitted should be the exact copy of the filed paper copy.
● “If the court determines… that there are material discrepancies between the
paper copy and the electronic copy, it may impose an appropriate sanction or
refer such finding to the proper office for disciplinary action on the lawyer, law
firm, or party responsible for the filing” (Section 5).
● “Electronic copies of pleadings and other court submissions transmitted to the
court not in PDF; or as PDF files with password protection or other encryption,
or with embedded executable code or scripts; or as corrupted files, shall be
deemed as not filed.”
● The same Rule will apply to electronic copies of additional accompanying
documents which shall be excluded from the records or rollo of the case/s for
which they have been submitted (Section 5).
● However, “when the primary manner of filing is through electronic transmittal
pursuant to Rule 13, Section 3(d) of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the subsequent submission of a paper copy shall be dispensed
with.
● “The time and date of the electronic transmittal shall be considered as the time
and date of filing” (Section 3[b]).
● “[E]xpress permission must be granted by the court for the primary filing through
electronic transmittal of the following: (a) initiatory pleadings and initial
responsive pleadings, such as an answer to a complaint or a comment to a
petition; (b) annexes, appendices, exhibits, or other accompanying documents to
pleadings or other court submissions not readily amenable to digitization to PDF;
and (c) sealed and confidential documents or records” (Section 3[b]).
● “In the absence of express permission from the court to file the foregoing
pleadings and court submissions by electronic means, paper copies shall be
required and the date of filing shall be the date when the paper copy was filed in
person, sent by registered mail, or sent by accredited courier” (Section 3[b] last
paragraph)
● While there are different modes of filing pleadings and court bound documents,
courts must be convinced that these are actually filed by the parties and received
by the courts.
● The process of ascertaining whether a party has indeed filed a pleading or court
bound document is known as “proof of filing.”
● “For pleadings or other court submissions filed personally, the electronic copy
shall reflect the written or stamped acknowledgment of the clerk of court in Rule
13, Section 16(a) of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
clearly showing the date and time of filing and the signature of the receiving
court personnel” (Section 4[a]).
● “For pleadings or other court submissions filed by registered mail or by
accredited courier, the PDF copy shall include the following: (i) a PDF copy of the
proof of mailing stated in Rule 13, Section 16 of the 2019 Amendments to the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly showing the date and time of mailing or
delivery to the post office or accredited courier; and (ii) PDF copy of the proof of
payment of fees, when applicable” (Section 4[b]).
● For pleadings or other court submissions electronically transmitted pursuant to
Rule 13, Section 3(d) of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the electronic transmittal shall include a PDF copy of the affidavit of
electronic filing of electronic copies before the lower courts and its additional
accompanying documents (Section 4[c]).
● Said filings must be accompanied with an undertaking that, for other court
submissions for which permission for electronic transmittal was not secured
from the court, the filer will submit their paper copies to the court personally, by
registered mail, or by accredited courier, within 24 hours from the date of the
electronic transmittal (Section 4[c]).
● “The filing of the paper copies of other court submissions for which permission
for electronic transmittal was not secured from the court must include a paper
copy of the transmittal e-mail header as evidence of the filing and receipt of the
electronically-transmitted portions of the same filing” (Section 4[c]).
● “The PDF copy of the primary pleading or court submission must be separated
from the electronic copies in PDF of any accompanying additional documents,
each of which must be contained in their own PDF files.
● “The PDF copy may be electronically generated from a word-processing or PDF
creation program, or be scanned images of the document compiled in a PDF file,
or a combination of both methods, but in all cases, the contents must be
completely legible” (Section 5)
● “The filer is also responsible for ensuring that the receiving court’s official e-mail
address service will not reject or block a transmittal e-mail due to the file size of
an attachment.
● “If the primary manner of filing is through electronic transmission, the form and
substance of the contents of the PDF copy, as first filed, shall be controlling”
(Section 5).
● “In addition to other information required to be included in the signature and
address of the party or counsel signing the pleading or other court submission,
the signing counsel or party must indicate their valid e-mail address, which shall
serve as their e-mail address of record” (Section 6).
● “All filings by electronic transmittal must be made with any of the e-mail
addresses of record of the counsels of record or the e-mail address of record of
the filing party.
● “If an electronic transmittal is made with an e-mail address not of record, the
entire transmittal shall be deemed as not filed” (Section 6).
● “Counsel and parties have the obligation to monitor the inboxes of their e-mail
address of record with the courts regularly and diligently.
● “No court shall accept as an excuse for any purpose that counsel or parties have
not checked the inboxes of their e-mail addresses of record” (Section 6).
● “Any lawyer who neglects to check the inbox of their e-mail address of record
regularly and diligently or fails to comply with Rule 13, Section 11 of the 2019
Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, should there be changes to
their e-mail address of record, to the detriment of the cause of their client, shall
be subjected to disciplinary action” (Section 6)

Tranquil Bites

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Can the government take your property?

Date: July 2, 2021

Can the government take your property?

Date: August 6, 2021

Death of a party in a civil case

Date: November 5, 2021

DATE: June 3, 2022

Expedited rules in criminal cases

Date: May 6, 2022

EXPEDITED RULES SUMMARIZED

DATE: June 10, 2022

● Under this Convention, the tedious requirements of legalization in different

Maintaining judicial stability

Date: JULY 8, 2022, 12:25 AM

Date: July 15, 2022, 12:05 AM

Date: August 5, 2022, 12:15 am

● Replevin is both a principal remedy and a provisional relief. When replevin is

Claims, defenses, and judgment on the pleadings

Date: August 26, 2022

Habeas corpus: A prerogative writ

Heart-to-heart talk with a priest

Date: September 9, 2022

● The 2019 Priest-Penitent privilege provision was expanded to cover “any

The Philippine perspective on the parent-child privilege

Date: September 16, 2022

Circumstances leading to a conviction

Date: September 30, 2022

● Circumstantial evidence relates to a series of facts, other than the fact in

Date: October 7, 2022

Quantum of proof in criminal cases

Date: October 14, 2022

Date: October 21, 2022

● If an accused dies before judgment is rendered in a criminal case, the criminal

Rescinding fraudulent transfers

Date: October 28, 2022

● Can an aggrieved creditor immediately file an action for the rescission of a

Attachment as a provisional remedy

Date: November 11, 2022

● A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the court

Date: November 22, 2022

● A judicial admission is a formal statement, either by the party or by his or her

Uniqueness of an interpleader action

Date: December 2, 2023

Meeting court deadlines

Date: January 6, 2023

Writings and signatures

Date: January 13, 2023

Peeking into wills and succession

Date: February 17, 2023

Date: February 24, 2023

Refreshing a witness’ memory

Date: March 10, 2023

● Not all documents presented to a witness during trial has to be marked in

Date: March 17, 2023

Ombudsman’s dismissal of a criminal complaint

● The office of the Ombudsman is an investigative body tasked to “investigate on

Reasonable certainty of conviction

Date: April 14, 2023

● Recently the Department of Justice issued Department Circular 20 dated March

Identification of the offender

Date: April 28, 2023

● “[T]he… identification of the author of a crime should be the primal concern of