REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

NASATAMA NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by
its President ARMANDO Q. CANLAS,
SR.,
Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. No. 256908

(CA-G.R. CV No. 161172)
(Civil Case No. M-PSG-16-03062-
SC-R00-00, RTC-Br. 161-Pasig City
Civil Case No. M-PSG-16-03062-SC,
Branch 68, MTC-Pasig City
SPS. NICOLAS V. LANON and
LIGAYA LANON,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

COMES NOW, Petitioner NASATAMA NEIGHBORHOOD

ASSOCIATION INC., herein duly represented by its President,
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, SR., by and through the undersigned counsel,
respectfully states:

I
Prefatory

1.1 In the seminal case of Supia and Batioco vs. Quitero and
1
Ayala , this honorable high court did not minces word when it says:

The answer is a mere statement of the facts which the

party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. If however
on trial, it should [later] appears that the action is not in fact for
the recovery of possession over the premises but to determine a
question of title, the court will have no authority to proceed and
the case must be dismissed. In other words, wherever the
question to be determined is one of title, it will oust the court of
jurisdiction.

1
59 PHIL REPORTS at page 312
 1.2 When it filed the Complaint before MTC, Branch 68 of Pasig
City, there is no dispute and it is crystal that Petitioner Association,
NASATAMA, INC., as per its prayer for affirmative reliefs in the
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, has as its sole object, the surrender
and restoration of its peaceable possession of and overa certain and
particular property situated and located at Manggahan, Pasig City.

1.3 It came to pass that the Honorable MTC, Branch 68 of Pasig

City has an entirely different take of the Complaint and the application
of the Rules as well, when it went on to rule that the issue of conflicting
ownership claims by the parties to the present case is interminably
linked and intertwined to the claim for restoration of possession being
prayed by Petitioner Association.

1.4 The Petitioner is now, therefore, before this Honorable

Court and pinning his last hopes on the awesome judicial power of
review which the Honorable Supreme Court wields over lower courts
even as Petitioner felt robbed of its property rights over the property at
Manggahan, Pasig City.

1.5 Petitioner Association wishes and desires that the

Honorable Supreme Court will please pass upon the several Decisions
and Resolutions either made by RTC Pasig or, subsequently, by the
Honorable Court of Appeals itself, all of which stem and find provenance
from the Decision first made and rendered by MTC, Branch 68 of Pasig
City.

1.6 Hence, on the grounds that the decisions and resolutions

issued by the three lower courts clearly smacks of reversible errors and
for simply not being in accord with the law, jurisprudence, and reality,
Petitioner-Plaintiff was constrained to institute this Petition For Review
on Certiorari.

II
Nature and Object of the Petition

2.1 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to the

provisions of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking a review of
the twin issuances of the Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
161172, to wit:
a) The DECISION of the Honorable Court of Appeals
promulgated on 11 December 2019 DISMISSING

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 Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Petition for Review filed before it,
and

b) The RESOLUTION of the Honorable Court of Appeals

denying and finding no merit to the Motion For
Reconsideration promulgated on 10 June 2021.

2.2 In issuing the above assailed DECISION and RESOLUTION,

the Honorable Public Respondent Court of Appeals committed various
REVERSIBLE AND EGREGIOUS ERRORS that are correctible by way of a
Petition For Review on Certiorari before thew Honorable Supreme
Court and such remedy is subsumed under the adjectival provisions and
rules under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules.

2.3 For starters, one of the decidedly pure questions of law

being raised in this Petition which needs to be resolved by the
Honorable Supreme Court is the propriety of the first level court’s legal
stance---on the mere say so and very loose claims of the Respondents-
Defendants in their Answer conveniently alleging and pleading
ownership as defense---to go beyond the issue of material possession
and hastily proceeded to resolve the issue of ownership.

2.4 In hastily asserting that there is a compelling need to

determine the perceived issue of ownership in a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer as a necessary incident to resolving the issue of who has better
and more superior possessory right over the property situated in
Manggahan, Pasig, the first level court, MeTC, Branch 68 of Pasig City
swallowed more than it can chew, practically threw out of the window
more than a hundred years of painstaking formulation of salutary case
law designed to withstand the test of time.

2.5 Fashioned by no less than the Honorable Supreme Court

through the years, the jaw and backbone of the present jurisprudence
on ejectment cases undoubtedly recognize a set of kindergarten legal
precepts forming part of the basic ground rules that a magistrate must
apply in resolving a complaint for unlawful detainer.

2.6 Skewing common sense and unabashedly displaying lack of

familiarity with well-entrenched jurisprudence involving unlawful
detainer cases, MTC 68 of Pasig City became too much of an eager
beaver, unfortunately forgot the truism that discretion is indeed the
better part of valor, went beyond the basic issue of material possession
and peremptorily resolved the issue of ownership and thereby, in the
process, appropriated for itself powers belonging only and exclusively
to courts of general jurisdiction.

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 2.7 In blunter terms, the first level court, MTC 68 of Pasig City
which knows too well that it is hearing not an accion publiciana but a
pretty basic and very unpretentious complaint for unlawful detainer
under the Rules on Summary Procedures, seemingly believed it is way
too much beneath the Court’s dignity to task and busy itself to such too
mundane things like resolving the issue of material possession.

2.8 Calling the shots and even as it is running under summary

rules and NOT under the regular rules, MTC 68 has somewhat starred
and willed itself to take the lead role in a classic tragi-comedy when it
proceeded to exceed its jurisdiction and casually took unto itself to
resolve, as it did resolve, at top and lightning speed, the very serious and
decidedly complex issue of ownership over the subject property
ultimately recognizing the herein Respondents-Defendants as the owner
of the property. Again, for emphasis, it is inconceivable that the
honorable court a quo, MTC 68 of Pasig City did all these on one fell
swoop and under Summary Rules and Summary Procedures milieu.

2.9 Thusly, we now felt an imperative need to ask this purely

rhetorical question: May the Defendants-Respondents mere plea of
ownership in their Answer warrants MTC 68 of Pasig City to lose
itself in the moment and display a knee-jerk reaction by
peremptorily, precipitately and hastily deeming that the
determination of who has the better and superior possessory right
between the parties necessarily compels the court itself to delve on
and resolve the issue of ownership over the subject property?

III
Compliance with Jurisdictional Requirements
and Annexes

3.1 As integral parts of this petition, the petitioner has attached

the following pertinent documents, to wit:

3.1.1 Affidavit of Service;

3.1.2 Verification with Certification of Non-forum Shopping;

3.1.3 Secretary's Certificate authorizing Armando Q. Canlas,

Sr. to represent the petitioner in the instant petition;

3.1.4 ANNEX "A" - Motion for Extension of Time to File

Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 2, 2021;

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 3.1.5 ANNEX "B" - Original Receiving Copy of the Questioned
Resolution promulgated on 10 June 2021 of the CA;

3.1.6 ANNEX "C" - Motion for Reconsideration dated

December 27, 2019;

3.1.7 ANNEX "D" - Original Receiving Copy of the Decision

promulgated on 11 December 2019 of the CA;

3.1.8 ANNEX "E" - Photocopy of the Petition for Review

(under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court) 01 July 2019;

3.1.9 ANNEX “F” – Photocopy of the Decision dated 03

December 2018 of the RTC 161;

3.1.10 ANNEX “G” – Photocopy of the Order dated 23 May

2019 of the RTC 161;

3.1.11 ANNEX “H”- Photocopy of the Motion for

Reconsideration filed by petitioner before the RTC 161;

3.1.12 ANNEX “I” – Photocopy of the Opposition (to the

Motion for Reconsideration) filed by respondents dated
22 April 2019;

3.1.13 ANNEX “J” - Photocopy of the Memorandum of Appeal

filed by the petitioner before the RTC 161;

3.1.14 ANNEX “K” –Photocopy of the Memorandum filed by

the respondents before the RTC 161;

3.1.15 ANNEX “L” – Photocopy of the Decision of the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68dated 12
February 2018;

3.1.16 ANNEX “M” – Photocopy of the Position Paper filed by

the petitioner before the court a quo;

3.1.17 ANNEX “N” – Photocopy of Position Paper filed by the

respondents before the court a quo;

3.1.18 ANNEX “O” – Photocopy of the Complaint filed by the

petitioner before the court a quo; and

3.1.19 ANNEX “P” – Photocopy of the Answer filed by the

respondents before the court a quo;

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 IV
Statement of Material Dates
and Timeliness of the Present Petition

4.01 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, and pursuant

to the ruling in Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, herein Petitioners have 15
days from the notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.

4.02 On December 18, 2019, Petitioner-Plaintiff through the

undersigned counsel received a copy of the CA's Decision promulgated
on 11 December 2019.

4.03 Aggrieved to the CA's Decision, a Motion for

Reconsideration was filed on January 2, 2020 by the herein Petitioner-
Plaintiff through the undersigned counsel;

4.04 On June 30, 2021, a Notice of the Resolution as well as a

copy of the Resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals denying the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein Petitioner-Plaintiff through
the undersigned counsel.

4.05 However, on July 12, 2021, Petitioner-Plaintiff sought an

extension of thirty (30) days reckoned from July 15, 2021 and up to
August 13, 2021 within which to file the Petition via a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari duly filed
before this Honorable Court.

4.06 In the interregnum and before the extension expired, the

Honorable Court reacted to the quarantine classifications for NCR which
calls for GCQ with heightened restrictions and ECQ (intended for August
6 to August 20, 2021). In its circular, all judicial offices were declared
closed and such closure coincided with the granular lockdown for NCR.

4.07 Petitioners, therefore, is filing the instant Petition with the

delays beyond their control but due to the exigencies of the prevailing
restrictions in response to the dreaded onslaught of the Delta Variant of
COVID-19. Hence, this Petition is still timely considering the present
situation.

V
The Parties

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 5.1 Petitioner-Plaintiff, NASATAMA NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., is a non-stock and non-profit association organized
and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and with
office address at No. 1522 Monggo Street, Taniman Bayan Avenue,
Manggahan, Pasig City. For purposes of this Petition, Petitioner may be
served with notices and other court processes through the address of
undersigned counsel as indicated below.

5.2 Respondents-Defendants, SPOUSES NICOLAS LANON and

LIGAYA LANON, are both of legal age, Filipino citizens, married to each
other and presently residing at No. 477 Acacia Street, Taniman Bayan
Avenue, Manggahan, Pasig City. For purposes of this Petition,
Respondent may be served with notices and other court processes
through the address of their counsel on record, Atty. Ma. Antonieta B.
Albano Placides at Placides & Albano-Placides Law Offices, 2nd Floor
Calderon Bldg., 287 Edsa, 1100 Quezon City.

VI
Statement of Material Facts

6.1 Petitioner-Plaintiff is the owner of several parcels of land

with an aggregate area of forty-three (43) hectares. The said parcels of
land were donated by the owner Don Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes,
being administered by Mr. Robles by virtue of a Deed of Donation in
favor of the petitioner.

6.2 Respondent-Defendant Nicolas Lanon is a member and

former officer of the petitioner, occupying the position of Vice President
until his resignation in 2009.

6.3 Prior to the execution of the Deed of Donation, Mr. Robles

issued Certificate of Occupancies to the members of the petitioner.
Respondents were among the member-recipients of said certificates.

6.4 The occupancies of the member-recipients were tolerated

for as long as they remain members in good standing of the petitioner-
association.

6.5 To be a member in good standing, a member-recipient is

expected to comply with the following obligations, to wit: (a) To obey
and comply with the by-laws, rules and regulations that may be
promulgated by the association from time to time, (b) to attend all

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meetings that may be called by the Board of Trustees; and (c) to pay
membership dues and other assessments of the association.

6.6 By virtue of the Certificate of Occupancy, respondents were

allowed to occupy for free seventy-two (72) square meters of lot located
along Acacia Street, Tanimang Bayan Avenue, Manggahan, Pasig City
(hereinafter, the “subject property”). Respondents constructed their
house on thesubject property and introduced improvements therein.

6.7 Sometime in 2009, however, respondent Nicolas Lanon

resigned as Vice President of the petitioner association, and went
abroad.

6.8 After a few months, respondents returned to the

Philippines. Ever since respondents returned to the Philippines,
respondent Nicolas Lanon no longer attended the meetings of petitioner
association, and worst, no longer paid his monthly association dues. As
such, petitioner declared the respondents as members in bad standing,
and consequently, respondents were expelled from the association.

6.9 Thus, petitioner sent a Demand Letter to the respondents,

demanding the latter to peacefully surrender the subject property to the
former. Respondents, however, refused to vacate and surrender the
subject property. Hence, the petitioner filed a case for Unlawful
Detainer.

6.10 Respondents filed their Answer, and admitted that they

were previously members of petitioner association and that they
received the demand to vacate. Respondents, however, questioned the
ownership of the petitioner association over the parcel of land.
Respondents claim that the subject property is owned by Napico
Homeowners Association, Inc.

6.11 Thereafter, Pre-Trial ensued. The parties were, then,

directed to submit their respective Position Papers.

6.12 On 12 February 2018, the court a quo, rendered a Decision

dismissing the complaint.

6.13 The petitioner has timely filed a Notice of Appeal, and which
appeal was given due course. The appeal was raffled to RTC 161,
whereby the parties submitted their respective Memoranda.

6.14 On 03 December 2018, the RTC 161 rendered the assailed

Decision affirming the Decision of the court a quo and, thus, dismissing
the appeal of the petitioner.

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 6.15 A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner,
but the same was denied by the RTC 161 in its assailed Order dated 23
May 2019.

6.16 Aggrieved to the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration,

Petitioner appealed the case by way of Petition for Review under Rule
42 of the Revised Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals on July 3,
2019.

6.17 However, in the 11 December 2019's Court of Appeals'

Decision dismissed the Petition and affirmed the RTC's Decision dated
December 3, 2018 and RTC's Order dated May 23, 2019.

6.18 On January 2, 2020, a Motion for Reconsideration on the

CA's Decision was filed but the same was denied pursuant the
Resolution dated 10 June 2021 which was received on June 30, 2021.
6.19 Hence, this Petition before the Honorable Supreme Court as
last resort.

VII
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition

7.01 The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible

errors in dismissing the appeal, and affirming RTC December 3, 2019
and May 23, 2019 Order.

VIII
Petitioner’s Submissions

8.1 Firstly, as between the ultimate allegations of facts of the

Complaint showing Petitioner’s valid claim to a better and
superior right of possession over and above the contrary
claims of Respondents, coupled with the crystal
allegations of the Complaint clearly outlining and making out
all the requisite elements of an Unlawful Detainer
Case, the bare allegations of ownership foisted by the
Respondents in their Answer clearly being pleaded as a matter
of defense do not persuade and support a departure from the
rule that the MTC, more so when acting under
summary rules and procedures, may NOT go
beyond the issue of material possession.

8.2 Secondly, the possession contemplated under the Rules in

resolving unlawful detainer complaints, as a legal concept,
refers only to material possession. It is possession

9|Page
de facto and not possession de jure in the concept of an
owner nor possession as an incident to ownership of the
property.

8.3 Thirdly, it is a no small and a trivial matter that MTC Pasig,

the RTC and the Honorable Court of Appeals went to a
travail of confusing DECISIONS when they reached similar
and wholly identical conclusions that the Resolution of the
Unlawful Detainer Complaint of Petitioner NASATAMA, INC.
requires a necessary resolution as to who should be
finally held as the owner of the property.

8.4
Fourthly, if this will be accepted as the standard norm by the
first level court and all for the sake of a quick, painless, way
to dispose and resolve ejectment cases, it will engender
insanely absurd results with the answering litigant, the
defendant, just merely hours or minutes away from making
a ruse and pretext to derail the complaint for
ejectment by asserting in his Answer that he has a claim
of ownership over the land.

IX
Arguments/Discussion

9.1 This is not the object envisioned in coming up with the rules
on special civil actions for Unlawful Detainer and Forcible Entry. The
summary nature of the proceedings highlights the need to prevent
social unrest due to undeterred encroachment and dispossession of the
first and prior occupants.

9.2 As early as May 31, 1965, the Supreme Court had an

occasion to declare in Garcia vs. Anas2 which thusly holds:

In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is

possession de facto, the purpose of which is to protect [the
possessor and actual occupant] from any physical
encroachment from without. The title to the land or its
ownership is not involved, for if a person is in actual possession
thereof, he is entitled to be maintained and be respected in it
even against the owner himself.

9.3 All that the Defendants would do is to uniformly plead and

claim, on mere pretext of pleading that theirs is ownershipright every

2
L-20617, May 31, 1965.

10 | P a g e
time and whenever they are summoned to file their Answers to every
Complaint for Ejectment.

9.4 Hence, chaos will reign and will become the order of the day
with the MTC constantly deluged of Answers adopting the same ploy of
pleading ownership over the property and the end result will be
tantamount to unrestrained allowance of DISMISSAL of ejectment
cases,effectively rendering inutile the first level courts from hearing the
cases as they will be effectively divested from the jurisdiction of the
MTC outlined under Rule 70 and under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedures.

9.5 There is even no quarrel that such is never the legislative

intent or rationale for making summary and expeditious, the resolution
of the MTC of all ejectment cases.

9.6 Petitioner Association is very sorry to say that MTC Pasig

has horribly confused the concept of possession which ultimately led it
to resolve the issue of ownership even as constant admonitions and
stern warning from the high court has been repeatedly expressed in
unlawful detainer cases under the attendant circumstances Plaintiff’s
NASATAMA has more than substantially and preponderantly proved
that the possession of the Respondents Spouses, way earlier and long
before the supposed transfer of title from NAPICO, emanates from the
Contract of Occupancy knowingly executed and agreed upon by the
parties such that Respondents are now estopped from attacking the title
of their landlord, NASATAMA;

9.7 The belated claim that they were deceived by

misrepresentations made by the Petitioner Association is a mere
afterthought and nothing but pure canard concocted in desperation by
the Respondents.

9.8 Verily, such tall tale at this late stage of the proceeding is
only deserving ofthe Honorable Court’s most scant attention and
consideration.

9.9 In a long and never-ending line and parade of cases that

ended tackled by the high court, it is a decidedly pure questions of law
heretofore being squarely raised in this Petition and which needs to be
resolved by the Honorable Supreme Court that it is a reversible error for
RTC Pasig and for the Honorable Court of Appeals to sustain the first
level court’s legal stancethat the present case warrants MTC Branch 68

11 | P a g e
of Pasig, a court of limited jurisdiction, to likewise dwell on, determine
and resolve the issue of ownership of the subject property.

9.10 The odd insistence and steely resolve of the lower court to
still dwell on the issue of ownership in its DECISION appears to have
been hastily thought of in response to the claims of ownership of the
property as a matter of defense casually pleaded by the Respondents-
Defendants in their Answer.

9.11 And here lies a grave problem. Instead of resolving the

pertinent issues incident to material possession (Who among the
parties can lay claim to possession de facto, not possession de jure
which is possession as necessary and material attribute of
ownership, and who has better and superior possessory right over the
property) the first level court, MTC 68 of Pasig surprised even itself
when it blurted in the appealed and assailed Decision that it is going
beyond the issue of material possession and it felt a compelling need to
resolve the issue of ownership.

9.12 The legal conclusion arrived at by the Honorable MTC,

Branch 68 of Pasig City that the ownership issue is necessary to resolve
who has better possessory rightappeared out of thin air and, strictly
speaking, it is more of abare and naked assertionwithout any
supporting explanation and discussion at all by the court in its Decision.

9.13 Whatever consideration and ratiocination which moved

MTC Pasig to convince itself that, more than rendering judgement
confined only to the issue of material physical possession, there isalso a
need to go further and go beyond the discussion on possession, we may
never know as the MTC 68 Pasig Decision itself offers scant explanation
and discussion. Such trip to nowhere is not one that herein Petitioners
would be willing to take.

9.14 Apparently, MTC Pasig regarded the act of passing upon the
matter of who owns the property as the better and more meaningful
part of its task in resolving the case.

9.15 As a result, MTC Pasig ultimately took and devoted almost

all portions of the Decision, in a repetitive and rambling manner,
discussing and passing uponwhy ownership of the subject property
belongs to the Respondents-Defendants to the exclusion of Petitioner-
Plaintiff and why, in its avowed estimation, the alleged ownership
claims made by Petitioner-Plaintiff Association fades and loses suasion
and forceover and above the opposing claim of Respondents-Defendants

12 | P a g e
of which to the mind of MTC Pasig, it is perceived as the better and more
credible claims. Nothing is further from the truth.

9.16 Before MTC Pasig has unwittingly allowed itself to lose its
wits by selling itself too short on the convoluted defense of ownership
pleaded casually by Respondents-Defendants in their Answer, it should
have timely made a reality check and reminded itself that what comes
before it is a pretty straight forward Complaint for Unlawful Detainer.

9.17 Alas! The first level court is simply besides itself when it
went to the point of no return and, simply not contented to resolve the
case and confining the Decision to the only issue: who among the
parties has better and more superior possessory right over the property
situated in Manggahan, it too ruled that, definitively, the right to own
the property belongs to no other than the Respondents-Defendants.

9.18 For going to extreme lengths and manifestly beyond the

pale in ejectment cases, MTC Pasig committed a travesty of justice and
sheer intellectual dishonesty.

9.19 On this score, it is thus with more reason and on a

increasing sense of urgency to please allow the instant Petition For
Review On Certiorari as it presents an opportunity for the Honorable
Supreme Court to check and hold off the indiscriminate slaughter and
debasement of the property rights of Petitioner.

9.20 Crystal, the first level court, MeTC, Branch 68 of Pasig City
swallowed more than it can chew, when it practically threw out of the
window more than a hundred years of painstaking herculean efforts at
formulation of a salutary case law on ejectment cases designed to
withstand the test of time.

9.21 Fashioned by no less than the Honorable Supreme Court

through the years, thefigurative jaw and backbone of the present and
prevailing jurisprudence on ejectment cases undoubtedly recognize a
set of kindergarten legal precepts all forming part of the basic ground
rules that a magistrate acting with the highest sense of professionalism
must invariably apply in resolving all complaints and cases for unlawful
detainer brought before it.

9.22 Thusly, one such basic rule which leaves no room for
improvisation, modification and alteration but iron clad application is
the rule that the only issue in a Complaint for unlawful detainer is the
issue of material possession.

9.23 In other words, it is an unfailing and definitely infexible rule

that when the Honorable Court, in an ejectment case where it finds itself

13 | P a g e
confronted with the opposing claims and arguments of the contending
parties, it must not lose sight of the rule thatthe parties are not
permitted to muddle the proceedings by claim no higher basis than their
better right to possess the property described and the Judge is not given
the luxury of choice to assume any sort, manner and degree of flexibility
when it is called to adjudge the merit or non-merit of the Complaint for
ejectment.

9.24 He is simply barred by the Rules, the long settled

jurisprudential pronouncements made in a very long line of cases
tackled by this Honorable Supreme Court that, stripped to the bare
essentials, the singular case law oft-repeated, ever-constant and made
inflexible:

“[Mere] assertion of ownership by the defendant in

an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its
summary jurisdiction."3

9.25 With due respect and without intending a slight to the

Honorable MTC 68 of Pasig City, it is crystal that it has needlessly
ventured forth on a very slippery slope to merely assert loosely and in
too sweeping terms in the assailed DECISION, unsupported by any
explanation of the whys and wherefores why an exceptional rule to the
general and most iron clad rule in ejectment cases suddenly finds
application and consequently rebuffs Petitioner-Plaintiff by declaring
Respondents-Defendants are the owners of the property. Verily, the
Honorable Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 161 and
MTC 68 are unanimous in coming to the conclusion that the Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer deserves DISMISSAL by applying the exceptional
rule allowing the Municipal Trial Court to confront, tackle and resolve
the issue of ownership over the subject property at Manggahan, Pasig.
Going to the respective Decisions of the three courts on a fine-toothed
comb and a thousand times over, it is crystal that there was not one
proferred explanation coming from the honorable courts themselves,
the Court of Appeals, RTC 161 and MTC 68, why they all came up with
the most peculiar legal conclusion that, in the Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer titled “NASATAMA, INC., Plaintiff, versus SPOUSES NICOLAS
V. LANON AND LIGAYA LANON, Defendants,” docketed as Case No. M-
PSG-16-03062-SC and duly heard by the Honorable Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 68 of Pasig City under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, it is indeed necessary to resolve, then and there, the issue of
ownership.

9.26 This dearth of explanation only both show and articulately

brings to the fore that herein Petitioner-Plaintiff Association,

3
Orellano v. Albvestir, 76 SCRA 536 citing extensively other cases.

14 | P a g e
NASATAMA , INC., received most undeservedly an erroneous DECISION
from the Honorable Court of Appeals and from RTC Branch 161 of Pasig
City when both sustained, for all the wrong reasons, the equally
egregious and erroneous Decision rendered by the first level court of
MTC, Branch 68 of Pasig City.

9.27 With unabashed display of lack of familiarity with well-

entrenched jurisprudence involving unlawful detainer cases, MTC 68 of
Pasig City became too much of an eager beaver, unfortunately forgot the
truism that discretion is indeed the better part of valor, went beyond
the basic issue of material possession and peremptorily resolved the
issue of ownership and thereby, in the process, appropriated for itself
the powers belonging only and exclusively to courts of general
jurisdiction.

9.28 In blunter terms, the first level court, MTC 68 of Pasig City
which knows too well that it is hearing not an accion publiciana but a
pretty basic, most boring and very unpretentious complaint for
unlawful detainer under the Rules on Summary Procedures, seemingly
further believed it is way too much beneath the Court’s dignity itself to
task and busy itself to such too mundane things like resolving and
confining the decision only to the issue of material possession.

9.29 What is more, by calling the shots, days in and days outeven
as it is running under the summary rules and NOT under the regular rules,
MTC 68 has somewhat starred and willed itself to take the lead role in a
classic tragi-comedy when it proceeded to exceed its jurisdiction,
casually took unto itself to resolve, as it did resolve, at top and lightning
speed, the very serious and decidedly complex issue of ownership over
the subject property ultimately recognizing the herein Respondents-
Defendants as the owner of the property.

9.30 Again, for emphasis, it is inconceivable that the honorable

court a quo, MTC 68 of Pasig City did all these on one fell swoop and
under Summary Rules and Summary Procedures milieu.

9.31 Thusly, we now felt an imperative need to ask this purely

rhetorical question: May the Defendants-Respondents mere plea of
ownership in their Answer warrants MTC 68 of Pasig City to lose itself in
the moment and display a knee-jerk reaction by peremptorily,
precipitately and hastily deeming that the determination of who has the
better and superior possessory right between the parties necessarily
compels the court itself to delve on and resolve the issue of ownership over
the subject property? The answer is a BIG NO. The last time we look at
the rules, the first level court is still shorn of the power to hear actions
for recovery of ownership which actions are within the province of the
Regional Trial Court.

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 9.32 In dismissing the complaint, the court a quo delved into the
issue of ownership. Jurisprudence is replete, however, that – the only
issue to be determined is possession de facto. In other words, who
among the parties have a right of better possession over the subject
property, is the only issue to be resolved. The court a quo, the RTC 161
and the CA, however, went beyond their respective jurisdiction when
they dealt with the issue of ownership.

9.33 As established by the evidence, the petitioner has a better

right of possession over the subject property, having acquired the same
by virtue of a donation executed by the registered owner, through Mr.
Robles in favor of the petitioner.

9.34 It is worthy to point out that the possession of every

member-recipient, to include the respondents, of the respective
properties they are occupying is dependent on their membership with
the petitioner-association, and their status as a member in good
standing.

9.34 To reiterate, a member in good standing is one who obeys

the rules of the petitioner association, attends meeting called by the
association, and pays the monthly membership dues and imposed
assessments.

9.35 Respondents became members in bad standing, when

respondent Nicolas Lanon resigned as Vice-President, refused to attend
meeting called by the petitioner association, and worst, refused to pay
the monthly association dues and assessments. Consequently,
respondents were expelled from petitioner association, and thus, their
stay in the subject property was rendered unlawful. Hence, the instant
case for unlawful detainer was in order.

9.36 Contrary to the claim of the respondents, the elements of

Unlawful Detainer are present in the instant case.

9.37 In the case of Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla v. Marcelo Abierra,

G.R. No. 144637, 26 July 2010, the Honorable Supreme Court held to
wit:

“Unlawful detainer involves the person’s

withholding from another of the possession of the real
property to which the latter is entitled, after the
expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed or
implied.

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 A requisite for a valid cause of action in an
unlawful detainer case is that possession must
be originally lawful, and such possession must have
turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right
to possess. It must be shown that the possession was
initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful
possession must be established. If, as in this case, the
claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of
the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. xxx”

9.38 In the case of Spouses Dionisio v. Wilfredo Linsangan,G.R.

No. 178159, 02 March 2011, the Honorable Supreme Court declared:

“Is the action one for unlawful detainer? An

action is for unlawful detainer if the complaint
sufficiently alleges the following: (1) initially, the
defendant has possession of property by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
however, such possession became illegal upon
plaintiff’s notice to defendant, terminating the latter’s
right of possession; (3) still, the defendant remains in
possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of
his property; and (4) within a year from plaintiff’s last
demand that defendant vacate the property, the
plaintiff files a complaint for defendant’s ejectment. If
the defendant had possession of the land upon mere
tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be
present at the beginning of defendant’s possession.”

9.39 In the instant case, the evidence of the petitioner

established that he has a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

9.40 The possession of the respondents of the subject property

was by virtue of tolerance of the petitioner association.

9.41 In the same case of Fe Quijano v. Atty. Amante, supra, the

Honorable Supreme Court held:

“Unlawful detainer involves the defendant’s

withholding of the possession of the property to
which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or
termination of the former’s right to hold possession
under the contract, whether express or implied. A
requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful

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 detainer is that the possession was originally lawful,
but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the
right to possess.

To show that the possession was initially lawful,

the basis of such lawful possession must then be
established. With the averment here that the
respondent’s possession was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for
bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least,
the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of
her or her predecessor’s tolerance, or her co-heirs’
permission for him to occupy the disputed property.”

9.42 In the instant case, the respondents admitted, in their

Answer, that they were members of the petitioner association. Clearly,
respondents admitted that their stay in the subject property was by
reason of their membership, and thus by mere tolerance of the
petitioner.

9.43. The admission by the respondents constitutes a judicial

admission. As such, the said admissions need not require further proof.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
 
“SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission,
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by a showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.”

9.44 In the case of Jesus Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex,

Incorporated, G.R. No. 174154, 17 October 2008, the Supreme Court
declared, to wit:

“A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the

pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of
the judicial proceeding.  xxx”

9.45 Since the respondents made a judicial admission that they

were members of petitioner association, it follows that they have to

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comply with the rules of the association and pay their membership dues
as a condition to remain in the subject property.

9.46 When respondents failed to follow the rules of the

association, attend meetings, and failed to pay their association dues,
which led to their expulsion from the association, the tolerance of the
stay of the respondents on the subject property ceased, and thus was
deemed unlawful.

9.47 Likewise, respondents admitted that they have received the

demand to vacate, but refused to heed to the demand indicated therein.
Clearly, all the elements of an unlawful detainer case are present and
established by evidence. Thus, the court a quo and RTC 161 seriously
erred in dismissing the complaint.

9.48 Furthermore, on dwelling with the issue of ownership, the

court a quo and the RTC 161 relied on the documentary exhibits of the
respondents. It is worthy to point out, however, that the originals of the
said documents were never presented before the court a quo, and thus,
it was erroneous for the court a quo to have given the same probative
value.

9.49 Jurisprudence is replete – it has been settled that the

originals of a document, must be presented, and compared, before they
could be offered in evidence. Otherwise, the submission of provisionally
marked evidence would be in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.

9.50 In the case of Silkair (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 184398, 25 February 2010, the Honorable
Supreme Court stressed, to wit:

“xxx It is an elementary rule in law that

documents shall not be admissible in evidence unless
and until the original copies itself are offered or
presented for verification in cases where mere copies
are offered, save for the exceptions provided for by
law. xxx”

9.51 Respondents failed to compare the originals of the

photocopies presented despite ample opportunity to present the
originals. Thus, the photocopies (as provisionally marked) are
inadmissible evidence, for being a clear violation of the best evidence
rule.

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 9.52 In the case of NAPOCOR v. Bangpai Shipping Company, G.R.
No. 17041, 04 April 2007, the Honorable Supreme Court discussed, to
wit:

“xxx The Xerox or photocopies offered should,

therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from their
being not properly identified by any competent
witness, the loss of the principals thereof was not
established by any competent proof. xxx Accordingly,
we find no error in the Order of the court a quo
denying the admissibility of the photocopies offered
by petitioner as documentary evidence. xxx”

9.53 Thus, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a most

reversible and most basic error in rendering the assailed DECISION
thereby joining in infamy the court a quo, MTC, Branch 68 of Pasig and
RTC, Branch 161 of Pasig as well, in committing serious fundamental
errors not in accord with teeming case laws on ejectment cases.

9.54 What is more, in giving value to a mere passing assertion of

ownership by the Respondents Spouses in their Answer, the Honorable
Court of Appeals only lend further confusion to the proverbial Tower of
the Babel confusion left inn the wake of the Decisions rendered
sequentially by MTC, Branch 68 and RTC, Branch 161 both of Pasig City.

X
Prayer for Affirmative Reliefs

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed unto

this most Honorable Court to REVERSE, NULLIFY or SET ASIDE the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals
and in lieu thereof, a new one will now please be issued, by the Most
Honorable Supreme Courtthereby upholding the superior possessory
right of PETITIONER NASATAMA, INC., directing the respondents-
spouses, all heirs, assigns and practically all persons whose continued
occupation of the property is being derived from and/or acting under
orders and authority from the Respondents-Spouses, TO NOW PLEASE
FORTHWITH VACATE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND,
ESSENTIALLY, TO SURRENDER AND TO TURN OVER THE
POSSESSION TO THE PETITIONER CORPORATION WITH UTMOST
CELERITY.

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 FINALLY, to please direct the honorable MTC, Branch 68 of Pasig
City to come to terms with the Honorable Supreme Court’s Decision and
enforce and execute the said Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court
as soon as deliberate speed would permit and without further delay.

OTHER RELIEFS, just and equitable under the premises, are also
prayed for.

Pasig City for the City of Manila, September 1, 2021

MARCELINO P. ARIAS
Counsel for Petitioner
Room 201 MN Square Building
678 Shaw Blvd., Pasig City
Tel. No. 6374478
IBP OR NO. 069113 1\14\2019 Pasig City
PTR OR NO. 5282147 1\15\2019 Pasig City
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0000018 valid April 14, 2022
Roll of Attorneys No. 24201

EXPLANATION
(Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

Due to the nature of the pleading and the lack of personnel to

effect personal service, service was made by registered mail upon the
parties as herein below indicated by the corresponding attached
registry receipts.

MARCELINO P. ARIAS

Copy furnished:

Atty. Ma. Antonieta B. Albano Placides

Placides & Albano-Placides Law Offices
Counsel for Respondents
2nd Floor Calderon Bldg.
287 EDSA, Quezon City

Hon. Court of Appeals

Ma. Orosa St., Ermita
Manila
(CA-G.R. CV No. 161172 )

21 | P a g e
 VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING

I, ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, SR., of legal age, Filipino, and with

residence and postal address at No. 1522 Monggo St., Tanimang Bayan,
Manggahan, Pasig City, after being duly sworn to in accordance with
law, do hereby depose and state, that:

That I represented the Petitioner in the above-entitled case by

virtue of the Special Power of Attorney and being its President hereto
attached for easy reference; that I have caused the preparation of the
foregoing PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI having supplied all
the material allegations contained therein and hereby attest that they
are true and correct to my own personal knowledge and based on
authentic records.

The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or

needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified will likewise have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for discovery.

I have not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding

involving the same issue in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency. Neither is there any such action or
proceeding pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or before
any other tribunal or agency.

In the event that I learn that a similar action or proceeding has

been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
or any other tribunal or agency, I hereby undertake to report the fact
within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this

____ day of _______ in Pasig City.

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, SR.

Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ____ day of _________

Pasig City, affiant exhibiting to me his Senior Citizen ID No. 82574
establishing his identity.

Doc. No. ______;Page No. ______;

Book No. ______;Series of 2021.

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