Al-Ghazali's Method of Doubt

Author(s): Sobhi Rayan

Source: Middle East Studies Association Bulletin , December 2004, Vol. 38, No. 2
(December 2004), pp. 162-173
Published by: Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA)

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23062806

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 Al-Ghazali's Method of Doubt

Sobhi Rayan
Haifa University

Introduction
Al-Ghazali introduces the issue of doubt in his book al-Munqidh min al-Dalal
[Deliverance from Error], The book can be considered an intellectual
autobiography of this philosopher. Here al-Ghazali describes his intellectual
development and the method of his search for truth. He also discusses the ideas of
various doctrines that were present in Islamic society in his period, including the
philosophers, al-Mutakallimun (scholastics), al-Batiniyya (interiority), and
Sufism. The book is a concise exposition of al-Ghazali's experience in the field of
research and epistemological criticism.
It is possible to consider this book as a "method" that describes al
Ghazali's style of looking for the truth. He wrote it in the last years of his life
(1105-1106), after he had finished writing most of his books, which are
considered to be the real content of his search for truth. Besides, the title of the
book shows that it is an introduction and definition of a specific method that
saves the person who assumes it from error and loss and leads him to loftiness
and grandeur, which are certainty and complete truth.
It is not accidental that al-Ghazali exposes the question of doubt as a
method of thinking and a way of searching by which it is possible to reach the
truth. What reinforces this argument is al-Ghazali's work during the period of
Kalam which appeared before his reaching the stage of Sufism, which largely
deals with criticizing the widespread thoughts in that period such as the thoughts
of the philosophers, and of al-Batiniyya. Doubt is not an emergent state in his life;
it accompanies his intellectual process from the beginning of his youth till he
reaches the period of certainty. Al-Ghazali points out from the beginning that the
purpose of his research is to achieve certain knowledge, and this compels him to
review and criticize the known intellectual doctrines.
Most researchers of Islamic philosophy consider doubt as an intellectual
crisis from which al-Ghazali suffered in the last period he spent in Baghdad
(1095). Some of them claim that doubt is a result of mental disease,' an organic
neurological disease,2 or a disease of fear resulting from the political threats

1 Will Durant, The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith (New York, 1950), vol. 4,
p. 331.
2 Umar Farrukh., "Rujua' Alghazali Lilyaqen" Abu Hamid al-Ghazali: In Memory
of the 9"' Century of his Birth (Damascus, 1961), p. 311.

162

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 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004) 163

exerted by al-Batiniyya;3 some researchers claim that al-Ghazali did not pass
through the successive stages of doubt, but that this is merely a mental play.4
Some researchers believe that al-Ghazali doubted some of the contents, which
became a cause for his crisis of doubt that required a solution and an outlet.
Therefore, their researches concentrate on the doubted contents. For example, al
Ghazali looked for certainty, but he did not find it in religion or philosophy. As a
result, he hid his doubt till the end of his life.5 He doubted the intellect in order to
defend religion.6 Doubt started with acquired knowledge by imitation, and then
the senses and the intellect, but he did not doubt the religious principles such as
God, prophets, and the Judgment Day.7 He started doubting religion and then the
senses and then the intellect.8 His skepticism was eventually turned against
philosophy as well as theology9—not the fundamental doctrines of the unity of
Allah and prophethood, but the competing interpretations of Islam.10 Contrary to
these approaches, I argue that doubt was not an issue of specific content, but a
formal system whose purpose was to deal with certain contents and reveal their
facts. It is not the "content" of thinking but the "method" of thinking that
attempted to review the content and achieve certainty.
In this article, I try to analyze the theory of doubt as introduced by al
Ghazali and show that al-Ghazali's "doubt" is an intellectual method and
approach of critical thinking that aims at purifying knowledge from faults and
impurities and at revealing the truth of things. I believe that doubt as al-Ghazali
sees it is a reviewing of the sources of knowledge and criticizing them again. It is
also a critical rethinking of data that are considered implicitly correct in the social
and epistemological consciousness, or taken for granted. Doubt is a method of
thinking directed at the process of thinking, rather than its content. In fact, it is a
process of returning the content to the form.
This claim, that doubt is a research method, contradicts the attitudes of
many researchers, including Osman Bakar, who says,
the general spirit of the book Deliverance from Error does not support the
opinion that al-Ghazali defends his method of doubt as a tool of search for

3 Aref Tamir, al-Ghazali (London, 1987), p. 58.

4 A. Carra de Vaux, al-Ghazali, translated by A'adil Za'ter (Cairo, 1959), pp. 48-49.
5 Najeb Makhul, al-Ghazali wa Ibn Rushd (Beirut, 1962), p. 20.
6 Jamel Saliba and Kamil Ayyad, in their Introduction to the al-munqidh min al-dalal
(Beirut, n.d.), p. 22.
7 Mahmoud Zakzuk, AlmanhagAlfalsa.fi bain al-ghazali wa Descartes (Cairo, 1997),
p. 76.
8 Sulaymam Dunya, al-hakeka fi Nzar al-ghazali (Cairo, 1965), pp. 26-31.
9 W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim Intellectual, A Study of al-Ghazali (Edinburgh,
1963), p. 53.
10 Hamid Algar, Imam Abu Hamid Ghazali (Oneonta, NY, 2001), p. 16.

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164 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004)

truth....We strongly believe that Sufism played a decisive role in al

Ghazali's reaching his epistemological crisis, which confirms the
existence of the stage beyond the intellect and criticizes the intellect.
Doubt does not end by the activity of the intellect, but as a result of the
godly light."
I try to prove the opposite of this argument, and try to introduce a new analysis
that contributes to the understanding of the issue of doubt as al-Ghazali
introduces it. This requires looking into the issue of doubt on two different levels:
dialectical and epistemological.

Dialectical Doubt
At an early age, al-Ghazali noticed the multiplicity and differences of
intellectual doctrines in his cultural and intellectual environment.12 He describ
it as "a deep sea in which many have drowned and few have survived, and each
group claims that it is the survivor."13 These differences pushed al-Ghazali
study and discuss the various intellectual doctrines in an attempt to understan
their secrets and to be able to distinguish between the right one and the wron
one."14 He found that intellectual affinity with a certain doctrine results fro
imitation and not from study and search, "till the tie of imitation left me and th
inherited beliefs were broken in my boyhood, when I saw Christian boys have n
other choice but to be Christians, and the Jewish boys have no other life but bein
Jews, and the Moslem children have no other life but to grow according to
Islam."15 When al-Ghazali reached this conclusion, he started looking for the
reality of original intuitive and spontaneous truth, which constitutes the basis fo
the beginning of the search for truth.16
These inherited beliefs are acquired from parents and teachers by
imitation that is the opposite of independent thinking, and search that aims a
reaching the truth. Therefore, we see him advising one of his pupils:
avoid attachment to doctrines, and don't be like a blind one imitating you
leader who directs you to a certain way, while there are a thousand peopl
like your leader who are warning you that he has ruined you, has misled

" Osman Bakar, "The Meaning and Significance of Doubt in al-Ghazali'

Philosophy," The Islamic Quarterly 146 (1986): 38-39.
n This period was characterized by a variety of religious sects and intellectu
doctrines such as Batiniyya, Falasifa, Sufism, and Kalam.
13 al-Ghazali, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal wa al-Musil ila al- 'Izzati wa al-Jalal, ed. b
Ali Abu Milhem (Beirut, 1993), p. 18.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.

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 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004) 165

you off the right way, and you will know in the end that your leader
persecuted you. There is no salvation except in independence.17
This is a clear call for a search for truth in an individual and independent way,
without following a specific doctrine that claims to have gained all the truth that it
guarantees for its followers. Al-Ghazali emphasizes here the importance of the
method of right thinking and the collapse of the methods of reception and
imitation:
The searcher for truth should be independent and not affiliated with a
specific doctrine, the veil of imitation raised by leaving fanaticism to
doctrines... if fanaticism to the doctrines overcomes him, and he leaves no
room for others in his soul, this becomes a handcuff and a veil, and the
condition of the disciple is that he should not be affiliated with a specific
doctrine. Knowledge of the truth by a doctrine reinforces the tendencies of
fanaticism within the imitator and makes it harder for him to see the truth
or to distinguish between right and wrong, since he cannot see the right
outside the intellectual frame to which he belongs, and he denies the
possibility of the existence of truth in any other place and believes in the
existence of truth only in his frame.18
In Deliverance from Error, al-Ghazali describes his personal experience of search
for truth. It can be considered a personal review and assessment of his intellectual
development. The importance of this assessment lies in the revelation of his
opinions against imitation being one of the significant factors in his intellectual
development. It is worthwhile mentioning that he often uses the first person
pronoun in his description of his experience. Though the description of his
process of revealing the truth is particular to him, every person can experience
this process.
S. R. Shafaq says that al-Ghazali's chief purpose is not the expression of
doubt or the search for the origins of religion, but the establishment of a
constructive, and true epistemological research. This research is the result of his
love for truth. He is thirsty for knowledge and his real goal is the achievement of
right."
Al-Ghazali decides that the importance of the idea originates from the idea
itself. A truth remains a truth irrespective of the identity of the person who tells
the truth. The mission of the doctrines and their adherents is to look for the truth,
and this means that they themselves are not considered criterion for truth,

17 Al-Ghazali, Mizan al- 'Amal, Introduction by Ali Abu Milhem (Beirut, 1995), p.
222.
18 al-Ghazali, Ihya 'a 'Ulum al-Din (Beirut, n.d), vol. 3, p. 75.
19 S.R. Shafaq, "Some Abiding Teaching of al-Ghazali," The Muslim World XUV
(1954): 44.

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166 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004)

and thus the achievements of human consciousness and knowledge

become accepted in themselves, which, in turn, leads to mold the accurate
principle of the intellectual treatment of facts through the absence of their
historical and ideological weight....This raises the practice of revealing
the importance of idea in itself above all ideological and doctrinal
symptoms, and subsequently to convert them to the level of the theoretical
principle.20
This is considered by al-Ghazali destruction of the traditional frames in the
consciousness, and engagement in objective material that gives space for free
independent thinking unconnected to other factors.
Al-Ghazali's rejection of imitation and his emphasis on independent
thinking is clear in his support of the principle of ijtihad. He endeavors to
establish the science of jurisprudence on the rules of logic and the development of
the idea of interior probability (al-ihtimaal al-thanni) so that the theory will be
connected to the constant development of life. In this way, imitation will have no
meaning because of the constant need for ijtihad and independence of judgments.
In Deliverance from Error, Al-Ghazali introduces the idea of original
intuitive spontaneity that precedes all doctrines and human religions as the
condition or primary image on which man is created. This return to the beginning
aims at discussing the truths of things as they are. However, man can't arrive at
that spontaneity because the ideological and doctrinal heritage constitutes an
obstacle or a veil that separates him from spontaneity. Therefore, al-Ghazali
criticizes the method of imitation because it is a veil that prevents seeing the truth
as it is.
Al-Ghazali believes that reaching the truth of things requires knowledge
of "true science." It is apparent to him that "certain science" is the one in which
the "known thing" is revealed in an undoubted way, and is not connected to the
possibility of error and illusion, and the heart cannot have room to assess it.21 This
means that al-Ghazali has doubt in every science that is not certain, and certainty
for him is the criterion for the truth of things. Science is considered real only
when it is absolutely certain and proves true in the face of any expression of
doubt. Here, al-Ghazali puts a strict criterion on acceptance of the known thing. In
fact, he does not leave room for doubt or probability of making an error; he
requires full safety against error.
Al-Ghazali gives an example to explain the level of absolute safety of
certain science:
safety from error should be connected to certainty in a way that if
someone who can convert a stone into gold and a stick into a snake
challenges certainty by showing its invalidity, such a challenge would not

20 Maitham Al-Janabi, al-Ghazali (Damascus, 1998), p. 40.

21 al-Ghazali, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, p. 19.

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 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004) 167

leave any sign of doubt or denial; if I know that 'ten' is larger than 'three'
and someone says, to me: No, but 'three' is greater than 'ten' by evidence
that I can change this stick into a snake, and he does so, and I see that, I
would not doubt my knowledge because of him, and I show nothing about
him except my wonder at his ability to do what he did. However, as for
doubt, I would not show it.22
Thus, no evidence, whatever it is, can cast doubt on certain science. It is
worthwhile mentioning that the example of "turning a stick into a snake" is
externally tangible evidence. Against this, we see that the example of certain
science—ten is larger than three—is an intellectually intangible example. This
tangible example is not a mere example by which it is possible to doubt the
intellectual operation, but is a radical example, through which it is possible to
invalidate the certain science. This means that certain science, which al-Ghazali
searches for, is at the level of the absolute, which cannot be doubted at all. In the
case of absolute safety, certain science can prove true in the difficult test and
stands even in the face of metaphysical supposition outside the world of the
senses.

Doubt in the Senses and the Intellect

As soon as al-Ghazali has defined the criterion of real science, he finds
that science that he has gained by imitation does not stand in the face of this
criterion. He tries to test his acquired science by the use of his senses and
intellect. He starts his research in the world of senses at the first epistemological
stage, "and so, I started contemplating with strong effort in the concrete, and the
necessary things, and see if I can have doubt in them."23 Al-Ghazali describes his
doubt in the senses by saying:
how can I trust the senses, the strongest of which is sight, when it sees the
shadow and thinks it stands still, and judges that there is no movement?
But then, by experience and observation, you know that it is moving,
though it does not move all at once, but gradually, an atom after another,
and it had not even a second of standing still. You look at the star and see
it the size of a dinar, but the geometric evidence shows that it is larger
than the earth in size. This and other examples are judged by the sense of
sight, but are refuted by the judgment of the intellect in a way that cannot
be denied. I said: probably trust in the senses is invalid, and probably there
is no trust except in the intellectual powers, which are the primary
things.24

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 21.
24 Ibid., p. 22.

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168 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004)

It is clear that al-Ghazali has lost his trust in the concrete things after he has
recognized the misleading of the senses in some cases. He tries to prove this
supposition by giving examples from the world of the senses where the intellect
judges that the senses make errors.
After examining and testing the data of the senses and expressing his
doubt in them, al-Ghazali moves to the examination of the data of intellect, which
is considered a more advanced epistemological stage than the senses and their
ruler. It can distinguish between the right and the wrong with regard to the things
that are related to the senses. However, the difficulty that faces al-Ghazali in his
research lies in this statement:
probably, behind the realization of the intellect, there is another ruler, and
if he is revealed, he might refute the intellect in its judgment, as did the
intellect to the senses. Non-appearance of that ruler does not deny its
existence. The soul hesitated in replying to this question, and supported its
forms in its sleep, and said: don't you see things in your sleep and imagine
conditions and believe they are stable and settled? You don't doubt that
condition and then you wake up and realize that your imagination and
beliefs had no origin or result. You may feel safe to believe that all that
you believe in your waking time through your senses or your intellect is
truth, in addition to your present state, but a certain state may occur to
you, whose relation to your awakening is similar to the relation of your
awakening to your sleeping state, and your awakening is a sleeping state
in addition to it, and if that state occurred, you can be certain that all that
you believed in with your intellect was merely imagination that does not
take place in reality.25
Here, al-Ghazali supposes the existence of a stage beyond the intellect, which can
judge the data of the mind as an epistemological stage, which is more developed
than the intellect. It is possible to try to reach this stage when man gets rid of the
senses and the material world surrounding him. Man can reach this stage
automatically after death. However, it is possible to reach this stage during the
state of the Sufi revelation and inspiration that requires a large intellectual effort
or abstract thinking which is likely to decrease the function of the senses to their
lowest level.
Here, the establishment of knowledge appears in its three stages—senses,
intellect and beyond the intellect. It appears that the difference between the senses
and the intellect is similar to the difference between the intellect and beyond the
intellect stages. However, these stages are not separated; in fact there are
reciprocal and complementary relations among them.
Al-Ghazali tries to prove the existence of the stage beyond the intellect by
the "sleeping claim" which shows the uncertainty of existence. Man knows

25 Ibid.

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 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004) 169

existence and judges it through his senses and his intellect. He does not doubt this
knowledge and considers it as certain. On the other hand, when man undergoes
the experience of a dream, he trusts the things that he sees in his dream without
doubting them during his dream state. However, when he returns to the
awakening state, man changes his judgment. So, we are in front of different
states, and each one is true in its existing frame of time, and every state has its
own judgment rules.
Al-Ghazali wonders that the apparent truth in reality is a truth within the
context of its reality only, but it is not a truth in relation to another state, whose
relation to reality is similar to the relation of reality to sleep. When we try this
state, we become certain that the things that we acquire by the intellect are unreal
and untrue illusions. In the state of sleep, man does not know that he is in a state
of a dream, and he becomes aware of it only after he awakes. Besides, man does
not know that he is dreaming in reality, but the state of "after reality" might
appear to confirm that reality was a dream. In this way, we can say that reality is
not a guarantee for certainty. This argument constitutes a problem for the sensory
and intellectual issues. He has doubt in all the sources of human knowledge in a
way that makes the possibility of achieving certainty a difficult goal if not
impossible. Al-Ghazali arrives at a very hard situation. He cannot find a solution
for the idea of doubt that includes all the existing things in this universe. He
doubts on both levels, the existential and the epistemological, because he
discusses the question of "if' and "how" we can know our reality and the reality
of the things that exist in reality.
Al-Ghazali enters a deep crisis because of his doubt in the senses and the
intellect, and describes this state in the following way: "this disease became so
hard and lasted for two months while I was following the doctrine of sophistry
due to my state, and not due to utterance and writing.26 This state is considered
the peak of the process of doubt, which is compared to a disease that has a great
influence on his entity. It is possible to consider this state as existential doubt.
Al-Ghazali tries to get out of this crisis, but in vain. It is not possible to
find answers to these doubts except by proofs that are based on primary science.
He needs one axiom at least from which he can step to greater certainties.
However, these sciences are also doubted. Therefore, they cannot constitute a
basis to get rid of doubt. This situation requires the interference of an external
element on which human knowledge can be established, because the natural
intellect is insufficient to guarantee certainty of human knowledge. Here, al
Ghazali discovers the "Godly light" that saves him from the crisis of doubt,
till God cures me of that disease and the soul returns to its health and
moderation, and the intellectual necessities become accepted and reliable
in its safety and certainty, but that is not as a result of some evidence or

26 Ibid.

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170 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004)

arrangement of words, but it is God's throwing of that light, which is the

key to all knowledge, and he who thinks that revelation is dependent on
free proofs is wrong and narrows God's mercy.27
Despite the importance of the Godly light, al-Ghazali does not describe or explain
it in detail; but we can deduce that this light is not in contradiction with the
intellect, though it is not mental. On the other hand, it is impossible to consider it
non-intellectual because it leads to the truth in intellectual issues and consolidates
the certainty of intellectual axioms.
Al-Ghazali explains the difficulty of dealing with the intellectual axioms,
because it is primary, which means it exists, but they are hard to prove because
they are not subject to the logic of axioms. This means that the correctness or
incorrectness of these axioms cannot be proved. Despite this, al-Ghazali tries to
go beyond the intellectual limits of the axioms in order to be sure of their abstract
certainty. "What is meant of these stories is to attempt fully to demand till one
arrives at the point of demanding what cannot be demanded. In this way, he is not
accused of negligence of demanding what can be demanded."28 This means the
establishment of a science of certainty on a solid basis that cannot be doubted. He
sees the Godly light as an illogical certainty on which he can establish intellectual
axioms. By doing so, al-Ghazali resorts to a logic that is different from
intellectual logic in that it is at a different level, since he needs logic that is above
intellectual logic.

The Role of Doubt in al-Ghazali's Theory of Epistemology

We notice that the task of doubt is to reach the truth as it is. Doubt is a
tool or an epistemological method that aims to sieve human knowledge of its
faults and ignorance, rather than a method of revealing the incapability of
knowledge and questioning all of its creations and achievements. Doubt is a tool
that reveals the epistemological errors that man acquires from unreliable sources,
and attempts to establish knowledge on principles of certainty. Therefore, doubt is
directed at the method rather than knowledge itself.
Al-Ghazali defines the role of doubt by saying, "doubts are the things that
lead to right; he who does not doubt has not looked, and he who does not look did
not see, and he who does not see remains all his life in blindness and
ignorance."29 Al-Ghazali does not feel satisfied with defining the role of doubt as
a method that leads to truth, but also warns against the negative results of non-use
of this method: staying in blindness and ignorance.
In addition to connecting between doubt and achievement of right, al
Ghazali confirms the methodology of revealing the truth that starts with doubt

27 Ibid., p. 23.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 22.

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 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004) 171

and ends with reaching and achievement of right. If we look deeper into his
connection between doubt and looking on the one hand, and between looking and
sight on the other, we conclude that doubt means the operation of thinking,
because looking means deep study that depends on the intellect, and sight is the
study that depends on the senses. This means that any intellectual or experimental
study that aims at reaching the truth must depend on the method of doubt that
characterizes right from wrong or the correct from the incorrect.
Doubt is a method that attempts to establish knowledge on bases of
certainty that is reached by critical thinking that is concerned with reviewing the
epistemological data, scrutinizing, and editing them of their errors. Al-Ghazali
performs a new operation of investigating the sources of knowledge—imitation,
sense, and intellect—and this is a critical reviewing operation and a new
assessment of these sources. Through this critical method, al-Ghazali tries to
purify the epistemological heritage acquired by imitation of the ancestors and
teachers of errors and ignorance.
He does not attempt to nullify or negate it, but to examine and try it by
using instruments of correct thinking, where correct knowledge is accepted while
acquired knowledge by imitation and reception without criticism and testing is
refused and rejected. This critical method is able to reveal the mistaken
knowledge that has become part of the cultural legacy of the nation, and is passed
from one generation to the other as true and accepted knowledge. Sometimes,
such knowledge can be considered "sacred" and outside the circle of permissible
thinking, while, in reality, the error of incorrect appears only when it is subjected
to the tools of critical thinking.
Al-Ghazali moves on to criticize the senses and the intellect as sources of
knowledge, which are more certain than imitation. If they are subjected to
criticism, we can recognize the uncertainty of acquired knowledge by sense and
intellect. Having doubt in this knowledge means nothing except rethinking and
reestablishing it on correct rules of certainty. The purpose is not the mere doubt
and revealing of the incapability of sense and intellect.
It is possible to say that the employment of the method of doubt is clear
evidence of the existence of consciousness for al-Ghazali, because thinking
means maintaining the existence of consciousness. We notice that the level of
supreme consciousness to which al-Ghazali reached is rethinking about thinking,
which means awareness of the consciousness or converting the substance of
thinking into an image of thinking or a tool of thinking. Al-Ghazali performs an
operation of critical thinking of epistemological material which had been thought
of previously, and attempts to turn it into a method of thinking. This operation is
considered the highest level of thinking and epistemological consciousness, which
is the opposite of epistemological rumination that keeps the content and freezes it.
The meaning of doubt in the sensory and intellectual types of knowledge,
which represents every existing thing in the world, and proves the uncertainty of

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172 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004)

these existing things is in reality their nullification and their returning to thinking,
and establishing everything on thinking. He has doubt in everything, except one
thing, which is having doubt that he doubts. This means he cannot doubt that he
thinks, and this is the consciousness of consciousness. Al-Ghazali performs an
operation of nullification of the whole world by methodological doubt, and he
keeps only thinking. He nullifies the epistemological content and preserves the
method of thinking, which means that there is no existence except thinking itself.
Here, it is impossible to talk about "correspondence" or "conformity" because
thinking is something, namely, fictitious truth. The existence of a tool for thinking
does not necessarily mean its correspondence with the existing epistemological
content.

Al-Ghazali confines himself within a circle of thinking, and tries to

arrange his thoughts in order to go out of them. He soon realizes that there are
essential thoughts (essences) that possess independent, and necessary existence
within the consciousness. This means they impose themselves on the
consciousness from within the consciousness and not from outside, and also they
are not part of the thinking ego, "I." For example, he finds the idea of God within
the consciousness, but this thought does not occur as a result of thinking; rather
its existence was essential and imposed on the consciousness from within. Al
Ghazali expressed this idea in the concept "Godly light" thrown into the chest,
which does not occur by arranged evidence or arranged speech. This means that
these "essences" or thoughts did not result from intellectual thinking, and their
existence is spontaneous. This is what explains al-Ghazali's attempt to return to
the original intuitive spontaneity.
Al-Ghazali doubts every existing thing because of his belief in the
existence of something, which is the beginning. He tries to nullify every existing
thing in order to reach the point of the beginning, because these existing things
constitute the obstacle for their revelation. The reason for this relentless attempt
to return to the beginning is that it constitutes the basis of certainty for all existing
things. Reaching it means reaching certainty, which is connected to personal
consciousness. Therefore, it is possible to end with it rather than begin with it. Al
Ghazali performs a thorough critical operation and new assessment of sciences
that he has acquired by imitation or sense or intellect. By doing so, he removes all
ideological, social, and epistemological accumulations that cover human
spontaneity. He attempts to reach this beginning since it is the only truth of
certainty upon which he can establish the certainty of other existing things.
For a while, this method appears to be paradoxical, because the ordinary
mind knows that we begin rather than end with the beginning. However, critical
thinking goes beyond "ordinary thinking," being a method rather than mere
content. Therefore, we notice that al-Ghazali realizes the necessity and
importance of ending up with the beginning, because it is possible to reach it only
after an operation of criticism, and evaluation of all accumulated epistemological

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 MESA Bulletin 38/2 (2004) 173

heritage. He digs up with epistemological tools the layers of human knowledge in

order to reach the truth of original spontaneity that has been distorted because of
large accumulations throughout human history.

Conclusion
From what has been said above, we conclude that doubt for al-Ghazali is a
method of thinking through which one can reach the truth. This is what
characterizes the development of the various intellectual stages in his work. He
applied this method in his review of acquired knowledge by imitation, sense, and
intellect. Through it, he also reaches the truth of certainty (intuition or
spontaneity) that formed the certain basis to rebuild the various types of
knowledge. We notice that his thoughts about doubt were a description of a
method that aims at criticizing the epistemological content and reaching the truth
of content.
At the beginning of his research al-Ghazali defines the goal he is trying to
achieve, which is certain science and knowledge. He uses the method of doubt as
a tool to achieve this goal. Doubt is the tool that reveals the truth of acquired
sciences from the cultural and epistemological heritage. By doubt, al-Ghazali
reveals the uncertainty of the senses and the intellect. He also reaches the basis of
certainty upon which he establishes other certainties. This means that these
existing or various sciences that are acquired by imitation require a solid basis of
certainty because they do not bear in themselves proofs that confirm their
certainty.
Al-Ghazali starts his research from the end but the beginning is not the
principle of his research. He nullifies and destroys everything in order to reach
the beginning. He also declares his success after any destruction that he claims.
Al-Ghazali expresses this, for example, by his announcement of "the breakup of
the glass of imitation" in order to reach the greater breakup, which is the breakup
of the intellect, which does not occur except by a great effort. After his success in
these breakups, the certainty is revealed to him and this is the purpose of his
research, upon which he reestablishes the edifice of epistemological certainty.
This thorough critical thinking leads to an assessment of all types of knowledge
that have been accepted for a long time, and to the shaking of trust in concepts
that have been taken for granted as reliable. This in turn leads to review of the
sciences according to logical criteria that are meant to distinguish the right from
the wrong, the correct from the incorrect.

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