The impact of Eurosceptic Parties within the European Union: Examining

Their Influence and Future

Cărăbuș Sara-Giulia
student Relații internaționale și studii europene, an universitar 2023-2024, an studiu 3, grupa 1; Facultatea de
Filosofie și Științe Social-Politice, Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
contact: carabus.saragiulia@gmail.com

Abstract:

The following article has the objective of exploring the impact of the Eurosceptic Parties
within this intimidating himera we nowadays call: the European Union. The analysis is
structured on two main points: First, we shall examine the root of eurosceptism, tracing its shape
and emergence inside the European landscape. Secondly, we will introduce some notable
Eurosceptic parties within the EU and determine their differences and similarities (UKIP,
National Rally, Sweden Democrats, and True Finns). To achieve this, our approach employs
qualitative research methods, more specifically scientific observation, bibliography review, and
case study.

Key-words: Euroscepticism, right-wing party, referendum, national sovereignty, immigration,

populism;

Introduction:

The term ‚Eurosceptic’ refers to individuals, political parties, or movements that express
skepticism or opposition towards the European Union(EU). According to Paul Taggard's seminal
article on Euroscepticism and political parties, he defined it as expressing ‘the idea of contingent
or qualified opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the
process of European integration’. Within this grand plan of the EU, skepticism arose from
different concerns about its impact, such as how it would affect national sovereignty, policies and
regulations, economic and financial aspects, and its democratic accountability. We can’t
specifically say that each state. party or social actor within the continent views things as black
and white. There is a range in which Euroscepticism can manifest in different ways, from mild
skepticism about certain EU policies to the very existence of the union. Some countries prove to
be opposed and advocate for their countries to leave, while others may seek reforms or
renegotiation of their country’s relationship with the EU, all within their unique national context.

The emergence of Eurosceptism in the EU:

From the 1960s until the 1980s, the process of European integration was generally
understood as an elite-driven phenomenon for which the public was seen as having a permissive
consensus for integration.i Experts believed that a country’s decision whether or not to engage
with European integration would be influenced by public opinion but would not significantly
influence the European plan. Unfortunately, things proved to be unexpected.
In 1992, as an example, the Danish referendum rejected the Maastricht Treaty, making a
significant turning point in what consisted of the ‘‘Europeanization’’ process. This rejection was
primarily attributed to concerns about the lack of democratic processes and transparency in the
integration process. This event exposed the existence of a growing Eurosceptic sentiment within
member states, leading scholars to scrutinize and dissect the phenomenon more thoroughly.

Subsequent developments regarding the context continued to complicate the European

landscape: The Treaty of Amsterdam, coming into force on May 1, 1999, introduced key
changes to the institutional framework and policies of the EU; the Eastern Enlargement in 2004,
Brexit in 2006, and ongoing debates about the EU’s role in critical areas such as immigration,
national sovereignty, and economic policies. Europe nourished the rise of populist-style politics,
becoming the most important reason for the subject of Euroscepticism within the continent. It
falls as an issue for both populist right and left-wing parties but is predominantly associated with
the right wing.ii The main difference refers to the fact that, on one hand, left Eurosceptic parties
oppose the EU on socio-economic concerns, whereas the right-wing populist parties reject the
EU integration on the basis of sovereignty arguments and cultural claims.iii For example: English
Euroscepticism is based on the British history of empire, germans are pro-European as they see it
as a peace project after World War II, while Spain sees it as a way to modernize and
democratize.iv Each member state is influenced by a unique national context regarding its
existence within the EU.

Soft and Hard Euroscepticism:

To better understand Euroscepticism, scholars like Paul Taggart and Aleks Sczerbiak have
categorized it into two different versions: hard and soft Euroscepticism.v In the context of a
member state, hard Euroscepticism denoted a principled opposition to the EU and European
integration, involving a desire for complete national withdrawal. In contrast, a soft euro-skeptical
party speaks about the opposition to certain policies based on perceived threats to the national
interest, without necessarily advocating for complete withdrawal. Eurosceptic parties tend to
view European integration as an encroaching, bureaucratic, and elitist phenomenon and have
been critical of the top-down nature of the European integration process.vi A more detailed
differentiation is proposed by Chris Flood and Simon Usherwood’s gradual classification,
distinguishing six categories of alignments:
1. Maximalists are strongly in favor of European integration, both in general and for specific
policies
2. Reformists combine a general acceptance of advancing integration with constructive criticism.
3. Gradualists accept slow and piecemeal advances of integration.
4. Minimalists accept the status quo while rejecting further advances in
integration,
5. Revisionists want to return to an earlier state of integration, e.g. before
a treaty revision,
6. Rejectionists outright refuse integration in general and oppose membership
more specifically

United Kingdom Independence Paty (UKIP)

The Brexit referendum from 2016 is a meaningful example of a hard Eurosceptic view.
UKIP was a prominent Eurosceptic political party in the United Kingdom, playing a significant
role in the Brexit campaign which ultimately led to the UK’s decision to leave the EU in 2016.
UKIP was established in 1991 as the successor of the Anti-Federalist League by Alan Sked, a
Scottish Eurosceptic academic. Over time, it gained popularity and support, becoming the third-
largest national party in the UK and the largest UK party in the European Parliament in 2018. By
2013, they had peaked at around 15% of the electorate’s support. Promoting success and
representation within the European Parliament prompted Prime Minister David Cameron to
promise a referendum on EU membership, which ultimately led to a significant impact.
The main two arguments in favor of Brexit focused on the EU’s liberal rules for internal
migration and the EU’s burdensome economic regulations. On June 23, 2016, the referendum’s
votes resulted in 52 to 48% in favor of leaving the European Union. A majority of voters in
England and Wales have backed ’’Leave’’, while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted for
’’Remain.’’

National Rally (formerly known as the National Front, until 2018) in France:

Led at the present by Jordan Bardella, this far-right party has expressed eurosceptic views
and opposes EU integration. It insists on French withdrawal from the EU, citing concerns about
national sovereignty and the impact of EU policies on France. The party advocates for significant
cuts to legal immigration and the protection of French identity.
The party was founded in 1972, by Jean Marie Le Pen unifying the French nationalist movement
with a humble start but soon experiencing a breakthrough in the 1984 European Parliament
election when it won 11% of the vote and secured ten MEPs. Over the years, the party’s support
fluctuated between 10% to 15%, with occasional dips to around 5% in the late 2000s.vii In the
2017 presidential election, the party once again advanced, doubling its percentage compared to
the 2002 presidential election, ultimately earning 34%. In the 2019 European elections, after a
rebrand as the National Rally, the party remained in its position as the leading party.

Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) in Sweden:

This party has raised concerns about the EU’s influence, however as an example of a soft
Eurosceptic party, its primary focus is on immigration and social issues. It opposes
multiculturalism and prefers a very restrictive immigration and refugee policy, The formation of
Sweden Democrats consisted of people who had previously been members of former parties and
earlier movements in Sweden, beginning its activity during the 1980s. Its controversies were
linked to the fact that some of the members had been taking activity in Swedish nazi parties from
the 1930s to 1940s while the leader at the time, Anders Klarstrom, had been part of the Nordiska
Rikspartiet, an openly neo-nazi party. Starting in 1995, after Klarstrom was replaced by Mikael
Jansson as the new leader, the party began to clear its image.
It didn’t follow a quick rise in popularity, remaining a marginal party not very discussed by
the public eye. They started with only 0.02 % of the vote in their first election. Over the years,
they gradually grew, reaching 0.4% in 1998 and 3% in 2006. Their breakthrough came in 2002
when they gained more local representation and expanded their support in the south of Sweden,
making it possible for them to eventually enter the national parliament.viii

True Finns (Perussuomalaiset) in Finalnd:

The True Finns are another example of a soft Eurosceptic and populist party. They are
skeptical of further EU integration but have not called for Finland’s withdrawal from the EU.
Their concerns combine left-wing economic policies and economic nationalism with socially
conservative values and ethnic nationalism.ix
The main problems with the Eurozone, according to the Finns Party, are related to the
common monetary policy and financial responsibility. They believed that Finland’s decision to
adopt the Euro was a significant political and economic mistake, thinking that by losing their
own currency, they would limit the country’s ability to respond to specific economic challenges.
They view two paths for the Eurozone: further integration into an economic and political federal
state or eventual disintegration. They do not support the federalized approach and instead
advocate for a ’’well-controlled exit’’ from the Euro.x
The party was founded in 1995 after the dissolution of the Finish Rural Party. They held an
electoral breakthrough in the 2011 Finish parliamentary election, securing 19.1% of the votes
and becoming the third-largest party in the Finnish Parliament. Over the years it maintained a
strong position, with a slight deviation in 2017, when a part of the members of the Parliament
left and formed the Blue Reform group (although it still supported the government). In the 2019
election, the Finns Party rebounded with 39 seats, and in 2023 since its founding, it reached 46
seats.
Conclusion:

Eurosceptic parties have emerged as significant players in European politics. Their

influence has challenged the EU’s drive for further integration and prompted a reevaluation of
the European project. As the EU navigates the complex terrain of Euroscepticism, finding
common ground and addressing the concerns of Eurosceptic votes will be the key to maintaining
stability and unity through the process of Europeanization.
i
https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2012-2-page-323.htm
ii
https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=2495&lid=1872
iii
Dr. Maurits J. Meijers, Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism: A Dynamic Phenomenon, Policy Paper 191, Jacques Delors Institut, Berlin, 7
April 2017
iv
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European
Integration?” PSO online. University of North Carolina, 2007
v
https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2012-2-page-323.htm
vi
https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=2495&lid=1872
vii
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Rally
viii
https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/sweden-democrats-an-anti-immigration/
ix
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finns_Party
x
https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/EUpolitiikkaENG_2019.pdf

Bibliography:

1. Katrin Bottger, Grabriel VanLoozen; ’’Euroscepticism and the Return to Nationalism in the Wake of
Accession as Part of the Europeanization Process in Central and Eastern Europe’’ Dans L’Europe en
Formation, 2012, pages 323 à 342 (https://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2012-2-page-
323.htm?contenu=article)

2. Johan MARTINSSON, ’’SWEDEN DEMOCRATS: AN ANTI-IMMIGRATION VOTE’’, Fondation

pour L’innovation politique, fondapol.org, 2018 (https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/sweden-
democrats-an-anti-immigration/)

3. Nathalie Brack, Nicholas Startin; ’’Euroscepticism, from the margins to the mainstream’’
International Political Science Review, 2015, Vol.36(6) 239-249
(https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0192512115577231)

4. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on
European Integration?” PSO online. University of North Carolina, 2007

5. Christopher Flood and Simon Usherwood, ’’Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A Model Group
Alignment on EU Integration’’, Department of Political, International and Policy Studies, University of
Surrey Guildford, 2005
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228490382_Positions_Dispositions_Transitions_A_model_o
f_Group_Alignment_on_EU_Integration)

6. https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/EUpolitiikkaENG_2019.pdf
7. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0192512115577231

8. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=2495&lid=1872#_edn3

9. https://www.britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom/The-Brexit-referendum

10. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Rally