GEORGE BONGALON vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013

FACTS:

The petitioner, George Bongalon, was charged of child abuse, an act in violation of
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610. He allegedly struck Jayson, a minor, with his hand and
slapped him on the face after the latter threw stones at George's daughter.

The RTC found George guilty as charged. This was affirmed by the CA, but the said
court modified the penalty.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the SC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
ROC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy.

2. Whether the petitioner is guilty of child abuse, under RA 7610.

RULING:

1. No. The SC held that the petitioner adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s
affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an
appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari.

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is
only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As
observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for
certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration
of justice would not survive.

Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a
decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the CA in his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the
granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper
and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition
indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He
mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime that he claims were really
 constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies reasons why he believes
Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt for the crime charged. The
errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and
assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

2. No. The SC held that petitioner is not guilty of child abuse, but rather of the crime of
slight physical injury only.

Despite the procedural transgression, the court continued to rule on the substantive issue.
According to the SC, the records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the laying of
hands by George on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson
and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse. Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of
medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.

People of the Philippines v. Romeo Gonzales

G.R. Nos. 113255-56 July 19, 2001

Lessons Applicable: Pro reo doctrine, indeterminate sentence law, buy-bust operation, buy-bust
operation

Laws Applicable: indeterminate sentence law

FACTS:
 Early February 1991: the police received an information that Romeo Gonzales
was selling large quantities of marijuana.
 February 13, 1991: After 4 days of surveillance, they conducted a buy-bust
entrapment operation. Their informant introduced Sgt. Ortiz to Gonzales as a
buyer (poseur-buyer) of 1 kg. marijuana for P1,200. Then, Ortiz took out his
handkerchief as a pre-arranged signal so the team immediately rushed to the
scene introducing themselves as Narcom agents and arrested Gonzales. Sgt.
Ortiz handed over the bag of marijuana to Pfc. Danilo Cruz.
 The team confiscated 1 more bag containing 2 blocks of marijuana weighing
about 1.5 kg and 10 medium size plastic bags containing 300 grams of
marijuana. The tests yielded positive indications for the presence of
tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC
 Gonzales orally admitted that he was selling marijuana to different buyers, but
claimed that somebody else owned the marijuana he sold. When asked to
identify the owner, he kept silent.
 2 informations charging Gonzales with violation of RA 6425:
o Crim. Case No. 91-180: possession, custody and control of 2 block size of marijuana weighing
(1.5 kilos) and 10 medium size plastic bags of dry marijuana weighing (300 grams)
o Crim. Case No. 91-181: selling more or less 1 kilo of high-grade marijuana
  RTC: Romeo Gonzales guilty for Violation of Sections 8 and 4, Art. II., RA 6425
and imposes penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000
for Criminal Case No. 91-180 life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000 for Criminal
Case No. 91-181.
 Gonzales: Victim of a frame-up since he was inside the comfort room of a
neighbor from whom he borrowed P100 to buy medicines for his sick mother and
he was just wearing underwear when he was brought out of the house. – NOT
proven
 A buy-bust operation, normally preceded by surveillance, is an effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers and, “if carried out with due regard to constitutional
and legal safeguards, it deserves judicial sanction.” A warrant of arrest is not
essential because the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. Searches made
incidental thereto are valid.

ISSUE: W/N the Indeterminate Sentence Law should apply to Crim. Case No. 91-180

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. 91-181,life imprisonment
and fine of P20,000. In Criminal Case No. 91-180, indeterminate penalty of 2 years and 4
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P6,000.

 The Dangerous Drugs Act, Sec. 8 (special law) prescribes as penalty for
possession of Indian hemp (marijuana), regardless of amount, an imprisonment
of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and a fine of P6,000 to P12,000. Applying the
pro reo doctrine in criminal law (when in doubt favour the accused), we hold that
the penalty prescribed in R. A. No. 6425, Section 8 while not using the
nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC is actually prision
mayor. Consequently, it is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, which shall apply in imposing the indeterminate sentence.

SUSAN GO v. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, GR NO. 151876, 2005-06-21

Facts:
Dimagiba issued Go thirteen checks that were subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason “Account Closed”.
Go lodged a complaint against Dimagiba for violating B.P. 22 in the MTCC of Baguio
City (Branch 4) which convicted the respondent on July 16, 1999 for 13 counts of
violation of the law a quo. Dimagiba was also ordered to serve 2-month imprisonment
for each count and a fine of 1,295,000 pesos.
Dimagiba appealed in Baguio City RTC Branch 4 on May 23, 2000, but the latter denied
the appeal. Having no further appeal in CA, Branch 4 issued a Certificate of Finality of
the Decision on February 1, 2001.
The MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his
sentence and a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of his civil liability. Dimagiba filed
a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2001, praying to recall the Order of Arrest
and a Modification of the Final Decision, arguing that only the penalty of fine shall be
imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion. Dimagiba was arrested on September
28, 2001.
Dimagiba filed a Petition of Habeas Corpus in Baguio City RTC Branch 5. The court
ordered the immediate release of the respondent and ordered Dimagiba to pay 100,000
pesos in lieu of his imprisonment. The court justified this modification by invoking the
SC ruling on Vaca v. Court of Appeals andSupreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-
AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly required the imposition of only a fine instead of
imprisonment for BP 22 violations, provided that the accused was not a recidivist or a
habitual delinquent.
The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It
further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender; and (2) the civil liability had already
been satisfied through the levy of his properties.
Petitioner Susan Go elevated the case to the Supreme Court assailing the order a quo.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not habeas corpus is a proper remedy since the case has
conclusively been decided.
2. Whether or not the SC-AC No. 12-2000 deleted the imposition of the penalty of
imprisonment if a fine has already been imposed.
3. Whether or not the preferential imposition of a fine in lieu of imprisonment as
allegedly enunciated in SA-AC No. 12-2000 shall be applied in the case at bar as
the respondent is not a “first-time offender”.

HELD:

On the first question of law.

No, the writ of habeas corpus may not be availed of when the person in custody is
under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. The writ of habeas
corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are
deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and
thus deliver them from unlawful custody.
However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed
penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. The remedy
should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he
should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed.

On the second question of law.

No, SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The
competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to the Court. The circular
in question, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, merely established a rule of
preference in imposing the above penalties. When the circumstances of the case
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.

On the third question of law.

Not necessarily. Being not a first-time offender is not a sole factor in determining
whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. It is in the trial court’s
discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law (SC-AC No. 13-2001).

PEOPLE v. FERNANDO SULTAN Y LATO, GR No. 132470, 2000-04-27

Facts:
Juditha M. Bautista. According to her, on 2 June 1997 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening she was on
her way home from a visit to her cousin Cristina Mansilongan in Novaliches, Quezon City;...
when she passed the dark alley in her cousin's compound she was accosted by someone, later
identified as accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her neck
and announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her to a house along the alley...
which turned out to be his. Once inside the house, he made her sit down. He offered her a drink;
she refused it. Then he started divesting her of her watch, ring, earrings, and necklace the
values of which are now reflected in the Decision of the court a quo, and her cash of
P130.00. After taking her valuables, he started kissing her on the lips and cheeks. As if to
discourage him from making further sexual advances, she told him that she was married with
two (2) children but accused-appellant was not dissuaded from pursuing his intentions. While...
pointing an ice pick at her he ordered her to undress. She acceded for fear that he would kill her
as she was under constant threat. After she had completely undressed, accused-appellant
ordered her to lie down on the floor. He then kissed her again from head down. Still she... could
not resist him because of fear. He went on top of her, held her two (2) hands on the level of her
head, spread her thighs and inserted his penis into her vagina. The coital encounter lasted for
ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes.
Issues:
the Court held that the additional rapes... committed should not be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance despite a resultant "anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape
would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of gravity.
Ruling:
The Court realized that there was no... law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for
that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code... which enumerates the mitigating circumstances
where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the legislature.
Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s
may be considered aggravating, the Court... must construe the penal law in favor of the offender
as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. Under
this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating
circumstance. Applying Art. 63,... par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(i)n
all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither
mitigating nor... aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied," the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-
appellant.

OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

GR No. 217874 December 5, 2017

TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By virtue
of his position, she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer.

As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the
payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections she
received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), Baguio City Branch.

On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by Hernan was conducted. It
was found out that the deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing
the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt by LBP
nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then informed that the two aforesaid remittances
were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for
the P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00.

Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds with the amount of
P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed
her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its
decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the
penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution
dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner’s MR became final
and executory.

On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and
with Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the execution
of the judgment of conviction.

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry
of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014
which was likewise denied.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation
of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES.

The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime of malversation of public
funds.

The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public
funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to
have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to
personal uses.

As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that
she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject
P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the money
went failed to overcome the presumption of law.

For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned
about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she
also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all
that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received
public funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made,
and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed
that it was somebody else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be
held liable for malversation.

SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the
penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the accused.

The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of the first requisite that the
reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the Motion to
Reopen the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration had already become final
and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26,
2013.

Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule 119 of Rules of Court)

1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;

 2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty
days from the issuance of the order

However, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the
Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of
evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by
said court.

The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc
and give due regard to such exceptional circumstancewarranting the relaxation of the doctrine
of immutability.

To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 which accordingly reduced
the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of such
exceptional circumstance.

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a novel situation wherein
the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory
and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law.
Because of this, not only must petitioner’s sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on
the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may
even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification, in
view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707.

Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible
multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and
recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six
(6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount
involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should
be imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term
of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.

The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of
the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the
accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and
immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of
guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review

Facts: A complaint was filed against Sweet, an employee of the US Military, for having
committed an offense against a prisoner of war. In his defense, he contended that being a
soldier or a military employee, that he was “acting in the line of duty” at the time the offense was
committed, it exempts him from the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

Issue: Does the civil court have jurisdiction to try the case of the accused?

Ruling: The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes. In this case, the general principle applies—that the jurisdiction of civil
courts is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before it.
The contention also that the act was performed under the order of his military superior cannot
affect the right of the court to take jurisdiction of the case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
ruled that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions; the military tribunal not
asserting any claim.