Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

REGIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD
PHILIPPINE ASOCIATION OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS
Ground Floor, DOLE Building, Intramuros, Manila

OFFICE OF THE PANEL OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS:

HON. MVA CENON WESLEY P. GACUTAN, CHAIR
HON. MVA WALFREDO D. VILLASOR, MEMBER
HON MVA LEONARDO B. SAULOG, MEMBER

IN THE MATTER OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION

CASE BETWEEN:

JOSEFINO ASEO JIMENEZ, CASE NO.: MVA-086-RCMB-NCR-

Complainant, 403-07-09-2023

For: Permanent Total

Disability Benefits
---VERSUS--- and Damages

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC., NSC SHIPPING
GMBH & CIE KG (DOC HOLDER),
and MR. GERARDO A. BORROMEO,
Respondents.
X…………………………………X

COMPLAINANT’S
POSITION PAPER

COMPLAINANT JOSEFINO ASEO JIMENEZ, by and through

the undersigned counsel, to this Honorable Panel Maritime
Voluntary Arbitrators and, for sufficient causes of action,
respectfully states:

PREFATORY

1
 Loss of earning capacity is the controlling consideration in
determining disability compensation and not the medical
significance of the injury or illness as enunciated by the Supreme
Court in a litany of cases:

“Disability should not be understood more

on its medical significance but on the loss of
earning capacity. Permanent total disability means
disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he
was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any
kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainment could do. It does not mean absolute
helplessness.” (Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. v.
Penales, G.R. No. 162809, September 5, 2012)

xxx

“Total disability does not require that the

employee be completely disabled or totally
paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury
must be such that the employee cannot pursue
his or her usual work and earn from it. A total
disability is considered permanent if it last
continuously for more than 120 days”. (MAERSK
FILIPINAS CREWING INC., et al., vs. MESINA, G.R.
NO. 200837, 5 June 2013, citing FIL-STAR
MARITIME CORPORATION vs. ROSETE G.R. NO.
197680, 23 November 2011).

Xxxx

“Regarding the issue of compensability,

it has been the Court’s consistent ruling that in

2
 disability compensation, it is not the injury
which is compensated, but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of
one’s earning capacity.” (FIL-PRIDE SHIPPING
COMPANY INC., et al., vs. EDGAR A BALASTA
G.R. NO. 193047 March 3, 2014)

It is well to point out that in disability compensation, it is not

the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity
to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning
capacity. Total disability refers to an employee's inability to
perform his or her usual work. It does not require total paralysis or
complete helplessness. Permanent disability, on the other hand, is
a worker's inability to perform his job for more than 120 days or
240 days, if the seafarer required further medical attention
justifying the extension of the temporary total disability period,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body
(TEODORO vs. TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, G.R. no.
244721, February 5, 2020).

Here, Seafarer-Oiler JOSEFINO ASEO JIMENEZ (hereafter,

Josefino) has been working for more than twenty (20) years aboard
ATACAMA, the container vessel of the Respondents.

It is tragic that, on April 9, 2022, while in the course of his

latest employment contract and while working aboard the vessel
ATACAMA, Josefino has developed hernia, gastritis and gall bladder
stones.

3
 Verily, under this factual milieu, Josefino, under the law, is
undoubtedly entitled to permanent and total disability
compensation.

A review of applicable legal principles in labor cases is well in

order to resolve the present claim.

It is well to point out that in disability compensation, "it is not

the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to
work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."1

Fil-Star Maritime Corp. v. Rosete2 formulated the classic

definition of what constitutes total disability.

Thusly:

Total disability refers to an employee's inability

to perform his or her usual work. It does not require
total paralysis or complete helplessness.

Permanent disability, on the other hand, is a

worker's inability to perform his or her job for more
than 120 days, or 240 days if the seafarer required
further medical attention justifying the extension of
the temporary total disability period, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his
body.3

1
Please see the Supreme Court Decisions in Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, 521 Phil. 330, 347
(2006) [Per J. Puno, Second Division) citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, 405 Phil. 487 (2001) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].

2
677 Phil. 262 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

3
Kindly see Sunit v. OSM Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 223035, February 27, 2017 <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/february2017/223035.pdf > [Per J.
Velasco, Third Division). See also Fair Shipping Corp. v. Medel, 693 Phil. 516 (2012) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First
Division].

4
 Conversely, it might not be amiss to state that, too,
in Belchem Philippines, Inc. v. Zafra, Jr.,4 the Supreme Court
held that:

[P]ermanent partial disability presupposes a

seafarer's fitness to resume sea duties before the
end of the 120/240-day medical treatment period
despite the injuries sustained. The premise is that
such partial injuries did not disable a seafarer to
earn wages in the same kind of work or similar
nature for which he was trained.5

We hasten to add that settled is the rule that for illness or

injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the
employment be the sole and only reason for the injury and disability
suffered by the seafarer.

Thus, in David v. OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc., the

high court did not mince words holding as follows:

It is sufficient that there is a reasonable

linkage between the disease, ailment or injury
suffered by the employee and his work to lead a
rational mind to conclude that his work may have
contributed to the establishment or, at the very
least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he
might have had.6

4
759 Phil. 514 (2015).
5
Same Case citation at page 526 thereof.
6
David v. OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc., G.R. NO. 197205, September 26, 2012, citing Nisda v. Sea Serve
Maritime Agency, G.R. NO. 179177, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 668, 699; NYK-Fil Ship Management v. Talavera, G.R.
NO. 175894, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 183, 198.

5
 Here, Complainant suffers permanent total disability. The
Company doctors and the private specialists of choice having
unanimity that Josefino has hernia, gastritis and gallbladder
stones.

THE PARTIES TO THE CASE

Complainant JOSEFINO ASEO JIMENEZ is of legal age, a

Filipino Citizen and with residence address at 023 Everlasting St.,
Farmers Village, Bagbag II, Rosario, Cavite, Philippines.

Notices, orders, resolutions and all other processes issued by

this Honorable Office may be validly served to Complainant through
his counsel of record, A.M. BURIGSAY LAW OFFICE AND
ASSOCIATES, which holds office at Room 310, Third Floor, Trinity
Building, T.M. Kalaw Avenue, Ermita, Manila.

Respondent NSC SHIPPING GMBH & CIE KG (DOC

HOLDER)., the foreign principal, is the employer of Complainant
holding offshore office at Hamburg, Germany.

Respondent PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS is a

local recruitment agency and holds office at Bagtikan St., San
Antonio Village, Makati City.

6
 Respondent Corporation President/Manager MR. GERARDO
A. BORROMEO, is of legal age, a Filipino Citizen and with the same
office address as that of Respondent PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS.

THE FACTS

The following material antecedents transpired before the filing of

the Complaint with NTA7:

1. Complainant JOSEFINO JIMENEZ, per latest Contract of

Employment executed on March 17, 2022 8, was employed as
OILER on board ATACAMA, a container vessel with port of
registry at Liberia and belonging to the Respondent Foreign
Principal.

2. Prior to his latest contract, Josefino has been continuously

working aboard the vessel of the Respondents for more than
20 years.

3. Thus, at the age of 56, Josefino inked a fresh employment

contract with the Respondents.

4. The employment is supported by a Philippine Overseas

Employment Agency (POEA)-approved CONTRACT OF

7
Notice To Arbitrate.
8
POEA-validated on March 24, 2022.

7
 EMPLOYMENT (attached hereto as ANNEX A and made an
integral part of this Position Paper) embodying the Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels and stating in
particular the terms of Complainant’s employment.

5. As indicated in the Contract, the employment was further

covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement, referred to as
IMEC-IBF VER.DI (hereafter, CBA for brevity and marked as
ANNEXES B and SERIES hereof).

6. Prior to joining the vessel, ATACAMA, Complainant underwent

a very comprehensive pre-employment medical examination
(PEME) at the Respondents’ accredited clinic and was declared
FIT FOR SEA SERVICE.

7. Subsequently, on April 1, 2022, he was then deployed and

joined the assigned vessel, working thereat as OILER.

8. The OILER is a licensed member of the engine department of a

merchant ship as per Section A-III/6 of the STCW Code. He
manages a key role in the Senior Management Team and
reports directly to the Chief Engineer.He is normally on call 24
hours a day and generally work a daily shift carrying out
maintenance, repairs, diagnosis, installations and testing.

9. As oiler, Complainant’s work requires sheer physical labor

and performs maintenance and demands that he is in tip-top
shape.

8
 10. Cut to the chase, Complainant’s job demands a lot of
physical energy as he is subjected to the daily tasks of
carrying, lifting and pulling heavy equipment as well as heavy
provisions, carrying and transferring cargo provisions, as well
as activities requiring prolonged standing, walking, repetitive
bending and similar strenuous actions. He is, without doubt,
therefore constantly subjected to prolonged bone and muscle
strains as well as mental stress.

11. Thus, while in the employment of the Respondents, the

Complainant was constantly exposed to toxic and carcinogenic
chemicals as the vessel specialized in the transport of chemicals.
Needles to state, Josefino was exposed to physical, psychological
and chronic stress.

12. Additionally, his dietary provisions did not help his

health condition. For 20 years being aboard the Respondents’
vessel, Complainant’s daily fare has been a consistent mix of high
cholesterol, fatty foods and low-fiber foods.

13. The material dates leading to Complainant’s illness and

affliction are unmistakable.

14. In the course of the voyage of the container vessel

“ATACAMA” and on April 9, 2022, Complainant, while working
aboard as oiler, suddenly felt acute epigastric pain radiating from
the right lower quadrant of his abdomen which gave him difficulty
from moving well.

9
 15. Initially, he tried to ignore the pain and was given mere
pain relievers but it became progressively worse as days passed
until he can no longer work with ease. The pain he felt started to
radiate even from his right leg severely limiting his movements.

16. Naturally, the Complainant went to the ship captain and

master to complain of his painful condition which already prevents
him from performing his work.

17. He was diagnosed of hernia, gastritis and gallstones at

Cape Town Hospital, South Africa. Appended herewith as ANNEXES
C and SERIES are the medical reports of the shore side physician
at Buenos Aires, Argentina.

18. The foreign physician advised Respondents of Josefino’s

immediate repatriation to the Philippines and declared him UNFIT
to further resume his duties aboard ATACAMA.

19. Josefino complied with the POEA_SEC three-day

reportorial requirement presenting himself to the Respondents
within three days after his date of arrival in the Philippines on April
16, 2022.

20. Thereafter, he was referred to a medical facility 9 approved

by the Respondents where he was admitted and treated for a
lengthy period covering more than four (4)months.

9
Marine medical Services, Manila Doctors Hospital at Manila City.

10
 21. On August 16, 2022, a Certificate of Final Assessment
(ANNEX D) by the senior medical coordinator and
gastroenterologist, DR. JAMES MONTESA, at SHIPHEALTH was
issued certifying Josefino as FIT-TO-WORK and certifying that his
esophagitis, umbilical hernia, gallstones and gastritis have all been
resolved with the following cryptic observation:

“With no further medical intervention

warranted at that time, Mr. Jimenez was
deemed “maximally medically improved
and was cleared for the condition referred
by General Surgery service.”

22. Likewise, the Medical Abstract and Laboratory Results

(ANNEX E AND SERIES) are issued detailing the treatment of
Josefino and indicating that after his follow-up consultations with
the company physician, he was prescribed and directed to continue
with take home medications.

23. Presently, he is taking home medications.

24. Notwithstanding the medical intervention provided by the

Respondents’ health facility and provider at Manila Doctors
Hospital Complainant remains incapacitated to work.

25. His ability, therefore, to work as a seafarer is ineluctably

compromised, rendering him totally and permanently UNFIT
to work.

11
26. For this reason, Complainant respectfully asked
Respondents for Permanent Total Disability Benefits under the
applicable CBA, IBF-IMEC CBA.

27. Sadly, months after his repatriation, the Complainant’s

treatment abruptly came to a halt. This cessation is despite
the fact that the Complainant still suffers persistent and acute
pain. More pain is felt whenever he exerts effort.

28. Moreover, the Complainant was not even told the status
of his illness. He was only told to wait for the call of the
Respondents which call never came.

29. Left with no choice but to tend to his medical needs and
notwithstanding the declaration of the company doctor he
sought the opinion of DR. FELIX TERENCIO.

30. Despite the declarations of the company doctor, DR.

TERENCIO made contrary findings inconsistent with the views
of the company-physician. Dr. Terencio States in his SECOND
Medical Report (ANNEX F AND SERIES) that Complainant is
totally UNFIT to work as a seaman in any capacity. This is
clear from his report:

“At present [Josefino] is still

experiencing occasional abdominal pain
and bloated stomach after eating
meals. He is also experiencing pain in
the umbilical area upon straining or
12
 lifting heavy objects. With his current
condition, he will be having difficulty
in coping up with the demands of his
present work and therefore is not fit to
be deployed as a seafarer.”

[sgd.] Felix T. Terencio, M.D.

31. Such disability assessment could be easily gleaned from

the DISABILITY REPORT (Hereafter, SECOND MEDICAL
REPORT) dated November 22, 2022 where it was categorically
stated that “he will be having difficulty in coping up with
the demands of his present work and therefore is not fit
to be deployed as a seafarer.”

32. In view of the above findings and assessments of his

physician of choice and Complainant’s mounting concern that
he will be refused payment by the Respondents of what is due
to him as work-related benefits emboldened him to consult as
he did consult his counsel, ATTY. ARNOLD M. BURIGSAY.

33. Upon learning of Complainant’s sorry plight, said

counsel, on October 14, 2022, wrote a GRIEVANCE LETTER
(marked as ANNEX G of this Position Paper, as well as the
LBC receipt which is likewise marked as ANNEX G-1 of this
Position Paper) to Respondent Borromeo requesting for an
October 28, 2022 grievance conference.

34. Another LETTER (ANNEX H and H-1) dated December 5,

2022, along with the SECOND MEDICAL REPORT and
13
 demanding for a third doctor referral to confirm that
Complainant indeed suffers from TOTAL PERMANENT
DISABILITY was sent to Respondents.

35. Unfortunately, no amicable settlement was reached

between the parties during the grievance conference.

36. Complainant has no recourse but to file a formal claim

via a Notice To Arbitrate (ANNEX I, hereof) before the NCMB
through RCMB, Manila.

37. Records of the repeated mandatory conferences’ hearings

would readily show that the Parties ultimately failed to agree
on the parameters for securing a Third Doctor’s Medical
Opinion in the face of the numerous conditions proposed by
the Respondents.

38. Hence, this Position Paper for Complainant JOSEFINO

JIMENEZ.

THE ISSUE

The threshold issue in the present case is whether

JOSEFINO's illnesses and resulting permanent total disability is
compensable.

14
 On this score, Complainant can only answer in the affirmative.

ARGUMENTS,
DISQUISITION AND CONFABULATION

Josefino’s unresolved
esophagitis, umbilical hernia,
gallstones and gastritis is a
compensable work-related
illness.

We respectfully submit that Josefino suffers from Permanent

Total Disability by reason of unresolved esophagitis, umbilical
hernia, gallstones and gastritis and that he is very much
entitled to Permanent Total Disability Benefits as per CBA
provisions on disability compensation by reason of work-
aggravation.

Too, it is likewise respectfully submitted that Damages and

Attorneys’ Fees are recoverable as part of the judgment award.

Respondents argue that the unresolved esophagitis,

umbilical hernia, gallstones and gastritis is not compensable
because they have been “maximally medically improved”. Too, they
contend that he is now FIT-TO-WORK.

15
 We respectfully beg to disagree.

Verily, Josefino has established that his ailments, or, at the

very least, the aggravation thereof, was work-related. That it arose
from his 25 years of work as oiler of ATACAMA and from nowhere
else.

Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contract

provides for the conditions that must be established for the illness
to be a compensable occupational disease, to wit:

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or

death to be compensable, all the following conditions must be
established:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risk described herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's
exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer.

The Supreme Court has held that under Section 32-A of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract, abdominal ailments and
hernia are considered a work-related diseases. The Court explained
that the seaman is entitled to disability benefits if the seaman

16
proves that the conditions inside the vessel increased or aggravated
the risk of the seaman of his ailments.

In one analogous case10, it was held thus:

Colon cancer, also known as colorectal cancer

or large bowel cancer, includes cancerous
growths in the colon, rectum and appendix.
With 655,000 deaths worldwide per year, it is
the fifth most common form of cancer in the
United States of America and the third leading
cause of cancer-related deaths in the Western
World. Colorectal cancers arise from
adenomatous polyps in the colon. These
mushroom-shaped growths are usually
benign, but some develop into cancer over
time. Localized colon cancer is usually
diagnosed through colonoscopy.

Tumors of the colon and rectum are growths

arising from the inner wall of the large
intestine. Benign tumors of the large intestine
are called polyps. Malignant tumors of the
large intestine are called cancers. Benign
polyps can be easily removed during
colonoscopy and are not life-threatening. If
benign polyps are not removed from the large
intestine, they can become malignant
(cancerous) over time. Most of the cancers of
the large intestine are believed to have
developed as polyps. Colorectal cancer can
invade and damage adjacent tissues and
organs. Cancer cells can also break away and
spread to other parts of the body (such as
liver and lungs) where new tumors form. The
spread of colon cancer to distant organs is
called metastasis of the colon cancer. Once

10
628 Phil. 81 (2010).

17
metastasis has occurred in colorectal cancer,
a complete cure of the cancer is unlikely.

Globally, colorectal cancer is the third leading

cause of cancer in males and the fourth
leading cause of cancer in females. The
frequency of colorectal cancer varies around
the world. It is common in the Western world
and is rare in Asia and in Africa. In countries
where the people have adopted western diets,
the incidence of colorectal cancer is
increasing.

Factors that increase a person's risk of

colorectal cancer include high fat intake, a
family history of colorectal cancer and polyps,
the presence of polyps in the large intestine,
and chronic ulcerative colitis.

Diets high in fat are believed to predispose

humans to colorectal cancer. In countries
with high colorectal cancer rates, the fat
intake by the population is much higher
than in countries with low cancer rates. It
is believed that the breakdown products of
fat metabolism lead to the formation of
cancer-causing chemicals (carcinogens).
Diets high in vegetables and high-fiber
foods may rid the bowel of these
carcinogens and help reduce the risk of
cancer.

A person's genetic background is an

important factor in colon cancer risk. Among
first-degree relatives of colon-cancer patients,
the lifetime risk of developing colon cancer is
18%. Even though family history of colon
cancer is an important risk factor, majority
(80%) of colon cancers occur sporadically in
patients with no family history of it.
Approximately 20% of cancers are associated
with a family history of colon cancer. And 5%
of colon cancers are due to hereditary colon
18
 cancer syndromes. Hereditary colon cancer
syndromes are disorders where affected family
members have inherited cancer-causing
genetic defects from one or both of the
parents.

In the case of Villamater, it is manifest that

the interplay of age, hereditary, and dietary
factors contributed to the development of
colon cancer. By the time he signed his
employment contract on June 4, 2002, he was
already 58 years old, having been born on
October 5, 1943, an age at which the
incidence of colon cancer is more likely. He
had a familial history of colon cancer, with a
brother who succumbed to death and an
uncle who underwent surgery for the same
illness. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
found his illness to be compensable for
permanent and total disability, because they
found that his dietary provisions while at sea
increased his risk of contracting colon cancer
because he had no choice of what to eat on
board except those provided on the vessels
and these consisted mainly of high-fat, high-
cholesterol, and low-fiber foods.

On these points, it was sufficiently shown that Josefino having

contracted his ailments was, at the very least, aggravated by his
working conditions, and, most significantly, his fatty dietary
provisions aboard the ship ATACAMA..

In Villamater, the Supreme Court ruled that the dietary

provisions which were high in fat and cholesterol given to the seaman
while on duty increased or aggravated the seaman's risk of
contracting esophagitis, hernia, gastritis and gallstones.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court considered such ailments as

19
compensable work-related diseases and granted full disability
benefits to the seaman.

Likewise, in Dohle-Pilman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Heirs of

Andres G. Gazzingan,11 the Supreme Court granted full disability
benefits to a seaman who proved that the conditions on board the
vessel aggravated his illness, thus:

Indeed, the causal connection between the

illness contracted and the nature of work of a
seaman is a factual question, which is not a
proper subject of this Court's review.
Nonetheless, considering the conflicting
findings of the tribunals below, this Court is
constrained to dwell on factual matters
involved in this case and reassess the evidence
on record. Gazzingan's work as a messman is
not confined mainly to serving food and
beverages to all officers and crew; he was
likewise tasked to assist the chief cook/chef
steward, and thus performed most if not all
the duties in the ship's steward department. In
the performance of his duties, he is bound to
suffer chest and back pains, which could have
caused or aggravated his illness. As aptly
observed by the CA, Gazzingan's strenuous
duties caused him to suffer physical stress
which exposed him to injuries. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that Gazzingan's
11
760 Phil. 861 (2015).

20
employment has contributed to some degree to
the development of his disease.

It must also be pointed out that Gazzingan

was in good health and fit to work when he
was engaged by petitioners to work on board
the vessel M/V Gloria.1âшphi1 His PEME
showed essentially normal findings with no
hypertension and without any heart problems.
It was only while rendering duty that he
experienced symptoms. This is supported by a
medical report issued by Cartagena de Indias
Hospital in Colombia stating that Gazzingan
suffered intense chest and back pains,
shortness of breath and a slightly elevated
blood pressure while performing his duties.
Therefore, even assuming that Gazzingan had
a pre-existing condition, as alleged by
petitioners, this does not totally negate the
probability and the possibility that his aortic
dissection was aggravated by his work
conditions. The stress caused by his job
actively contributed to the progression and
aggravation of his illness. In compensation
cases, "[i]t is sufficient that there is a
reasonable linkage between the disease
suffered by the employee and his work to lead
a rational mind to conclude that his work may
have contributed to the establishment or, at
the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing
condition he might have had."

21
 Notably, in Dohle-Pilman Manning Agency, Inc., it has been
ruled that illnesses which are either: (1) acquired by the seaman on
board the vessel; or (2) resulting from a pre-existing condition of the
seaman which is aggravated by the conditions on board the vessel
are compensable work-related diseases.

In a recent case, in Talosig v. United Philippine Lines,

Inc.,12 the Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in Villamater, and
held that, following Section 32-A of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract, the seaman must prove through substantial
evidence the presence of the conditions that aggravated the
seaman's risk of ailments.

Accordingly, we disagree with Respondents’ legal stance that

the ailments and the resulting disability are not compensable.

Clearly, the POEA Standard Employment Contract only

requires that the conditions mentioned in Section 32-A thereof be
established to prove that the occupational disease is work-related.
Illnesses like colon cancer, acquired or aggravated while on duty on
board the vessel, which were caused by the conditions on board the
vessel, are also considered work-related if the acquisition or
aggravation of the illnesses is proven by the seaman through
substantial evidence. Therefore, applying the decisions of the
Supreme Court, colon cancer is a compensable work-related disease
if the seaman is able to establish the conditions under Section 32-A

12
739 Phil. 774 (2014).

22
of the POEA Standard Employment Contract through the required
quantum of proof of substantial evidence.

The seaman, thus, must prove that the conditions aboard the
vessel increased, aggravated, or elevated the seaman's risk of colon
cancer for the occupational disease to be compensable.

Disability claims cases are not so unique that each case is

resolved on varying standards and rules. They are resolved under
uniform and well-delineated legal principles and rules culled from
statutes as well as those enunciated in salutary decisions that the
Court deigns not to disturb or alter later on.

Disability claims are determined by law, the contracts and the

medical findings. To take a leaf from the Court’s myriad decisions,
the entitlement or, conversely, the non-entitlement, of a seafarer to
disability claims is not only governed by the medical findings, but
by law (the Labor Code) and the terms of the contract executed
between and among them: the POEA-SEC by incorporation 13 to the
actual contract, the Contract of Employment, Employment
Agreements, and, last but not the least, the Collective Bargaining

13
That all provisions of the POEA-SEC are standard and deemed integral part of any contract of employment
binding the parties to at least comply with barest minimum terms and conditions deemed acceptable by law, and
case law and as updated by timely revisions made by the regulatory body, the POEA-SEC. This is to ensure that the
minimum terms and standards for all contract of employment, minimum labor standards and terms of
employment, are adhered to by the parties to the contract and, obviously, on the consideration and concern that
the worker is not put into disadvantage. The Court has aptly stated:

Laws are deemed incorporated in employment

contracts and the contracting parties need not repeat
them. They do not even have to be referred to. Every
contract, thus, contains not only what has been
explicitly stipulated, but also the statutory provisions
that have any bearing on the matter.

23
Agreement, if there is any in effect and governing the parties in the
course of the employment.

Another fundamental legal truism is the principle that

disability compensation put less importance and less understood
on the medical significance of the injury or ailment, and more on
the legal signification of the resulting disability: that, henceforth,
the claimant’s resulting disability impacts and impairs his capacity
to earn a gainful work, work that is customary for him and which
he is accustomed to doing before the disability transpired and,
necessarily, it involves such works which the seafarer-claimant has
been trained for.

Courts and labor tribunals are not bound by the medical

findings of the company physician such that the repetitive
arguments of manning agencies that the company-designated
physician is more controlling than any other medical findings has
become passé. The more correct rule is that the courts and labor
tribunals are not bound by the medical findings because they are
ordained to look and inquire as to the real condition of the seafarer.
In which case, the rule of thumb is to delve and weigh the inherent
merits of the contentious medical opinions. They are to be
appraised based on their inherent merits.

The rules require that the medical assessment must be final,

complete and definitive and, as currently stands, adhere to the
120/240 window evolved in Kestrel and Vergara and the twin
requirements in Dario Carcedo vs Maine Marine. Failure and
shortcomings from any of the foregoing requirements, perforce, the
law is deemed to effectively step in to fill the void, characterizing
whatever disability that the seafarer has, into one that is Permanent

24
and Total. The requirements are deemed built-in safeguards to
dissuade a situation where the company doctor can simply defeat
the claims if the time to issue when is entirely dependent on him. In
which case, the doctor may just simply sit back idly and issue no
medical report at all, all the while putting the seafarer to an
interminable waiting game.

The seafarer has the statutory and substantial right to contest

the findings and he may seek a second opinion from a specialist of
his own choosing. In such classic impasse, where the first clash
with the second, the seafarer is obliged to contest anew the first
medical report by initiating the third doctor process in the hope
that the third opinion will confirm the second medical opinion.

Where the third medical opinion did not come about due to the
failure of the claimant to initiate one, the courts are bound to
uphold the first medical opinion.

Even if the claimant failed to seek a third opinion, the court

may not uphold the first medical opinion simply as the gospel truth.
Where it is attended by apparent bias, where the conclusions are
unsupported, or when the findings are sham and merely intended
to co-opt the wishes of the employer, there is no rule forbidding the
court or tribunal from junking the first medical opinion, and, on the
basis of the inherent merits, upheld the opinion of the private
specialist.

25
Entitlement to Disability Benefits

A contract is the law between the parties, which in this case

are the CBA and the POEA-SEC. The CBA contains the following
pertinent medical and disability provisions:

“A seafarer who suffers permanent disability but

excluding permanent disability due to wilful acts,
shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to
compensation according to the provisions of this
Agreement.”

Based on the CBA, there are three instances when a

seafarer may be entitled to 100% disability
compensation. These are: (1) when the seafarer is
declared to have suffered 100% disability; (2) when
the seafarer is assessed with disability of at least
50%; and (3) when the seafarer, while assessed at
below 50% disability, is certified as permanently
unfit for sea service.

According to the CBA, both the disability assessment and the

certification as permanently unfit for sea service are to be given by
the company-designated physician. Under the the provisions of
the POEA_SEC, necessarily read into the contract, these can be
overruled by a third doctor jointly appointed by the company
and the union, in the event that the seafarer’s personal
physician disagrees with the evaluations of the company-
designated physician.

26
 Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides a similar
mechanism for determining the disability assessment.

However, it is not only the contract between the parties that

governs the determination of the disability compensation due the
seafarer. The Court has ruled that the provisions on disability of the
Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation
(AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code are
applicable to the case of seafarers.

In Remigio v. NLRC,14 the Court held:

The standard employment contract for

seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant
to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to “secure the
best terms and conditions of employment of
Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance
therewith” and to “promote and protect the well-
being of Filipino workers overseas.” Section 29 of
the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that “[a]ll
rights and obligations of the parties to [the]
Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be
governed by the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, international conventions, treaties
and covenants where the Philippines is a
signatory.” Even without this provision, a
contract of labor is so impressed with public
interest that the New Civil Code expressly
subjects it to “the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of
labor and similar subjects.”

Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of

permanent total disability to the case of seafarers.

14
521 Phil. 330 (2006).

27
 In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, seaman
Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart
failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by
the company-accredited physician.

The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the

seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v. CA, and Bejerano v. ECC that
"disability should not be understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of earning capacity.

Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee

to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature
that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of
work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It
does not mean absolute helplessness.

It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a disability

compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather
it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s
earning capacity.15

The pertinent Labor Code provision is found in Article 192(c)

(1), Chapter VI, Title II, Book IV:

Art. 192. Permanent and total disability.

xxxx
15
521 Phil. 330 (2006).

28
 (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed
total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting

continuously for more than one hundred twenty
days, except as otherwise provided for in the
Rules[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The corresponding provision in the AREC is Section 2(b) of

Rule VII which reads:

SECTION 2. Disability. x x x

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result

of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to
perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise
provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (Emphasis
supplied)

The above rule pertains to Section 2, Rule X of the AREC:

SECTION 2. Period of entitlement. (a) The

income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first
day of such disability. If caused by an injury or
sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120
consecutive days except where such injury or
sickness still requires medical attendance
beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days
from onset of disability in which case benefit for
temporary total disability shall be paid. However,
the System may declare the total and permanent
status at any time after 120 days of continuous
temporary total disability as may be warranted
by the degree of actual loss or impairment of
physical or mental functions as determined by
the System. (Emphasis supplied)

29
 These provisions, in conjunction with Section 20(B)(3) of the
POEA-SEC, were interpreted in the case of Vergara v. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc.16 thus:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon

sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three (3) days from
arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration
of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days,
the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is
totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage
during this period until he is declared fit to work or
his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally,
as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine
laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded
and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then
the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject
to the right of the employer to declare within
this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of
course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical
condition.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, a partial and permanent disability could, by legal

contemplation, become total and permanent.

The Court could have not been way clearer on this point
in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar18 which held that the
declaration by the company-designated physician is an obligation,
the abdication of which transforms the temporary total disability to
permanent total disability, regardless of the disability grade, viz:

16
588 Phil. 895 (2008).
17
588 Phil. 895 (2008).
18
G.R. No. 198501, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 795.

30
 Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only
those injuries or disabilities that are classified as
Grade 1 may be considered as total and
permanent. However, if those injuries or
disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14,
hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate
a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties
for a period of more than 120 or 240 days,
depending on the need for further medical
treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation,
totally and permanently disabled. In other words,
an impediment should be characterized as partial
and permanent not only under the Schedule of
Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC
but should be so under the relevant provisions of
the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on
Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing
Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. That while
the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is
not precluded from earning doing the same work
he had before his injury or disability or that he is
accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his
illness or injury prevents him from engaging in
gainful employment for more than 120 or 240
days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed
totally and permanently disabled.

Moreover, the company-designated physician is

expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the
seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability
within the period of 120 or 240 days. That
should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s medical
condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall
be deemed totally and permanently
disabled. (Emphasis supplied)
19

The duty of the company-designated physician to issue a final

and definitive assessment of the seafarer's disability within the
prescribed periods is imperative. His failure to do so will render his
findings nugatory and transform the disability suffered by the
seafarer to one that is permanent and total.

19
G.R. No. 198501, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 795.

31
 As explained by the Court in Pelagio v. Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc:20

Otherwise stated, the company-designated physician

is required to issue a final and definite
assessment of the seafarer's disability rating within
the aforesaid 120/240-day period; otherwise, the
opinions of the company-designated and the
independent physicians are rendered
irrelevant because the seafarer is already
conclusively presumed to be suffering from a
permanent and total disability, and thus, is entitled
to the benefits corresponding thereto.

Similarly, in Olidana v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.,21 the Court

declared as follows:

x x x The Court in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v.

Munar, held that the declaration by the company-
designated physician is an obligation, the abdication
of which transforms the temporary total disability to
permanent total disability, regardless of the
disability grade, viz.:
Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only
those injuries or disabilities that are classified as
Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent.
However, if those injuries or disabilities with a
disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and
permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from
performing his usual sea duties for a period of more
than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for
further medical treatment, then he is, under legal
contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. In
other words, an impediment should be characterized
as partial and permanent not only under the
Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the
POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant
provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules
on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing
Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. That while the
seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is not
precluded from earning doing the same work he had
before his injury or disability or that he is
accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness
or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful
20
G.R. No. 231773, March 11, 2019.
21
722 Phil. 234 (2015).

32
 employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the
case may be, he shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.

Moreover, the company-designated physician is

expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the
seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability
within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he
fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition
remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed
totally and permanently disabled.22

Here, JOSEFINO was seen as outpatient for a

period of MORE THAN 120 DAYS without
sufficient justification to extend the period,
the company doctors having done no
significant action but merely going through
the motions. No definitive, complete and final
assessment was given, furnished and
explained to him. The purported letter-
assessment was merely “attentioned” to him.

Applying the foregoing rules in the present case, the company-

designated physician was unable to timely issue a final assessment.
We cannot simply agree that the haphazardly issued Certificate of
Final Assessment made by the company-designated doctor, is the
Medical Report that is definitive, complete and final as
contemplated by the rules.

To our mind, the said disability assessment was an interim one

because Josefino, in fact continued to require medical treatments
and management that extended even after his treatment with the
hospital and that he was still being examined way beyond six
months after repatriation.

22
Id. at 251.

33
 Verily, he was certainly still under total disability at that time
and, even at present, he has not been able to resume seafaring
work of any kind.

We can all easily agree that his disability is a Permanent Total

Disability. Despite his medical treatment at the hands of the
company physicians, the treatment and take-home medications
extended to beyond six months from repatriation. Certainly, the
unfitness and continuing disability is clear and apparent. No
amount of legal sophistry could controvert this point.

Indeed, the schedule of disabilities in the CBA, if there is one,

or the POEA-SEC, should be the primary basis for the
determination of a seafarer’s degree of disability. However, the
POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot be read in isolation from the
Labor Code and the AREC. Otherwise, the disability rating of
the seafarer will be completely at the mercy of the company-
designated physician, without redress, should the latter fail
or refuse to give one.

Here, the company-designated physician failed to give a

definitive assessment on the disability beyond the extended
temporary disability period, after the 120-day period but less than
240 days. There was no Medical Certificate stating a disability or fit
to work assessment and, most importantly, duly explained to the
complainant. In the absence of a medical report that is definitive
and final as required by law, the disability, to all intents and
purposes has become permanent and total.

34
 By operation of law, therefore, Josefino’s total and temporary
disability lapsed into a total and permanent disability. 23

Josefino cannot resume his customary work as he was

rendered ineffective and forbidden to carry strenuous and
physical hard work due to his ailments.

He cannot work effectively and without extreme discomfort

as his condition leaves him vulnerable.

Says Dr. Terencio:

“At present [Josefino] is still

experiencing occasional abdominal pain
and bloated stomach after eating
meals. He is also experiencing pain in
the umbilical area upon straining or
lifting heavy objects. With his current
condition, he will be having difficulty
in coping up with the demands of his
present work and therefore is not fit to
be deployed as a seafarer.”

[sgd.] Felix T. Terencio, M.D.

In C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok,24 the Court

held:
23
Libang v. Indochina Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 189863, 17 September 2014.
24
G.R. No. 193679, 18 July 2012, 677 SCRA 296.

35
 Based on this Court’s pronouncements in Vergara, it
is easily discernible that the 120-day or 240-day
period and the obligations the law imposed on the
employer are determinative of when a seafarer’s
cause of action for total and permanent disability
may be considered to have arisen. Thus, a seafarer
may pursue an action for total and permanent
disability benefits if: (a) the company-designated
physician failed to issue a declaration as to his
fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after
the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no
indication that further medical treatment would
address his temporary total disability, hence, justify
an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days
had lapsed without any certification being issued by
the company-designated physician; (c) the company-
designated physician declared that he is fit for sea
duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the
case may be, but his physician of choice and the
doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-
SEC are of a contrary opinion; (d) the company-
designated physician acknowledged that he is
partially permanently disabled but other doctors
who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his
employer, believed that his disability is not only
permanent but total as well; (e) the company-
designated physician recognized that he is totally
and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on
the disability grading; (f) the company-designated
physician determined that his medical condition is
not compensable or work-related under the POEA-
SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor
selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC
found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g)
the company-designated physician declared him
totally and permanently disabled but the employer
refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits;
and (h) the company-designated physician
declared him partially and permanently disabled
within the 120-day or 240-day period but he
remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea
duties after the lapse of the said
periods. (Emphasis supplied)
45

Clearly, whatever assessment made by the company

doctor is an interim one. Not that final and definitive declaration
required by law.

36
 In fine, no sane and enterprising shipping company would ever
hire Complainant, by reason of his very disabling and debilitating
conditions.

Clearly, on the inherent merits of the clashing medical

opinions, that of Dr. Terencio stands out. Indeed, Josefino
continues to suffer to this very day a Permanent and Total
Disability and, by all means, he is entitled to the allowable
maximum benefits under the prevailing CBA.

Disability Compensation as Per CBA Provisions

There is no quarrel that the disability is clear and

apparent. Based on the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully
submitted that Josefino is entitled to full disability compensation.

Cut to the chase, it taxes credulity and it is improbable to

expect him to resume seafaring work, especially in the rigorous and
strenuous activities with his present condition.

As such, he is entitled to the maximum amount indicated

under the overriding provisions of the beneficent CBA.

Crystal, the presumption of compensability therefore stands in

the instant case.

37
 Of vital significance, although the employer is not the insurer
of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them
and assumes the risk of liability.25

The quantum of evidence required in labor cases to determine

the liability of an employer for the illness or injury suffered by an
employee under the POEA-SEC is not proof beyond reasonable
doubt but mere substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."26

The compensability and apparent permanent disability having

been established, the opinion of the company-designated doctor no
longer holds any particular significance. It is already idle to discuss
whether his views or those of the seafarer’s physician should carry
more weight, where it appears by the evidence that the colon cancer
and the resulting disability are, in fact, compensable as permanent
total disability.

Section 20 (B), paragraph (3) of the POEA-SEC provides that:

Section 20 (B)

COMPENSATION
AND BENEFITS
FOR INJURY
OR
ILLNESS

25
Fil-Star Maritime Corporation v. Rosete, G.R. No. 192686, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 247, 255, citing Seagull
Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, 388 Phil. 906, 914 (2000), citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v.
NLRC, 366 Phil. 646, 654-655 (1999).
26
David v. OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc., supra

38
 The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract are as follows:

x x x x

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical

treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessed by the company-
designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself

to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working
days upon his return except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written
notice to the agency within the same period is
deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to
comply with the mandatory reporting requirement
shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim
the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with

the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on
both parties. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Based on the afore-quoted provision, it is crystal clear that the

determination by the company-designated physician pertains only to
the entitlement of the seafarer to sickness allowance and nothing
more.

Moreover, the said provision recognizes the right of a seafarer

to seek a second medical opinion and the prerogative to consult a
physician of his choice.

39
 This is precisely a remedy that Josefino pursued when he
engaged the services of a private specialist and contested the
assessment of the company doctor which was never embodied in a
complete and definitive report. Let alone such report adequately
explained to him.

The POEA-SEC provisions should not be

construed that it is only the company-
designated physician who could assess the
condition and declare the disability of
seamen. The provision does not serve as a
limitation but rather a guarantee of
protection to overseas workers.

In fact, it allows a third opinion in case the seafarer’s doctor

disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated
physician. Therefore, the provision should not be construed that it is
only the company-designated physician who could assess the
condition and declare the disability of seamen. THE PROVISION
DOES NOT SERVE AS A LIMITATION BUT RATHER A GUARANTEE
OF PROTECTION TO OVERSEAS WORKERS.

Most apropos, the company doctor has committed abject

failure to issue a complete and definitive medical report and, in the
process, failing to give a clear assessment and fitness for seafaring
work of Josefino.

Verily, the law has already stepped in and whatever disability

Josefino had, has now been transformed to a permanent and total
one.

Without doubt, this is irrefutable from the records.

40
Moral and Exemplary Damages
and Attorney’s Fees

There is basis to award damages and attorney’s fees. The same

may be awarded as Respondents acted jointly and in concert, and
in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff’s plainly
valid, just and demandable claim.

Here Respondents acted in bad faith because they in fact

abandoned Complainant to deal on his own and with the resulting
inability to seek a gainful employment.

In closing, we borrow the words of the High Court in Philippine

Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, 405 Phil. 487, 495 (2001),
citing Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 376 Phil. 738, 749
(1999), viz:

“After all, the POEA-SEC is designed primarily

for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen
in the pursuit of their employment on board
ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must,
therefore, be construed and applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only
then can its beneficent provisions be fully
carried into effect.

In fine, this goes without even saying, we beseech this

Honorable Sole Arbitrator to please order the payment of

41
permanent total disability benefits rightly due to JOSEFINO
JIMENEZ, erstwhile OILER of MV ATACAMA, and in line with the
overriding and more beneficent provisions of the afore-stated
applicable and governing CBA.

PRAYER
FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEFS

WHEREFORE, BECAUSE OF THE FOREGOING

PREMISES, it is respectfully prayed that the Complainant’s claim
for TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS will now
please be GRANTED in favor of Complainant.

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby prayed that JUDGMENT be

rendered declaring Complainant as totally and permanently
disabled and herein Respondents be made to pay jointly and
severally the following amounts:

1. ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$

100,000.00) representing payment of Complainant’s
Total and Permanent Disability benefits,

2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php50,000.00) by way of

moral damages, and

3. TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total judgment award as

Attorneys’ Fees.

42
 OTHER RELIEFS, just and equitable under the premises, are
likewise prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12TH day of December

2023 at the City of Manila, Philippines.

A. M. BURIGSAY LAW OFFICE

& ASSOCIATES
Counsel for the complainant
Room 310, Trinity Building
Kalaw Avenue, Ermita,
Manila City

By:

ARNOLD M. BURIGSAY
IBP No. 260805 January 5, 2023
PTR NO. 0862689
January 4, 2023; Manila
Roll No. 43265
MCLE No. VII- 0028015
April 14, 2023; Pasig City
Tel No. 564-49-00/6646124
amburigsaylaw@gmail.com

Copy Furnished:

ATTY. ALTON C. DURBAN

Alchemy Unit G/F
Casa Baronesa
Building 86 Esteban Adaba St.,
Loyola Heights, Quezon City

EXPLANATION:

Due to distance and for lack of office personnel to effect

personal service, a copy of the foregoing POSITION PAPER was
served by registered mail to the respondents’ counsel.

43
ARNOLD M. BURIGSAY

44