SECTION B

1. In the matter of D, An Advocate, AIR 1956 SC 102

In Re: D An Advocate Of The Supreme Court vs Unknown on 23 November, 1955

Equivalent citations: AIR1956SC102, (1956)58BOMLR510, 1956CRILJ280, (1956)IMLJ85(SC),
[1955]2SCR1006
Author: B.K. Mukherjea
Bench: B.K. Mukherjea

FACTS:-
1.This Rule was issued by this Court under Order IV, rule 30 of the Rules of this Court after receipt of
a report from the Bombay High Court that that High Court had, by its order made on the 13th October,
1955 in Civil Application No. 1506 of 1955, suspended the respondent from practice as an Advocate
of that High Court for a period of one year from the date of the said order. By the rule the respondent
has been required to show cause why, in view of the matter specified in the judgment and order of
the Bombay High Court referred to above, appropriate action, disciplinary or otherwise, should not be
taken against him by this Court.
2. The respondent is an Advocate of some standing in the Bombay High Court and as such was also
enrolled as an Advocate of this Court. It appears that in the earlier part of the year 1953 the Advocate
was prosecuted before Mr. Sonavane, one of the Presidency Magistrates at Bombay, on a charge of
having committed an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act. The trial lasted from July 1953 to
November 1953. On the 18th November, 1953 the Magistrate convicted the Advocate of the offence
with which he was charged and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one month and to a fine
of Rs. 201 and to rigorous imprisonment of four weeks in default of payment of the fine. The Advocate
went up on appeal to the High Court. The High Court on the 24th February, 1954 upheld the conviction
but altered the sentence to one of fine of Rs. 1,000 only.
3. In the meantime, on the 25th November, 1953, the trial Magistrate, Mr. Sonavane, made a report
to the Registrar (Appellate Side) of the Bombay High Court as to the conduct of the Advocate who
appeared in person as the accused before him. On a perusal of that report the Hon'ble the Chief Justice
of the Bombay High Court constituted a Tribunal consisting of three members of the Bar Council to
enquire into the conduct of the Advocate. The Tribunal issued a summons against the Advocate
intimating that it would enquire into his conduct as disclosed in :-
(a) the report dated the 25th November, 1953, of Shri T. A. Sonavane, B.A. LL.B., Presidency
Magistrate, 18th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, to the Registrar, High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay,
regarding Case No. 593/P of 1953 tried by him, and
(b) the judgment recorded by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 1532 of
1953 (with Criminal Appeal No. 1564 of 1953) upholding the judgment and order of conviction passed
against him by the aforesaid learned Magistrate in the aforesaid case.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in view of the conduct of the Advocate seen in the light of the
surrounding circumstances we are clearly of opinion that the Advocate should, by reason of his having
indulged in conduct unworthy of a member of the honourable profession to which he belongs, be
suspended from practice for some time. He is an Advocate of this Court and according to a majority
decision of this Court he is entitled, under the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act,
to exercise his profession in all Courts throughout the Union of India. Any suspension for a period less
than the period fixed by the Bombay High Court will obviously lead to serious anomaly and
inconvenience. We accordingly direct that the Advocate concerned be suspended from practice for a
period co-terminous with the period of suspension fixed by the Bombay High Court, namely, up to the
13th October, 1956.

2. P.J. Ratnam vs D. Kanikaram And Others on 10 April, 1963

April 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J.--This appeal has been filed by
special leave of this Court against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which the
appellant who is an Advocate was held guilty of professional misconduct and had been suspended
from practice for five years. The facts relating to the misconduct charged were briefly these: The three
respondents before us and one other--Kagga Veeraiah--were plaintiffs m O.S. 432 of 1951 on the file
of District Munsiff, Guntur in which a claim was made for possession of certain lands. The appellant
was the Advocate for these plaintiffs. The suit was dismissed by the Trail Court and an appeal was filed
therefrom to the Subordinate Judge, Guntur and pending the disposal of the appeal there was a
direction by the Court that the crops standing on the suit-land be sold and the proceeds deposited into
Court. In pursuance of this order a sum of about Rs. 1,600/- was deposited into Court-on December
19, 1951. The appeal by the plaintiffs was allowed by the Subordinate Judge. The' unsuccessful
defendants preferred a second appeal to the High Court, but meanwhile the plaintiffs made an
application for withdrawing the amount deposited in Court. By virtue of interim orders passed by the
Court they were granted liberty, to withdraw the sum pending disposal of the second appeal in the
High. Court filed by the defendants on furnishing security of immovable property. The security was
furnished and. the withdrawal was ordered. A cheque petition E.A. 250 of 1952 was accordingly filed
which was allowed and thereafter a cheque was issued in favour of the Advocate--the appellant before
us--for Rs. 1,452/4/-, this being the sum remaining to the credit of the plaintiffs after deduction of
poundage etc. It was admitted that this cheque was cashed by the appellant on April 23, 1953. The
appellant did not dispute that. he cashed this cheque on behalf of his clients or that the latter were
entitled to be paid this sum and the charge of professional misconduct against the appellant was that
the Advocate had not made this payment in spite of demands but that on the other hand he falsely
claimed to have paid them this sum.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:Civil Appeal No. 321 of 1962.

Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated August 4, 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Referred Case No. 29 of 1957..
This is on the question of the dissimilarity of the signatures on which rests the argument that the
respondents were not the complainants. Coming next to the point about the verification of the
complaint the matter stands thus: The three complainants (the respondents before us) originally filed
a petition on March ?6, 1956 before the District Judge but this did not bear the attestation of a
gazetted officer or other authority as required by the rules. This defect was made good by a fresh
petition which they filed before the District Judge on April 16, 1956. After the petition was signed by
the three petitioners they added a verification in these terms:
Supreme Court of India N.B. Mirzan vs The Disciplinary Committee Of The ... on
15 September, 1971
This is an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The appellant, Mr.
N.B. Mirz was an Advocate on the roll of the Bar Council of Maharashtra. On 27th
October, 1964, respon No. 2, who was once the client of the appellant, made several
allegations of professional misc against the appellant which were referred by the
State Bar Council to its Disciplinary Commit consisting of three Advocates, one
being the Committee's Chairman and the other two its mem After a detailed
inquiry into the allegations, the Disciplinary Committee came to the conclusio
professional misconduct had been established on three counts which involved
moral turpitude Commitee, therefore, directed on 3rd October, 1968 that the
appellant should be suspended permanently and should not be allowed to appear
before any Court, authority or person in Ind was also directed to surrender his
Sanad forthwith. From this order, an appeal was filed to the Council of India, being
Appeal No 9 of 1968. The appeal was heard by the Disciplinary Commi the Bar
Council of India consisting of a Chairman and two members. On 30th November,
1969 detailed order, the Disciplinary Committee confirmed the findings of the State
Disciplinary Committee but, as regards the punishment, it directed that the
appellant be suspended from practice for a period of five years and to pay to
Respondent No. 2 a sum of Rs. 850/-within two months. It was further directed
that, if the amount was not paid, the punishment imposed by t State Disciplinary
Committee striking out the appellant's name from the roll of Advocates wou stand
confirmed. It is from this Order that the present appeal has been filed.
The State Disciplinary Committee had permanently debarred the appellant from practising as an
Advocate, but, in appeal, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India has taken a more
lenient view and suspended the appellant from practice for a period of five years on condition that he
pays respondent No. 2 Rs. 850/-within two months. No argument was addressed to us on the question
of punishment. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the point.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

3. Bar Council Of Maharashtra vs M. V. Dabholkar Etc. Etc on 3 October, 1975

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1461 to 1468 of 1974.
V. S. Desai, Vimal Dave, Miss Kailahs Mehta for the Appellants.
Sakuddin F. Bootwala and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for Respondents in CAs. 1462-1464 V. N. Ganpule for
Respondent in C.A. 1465.
D. V. Patel and Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Bar Council of India.
The first chapter of the litigation in this Court related of the standing, of the State Bar Council to appal
to this Court, under s.38 of the advocates Act, 1961 (the Act, for short) against appeallate decision of
the Disciplinary Tribunal appointed by the Bar Council of India. This Court upheld the competence to
appeal, thus leading us to the present stage of disposing of the eight cases on merits.

The bench observed : We wish to put beyond cavil the new call to the lawyer in the economic order.
In the days ahead, legal aid to the poor and the weak, public interest litigation and other rule-of law
responsibilities will demand a whole new range of responses from the bar or organised social groups
with lawyer members. Indeed, the hope of democracy is the dynamism of the new frontiersmen of
the law in this developing area and what we have observed against solicitation and alleged profit'
making vices are distant from such free service to the community in the Jural sector as part of the
profession's tryst with the People of India.
simple enough in given situations, though involved when expressed in a single sentence. We but touch
upon this call to the calling of law, as more is not necessary in the facts of these cases.
The law has thus been set right, the delinquents identified and dealt with, based on individualised
deserts and the appeals are disposed of in the trust that standards and sanctions befitting the national
Bar will be maintained in such dignified and deterrent a manner that public confidence in this arm of
the justice-system is neither shaken nor shocked.
Parties will bear their costs throughout.
 4. Chandra Shekhar Soni vs Bar Council Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 20 July, 1983
Bench: A.P. Sen, E.S. Venkataramiah, R.B. Misra
This appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 is directed against an order of the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India dated January 7, 1977 upholding the order of the
Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council of Rajasthan, Jodhpur dated July 21, 1974 by which
the appellant has been held guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from practice for a
period of three years under Section 35(c) of the Act.

The State Bar Council gave the appellant the benefit of doubt on the first charge that he changed sides
in a criminal case, holding that though such conduct on his part was unprofessional, it was not
tantamount to professional misconduct. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India rightly
observes that it failed to appreciate the distinction drawn by the Slate Bar Council as his act in
accepting the brief for the accused after having appeared for the complainant was clearly contrary to
r. 33 of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975. We concur with the Disciplinary Committee. It is not in
accordance with professional etiquette for an advocate while retained by one party to accept the brief
of the other. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests except by express consent given by
all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. The appellant would not have appeared for the other
side except with the permission of the learned Magistrate. Counsel's paramount duty is to the client,
and where he finds that there is conflict of interests, he should refrain from doing anything which
would harm any interests of his client.

It is true that the appellant was a mere junior at the bar and not much experienced when the incident
is said to have taken place. The temptation for money at that stage is of course very great but at the
same time it is to be realised by the appellant that he belongs to a noble profession, which has very
high traditions and those traditions are not to be sullied by malpractices of this nature.
Accordingly it declined to interfere with the punishment. We however feel that the punishment of
suspension from practice for a period of three years to a junior member of the bar like the appellant
is rather severe. The lapse on the part of the appellant was perhaps due to the fact that in the struggle
for existence he had to resort to such malpractices. We strongly deprecate the conduct of the
appellant but take a lenient view because he was an inexperienced member of the bar, and the fact
that the incidents took place in 1971. In all facts and circumstances of the case, we feel it would meet
the ends of justice if we reduce the period of suspension from three years to one year. We order
accordingly.
Subject to this modification, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
 5. Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union Of India, AIR 1998 SC 1895
Citation – AIR 1998 SC 1895
Date of judgement – 17 April 1998

The Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of India (1998) stands as a landmark case
in the legal history of India. This pivotal judgment, delivered by the Supreme Court of India, has far-
reaching implications and addresses fundamental issues that resonate within the nation’s legal
framework.

The contemner, an attorney, was found guilty of criminal contempt of court for interfering with
and “obstructing the process of justice by attempting to frighten, overawe, and
overbear the court by using rude, contemptuous, and threatening words.”
He was condemned to simple jail for six years and barred from practising as an advocate
for three years. The sentence of confinement was suspended for four years and would be activated
if he was convicted of any other act of contempt of court during that time.
Dissatisfied with the decision to bar the defendant from practising as an advocate for three years, the
Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary, filed a writ petition under Article 32
of the Indian Constitution, seeking:
An appropriate writ, direction, or declaration declaring that the disciplinary committees of the Bar
Councils established under the Advocates Act, 1961, have sole authority to investigate and
suspend or bar an advocate from practising law for professional or other misconduct arising out of a
punishment imposed for contempt of court or otherwise; and
A statement that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court, acting within its inherent
jurisdiction, has no original jurisdiction, power, or authority in this matter.
Issue
Can the Supreme Court, in exercising its powers under Article 129, read with Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, punish an advocate for committing proven contempt of court by suspending his
licence for a defined term and barring him from practising law?
Analysis
The Supreme Court’s job, according to the court, is to ensure that statutory bodies and other state
organs fulfil their tasks in conformity with the law; nevertheless, it is not allowed for the Supreme
Court to assume the role of the bodies and other state organs and perform their activities.
In the case of Vinay Mishra, there was an inherent fallacy: it was argued that once the subject was
before the court, it may pass any order or instruction. However, this is a case of contempt of court
rather than professional misconduct. The court has authority over contempt, while the Bar has
jurisdiction over professional misconduct.
After the case of Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India 1978 AIR 597, the Bar can only suspend
an advocate after providing him with the opportunity to represent himself, as required by due process
of law. In Vinay’s case, the court endowed itself with jurisdiction it had never had before.
The Supreme Court can punish anybody who commits contempt of court under Article 129, read with
Article 142 of the Indian Constitution. The High Courts can punish contemners under Article 215 of
the Constitution, and the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 controls the sanctions imposed
by the High Court. This Act has no bearing on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the court
misinterpreted Article 129 and Article 142, depriving the Bar of any ability to sanction individuals who
engage in professional misconduct.
The court used a fairly objective approach and, with the support of the law and proper interpretation,
concluded that the ability to punish for any professional misconduct lies with the Bar. However, it only
has jurisdiction over itself and subordinate courts to punish for contempt. No legislation can take away
the Supreme Court’s or the High Court’s contempt jurisdiction.
The superior court’s contempt jurisdiction is not founded on legislation but rather on the fact that it is
a court of record, which gives it that power. The Supreme Court and High Courts have the power of
contempt since the Constitution considers them courts of record.
Conclusion
Civil contempt is important because deliberately disobedient litigants who disobey the court’s orders
cannot be excused; otherwise, the administration of justice and public confidence in the judiciary
would suffer. Citizens’ trust, faith, and confidence in the judiciary is a precondition for the Rule of Law
to exist.
Experts, conversely, feel that criminal contempt should be simplified if not outright abolished. This is
because it can potentially be used to restrict freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of
the Indian Constitution.
* The term “broad” refers to the extent or scope of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction. It suggests that while the Supreme Court has a significant or wide-
ranging jurisdiction, there are certain limits or restrictions imposed on it when it
comes to penalizing individuals for contempt of court.

CASE 1
(Negligence in Conducting Case)
25(1) 1998 IBR135
D.C. Appeal No. 16/1993
A vs. R
Shri C.L. Sachdeva (Chairman) and Shri O.P. Sharma and Shri T.P. Singh (Members) Judgement Dated 5th October,
1996
FACTS OF THE CASE
Complainant’s Case
: Complainant had executed a registered sale deed with an option torepurchase a house property
situate in Deeravalli village in favour of one Lanka SambaShiva Rao. However, the Complainant
continued to be in possession and enjoyment ofthe property. Vendor made attempts to take
the possession of the property forcibly incollusion with the police and Complainant filed a suit
for injunction against him throughhis Advocate, i.e., the Respondent at OS No. 87/85. Vendors also
filed a counter suit atOS No. 89/85 against the Complainant in the Sub-Court of Gudivada for
foreclosure
oft h e m o r t g a g e , c l a i m i n g t h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d s a l e d e e d a s m o r t g a g e d e e d .
This wasopposed by the C omplainant in his Written Statement wherein he
c l a i m e d t h a t t h e document is sham and nominal.In the mean while in OS No. 87/85 Court ordered for
payment of deficit Court fee undersec. 24 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation
Act. The Complainantalleges that the Respondent was negligent in conducting the case and did not
inform theComplainant regarding any progress of the case as a result of which the order
of theC o u r t f o r p a y m e n t o f d e f i c i t C o u r t f e e c o u l d n o t b e c o m p l i e d w i t h . T h i s
resulted
inr e j e c t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t . E v e n t h i s w a s n o t i n t i m a t e d t o t h e C o m p l
a i n a n t b y t h e Respondent. The Complainant further alleges that there was no negligence on his
partand he regularly kept in touch with the Respondent-Advocate and asked him about thestages of
both the suits. However, he did not get true reply from the Respondent. On23.9.1991 he
came to know from some other persons that OS No. 87/85 was
dismissedl o n g b a c k , o n 1 5 . 4 . 1 9 8 6 , a n d t h a t O S N o . 8 9 / 8 5 w a s
a l l o w e d . O n v e r i f i c a t i o n , t h e Complainant found the rumours true. On 24.9.1991 the
Complainant met Respondent-Advocate and requested him to return the papers of both suits with a
“no objection” toengage another Advocate.

CASE 1
(Negligence in Conducting Case)
25(1) 1998 IBR135
D.C. Appeal No. 16/1993
A vs. R
Shri C.L. Sachdeva (Chairman) and Shri O.P. Sharma and Shri T.P. Singh (Members) Judgement Dated 5th October,
1996
FACTS OF THE CASE
Complainant’s Case
: Complainant had executed a registered sale deed with an option torepurchase a house property
situate in Deeravalli village in favour of one Lanka SambaShiva Rao. However, the Complainant
continued to be in possession and enjoyment ofthe property. Vendor made attempts to take
the possession of the property forcibly incollusion with the police and Complainant filed a suit
for injunction against him throughhis Advocate, i.e., the Respondent at OS No. 87/85. Vendors also
filed a counter suit atOS No. 89/85 against the Complainant in the Sub-Court of Gudivada for
foreclosure
oft h e m o r t g a g e , c l a i m i n g t h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d s a l e d e e d a s m o r t g a g e d e e d .
This wasopposed by the C omplainant in his Written Statement wherein he
c l a i m e d t h a t t h e document is sham and nominal.In the mean while in OS No. 87/85 Court ordered for
payment of deficit Court fee undersec. 24 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation
Act. The Complainantalleges that the Respondent was negligent in conducting the case and did not
inform theComplainant regarding any progress of the case as a result of which the order
of theC o u r t f o r p a y m e n t o f d e f i c i t C o u r t f e e c o u l d n o t b e c o m p l i e d w i t h . T h i s
resulted
inr e j e c t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t . E v e n t h i s w a s n o t i n t i m a t e d t o t h e C o m p l
a i n a n t b y t h e Respondent. The Complainant further alleges that there was no negligence on his
partand he regularly kept in touch with the Respondent-Advocate and asked him about thestages of
both the suits. However, he did not get true reply from the Respondent. On23.9.1991 he
came to know from some other persons that OS No. 87/85 was
dismissedl o n g b a c k , o n 1 5 . 4 . 1 9 8 6 , a n d t h a t O S N o . 8 9 / 8 5 w a s
a l l o w e d . O n v e r i f i c a t i o n , t h e Complainant found the rumours true. On 24.9.1991 the
Complainant met Respondent-Advocate and requested him to return the papers of both suits with a
“no objection” toengage another Advocate.

D.C. of B.C.I. found no reason to differ with the order and reasons of the D.C. of
S.B.C.In the circumstances, the order passed by the S.B.C. was affirmed and the
appellant wasdirected to undergo.